

Societal Unity of Effort, a Fork in the Road to Development or Disaster—Considerations for State Building

**A Monograph
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Abstract

Societal Unity of Effort, a Fork in the Road to Development or Disaster—Considerations for State Building by MAJ Wolfe Davidson, U.S. Air Force, 60 pages.

Throughout history scholars have studied the development of states and posed the question, why do some states develop more than other states? In addressing this question, most studies have focused on the economic and political elements of the state. This paper analyzes the question: Can we assess state development potential by studying the societal or cultural elements of the state? This paper uses case studies of South America, Africa and Asia to demonstrate the correlation between societal composition, traits and characteristics, and development as defined by the United Nations and The World Bank. This paper also endeavors to develop and present a concept that provides a framework for assessing state development potential based on societal elements. I term this concept, unity of effort. The unity of effort concept utilizes three components to assess the sub-societal elements of the state -- (1) commonality of interests, (2) achievement orientation, and (3) motivational mechanisms.

By applying the unity of effort concept to South America, Africa and Asia, we identify inhibiting social characteristics common among underdeveloped states. The identification and acknowledgement of these limiting and inhibiting traits and characteristics are first steps toward finding ways to overcome these impediments and attempt to solve state development problems across the globe. Current United States and international norms and policies constrain the way we view possible solutions to development problems today. A broader perspective with a focus on the long-term potential for security and human dignity may be required to resolve these issues. Through this paper, I hope to inform and provide considerations for state building endeavors by the United States and others.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, scholars have studied the development of states and pondered why some states develop more than other states. With the arrival of the information age and the continually spreading effects of economic globalization, this question is as relevant today as ever. Although scholars have debated this question for decades, they have been unable to agree on a universally accepted explanation. This paper does not portend to provide that explanation, but rather seeks to provide considerations for study in developmental theory and for United States state building efforts.

Historically scholars have addressed state development from political and economic perspectives that are focused externally on the environment of the state and internally on the state's economic potential and political structure. As the United States military's role in state building is rekindled, it is important to understand the dynamics of the domestic situation not only from a deductive approach based on economic success, but with a synthesized understanding of the internal elements that allow for state unity and successful integration into the contemporary era of globalization.

Historic and contemporary developmental theories are insufficient in that they fail to account for societal characteristics in state development. Commentators often segregate political, economic and social developmental theories into separate studies within their respective disciplines. Such parsing out of theories oversimplifies development.¹ It is rare, although not impossible, for development to occur in only one of these realms without a significant spillover into the others. Thus, an understanding of state development requires a holistic perspective of all three elements. As one commentator explained, "scholars associated with theories of "nation-building" have tended either to ignore the question of ethnic diversity or to treat the matter of

¹ Monte Palmer, *Political Development Dilemmas and Challenges*, (Illinois: F.E. Peacock, 1997), 14-15.

ethnic identity superficially as merely one of a number of minor impediments to effective state-integration.”²

This paper seeks to identify several intrastate societal considerations that support or detract from the overall potential for a state's social, political, and economic development. It also discusses these societal considerations and describes their role in state development through the presentation of the unity of effort concept. Unity of effort is a state's potential for economic, social, and political development as determined by its societal characteristics, traits and human composition. The unity of effort concept has three components: the commonality of interests, achievement orientation, and motivation mechanisms among the state's constituents. Chapter 3 discusses these characteristics, traits, and considerations in detail, and tests the existence of a correlation between development and unity of effort, with a deductive approach to analyze selected successful and unsuccessful states based on their level of success and their societal conditions. Chapter 4 uses South America as a test set and presents the case for the role of unity of effort in state development as defined by leading international development organizations like the United Nations and The World Bank. Chapter 5 applies the unity of effort concept to other regions of the world, both successful and unsuccessful, by current standards to prove the universality of the concept.

Due to the broad multi-disciplined nature of this topic, it is important to discuss the broader framework of development theory and to identify specifically what this paper does and does not address. Scholars most often study state development from a comparative perspective using primarily a political science and economic discipline. However, state development is also indirectly studied from a sociological perspective as well. All three of these disciplines...political science, economic and sociology together provide the academic foundation for a more thorough

² Walker Conner, “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?” *World Politics*, 24:3 (April 1972): 319.

understanding of state development from a holistic perspective. However, specific research on the social implications of the developmental process is rare, incomplete and lacks integration with political and economic theory.

I base my approach to understanding state developmental theory on a deductive comparative analysis of the differences between historically similar regions and states that have developed differently such as South America and North America. Concededly, no two complex systems are ever equivalent, every human societal interaction is a unique and complex system³, and the differences identified between states will never fully represent developmental differences. However, commonalities among numerous occurrences can provide a basis for understanding and identifying enabling and limiting characteristics of developed and developing states. An understanding of these limiting and enabling characteristics allows us to assess potential successes and failures in developing states.

The overall architecture of the state includes the political, economic, and social attributes and institutions. These form the three foundational pillars of state development. Enabling and limiting characteristics are certainly present in all three pillars, and an assessment of overall development potential requires the integrated consideration of all elements.

Figure 1 graphically depicts the three pillars of state development. In the center, constituting the whole of the state is the society of constituents. The boundaries of the society in this figure also depict the boundaries of the state. The society establishes the political structure within the state boundaries but external international politics and influence also affect it at the highest levels. Encapsulating the whole of society is the economic pillar that is clearly shaped and manipulated by internal political and social elements but is also greatly impacted by the

³ Dawa Norbu, *Culture and the Politics of Third World Nationalism*, (London: Routledge, 1992), XV.

external market due to the information age of globalization from which even traditional under-developed states are not immune.




Figure 1. The Three Pillars of the State

The comparative analysis of North America and South America led me to concentrate my research and this paper on the social pillar of development, specifically the differences in the societal characteristics and traits of the states and the role they play in the developmental potential. Given the similar political, economic and geographical circumstances of the two Americas, the role of society is highlighted and somewhat isolated as a developmental factor.

The unity of effort concept attempts to provide a framework within which to analyze and assess potential development enablers and inhibitors within the societal pillar of the state. The unity of effort concept does not purport to provide a comprehensive explanatory development theory, and it is dependent on separate political and economic theories to explain those aspects of a state's developmental potential.

The following chapter provides a literature review of current developmental theories and selected sociological concepts. The absence of discussion on the societal characteristics within this review was the genesis for the unity of effort concept that is presented and detailed in Chapter 3. This concept is applied to South America in Chapter 4 and identifies the strengths and weaknesses associated with the concept for the region. In Chapter 5, I analyze selected African and Asian states with the unity of effort concept and demonstrate its universal applicability. In Chapter 6, I demonstrate the concept's applicability to the United States' state building efforts. The paper concludes with a summary in Chapter 7.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

The focus of this literature review is on developmental theories for South American states, but most of the contemporary theories are equally applicable to other developing and underdeveloped states. The topic of this paper, however, required an inclusion of both post-colonial studies and a bit of sociology. Although not the strength of this literature review, I identify these topics briefly in this section and their applicable theories that are advanced later in the paper.

Most scholars do not consider the South American states part of the developed world, however they are also inconsistent with the developing world in many ways. Recent scholars have considered these nations as transitional societies commonly looked upon as leaders by the poorer developing nations.⁴ Despite their similarities and proximity, they are far less developed than the United States. Many studies have explored the differences among these hemispheric neighbors. Here, I concentrate mainly on the historic social, political, and economic aspects of the region, and their effects on the nation as a departure point for development.

⁴ Harvey F. Kline and Howard J. Wiarda, *Latin American Politics and Development*, (Boulder: Westview, 1990), 4-5.

As you will see, the focus of most theories and schools of thought regarding the development or lack of development of Latin America concern international interaction. These international development theories provide a foundation of current thinking regarding the other two pillars of development, economic and political. Accordingly, the acceptance or criticism of these theories does not necessarily result in the acceptance or criticism of the unity of effort concept.

To study states that, like those in South America, evolved from colonial rule, we must examine the impact of the pre and post-colonial factors on their development. Most Latin American scholars agree that the antidemocratic influences of the three-century Spanish and Portuguese colonial period significantly contributed to the inability of South American states to develop.⁵ Similar claims are made for post-colonial Africa.

S.N. Eisenstadt posits that specific ideological and religious differences between immigrants to North America and South America were a key component in the crystallization of the new societies. “The polity of the United States was characterized by a strong emphasis on egalitarian, achievement-oriented individualism, and on republican liberties, with the almost total denial of the symbolic validity of hierarchy...” The North Americans established a collective identity completely separate and disassociated with their mother country. In particular, their abolishment of the hierarchy within the governmental system is in contrast with the settlers of South America.⁶

The Spanish and Portuguese leaders in South America established a colonial system to exploit the colonies for the benefit of the mother country, and to spread Roman Catholicism. The establishment of the hierarchical system on top of a traditional society inherently produced a

⁵ Jan Knippers Black, *Latin America Its Problems and Its Promise*, (Boulder: Westview, 1998), 10.

⁶ S.N. Eisenstadt, “Culture, Religions and Development in North America and Latin American Civilizations,” *International Social Science Journal*, Vol 44 Issue 4, (Nov 1992): 593-607.

division of unity among regional constituents developed along economic, cultural, and ethnic lines. The establishment of the southern European hierarchical system produced a significant socio-economic gap between the ruling Europeans and South American natives that still exists today.⁷

Despite the importance of colonial factors, most modern theorists focus on post-independence factors when discussing lack of development. There are several major development and economic theories explaining development in South America that typically are characterized into four schools: Modernization, Dependency, Structuralism, and Neo-liberalism. Although they share some similar concepts, theorists most commonly associate with these competing ideologies.

Generally identified as the first of these schools, Modernization Theory became famous in the 1950s and 1960s. This theory claims that the economic activity of a nation leads to financial investment in infrastructure and social institutions. Social demand results in the establishment of liberal democratic institutions to meet functional imperatives and provide an appropriate type of financial governing.⁸ Hence, according to Modernization Theory, interaction with the developed world provides a stimulus for development as the liberal democratic institutions manage it. In the South American model, this theory was criticized by many scholars because of its inability to account for the diversity and differentiation produced by the existing cultural and socio-economic structure prior to independence. Critics pointed out that a positive attitude and personal desire for modernization does not always exist in South American cultures.

⁷ Kline, 25-27.

⁸ Todd Landman, "Economic Development and Democracy: The View From Latin America," *Political Studies*, Vol 47 Issue 4, (Sept 1999): 607-612.

Additionally, the political and economic structure of South American states does not lend itself to development as a product of modernization.⁹

The counter-theory to Modernization Theory, and probably the most popular of the mid 20th century, is Dependency Theory. This theory developed in part to demonstrate the inability of Modernization Theory to acknowledge the effects of international interaction in the development process. Dependency Theory offers that the South American states' developmental shortfalls were a product of, and in some part responsible for, the development of industrialized countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States. Dependency postulates that a “core” of industrialized nations perpetuates the lack of development of “periphery” nations that are the victims of world markets, multi-national corporations, and military intervention all of which are designed to foster the continued development and growth of the core nations. Dependency further explains that the periphery nation becomes increasingly dependent on the core nation to provide industrialized and technology-based products.¹⁰

South America began in a type of dependency, as its purpose was to serve the European or core nations. South American dependency was somewhat different in that the state as a whole did not need the core to fulfill its own desires, however the peninsulares (those born in Spain or Portugal) were fully dependent on the needs of Europe and they constituted the “so called” government. Modernization brought about a form of dependency as the ruling elite focused on exporting to the needs of the developed world for personal financial benefit. This modernization did not establish a social infrastructure for the gain of the people; it was simply a function of the ruling hierarchy. The weak governments failed to deal with the growing industry and large

⁹ Black, 7.

¹⁰ Howard J. Wiarda, “Toward Consensus in Interpreting Latin American Politics: Developmentalism, Dependency, and the Latin American Tradition,” *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol 34 Issue 2 (Summer 1999): 50-58.

export business and thus, modernization deepened dependency.¹¹ Hence, Dependency Theory offers that international interaction will only thwart the development of a periphery nation. The Dependency school includes a wide variety of sub-groups. Political scientists commonly group Marxists, Reformists, Neo-Marxists, and Non-Marxists as Dependistas.

The third of the major schools to develop was the Structuralists, the best known of which is Immanuel Wallerstein who developed the World Systems Theory. Wallerstein addresses the development theory from the perspective of economic interaction determining the establishment of core and periphery nations. Within these nations, especially the periphery nations like those in South America, the financial elite establish control of the economic system as opposed to the government. Multi-national corporations of the 20th century have dominated Latin American nations through financial and political means (via the multi-national corporation's home nation) on many occasions, demonstrating a transfer of power from political to economic entities. An example of this is in the chemical pesticide industry. Most developed states have banned a group of 12 environmentally damaging pesticides for use in their countries, but continue to export the products in large amounts to South American agricultural states. Multinational agricultural producing corporations continue to use these pesticides in gross amounts while persuading the South American countries to continue the pesticides' import and utilization. The multinational corporations have been so effective at controlling the policy of the South American governments, that the environmental opposition to the pesticides has redirected their lobbying efforts at the producing countries in an effort to outlaw export.¹²

The world economic crisis caused by the oil producing and exporting countries in 1973 led to the development of a new theory called International Political Economy. This view addresses the class conflict position of explaining development as the dependency theory does,

¹¹ Black, 74-75.

¹² Danielle Knight, "Global Politics of Pesticides," *Americas*, Vol 48 Issue 6 (Nov/Dec 1996): 55.

but asserts that the negative impacts of international interaction are due to the ineffectiveness of the government to control the conflict of the socio-economic classes in the conduct of national economics. This places it somewhere between the Structuralist and Dependency schools. International Political Economy theory balances between the Marxist and capitalist view in that both aspects of national economic structure and international interaction have important roles in the development of the nation. It suggests that limited state intervention is a necessity, but only when it is in the best interest of the state as a whole.¹³

Spurred by the collapse of socialism in the early 1990's there has been a resurgence of neoclassical or neoliberal economic theory to counter development theories such as Dependency and Structuralism. Neoliberalism has gained a significant academic following utilizing the basis of capitalism defeating Marxism as a loosely applied comparison of the United States defeating the Soviet Union. Neoliberalism is an economic theory of unrestricted international interaction and trade. It offers that South American countries should develop export oriented industrial systems and welcome interaction from developed states. Developed in the wake of Keynesianism Reaganomics, the newly industrialized countries of South East Asia, and success and power of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund; Neoliberalism has significantly affected development theory, but has certainly not provided an overarching answer in the question of development in South America.¹⁴

Although these schools of thought must be discussed with any topic regarding South America, none of them specifically addresses the relationship between ethnic composition and development. In fact, the absence of complete analysis on this subject is what prompted me to research it. I have been able to locate some scholarly philosophies on this relationship. The

¹³ Black, 12-13.

¹⁴ Cristoabla Kay, For a Renewal of Development Studies: Latin American Theories and Neoliberalism in the era of Structural Adjustment," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 14 Issue 4 (1993): 691-695.

following two theories address some of the critical issues regarding the interaction of state composition and development that are important and relevant to this subject.

As early as 1883, Domingo Sarmiento identified the challenges of establishing and developing a state with a stratified and diverse ethnic composition. In “Challenging the nation-state in Latin America,” R. Stavenhagen proposes that ethnic diversity and cultural differences have plagued the establishment and development of Latin American governments since independence. He claims that although intellectuals adopted the task of explaining the relationship between ethnic diversities and governmental progress in the 19th Century, the task is not complete. Stavenhagen offers that the political government’s internal struggle with racial and ethnic issues has prevented the state from uniting as a nation and moving forward with national development.¹⁵ Coincidentally, as most ethno-development scholars will agree, the greatest obstacle in the development of the United States was largely related to the state's inability and authority to resolve problems related to ethnic diversity resulting in the Civil War.

The final piece of literature review I include is also somewhat different from the primary schools of thought for Latin American development. In “Development studies and postcolonial Studies: disparate tales of the Third World,” Christine Sylvester suggests that development studies and post-colonial studies of the Third World “ignore each other’s missions and writings.” The typical focus of development studies is on the interaction of states in the economic sense and the effectiveness of the political or financial system within the state to deal with the external interaction. Post-colonial studies are more social studies oriented and have primarily attempted to explain the national composition and the actions of the government to identify and address the cultural or ethnic diversity. She offers that there are substantial similarities between development

¹⁵ R. Stavenhagen, “Challenging the Nation-State in Latin America,” *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol 45 Issue 2 (Winter 1992): 421-441.

studies and post-colonial studies.¹⁶ Her approach of focusing internally on colonial and postcolonial composition as a departure point for development as opposed to the development theory paradigm of examining external politics and economics as the catalyst for development provides an interesting and I believe a crucial element of the development process.

The absence of information in the political science literature led me to additional research within the sociology field and other developmental theories. Although not inclusive of all the works cited, three specific works provided the foundation for the unity of effort theory. Max Weber provided the epistemological perspective of behavior-oriented ideas and behavior oriented actions. Utilizing his four categories of individual action provided the framework for understanding differences in decision making of societal elements.¹⁷

Dawa Norbu's "Culture and the Politics of Third World Nationalism" provided the basis for differentiating between western and third world societies. Most importantly, Norbu offered a debate and literature review on the definition of society and culture to provide commonality of terms for the discussion presented in this paper. Additionally, Norbu's concept of mass societal motivation and unity provides an understanding of the challenges associated with gaining unity in traditional societies that are ethnically segmented.¹⁸

Monte Palmer in "Political Development, Dilemmas and Challenges" provided the third piece providing a foundation for sociological aspects of the developmental process. Palmer offered a detailed analysis of the differences between the traits and characteristics of modern and traditional societies.¹⁹

¹⁶ Christine Sylvester, "Development Studies and Postcolonial Studies: Disparate Tales of the Third World," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 20 Issue 5 (1999): 703-722.

¹⁷ Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, ed. by Talcott Parsons, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947) 114-118.

¹⁸ Norbu, 20-22.

¹⁹ Palmer, 80-86.

Upon completing a review of the above literature as well as numerous other pieces, I believe I have identified an area where I can conduct thorough research, examine pertinent data, and come to a meaningful conclusion that will contribute to the understanding of the slow developmental process of South American states. Additionally, this concept will provide a basis for the assessment of other underdeveloped or developing states.

CHAPTER 3: UNITY OF EFFORT

This chapter provides a detailed description of the unity of effort concept and the three subordinate components of the theory. I derived this concept based on perceived shortfalls in the literature review of the preceding chapter and an assessment of the developmental differences between North America and South America.

As addressed earlier, development is a function of political, economic, and social elements of the state. The unity concept addresses the sub-elements of the social aspect of the overall state development concept. We must break down the cultural or societal element of the triad of state development into more comprehensible and valuable elements that allow for the identification of distinct impediments and enablers to state development. As defined earlier, unity of effort is a state's potential for economic, social, and political development as determined by its societal characteristics, attributes, traits and human composition. I specifically use the term potential because state development is a tremendously complex phenomenon and no single element of the state can determine developmental success independently. I intend for unity of effort to provide a framework that includes societal considerations in assessments similar to other elements such as state resources, political structure and makeup, economic systems, geographical considerations, and the like.

The term "societal characteristics" offers a challenge in the academic realm due to the various understandings and definitions of society. To avoid confusion, I will define my use of the term in this paper. The term society is contextual across the social sciences. As Radhakamal

Mukerjee indicates in *A General Theory of Society* where the focus is on application to the “third world”:

“Ecologically, society is Region – a physical, spatial aggregation of population for the biological values of sustenance and continuity. Economically, society is Class, a pattern of resources, technology and standard of living for the choice and satisfaction of divisible, limited values. Sociologically, society is Institutional for the satisfaction of social goals and values of communication, control and status. Ethnically, society is Communion for the creation and maintenance of ideal values, ie. character.” (Dawa Norbu)²⁰

Dawa Norbu adds, “If the ultimate integrative organ of a social system is the state, then we may include political institution, administrative organization, political entity, autonomy, self-government, state.”²¹ This function of society is the most applicable to the discussion of state development. As used in this paper, “society” refers to the physical aggregation of population within the political boundaries of the state for the purpose of administrative organization and collective communion. Despite the initial indication that this fails to account for the whole of many societies and dissects them into arbitrary polygons, this is an accurate representation of the Westphalia model of how the western world views state development, and how the division or conglomeration of ethnic and economic societies within the state represents a characteristic of the state society itself.

The unity of effort concept represents the sum of the attributes, traits, ideals, and beliefs of a state’s individuals and groups that collectively contribute to its ability to unite and advance toward similar goals as a state and potentially a nation-state. Among these factors are cultures, social and economic classes, political ideology, personal beliefs, religious affiliation, ethnic background, and most importantly goals and desires. I have broken the unity of effort theory

²⁰ Norbu, 54-55.

²¹ Ibid., 56.

down into three primary interrelated components. The three components are commonality of interests, achievement orientation, and motivation mechanisms.

The commonality of interests among the individuals and groups of a state is clearly the broadest component and accordingly the most difficult to analyze. At the most basic level, this commonality is based on how far and in what direction individuals have departed from the most basic human needs for survival or traditional societies that are the starting point for all of man's social endeavors. Traditional societies comprise the basis for nearly every state that is deemed as lesser developed or third world.²² Many primitive tribal groups remain focused on traditional societal norms to the basic example of rival tribes or even families with no common interests besides fighting one another for basic human sustenance and survival. The further individuals and groups move from this basic state toward interests such as common land ownership, common enemies, common spiritual beings, common communications, and so on, the more interests become common and unity potential is developed.

Max Weber referred to these interests as behavior orienting ideas. "Man as a social animal acts under the influence or impulse of certain ideas as his motivational matrix, and the only time he is not doing so is when his orderly ideas go out of order – insanity."²³ The result of these ideas is social action and Weber identifies four types of social action. First, there is rational action where the individual acts rationally in accordance with the conditions of the situation to satisfy his own ends. Second, there is principled action where the individual acts rational in accordance with an absolute value based on one's conscious beliefs. Third, there is affectual action based on emotional interpretation. Lastly, there is traditional action based on habitual

²² Palmer, 86.

²³ Norbu, 18.

experiences.²⁴ These four types of action are not mutually exclusive and become interconnected in determining societal action.

For the purpose of this paper rational actions and affectual actions become relatively insignificant in their differences, as they will tend to have similarities across a society; however, they remain important in the extent of their impact in determining actions relative to the impact of traditional and principled actions. Hence, if a tribal group determines the majority of their actions based on rational and affectual considerations, then this is significant in that it marginalizes the role of principle and traditional based actions. Traditional and principled-based actions represent the majority of differences among a society that will define the common interests or lack thereof. Hence, I base the method for determining commonality of interests on an understanding of what types of social actions are important to the individuals, and what traditions and principles are responsible for those actions.

Keeping in mind that this is not a sociology paper, the commonality of interests are considered by conducting a relative analysis of a state's constituent's religion, anthropology, geography, modernity, class structure, economic structure, societal structure, and other elements that provide for an understanding of the amount and extent of differences in the traditions and principles that drive societal action. From a pragmatic perspective, these elements are difficult to study and attempts to quantify them are fraught with risks. However, ethnicity offers a commonly collected representative form that characterizes many of the above traits and characteristics. This is certainly not an ideal fit, but offers a rough method for applying this theory to practice. "By isolating ethnicity as a focus for research, one easily loses everything else from sight. This is perhaps the cardinal sin committed by many students of ethnicity."²⁵ Hence,

²⁴ Weber, 115.

²⁵ Thomas Hylland Eriksen, "A Non-Ethnic State for Africa?" A paper delivered at ASEN conference, (London, 11 May 1996) 2.

it is important to comprehend ethnicity as a consideration within the complex human system and not to accept it as the explanative variable in all of commonality of interests or developmental potential.

Ethnicity is another commonly misunderstood concept that warrants defining at this point. For this paper, ethnicity is defined as: “characteristic, distinctive cultural or sub-cultural traits that set one group off from others. Different beliefs, values and patterns of behavior are involved as well as self and other identifications.”²⁶ From this definition, it is clear that ethnicity is one of the better methods for analyzing differences in traditions and principles within a state and one of the few methods that data is regularly collected.

To advance the above point, using ethnicity as an indicator for the composition of the state, greater differentiation among the constituents negatively affects the ability of the state to unify and develop. Both the number of different ethnicities within the society and the actual scale or extremity of differences between ethnicities affects the unity potential. Hence, if commonality of interests is the objective, it is more detrimental to have five ethnic groups than to have two ethnic groups, and it is better to have three ethnic groups with similar ideologies than to have three groups with significant ideological differences. Although overly simplistic, this comparison represents the basis for correlating ethnicity with commonality of interests, which is a component of unity of effort and in turn state developmental potential.

The second unity of effort component, titled achievement orientation, is the individual and collective desire for achievement or advancement of the state’s constituents. Achievement orientation and the society’s common advancement from traditional characteristics are closely related. Westerners commonly overlook this simple and fundamental concept.

²⁶ Wendell Bell and Walter E. Freeman, *Ethnicity and Nation-Building: Comparative, International, and Historical Perspectives*, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications Inc, 1974), 10.

The United Nations and World Bank both use a western developmental standard as the basis for their development indicators and most other measurements. The first and most basic question in identifying why a state has not met a particular break point or standard is to address whether the observed society recognizes and desires to attain the expected outcome. For any state to successfully unite and move forward with development, the individuals of the state must desire advancement from their current condition to the expected condition. Not only must the people within the society understand that there is a perceived better or different way of life, they must want and be willing to change and compromise to achieve a more “developed” lifestyle.

The characteristics of traditional individuals as identified by Parsons and Shils’ five variables: affectivity, self-orientation, particularism, ascription, and diffuseness contrast those of modern societies and do not facilitate western development and modernization.²⁷ They conversely establish a system that protects and defends itself from a world of outside ideas.

“The diverse facets of the traditional environment, it should be noted, are reciprocal. Isolation, for instance, increases suspicion and distrust by inhibiting the flow of information about common problems. Distrust and suspicion, in turn reduce people’s willingness to share information, thereby increasing the isolation of traditional individuals. Both isolation and distrust reinforce the pervasive concern for security that permeates all facts of traditional life.” (Monte Palmer)²⁸

The nature of traditional societies is to isolate themselves in order to meet their independent hierarchy of needs. They typically avoid external contact beyond their family, tribe, clan or village unless it is required for the fulfillment of their traditional needs and expectations. The family, tribe, clan, etc... socializes individuals to the cultural norms and ensures compliance with the norms to the extent of death in some tribes. These traits of traditional societies suppress the individual expectations of advancement and achievement, and sometimes take generations of

²⁷ Palmer, 80-84.

²⁸ Ibid., 66.

slow acculturation in order to recognize western expectations of personal and societal achievement orientation.

When considering a state's potential for development, the assessor must take into account the achievement orientation of the society as a whole. The ability of the individuals to recognize and desire advancement toward the measured western standards is the foundation for their potential to reach these same developmental objectives.

Motivational mechanisms make up the final component of the unity of effort theory and are closely tied to achievement orientation. The personal, societal, domestic and external mechanisms that make individuals change, evolve, or adapt can themselves manipulate the individual's attitude toward achievement and desire for further change. Individuals require something that moves them toward improvement, change, and development when they do not recognize this desire as their personal right and nature. Motivation mechanisms can be permissive, co-opting, or coercive.

Dawa Norbu offers in his discussion of third world nationalism that "the critical question before the behavioral scientist is to specify those ideas and values that actually or sociologically influence the behavioral pattern and the structure of social action in a given society and situation." When a society lacks the inherent desire for achievement, a political, social or economic institution can attempt to influence the society by introducing emotive ideas such as cultural and ethnic symbols and myths that enhance a sense of higher identity, and certain aspects of modern ideology that promote interests and unity common to and accepted by traditional cultures.²⁹ As this evidence indicates, motivation is the component than can be most manipulated by leadership and the governmental structure and institutions of the state, genocide notwithstanding.

²⁹ Norbu, 18.

As briefly discussed above, the most difficult element of assessing human capital or cultural elements of a state's developmental potential is attempting to measure or quantify the impact of these societal characteristics. For commonality of interests, the ethnic diversity provides one general mechanism for analyzing and comparing the different states. However, achievement orientation and motivational mechanisms are more difficult to demonstrate empirically. Within these areas, additional research is required to determine if an empirical assessment will accurately reflect the role these elements have in the developmental process.

A state's unity of effort, which is a factor in its developmental potential, is determined by assessing the state's commonality of interests, achievement orientation, and motivational mechanisms. A state with common interests, focused on personal gain and advancement, and that is motivated by both self-actualization and institutional mechanism maintains a much greater potential for development than a state with great diversity among basic interests, no personal desire for advancement or betterment, and no mechanisms to encourage individuals to want to change or improve.

The three components of the unity of effort concept provide a framework for the analysis of a state's human capital or societal unity potential for development. This concept adds to current developmental theories by providing a more complete and more accurate assessment of a state's potential for development when included in the analysis along with political, economic, educational, geographic, and resource assessments.

CHAPTER 4: SOUTH AMERICA

In the study of developing states, there has been a significant amount of literature and study devoted to the developmental differences between North America and South America. The difference in these continents' development since independence is particularly interesting because of the geographic, colonial, and pre-colonial similarities of these two vast regions. This chapter will add to Latin American development literature by addressing the lack of development in the

major South American states compared to the successful development of the United States, and assert that in South American states, the unity of effort among the individuals has greatly affected many developmental factors, and is directly correlated to the level of development.

As we have discussed, most current development studies of South America address economic and external development theories during the post independence period. This chapter discusses the social, cultural, geographic, and historic perspectives of the individuals and groups that make up the state, and how their interaction affects the developmental process as a point of departure. Although there have been many changes in the composition of South American states, they still maintain many of the same societal characteristics that have limited their ability to develop as rapidly as North America. It was not until the last two decades that significant study focused on the internal cultural effects of the individual states as a factor in their developmental process. This specific area represents the greatest differentiation between the development of the United States and the South American states.

The following pages will address South American development from the perspective of the three components of unity of effort. The composition of South America is still a representative of its colonial past. Unlike the United States, South America had large numbers of natives or “Indians” when the Spanish and Portuguese settled the region. An estimated 3 million Indians were scattered across North America compared to 30 million in large structured civilizations in Latin America.³⁰ Despite the European influence reducing the percentage of Indians in Spanish Latin America from 96 percent to 41 percent from 1570 to 1825, there was still an exponential difference compared to North America. The Portuguese experience in Latin America reduced the native population more significantly from 94 to 9 percent during the same

³⁰ Kline, 21.

period. This reduction was primarily different based on the large importation of slaves by the Portuguese.³¹

Due to these large populations of natives, the colonial powers established a colonial power based government, economy, and social structure in an attempt to force the natives to abide by and accept the southern European hierarchical way of life. This is quite different from the North American model where the predominantly English settlers destroyed and isolated the Indians, and established a self-service government that defied and fought the colonial influence all the way to independence. This is one of the key differences in North and South American development. In South America, southern Europeans remained loyal to colonial powers and perpetuated societal differences in contrast to the rebellious English in North America who maintained a separatist attitude and a concern for the vast territory to the west.

The significant differences between the Europeans and the South American natives represent a dichotomy of state interests and established a long-standing socio-economic conflict that prevents any commonality of interests as defined by the first component of unity of effort. The tribal and religious based traditional societies of the South American natives had absolutely no desire for outside contact or interaction with the Europeans beyond normal trade relations. In fact, the tribes were quite aware that contact with the Europeans could lead to elimination of the entire tribe due to the numerous diseases that killed millions of Indians. The status of the natives was based on various systems of villages, clans, and tribes where there was no need for political, monetary, or proprietary based structure beyond their own domain. The addition of the hierarchical conquerors instantly developed a feudalistic society greatly divided by religion, economic status, culture, and ethnicity. Exacerbating the “class” differences was the forceful conversion to Catholicism, a policy adopted by the Spanish and Portuguese colonies. In general,

³¹ Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford, 1992), 26.

the colonization produced a divided, incompatible society of “cowboys and Indians” lacking collective unity toward common goals that still exists today. Table 1 represents the effects of this society. It is a list of South American States and their unequal wealth distribution as of 2005.

State	World Rank	Years Data Compiled	% Income to Richest 10%	% Income to Poorest 10%
Brazil	8	2001	46.9	0.7
Paraguay	9	2002	45.4	0.6
Columbia	11	1999	46.5	0.8
Chile	12	2000	47	1.2
Argentina	19	2001	38.9	1
Peru	25	2000	37.2	0.7
Venezuela	27	1998	36.3	0.6
Bolivia	36	1999	32	1.3
Uruguay	37	2000	33.5	1.8
Ecuador	40	1998	41.6	0.9
United States	49	2000	45.8	1.9

Table 1. South American’ Wealth Distribution³²

The world rank in column two represents the absolute rank of unequal wealth distribution of 123 states that were calculated in the report. As indicated by the statistics in column two, South America is among the worst regions in the world for equal wealth distribution. The economic and social class differentiation caused by such huge disparities in wealth, make unification of a state very difficult. Affluent individuals have completely different governmental needs and demands than do individuals who are simply struggling to survive. Whereas the governing elite may desire a hydroelectric damn to advance the electricity output, the majority of the natives may request the government not damn the river that they use to irrigate their crops.

³² Human Development Report 2005, Table 15.

People in such differentiated economic situations have different needs, beliefs, goals and most importantly interests.

Ethnic and racial diversity complicates the states' ability to unite even more than economic differences. If we look at the composition of several South American states today, we see a pattern of racial and ethnic diversity that is representative of the pattern produced by European colonization of the existing traditional societies. Table 2 is a breakdown of the main South American states (not included are Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana) listed in order of decreasing levels of development based on United Nation's standards. The second column is the level of development as assigned by the same standard. The third column is the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) based on living conditions, literacy, and income.³³ The fourth column is the percentage of population of the largest ethnic group. The last column indicates the ethnic homogeneity of the nation, which is a function of percentages of ethnic individuals combined with the actual numbers of ethnic groups.

³³ United Nations, "Human Development Report 2002," (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 253. The Human Development Index is a summary measurement of human development with a range of 0 to 1.0 with 1.0 being the highest. It is comprised of a life expectancy index, education index, and a gross domestic product per capita index. HDI is comprised of the average of the three.

Country	UN Development	HDI	% Dominant Group	Ethnic Homogeneity
Argentina	3	0.882	85	85
Uruguay	5	0.881	88	86
Venezuela	5	0.859	67	67
Brazil	5	0.804	55	54
Chile	5	0.88	95	91
Paraguay	7	0.723	95	91
Columbia	7	0.836	58	58
Ecuador	7	0.784	55	40
Bolivia	9	0.588	55	31
Peru	10	0.709	45	47

Table 2. South American' Developmental Status³⁴

As the table illustrates, there is an apparent general correlation between United Nations human development index (columns 2 and 3) and the ethnic make-up of the countries (columns 4 and 5), with the possible exceptions of Chile and Paraguay. The more homogenous in ethnic background, the higher the level of development. The scatter diagram in Figure 2 graphically displays this data.

³⁴ Column 1 and 2 from Palmer, 16-20. Columns 3 and 5 from *The Illustrated Book of World Rankings* 1997, numerous pages. Column 4 from *Statistical Abstract of the World* 1997, numerous pages.




Figure 2. Scatter Diagram for South America

A regression correlation of the four numeric columns indicates a substantial positive correlation between ethnic homogeneity and both the United Nations development level and the human developmental index significant to the .05 level. The .05 level of significance is the commonly accepted academic standard in regression correlation. Table 3 displays the results of this correlation.

		UN Development Standard	Human Development Index
Ethnic Homogeneity	Coefficient	10.340	0.613
	R Squared	0.431	0.417

Table 3. Regression Results-South America

As displayed in the Table 3, ethnic homogeneity statistically accounts for approximately 43% of the United Nations Developmental Standard and 42% of the human development index. However, the relationship between the developmental indicators and the percentage of the dominant ethnic group was insignificant. The apparent deviation in this correlation is from the statistics of Chile and Paraguay, which prompted further research into the raw data. I discovered inconsistencies in the ethnic statistics of these two states relative to the others. The data for Chile

and Paraguay showed an ethnic breakdown of only meztizos and others, whereas the other countries categorized whites, meztizos, and Indians all separately. Hence, the high percentage of the dominant group and ethnic homogeneity statistics are due to the lack of specific details in reporting ethnic composition for Chile and Paraguay.

If we discount these two states with questionable data, and perform a statistical regression on the remaining eight South American states, the data presented in Table 4 is generated.

		UN Development Standard	Human Development Index
Ethnic Homogeneity	Coefficient	11.810	0.539
	R Squared	0.634	0.732
% Dominant Ethnic Group	Coefficient	13.900	0.513*
	R Squared	0.619	0.455*

Table 4. Regression Results-South America³⁵

The data in Table 4 shows a much higher correlation between the ethnic make up of the state and the level of development. In this case, the ethnic homogeneity statistically accounts for 63% of the United Nations Developmental Standard and 73% of the human development index. The percentage of the dominant ethnic group accounts for 62% of the UN Developmental Standard and 45% of the human development index in these South American states. In all of these regressions, the level of significance increased from the previous regression, demonstrating an even stronger correlation between the ethnic make-up and development indicators. From this data, it is evident that the most representative and significant data is between ethnic homogeneity and the human development index. The specific details of the regression summaries are included in the appendix.

³⁵ All data significant to the .05 level except *. * Indicates insignificant (.06) The high coefficients under UN Development Standard is a function of ordinal instead of ratio data.

This raw data as well as the statistical regression firmly supports the first component of the unity of effort theory. The greater differentiation among the composition of a state's people negatively affects that state's ability to develop. In the case of the South American countries, the commonality of interests is limited by both the diversity of the state's constituents and the significant gap in interests between the individual ethnic groups.

The correlation regression demonstrates the strong relationship between ethnic homogeneity and development indicating the disadvantages of an ethnically diverse population. However, the true extent of the disadvantage is based primarily on the fact that the differences in societal characteristics between the ethnic groups are extreme. As discussed in Chapter 2, the historically traditionally based tribal cultures of the native South Americans are radically different from those of the European immigrants and descendents.

The behavior orienting actions of the competing ethnic groups are typically in conflict with the establishment of commonality of interests. The traditional based cultures of the natives depend primarily on principled and traditional ideas to determine societal action. In contrast, the European descendents apply primarily rational ideas to action. Additionally, the principled and traditional based actions of the Europeans reflect western capitalist, egalitarian concepts rather than the tribal and spiritual based concepts of the majority of the native South Americans.

The combined effect of the ethnic diversity and scale of differences in the basic characteristics of the various ethnicities produces a society that lacks a commonality of interests. The basic dichotomy of interests demonstrated by the ethnically split South American states produces a limiting state characteristic that impedes the developmental process.

The most important difference in the ethnic groups of most South American states is the achievement orientation of the diverse societal cultures. The second component of the unity of effort concept identifies the importance of individual and societal expectation for accomplishment. Individual expectations, goals or objectives are the basis for the concepts of

achievement and accomplishment. Although this mentality is entrenched in western thought, the concept is foreign to a significant portion of the traditional cultures of South America.

Before a group of people or a society can unite toward common goals such as literacy, increased life expectancy, and economic well-being, all of which are crucial to a state's development, the individuals must want to achieve those goals. Many traditional South American societies at the time of colonization, independence, and to some extent today, are patrimonial systems that do not lend themselves to upward mobility, achievement, and advancement in the same way that European societies do. These characteristics are also detrimental to the development of any "stakeholder conference" in the government, which is critical in the motivation of individuals to affect positive influence on a government.

The third component of unity of effort is also greatly affected by the traditional characteristics of the society. In fact, one of the characteristics of traditional cultures addressed above is ascription, or a person's willingness to accept their status or position based on hereditary or religious concerns. Without a desire for improvements like education, better nutrition, and higher standards of living, there is no goal setting, action for achievement, or actual impact. If individuals are not willing to seek advancement (by western or UN standards) for their own lives, they certainly cannot be expected to be motivated or interested in facilitating the development of the whole society. Without motivation, there is little desire for advancement; without collective desire for advancement, there is no unity; without unity, there is little development.

We have discussed the main components I feel have affected South American states' ability to establish a unity of effort. Now I will address the necessity of this unity of effort. For a state to develop by UN standards, it must have a successful and effective government. The government or state is being "judged" or rated in development based mainly on the status of the constituents, not necessarily on the actions of the system. The constituents are only affected when they choose to accept the programs or achievements presented by the government. For example, a government offering adequate urban housing is only effective in the program if the

needy constituents are willing to move to the city and reside in this housing. Hence, the goals and desires of the government must be similar to those of the individual or individual groups for the nation to show signs of development.

In order for a government to produce the best results for the maximum amount of its constituents, it must act on the goals and desires of the majority compromised with those of the minority. The greater the differentiation in terms of the number of ethnic groups and scope of the ideology of the individuals or groups, the lesser amount of people is able to achieve their goals. In a strictly traditional society, even an effective government could not meet the development standards of the modernized world due to the difference in goals between the society and the world's expectations.

The United States and South America were in quite similar positions by the mid-eighteenth century, but two centuries later, they were part of two completely different worlds. The United States quickly adapted a model of unified action, as a single society focused on individual achievement and affluence, and in the process nearly destroyed an entire race to achieve their goals. South America remained true to its traditional roots and was structured to support the west, not be the west. The preeminence of South America's past at its point of departure from colonialism prevented the development of a unity of effort to allow for successful integration into the development of the western world.

CHAPTER 5: AFRICA AND ASIA

No study of developmental theory is complete without a significant discussion of the two most dissimilar areas of development over the last half century, Africa and South East Asia. This chapter addresses the unity of effort concept as applied to both Africa and Asia, and reveals the applicability of the concept across both the most underdeveloped continent and the most recently developing continent.

The universality of the unity of effort concept is dependent on its applicability to the majority of the underdeveloped or developing world. In Africa, the concept illustrates not only the correlation among the African states, but it also provides for the external differences that separate African development from the other continents, which all have developed faster. Additionally, the unity of effort concept must provide for an understanding of those states that have developed much more rapidly in recent years as represented by the newly industrialized countries in Asia.

Africa

Africa is the second largest continental area and by far the least developed area of the world. There are 53 countries in Africa and 39 of them are among the world's 50 least developed states³⁶ Specifically Sub-Saharan Africa countries have an average human developmental index of .477 compared to the world average of .722. Sadly, Africa only has two countries, Libya and the Seychelles that exceed the world average human development index and of course, the Seychelles in most spheres is considered non-African.³⁷

Africa and South America are vastly different in a plethora of geographic, historic, and anthropological aspects. None of these differences is more important to the study of development than the multi-ethnic history and contemporary ethnicity of the African continent, and the vastly different colonial experiences.

Unlike South America, most of Africa is in the first half century of its postcolonial era with a majority of states only becoming independent in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s.³⁸ The challenges associated with the postcolonial aspects significantly complicate the development

13. ³⁶ Jeffress F. Ramsay and Wayne Edge, *Global Studies Africa*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford, 1992),

³⁷ United Nations, 149-152.

³⁸ Palmer, 100.

process and provide additional sets of problems to resolve. South American states for example are undergoing a double transformation comprised of dealing with the problems of ethnic conflict and dealing with the complexity of transitioning from a military dictatorship or some other type of totalitarian government to a democratic form.³⁹

However, African states are dealing with a tremendously more complicated scenario of resolving a quadruple challenge. They are dealing with the ethnic conflict, liberalizing the economy to deal with globalization, democratizing the political system, and attempting to build a previously non-existent state capacity to deal with its constituency.⁴⁰

This non-existent state capacity perspective represents the most fundamentally different challenge to Africa than is experienced in most other parts of the world, and its foundation rests on a lack of common interests resulting from a millennium on kinship based African society. Scholars have traditionally used a western perspective to guide African studies and have focused on either European history or a Marxist perspective. These perspectives fail to account for the role of the African individual in the development process.⁴¹

As addressed in Chapter 3, the complexity of the society, based on its advancement from the basic level of human needs, is an indicator of human development potential. A Hobbesian approach to understanding the individual's need for security in Africa reveals the African individual's political sociology, and how a flawed western approach fails to account for the lack of trust in any state system across most of the African continent. Viewing the individual security needs as the basis for social interaction, the development of kinship and tribal based societal elements represents a workable solution to collective security. However, the development of a

³⁹ Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh, and Will Kymlicka, *Ethnicity & Democracy in Africa*, (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2004), 14.

⁴⁰ Berman, 15.

⁴¹ Ibid., 26.

kinship or tribal based society is the premier stumbling point in the development of an effective state and a successful political sociology of the constituents.⁴²

Centuries of both Arab and European slave trade as well as colonialism significantly perpetuated the historically deep-rooted basis of kinship in Africa. Throughout this period, the relationship between the individual and any political entity was continually subjugated to the relationship between individual and tribal members. The power of specific tribes resulting from colonialism eventually raised the kinship level to ethnicity. The contemporary African individual and society is a result of this anthropological and historic process. A lack of trust for a state and a focus on ethnic and tribal affiliations dominates the political sociology of most contemporary African individuals.⁴³

Table 5 below displays the majority of the African states with their human development index rating and the percent of the dominant ethnic group. Inconsistent data for ethnic homogeneity ratings resulted in the switch from ethnic homogeneity utilized in Chapter 4 to percent of the dominant ethnic group. African countries not listed are the islands, those with imprecise ethnic data, and those not reported in the *Human Development Report* for human development index.

⁴² Berman, 27-29.

⁴² Ibid., 29-35.

State	HDI	% Dominant Ethnic Group
Libya	0.794	97
Tunisia	0.745	98
Algeria	0.704	99
South Africa	0.666	75
Gabon	0.648	95
Morocco	0.620	99
Namibia	0.607	50
Sudan	0.505	52
Cameroon	0.501	31
Congo	0.494	48
Zimbabwe	0.491	71
Kenya	0.488	22
Nigeria	0.466	21
Mauritania	0.465	40
Djibouti	0.454	60
Gambia	0.452	42
Eritrea	0.439	50
Senegal	0.437	43
Rwanda	0.431	84
Guinea	0.425	40
Cote d'Ivoire	0.399	42
Angola	0.381	37
Central African Rep	0.361	34
Ethiopia	0.359	40
Guinea-Bissau	0.350	30
Burundi	0.339	85
Mali	0.326	50
Burkina Faso	0.302	40
Niger	0.292	56
Sierra Leone	0.273	30

Table 5. Selected African States HDI and Ethnicity⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Table 5 Data HDI from Human Development Report 2002, % Dominant Ethnic Group from Global Studies Africa, Tenth Ed. Selected States were selected based on complete data only. No discrimination was taken based on conformity of data. African countries not listed were island states and countries without precise ethnic data or were not included in Human Development Report.

From the data in Table 5, the scatter diagram in Figure 3 displays the apparent correlation between HDI and the percent of the dominant ethnic group, which for all intensive purposes represents ethnic homogeneity.




Figure 3. Scatter Diagram of Africa

The scatter diagram in Figure 3 has a couple of notable deviations. In the upper right corner, four of the five countries with near ethnic homogeneity are the North African Islamic countries of Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and Morocco. These countries are more representative of the Middle East than they are of Africa. The two outliers in the bottom right of the diagram are Rwanda and Burundi. As some of the most densely populated areas of Africa, these two countries are in a unique circumstance where the approximate 15% of the population minority Tutsis control and have controlled the government. This unbalanced situation perpetuates the massive ethnic genocide across both countries as well as the Democratic Republic of Congo. The

intense violence between the ruling minority and the fighting majority has a significant impact on the factors of the human development index.

Despite these potential trend breakers, the correlation between ethnic homogeneity and the human developmental index appears to be strong. A regression correlation of this data yields the products in Table 6. The regression indicates that approximately 44% of the human development index is statistically explained by the percentage of the dominant ethnic group. This regression is statistically significant well above the .05 level and the correlation summary is in the appendix. The results of the correlation indicate an even stronger positive correlation between the percentage of the dominant ethnic group and the human development index for the African countries than it did for the South American countries.

		Human Development Index
% Dominant Ethnic Group	Coefficient	0.271
	R Squared	0.44

Table 6. Regression Results-Africa

The lack of common interests among the ethnic groups within the African societies is responsible for the correlation between ethnicity and development. Africa is comprised mainly of multi-ethnic states that have historically deepened the distrust toward a state government and prevented the establishment of more common interests beyond the individual level. The tendency toward kinship perpetuated individual and societal concentration at the most basic level of traditional societies with security and basic human needs remaining at the heart of individual expectations.

The anthropologic remnants of Africa produced a society whose behavior orienting actions are determined primarily by traditional and effectual based considerations. This behavior orientation precludes or significantly reduces the functional success of building unity for a state or even a local political organization. A traditionally based society generally addresses new

situations by looking to the past instead of the future; hence, the society is more resistant to change and accepts it at a much slower rate.

“In these accounts, market failure central to development economics and governmental failure central to neoclassical economists are replaced by something more debilitating and more recalcitrant societal failure signaled not only by lack of social capital, but also by the disease-like spread of this societal malaise into both market and state structures.”⁴⁵

The failed commonality of interests among most African states strongly supports the first component of the unity of effort concept as explained in Chapter 3. The multi-ethnic composition of African states combined with behavior orienting ideas based on traditional and affectual ideas and greatly exacerbated by a lack of state government provides the ingredients for ongoing conflict and developmental struggle. The majority of African states clearly lack commonality of interests as defined in the unity of effort concept.

Africa in general is representative of the failures expected by the second component of the unity of effort concept, achievement orientation. African societies are representative of if not the poster child for traditional societies as explained by Parsons and Shils’ five variables in Chapter 3. The anthropological and historical development of the tribalist societies produced a culture of isolation and insecurity. Not only geographic isolation, but more devastatingly, intellectual and economic isolation. The effects of a culture of isolation run through the spectrum of state development issues.

“Every society possesses a culture. That is to say, all societies develop and pass on their children a set of beliefs, customs, and traditions that (1) explain and sanctify the established social, economic, and political order; (2) prescribe desirable behavior patterns, define values, and generally establish standards of right and wrong; (3) prescribe accepted ways of handling situations such as marriage, death, child-rearing, interpersonal conflict, and deviant behavior; (4) provide some link with the supernatural through which the myriad uncertainties of life become more meaningful and, ideally, more bearable; (5)

⁴⁵ Thandika Mkandawire, “Thinking about Developmental States in Africa,” *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, (May 2001): 298.

define role content, i.e. the tasks that members of various age-sex categories are expected to perform; and (6) provide socially accepted outlets for internal conflict that might otherwise disrupt the established pattern of social relationships.” (Monte Palmer)⁴⁶

A culture of isolation hinders the ability to adapt and change to accept and leverage modernization and development at all levels, but most notably at the individual level. The traits, characteristics and attitudes of individuals are among the slowest to adapt and change. “But history shows new skills being rather readily acquired in a few years, as compared to the generations-or centuries-required for attitude changes....The cultural inheritance can be more important than biological inheritance, although the later stirs more controversy.”⁴⁷

The human attitude or characteristic associated with a desire for individual achievement, modernization and growth is a captive of traditional and tribal societies throughout Africa. The traditional based decisions of most African societies perpetuate the status quo as opposed to fostering an environment of change, modernization and development.

True to their traditionalist ways, most African societies and African states lack a positive motivational mechanism as addressed in the third unity of effort component. For many of the same reasons listed above, Africa remains further away from western egalitarian and capitalist ideologies than South America and unlike the latter; Africa lacks even a modest state capacity to marshal any type of nationalistic or collective movement toward development.

Mkandawire’s “ideology-structure nexus” model for state development highlights the required elements to establish appropriate motivational mechanisms that are absent in African states. “In terms of ideology, a developmental state is essentially one whose ideological underpinnings is ‘developmentalist’ in that it conceives its ‘mission’ as that of ensuring economic development, usually interpreted to mean high rates of accumulation and industrialization.” “The

⁴⁶ Palmer, 70-71.

⁴⁷ Thomas Sowell, *Ethnic America*, (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1981), 284.

state structure side of the definition of the developmental state emphasizes capacity to implement economic policies sagaciously and effectively” “And, finally, the state must have some social anchoring that prevents it from using its autonomy in a predatory manner and enables it to gain adhesion of key social actors.”⁴⁸

The majority of African states lack common interests and unity of effort to reach a consensus on an ideological concept for moving ahead and/or nationalizing the concept, and the state capacity to do so. The feat associated with acculturating the traditional based societies of Africa to a western self-accumulation and development model is daunting. It will most likely take decades or even centuries to accomplish. The process of instilling individual motivation beyond the basic level is a long and comprehensive process that has really only begun in post-colonial Africa.

By applying the unity of effort concept to Africa, we were able to identify the failures of most African states within the three components of the concept. This process demonstrated an even stronger correlation between ethnic homogeneity and state development. Additionally, the lack of achievement focused individuals combined with no state motivation mechanisms provided an understanding of the challenges that Africa faces. In all components, the unity of effort concept accurately provided societal considerations to explain the broader and deeper challenges of Africa as compared to South America.

Asia

I developed the unity of effort concept to provide a framework to assess societal elements of underdeveloped and developing states. However, for the concept to be legitimate, it must account for the ability of some states to develop more rapidly than others do. This section will

⁴⁸ Mkandawire, 290.

quickly look at the newly industrialized countries of South East Asia from the perspective of the unity of effort concept.

The entire area of South East Asia is representative of the correlation between ethnicity and development similar to both South America and Africa as you can see in the scatter diagram in Figure 3. However, to demonstrate the conformity of the unity of effort concept to successfully developed states, I will limit further discussion in this section to the newly industrializing countries.




Figure 4. Scatter Diagram for South East Asia

The rapid development of the “Asian Tigers” during the 1970s and 1980s represented the ultimate in success for newly independent developing countries. As a result, Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea are ranked 23, 25, and 27 respectively in human developmental index.⁴⁹ Taiwan is not included in the report but accordingly has a much higher development assessment than any of the African countries.

⁴⁹ United Nations, *Human Development Report 2002*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 149.

The “Asian Tigers” gained independence during the same period as most African states, but the history and human capital at the time of independence were much different. From an ethnic standpoint, all four of the Tigers have a higher percentage of the dominant ethnic group than nearly all of Sub-Saharan Africa as you can see by the data in Table 7.

State	HDI	% Dominant Ethnic Group
Honk Kong	0.888	95
Singapore	0.885	77
Korea, Rep of	0.882	100
Taiwan	N/A	84

Table 7. “Asian Tigers” HDI and Dominant Ethnic Group

In addition to a relatively higher ethnic homogeneity, history shaped the cultures of the Tigers differently, resulting in a much higher potential for development in accordance with the unity of effort concept. Despite the lower ethnic homogeneity of Taiwan and Singapore, the ethnic minorities in these two states are a result of voluntary immigration. Voluntary immigration is a selective process that hand picks the daring, adventurous, motivated, and achievement oriented individuals.⁵⁰ These immigrants complemented the residing population that in all four cases opened up to western trade and the capitalist movement not only at the state level, but all the way down to the individual.

The state government of each of the Tigers was in a completely different situation than the African states. Not only was there a strong state capacity for government (sometimes deemed too strong by the UN and much of the west) but the governments focused on establishing a common movement or even nationalist perspective early on in the post-colonial effort. In Singapore for example, the “two main goals for the administration have been to utilize fully

⁵⁰ Sowell, 285-287.

Singapore's primary resource—its deepwater port—and to develop a strong Singaporean identity.”⁵¹

Each of the Tigers' governments understood the ideology-structure nexus and leveraged their power to not only adapt the state structure but also imbed the ideology of achievement and development into the culture of the society. Despite early claims that the success in South East Asian was a result of absolute laissez-fairism, revisionist studies have revealed a much more active and governed approach to ensure accumulation, technology absorption, and attraction of foreign markets.⁵² Government initiatives helped shape the society acculturate to a developmental approach to government, economics, and societal interaction.

From a unity of effort standpoint, the “Asian Tigers” maximized the use of the three components. First, they leveraged the ethnic homogeneity by attempting to nationalize in order to accomplish both state and individual development goals. Second, they used the strong state capacity to not only control the role of economics in the state, but also to empower the society with a more achievement focused orientation by leveraging capitalist and egalitarian principles. Finally, the governments sought methods to motivate and unify the constituency while at the same time emboldening the pre-independence mindset of individual accomplishment.

The vast differences between the “Asian Tigers” and the states of Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of economic standing and human development today are a result of the human capital or societal characteristics that the governments inherited at the time of independence. Although the actions of the government, international community, and sub-state actors have a role in the development process, the role of the human capital of any particular state is un-avoidable and paramount to developmental potential.

⁵¹ Dean W. Collinwood, *Global Studies, Japan and the Pacific Rim*, 5th ed., (Guilford, CT: Dushkin/McGraw-Hill Company, 1999), 91.

⁵² Mkandawire, 292.

CHAPTER 6: UNITY OF EFFORT AND US POLICY

“Regional conflicts can arise from a wide variety of causes, including poor governance, external aggression, competing claims, internal revolt, tribal rivalries, and ethnic or religious hatreds. If left unaddressed, however, these different causes lead to the same ends: failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists. The Administration’s strategy for addressing regional conflicts includes three levels of engagement: conflict prevention and resolution; conflict intervention; and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.” (2006 National Security Strategy of the United States of America)⁵³

The previous chapters provided a framework within which to analyze potential developmental considerations for enhancing understanding and ability to resolve the issues and orient US state building actions accordingly. This chapter reaffirms the importance of the issue of state development, applies the unity of effort concept to the US role in state building, and discusses some possible options for US and international policy makers to consider in order to better deal with security challenges of the 21st Century posed by failed and underdeveloped states.

The 2002 and the 2006, National Security Strategies of the United States indicate the significance of failed states and the role of state building to US policy and security concerns both present and future. The increasing security risks associated with weapons of mass destruction in the hands of international terrorist organizations has placed underdeveloped and failed states around the globe at the forefront of US security considerations in addition to the position many of them previously garnered as humanitarian interests. The US security policy shift after the collapse of the Soviet Union and amplified by the Global War on Terrorism resulted in a fundamental change in the object of US security interests from the powerful states to the weak states.

Not only do weak and underdeveloped states present a greater risk to global security in the 21st Century, but they also have the potential for undermining the post-Wesphalian

⁵³ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 15.

international system and its underlying primacy of state sovereignty. When weak and underdeveloped states present a risk to stronger states, the situation presents a high risk of state intervention. The 1990s proved this point repeatedly with the US and other western states intervening in Somali, Haiti, and the Balkans to name a few. Many political scientists have expressed the view that the post-Wesphalian system is no longer valid due to the majority of the west supporting intervention for human rights over state sovereignty.⁵⁴ The logical extension of this argument is that if intervention is accepted for the defense of others, than it must also be legitimate for one's own self-defense.

The weak and underdeveloped states may shape the future of conflict even more than the powerful states have in the past. Recent US actions and the US National Security Strategy indicate that US policy makers understand this fundamental shift. Understanding the issue is a start, but successful navigation of the issue is based on properly identifying a solution to the problem that supports US interests. This is where the unity of effort concept can prove useful.

The specific role the US has assumed in dealing with underdeveloped states and state building has varied since the end of World War II, but the fact that the US was principally involved has proven true repeatedly. Unfortunately, we have made some fundamental errors even at the most basic level of understanding. Take the term “nation-building” for instance, across the US government to include the Department of Defense, Department of State, and the White House; you see the term “nation building” used interchangeably with state building. Although of little interest to most, these terms have vastly different meanings with the possibility of far reaching consequences when misused.

In Iraq for example, if the US were truly conducting nation building, it would have implemented an entirely different approach. Its focus would be on either drawing up the borders

⁵⁴ Francis Fukuyama, *State Building, Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*, (Ithaca New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), 96.

for three new nation-states one for each of the three nations Kurdish, Sunni and Shia.

Alternatively, it could expect some type of genocide that would eliminate two of the three nations to make Iraq a true nation-state. Of course, this is a simple misuse of terms; unfortunately, US intentions are not always transparent to the international community. “Nation building is generally too ambitious a task, but state building is a more realistic objective.”⁵⁵

More substantively, the US has a history of making another monumental mistake when dealing with underdeveloped states that represents the area where the unity of effort concept is most appropriately applied. Since the end of World War II, the US has consistently expected democracy and freedom to spread contagiously across any state, regardless of its specific characteristics once given the opportunity. This is certainly a centerpiece of modern Neo-conservative thought, but its roots in American policy run much deeper than the Reagan administration.

The US generally fails to take into consideration the specific factors of the state in question. The belief that freedom and democracy will equally spread throughout any country or group of ruled peoples fails to account for the political, economic, and social traits and characteristics of the target state. Democracy, capitalism, and human freedoms may spread quite rapidly in some environments with some cultures and not at all with others. The US must look at each state in question and take a holistic approach to understanding the elements that make up the state and then assess its potential for development.

The unity of effort concept provides a basis for including the societal elements in the assessment of a state’s development potential. When used in conjunction with other political, economic, and resource assessments, the concept can provide an understanding of the entire state framework and help determine the possibility and probability of success. The goal of the

⁵⁵ Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 346.

assessment is to adjust expectations, methods, and desired end states based on the state's characteristics and potential. In some cases, this may result in not taking action or taking a different action.

I was encouraged to see the release of the 2006 National Security Strategy while writing this paper. Included in this keystone document was at least a glimpse of understanding the process of assessing the state's potential before determining its end state.

“We have a responsibility to promote human freedom. Yet freedom cannot be imposed; it must be chosen. The form that freedom and democracy take in any land will reflect the history, culture, and habits unique to its people. The United States will stand with and support advocates of freedom in every land. Though our principles are consistent, our tactics will vary. They will reflect, in part, here each government is on the path from tyranny to democracy. In some cases, we will take vocal and visible steps on behalf of immediate change. In other cases, we will lend more quiet support to lay the foundation for future reforms. As we consider which approaches to take, we will be guided by what will most effectively advance freedom's cause while we balance other interests that are also vital to the security and well-being of the American people.” (2006 National Security Strategy of the United States of America)⁵⁶

How do we continue to work with underdeveloped states with the understanding that you must take into consideration the whole of the state's development potential given the threats they pose today? Some states have the potential to succeed in development given the traditional internationally accepted mechanisms for aid and assistance. North Korea for example, offers tremendous potential for development with a collapse of the existing government.

However, the answer may not always be the most politically palatable solution if we truly are concerned about our own national security as well as the security of the people of the failing or failed state. Three other options for exploration are: 1) accept that a democratic government is not always the best solution for the long-term development of some states 2) accept colonial type power from developed states to rule and govern some failing states in order to develop the

⁵⁶ National Security Strategy, 5-6.

capacity to become a viable state, or 3) redraw political boundaries where necessary to facilitate unity of effort.

Representative democracy as experienced in the US may not always be the best option for states in precarious positions. As addressed in Chapter 5, two crucial elements are required for this type of success to be realized. First is a constituency that understands and is willing to participate in the democracy, and the second is a state capacity that has both the ability and the trust of the people to govern. Fukuyama adds that these two elements of the state cannot be readily transferred.⁵⁷ The long-term development of the state requires first and foremost, the development of a state-individual relationship that builds both an understanding of and a trust in the state among the constituents. The development of the societal or human capital and the state capacity may be more rapidly developed in an authoritarian regime. This of course must be determined by addressing the specifics of the individual state, but should be considered as an option by US policy makers.

The second of the options listed above, accept a quasi-colonial approach to state building, is a violation of contemporary norms in international affairs. Since state capacity and constituency for development cannot rapidly transfer or develop, than logically the time line could be extended to allow for the establishment of an adequate state framework under a quasi-colonial relationship.⁵⁸ This approach is quite controversial and risky based on previous colonial experiences but all options should be addressed. The people and security of Puerto Rico for instance are better off in nearly every case than the people of Haiti or the Dominican Republic.

Since the post-Wesphalian system has already been challenged, the concept of redrawing the boundaries in some instances should also remain on the table of options to deal with underdeveloped states. One mechanism to enhance unity and deter ethnic conflict within a state

⁵⁷ Fukuyama, 31.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 104.

is to establish a constituency with more common interests and ethnic homogeneity. Taboo by current international standards, the risk of course is that the conflict would be raised to the intrastate level. However, in this case the long-term development objectives may be better met due to the strength of international system in dealing with state interactions. Additionally, this provides more potential for the development of the state-individual relationship in the long-term.

Regardless of the specific approach taken to deal with the underdeveloped states across the globe, the important aspect that the US must understand is that the state must be analyzed and assessed in a holistic manner to determine the potential end state possibilities. Although current US policy and international norms restrain the options of assisting the development of underdeveloped states, all options should be considered in the future to achieve the security needs of the US as well as to ensure the freedom and human dignity of individuals across the globe.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

State development across the globe is more important in the 21st Century than ever before. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the spread of trans-national terrorism combined with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction changed the security situation for most of the world. Understanding how to identify and eliminate the conditions that lead to failed and failing states must be at the forefront of any international attempt to ensure global security and human dignity.

The overall architecture of the state includes the political, economic, and social attributes and institutions that make up the three pillars of state development. Historically, scholars addressed state development from a political and economic perspective focused externally on the environment of the state and internally on the economic potential and political structure. Historic and contemporary developmental theory is insufficient in that it fails to account for societal characteristics in state development.

This paper endeavored to provide a framework within which to analyze and assess potential development enablers and inhibitors in the societal pillar of the state, in order to add to developmental theory. The unity of effort concept is the mechanism I have offered to provide the framework to assess a state's developmental potential based on its constituents. This concept must be utilized in conjunction with political and economic theories to explain the state's entire developmental potential.

Unity of effort is a state's potential for economic, social, and political development as determined by its societal characteristics, traits, and human composition. Unity of effort addresses the sub-elements of the social aspect of the overall state development concept. We must break down the cultural or societal element of the triad of state development into more comprehensible and valuable elements that allow for the identification of distinct impediments, inhibitors, and enablers to state development.

Unity of effort represents the sum of the attributes, traits, ideals, and beliefs of a state's individuals and groups that collectively contribute to its ability to unite and advance toward similar goals as a state. Unity of effort is determined by assessing the state's commonality of interests, achievement orientation, and motivational mechanisms, which make up the three components of the unity of effort concept. These three components provide the specific framework for the analysis of a state's human capital or societal unity potential for development.

The first and broadest component of the concept is the commonality of interests among the individuals and groups of a state. At the most basic level this commonality is premised on how far individuals have departed from the most basic human needs for survival or traditional societies that are the starting point for all of man's social endeavors. The further individuals and groups move from this basic state, the more interests become common and unity potential is developed. Ethnicity is a potential indicator of commonality of interest and provides a mechanism to assess this component.

The second unity of effort component, achievement orientation, is the individual and collective desire for achievement or advancement of the state's constituents. Achievement orientation and the society's common advancement from traditional characteristics are closely related. The ability of individuals to recognize and desire advancement toward the measured western standards is the foundation for their potential to reach these same developmental objectives.

Motivational mechanisms make up the final component of the unity of effort theory and are closely tied to achievement orientation. The personal, societal, domestic, and external mechanisms that make individuals change, evolve, or adapt can themselves manipulate the individual's attitude toward achievement and desire for further change. Individuals require something that moves them toward improvement, change, and development when they do not recognize this desire as their personal right and nature.

A state's unity of effort, which is a factor in its developmental potential, is determined by assessing the state's commonality of interests, achievement orientation, and motivational mechanisms. A state with common interests, focused on personal gain and advancement, and is motivated by both self actualization and institutional mechanism maintains a much greater potential for development than a state with great diversity among basic interests, no personal desire for advancement or betterment, and no mechanisms to encourage individuals to want to change or improve.

I based my approach to understanding state developmental theory on a deductive comparative analysis of the differences between historically similar regions and states that have developed differently such as South America and North America. In applying the unity of effort concept to South America, it becomes apparent that most states lacked development potential due to the state composition resulting from its unique colonial past. The differentiation among the composition of a state's people negatively affected the state's ability to develop. The basic

dichotomy of interests demonstrated by the ethnically split South American states produced an inhibiting state characteristic that impedes the developmental process.

A statistical regression of South American states demonstrates an extremely strong correlation between ethnic homogeneity and development by United Nations standards. The ethnic homogeneity statistically accounts for 73% of the human development index. This lack of common interest coupled with the effects of a traditionally based majority population demonstrates the development inhibitors identified within the context of the unity of effort context.

By applying the unity of effort concept to Africa, we identified the failures of most African states within the three components of the concept. This process demonstrated an even stronger correlation between ethnic homogeneity and state development. Additionally, the lack of achievement focused individuals combined with no state motivation mechanisms provided an understanding of the challenges that Africa faces. In all components, the unity of effort concept accurately identified societal considerations to explain the broader and deeper challenges of Africa as compared to South America.

As demonstrated by the unity of effort concept, the vast differences between the “Asian Tigers” and the states of Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of economic standing and human development today are a result of the human capital or societal characteristics that the governments inherited at the time of independence. Although the actions of the government, international community, and sub-state actors have a role in the development process, the role of the human capital of any particular state is un-avoidable and paramount to developmental potential.

From a unity of effort standpoint, the “Asian Tigers” maximized the use of the three components. They leveraged their ethnic homogeneity, used the strong state capacity to control the role of economics and to empower the society, and they sought methods to motivate and unify the constituency while at the same time emboldening the individual.

The 2002 and the 2006 National Security Strategies of the United States indicate the significance of failed states and the role of state building to US policy and security concerns both present and future. The US must look at each state of importance with a holistic understanding of the political, economic, and societal elements that make up the state and determine its potential for development. The unity of effort concept provides a basis for including the societal elements in this integrated assessment. The goal of the assessment is to adjust expectations, methods, and desired end states based on the state's characteristics and potential.

If the US and the international community are committed to attempting to resolve the problems of underdeveloped states as opposed to putting a patch on the symptoms, then some non-traditional approaches may prove helpful. Three of these options are: 1) accept that a democratic government may not be the best for the long-term development of some states 2) accept colonial-type power for developed states to rule and govern some failing states to develop the capacity to become a viable state, or 3) redraw political boundaries where necessary to facilitate unity of effort.

The underdeveloped state has taken a new position in world affairs, one that it did not request nor does it know how to deal with. The future of world security and human dignity across the globe could be more affected by the role of the failing state and the response from developed states than it will by the interactions of the powerful states. We can choose to react to each of the threats as they emerge, or we can choose to attempt to understand the problem and solve it at its root. Traditional economic and political development theories address aspects of the problem but fail to get at the root of state failures in many cases. The unity of effort concept is an attempt to build an understanding of how to identify the complex problems presented to underdeveloped states specifically by its human and societal capital.

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APPENDIX

Appendix A: Table 3 Regression Correlation Summary-South America

SUMMARY
OUTPUT

Table 3. Ethnic Homogeneity vs Development Standard

<i>Regression Statistics</i>	
Multiple R	0.656480321
R Square	0.430966412
Adjusted R Square	0.359837214
Standard Error	1.688869699
Observations	10

<i>ANOVA</i>					
	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>
Regression	1	17.28175313	17.28175313	6.058924064	0.039227624
Residual	8	22.81824687	2.852280859		
Total	9	40.1			

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>	<i>Upper 95%</i>	<i>Lower 95.0%</i>	<i>Upper 95.0%</i>
Intercept	10.34069767	1.726259012	5.990235303	0.000326933	6.359937258	14.32145809	6.359937258	14.32145809
X Variable 1	-0.06216458	0.025254876	-2.461488181	0.039227624	-0.120402429	-0.00392673	-0.120402429	-0.00392673

SUMMARY
OUTPUT

Table 3. Ethnic Homogeneity vs. HDI

<i>Regression Statistics</i>	
Multiple R	0.645822879
R Square	0.417087192
Adjusted R Square	0.344223091
Standard Error	0.07804599
Observations	10

<i>ANOVA</i>					
	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>
Regression	1	0.034866988	0.034866988	5.724179473	0.043683301
Residual	8	0.048729412	0.006091177		
Total	9	0.0835964			

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>	<i>Upper 95%</i>	<i>Lower 95.0%</i>	<i>Upper 95.0%</i>
Intercept	0.613102907	0.079773824	7.685514865	5.82145E-05	0.42914414	0.797061674	0.42914414	0.797061674
X Variable 1	0.002792263	0.001167077	2.392525752	0.043683301	0.000100977	0.005483549	0.000100977	0.005483549

Appendix B: Table 4 Regression Correlation Summary-South America

SUMMARY
OUTPUT

Table 4. Ethnic Homogeneity vs. Development Standard

<i>Regression Statistics</i>	
Multiple R	0.79635308
R Square	0.634178227
Adjusted R Square	0.573207932
Standard Error	1.519621644
Observations	8

ANOVA					
	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>
Regression	1	24.01950036	24.01950036	10.40142946	0.018020621
Residual	6	13.85549964	2.30924994		
Total	7	37.875			

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>	<i>Upper 95%</i>	<i>Lower 95.0%</i>	<i>Upper 95.0%</i>
Intercept	11.81074766	1.768998981	6.676514678	0.000546778	7.4821631	16.13933223	7.4821631	16.13933223
X Variable 1	-0.092918763	0.028810905	-3.22512472	0.018020621	-0.163416509	-0.022421018	-0.163416509	-0.022421018

SUMMARY
OUTPUT

Table 4. Ethnic Homogeneity vs. HDI

<i>Regression Statistics</i>	
Multiple R	0.855652824
R Square	0.732141755
Adjusted R Square	0.687498714
Standard Error	0.056360276
Observations	8

<i>ANOVA</i>					
	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>
Regression	1	0.052093991	0.052093991	16.39990779	0.006728565
Residual	6	0.019058884	0.003176481		
Total	7	0.071152875			

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>	<i>Upper 95%</i>	<i>Lower 95.0%</i>	<i>Upper 95.0%</i>
Intercept	0.539728972	0.065609273	8.226412973	0.000174219	0.379188865	0.700269079	0.379188865	0.700269079
X Variable 1	0.004327283	0.001068549	4.049679962	0.006728565	0.001712637	0.006941928	0.001712637	0.006941928

SUMMARY
OUTPUT

Table 4. % Dominant Group vs. Development Standard

<i>Regression Statistics</i>	
Multiple R	0.786708999
R Square	0.61891105
Adjusted R Square	0.555396225
Standard Error	1.551007414
Observations	8

<i>ANOVA</i>					
	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>
Regression	1	23.44125601	23.44125601	9.744355737	0.020543149
Residual	6	14.43374399	2.405623998		
Total	7	37.875			

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>	<i>Upper 95%</i>	<i>Lower 95.0%</i>	<i>Upper 95.0%</i>
Intercept	13.91180889	2.475899113	5.618891667	0.001357098	7.853502024	19.97011576	7.853502024	19.97011576
X Variable 1	-0.118689904	0.038022197	-3.121595063	0.020543149	-0.211726869	-0.025652938	-0.211726869	-0.025652938

SUMMARY
OUTPUT

Table 4. % Dominant Group vs. HDI

<i>Regression Statistics</i>	
Multiple R	0.674885678
R Square	0.455470678
Adjusted R Square	0.364715791
Standard Error	0.080358392
Observations	8

<i>ANOVA</i>					
	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>
Regression	1	0.032408048	0.032408048	5.018690379	0.066324867
Residual	6	0.038744827	0.006457471		
Total	7	0.071152875			

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>	<i>Upper 95%</i>	<i>Lower 95.0%</i>	<i>Upper 95.0%</i>
Intercept	0.512639273	0.128277447	3.996332059	0.007148791	0.198755669	0.826522877	0.198755669	0.826522877
X Variable 1	0.004413161	0.001969947	2.240243375	0.066324867	-0.000407126	0.009233448	-0.000407126	0.009233448

Appendix C: Table 6 Regression Correlation Summary-Africa

SUMMARY
OUTPUT

Table 6. % Dominant Group vs. HDI

<i>Regression Statistics</i>	
Multiple R	0.663084093
R Square	0.439680515
Adjusted R Square	0.419669105
Standard Error	0.104357585
Observations	30

ANOVA					
	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>
Regression	1	0.239280644	0.239280644	21.97149082	6.51798E-05
Residual	28	0.304934156	0.010890506		
Total	29	0.5442148			

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>	<i>Upper 95%</i>	<i>Lower 95.0%</i>	<i>Upper 95.0%</i>
Intercept	0.271114519	0.047252263	5.737598598	3.71633E-06	0.174322647	0.367906391	0.174322647	0.367906391
X Variable 1	0.003660785	0.000780988	4.687375686	6.51798E-05	0.002061003	0.005260567	0.002061003	0.005260567