

Learning from Darfur

Building a Net-Capable African Force to Stop Mass Killing

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Executive Summary

Once again, the world is faced with a mass-killing situation—U.S. leaders have called it “genocide.” And again, like Rwanda in 1994 and so many other cases, the international response to Darfur’s plight has been humanitarian assistance, condemnation, demands for the killing to stop, and a peacekeeping force with neither the means nor the mandate to defeat the killers. This response has neither convinced nor forced Janjaweed militiamen or their patrons in the Sudanese government to stop their assault on defenseless civilians. Even though the chance for action to prevent mass killing in Darfur has come and gone, we can learn from this tragedy what it will take to back up the pledge of “never again.”

The international community lacks a standing combat force to conduct decisive, forcible humanitarian interventions in such situations. Such a force must be capable of quickly reaching and establishing itself in a killing area with sufficient information and capability to stop the blood-letting and create an environment conducive to traditional peacekeeping, stabilization, and reconstruction. While the United States and several other Western¹ nations have such capabilities, Darfur has shown once again that they lack sufficient incentive to intervene decisively—which, in any case, most Africans would not prefer. At the same time, although a number of African nations have the will to stop the killing, they lack the combat capabilities, especially for collective action.

The purpose of this report is to explore one particularly promising model of a combat force to intervene in Africa to stop mass killings and other atrocities. Its conclusion is that networking concepts and technologies, which proved effective in defeating al Qaeda in Afghanistan and in toppling Saddam Hussein in Iraq can be applied by Africans with intensive external help to field a capability for forcible humanitarian intervention. This study explores (a) what capabilities are needed to stop killing in situations like Rwanda and Darfur; (b) whether selective African forces have the potential to become “net-capable”; and (c) what external support would be needed to this end. To be clear, although the study uses Darfur as an example, we are not advocating deployment of net-capable African force to Darfur because no such capability currently exists, and it could not be created in time to stop today’s killings.

The principal building-blocks of net-capable combat forces are: high-quality combat and special operations forces; deployable sensors and other intelligence sources; high-speed data links to fuse and disseminate intelligence products; command and control nodes; ground mobility; logistics support for small light forces; rotary- and fixed-wing air for mobility and strike; and precision weapons. Well-trained forces with these capabilities can be smaller and lighter and require less logistical support than traditional forces. They can move to and throughout a theater of operations by air, which permits a rapid response to warnings. Because they can receive and make good use of intelligence about where

¹ Throughout this volume, we will frequently refer to “the West” and “Western countries.” As many readers will understand, these terms are used often—and are used here by us—as short-hand for the loose community of advanced democratic states, whether geographically Western or not. By suggesting “Western” support for African efforts to build multilateral forces, we mean to include the democracies of Europe, North America, and East Asia, but not to exclude others able and willing to help. Africa needs and deserves support from all able and willing members of the international community.

killing is occurring or imminent, deploy swiftly by air, and receive prompt reinforcement, including precision air-strikes, net-capable forces could cover more territory with greater effectiveness and less risk than traditional forces.

This combination of speed, awareness, survivability, supportability, connectedness, and lethality would enable such forces to deter or stop mass killings early; find and destroy killing forces and their means of support, as warranted; and create favorable conditions for follow-on peacekeeping forces.

The hypotheses of this study are: (1) that well-prepared net-capable African combat forces, with the right operational and intelligence support from Western militaries, could intervene decisively to defeat mass-killing forces under most plausible conditions; and (2) that the creation of such forces is possible in a matter of years, provided African and key partner countries put their minds to it, commit resources, and cooperate closely. These hypotheses are tested by examining operational challenges that often arise in mass-killing situations. Analysis of the Darfur case suggests that if such a force existed and had Western support, it could have stopped or greatly reduced the killing.

The key to developing an African humanitarian intervention force is a partnership between advanced democratic nations that have the intelligence, air capabilities, and networking tools needed by the force, and African nations that have the troops and the will to take on this mission. (Commercial firms could provide some surveillance and logistics support, though direct assistance from Western governments is preferable.) Our model for cooperation envisions a timeline with heavy Western operational involvement initially, diminishing as African capabilities grow as a result of Western assistance.

This report does not offer net-capable forces as a panacea. It discusses the logistical, tactical, procedural, and technological hurdles that would face net-capable African intervention forces, including dangers they might encounter in operations. It also highlights a host of policy issues that have to be tackled, including intelligence-sharing, participation of Western forces on the ground, command and control, and ensuring that no African state abuses such enhanced intervention capabilities.

At this time, the United States and other Western nations seem to support the AU's philosophy of "African solutions to African problems." U.S. economic programs like the African Growth and Opportunity Act are directed toward that end, as are military support programs, such as the Global Peace Operations Initiative and the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance. The European Union, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and others are also extending relevant assistance to Africa. The cooperation we are suggesting to help build a net-capable AU combat force is consistent with the emerging strategy of building African capacity to improve security. The creation of an African capability for forcible humanitarian intervention should supplement and complement current efforts, not come at their expense.

Africans are already working together through the AU and African regional groupings to develop peacekeeping forces to lend stability to weak and war-torn states. A net-capable combat force for humanitarian intervention could be an added element of the multilateral African Standby Force that is being established.

Global support for the new-found determination of Africans must not become a way to shift responsibility to end mass killing entirely to African shoulders. Rather, this is an opportunity for the advanced democracies and Africans together, to live up to a

universal responsibility by acquiring better tools. With the Darfur killings and inadequate international response still raw, but also a growing belief the Africans deserve all the support needed to stop mass killings, there could not be a better moment for Western and African governments to consider creating the means to prevent future Darfurs. Humankind's most promising technology can be used to help end this dreadful and inexcusable scourge.

I. Introduction: The New Power to Protect

Another Tragedy

The United Nations (UN) has called Darfur "the world's worst humanitarian crisis."¹ According to UN estimates, there are 1.65 million internally displaced persons in Sudan's Darfur province and another 200,000 Darfur refugees in neighboring Chad—the results of unrelenting attacks on the people of Darfur by militia and forces of the Sudanese government. According to a *Washington Post* article, "Some outside analysts suggest more than 400,000 have been killed or perished from disease or malnutrition since the violence began in February 2003."²

Since late 2002, villages throughout Darfur have been methodically attacked and destroyed, as shown on the U.S. State Department map in figure 1. Men, women, and children have been tortured and slaughtered. Women and girls have been abducted and raped. Possessions have been plundered. The region and its people have been devastated.

The UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur found that:

Government forces and militias conducted indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement, throughout Darfur. These acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and therefore may amount to crimes against humanity. It is clear from the Commission's findings that most attacks were deliberately and indiscriminately directed against civilians.³

By the prevailing international norms of the 21st Century, such treatment of human beings cannot be considered a Sudanese domestic affair. Sovereignty cannot be respected when it is used to shield systematic atrocities intended to maintain control over a population. In fact, the mass killings in Darfur have attracted considerable international condemnation. Then-U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and President George W. Bush have proclaimed the situation "genocide,"⁴ and the UN has called it a "crime against humanity."⁵ The world community has denounced the government of Sudan and called for those involved to be held accountable for their misdeeds.⁶

¹ Mohammed Ali Said, "Two years on, UN still at odds over 'world's worst humanitarian crisis'," *Agence France Presse*, February 25, 2005.

² Colum Lynch, "Lack of Access Muddies Death Toll in Darfur: Estimates Vary Widely as Sudan Stalls U.N. Effort for Regional Mortality Study," *The Washington Post*, February 8, 2005, A20.

³ International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, *Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nation Secretary-General*: UN Document S/2005/60 (Geneva: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, January 2005), 3.

⁴ Jin VandeHei and Nell Henderson, "Bust to Boost Efforts to Assist Africans," *The Washington Post*, June 11, 2005, A13.

⁵ In this paper, we will use the term "mass killing," instead of "genocide," to describe the situations in which forcible humanitarian intervention may be justified. We do this for several reasons: first, to avoid semantic and legal debate over whether genocide has occurred; second, because the growing body of international law on the legitimacy of forcible intervention does not in fact treat genocide as the only trigger; third, because the authors believe that mass killing may well justify forcible intervention, regardless of how diplomats, lawyers, and spokespeople choose to describe that killing.

⁶ Emma Thomasson, "Suspected War Crimes In Darfur to Be Probed," *The Washington Post*, June 7, 2005, A19.




Figure 1. Sudan (Darfur)—Chad Border Region: Confirmed Damaged and Destroyed Villages as of January 19, 2005⁷

⁷ Humanitarian Relief Unit, U.S. Department of State, *Sudan (Darfur)—Chad Border Region: Confirmed Damaged and Destroyed Villages, 19 January 2005*, accessed at <<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/JHEN-66SU7G?OpenDocument>>.

But the killings and crimes have continued—through all the news coverage, deliberations, appeals for action, and calls for accountability. While the origins of the tragedy are complex, the reason it has persisted is simple: *There has been no security force on the ground in Darfur with the capability and authority to do whatever it takes to stop the killers.*⁸ While one hopes that international action will yet limit further killing in Darfur, this study is about building the means to intervene early and decisively so that no more Darfurs need occur.

Creating the Power to Protect

In its report on *The Power to Protect*,⁹ Refugees International, an independent non-governmental organization dedicated to helping embattled and uprooted peoples like those of Darfur, examined what sorts of intervention forces could stop such mass killing and displacement. Noting recent advances in Western military concepts and capabilities that exploit information technology, *The Power to Protect* sought to determine whether and how these advances “can enhance the military’s ability to be deployed quickly, capably and with fewer soldiers and therefore with fewer risks and costs to prevent mass killings of civilian populations and, to the degree that this type of force is available, whether leaders will be more likely to decide in favor of combat interventions to stop mass killings.”¹⁰

The new factor in considering how to stop mass killing is the advent of “net-centric” (also called “network-centric” and “net-capable”) military forces, endowed with information networks that offer unprecedented battle-space knowledge and permit flexible and distributed yet integrated operations. According to the U.S. Defense Department:

Network-centric warfare is an emerging theory of war in the Information Age. It is also a concept that, at the highest level, constitutes the military’s response to the Information Age. The term network-centric warfare broadly describes the combination of strategies, emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures, and organizations that a fully or even a partially networked force can employ to create a decisive warfighting advantage.¹¹

All else being equal, forces that incorporate information technology and organize in networks to exploit that technology tend to be faster, better informed, more agile, and more precise and economical in their effects than ordinary ones—not only in large-scale and high-intensity combat but across a wide spectrum of contingencies. Although they have not been used for such a purpose, net-capable intervention forces of modest size and high quality should be able to stop and, if necessary, tactically defeat the types of forces associated with most African mass killings, provided they have sufficiently liberal rules of engagement and timely access to relevant information (e.g., enemy location, movement, and capabilities, and exact whereabouts of friendly forces). Units of a networked force can team up in flexible, advantageous ways. If a small unit were to encounter unexpected trouble, it could use the network to call for speedy

⁸ There are, of course, international personnel in Darfur providing humanitarian relief, but this work, while crucial, is aimed at easing the effects, not at stopping the acts of mass killing. AU forces in Darfur have neither the mandate nor the means to stop the killing.

⁹ Clifford H. Bernath and David C. Gompert, *The Power to Protect—Using New Military Capabilities to Stop Mass Killings* (Washington, DC: Refugees International, 2003).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹¹ The Office of the Secretary of Defense, *The Implementation of Net-Centric Warfare* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 5, 2005).

reinforcement and direct air strikes on targets. Air and ground firepower available from other units, not just of the unit directly engaged, could be directed promptly and precisely at any part of the enemy's forces and logistics base.

Such forces (described in detail later in this report) would consist of light but well-armed air-mobile ground units and supporting precision-strike air power able to respond promptly to tactical warnings and to find and defeat killing forces decisively. Thanks to networking, the combination of superior, shared "battle-space awareness," the ability of units to collaborate across any distance, and the ability to have precise effects multiplies the combat effectiveness of such forces, and reduces their risk of being overwhelmed. Being small and light, they can deploy swiftly with little warning and only light support requirements into remote areas. With such advantages, intervention forces may be able to end the killing, defeat and disarm killing forces, and set safe conditions for humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, and reconstruction.

Developing net-capable forces is no substitute for the basic training and equipping that are the underpinnings of any competent military. Unless efforts to strengthen basic African military capabilities go forward, introducing networking concepts will be fruitless. At the same time, properly trained and equipped forces that are also net-capable could have considerable advantages in operations demanding quick intervention to stop widespread mass killing.

Military concepts and capabilities based on networking are not science fiction. They are increasingly prominent in the U.S. military and several other Western militaries that have begun transforming themselves. They were employed successfully, albeit in quite different circumstances, by U.S. forces in the opening combat phases of the interventions in both Afghanistan (Operation *Enduring Freedom*) and Iraq (Operation *Iraqi Freedom*). These capabilities could lower costs and risks of international humanitarian intervention in Africa and elsewhere. Yet, it is far from certain that Western countries will be any more inclined use force to stop mass killing in the future than they have been in the past.

What has not been adequately explored is whether African militaries, with the help of the advanced democracies, can tap this same new potential and take the lead in stopping the mass killing of Africans. The principal reason to turn to the Africans themselves is the growing evidence that they are willing, even determined, to accept greater responsibility under regional auspices to stop mass killing. This begs the central questions of this study: Can African militaries form multilateral net-capable forces to do the job? Broadly speaking, the surprisingly rapid global spread of information know-how in general and the speed with which determined non-U.S. militaries are acquiring the skills to use the technology suggest that creation of a net-capable African humanitarian intervention force is not unrealistic, provided the United States and other advanced democracies provide critical help.

Net-capable forces are qualitatively different from traditional forces in that they are designed, structured, and employed to exploit high-speed data links. Networking—the power of shared awareness, the ability of dispersed forces to have concentrated effects, and the substitution of information for mass—is its organizing principle. However, this does not mean that forces that are only partially trained and outfitted for net-centric operations are no better than those with none of the right training or equipment. It is not all or nothing. As forces begin to benefit from enhanced information sharing, their speed, awareness, effectiveness, survivability, and supportability will all improve; this is evident from the way U.S. forces have steadily improved in operations as they have become more networked (i.e., from Kosovo to Afghanistan to Iraq). The implication of this is significant: African forces could improve *in the course of* becoming net-capable, not only after completing a lengthy metamorphosis. That said, the goal is

not to equip traditional forces with better communications but to transform the way they organize, operate, and even think in order to take advantage of the new technology concepts.

With this background in mind, the central questions analyzed in this study are:

- Can networking concepts and capabilities be applied to enable African militaries to intervene multilaterally, quickly, forcefully, and capably to stop mass killings and pave the way for peacekeeping, stabilization, and reconstruction?
- If so, how can such capabilities be created?
- What Western assistance is required to enable African forces to incorporate and employ networked capabilities?

African Means and Western Will

Unless a serious effort is made to create operationally effective and politically practical forcible intervention capabilities and options, Darfur will not be the last case of unchecked mass killing. The potential for political, economic, tribal and ethnic strife and state failure in large swathes of West, Central and East Africa implies more mass killing ahead.¹² The international “responsibility to protect”¹³ and “right to protect,” both now widely accepted, are not being matched by a “power to protect.”¹⁴

Generally speaking, the decision to protect—that is, to intervene to stop mass killing—is based on a combination of *political will* and *military means*. These two factors are interdependent. Having better means to intervene can decrease the costs and risks and thus strengthen the will to do so; having the will to stop mass killing can motivate efforts to acquire the means. But Darfur demonstrates, yet again, that the advanced Western nations are short on will and the Africans are short on means. Although the United States and a number of its allies have armed forces capable of stopping mass killing in places like Darfur, they are reluctant to do so after weighing the risks against national interests. As this is written, only a handful of Western military advisors are in Darfur helping an African Union (AU) peacekeeping force.¹⁵ For its part, the AU peacekeeping force has been too little and too late. Operationally and politically, any practical solution will have to include some combination of increasing African capabilities to intervene and increasing Western will, if not to intervene then to step up support for African capabilities.

As already observed, the advanced democratic nations could use their own emerging net-capable forces to intervene to defeat those committing mass killings, with relatively few casualties and little risk. One might think that these new capabilities could improve prospects for success to the point where intervention could be justified to Western publics, especially if accompanied by a heightened appreciation that Africa matters and that violence in Africa is more than a moral concern.

¹² World Bank, *World Bank Group Work in Low-Income Countries under Stress: A Task Force Report*, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002). 26 of the World Bank’s 48 designated Low-Income Countries Under Stress are in sub-Saharan Africa.

¹³ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa, ON: International Development Research Centre, 2001).

¹⁴ Treatment of the responsibility to protect and the right to protect are summarized in Bernath and Gompert.

¹⁵ There are large numbers of international personnel in Darfur providing humanitarian relief; but this work, while crucial, is aimed at the easing the effects, and not stopping the acts of killing.

In fact, Africa is of growing importance to the advanced democracies, and their awareness of that importance is growing. U.S. national security policy recognizes the threat that failed and failing states pose to the war on terrorism. In recent Senate testimony, Director of Central Intelligence Porter J. Goss said “In Africa, chronic instability will continue to hamper counter-terrorism efforts and pose heavy humanitarian and peacekeeping burdens.”¹⁶ Western countries also have economic interests in Africa. For example, according to U.S. Department of Energy projections, 15% of U.S. oil imports come from Africa.¹⁷ In recent years, American and European assistance to Africa has grown significantly, and both British Prime Minister Blair and President Bush are calling for still greater efforts.¹⁸ Blair has made support for Africa a top priority of the UK presidency of the European Union.¹⁹

Even so, it is unrealistic to count on the combination of growing interest in Africa and declining military risks because of new technology to tip the decision-scales of Western governments in favor of using force to stop mass killing in Africa. Increased international aid and capacity-building in Africa suggest an aversion, not a predisposition, to intervening directly. The United States and its allies have been unwilling to commit combat troops to Darfur, just as they declined to do in Rwanda a decade earlier. The problems with a purely “Western option” are more political than operational and technical:

- The political threshold for military intervention, by the United States at least, may be rising because of the difficulties encountered by U.S. forces in Iraq.
- African and Western nations alike favor an “African solutions to African problems” approach.
- The few advanced democratic nations that are sometimes willing to intervene, such as the UK and France, once colonized Africa, and their motives are suspected, fairly or unfairly, of serving those nations’ national interests rather than saving lives.
- Unless there is a follow-on peacekeeping force and a nation-building mission to come in after a military intervention, there may be no way out for the intervention force. No Western country will risk getting stuck in a sub-Saharan quagmire.

Although improved military intervention capabilities and a heightened sense of Africa’s importance have not led to a willingness in the West to use force when mass killing occurs, they should at least foster greater efforts to help Africans create their own intervention force and to provide vital operational support to that force.

For their part, African states have demonstrated a greater willingness to commit African forces to African peacekeeping missions. Africans are not just “talking the talk” of African solutions to African problems. Recent examples are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployments in Liberia, the AU initiatives to establish an African Standby Force (ASF), and even the small but growing AU ceasefire-monitoring force in Darfur itself. However, as we shall address, combat intervention is far more demanding and dangerous than

¹⁶ Porter J. Goss, “Global Intelligence Challenges 2005: Meeting Long-Term Challenges with a Long-Term Strategy,” Testimony to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 16, 2005, available at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2004/Goss_testimony_02162005.html>.

¹⁷ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future With Non-Government Experts*, December 2000, available at <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/globaltrends2015/>>.

¹⁸ David Froomkin, “The Blair Bush Project,” www.washingtonpost.com, 7 June, 2005, available at <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/blog/2005/06/07/BL2005060700709.html>> .

¹⁹ Prime Minister’s EU Presidency press conference, July 1, 2005, available at <<http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page7782.asp>>.

peacekeeping. While African states appear to have the will to intervene forcibly to stop mass killings, they lack the means—the technology, intelligence-collection, equipment, transport, organization, doctrine, tactics and training—to do so decisively.

Current efforts by the United States and its allies to improve African military capacity, though commendable, are not targeted on the goal of enhanced expeditionary combat capabilities, which is what it will take to stop mass killing by force. Rather, these efforts are meant to enhance African peacekeeping forces with capabilities more relevant to permissive (UN Chapter 6) or semi-permissive (UN Chapter 7) conditions than to non-permissive intervention. Peacekeeping forces are ordinarily used when the parties to a conflict have agreed to stop fighting and to accept an international presence. Peacekeepers are not meant or equipped to enter an area forcibly or to take offensive action aimed at destroying the capability of a local force to conduct large-scale killing. They are normally lightly armed for self-protection and are not geared to call in air strikes if in danger of being overrun.

On balance, developing African multilateral humanitarian combat intervention capabilities with international support is a more promising option than counting on the West alone. A foundation for this is already being built with AU initiatives and external assistance programs aimed at beefing up African peacekeeping capabilities; now it is time to create a “high-end” force. The opportunity to do this now exists, thanks to the applicability of network-based capabilities to this military mission and to the potential of African forces, with help, to acquire such capabilities.

Because the responsibility to protect is a universal principle, the rest of the international community must not regard the newfound African will and potential to intervene against killing forces as a chance to shift this burden entirely to African shoulders. Instead, by helping to create an African intervention force and supporting it operationally, the advanced democracies should step up to their inescapable responsibilities. Mass killing in Africa is no more an exclusively African problem than ethnic cleansing in the 1990s in Bosnia was an exclusively European problem.

To some, the idea of equipping African military forces to conduct network-based operations may seem a bridge too far. After all, African militaries are among the least advanced and funded in the world, and even advanced Western forces are struggling with the new concepts and capabilities in the process of transformation.

In considering what it would take to create a capable African combat force that could utilize the power of information; we see no “show stoppers.” Rather, the principal hypotheses of this study are that:

- Well-prepared, net-capable African combat forces with the right operational and intelligence support from Western militaries can intervene decisively to defeat mass-killing forces under most conditions.
- The creation of such capabilities is possible, provided African and Western countries and multilateral institutions put their minds to it, commit resources, and cooperate closely.

We will test these hypotheses using Darfur as an analytical case. They hinge on a judgment that the potential of selective African armed forces to absorb new concepts and capabilities and use them skillfully is greater than is widely recognized. That judgment, in turn, rests on a broader appreciation of how rapidly and well people and organizations in general are able to exploit the power of information, provided they have a strong motivation to do so. In the case of Africa, we can already see such motivation at work in the determination with which they

are accepting responsibility to tackle African security problems. In the short time since the defunct Organization of African Unity was replaced by the more ambitious and vigorous AU, one can see considerable and growing African will, which can be applied to developing the means to stop mass killing.

Darfur as a Test Case

Although the international community has failed to protect many thousands of human beings already slain there, Darfur could serve as a turning point by illuminating a practical path toward having an African capability to protect Africans. The methodology of this study is to posit capabilities of a hypothetical African combat intervention force, along with key Western assistance, that *could have stopped* the Darfur killings early and decisively. With such a Western-AU partnership as the goal, the study analyzes the feasibility, pitfalls, requisite investments, time-line, and policies required to build and use this type of force to stop mass killings.

“Forcible humanitarian intervention”—our term for what the force must be able to do—should be seen along a spectrum of military and non-military actions that can be brought to bear against governments and combatants that will not, or cannot, protect their populations, or that may be the cause of mass killings.²⁰ Our focus is on the killing “spike” of a crisis and the combat phase of an intervention to eliminate or flatten that spike. We recognize the importance but do not analyze other aspects of humanitarian intervention such as preventative diplomacy, stability operations (e.g., peacekeeping), restoration of the rule of law, and post-war reconstruction, all of which require different military and political assets—and must precede, parallel, and follow any forcible humanitarian intervention.²¹

Forcible humanitarian intervention is not an alternative to peacekeeping but may be needed to pave the way for peacekeepers. If the slaughter of large numbers of noncombatants is happening or imminent, the objective of military intervention is not to preserve peace and order but to enforce an end to the killing.²² Rarely will intervention to stop mass killing be enough to eliminate the conditions that have led to such savagery. Nor will it obviate the need for timely diplomacy to avoid such conditions. Thus, building and using a humanitarian combat force cannot be viewed in a vacuum or counted upon to solve deeper issues that lead to mass killings or difficult challenges that follow them. However, these are not reasons to fail to take direct action against mass killing, let alone to fail to create the military capability for direct action.

Not every situation involving mass killing will lend itself to armed intervention. Conditions and complexities may present prohibitive costs and risks even for a high-end force.

²⁰ Bernath and Gompert, 6.

²¹ Nor does it look at humanitarian interventions for purposes other than to stop mass killing, such as responses to famines and coping with refugee flows.

²² It is important to re-emphasize that, while this report focuses on combat interventions to stop mass killings, such interventions must be closely and seamlessly linked to follow-on peacekeeping forces and related activities. As we have seen in Iraq, and as was discussed in Bernath and Gompert, *The Power to Protect*, 24-25, the forces required to engage in and win in combat are not necessarily trained, configured or equipped to maintain a peace and help a country build the infrastructure needed for long-term stability and growth. Without the latter type of force, there is no exit strategy for the former because—in the absence of eliminating the underlying causes of a conflict—the killing is likely to resume if the combat intervention force is withdrawn in the absence of a long-term follow-on commitment.

However, this does not argue against having the capability that provides the option of forcible action for those cases where it is feasible and necessary.

Throughout, we will use language associated with the use of force that may make diplomats cringe. The surest way to end mass killing is to stop it physically; the killers must be faced by superior fighting capabilities and, if need be, made to experience deadly force, which they typically do not encounter while they are killing civilians or facing peacekeepers. Of course, this requires rules of engagement aimed at mission success, not at minimizing force—a political question to which we will return. There may be a preference to refer to forcible humanitarian intervention as a type of “peace operation” or “stability operation.” We have no objection to such euphemisms as long as they do not obfuscate the need for fighting forces that may have to overcome armed resistance when entering a recalcitrant state and, once there, find and defeat the perpetrators of mass killing. Our preferred term is “Humanitarian Combat Force,” with the understanding that it is designed and prepared to intervene forcibly and to prevail in combat operations.

As controversial as any aspect of humanitarian intervention is whether to treat *as a requirement* the consent of the sovereign state on whose territory mass killing occurs. There are, of course, many advantages in having such consent, and AU members will be hesitant to act without it. But it cannot be essential. While we will return to this later, we will make three points for now:

- Any government that conducts, condones, or cannot control mass killing on its territory should not—and by standards of evolving international law, does not—enjoy absolute protections and prerogatives of sovereignty.
- The consent, perhaps even the cooperation, of such a government is far more likely to be secured if it knows that intervention will occur with or without consent.
- There is, in any case, a need for capabilities to provide the option of forcible intervention when consent is forthcoming.

We will proceed by first describing Darfur, our main test case. Then we will explain in more detail the capabilities and advantages of networked combat intervention forces. At that point, we will suggest a hypothetical African Humanitarian Combat Force, within the ASF, that could stop mass killing, using the Darfur case. Then we will tackle policy obstacles and suggest programmatic steps. We conclude with specific recommendations.

II. The Darfur Situation

The causes and the effects of the killings in Darfur have been well documented by news media, the UN, and humanitarian organizations. This report focuses only on the conditions in Darfur that help evaluate the military capabilities needed to intervene in such a case.

The Area

The Darfur region in the western part of the Sudan comprises approximately 250,000 square kilometers and has an estimated population of 6 million persons. Sudan is considered a Least Developed Country (LDC), and ranks 139 in the 2004 United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) Human Development Index.²³ There is no national road grid to speak of, and large parts of Sudan are agricultural, pastoral, or barren.²⁴ The majority of the population lives in small villages and hamlets, often composed of only a few hundred families. Individual allegiances are still heavily determined by tribal affiliations.

The Killing Forces

From the perspective of the Darfur population—and according to UN reports—all of the parties to the conflict are “killing” forces. All prey on and to some degree target the civilian population. Although the Sudanese government denies complicity, the January 2005 “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General,”²⁵ proves the contrary. According to that report, the combatants include:

The Sudanese Armed Forces. The army numbers approximately 200,000 in strength, although its logistical capacity was designed for an army of 60,000.²⁶ Support, in particular air support, therefore goes primarily to priority areas and is re-deployed only after those areas have calmed down. The central command and control of armed forces operations are therefore imperative.

Janjaweed. Up to six brigades have been identified, totaling an estimated 20,000 fighters.²⁷ The Janjaweed are of Arab descent, many with military experience. Although some dress in civilian clothing, most wear khaki uniforms similar to those of the Sudanese military.²⁸ The Janjaweed are not organized in one single coherent structure, and the Commission identified three main categories of Janjaweed actors, determined according to their type of affiliation with the Government of Sudan.²⁹

- Militias that are only loosely affiliated with the government but have received weapons and other supplies from Khartoum. These militias are thought to operate primarily under a tribal management structure. They are thought to undertake attacks at the request of State authorities, but are suspected by the Commission of sometimes also acting on their own initiative to undertake small scale actions to loot property for personal gain.
- Militias that are organized in paramilitary structures and in parallel to regular forces, including groups known as “the Strike Force,” the *Mujahedeen*, or the *Fursan* (the horsemen). Some of these may be headed by officers in the regular army while also

²³United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World* (New York: United Nations Human Development Report Offices, 2004), 141.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, paragraph 78, 27.

²⁵ International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, paragraph 78, 27.

²⁷ Human Rights Watch, *Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan*, 16, no. 6(A), (New York: Human Rights Watch, May 2004).

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, paragraph 99, 33-34.

controlled by senior tribal leaders. While militias in this category are thought to operate within a defined command structure, they do not have any legal basis.

- Members of the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) and Border Intelligence who have a legislative basis under Sudanese law. The PDF provides arms, uniforms, and training to mobilized civilians, who are then integrated into the regular army command and normally wear the same uniform as they unit they are fighting with.

Rebel Movement Groups. These groups formed in opposition to the government and government-supported groups listed above. Nominally, they seek to protect the lives, rights, and lands of the non-Arab populations under attack. However, there are documented instances of their own complicity in attacking those same populations.

- The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)
- The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
- National Movement for Reconstruction/Reform and Development (NMRD)
- *Korbaj*, which means “whip” in Arabic, is supposedly composed of members of Arab tribes
- *Al Shahamah*, which in Arabic means “The Nobility Movement”
- Sudanese National Movement for the Eradication of Marginalization.

Capabilities and Tactics

The capabilities and tactics of these killing forces can best be described by using three actual examples, extracted from the United Nations International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur report:

*Anka Village, North Darfur.*³⁰ About 0900 on or about 17 or 18 February 2004 the village of Barey, situated about 5 kilometers from the village of Anka, was attacked by a combined force of government soldiers and Janjaweed. A witness from Barey then alerted the villagers of Anka of a possible imminent attack.

About 1700 on the same day, witnesses from Anka observed between 300 and 400 Janjaweed on foot and another 100 on camels and horses advancing towards Anka from the direction of Barey. The attackers were described as wearing the same khaki uniforms as the government soldiers and were armed with Kalashnikovs, G3s, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

Witnesses observed more than 20 vehicles behind the Janjaweed forces, including four heavy trucks and eighteen Toyota pickup vehicles. Some of the vehicles were green and others were navy blue. The pickups had *Dushkas* (12.7mm tripod-mounted machine guns) fitted onto the back, and one had a Hound rocket-launcher system, which was used to fire rockets into and across the village. The trucks carried government armed forces and were later used to transport looted property from the village.

According to witnesses, villagers fled in a northerly direction, towards a wooded area about 5 kilometers from the village. Before the Janjaweed entered the village, the government armed forces bombed the area around the village with Antonov aircraft. One aircraft circled the village while the other one bombed. The first one was colored white and had a black underside,

³⁰ Ibid., 66-67.

while the second one was completely white. The bombing lasted for about two hours, during which time 20 to 35 bombs were dropped around the outskirts of the village. A hospital building was hit during the bombardment.

After the bombing, the Janjaweed and government soldiers moved in and looted the village including bedding, clothes and livestock. Remaining buildings were then destroyed by burning. Janjaweed also fired RPGs into the village from the top of the hill overlooking Anka. The bombing of the areas around the village appears to have been conducted to facilitate the looting and destruction by Janjaweed and government armed forces.

According to witnesses, approximately 30 SLM/A members were present in the village at the time of the attack, apparently to defend the village following the announcement of the imminent attack. 15 civilians were killed in Anka as a result of shrapnel injuries during and after the attack. 8 others were wounded. While some have recovered, others reportedly are disabled as a result of their injuries. At the time of the report, the village was totally deserted.

*Shoba, Kabkabya.*³¹ The first attack began at 0830 on 2 April 2001, a market day. Arab militia reportedly attacked Shoba West and Shoba Karika with the intention of looting animals. However, 15 people were killed and 9 were wounded in the attack. Approximately 55 Arab militia, wearing camouflage green uniforms and armed with AK47s, G3s, and RPGs, attacked the villages on horses and camels. The leader and several other attackers were known to the victims and were reported to the police station nearby. The police investigated the incident and arrested four suspected perpetrators, who were still in the village at the time. According to witnesses, no rebels were present in the village either at the time of the attack or at any other time.

Approximately 100 Arab militia attacked Shoba West and Shoba Karika from the north in a second incident on 28 April, 2002. The perpetrators of the second attack matched the profile of those responsible for the first attack. They were led this time by two senior leaders of the Arab militia. 24 people were killed during the attack and another 23 were injured. 338 houses were burned, and the north and east of the village were completely destroyed. Property belonging to villagers, including all livestock, food, and medicine, was looted.

According to witnesses, the attack took place from 0415 until about 0930, when government forces arrived. Villagers identified the perpetrators, who were about 500 meters from the village with the looted goods. However, the government soldiers reportedly refused to pursue them and one officer told a witness that he was under instructions not to pursue the attackers. Government armed forces later confiscated the villagers' weapons. Afterwards, the Minister of Interior visited the area, together with the Walis of the three Darfur states, to appraise the situation and later sent food and support to rebuild the village.

A third attack took place from 0500 to 1800 on 25 July, 2003, this time on Shoba East and Shoba West. According to reports, the attack was led by the two senior Janjaweed leaders and involved approximately 400 Janjaweed and government armed forces using camels, horses and Land Cruisers armed with *Dushkas*. The villages were totally destroyed during the attack and 42 people were killed and 10 injured. All moveable property in the villages was looted.

*Adwa.*³² According to witnesses, at 0600 on 23 November 2004, government armed forces in complicity with Janjaweed launched an attack on Adwa. Rebel forces reportedly held a base on

³¹ Ibid., 67-68.

³² Ibid., 68-69.

top of the mountains near Adwa, and a battle between government soldiers and rebel forces ensued. Two helicopter gunships and an Antonov were used during the attack, possibly for reconnaissance purposes. Ground forces used various weapons including AK47, G3, G4 assault rifles, RPG7, machine guns, and *Dushkas* mounted on vehicles. According to witness reports, civilians including women, children, and elderly persons were targeted during the attack. Many were forced to flee to a nearby mountain, where they remained for several days.

There are reports that government and Janjaweed armed forces instructed women not to flee and told them that they were not targets. However, some women were captured and detained by the attackers for two days. Men were summarily shot, as was anyone who attempted to escape. Young girls were taken by the attackers to another location, and many were raped in the presence of other women. The attackers looted the village. While in the mountains, several of the victims reportedly were shot by government soldiers and Janjaweed. Many people were killed and more than 100 were injured. Following the attack, representatives of an international organization searched the village and found several injured women and children, whom they escorted to hospital. They also found the bodies of between 20 and 30 civilians who had been killed during the attack, including women and children. All of the victims were reportedly from Adwa and belonged to the Fur tribe. It is also alleged that many bodies are still to be found in the mountains.

By way of recap, the equipment used by the killing forces includes:

- Aircraft (helicopter gunships and Antonovs) w/bombs and machine guns
- Light weapons and machine guns (AK47s, G3 and G4 assault rifles, and *Dushka* 12.7mm machine guns mounted on vehicles)
- Rocket-Propelled Grenade Launchers
- Land Cruisers, camels, and horses.

Tactics include:

- Cutting off phone services in areas about to be attacked
- Aerial attacks on villages followed by ground assaults
- Targeting (killing) villagers as they flee
- Systematic looting of belongings
- Systematic destruction of villages
- Systematic human rights abuses, including murder of unarmed civilians, kidnapping, slavery, torture, and rape.

The International Response

The UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland called the Darfur situation "ethnic cleansing" in April 2004.³³ On the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that action in Darfur could "mean a continuum of steps, which may include military action."³⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 1591 strongly condemned all human rights and international humanitarian law violations, and UN Security Council Resolution 1556 levied a vague threat of sanctions. The

³³United Nations News Centre, *Sudan: Envoy warns of ethnic cleansing as Security Council calls for ceasefire*, April 2, 2004, available at <<http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=10307&Cr=sudan&Cr1=#>>.

³⁴ Associate Spokesman for the Secretary-General of the United Nations, *Highlights of the Noon Briefing*, April 7, 2004, available at <http://www.un.org/News/press/docs/2004/hilites/hilites_arch_view.asp?HighID=15>.

International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur reported to the Secretary-General that the government and militias were systematically abusing civilians in Darfur, but did not call the abuse genocide.³⁵ The UN is a keen supporter of the fledgling peace-operation abilities of the Africa Union, facilitating planning, logistics and meetings for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and the Secretary-General has used his good offices to push for resolution of the crisis.³⁶

Washington has provided more than \$97m to support the AU ceasefire monitoring mission in Darfur, including \$75m appropriated from the U.S. Congress in FY2005 and an additional \$50m as part of the FY2005 Supplemental Budget, and \$138m and food aid for humanitarian needs in the Darfur crisis.³⁷

The AMIS Protection Force that monitors the Darfur crisis was originally meant to have 3,320 troops by the end of May 2005. As of April 2005, AMIS had a 1,695-strong Protection Force and approximately 450 military observers. The Protection Force comes from Nigeria (391 troops), Rwanda (392 troops), The Gambia (196 troops), Senegal (196 troops), Kenya (35 military police), and South Africa (285 troops).³⁸ In April 2005, the AU Peace and Security Council announced the decision to enlarge AMIS to 7,700 personnel by the end of September 2005.³⁹ The additional personnel will be drawn from Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, and South Africa,⁴⁰ though it is still unclear whether the troops will require further training.

In support of the ambitious AU plans, both NATO and the EU agreed in June 2005 to provide military, logistical and planning support for AMIS. NATO and the EU will have separate coordinating cells within the AU mission, based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Each cell will have a small staff of military officers that will liaise with one another to avoid duplication of effort in airlift, planning, and logistics. The organizations set a 1 July, 2005 target date to start troop airlifts. Under the NATO banner, the United States has agreed to provide airlift for Rwandan troops; under the EU banner, France will provide airlift to Senegalese troops. Canada has committed 25 transport helicopters and 100 armored personnel carriers. Most importantly, NATO and EU efforts will be under AU leadership.⁴¹

The most proactive elements of the AMIS mandate enable it to provide a “visible military presence by patrolling and establishment of temporary outposts in order to deter uncontrolled armed groups from committing hostile acts against the population.” However, AMIS’ mandate is only to protect civilians it encounters under “imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capabilities.”⁴² The AU force is lacking in speed, firepower, air support,

³⁵ International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur.

³⁶ United Nations Secretary-General’s Press Release, “We are not moving fast enough to deal with the appalling situation in Darfur,” SG/SM/9751 AFR/1120, March 7, 2005.; Mohammed Ali Saeed, “Annan arrives in Sudan for Darfur talks,” *Agence France-Presse*, May 27, 2005, available at <<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EVIU-6CSGAB?OpenDocument>>; Reuters, “Annan visits burned-out town in Darfur,” May 28, 2005, available at <<http://msnbc.msn.com/id/8017766/>>.

³⁷ Sudan Desk Officer, U.S. Department of State, interview by author, Washington, DC, June 16, 2005.

³⁸ Information supplied by COL Michael Smith, USA (Ret.), former U.S. Advisor to the African Union for Darfur Crisis Planning, June 24, 2005.

³⁹ African Union Peace and Security Council, *Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in the Darfur region of the Sudan*, PSC/PR/2(XXVIII), April 28, 2005, available at <http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/centorg/PSC/2005/28rep.pdf>, 28, paragraph 114.

⁴⁰ Judy Dempsey, “NATO agrees to lend its help in Darfur,” *International Herald Tribune*, June 9, 2005.

⁴¹ Ibid.; ISN Security Watch, “NATO, EU agree to help AU in Darfur,” June 10, 2005.

⁴² African Union Peace and Security Council, *Communiqué of the 17th Meeting*, PSC/PR/Comm.(XVII), October 20, 2004, available at <http://www.africa-union.org/News_Events/Communiqu%C3%A9s/Communiqu%C3%A9%20_Eng%2020%20oct%202004.pdf>, 2, paragraph 6..

communications, and intelligence—qualities that net-capable forces can bring to bear.⁴³ Lacking these capabilities, it is much too small to create a “visible presence” in such a vast area. Nonetheless, AMIS is performing competently and has begun to head off some attacks and permit some villagers to return home. Evidently, the Janjaweed do not attack if an AU unit has reached the village first, which gives some indication of the limits of the killers’ capability and willingness to fight.⁴⁴ This provides a glimpse of what is possible if the Africans and the West commit to creating an effective AU combat intervention force with Western operational support.

III. Net-Capable Model for Forcible Humanitarian Intervention

The Operational Challenge

The military capability to intervene forcibly to stop mass killing should be shaped to meet the operational challenges commonly posed by such contingencies. Generally speaking, situations in Africa such as Darfur, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Cote d’Ivoire can be characterized as follows:

Large numbers of defenseless civilians killed over wide areas. While sometimes concentrated, mass killings tend to be geographically distributed. They may occur in a relatively short period of time, as in Rwanda, or over a longer period of time, as in Darfur. Warning time and the chance of reaching the scene of killing in time to stop it vary accordingly.

Killing forces lacking in serious combat capability, discipline, and a will to fight well-trained, well-equipped military forces. While they may be ideological and fanatical, they are more often motivated by material rewards, revenge, or criminal tendencies, and to be agitated by unscrupulous leaders.

Government complicity (or, at best, inability to stop the killing). While the killing may be perpetrated by rebel forces, as in Sierra Leone, or result from a general collapse of authority, as in Eastern Congo, it is as likely to be orchestrated, supported, or condoned by the national government, as it was in Rwanda and is in Darfur.

Alliances of convenience. In most cases, the killing forces comprise multiple armed factions—some of which may be backed by neighboring countries—with differing strategic goals. Often, alliances among these groups change over time.

Underdeveloped infrastructure. Because mass killing tends to occur in poor regions, countries, and areas, there are usually few and poor roads, airfields, railways, ports, and communications networks.

⁴³ African Union Peace and Security Council, *Report of the Chairperson*, 11, paragraph 43 details efforts to curb the shortages.

⁴⁴ Ken Bacon, Shannon Meehan and Eileen Shields-West, “Sudan: African Union Peace Monitors Creating Pockets of Security in Darfur,” *RI Bulletin* (Washington, DC: Refugees International, February 25, 2005); African Union Peace and Security Council, *Report of the Chairperson*, 7, paragraph 25.

Killing locations not routinely covered by international intelligence collection. The United States possesses most of the world's technical intelligence sensors and concentrates them on regions where it has or may use large-scale military power or faces threats to vital interests or allies. Accordingly, it does not keep them trained on Africa.

These conditions make it difficult and potentially risky for traditional armed forces to intervene effectively to stop killing, which helps explain the inhibitions to mounting such operations. Lack of intelligence coverage, government complicity, fluid alliances, large geographic areas, and poor transportation infrastructure and communications networks all favor the killing forces. They can attack quickly with minimal weapons—because their targets are mostly unarmed civilians—and without fear of detection. In short, even unprofessional killing forces are able to commit mass murder because they can exploit and operate within an information vacuum. Even when peacekeeping missions are established within the country, the killing sprees often are so sudden, scattered, and unpredictable that the killers are done and gone by the time peacekeepers arrive.

Yet, these challenges are not as forbidding when faced by forces enabled by the power of information and the concept of networking. Operation *Enduring Freedom*—the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan following the 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States—showed what small, mobile, well-trained forces, endowed with situational awareness and networked with precision-strike air power can do against a scattered and elusive enemy in difficult terrain. True, those were U.S. special operations forces (SOF) and strike aircraft. Yet, the Al Qaeda forces they defeated were far more capable and fierce than typical African killing forces, most of which have neither the skill nor the will to fight professional troops, especially if backed by precision air power.

The point is not that conditions in Darfur resemble conditions in Afghanistan, for they do not. Rather, it is that net-capable forces can reach and operate effectively in remote and unimproved areas, that substantial intelligence assets can be brought to bear quickly, that dispersed irregular forces, if found and isolated—an important “if”—can be defeated by high-quality regular forces, especially if ground and air power are integrated via data links. With the right preparation, equipment, and support, forces less sophisticated than American SOF—e.g., high-quality African troops—should be able to defeat the likes of Sudan's camel-mounted Janjaweed.

Net-Capable Combat Forces

The principal building-blocks of net-capable combat forces are: high-quality combat and special operations forces (SOF); deployable sensors and other intelligence sources; high-speed data links to gather, fuse and disseminate intelligence products; command and control nodes; ground mobility; logistics support for small light forces; rotary- and fixed-wing air for mobility and strike; and precision weapons. Why are such forces with such capabilities so advantageous?

By enhancing both shared awareness and connectivity for collaboration among units, superior information capabilities can reduce the size and weight (e.g. armor) of a military force required for a given mission. Reduced size and weight, in turn, permit greater mobility and speed. Speed can be further enhanced by greater knowledge of the battlefield, enemy forces, and friendly forces, thanks to sensors accessible through the network. At the same time, networked forces need not be spatially concentrated to collaborate and concentrate their effects; indeed,

dispersed but integrated forces can be more effective than massed forces, whether in responding to a distributed enemy or a concentrated one. Against larger and heavier forces, dispersed networked forces can call on other mobile forces on the network. In sum, by enhancing both awareness and collaboration, networked forces can be light, dispersed, quick, and survivable—a potent combination for dealing with sudden and dispersed killings across a wide area.

Because net-capable forces can be comparatively small and light, they have a smaller footprint—heavy gear, support personnel, command and control apparatus, logistics vehicles, and stocks—than traditional forces. Therefore, they can more easily be deployed to the zone of killing by air. This permits a rapid international response—assuming timely political decisions are made—and the chance to deter or otherwise prevent killings before they have gotten very far. With such forces, the risks, costs, casualties, collateral damage, and duration of intervention could be lowered, and confidence in success could be raised. In some cases, given the nature of many of the killing forces in Africa, the timely deployment of a highly capable, highly lethal military force may deter killers who choose flight over fight. All these factors could incline political leaders to take action based on humanitarian concern and international responsibility, even in the absence of direct national strategic or material interests.

As important as the composition of the force is the way it operates. In keeping with network concepts, every unit or individual of the force is able and expected to collect and share all relevant information available anywhere on the network—i.e., among all sensors and other units (which themselves serve as sensors). In addition any unit can collaborate via the network with any other unit, whether ground-to-ground, ground-to-air, or air-to-air. Because their logistics systems are also networked, such forces can get the ammunition, fuel, water, food and parts they need when they need it, rather than having to lug supplies around with them.

Decisionmaking authority can be decentralized to exploit distributed information, enhance agility, and shorten reaction time while still keeping top commanders informed of the course of the operations in whatever detail they need. Plans can and should provide broad latitude for local initiative and adjustment, offering flexibility that is crucial in the confused, cloudy, and shifting circumstances that often surround mass killing. Similarly, the elements of the force can be modular, enabling them to be augmented, reconfigured, or reduced as the conditions of the contingency warrant. Net-capable forces are more easily tailored, sized, packaged, and modified than ordinary forces.

For all the advantages of net-capable forces, the transition to them is inherently difficult. The U.S. military has been transforming itself for a decade or longer and still has a distance to go before it is thoroughly networked in its structures, capabilities, command and control, and skills. As with the information-network revolution in any human sector or endeavor, the technology is the easy part. Far harder to overcome are institutional resistance, ingrained doctrine, culture, and tradition and experience that make full exploitation of the technology difficult. The greatest obstacle of all in Africa may be the legacy of centralized decisionmaking—the predilection of top commanders to *control*—that defeats the very purpose of networking and discourages the initiative and accountability at lower ranks that enables a networked force to function with agility. It takes a combination of determined leadership and a new generation lacking in sympathy for the status quo to clear these obstacles from the path. Unless and until this occurs, the effectiveness of an African humanitarian intervention force will fall short of its potential.

Yet, without underestimating these obstacles, it would be a mistake to think that African military establishments cannot make the necessary changes. Because security problems persist in much of Africa, a growing number of African military establishments are taking the quality,

readiness, and preparation of their forces seriously. More and more African officers have been exposed to American, British, and other Western concepts, standards, and information technology. Nevertheless, it will take intensive training, education, exercise, leadership development, and exposure to Western militaries that are going through the same process.

Is Networking Really Necessary?

As we have noted, there are significant efforts underway by Western powers to increase African traditional peacekeeping capacity in terms of military training (tactical training, professional military education, civil-military relations, professionalism, doctrine development, logistics, etc.) and equipment. These efforts are still needed. The addition of net-centric training and equipment the ability to deploy lighter, more agile, more inter-connected, and more lethal forces will help Africans address their growing need not only to keep peace, but to forcibly intervene to stop mass killings and make a peace possible.

It might be feared that investing in the creation of a net-capable African force would delay the day when humanitarian intervention could stop mass killing. This is wrong for two reasons. First, as noted earlier, forces undergoing transformation to exploit information technology improve throughout the process, not only at the end of it. Provided that operating doctrines and plans are revised to incorporate networking principles, investments in linking sensors, forces, and command nodes can begin to pay dividends right away. Indeed, favoring platforms, weapons, and traditional training over information, connectivity, and net-centric concepts of operations is less likely to produce early results. There is nothing to be gained and precious time to be lost by withholding the benefits of information networking from selected African combat units until they have mastered previous stages of military doctrine.

Second, traditional forces, even if strengthened, may not be able to respond effectively to the operational conditions associated with mass killing. Compared to net-capable forces, traditional forces lack shared and detailed battle-space awareness, speed, and the ability to operate in a distributed, interconnected, and collaborative way. They cannot disperse to protect remote populations with confidence in immediate support from other units on the network. Un-networked ground and air units cannot team up as easily to deter or overcome enemy forces or adjust to unforeseen or changing circumstances.

Being less aware and agile, traditional forces have to be substantially larger and heavier than net-capable ones to accomplish the same mission. One net-capable brigade-size force, for example, might have the combat equivalence of several conventional brigades. At least one of the conventional brigades would have to be heavily armored; the others might be traditional infantry with artillery and other heavy equipment. Logistic support for such a force would have to be much larger, and the entire force and its support train would be much slower than a networked force—slow to get to the country in crisis, slow to respond to tactical warning of impending killing, and slow to adjust as conditions warrant. Size and weight would hinder if not preclude air-lift and air-assault. Network inadequacies would limit coordination with precision air strikes.

The concept of operations for a traditional force would be quite different from that of a network-centric force. Because a traditional force cannot readily rely on widely dispersed and networked SOF, UAVs, and other intelligence sensors, it might have to dispatch intelligence units across the countryside to get even a limited view of what was happening. Even then, main fighting units would not be able to pull information in real time from these intelligence units.

The headquarters would not have a complete, all-source, and timely picture of the operational situation across the countryside; its information about both enemy and friendly forces could be days old—far longer than the time it takes for killing forces to enter a village and slay or chase away the population.

Lacking actionable information and the means to react and move swiftly, and being required to concentrate forces to concentrate firepower, a traditional force might have to be massed at central locations—secure but unresponsive. The lack of agility, survivability, and ability to share firepower compared to a networked force would drive up the size and weight and thus reduce the mobility of the force required, with little hope of being able to reach villages ahead of the killing forces. An alternative would be to spread the force thinly throughout the province to create a visible presence in hopes of deterring attack, but this would amount to stationing disconnected and potentially vulnerable units at long distances from each other and from their support.

A third alternative for using traditional forces is to deploy them on such a massive scale (e.g., several divisions) that they provide a credible and survivable presence throughout an expansive killing zone. Organizing such a huge African regional combat force is surely less realistic than creating a small, high-quality, net-capable one. Moreover, planning an operation, assembling the force and logistics, and deploying could take many months, if it were not out of the question for political and resource reasons. In any case, whether concentrated (thus unresponsive), dispersed (thus vulnerable), or massive (thus unrealistic), a traditional force might not present an adequate deterrent to the killers, who could avoid unfavorable engagements and attack when and where they wished, or complete their killing before an intervention. Nor could the traditional force track and strike bands of killers.

The point is not merely that traditional forces would not be as good as net-capable ones in such operations, but that the former might not succeed at all and could face high casualties and other costs.

General Shape and Mission of an African Humanitarian Intervention Force

The key to successful humanitarian intervention is to maximize the force's awareness and agility, not its size and weight. Thus, well-prepared, light, mobile, net-capable African humanitarian intervention forces—with air power and other operational support from advanced Western nations—offer the best chance to stop mass killing in African countries. This proposition demands, among other things:

- that these forces operate under a mandate that allows them tactically to engage and defeat killing forces, if that is what it takes, and even to initiate action against those forces if it advances the mission of stopping mass killings of civilians;
- that they are composed of the most capable African forces available; and
- that they are given access to information networks that improve situational awareness and permit flexible teaming.

The importance of being able and authorized to take the battle to the killers cannot be overstated. As British forces showed in Sierra Leone, a strategy of seeking, attacking, and bloodying a killing force can have dramatic salutary effects—setting conditions for restoration of security, reconstruction, and eventual reconciliation. Intervention to stop large-scale killing could prove highly violent or not, depending on the situation and the reaction of those doing the killing.

In Kosovo, intervention came in the form of weeks of unrelenting NATO air strikes on Serbian targets. In Croatia, ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs ended when the Croatian army regrouped and went on the offensive. In Bosnia, a European-led UN Protection Force was unable for several years to stop ethnic cleansing and killing until NATO began bombing Serb forces. In Rwanda, the killing abated only when the rebel Tutsi army closed in on the capital. In all five cases, confronting the killers with superior forces was both necessary and sufficient to stop the atrocities. In the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), UN forces have been permitted to strike back hard against militias that attacked peacekeepers, with salutary effects.

Perhaps the prospect of having to face well-armed, networked, high-quality combat forces would deter would-be killers or compel them to abandon their campaign. As it is today, those who commit such outrages know they have little danger of being stopped, much less attacked. Indeed, the surest way to avoid losses while carrying out a humanitarian intervention is to convince the killing force to avoid combat.

Of course, it may be that nothing short of fighting the killers will work. While intervention to stop large-scale political killing may not require or resemble all-out warfare, killing is more likely to be stopped if the killers know that intervention forces have the ability, will, mandate, and rules of engagement to defeat and eliminate them. Those who commit mass slaughter are less ready to fight than to kill—and may be less ready to kill if they face being killed. They may have no combat capability to speak of, since it takes none to kill unarmed civilians. Only by intervening with superior combat forces can a humanitarian intervention force be assured of success, either by intimidating the killers into submission or flight or by defeating them.

Prospects for Operational Success

Although networking concepts and capabilities have been employed in combat (against al Qaeda, the Taliban and Saddam Hussein's forces), they have not been used for forcible humanitarian interventions with a primary mission of stopping mass killing, which presents quite a different set of operational challenges. Nevertheless, it is possible to make qualitative analytical judgments about how a net-capable humanitarian intervention force *should* fare in those circumstances. This can be done by deconstructing actual occurrences of mass killing into operational challenges and examining how well forces with such capabilities would perform against those challenges.

By this method, *The Power to Protect* analyzed killing situations in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East Timor, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Cote d'Ivoire, using a common set of criteria to assess the difficulty each would have posed to a net-capable military intervention force.⁴⁵ Those results were compared with a similar breakdown of the conditions faced by U.S. networked forces in Afghanistan during Operation *Enduring Freedom*, taking into account the differences in the two types of operations. (The most important criteria are those in figure 2.) That analysis indicated that there usually is enough strategic warning to mount an intervention and that killing forces, if engaged, can be defeated by combat forces with network-based capabilities.⁴⁶ Although sudden, sporadic, scattered killing and dispersed killing forces

⁴⁵ This analysis was based in part on visits to some of the areas, opinions of military and civilian experts who served in some of the areas, and independent research. This was not a scientific survey based on statistical analysis. The results reflect "collective wisdom" based on research and interviews.

⁴⁶ Bernath and Gompert, 18-22.

present operational problems, these can, in the analysis, be overcome by net-capable forces supported by advanced sensors, operating in small mobile units, capable of quick response on tactical warning, and with networked reinforcements readily available. Of course, air transport and precision-strike assets are essential enablers.

Strategic Warning	Are there observable conditions that gave early warning to the international community of the <i>danger of large-scale political killing</i> ?
Tactical Warning	Was information available to indicate that <i>killing had begun or was imminent</i> ?
Clarity of Combatants	Is it possible to distinguish combatants from one another and from non-combatants?
Clarity of Killing Group(s)	Is significant killing being done by more than one force against more than one group?
Clarity of Victims	Is it clear who was being killed (combatants, noncombatants, ethnic groups, etc.)?
Killing Force Capabilities	Are the killing forces well trained and equipped?
Resolve of Killing Force	Is their motivation strong enough that they are willing to risk death in battle to achieve their goals?
Allies of Killing Force	Can the killers expect reinforcement from another force? If so, how capable is that force?
Disbursement of Killing Force	To what extent is the killing concentrated/dispersed?
Friendly Forces	Is there a capable, friendly local military force (not engaged in killing itself) that could facilitate an intervention?
Status of Noncombatants	Is there a separate capacity to provide concurrent humanitarian relief (so that the intervening force can concentrate on fighting the killers)?
Operational Accessibility & Logistics	How accessible is the theater (e.g., distant, land-locked) and how difficult are logistics for intervening force?
Terrain	How difficult is the terrain (e.g., mountainous, vegetation, urban)?

Figure 2. Operational Criteria

The analysis also revealed potential difficulties even for net-capable forces in forcible humanitarian interventions, among them:

- Inaccessible areas
- Unfavorable terrain
- Poor visibility
- Difficulty in distinguishing the killing force(s) and identifying external parties who provide direct and indirect support to the killing forces
- Lack of capable friendly local forces
- Lack of parallel humanitarian relief capacity.

As previously noted, however, difficult access and terrain should be less of a problem for net-capable intervention forces than for traditional forces, because the former forces are smaller, lighter, and require less logistic support.⁴⁷ Such forces are more easily airlifted to distant and/or land-locked countries with poor infrastructure.⁴⁸ Once there, they have greater mobility in mountains, jungle, and even urban terrain. The effectiveness of the force could be impaired if terrain, location, and infrastructure do not permit fixed-wing air-transport and strike operations.

Although poor visibility would not necessarily stop net-capable intervention forces, it could present difficulties for surveillance and reinforcement. The difficulty of seeing through forest canopy would not only militate against effective intervention—because of the need for swift response on warning—but also increase risks that intervening forces will be engaged by larger-than-expected enemy forces. Although they are linked to supporting firepower, small light forces, even with sufficient awareness, can be ambushed and possibly overrun before air strikes or ground reinforcements arrive. Hours and minutes can be precious when a small force is caught against a larger and heavier force, even if the latter is of lower quality with less sophisticated weapons. While most cases of large-scale killing have not involved the kinds of forces that could pose a threat to small but able, networked, combat forces, the danger cannot be excluded.

This danger argues for ensuring that intervention forces are top-notch fighting troops who can hold their own if help is delayed.⁴⁹ It also suggests the need for rules of engagement that permit preemptive strikes on killing forces when they are exposed, as well as retaliatory strikes against killing forces that attack intervention forces. It must be clear that any force—regardless of origin, sponsorship, or motivation—that interferes with the multilateral humanitarian mission becomes fair game.

Humanitarian intervention forces cannot count on having local allies. In Kosovo and Afghanistan, U.S. and coalition forces were able to rely on local forces (the Kosovo Liberation Army and Northern Alliance, respectively) to smoke out enemy forces, making air strikes more effective. Although potential allies may be available in some situations of large-scale killing (as the Tutsi rebel army was in Rwanda), intervening forces cannot count on them. Alignment with one side may imply that the intervention is not intended merely to save lives. Therefore, the intervention force should be sized to stop the killing on its own, though reinforcement plans ought to be agreed in advance.

One problem not easily overcome, even by net-capable forces, is that killing is often not the work of a single armed group against a single unarmed group. Different forces could be

⁴⁷ Think of the dramatic difference in approach and effectiveness between small networked U.S. forces in Afghanistan and a huge traditional Soviet army there 20 years earlier.

⁴⁸ This depends on the range, capacity, and required runway length and conditions of the transport aircraft.

⁴⁹ This requirement underscores the need for current efforts to improve basic combat skills to continue.

killing different groups of innocents believed to be sympathetic to the other side, which has been the case in Eastern DRC and Cote d'Ivoire. Moreover, the killers might not be forces at all but instead civilians or undisciplined militia (as in East Timor and Rwanda). Net-based improvements in awareness and precision, although dramatic, may not be sufficient if killers are indistinguishable from those being killed. At the same time, networked forces can be more responsive than traditional forces to fluid and ambiguous local conditions, provided that decisionmaking authority has been distributed adequately along with information throughout the network. One of the great virtues of networking, in all fields, is that it encourages discretionary action by individuals "on the edge" who are face-to-face with reality. This goes for humanitarian intervention forces sent to confront elusive killers in shifting and murky situations.

In any case, situational murkiness is not a legitimate excuse for inaction. It is both an operational and moral imperative that a humanitarian intervention force sent to stop killing of civilian populations be authorized and expected to stop killing by *any* group. Several different groups, whether allied or opposing, may threaten innocent people, and the threat can change from one phase of the conflict to the next. Even though the intervention may be ordered with one killing force in mind, the mission of protecting people should be constant, even if different killers appear. The mission of the force is to stop the killing, not to support one faction over another. This goes for government forces, militia, rebels, foreign forces, or any other group. A net-capable force is both better informed and more flexible in the face of fluid conditions.

Finally, the absence of parallel humanitarian-relief missions can mean that uprooted people may suffer and die, even though they have been protected from killing forces. For every person killed outright in Darfur, about thirty have been displaced and depend on international relief for survival. To be militarily effective, an intervention force cannot be diverted by relief demands. Moreover, combat forces are not equipped or trained to handle the particular set of tasks involved in providing large-scale humanitarian care. Conversely, as the replacement of UN by NATO forces in Bosnia showed, humanitarian relief is far more effective once killing forces are defeated or neutralized.

In sum, mass-killing episodes can be complex and confusing, and there should be no assumption or implication that forcible humanitarian intervention by mobile, net-capable, combat forces, even with advanced intelligence, can be made risk-free and certain of success in every instance. Leaders contemplating intervention to stop mass killing must expect some casualties among the forces they send and some uncertainty about quick victory. Nevertheless, net-capable forces and operations have distinct advantages over large hierarchical ones that lack of speed, awareness, and flexibility. Nearly every one of the conditions that may militate against successful intervention can be more readily overcome by net-capable forces than by traditional ones. In particular, the occurrence of widespread killing by dispersed and mobile killing forces over wide expanses of unimproved and remote territory virtually demands the exploitation of information technology and the application of network operating principles. Thus, although network-based concepts and capabilities were not originally designed with the goal of stopping mass killing in mind, they appear to be well suited to such circumstances and such a mission.

The Intelligence Challenge

One of the biggest challenges is the reliance of net-capable intervention forces on timely, accurate, abundant, and usable intelligence. Indeed, in the murky circumstances that often

accompany mass-killing, intelligence is vital for net-capable forces—and their ability to exploit intelligence is what sets them apart from traditional forces.

Operations will often be characterized by urgency and by the difficulty of distinguishing killers from victims or bystanders. Intelligence is needed to provide strategic and tactical warning, to improve combat preparations, and to illuminate actual operations. Knowing the location, capabilities, and movement of a killing force can improve the effectiveness and reduce the vulnerability of intervening troops. Conversely, poor intelligence could be the Achilles Heel of any effort to stop large-scale killing.

The challenge is to be able to scan wide geographic areas for signs of trouble, to detect preparations or other warning signs of large-scale killing, and to conduct surveillance on a crisis area as long as necessary. While this is a tall order, there are a variety of ways to perform these tasks: satellite photo-reconnaissance (including commercially available satellite imagery), manned or unmanned airborne surveillance, ground sensors, interception of communications, and, of course, old-fashioned but often indispensable human intelligence (HUMINT). The challenge in Africa is that the intelligence assets needed to ensure success belong to Western nations and are not concentrated in that part of the world. That poses significant problems:

Problem 1: Availability of Intelligence Sensors. Violence-prone parts of sub-Saharan Africa are not normally covered by U.S. satellites and intelligence-gathering systems (though some imagery may be available commercially). This affects both the likelihood of early warning and the ability to support military intervention. There is no question that light, quick-response units cannot reach potential killing fields in time, and without danger of being overwhelmed, unless they have accurate, current, actionable intelligence, whatever the source.

Of course, once a decision has been made to support a forcible humanitarian intervention, from that point on the region in question should become a higher priority for technical intelligence assets. Satellite imagery, communications intercept capabilities, and airborne surveillance platforms can be redirected with flexibility and speed—assuming they are not committed to even higher priorities. This does not mean the full panoply of U.S. and allied intelligence assets needs to be focused on the crisis area. One of the most important aspects of IT-based transformation is the growing capability of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that can be deployed quickly and in large numbers.

We will return toward the end of this study to the policy question of whether and under what conditions the United States should be prepared to share information technology and operational intelligence to an African intervention force.

Problem 2: Lack of Human Intelligence Sources. The effectiveness of most technical means of intelligence gathering can be diminished by the effects of weather, terrain, other natural obstacles, and deception. For example, UAVs and satellites cannot see through dense canopy to determine whether killing is taking place or killing forces are gathering. For these reasons, HUMINT is almost always required (and in any case always useful). Moreover, by its patient and interactive nature, it is more likely to reveal intentions to resort to large-scale killing.

But the killing situations we find in Africa make it unlikely that trained HUMINT operators will be on the ground prior to a combat intervention. There would be little time to effectively deploy them. In most cases, news of impending or ongoing attacks against civilians is likely to come from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations and the media. These are ad hoc sources of information that do not have the strategic and dedicated capabilities of HUMINT operators.

In addition, NGOs, international organizations, and media are, to varying degrees, inhibited from passing what might be construed, and undoubtedly would be used, as intelligence by combat forces. Yet, this information barrier need not be absolute. If it is not just an AU-sanctioned force, but an actual AU force, other international organizations may (should) be less reluctant to share information. In addition, some type of international information centers—in which international organizations, force officers, NGOs, media, local inhabitants, and others—could aid in exchange of information about killings and other factors affecting their missions. In fact, this type of information sharing already exists in many conflict areas under the auspices of the UN Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs. One and all would have both a self-interest and a larger humanitarian interest in receiving and providing information that could save innocent lives. Although NGOs strive to be neutral in conflict areas—both for their protection and to allow them to better serve needy populations—NGOs we talked to indicate few qualms about sharing tactical information informally to help stop mass killing.

Problem 3: Making Good Use of Information. Whether in receiving intelligence, sharing intelligence, or collaborating with friendly units, net-capable forces depend vitally on the ability of their personnel to use information systems. At present, only the United States and certain other Western countries are capable of creating and managing advanced information systems and networks for use in military expeditionary operations. However, there is no reason why forces of other countries cannot use them effectively, with Western help. As the unexpectedly rapid worldwide spread of the Internet shows, it is not necessary to be able to invent, make, control, or even understand information systems to be able to use them proficiently.

A larger problem than gaining technical proficiency is that African military establishments are very hierarchical—the antithesis of information-rich organizations. One of the underpinnings of networked warfare is the concept of distributing information and decisionmaking to the lowest levels of operation that can exploit that information. In its purest form, the squad leader in an armored personnel carrier should be able to transmit information to the network for use by everyone else on the net. But more importantly, he should be able to access the network for the most critical decisions—to open fire or not, to remain in place or withdraw.

U.S. military doctrine calls for centralized planning and decentralized execution. Increasingly, fluid and confusing circumstances in unfamiliar contingencies demand flexibility and ad hoc decisionmaking, which makes distributed authority ever more important. In addition, such conditions require unplanned, horizontal—“peer-to-peer”—collaboration without reference to higher authority (because there may not be time). Networked operations require and permit reduced reliance on hierarchical and centralized control. However, most African militaries are not structured, conditioned, or educated to function this way. With them, decisionmaking authority is centralized and hierarchical. The adoption and successful use of network-based assets will require not only training for African forces but also a change in leadership skills and doctrine from senior levels on down through the junior officer and enlisted ranks.

IV. A Humanitarian Response Combat Force for Africa

What Force Could Have Prevented the Darfur Killings?

Thus far, we have described the need for forcible humanitarian interventions and generally how net-capable forces can be better adapted to these types of missions than conventional forces can. We have pointed out that networking is not a panacea; net-capable forces still face significant challenges. But, in examining factors common to interventions in Africa and elsewhere, it is clear that net-capable forces have distinct advantages in terms of size, mobility, lethality, speed, and survivability that lend themselves to success in forcible humanitarian interventions.

We have also outlined the military situation in Darfur, including the capabilities and tactics of the killing forces. The next step, then, is to apply the aforementioned analysis of intervention factors to the case of Darfur. In figure 3,  indicates that a factor favors the Intervention Forces. For example, on the question of strategic warning, there was sufficient warning of the Darfur killings to allow an intervening force to deploy in time to stop it.

 means the factor would favor the killing forces.  indicates that a factor does not clearly favor one side or the other.

The comparison indicates that an intervening combat force would have had little trouble stopping killings by the Janjaweed if it could have tracked and engaged them. The killers lack skill, strong motivation, and capabilities, and with decent intelligence it is not very difficult to distinguish them from their civilian targets. There was ample strategic warning, and there could be ample tactical warning, if good sensors were available and information shared—a significant but not insurmountable challenge for a Western-augmented, net-capable African force in Darfur. Dispersed killings and killing forces present major challenges, albeit more easily met by air-mobile net-capable forces. Similarly, although access would be a problem, net-capable forces would have less difficulty than large, heavy, slow ones reaching and operating throughout this vast undeveloped area.

On balance, it seems reasonable to expect that a fast, light, lethal, well-trained, and well-led African combat force, operating in distributed, interconnected, and collaborative fashion, could have been more forward deployed and dispersed to strategic points throughout Darfur, better able to obtain intelligence on Janjaweed movements and intentions, mobile enough to move quickly to areas of potential or ongoing killings, and stop or deter mass killing, provided the force could get deep into Darfur, receive ample intelligence, and be backed up by precision air-strikes if trapped, ambushed, or confronted by Sudanese military units. Western support would be indispensable; with it, decisive success would be feasible.

		Range of Other Cases	Darfur
Strategic Warning	Were the preconditions apparent?		
Tactical Warning	Was the outbreak known?		
Clarity of Combatants	Can combatants be distinguished from non-combatants and from one another?		
Clarity of Killing	Is the killing going mainly in one direction?		
Skill of Killing Force	Are the killers a trained, cohesive, combat-proven military force?		
Motivation of Killing Force	Is the killing force's motivation strong enough to accept substantial risk?		
Capabilities of Killing Force	How large, well-equipped, well-supported and well-commanded is the killing force?		
Availability of Reinforcements for the Killing Force	Are capable forces able and willing to counter-intervene?		
Concentration of the Killing Force	Are the forces deployed in a few large areas or dispersed throughout the countryside?		
Concentration of Killing	Are killings taking place in large numbers but in a few locations, or is there widespread killing?		
Availability of Friendly Forces	Is there a capable, friendly force that can be coordinated with the intervention?		
Terrain	To what extent does the terrain affect insertion, maneuver, and engagement? Might it permit ambush?		
Accessibility	What is the ease or difficulty of getting troops/logistics to the area?		
Humanitarian Relief Infrastructure	Is there a humanitarian relief infrastructure that can begin operations as soon as fighting has ended?		

Figure 3. Comparison of Operational Challenges

A Hypothetical AU Force

With this assessment in mind, the next step is to get more specific in illustrating a multilateral combat force with the capabilities to intervene forcibly to defeat killing forces in a situation like Darfur. In identifying required capabilities, the best place to start is with operational tasks that must be accomplished. Broadly stated, an African humanitarian intervention force would need to:

- Acquire and analyze all-source intelligence on current conditions and the capabilities and intentions of the killing forces
- Deploy swiftly from base operating areas to sites where killings are taking place, entering by force if necessary
- Disaggregate into combat-response units that are deployed quickly strategically and able, upon tactical warning, to be deployed to threatened population centers
- Defend threatened populations by deterring or defeating killing forces
- Maneuver to interdict, engage, pursue, and destroy killing forces
- Respond swiftly to calls for support or reinforcement
- Re-deploy as needs shift
- Provide security until peacekeeping forces arrive
- Sustain combat operations for a month or longer.

With the Darfur case of mass killing in mind, such a mission would require a brigade-plus combined ground-air force consisting of:

- A deployable brigade headquarters and several mobile battalion headquarters
- Two battalions of light, mobile infantry equipped with rifles, machine guns, mortars, light artillery, air defense missiles, armored personnel carriers, Humvees, and small trucks
- One battalion of air-mechanized armor, with light tanks and mobile mortars/artillery
- From one to several companies of SOF
- Flexible (e.g., short- or crude-runway-capable) air transport, fixed- and rotary-wing gunships, and precision-strike aircraft
- Military police, intelligence, medical support, logistics, engineering, civil administration, and information operations.

A bigger AU force can be fielded by creating five maneuver battalions, rather than three battalions. A brigade of five battalions might have four light infantry and one air mechanized battalion, or three of the former and two of the latter.

External Support Required

While the ground forces in our model would be African, critical information, mobility, logistics, planning and advisory support, precision-strike aircraft, and possibly SOF would, for some time, have to come from Western countries. In addition to the United States, some of the more advanced net-capable militaries include the UK, Canada, France, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, and Australia—though a number of others, including Germany and Italy, are now planning to transform their forces in the same general direction. Most of these countries are currently contributing to African peacekeeping capacity-building, so it would be a matter of

expanding or adjusting that support to include forcible intervention combat capabilities, rather than starting anew.

Western countries, acting in concert, would need to provide training in network-based operations and tactics, including the use of information systems and exploitation of information. Africans themselves, augmented by existing Western training and equipment programs, should be expected to provide good basic training in individual and unit military skills. Additional Western training is needed to concentrate on forging networked capabilities and operating concepts, e.g., in exploiting information and air-ground integration. This net-centric training can and should be integrated into existing African training and equipment programs. In addition, Western countries would need to provide radios, cellular systems, laptop computers, displays, weapons systems, vehicles and other light but high-grade equipment—and the related training needed to use these assets. Whether this would include transfers of fixed- and/or rotary-wing transport aircraft would depend on the Africans' ability to maintain and employ them effectively, and on whether Western countries can be counted on to contribute needed air power. Given its modest size, the goal should be for the African force to have transport capacity to move itself to and around the killing zones within a decade.

The West can provide superior tactical aircraft for air control, close-air support, and precision strike. It would not take much—a squadron or two. In the absence of local airstrips, several NATO countries have aircraft carriers.⁵⁰ A few AU members have combat aircraft, though precision-strike capabilities are years away. All things considered, reliance on Western combat air power would be unavoidable for the foreseeable future. Such support could be crucial in situations like Darfur—to keep away the Sudanese air force, back up AU forces in trouble, and hit Janjaweed out of reach of African ground forces. A few well-placed strikes on Janjaweed, their sources of support, and their backers might even dissuade them from further fighting or killing.

Even as the Africans improve their air-strike capabilities, there is a strategic reason to involve Western air power. An African intervention force is more likely to succeed if it is the only serious combat force in the killing zone. Therefore, it is crucial to keep at bay the army of the regime, assuming it is complicit. AU consensus in support of intervention is more likely to hold if it does not become necessary to engage in hostilities with the forces of a fellow member, however odious and complicit. Western air power was indispensable in neutralizing Serbian forces in Bosnia and Kosovo, and equally indispensable in protecting the Kurds from mass killing at the hands of the Iraqi Army after the First Gulf War. Western air cover for an African intervention may be vital.

In addition to air support, Western C4ISR—command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—would be a key to success. For now, the United States would have to provide the bulk of the strategic and tactical intelligence and networking capability. In time, Europeans may be able to augment or substitute for American support. Communications, obviously crucial for networked operations, would be provided via the U.S. Global Information Grid (GIG) and deployable, mobile systems, which are now a priority among Western expeditionary forces. Western logistics support and management will also be essential, though, again, small and light forces are more easily supported than large and heavy ones.

⁵⁰ At present, the only country that is sure to have aircraft carriers capable of operating aircraft with enough range to reach significantly beyond the African coast is the United States.

Since the Balkan wars of the 1990s, commercial firms have appeared that are capable of providing logistics support, advisors, transport, and even air-surveillance. This represents an option in the event that Western government support is not available. For example, an AU force could acquire overhead intelligence information commercially. While such practical alternatives should not be dismissed, they do not relieve the West and the rest of the international community of responsibility to partner with Africa to stop mass killing. Moreover, the more complex and dangerous conditions might be, the more important it would be that Western support be official, not commercial.

Finally, and potentially most controversial, Western countries might need to provide advisors and possibly some soldiers on the ground. At a minimum, a small number of advisors could be vital in command and logistics management centers. A more difficult question is whether Western SOF should accompany African quick-response units or operate on their own to pass intelligence, direct air strikes, or even engage some killing groups. At the end of the day, the presence of Western advisors or fighters is a policy issue, which we will take up in the next section.

Western support for the hypothetical AU force might consist of:

- sensors and information networks for intelligence, combat C2, and logistics
- a company of SOF, with UAVs, for establishing intelligence coverage over key parts of the province and for advising African officers in quick-response units
- a squadron of multi-purpose, precision-strike aircraft (e.g., F-16s) for airspace control and ground attack
- attack helicopters and gunships (e.g., AC-130s) for support of ground troops
- air-cargo and troop transports (e.g., C-130s) and utility/cargo/lift helicopters
- C4ISR aircraft for air and ground surveillance, communications, and C2
- augmentation of such government support by commercial firms, as appropriate.

Western operational involvement along these lines would also have strategic advantages. The AU and African force contributors could be more certain of success at acceptable costs if Western military establishments were engaged and their governments committed. Once involved, Western countries—certainly the United States—are unlikely to allow a forcible humanitarian operation to fail and have the strategic depth (of resources and military capabilities) to succeed. By the same token, killing forces and complicit government forces are less likely to resist an AU force if they know that Western strength, experience, and determination lie behind it. In addition, the provision of essential Western support (e.g., US C4ISR) lends added assurance that no African country or grouping could abuse a role in an AU intervention force for selfish gains. In sum, Western operational support can be a major confidence builder.

Terrain Coverage and Operational Requirements

Assuming it had such Western advisory, intelligence, and air support, could a net-capable, brigade-sized, AU force get the job done in an area as big as Darfur? The answer is that it probably could do so—if properly equipped with information networks, helicopters, and other mobile equipment—but it might be stretched thin by the sheer size of the territory and the far-flung location of many villages. In an area as big as Darfur, a brigade of five combat battalions would be better than one of only three combat battalions, but the smaller brigade might be able to do the job if properly trained, equipped, and used. We will look at both.

The size of the Darfur terrain matters in determining force-to-space ratios and resulting mobility requirements. Darfur can be thought of as a square of roughly 200x200 miles.⁵¹ If the AU brigade has three combat battalions, each one will be required to cover an area equivalent to a square of about 115x115 miles. Assuming the battalion is centrally located, this means that its response units might need to move quickly to distances of up to 58 miles for individual contingencies. If the brigade has five battalions, each battalion will have to cover a square of 90x90 miles and will be required to deploy to a distance of up to 45 miles for individual contingencies. Such distances could be covered by truck in 2-3 hours or more. Helicopters could arrive on the scene within 20-30 minutes of take-off. Thus, a helicopter-equipped AU force could handle the requirements for terrain coverage arising in Darfur.

The required size of the AU force also is influenced by the number of contingencies likely to be encountered and their simultaneity. Thus far, Janjaweed attacks on individual villages have ranged in size from about 100 to 400 fighters. An AU response unit of platoon-size, if backed by air support and artillery, should be able to handle an enemy force at the low end of that range. A response unit of company size (250 troops), with air support, should be able to handle an enemy of 400 troops. In the event of unusually large killing-force concentration, the AU force might have to operate in battalion response units, but operations requiring the entire brigade are unlikely. Assuming that the normal mode of operation will be at the company level, an AU brigade of 3 battalions will field 9 companies, 6 of which might be deployable at any single time. A brigade of 5 battalions will field 15 companies, 10 of which would be deployable at one time. Thus, an AU brigade would be capable of carrying out 6-10 operations simultaneously—a substantial capability that could cover most of the population of the province within a few hours at most and could thus deter or engage most enemy forces.

This AU brigade would have to be properly equipped and supported. A brigade of the 3 battalions would total about 2,400 troops in those maneuver units; one of 5 battalions would total 4,000 troops. Combat support and combat service support units would roughly double the required manpower. Thus, an AU brigade of 3-5 battalions would involve about 4,600-8,000 troops in Darfur, and an additional 2,000-3,000 support troops in rear-area supply and staging locations. An essential element of support is the maintenance and sustainment of equipment. Required training and support include adequate spare parts, maintenance training at various levels from individual equipment maintenance through higher echelons, and eventual equipment replacement procedures.

Helicopters would be especially important. Based on U.S. Army standards, a reasonable estimate is that this AU Force would require 3 or 4 command helicopters, 10-15 reconnaissance helicopters, 24-36 attack helicopters, 40-50 utility helicopters, and 15-25 heavy cargo helicopters.⁵² (These numbers are smaller than the number of helicopters available among African militaries in the aggregate, but greater than the number of reliable ones that would be available.) An AU force of this many helicopters clearly would require an effective logistic support infrastructure to keep them operating at high tempo. U.S. experience in combat shows that helicopters are delicate instruments that require considerable maintenance and consume large amounts of spare parts and fuel. This is especially the case for attack helicopters and air assault helicopters used in direct combat operations, but even cargo helicopters can quickly suffer breakdowns if they are not well-supported. Support staff must be skilled at maintenance,

⁵¹ These figures are derived from map measurements of the Darfur region.

⁵² Although some African countries have significant numbers of helicopters on paper, augmentation by Western assets and support personnel is likely to be necessary.

repair, refueling, rearming, and planning. Fortunately U.S. and other western militaries have ample experience at employing helicopters for difficult missions. A western-operated AU helicopter force should be capable of operating effectively in Africa today. If African militaries are expected to operate the helicopter force, they will need to be endowed with the necessary skills, which would take time.

Similar analysis applies to other aircraft that would be operated by the AU force, including attack gunships, cargo transports, and fixed-wing strike aircraft. With the necessary air bases, stocks, and trained support personnel, high-tempo air operations can be mounted and sustained. Because such operations will be highly demanding, they initially should be carried out by Western militaries that are experienced in using combat and support aircraft at high tempo in austere locations. But as African forces acquire the requisite skills, they can gradually take over the air operation for both helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.

The force also would require a large number of trucks, Humvees, and other small vehicles. Support assets would need to be sized and structured for the mission. Requirements for munitions might be relatively modest, but requirements for fuels, food, construction materials, medical supplies, maintenance, and similar assets might be relatively high. In sum, to say that a net-capable force would be able to intervene effectively to stop mass killing in a place like Darfur is not to say that it would be a simple operation or that it would be 100% successful.

A Hypothetical Operation

How, specifically, might such an African force with Western support operate to bring an end to mass killing in Darfur? The following illustrates a possible course of action, based on the assumption of a 3-battalion brigade (the smallest viable force). In this case, assuming Western support and a high state of readiness of the African intervention forces, upon strategic warning of mass killing, such a force would deploy to Darfur within days of an AU political decision and orders to do so. Once there, it would be distributed as follows:

- The force headquarters, mechanized battalion, support units, and air assets would deploy to a single central location, (e.g., an air base).
- The two light motorized infantry battalions would disperse to locations some distance from force headquarters to extend coverage across the province and shorten response times.⁵³
- From these three locations, multiple SOF-UAV detachments would disperse across the surrounding countryside, thus providing a networked capacity for surveillance of potential sites of violence
- Deployable Western C2 systems and links would be overlaid on this brigade-battalion African force disposition and “wired” into wider intelligence networks.

Upon warning of impending killings:

- Surveillance and strike aircraft would launch to detect and intercept government air or ground deployments.
- SOF with UAVs would track killing forces approaching a population center and relay intelligence to brigade and battalion headquarters.

⁵³ Alternatively, infantry and mechanized units from these battalions could be cross- attached, thereby forming three combined-arms battalions, each with two companies of light infantry and one company of light mechanized forces.

- Within an hour of tactical warning, attack helicopters and gunships (possibly with F-16s) would arrive to interdict killing forces, based on spotting guidance from SOF and/or requests from African ground commanders.
- Within at most a few hours, light infantry forces—ranging from a single company to an entire battalion—would arrive at the scene by truck, C-130, or helicopter lift, depending on the distance, urgency, and amount of force needed.
- If combat ensued, African ground forces would use deadly force against the killing forces.
- If necessary, mechanized reinforcements would arrive by ground or air within a day, thereby adding firepower to the light infantry forces.
- Because of the resourceful use of networked forces and exploitation of speed, this same pattern of phased application of joint combat power could be conducted elsewhere in the province and repeated over a period of days and weeks.
- With Darfur countryside secured by African combat forces, AU/UN peacekeepers would deploy to preserve local stability, restore order, and set conditions for reconstruction.
- Within a month or two, the combat force could be withdrawn, leaving AU/UN peacekeepers in its place.

In addition to responding to, interdicting, and defeating attacks on the population, the intervention force could be given the mandate, and therefore should have the capability, to destroy the capacity of the killing forces to fight and kill. Air-assault ground forces and air-strike forces could be used against enemy centers of gravity and choke points, such as operating and support bases, command posts, and supply chains. Even though killing forces may have little such infrastructure and critical nodes, destroying what they have could weaken their effectiveness and determination.

Again, as important as the employment of forces are the provision, sharing, and use of information. The awareness and collaboration requirements of this otherwise modest operation are quite demanding, mainly because of the importance of speed (to cover territory and gain tactical advantage) and the need to be able to engage and integrate air and ground assets distributed throughout the force. The first requirement, of course, is to get an accurate picture of what is happening in the province as a whole. The second is to look more persistently at concentrations of vulnerable populations and activities of killing forces. With this as an information base, surveillance sensors and HUMINT networks must then be used to detect and report dangerous movements by killing forces against population concentrations. All such information must be fused and made available not only to force headquarters but also to the distributed battalion headquarters, suggesting the need for deployable, province-wide communications links.

Once warning is given and forces respond, sensors must provide real-time information on both friendly and killing forces. Whatever the source—UAV, manned surveillance aircraft, or information gleaned by SOF or combat units—this data must be available to the on-site commander and other junior or noncommissioned officers. Such information superiority over killing forces can multiply the combat effectiveness of the response unit and also indicate what if any additional support is needed. No less important are the links among the ground forces and air-strike forces, since either may be engaged as both sensors and shooters. Lastly, information sharing and collaboration between quick-response units and force headquarters are critical. Even

though decisionmaking should be decentralized as much as possible, there will be decisions that must be made by the force commander.

Least tangible but perhaps most important are the leadership qualities and decisionmaking skills of African officers—not only the force commander but also the junior officers who command quick-response battalions, companies or smaller units. These individuals must be willing to take responsibility, be able to integrate reliable intuition with rapid reasoning, and have key cognitive abilities, such as anticipation, quick reaction time, opportunism, and the capacity to learn in action.⁵⁴ They must be able to cope with the ambiguities and dilemmas inherent in the sort of interventions described here, know right from wrong, have exceptional collaborative skills, and be self-aware of their mental strengths and weaknesses. African military structures and traditions have neither demanded nor fostered such qualities among junior officers nor given them much authority to decide and act under fire. Therefore, one of the most important aspects of Western training will be to impart and nurture what it takes for an officer to succeed in an urgent, dangerous, high-stakes, messy, networked operation. To some extent—but only some—Western advisors embedded in the force can assist African colleagues in making use of information, making sense of the situation, and making quick and sound decisions.

There is little question that the net-capable force described above, operating in the manner described, could largely stop the Janjaweed. While not every village could be protected, and not every killing orgy prevented, most would. After a few costly engagements, the Janjaweed might try to avoid the force by striking villages quickly and stealthily in remote locations, by lying low, or by dissolving. In all likelihood, the Janjaweed would not continue killing and raping at the same rate.

As stressed earlier, international involvement cannot end once the killing has been stopped. Peacekeeping, stabilization, reconstruction, and possible reconciliation will follow. But we know from several cases—the current struggle to build a new Iraq, for instance—that the success of such follow-on endeavors depends critically on the level of security, which can be shattered if hostile forces reappear as insurgents, terrorists, or criminals. Therefore, to the extent possible, the intervention force should attempt to neutralize the potential for violence against civilians, peacekeepers, or aid-workers once it has left. Beyond stopping the killing, this could require seeking, defeating, disbanding, disarming or destroying at least part of the killing force. In the Darfur case, under threat from the intervention force and no longer able to do Khartoum's dirty work, Janjaweed fighters might accept terms for their own demobilization. This additional mission of eliminating the killing force could, of course, be more demanding and risky than stopping killing. While setting conditions for a secure future are highly desirable and should be part of the intervention mandate, inability to achieve it should not be a reason to refrain from intervention to stop the killing itself.

What Could Go Wrong?

Intervention to stop mass killing is bound to be complex and fraught with danger. In Darfur, risks include hostilities with government military forces, ambush, and getting ensnared in a civil war. If the intervention force is given an expansive mandate, there is a good chance that government military forces would act against what they might regard as an invasion force. At

⁵⁴ For a treatment of decisionmaking demands and opportunities presented by networked warfare, see David C. Gompert, Irving Lachow, and Justin Perkins, "Battle-Wise: Gaining Cognitive Advantage in Networked Warfare," *Defense and Technology Paper 8* (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2005).

worst, this could lead to a major escalation into an Africa-wide conflict that the sponsors of the African intervention had never intended. For this reason, it would be important to act forcefully to challenge the first indication of government intervention. Western and African air power should be sufficient to prevent government military units from interfering with humanitarian intervention operations.

Another danger is that of ambush or other circumstances in which small, light, intervention forces find themselves isolated and over-matched. Reliance on networks for information dominance and reinforcement could backfire if sensors or communications links fail or are disrupted.⁵⁵ While this is unlikely to be a problem against a primitive adversary, it is possible that a company trying to save a village could be exposed to heavy casualties, possibly including atrocities. The response to such an occurrence should be strong, such as striking Janjaweed forces even though they are not menacing population centers.

Finally, the intervention force might embolden Darfur rebels, thus fanning a civil war. The rebels of Darfur have done little to protect the people of Darfur, and it is more likely that they would take advantage of an international intervention than curtail their activities. Anticipating this risk, AU political authorities or officers must communicate in advance that rebel military opportunism will not be tolerated. While the merits of the rebels' cause against Khartoum go beyond our scope, forcible humanitarian intervention should, as a general rule, focus strictly on the goal of saving lives and, to the extent possible and consistent with that goal, avoid precipitating permanent political change.

In sum, our hypothetical, net-capable force, with the right mandate, rules of engagement and Western support, should be able to stop mass killing in a situation like Darfur. Of course, our analysis assumes that African countries would make available their most capable forces, that Western assistance in training and equipping would be forthcoming and effective, that Western-African cooperation would be close, that exceptional African officers would emerge, that African personnel would be able to operate information terminals, and that the West would provide air support. In other words, an effective African capability for forcible humanitarian intervention is conceivable, but the effort to create it, while not prohibitively difficult or expensive, will be a great challenge for all involved. The remaining chapters of this study are about meeting that challenge.

V. Getting There

Setting the Goal

We have identified a force that is roughly equivalent in size to the 8,000 called for by the UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS).⁵⁶ That is where the similarity ends, however. The force we prescribe should possess enough speed, maneuverability, lethality, awareness, and inter-connectedness to carry out forcible humanitarian intervention missions. Precisely because

⁵⁵ In the Darfur case, it is unlikely that Janjaweed or their backers could attack the computers and networks of the intervention force.

⁵⁶ UN News Service, "Thousands of troops needed in Darfur to protect civilians and workers, UN envoy says," 23 March, 2005, available at <http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=13747&Cr=sudan&Cr1=&Kw1=Thousands+of+troops+needed+in+Darfur+&Kw2=civilians&Kw3=workers>.

we have suggested such a capable force, building it would be an ambitious undertaking. The modest size of the force should not mask the difficulties on the road to its creation, notably: finding and helping build the requisite number of first-rate African participating units; preparing them—in fact, transforming them—for networked operations; intensifying AU-Western cooperation; unifying Western assistance efforts (at least for this force); and preparing for combined African-Western operations.

The first step on the road to creating an African force that could to stop mass killing would be to set a definite goal, to be agreed upon within the AU and between the AU and the group of developed nations prepared to help. We suggest that an appropriate goal would be to create an “African Humanitarian Combat Force” (AHCF) as a new added element of the ASF under the AU. The AHCF would provide new capabilities for the ASF, not compete with it.

Of course, there are ways and opportunities for Africans to increase their capacity of forcible humanitarian intervention short of creating an actual multilateral force-in-being. However, both operational effectiveness (speed, coherence, standards) and absolute clarity about multilateral control (under the AU) argue for a specific force. Moreover, defining such a goal would offer strong motivation to prospective participants, facilitate international support, and permit measurement of progress. It might also signal to dangerous groups that the AU was not going to tolerate mass killing.

Existing African Capacity and AU Initiatives

African military forces range widely, from the South Africa National Defense Force at the upper end to the 500-person Sao Tomean military. Six militaries in Africa with significant operational experience and combat capabilities, including airlift, strike, and mechanized forces illustrate the potential:⁵⁷

Ethiopia: 182,500 troops. The army consists of six divisions, three reinforced mechanized brigades, and strategic reserve divisions of six brigades. The air force has 48 combat aircraft, 25 attack helicopters, 4 C-130s, and 12 transport helicopters.

South Africa: 55,750 troops. The army is organized in five regional joint task forces and one SOF brigade. The army also has regular cadre units comprising seven armored battalions, and 27 infantry battalions, including an airborne battalion, eight artillery battalions, and five air defense battalions. The air force includes 50 combat aircraft, 12 attack helicopters, and 5 squadrons of transport aircraft, including nine C-130s, and UAVs.

Nigeria: 78,500 troops. The army includes one armored division, consisting of two armored brigades; one composite division, consisting of one motorized infantry brigade, one amphibious brigade, and one airborne battalion; two mechanized divisions, each consisting of one mechanized brigade and one motorized infantry brigade; and one air defense brigade. The air force includes 84 combat aircraft, 10 attack helicopters, and 5 C-130s, plus other transport.

⁵⁷ All numbers are from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2004-2005* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005). It is worth noting that the official numbers may not reflect accurate inventories or the quality of the force and the equipment.

Kenya: 24,120 troops. The army includes one armored brigade, five infantry battalions, one artillery brigade, and one airborne battalion. The air force has 29 combat aircraft and 34 attack helicopters.

Ghana: 7,000 troops. The army includes two brigades, including six infantry battalions, one training battalion, two airborne/SOF companies, and one reconnaissance regiment. The air force includes 19 combat aircraft, 13 small transport aircraft, and 34 attack helicopters.

Senegal: 13,620 troops. The army includes three armored battalions, six infantry battalions, one commando/airborne battalion, and one artillery battalion. The air force includes eight combat aircraft and seven transport aircraft.

Compared to all other regions but Europe, Africa has ambitious plans for multilateral forces, which have the advantages of pooling scarce capabilities, de-nationalizing defense, and promoting African solutions to African problems. In 2004, the African Union established agreements for the ASF, comprising African peacekeeping units that can deploy in crisis situations at short notice. Current plans are for the ASF to consist of five “regional” (i.e. sub-continental) brigades, which can be deployed by either the African Assembly (the AU equivalent of the UN General Assembly) or the AU Peace and Security Council (the AU equivalent of the UN Security Council). The ASF is envisioned essentially to provide peacekeeping in civil wars, implement disarmament programs, and provide humanitarian relief.⁵⁸ The presumption is that a peace agreement or ceasefire is in place and that the parties to a conflict accept the deployment of peacekeepers. This region-by-region ASF is developing unevenly. There is progress in establishing a Western Standby Brigade, and somewhat less progress in developing Eastern, Central and Southern Standby Brigades. Plans for a Northern Standby Brigade are at a standstill.

Sierra Leone and Mali volunteered to serve as ASF regional logistics depot locations,⁵⁹ and Nigeria has pledged to supply C-130 medium lift aircraft, one motorized battalion, and specialist units including reconnaissance, engineering, and artillery units.⁶⁰ Provisional units totaling 4,500 troops and 1,000 police and civilian workers were identified for the East African Standby Brigade in 2004. Under the auspices of the Economic Community of Central African States, the 2,400-strong Central African Standby Brigade is scheduled to be formed for the first exercise in Chad in 2005.⁶¹ In the South African region, twenty military planners based in Botswana will draw up operational requirements for the brigade; decisions on the regional headquarters and depots are slated for 2006.⁶²

⁵⁸ Todd Pitman, “African Leaders Sign Common Security Plan,” *Associated Press*, February 28, 2004, available at <<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/region/0228sign.htm>>.

⁵⁹ Helmoed-Romer Heitman, “West African states form rapid-reaction force,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, June 24, 2004.

⁶⁰ Segun Adeyemi, “ECOWAS members pledge 6,500 troops for standby force,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, October 13, 2004.

⁶¹ Helmoed-Romer Heitman, “Central African States commit to standby force,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, January 12, 2005.

⁶² BBC Monitoring International Reports, *Botswana Likely to Host Sub-regional Standby Force*, December 28, 2004.

While the current ASF design is not explicitly restricted to peacekeeping, there is no mention of offensive or air-strike capabilities, and the nature of the forces and the training they will receive confirms that they are not intended or being prepared for forcible intervention and combat. Nor does there seem to be any recognition of the possibility of leap-frogging over traditional structures and operating concepts to embrace the potential of information and networking.

External Military Capacity-Building Efforts in Africa

In the decade since the international failure to stop the Rwandan horror, Western countries have provided assistance to build African multilateral capacity. The assistance has ranged from imparting democratic values to teaching management, to fostering common regional experiences and perspectives, to unit and individual training and education. The political basis for this is consensus among the Africans, the North Atlantic allies, and other advanced democracies that Africans should take primary responsibility to deal with their security problems.

The Bush administration has asked Congress to fund a Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) to improve African peacekeeping capabilities. GPOI targets include training 75,000 peacekeepers, primarily in Africa, boosting training for peace support operations in regions including Africa, and establishing transport and logistics arrangements to assist countries that want to participate in operations but lack the capabilities.⁶³ GPOI will be implemented through the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA), with \$50m in funding for FY2005 to improve African peacekeeping capabilities. There are currently eleven ACOTA partners, including Ghana, Kenya, Ethiopia, Botswana, Senegal, Mozambique, Benin, Malawi, and Mali, that are in training programs; South Africa and Zambia are in training discussions.⁶⁴ More partners are on the horizon. ACOTA training programs are tailored to each recipient nation's needs, so as to build good soldiers who become good peacekeepers. Hence, South African forces are focusing their training on information security, information operations, and logistical operations in regard to C-130 airlift. Smaller militaries focus on "niche" skills, i.e. airfield logistics or standing up civilian-military operations centers. ACOTA also implements a train-the-trainer approach, preparing Africans to use their ACOTA-trained units to train their national militaries, thereby reinforcing peacekeeping capacity and effectiveness.

Ghana is a good example of success. The Ghanaian peace-support operations training school now runs a 10-week training program for all Ghanaian peace operation forces, maintains its own equipment, and has started training future trainers. Supplementing this, ACOTA emphasizes working with regional organizations, like the Economic Community of West African States, enabling the mobilization of bilaterally-trained forces for multilateral operations.

The United Kingdom is taking a similar approach to support African initiatives to develop military capacity. The UK trains African troops to conduct effective peacekeeping operations, through significant efforts with Ghanaian, Kenyan, Tanzanian, and South African militaries. By 2010, at least 17,000 African troops will have been trained directly or through organizations supported by the UK government. Training activities include peacekeeping map

⁶³For more details, see Douglas J. Feith, "The Global Peace Operations Initiative and Its Potential Boost to African Militaries," *African Armed Forces Journal*, September 2004, 7-8.

⁶⁴The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, African Affairs, International Security Affairs, United States Department of Defense, interview by author, Washington, DC, March 22, 2005.

exercises, conducting peacekeeping training courses, and exercises at the Ghana Staff College (a UN regional center for peacekeeping training) and in South Africa and Tanzania. Supplementing this, a number of senior-level courses and numerous operational and tactical level training activities are run each year at the Kenya Peace Support Training Center. The UK government also supports the effort of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in eastern Africa to create the East Africa Standby Brigade.

France has a well-developed capacity-building program called Reinforcement of African Capacity to Maintain Peace (RECAMP). RECAMP trains African battalions to carry out peacekeeping operations so they can participate in brigade-size forces within a regional framework. RECAMP also aims to integrate humanitarian support with peacekeeping efforts and is supported by around 20 donor nations from most European Union states, the United States, Canada, Russia, China, India, Japan, and Argentina. In November 2004, 1,500 soldiers from the proposed 6,500 West African Standby Brigade received humanitarian-assistance training under the French capacity-building program. A RECAMP exercise was held in Benin from November 2004 to February 2005.

A number of other countries have smaller, but useful assistance efforts to train African militaries. Collectively, however, Western assistance is not well-integrated, optimized, or targeted, except loosely concentrating on peacekeeping capacity.

Building on Current African and External Efforts

Because we are proposing a multilateral force under AU auspices, and in view of existing international efforts to enhance African capabilities (GPOI, ACOTA), we recommend that the AHCF be developed under the established umbrella of the AU ASF. Given this, there are two options worth considering: creating a new element of the ASF, drawn from all of Africa, and utilizing the current five-region/five-brigade structure.

The first option has important advantages. Organizing the AHCF from an Africa-wide pool would help ensure a critical mass of high-quality combat units, whereas relying on each of the five regions might well not. Moreover, the standards for the regional peacekeeping brigades and AHCF are quite different; the former are to function mainly in permissive conditions (UN Chapter 6 and Chapter 7), while the latter are fighting forces specifically designed for non-permissive conditions in which a peace agreement may not exist, including the possibility of offensive operations. Blurring this distinction would endanger the combat effectiveness of the AHCF. In addition, the regional peacekeeping brigades are important in their own right and short of capabilities as it is. It would be a mistake for the AU to create a combat intervention force at the expense of the peacekeeping forces needed to consolidate stability and permit reconstruction, post-intervention. Both capabilities are needed.

The other advantage of an Africa-wide force is that it would facilitate effective partnership with the West. Given the demanding combat mission and requirements of an AHCF, Western effort to help build one must be much more focused and integrated than current to increase regional peacekeeping capacity. Establishing and meeting high common standards would be facilitated by a single Western effort linked to a single African effort. Furthermore, planning Western participation in support of actual operations would be much easier if there was a single, Africa-wide AHCF.

The advantages of basing African humanitarian combat forces on the regional brigades are mainly political and expedient. Agreement already exists on the regional brigades. Also,

African states within any of the five regions may be more agreeable to use of a force coming from within that region; troop contingents from distant parts of Africa may seem as foreign as non-African troops.

In the end, Africans will decide how (and of course whether) to construct an AHCF. If they accept the need for a highly capable force that can stop mass killing—combat-ready, cohesive, net-capable, rapidly deployable, built with Western assistance, and capable of receiving critical Western operational support—they will find it difficult if not impossible to create one in each of five regions or drawn from the five regional peacekeeping forces.

If it is deemed too difficult to reach agreement at the continental level to create an Africa-wide force, a constructive alternative might be to look to one of the regions, such as West Africa, to take the lead by forming a humanitarian combat brigade in addition to the national forces already being earmarked for participation in the regional peacekeeping brigade. That regional force could then be made available to the AU for deployment anywhere in Africa, under AU mandate and management. Instead of such an initiative then being replicated in the other regions, which could preclude an Africa-wide force, it could be open to participation by qualified countries from other African regions. Upon accepting units from outside the initial region, the force would begin transforming from a regional to an Africa-wide capability.

Whatever the formula, selection of forces for the AHCF will be critical. Several standards might be considered when recruiting and screening for participation:

- Good governance and democratically-accountable armed forces
- Peaceful and responsible conduct toward neighbors
- Military capability
- A record of effective contribution to multilateral forces, e.g., existing ASF
- Geographic balance and broad participation to underscore AHCF legitimacy

Africa is in transition, as are many of its countries. It may be difficult to find willing and able participants that meet absolutely all such standards. Rather than ironclad tests, the standards should be important considerations. Once again, this is for Africans to sort out, though it is only fair to point out that non-African supporting countries may have more difficulty assisting certain countries than others.

Another issue is what size units to seek from the main participants. In theory, battalions would be ideal, since each battalion must operate with cohesion and common standards. If this is not practical, perhaps assembling the AHCF based on company-size commitments would be acceptable—the company being the preeminent unit of action in the concept of operations described earlier. At the far extreme, the AU could create a force based on the nomination, recruitment, volunteering, and screening of individuals from any country in the AU. The authors believe that, on balance, the most practical and efficacious approach is at the battalion level. This approach should at least be explored before an alternative is pursued.

Creating an AHCF would require a multi-track approach tied together by integrated training and doctrine to engender and exploit the principles of networked operations, as illustrated in figure 4. Western support for the AHCF would come in two forms:

- programmatic assistance to build capacity (the white areas below each curve)
- capabilities to fill AU gaps during actual operations⁶⁵ (the shaded areas)

⁶⁵ An example of Western initiatives that can be used to fill the immediate operational gaps in African contingencies is the November 2004, EU Defence Ministers agreement to form EU Battle Groups—mobile combat units that would be ready to address international crises at short notice. Initially conceived in the wake of the EU Operation




Figure 4. Multi-track program to establish the AHCF

Over time, as shown, capacity-building assistance will reduce operational gaps to be filled by Western forces. The potential for capacity-building, and thus the need for capabilities gap-filling, varies significantly from one type of capability to another (as the different curves indicate different rates of change). For example, African contributions in main combat units would be expected to rise quickly, whereas African C4ISR capacity would require a longer period of time. With each track progressing at its own agreed and practical pace, it is critical that the African-Western partnership oversees the entire process so that (a) the capability would exist at any time to conduct successful intervention, and (b) over time, African capacity is developed.

To illustrate, at time T1, the AHCF could provide nearly all the ground-combat capability, logistics, and mobility, and a fraction of the air power, relying on the Western partners for most of the air power, and nearly all of the SOF and C4ISR. By T2, the Western contribution would be mainly C4ISR. With strong African and Western long-term commitments and follow-through, it is not unrealistic to suggest that T1 could be reached within a decade; this could be a goal against which resources and activities could be scheduled. . Even before then,

Artemis by the French government in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Battle Groups are understood to be available for African operations also—therefore, filling an immediate gap in African capabilities. For more details, see Karl-Heinz Kamp, “European ‘Battle Groups’: A New Stimulus for the European Security and Defense Policy?,” *Analysen und Argumente aus der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung*, 15, 1 (Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, December 17, 2004).

combined African-Western capabilities for forcible humanitarian intervention would come into being.

Ultimately, after a decade or so, the AHCF could be virtually a self-reliant force, signified by the curves' plateaus that indicate Western contributions during operational contingencies would no longer be needed. Once that point has been reached, Western efforts could be focused solely on maintaining and improving African capacity. Even at that point, however, it could be politically and operationally advantageous to include some Western support (e.g., C4ISR, SOF and air). But this would be for the Africans to decide; they would no longer be vitally dependent on Western operational involvement.

As already stressed, because of the huge dividends of creating a net-capable force, this effort must not only combine and upgrade African forces but also transform them to exploit information technology and network-based concepts of operation. Some of the most critical qualities—and difficult changes—have more to do with organization, human capital, command and control processes, traditions, cognition, and willingness to change. At the heart of this lies the willingness to senior officers and authorities to entrust company- and battalion-level officers, and below, with authority to make quick decisions in an operation. While this runs against the grain of African military (and societal) tradition—as it does in other parts of the world—it should be possible to create sufficient confidence and procedures whereby an initially small number of highly capable officers are both permitted and willing to take command initiative when faced with situations of imminent or actual mass killing. We do not underestimate the importance or difficulty of this aspect, but we think it can be overcome with determination and focus.

An AU-Western effort to create an effective AHCF would have to tackle the following challenges:

- Convincing senior officers to delegate operational decisionmaking authority, and inducing junior officers to accept corresponding responsibilities
- Fostering battlefield decisionmaking that combines use of abundant information with sound intuition
- Developing horizontal (peer-to-peer) teaming to meet fluid operations demands
- Building cognitive abilities to sort and evaluate information
- Encouraging information sharing among units and across boundaries
- Strengthening the willingness to take initiative and the ability to learn in action.

Finally, and of somewhat less concern than the challenges just listed, is the technical ability to make good use of information terminals, displays, and network ports. It is important to keep in mind that African troops in the AHCF would need to become effective *end-users* of such technology, not designers or producers or suppliers; and for the most part the technology is highly *end-user friendly*. Recent experience in both non-military and military settings suggests that African officers and NCOs will have little difficulty absorbing and applying well-delivered training in using information systems. While being a competent C4ISR end-user is obviously more complicated and unforgiving than being a proficient Internet user, we now know that exploiting information technology is within the reach of most people, given the opportunity, instruction, and motivation. In any case, to the extent that using information systems is a challenge for soldiers in the urgency and dangers of battle, there is no reason to think that African soldiers will fail where Western ones succeed.

Current Western efforts to expand African peacekeeping capacity (e.g., the ASF) are essentially bilateral. Different Western countries concentrate their military-technical aid on different African recipients. There is some coordination in the form of periodic discussions among chief contributors (United States, UK, and France). While not ideal, these programs of assistance need not be tightly coordinated, much less integrated, in order to be useful; peacekeeping missions are normally neither so demanding nor so dangerous that participating forces must be interoperable in technology or doctrine. In contrast, Western assistance in creating an AU intervention force, as well as in providing operational support for the force, cannot be handled bilaterally. Occasional coordination meetings would be totally inadequate for the level of coherence required in Western support. The units of the force must meet common, high standards, be able to support and fight alongside one another, and function on common networks. Therefore, training and other assistance must be as strictly standardized as possible.

Even more critical, of course, is that Western participation in an actual AHCF operation not be disjointed. In return for its striking advantages, networking demands operational and informational integration. Western intelligence, logistics, SOF, air, and advisory support in the run-up to and conduct of an AU operation would have to be unified among the Western providers and between those providers and the AU force. Moreover, the political decisionmaking and military command and control of a fast and difficult operation of the sort described earlier would demand maximum Western unity, as well as African-Western unity.

There are major advantages to forming a grouping or “club” of non-African countries willing to assist significantly in building the AU capability and, in principle, to provide support for operations. It would be best if this group of supporters operated through an existing institution with capability and background of its own in preparing and mounting multilateral military operations. The candidates to take the lead are the G-8,⁶⁶ NATO, and the UN. The following highlights the main strengths of each group:

- The rationale for a G-8 lead is that it encompasses major economic power and is flexible; the G-8 could kick off an effort in cooperation with the AU and then either invite additional participants or initiate a larger ad hoc but formal grouping—a G-X—specifically to work with the AU to create and support an AHCF
- NATO has the capacity and experience in combat operations, including operations outside Europe; most of the countries that could provide assistance and operational support for an AHCF are NATO members or partners, and others could be included for this purpose
- The UN provides added legitimacy, can tap into worldwide resources, and has vast experience and growing capacity in peace operations. A critical question is whether the UN would be able and authorized to provide support to combat forces involved in forcible humanitarian intervention, which does not presume that the parties to the conflict agree to allow the force to enter—a standard feature of UN-based peacekeeping.

Whatever the institutional framework, the role of the United States in building African capacity and providing operational support will be important, though not necessarily indispensable in every contingency. The United States has had underway, for some years, efforts to enhance African capacity to provide security and now plans to expand those efforts through the GPOI, as described earlier. Among other aims, GPOI is meant to create a large pool of

⁶⁶ The G-8, or Group of Eight, is composed of the world’s leading economic powers (United States, UK, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada) plus Russia; the EU also joins meetings.

African peacekeepers. The relationship between that effort and what is suggested here should be clear:

- None of the efforts of the United States (or other Western democracies) to expand African peacekeeping capacity should be diverted, curtailed or delayed. Parts of Africa are highly insecure and growing more so as political and economic conditions deteriorate. African peacekeeping is a required capability.
- At the same time, GPOI is not aimed at creating advanced combat capability to intervene forcibly and defeat killing forces. If Africans and Westerners want an African capability that can stop future Rwandas and Darfurs, they will need a force that is trained, equipped, and supported for intense combat, whether the parties to the killing agree or not.
- Efforts to build a net-capable humanitarian intervention force would “rub off” on other African peacekeeping forces. The use of information and information systems is of value across the full spectrum of operations. Whether in providing computer and communications gear, training to permit its effective use, or operational intelligence to assure success, the kind of assistance that is vital for an intervention force would be beneficial for peacekeeping as well.

In sum, creation of an AU force capable of stopping mass killing should and would supplement and complement ongoing efforts.

VI. Policy Issues

A cooperative African-Western effort of the sort outlined to create a capable humanitarian intervention force will face a number of significant policy issues, some of which have already been noted. Unless squarely addressed and sensibly settled, these issues could make it difficult for a force to act effectively.

Mandating Forcible Intervention and Adequate Rules of Engagement

An African force, with Western support, must have the authority as well as the capability, to intervene and forcibly stop mass killing. This raises the question of whether and how the force can be mandated to *use whatever force is necessary*. Once the capability exists, having a lesser mandate would be tantamount to a limited commitment to stop mass killing—in effect, no commitment at all.

International law does not grant or protect any prerogative of sovereign states to brutalize their people or to stand by while others brutalize them on the territory they claim to control. Sovereignty is no defense for conducting or failing to stop mass killing or other crimes against humanity. Because of growing global consciousness—and conscience—the concept of sovereignty is no longer absolute (as conceived by the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648) but increasingly qualified by the responsibility of every government to protect its citizens from severe abuse and violence. The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), called *The Responsibility to Protect*, points out that there has been a growing acceptance since the end of the Cold War of the notion that the international community has a both a right and a responsibility to intervene militarily in nations where governments either

cause or fail to stop massive killings and other abuses of human rights.⁶⁷ The report goes on to note that “the specific nature of the task to protect (people from their government) may over time lead to the evolution of a new type of military operation, carried out in new ways.”⁶⁸

These concepts are echoed in the AU Constitutive Act, which establishes “[t]he right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”⁶⁹

Note that genocide is not the only trigger for intervention. Even with its expanded role, however, the AU force in Darfur is only authorized to deter killing by creating a visible presence. It is important to be clear—and the AU charter is very clear—that the circumscribed mandate in Darfur is not the result of a lack of legal basis for forcible intervention. If the AU had had a humanitarian intervention combat force capable of stopping most or all of the killing, it could have given it the mandate to do precisely that.

Note also that a “decision of the Assembly” of the AU is both necessary and sufficient to mandate an intervention for the purposes of this provision. Such a decision requires every effort to find a consensus; however, if that proves impossible, a two-thirds majority suffices. Neither the agreement of the parties to the killing, nor the consent of the government of the country where the killing is happening, nor the approval of non-AU countries or organizations are absolutely required, though the latter two may be helpful. The AU may authorize intervention to save human beings from the actions or inaction of their sovereign. Of course, not only the consent but also the cooperation of the sovereign is desirable for both operational and political reasons, and every reasonable effort should be made to obtain it, provided time is not lost while killing occurs. That effort may include not only diplomatic and economic pressure, but also a threat or ultimatum to cooperate with or at least acquiesce in a military intervention or else be faced with one nonetheless. It is more likely that a negligent or complicit government will consent to an intervention if it knows its consent is not a requirement.

Still it is possible that the sovereign in question may not only object to, but physically resist, intervention, in which case forcible entry into the country may be mandated. Moreover, if the declared mission is to stop mass killing, the legitimacy of the use of force *as necessary* to carry out the mission is implicit. It appears, then, that any reluctance in a particular case to grant explicit authority to use force to overcome the resistance of the sovereign and to discharge the mission is political, not legal. If the cases involve genocide or crimes against humanity—both terms that have been applied to Darfur—it would stand to reason that the international authority would grant authority to intervene and act forcibly, assuming the capability exists. Of course, there could be mitigating circumstances, such as fault or killing on both sides, in which case the intervention force might have to be even-handed. In any case, neither the responsibility nor the right to protect is reduced in the event that more than one side is to blame.

Rules of engagement flow from mandates and requirements. Operationally, rules of engagement can range from strict self-protection to the use of whatever force is necessary to carry out the mission. There is no question that use of force—or at least the credible threat to use force—may be essential to stop mass killing. A harder question is whether the intervention force can “shoot first” if an imminent threat exists to the force or to the people it is supposed to protect. Still harder is whether the intervention force can seek and attack killing forces when

⁶⁷ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁶⁹ Organization of the African Union, “Constitutive Act of the African Union” (Lome, Togo: Organization of the African Union, July 11, 2000), Article 4h.

those forces are not engaged in killing. Legally it is probably permissible. Operationally it is highly advantageous. Thus, provided the force is capable (manned, trained, and equipped) of implementing robust rules of engagement, it is a matter of policy whether or not it is authorized to do so.

Political reluctance to grant expansive rules of engagement may stem from a lack of confidence that the intervention force can prevail in a fight. The sort of force we have prescribed, under certain circumstances, is designed to prevail and would have sufficient operational support and backing to ensure that it does. Another concern about loose rules of engagement is that the intervention force may lack the discipline and control to act judiciously. The political authority—the AU in this case—must have confidence in its troops to act with discipline, which derives from training and clear rules of engagement.

In the end, providing adequate mandate and rules of engagement is a relatively clear policy choice for Africans to make: Should military units capable of stopping killing be authorized to use whatever reasonable force is needed to stop killing? While there are sure to be political complications and concerns about risks of unwanted consequences and escalation in any contingency, a reasonable premise is that, if killing is of a scale to warrant intervention, the intervention ought to be given every chance to succeed.

Given the need for an expansive mandate and rules of engagement, trust between African political and military leaders will be essential. There can be little room for disagreement that authority granted will be used judiciously to avoid unnecessary death and escalation, yet adequately to assure success. Finally, a clear and sufficient mandate and rules of engagement for a well-trained and well-led force would reduce the probability of political micro-management of operations, which is rarely helpful.

AU Acceptance of Foreign Intelligence

Given the blemished history of Western involvement in Africa, from colonialism to siding with some odious regimes during the Cold War, the AU and many of its member states may be reluctant to accept the products of Western intelligence sources for fear that those same sources may be used to spy on them. Moreover, like the UN, the AU might have institutional hesitation about accepting intelligence on one of its members.

In this context, however, the case for accepting operationally critical intelligence is strong, especially in contingencies serious enough to warrant forcible intervention in the first place. It needs to be understood that the option of an African humanitarian intervention combat force is not viable without acceptance of intelligence. Networked forces derive their power not from size but from information. Timely, accurate, and abundant information is the equivalent of ammunition. Without it, missions will fail, intervention forces will take casualties, and killing force will continue their rampage.

Indeed, so critical is the free and fast flow of intelligence that arrangements for its acceptance and use by African forces in the AHCF ought to be clear and formal, not ambiguous. If this includes intelligence about the forces of a sovereign AU member, so be it. Because sovereignty does not protect a government from systematically killing or condoning the killing of its subjects, it does not shelter any information that could be used by AU-sanctioned international forces to stop such killing.

It may be easier politically in some cases for the AHCF to accept information from commercial firms that furnish surveillance information. To make it even easier, such information

could be made available to the government in which the intervention is to take place. However, it would be a mistake for the AHCF to limit itself to information that can be gathered commercially and/or shared with the local government. In many circumstances, having information that the government in question is not privy to could be crucial for success. To ensure operational effectiveness and security, the AHCF must be prepared to make use of the best information that can be generated—including intelligence from Western government sources—and to accept information that is denied to the local government.

U.S. Willingness to Share Technology and Intelligence

Because a net-capable force derives its power from information, operational success would depend vitally on Western intelligence and information systems, know-how, and content, as already noted. While most HUMINT will be from African sources, African capacity to provide intelligence by technical means will be one of the slowest capabilities to develop. There are two types of useful intelligence support: assistance in intelligence-gathering, dissemination, and use as part of the effort to develop the African intervention force, and the provision of real-time information in operations.

The United States and other Western states are very careful about sharing intelligence and even more careful about sharing intelligence technology and sources and methods. Indeed, they do not share freely even with one another, but do so selectively and on the basis of well-established intelligence liaison arrangements. There is also little sharing of intelligence information to support UN missions.

With regard to assistance, it is doubtful that the information systems and intelligence training needed by African intervention troops would be especially sensitive. Requirements are mainly terminal computing and communications devices and displays—laptops, wireless devices, and other ports to the network. For the most part, commercial-off-the-shelf systems would suffice. If encryption is needed, this too is widely available outside government systems. It would be unnecessary to transfer sensitive technologies, which are for the most part buried in the software and hardware of the network and the sensors that participating Western countries would control and operate. Although specific devices would be considered on a case-by-case basis, it seems implausible that selective and fairly basic Western assistance to African troops in using information networks would create a hole through which sensitive military technology would find its ways to those who would harm Western interests.

The value of information shared in an actual operation would be short-lived. Provided killing forces were not able to gain instant access to it, its leakage would not be harmful. Western forces would certainly not be placed in danger. A more serious concern about sharing information is that it could compromise intelligence sources and methods, which sometimes can be inferred from content; such compromise can do more lasting damage to intelligence-collection capability. This problem can be worked at two levels: first, by packaging (without delaying) information so that sources and methods cannot be inferred; second, by developing regular intelligence-sharing relationships that provide for accountability of information and screening of individuals for reliability. While neither practice will be perfectly effective, together they can reduce the risks of compromise to a manageable level. In any case, because the issue is operational support in a contingency, the United States and other Western states will have to decide whether enabling African forces to stop mass-killing is worth the risk and is better than the alternatives.

As previously noted, there are commercial firms that operate airborne sensors and sell intelligence products. If operating conditions are not especially demanding and Western participation is minimal, such intelligence might suffice. However, any participation by Western air or ground personnel would warrant and most likely demand the use of government intelligence assets. Presumably, if the United States or other Western nations deem the operation to be important enough to furnish personnel in support roles, they would see fit to provide adequate intelligence as well.

Non-African Troops with African Units

As we have explained, it will not be enough for Western countries to help prepare an African intervention force and then wish it luck as it heads into operations. For a long time to come, direct Western involvement will be essential. Such involvement is likely to require Western personnel performing some functions during an operation, on the ground, and connected to the African force.

Starting at the least substantial level, these functions include:

- Technical C2 support at operations centers
- Operational advisory support at unit headquarters
- Operational advisory support to African units in the field
- Special operations with African units in the field
- Autonomous special operations.

The latter three functions entail possible danger; the latter two could entail combat tasks.

The functions performed by Western personnel should be determined prior to an operation and in view of the circumstances and needs anticipated. No Western country would give up the right to decide what if any support to provide in the event. However, it would not be helpful to rule out any of the functions as a matter of principle. Even with creation of an AHCF, the responsibility to protect innocent Africans is not restricted to African nations and troops. In the extreme, the direct use of force by Western SOF and strike aircraft should be an option, provided it is agreed with the AU.

Over time, Western assistance efforts should be geared to bringing down the numbers of Western personnel assigned to an operation. In particular, the sooner the Africans can provide SOF and have sufficient competence in managing forcible humanitarian operations, the smaller the need for Western troops and advisors on the ground. Of course, Western states and the AU may decide that it is advantageous to involve Western personnel, even if they are not essential.

As already noted in the discussion of intelligence needs, many services that support an African Humanitarian Combat Force in action could be outsourced to reputable firms that offer combat advisory assistance, surveillance, security, logistical services, and even forms of special operations. Some are active today in Africa (as well as in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere). At first blush, this may strike many observers as reliance on “mercenaries,” evoking most unfortunate connotations from African history. Provided there is full transparency, control, and oversight by experienced management—i.e., Western governments—this option should not be rejected. By the same token, it should not be used as a way to allow Western countries to wash their hands of responsibility to assist AU forces in preparation or operation.

Providing Africans with Capabilities That Could Be Misused

Although nothing could be further from the purpose of an African-Western effort to stop mass killing by forcible intervention, there is at least a theoretical danger that one or more African countries could use new-found network-based capabilities to attack or intervene unilaterally against their neighbors or direct these assets against their own citizenry. Precisely because African military capabilities in general are so weak, it is possible for a state determined to gain military advantage to do so—and then to use it. From the ashes of the 1994 slaughter and civil war, the Rwandan military has become powerful compared to its neighbors, as well as something of a neighborhood menace; Rwandan forces have been operating uninvited in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The bulk of the AHCF would, by design, be composed of the most capable combat forces available, and strenuous efforts would be made to make them more capable still.

Compounding this problem is the offensive potential of network-based capabilities. After all, the principal motivation behind the network-based military transformation of the forces of the United States and other advanced democracies is the desire to be able to project forces over distance to conduct rapid, decisive, expeditionary operations. As African armed forces become faster, more deployable, more lethal, more survivable, and better able to gather, share, and exploit information, there is no question that they will be more capable of intervening outside their borders.

There are four ways to mitigate this undeniable risk. First, net-capable African forces will remain critically dependent on the C4ISR of the United States and other Western states for years, if not perpetually. Depriving such a force of information is like depriving it of ammunition or fuel. This does not preclude one of the more advanced and ambitious participants in the AU force from acquiring some sensors of its own and creating network connectivity using widely available technology, but the effectiveness of the AHCF would be severely impaired without the Western C4ISR on which it would rely. Moreover, because net-capable forces are highly interdependent, national units that participate in the AHCF would be less capable if taken out of that context.

Second, the pursuit of AU multilateral military collaboration and capabilities, which has already begun with the creation of the Regional Standby Forces, should help “de-nationalize defense,” the way it did and continues to do for the European members of NATO, which had warred with one another for centuries. Apart from the political openness and trust that is engendered by such sustained cooperation, the forces become interdependent, even to the point of being less capable of operating separately than together. This is especially so if AU efforts to form both peacekeeping and combat forces cause the participants to begin specializing, rather than maintaining completely self-sufficient forces.

Third, the development of AU combat capabilities could, in time, provide a source of collective security, whereby the excessive strength and misconduct of any one country could be checked by the strength of the Union as a whole. For example, if a strong country attacked a weak neighbor, it might have to face forces of the AU. Apart from the military obstacle this would present to the aggressor, having to fight pan-African forces would turn the aggressor into a pariah.

The final option is for the West to intervene, at AU or UN request, if an African country uses intervention forces that are stronger than other Africans, even acting collectively, can defeat. The option of Western intervention is not an appealing one; indeed, the proposal for an

AU force with Western assistance and operational support is meant, in part, to minimize, not increase, reliance on Western military power to solve African security problems. However, Western military power would provide some insurance against an African country with advanced military forces turning to aggression.

Command and Control

Any multilateral military operation can raise perplexing questions surrounding the basic issue of who is in charge, among them:

- Where does the ultimate political decisionmaking authority reside?
- From which participating country (accountable to whom?) should the commanding military officer come?
- How does the command and control structure reflect the contributions and interests of the participating countries?

This set of issues could be especially complex in the case of an AU operation with heavy Western involvement, possibly orchestrated by NATO or the EU, and with the UN Security Council involved or not. A further complication is that most or all of the ground troops would be African, much of the air-strike forces Western, and the C4ISR infrastructure and processes wholly Western and possibly American.

Notwithstanding the critical dependence on Western operational involvement, operations of the sort described in this study should be African-led. African responsibility and command are important for the legitimacy and viability of an operation—quite possibly a violent one—the mandate of which must come from the AU (with or without UNSC backing). Embedded Western personnel should respect African command consistent with prior understandings about mission, rules of engagement, campaign plan, geographic and escalation constraints, and contingency plans. While some might argue that this formula may not maximize operational effectiveness, it is at least equally possible that legitimacy can be of great importance to neighboring countries, the local population and authorities, and even the government in question—all of which may be operationally critical.

African political authority and command raise two immediate questions:

- Who will decide whether and how an intervention will be mounted?
- Who will decide how the views of Western participants will be taken into account in the course of the intervention—as regards to both the operation as a whole and the conduct and use of Western personnel?

The U.S. body politic barely accepts the assignment of U.S. forces to the command of its closest and most capable allies. And no country—certainly not the United States, France, or the UK—is going to participate in a forcible humanitarian operation decided upon by other countries, much less an international organization of which it is not even a member. Nevertheless, here are some principles and practices that may permit solutions:

- Obviously, every participating non-AU country would make its own decision whether to contribute.
- As long as Western operational support is indispensable for decisive, modest-risk success—as will be the case for many years—those countries able and expected to provide that support will have a virtual veto on the operation. Given this leverage, they

will have a major influence in shaping the objectives, plans, and capabilities to maximize the prospects for success and minimize the risks of failure and casualties. Conversely, as Africans become self-sufficient, Western countries will have less leverage but also less at stake.

- To the extent that Western countries provide indispensable support and, more important, place people at risk (e.g., SOF and pilots), the lead supporting country should assign the deputy commander of the intervention force. Like the role often played by the British deputy commander in a U.S.-led coalition involving sizeable UK forces, and risks, the Western deputy would have complete information, unhindered access, and considerable influence over both the operation as a whole and the use of Western forces.
- Western military advisors posted in the force's command chain, whether at headquarters or in quick-response units, would have several functions: assisting their African counterparts, overseeing Western personnel, and acting as liaisons to their own governments. If problems arise, capitals can be informed and can settle problems politically. Such Western advisory-liaison officers should do nothing in secret from African commanders. Similarly, African commanders should be open with Western personnel and apprise them of evolving plans.

These are complex arrangements, and they require high degrees of clarity and mutual confidence and trust. Yet, when mass killing is imminent or has begun, speed is of the essence. Consequently, it is imperative that the principles and practices governing military command and political decisionmaking be addressed not in the face of a crisis but in the calm course of AU-Western cooperation to create the capability.

VII. Conclusions and Recommendations

We conclude this complex treatment of a complex idea with a simple conclusion and equally simple recommendation.

Our conclusion is that the confluence of new technology, new-found collective readiness of Africans to “step up,” and heightened Western appreciation that Africa matters offers an opportunity to form and use a militarily and politically feasible capability to stop mass killing. If several key points are accepted, the rest, though complex, can be settled:

- Africans must take the lead
- The combined force must be prepared and authorized to fight and win
- Western support is indispensable
- An unprecedented degree of African-Western cooperation is needed.

Our recommendation is that African and Western governments and institutions begin to discuss this idea without delay. Of course, much more analysis, discussion, and debate are needed, within governments, among governments, within and among international institutions, in think tanks, among NGOs, in the media, and among lawmakers. Laying out some work-plan for such a process in this report is impossible and unnecessary. The idea of making Darfur the last case—at least, the last unchecked case—of large-scale killing is compelling enough that all it should take is a few key governments and leaders charging ahead and challenging others to follow. If the U.S. government will do this, Europeans cannot and will not fail to join it—and

vice versa. If AU officials and African national leaders seize the initiative, other Africans will get on board, and the West will be left with no choice but to respond. If leaders do not seize the opportunity to create a capability to stop mass killing, the verdict will be harsh when the next Rwanda or Darfur goes unchecked.

A final observation: The development of African capabilities, with Western support, to intervene forcibly to stop mass killing should not, indeed cannot, relieve the advanced democracies of their own “responsibility to protect.” Western concern for human life must not decline the farther from the North Atlantic the problem occurs, or if Africans rather than Europeans are being slaughtered. These concerns are universal, not regional. They do not vary from Bosnian Muslims to Rwandan Tutsis. At the end of the day, the basis for the right and responsibility to protect are not interest-based but value-based. The combination of Western values and Western power imposes an obligation not only to enable Africans to use force to stop killing in Africa, but to do so themselves, if Africans cannot or will not. If Africans and Western countries collaborate to create and use a humanitarian intervention force of the sort described here, it may be possible to stop mass killing without Western intervention—a success for all concerned.