The U.S. Intervention in Lebanon, 1958: A Commander's Reminiscence
Abstract
In the summer of 1982, the Director, Combat Studies Institute, assigned me the task of writing a Leavenworth Paper on rapid deployment logistics, using the U.S. intervention in Lebanon in 1958 as a case study. Lebanon was chosen because there was ample documentation, much of it only recently declassified, and because Dr. Roger Spiller had set the strategic and tactical stage in Leavenworth Paper Na 3, "Not War But Like War": The American Intervention in Lebanon. In the course of my investigation, I decided to contact several military officers who had participated in the operation Major General (Retired) David W. Gray was one of those contacted. General Gray said in his initial response that he would reply at a later date, after he had had time to review his papers and comb his memory in order to prepare as thorough and accurate a narrative as possible. When his reply arrived, it totaled over one-hundred handwritten pages. In addition to providing answers to my specific questions about logistics, General Gray provided his recollections of the Lebanon operation and a critique of Leavenworth Paper No. 3. His manuscript not only contained a detailed and candid account of his activities, but amplified, elaborated and sometimes disputed Dr. Spiller's work. In this sense, it is both an important eyewitness account and a companion piece to Leavenworth Paper No 3. The reader of both publications will benefit from being able to draw upon the scholarly work of a trained historian and the memoir of an actual participant. The historical record could not be better served.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 01, 1984
- Accession Number
- ADA450232
Entities
People
- David W. Gray
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College