

The Maneuver Center of Excellence and Its Support of the Brigade Combat Team

**A Monograph
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Abstract

The Maneuver Center of Excellence and Its Support of the Brigade Combat Team by MAJ Jason M. Hayes, United States Army, 52 pages.

Recommendation Number 9 from the Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) report recommended, among other things, the consolidation of the U.S. Army's Armor and Infantry Centers and Schools at Fort Benning, Georgia to create a Maneuver Center of Excellence (CoE) for ground forces training and doctrine development. Shortly following approval of the BRAC recommendations, the U. S. Army issued change two to its Army Campaign Plan (ACP). Its purpose was to direct planning, preparation, and execution of Army operations and Army transformation within the context of ongoing strategic commitments to include the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

In response to guidance given by the ACP and BRAC, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) issued a memorandum dated 13 October 2005 and titled *Initial Planning Directive – TRADOC Areas of Interest*, where the Commanding General (CG) of TRADOC directed the organization to initiate action to plan, prepare, and execute a detailed assessment of CG, TRADOC Areas of Interest (TAI). A focus group, organized and titled TAI 3 – Redesign for Excellence, executed the task of developing an organizational structure for all Centers of Excellence within TRADOC.

This paper uses the organizational structure for the planned Maneuver CoE to evaluate how a CoE supports the Army's transformation effort to create modular, combined-arms brigade combat teams.

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INTRODUCTION

On 08 September 2005, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) submitted its recommendations to the President of the United States, George W. Bush. Recommendation Number 9 from the commission, chaired by Anthony J. Principi, recommended, among other things, the consolidation of the U.S. Army's Armor and Infantry Centers and Schools at Fort Benning, Georgia to create a Maneuver Center of Excellence (CoE) for ground forces training and doctrine development.¹ The justification for this recommendation was that it would enhance military value, improve training and deployment capabilities, better utilize training resources, and create significant efficiencies and cost savings while maintaining sufficient surge capability to address unforeseen requirements. The relocation of Operational Army units to Fort Knox, to occupy the space vacated by the Armor Center and School, would support the Army's Force Structure Plans and modular force transformation. Additionally, the consolidation of both infantry and armor One Station Unit Training (OSUT) would allow the Army to reduce the total number of Basic Combat Training (BCT) locations from five to four, therefore providing a savings in cost and resources.²

Shortly following approval of the BRAC recommendations, the U. S. Army issued change two to its Army Campaign Plan (ACP). Its purpose was to direct planning, preparation, and execution of Army operations and Army transformation within the context of ongoing strategic commitments to include the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Among the major objectives addressed in the ACP was the adaptation of the Institutional Army to effectively

¹ 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, *2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report: Volume 1*, (Washington. D.C.: 18 September 2005), 17.

² Ibid., 17-18.

generate and sustain the Operational Army's mission to provide relevant and ready land power to the Joint Force.³

In response to guidance given by the ACP and BRAC, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) issued a memorandum dated 13 October 2005 and titled *Initial Planning Directive – TRADOC Areas of Interest*, where the Commanding General (CG) of TRADOC directed the organization to initiate action to plan, prepare, and execute a detailed assessment of CG, TRADOC Areas of Interest (TAI).⁴ TRADOC's mission was to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the TAIs in order to identify and implement actions that would enable TRADOC to adapt processes, relationships, and organizations to the realities of a dynamic joint operating environment. Specifically, one of the key tasks identified by the memorandum, which later changed to a focus on the development of CoEs, was to seize the opportunities posed by BRAC to accelerate integration across TRADOC.⁵ A focus group, organized and titled TAI 3 – Redesign for Excellence, executed this task and presented its findings during the TRADOC Senior Leader Conference in January 2006. TRADOC would use these findings to guide how it would organize and execute its responsibilities in support of the Operational Army. The TRADOC Campaign Plan (TCP) would then direct approved solutions resulting from each TAI's recommendations.

This author's participation as a member of TAI 3 and the result of his analysis of BRAC and TRADOC's restructuring resulted in the position that the relocation of the U.S. Army Armor School and Center and its subsequent consolidation with the U.S. Army Infantry School and Center at Fort Benning, Georgia supports the Army's modernization efforts in more ways than

³ U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, *Army Campaign Plan, Change 2*, (Washington, D.C.: 30 September 2005), Annex F, 2-2, F3, 20; U.S. Department of the Army, United States Army War College and Carlisle Barracks, *How The Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2005-2006*, (Carlisle, P.A.: 30 September 2005), 1.

⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Office of the Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, *Initial Planning Directive – TRADOC Areas of Interest*, (Fort Monroe, V.A.: 13 October 2005), 1.

⁵ Verbal guidance given by CG, TRADOC to TAI 3 – Redesign for Excellence, 18 November 2005.

those stated by BRAC. Specifically, the consolidation of the U.S Army Armor and Infantry Centers and Schools at Fort Benning, Georgia to create a Maneuver CoE for ground forces training and doctrine development supports the decisive effort of Army transformation to create modular, combined-arms⁶ maneuver brigade combat teams (BCT).

Methodology and Organization

Chapter One establishes the context for Army transformation and CoE development. The discussion of Army transformation will outline its history, its principles and main components, and the reorganization of maneuver forces into modular, combined-arms maneuver BCTs. CoE development will outline the history of the Maneuver CoE and its main principles. Finally, the chapter sets out the framework for the analysis of Maneuver CoE.

Chapter Two discusses the consolidated directorates that directly support infantry or armor forces within a BCT. This chapter begins by providing a background discussion and description of the three directorates within the CoE whose primary responsibility is the support of armor and infantry soldiers and units: the Directorate of Doctrine and Training Development (DOTD), the Combat Developments and Integration Directorate (CDID), and the Directorate of Training (DOT). The chapter then conducts the analysis of the effectiveness and efficiency of each directorate. The final section of this chapter offers a conclusion to the analysis of the effectiveness and efficiency of the three directorates.

Chapter Three discusses the co-located Armor School and Infantry School. This chapter begins by providing a background discussion and description of the two branch schools. The next portion analyzes the effectiveness and efficiency of the schools followed by a conclusion to the analysis of these subordinate organizations.

⁶ FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics defines combined arms as “the synchronized or simultaneous application of several arms—such as infantry, armor, field artillery, engineers, air defense, and aviation—to achieve an effect on the enemy that is greater than if each arm were used against the enemy in sequence.

Chapter Four discusses the consolidated Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA). This chapter begins by providing a background discussion and description of the NCOA. The next portion analyzes the effectiveness and efficiency of the schools and courses instructed in the NCOA followed by a conclusion to the analysis.

The Conclusion provides recommendations based on the analysis executed in Chapter Two through Chapter Four.

CHAPTER ONE

“The Army will undergo substantial transformation over coming decades whether it wants to or not. No living organization, and the Army is a living organization, can survive without change.”

Williamson Murray⁷

Army Transformation

The U.S. Army is at a time when multitudes of factors are driving change. The Internet, computers, and other mobile data systems allow organizations almost limitless multi-echelon access to information and connectivity. This rapidly developing network centric mode of operation is allowing concurrent vertical and horizontal communications and access to near real-time information.⁸ Simultaneously, the development of technologies with broad military applicability is continually improving precision, detection, range, lethality, navigation, situational awareness, and other aspects of system and organizational performance. Finally, the end of the Cold War exposed points of stress worldwide where a variety of threats could endanger American interests. These threats include the emergence of a more complex national security environment with diminishing protection afforded by geographic distances, a deteriorating international security environment caused by weak and failing states, the emergence and diffusion of power to non-state actors, and a global war against terrorism. These trends and others have caused the nature and location of conflicts to be unpredictable and have created a broad spectrum of new threats within the strategic and operational environments.⁹ The combination of these influences is

⁷ Williamson Murry, *Army Transformation: A View From The U.S. Army War College*, (Carlisle, P.A.: July 2001), 17.

⁸ Network Centric defined in U.S. Department of Defense Report to Congress, *Network Centric Warfare*, 27 July 2001, 2-4.

⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 1: The Army*, (Washington, D.C.: 14 June 2005), 2-2; How the Army Runs, 1.

forcing a transformation, in not only new weapons systems and platforms, but in the organizations, systems and processes used to develop and manage the Army.

In response to these issues (and others not discussed in this document), the Army seeks to transform in order to adapt to the current operating environment and prepare for the future operating environment. At the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) annual meeting on 12 October 1999, the former Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General Eric K. Shinseki, unveiled a new strategic vision for the Army. This vision was to transform the Army into a force that is strategically responsive and dominant across the entire spectrum of operations.¹⁰ General Peter J. Schoomaker, the current CSA, has continued Army transformation at a fast pace. In regards to transformation, General Schoomaker stated, “As long as the United States Army has existed we have transformed—and we always will. For four years under General Shinseki, our Army has asked hard questions and made tough choices. We will continue to go where the answers to those questions take us. Our azimuth to the future is good. The Army must remain relevant and ready.”¹¹

Transformation is the process that the Army uses to shape the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations. It is the evolution and deployment of combat capabilities that provide revolutionary or asymmetric advantages to the forces. The Army’s transformation efforts improve Army and Joint Force capabilities to meet current, as well as future, full-spectrum operational requirements.¹²

The Army has refined its overall transformation strategy to ensure it can meet current and future challenges and is executing a plan consisting of four overarching, interrelated strategies to

¹⁰ Thomas G. Mahnken and James R. Fitzsimonds, “Tread-Heads or Technophiles?: Army Officer Attitudes Toward Transformation,” *Parameters* (Summer 2004): 57.

¹¹ How the Army Runs, 2.

¹² U.S. Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, *2006 Army Modernization Plan*, (Washington, D.C.: 1 March 2006), 17; U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress, *Network Centric Warfare*, (Washington, D.C.: 27 July 2001), 2-4; 2006 Army Modernization Plan, 17.

manage change across the entire spectrum of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) and guide the Army's progression from current to future capabilities. This progression improves and modernizes capabilities and transforms Army organizations in order to provide ready and relevant land power. It develops, trains, and equips soldiers; grows adaptive leaders; sustains the volunteer force by matching the quality of life with the quality of service; and provides the infrastructure and support necessary to ensure successful mission accomplishment. In essence, this plan is an orientation, or path, of continuously improving capabilities, through which the Army expects to field a force of adaptive and innovative soldiers, led by experienced leaders, organized into deployable elements and enabled by leading-edge technologies to assure its dominance in any environment.¹³

Transformation of the Army occurs across the Operating Force (those units that deploy to conduct operations in support of Joint Force commander requirements) and the Generating Force (that portion of the Army that exists to carry out Title 10 functions required to provide relevant and ready land power capabilities to Joint Force commanders.)¹⁴ The operating and generating force distinctions tend to blur in practice, but still provide constructs for capability development.¹⁵

The Brigade Combat Team

The current CSA set three goals for the transformation effort of creating modular units. First, the new design had to increase the number of combat brigades available to the Army while maintaining combat effectiveness that is equal to or better than that of current divisional brigade combat teams. Second, it had to create smaller standardized modules to meet the varied demands of Regional Combatant Commanders (RCC) and reduce joint planning and execution

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Combined Arms Center, TRADOC Target Area of Interest 3-Redesign for Excellence, White Paper, *Generating Force*, 6.

¹⁵ 2006 Army Modernization Plan, B-3.

complexities. Finally, it had to redesign brigades to perform as an integral part of the joint team, making them more capable in their basic ground close combat role, able to benefit from other service support and to contribute more to other service partners.¹⁶ The key part of this effort is the creation of BCTs.

The decisive effort of Army transformation is the creation of modular, combined arms maneuver BCTs.¹⁷ As part of this effort, the Army shifts capabilities previously found at division and corps level to the brigade – the building block of combat forces in the future force.¹⁸ Each type of brigade is of standard configuration and organization. These units serve as the foundation for a land force that is balanced and postured for rapid deployment and sustained operations worldwide.¹⁹ This pairing of combat potential with command and control (C2) gives the BCT the ability to gather information quickly and more reliably and fight along with other services as a networked teammate. This gives the BCTs significantly greater combat power than that of other contemporary units.²⁰

The principal tactical unit of the modular Army is a BCT; comprised of battalion and company sized subunits that reflect a combined-arms organization down to battalion level.²¹ This brigade based, modular unit is a rapidly deployable, lethal, responsive, agile, tailorable, and discrete package of land force combat power.²² The three BCT designs are the Heavy (HBCT), Infantry (IBCT) and Stryker (SBCT). Each BCT is similar in overall configuration. The main difference is that the SBCT has three maneuver battalions instead of two as in the HBCT and IBCT. The HBCT has two combined arms battalions, an armed reconnaissance squadron, a fires

¹⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, *FMI 3-90.6, Heavy Brigade Combat Team*, (Washington, D.C.: 15 March 2005), xx.

¹⁷ 2006 Army Modernization Plan, B-6.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0, The Army in Joint Operations*, (Fort Monroe, Virginia: 7 April 2005), i.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, *FMI 3-90.5, Heavy Brigade Combat Team Combined Arms Battalion*, (Washington, D.C.: 15 March 2006), xxvi; 2006 Army Modernization Plan, B-6.

²⁰ FMI 3-90.6, xx.

²¹ TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0, 52.

²² FMI 3-90.6, xx.

battalion, a support battalion, and a brigade special troops battalion (BSTB). The IBCT has two infantry battalions, a reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron, a fires battalion, a support battalion, and a BSTB. The SBCT has three infantry battalions, a RSTA squadron, a fires battalion, and an engineer, signal, military intelligence and anti-armor company.²³

The BSTB provides the command posts, liaisons, military intelligence and signal support for the HBCT and IBCT, with the addition of an engineer company within the IBCT special troops battalion. The armed reconnaissance squadron, of the HBCT, and the RSTA squadron, of the IBCT and SBCT, conducts reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition for the BCT. The combined arms battalions in the HBCT consist of two infantry and two armor companies, as well as one-engineer company. The infantry battalions in the IBCT consist of three infantry companies and one weapons company. The infantry battalions in the SBCT have three infantry companies. The fires battalion consists of two artillery batteries in the HBCT and IBCT while the SBCT has three artillery batteries; all having target acquisition and counter-mortar radar systems. Finally, the support battalion provides additional transportation, distribution and maintenance functions that the forward support companies cannot cover and it directly supports the brigade special troops battalion.²⁴

The importance of the transformational effort to develop modular, combined-arms BCTs is that a combined-arms focus forms the center point of their formation; not the branch focus of Armor or Infantry. This significant shift from unit organizational models of the recent past improves responsiveness by reducing the need to cross attach units and strengthens the BCT's ability to fight cohesive teams.²⁵ This higher level of integration of infantry and armor forces at

²³ 2006 Army Modernization Plan, B-6.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ TRADOC Phamplet 525-3-0, 52.

the brigade and battalion level ultimately necessitates a higher level of integration at the branch and center level.

Centers of Excellence

The US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) defines a CoE as “institutions possessing special knowledge or expertise in a particular area of concern and incorporated into the collaborative environment to facilitate development of the products supporting Standing Joint Forces Headquarters (SJFHQ) and Joint Task Force (JTF) functions and operations, e.g., academia, industry, banking.”²⁶ TRADOC further defines a CoE as “a premier organization that creates the highest standards of achievement in an assigned sphere of expertise by generating synergy through effective and efficient combination and integration of functions while reinforcing the unique requirements and capabilities of the branches.”²⁷ TRADOC’s definition is more relevant to this discussion of CoEs because it was the definition used by TAI 3-Redesign for Excellence during the development of a basic CoE model.

Six principles form the organizational design model of an Army CoE. Each of the CoEs must support the Operational Army and be designed around a common organizational framework that will strengthen synergy and integration among centers. They should create structure around TRADOC’s core functions while consolidating functions at center level to maximum extent. Finally, they should maintain each branches identity, with the primary focus of branch commandants on training and leader development, and should remain consistent with TP 525-3-0, *The Army in Joint Operations*.²⁸

²⁶ Definition found online USJFCOM Glossary at <http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm#C>. (accessed on 12 March 2006)

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Combined Arms Center, TRADOC Target Areas of Interest 3-Redesign for Excellence, Brief to CAC G3, *Outcomes of the TAI #3 Redesign for Excellence CoE Workshop*, 02 December 2005.

There are presently two models for an Army CoE, single branch and multiple branches. The existing Army single branch CoEs are the Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, the Signal Center at Fort Gordon, Georgia, and the Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama. The existing multiple branch CoEs are the Maneuver Center at Fort Benning, Georgia, the Fires Center at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, the Maneuver Support Center at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and the Logistics Center at Fort Lee, Virginia. Each existing, or developing, CoE within TRADOC adheres to one of these basic organizational models with minimal differences.

The Maneuver Center of Excellence

As stated earlier, on 08 September 2005, the BRAC submitted its recommendation that the U.S. Army's Armor and Infantry Centers and Schools consolidate at Fort Benning, Georgia to create a Maneuver CoE for ground forces training and doctrine development.²⁹ In conjunction with the TRADOC, led CoE team, TAI 3 – Redesign for Excellence, the Armor and Infantry Centers began developing a plan for the creation of the Maneuver CoE. The center's focus group was to develop a plan that would consolidate the existing Armor and Infantry Centers and Schools at Fort Benning, Georgia before the expected BRAC completion date of December 2011.³⁰

As a prelude to mission analysis, the CG of TRADOC gave additional guidance concerning the development of CoEs. TRADOC Regulation 10-5, Organization and Functions of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, would continue to define relationships between TRADOC organizations including the lead responsibilities for core functions and key enablers. The CoE would continue to be responsible, at their level and within their expertise, for TRADOC core functions and key enablers. The centers would consolidate functions to the greatest extent possible and co-locate functions only if more effective than consolidation. The design of the CoE

²⁹ 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report, 17.

³⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Combined Arms Center, Maneuver Center, internal briefing, 08 August 2005.

must support needs of the Army now and in the future and, finally, there was to be no growth in personnel.³¹ Both TAI 3 – Redesign for Excellence and the Maneuver CoE focus group presented the results of their research at the TRADOC Senior Leader Conference in January 2006. Their findings formed the model for how the Maneuver CoE would organize and execute its responsibilities in support of the Operational Army and in accordance with the CG, TRADOC’s guidance.




Figure 1-Approved model for the Maneuver Center of Excellence³²

³¹ Verbal guidance given by CG, TRADOC to TAI 3-Redesign for Excellence, 13 October 2005.

³² U.S. Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Combined Arms Center, Maneuver Center, *MCoE update to TRADOC Commander*, 16 March 2006.

The Maneuver CoE supports the Operational Army through its execution of sub-functions to TRADOC's core functions. Core functions are derived, sustainable components integral to TRADOC's core competencies.³³ TRADOC's core functions are Recruit, Initial Military Training, Functional Training, Leader Development and Education, Lessons Learned, Collective Training, Doctrine, Training Support, Concepts, Experimentation, and Requirements Determination. The sub-functions the Maneuver CoE performs relate to ten of TRADOC's eleven core functions. The only core function not covered by a sub-function within the Maneuver CoE is recruiting. Responsibility for recruiting within TRADOC lies almost completely within Army Accessions Command (AAC).

Summary

The Army's transformational effort to create modular, combined-arms maneuver brigade combat teams has resulted in a higher level of integration between infantry and armor forces. This integration is significant for two reasons. First, battalions now have infantry and armor forces within their organization; organizations that were previously designed around only one branch function. This significant shift from unit organizational models of the recent past improves responsiveness by reducing the need to cross attach units and strengthens the BCT's ability to fight cohesive teams.³⁴ Second, each branch maintains the distinct and necessary differences concerning its capabilities and requirements that make it an integral part of the combined arms team.

The objective of TRADOC's transformation of the Institutional Army (part of the Generating Force) is to adapt processes, relationships, and organizations to the realities of a

³³ TRADOC defines its core competencies as 1) Recruit quality people, train Soldiers, and develop leaders 2) Prepare the Army to dominate land combat in a joint warfight 3) Design, develop, and integrate warfighting requirements; foster innovation; and lead change; U.S. Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, *TRADOC Regulation 10-5, Organization and Function*, U.S. Army Training And Doctrine Command, (Fort Monroe, V.A.: 22 December 2005), 9.

³⁴ TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0, 52.

dynamic joint operating environment and best meet the needs and requirements of operating in the current and projected security environment.³⁵ It focuses on the development of adaptable leaders, Soldiers, and Department of the Army (DA) civilians while similarly, reexamining doctrine, processes, education, training methodology, and systems to develop and institutionalize a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset.³⁶

Transformation of the Army occurs across the Operating Force, those units that deploy to conduct operations in support of Joint Force commander requirements, and the Generating Force, that portion of the Army that exists to carry out Title 10 functions required to provide relevant and ready land power capabilities to Joint Force commanders.³⁷ The decisive effort of Army transformation is the creation of modular, combined arms maneuver BCTs. Each type of brigade has a standard configuration and organization and serves as the foundation for a land force that is balanced and postured for rapid deployment and sustained operations worldwide.³⁸ The redesign of a brigade into a modular, combined-arms maneuver BCT requires the integration of infantry and armor forces at the battalion and brigade level. This higher level of integration of infantry and armor forces at the brigade and battalion level ultimately necessitates a higher level of integration at the branch and center level.

While the operating force of the Army transforms, so does the generating force. A CoE serves as “a premier organization that creates the highest standards of achievement in an assigned sphere of expertise by generating synergy through effective and efficient combination and integration of functions while reinforcing the unique requirements and capabilities of the

³⁵ Initial Planning Directive-TRADOC Areas of Interest, 1; Francis J. Harvey and Pater J. Schoomaker, *Out Army at War-Relevant and Ready...today and Tomorrow: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 2005*, Posture Statement presented to the 109th Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 6 February 2005, 2; For further discussion of Generating Force see pg 8.

³⁶ Relevant and Ready, 2.

³⁷ 2006 Army Modernization Plan, B-3.

³⁸ Ibid., B-6.

branches.”³⁹ Since a CoE is part of the Generating Force and BCTs are part of the Operating Force, a CoE must support the decisive effort of Army transformation to create modular, combined-arms maneuver BCTs. The creation of maneuver BCTs requires a higher level of integration of armor and infantry forces at the brigade and battalion level, therefore the Maneuver CoE must support integration.

Developing the Model for Analysis

The Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines integrate in three ways that are pertinent to this discussion. First, to form, coordinate, or blend into a functioning whole; second, to incorporate into a larger unit; third, to end the segregation of and bring into equal membership in society or an organization.⁴⁰ From these definitions, and the principles behind the formation of combined-arms BCTs, this paper uses the term integration to define the synergistic combination of individual-to-battalion sized armor and infantry forces within a modular, brigade-sized organization.⁴¹ The maneuver BCT’s strength is that it utilizes the similarities, and necessary differences, of each branch. The emphasis is that this combination of forces, a combination only previously attained at battalion-size level by the creation of a Task Force, is greater than the sum of its parts. Therefore, if the Maneuver CoE is to support the development of maneuver BCTs it must support the unique capabilities and requirements of each branch while capitalizing on similarities.

The Secretary of the Army has approved the organizational design of the Maneuver CoE during the TRADOC Senior Leader Conference. The Maneuver CoE’s requirement to develop its organization in accordance with the TRADOC CG’s guidance, and the CG’s approval of the

³⁹ TRADOC New Service accessed on line at <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/TNSarchives/November05/110905.htm> (accessed 20 March 2006).

⁴⁰ Merriam-Webster, Inc, *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, (Springfield, M.A.: 2004), 378.

⁴¹ Author’s definition.

recommended organization forms this paper's assumption that all subordinate organizations within the Maneuver CoE comply with the TRADOC CG's guidance.

Taking into account that the CoE must support the unique capabilities and requirements of each branch while capitalizing on their similarities, and that the organizations within the Maneuver CoE comply with the CG's guidance, this paper analyzes those subordinate organizations within the Maneuver CoE that directly support armor and infantry forces. This paper will not discuss the organization within the Maneuver CoE whose focus is on the internal support of the center.

The Secretary of the Army has approved the transformation initiatives of developing modular, combined-arms maneuver BCTs and the Maneuver CoE. The implementation of these plans is an on-going effort with a scheduled completed date of December 2011.⁴² With this in mind, and because both initiatives are approved, this paper will refer to both actions as if they have been completed. Additionally, even though Army transformation encompasses more than just unit reorganization, the discussion of how the Maneuver CoE supports Army transformational efforts will be limited to the creation of modular, combined-arms maneuver BCTs.

There is one final point for the analysis of the Maneuver CoE's support to combined-arms maneuver BCTs. As discussed previously, BCTs are combined-arms organization comprising multiple branches. The Maneuver CoE's focus is on the armor and infantry forces found within the IBCT, SBCT, and HBCT. The remaining organizations that exist within the BCTs in company-or-larger sized elements (Engineer, Field Artillery, and Battlefield Sustainment) are included in the focus of their branch's CoE (Maneuver Support CoE for Engineers, Fires CoE for Field Artillery, and Logistics CoE for Battlefield Sustainment).

⁴² December 2011 is the scheduled completion date for all BRAC initiatives.

Measure of Effectiveness

The measures of effectiveness for this paper's analysis of the Maneuver CoE are effectiveness and efficiency. Effectiveness is defined as producing the decided, decisive, or desired effect of integrating armor and infantry units within a BCT.⁴³ Efficiency is defined as acting or a potential for action or use in such a way as to avoid loss or waste of energy in effecting, producing, or functioning.⁴⁴

Conclusion

The Army's effort to create modular, combined-arms maneuver BCTs and the creation of the Maneuver CoE both show how the Army is transforming to react to the current operating environment and prepare for the operating environment of the future. The transformation of the Operating and Generating Force are necessary to support the Army's overall transformation efforts. The following chapters discuss the combined and co-located schools and directorates within the Maneuver CoE that directly support the armor and infantry forces within maneuver BCTs.

⁴³ Author's definition.

⁴⁴ Merriam-Webster's, 229.

CHAPTER TWO

Introduction

The Maneuver CoE consists of several directorates, schools, and staffs, each with a specific purpose or function. The CoE considers these subordinate organizations necessary to accomplish some specified or implied task to support either internal or external agencies. This chapter focuses on those consolidated directorates that directly support infantry or armor forces within a BCT.

This chapter begins by providing a background discussion and description of the three directorates within the CoE whose primary responsibility is the support of armor and infantry soldiers and units: the Directorate of Doctrine and Training Development (DOTD), the Combat Developments and Integration Directorate (CDID), and the Directorate of Training (DOT). The chapter then analyzes the effectiveness and efficiency of each directorate. The final section of this chapter offers a conclusion to the analysis of the effectiveness and efficiency of the three directorates.

Background

The Maneuver CoE based its decision to consolidate the DOTD, CDID, and DOT on the commonality in organization, responsibilities, and functions of the two joining centers and schools. The DOTD, CDID, and DOT execute key functions and sub-functions in support of TRADOC, the Maneuver CoE, and more relevant to this paper, armor and infantry soldiers and units. To analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of each of these three directorates it is first important to understand the functions and sub-functions they support. The first directorate discussed is the Maneuver CoE's DOTD, which is responsible for the functions of Doctrine, Collective Training, and Lessons Learned.

The Doctrine function requires the development and integration of land forces warfighting doctrine, and ensures the consistency of Army doctrinal publications, by considering joint, multi-Service, and multinational doctrine and national policy and guidance.⁴⁵ It consists of researching, authoring, coordinating, and publishing field manuals, the Army Universal Task List (AUTL), and assigned joint doctrine. DOTD prepares doctrinal publications, performs management, integration, and quality control of armor and infantry doctrine and then integrates that doctrine vertically and horizontally with joint and multinational doctrine.

The function of Collective Training focuses on the production of branch specific collective, individual, and functional level training. DOTD develops collective, individual, and functional training standards and strategies by determining training requirements and managing programs to enable crews, teams, staffs, and units to conduct the full range of military operations in the contemporary operational environment.

The purpose of the Lessons Learned function is to obtain and process observations, insights, and lessons to define DOTMLPF implications leading to actionable solutions for armor and infantry forces. The center collects, analyzes, disseminates, and archives observations, insights, and lessons; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); and research and special study materials regarding armor and infantry forces. The function also requires DOTD to work with CDID to determine DOTMLPF implications from lessons learned and integrating products from Army activities and the Joint, Interagency and Military (JIM) environment into proponent action plans that produce solutions to key issues.⁴⁶

The second directorate to consolidate functions at the center level is the CDID. This directorate supports both armor and infantry forces through its focus on the functions of Concepts, Requirements Determination, and Experimentation.

⁴⁵ TRADOC Regulation 10-5, 11.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

The function of Concepts is to develop ideas that lead the Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS).⁴⁷ Concepts should illustrate how future armor and infantry forces will operate, describe the capabilities required to carry out a range of military operations against adversaries in the expected joint operational environment, and how a commander, using military art and science, might employ these capabilities to achieve desired effects and objectives. Concepts consist of future capability descriptions within a proposed structure of future military operations for a period of ten to twenty years. Each concept describes problems to solve, the components of potential solutions, and how those components work together to solve the problems.⁴⁸

Requirements Determination assesses capabilities of armor and infantry forces to identify gaps and then develops integrated DOTMLPF requirements to resolve or mitigate those gaps. It consists of determining and recommending priorities and documenting changes in DOTMLPF for armor and infantry forces, as well as supporting analysis. These requirements result from JCIDS, needs statements, operational lessons learned, and senior leadership decisions to spin future capabilities into the current force. Initial capabilities documents (ICD), capability development documents (CDD), capability production documents (CPD), and DOTMLPF change recommendations (DCR) formally document these requirements.⁴⁹

Experimentation explores innovative methods of operating, assesses their feasibility, evaluates their utility, or determines their limits to reduce risk in the current force and the future force. It identifies and verifies acceptable solutions for required changes in DOTMLPF to achieve significant advances in current and future capabilities. Experimentation consists of reducing risk to soldiers and developments by conducting concept development and prototype experiments that provide credible analytical underpinnings to support decision making for current and future armor

⁴⁷ JCIDS described in *How the Army Runs*, 216.

⁴⁸ TRADOC Regulation 10-5, 12.

⁴⁹ ICD, CDD, CPD, and DCR discussed in *How the Army Runs*, 221-223; TRADOC Regulation 10-5, 12.

and infantry forces. It applies structured assessment procedures to substantiate the effects of proposed warfighting capabilities, using discovery, hypothesis testing, and demonstration approaches as appropriate. It refines operational concepts, develops DOTMLPF capability requirements, and assesses potential DOTMLPF capability solutions through analysis based on experiments using venues supporting the appropriate level of resolution. These venues may range from wargaming (principally used for concept development) through integrated live, virtual, and constructive experiments.

The third and final directorate that the Maneuver CoE consolidated to support both armor and infantry forces is the DOT. This directorate has responsibility for the function of Leader Development and Education. It also operates the Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC) and the Armor and Infantry Pre-command Course (PCC).

Leader Development and Education consists of creating leader development concepts, doctrine, programs of instruction, strategies, training, and education; and includes training officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers (NCO), and civilian supervisors to perform in leadership and supervisory roles. Training includes job-specific skills, as well as tasks that provide a leader with the skills to motivate, counsel, and care for subordinates. The principal leader development and education systems are the Officer Education System (OES), Warrant Officer Education System (WOES), Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES), and Civilian Education System (CES). These education systems instill leaders with the ability to think through complex, unexpected, and ambiguous problems in order to develop solutions.⁵⁰

The MCCC is an integrated captain's career course for both armor and infantry officers. Officers normally attend their branch captain's career course following selection for promotion to captain. This is the second major branch school officers attend before company level command. The course combines the instruction formerly taught in the branch Officer Advanced Course

⁵⁰ Ibid., 10.

(OAC) and the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3).⁵¹ The MCCC prepares company grade officers to command and train at the company or troop level. It also prepares officers to serve in staff positions at battalion and brigade levels.⁵²

PCC prepares selected officers for command by providing a common understanding of current doctrine and by providing both new and refresher training in selected functions and duties. The PCC program's goal is to ingrain warfighting and combined arms thinking into commanders. The course consists of several phases distributed over numerous locations but the Maneuver CoE's portion of PCC is branch oriented for both Armor and Infantry and focuses on tactical and technical proficiency, system proficiency and hands-on training.⁵³

Analysis

DOTD

The center's execution of the functions of Doctrine, Lessons Learned, and Collective Training requires the development and maintenance of numerous publications. As an example, Armor and Infantry are responsible for over sixty-five field manuals (FM), nineteen combined arms training strategies (CATS), and eighteen mission-training plans (MTP).⁵⁴ The consolidation of the schools and centers only consolidates the location for the development of these doctrinal publications and has a negligible effect on the total combined number of publications.

In addition to the number of doctrinal publications DOTD is responsible for is the fact that most of these publications cover units, specialties, or vehicles present in organizations consisting of both branches. Infantry branch is the proponent for Stryker doctrine while Armor is

⁵¹ Department of the Army, *DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management* (Washington, D.C.: 28 December 2005), 19; TRADOC Regulation 350-10, 19-20.

⁵² The Maneuver CoE is currently developing the Program of Instruction (POI) for the MCCC. The information provided for the MCCC is extrapolated from the current explanation of the Captains Career Course in DA Pamphlet 600-3 and discussion between the author and the Maneuver CoE.

⁵³ DA Pamphlet 600-3, 30.

⁵⁴ A list of Armor and Infantry publication is available online at <https://atiam.train.army.mil>

the proponent for reconnaissance doctrine (RSTA and Armed Reconnaissance units). Infantry is the lead agency for the development of the SBCT FM, the SBCT has a RSTA and Armor is responsible of RSTA doctrine. Therefore, detailed coordination between the armor and infantry branch is required since the SBCT FM includes information within the domain of RSTA doctrine.

The consolidation of Doctrine Development, Lessons Learned, and Collective Training under the control of a central authority (the director of DOTD) allows the center to facilitate the coordination and integration of these responsibilities between both branches in a more effective manner. Additionally, the DOTD director can ensure synchronized efforts through a central quality control element. This unity of effort between the branches allows for the effective integration of doctrine and collective training, thereby supporting the integration of armor and infantry within a BCT.

The measurement of efficiency for DOTD's consolidation is how it facilitates the integration of armor and infantry doctrine, lessons learned, and collective training while avoiding loss of resources and limiting waste of effort. This paper has already determined that the central control and integration of DOTD's responsibilities adds to its effectiveness and that this gain in effectiveness is a result of the reduction of personnel, time, and distance required for integration. This reduction also adds to DOTD's efficiency. By reducing the total number of personnel required to run DOTD the center provides a savings in money. Additionally, a consolidated quality control element for both armor and infantry products provides a savings in personnel. The questionable savings is time. The fact that the consolidation of the two schools and centers resulted in only a negligible effect on the number of combined publications that the center is responsible for, coupled with a reduction in overall staff due to consolidation, could lead to an increase in the total amount of time required to produce a product.

CDID

The purpose of creating a consolidated CDID is to oversee all requirements determination, experimentation, concepts development, and DTLOMPF integration for both armor and infantry forces.⁵⁵ Its mission is to develop CoE-related concepts and requirements and conduct experiments to validate DOTMLPF-integrated combined arms capabilities that complement joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities.⁵⁶ Since the Maneuver CoE is responsible for armor and infantry branch, as well as HBCT, SBCT, and IBCT units, a central authority should focus the efforts of CDID to ensure the best interest of both branches and all three formations.

As stated in Chapter One, the development of BCTs has linked both armor and infantry forces. Because of this, there should be a link between their futures and futures development. Two co-located CDIDs, both with their own director, could result in conflicting priorities that would hinder the development process. A centrally controlling element, or position, would be responsible for ensuring the establishment of, and adherence to, an integrated plan for future developments and concepts.

The CDID director is responsible for synchronizing and integrating capabilities for both branches. Additionally, the CDID director synchronizes and integrates capabilities with other CoEs and, where applicable, Army, joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities. The CDID director's control over developments for both Infantry and Armor allows him to establish a unity of effort within the directorate. The director can control the priorities of development within the directorate, thereby providing him, or her, the ability to ensure the best interest of both branches in a more effective way than if the directorates were co-located.

The measurement of efficiency for CDID's consolidation is how it facilitates the development of armor and infantry related functions while avoiding loss of resources or waste of

⁵⁵ Maneuver CoE update to the TRADOC CG, 16 March 2006.

⁵⁶ TAI #3 Redesign for Excellence Video Teleconference, 28 February 2006.

energy. A consolidated CDID helps to ensure efficiency by developing and enforcing integrated priorities of work for the future developments. By doing this, the CDID director reduces the chances that conflicting interest between the branches results in a loss of resources due to unnecessary efforts. Additionally, a consolidated quality control element for both armor and infantry products provides a savings in personnel. The questionable savings for a consolidated CDID, just as with DOTD, is time. There is a possibility that the reduced work force (reduced from the total number of personnel from both centers and schools that were previously working the same mission) could cause an increase in total production time.

DOT

An infantry officer's initial assignment could be to a vehicular or non-vehicular organization comprised of light, mechanized, airborne, ranger, air assault or Stryker formations within a HBCT, SBCT, or IBCT. That officer's initial assignment steers his technical and tactical focus. However, the Army expects an infantry officer to understand the characteristics of each type of infantry, with the understanding that what differentiates them are the means of delivery to the battlefield. Infantry officers must also understand the characteristics of other combat arms, such as Armor, Field Artillery, Air Defense, Aviation and Special Forces.⁵⁷

An armor officer's initial assignment is to an armor organization designed to close with and destroy the enemy using fire, maneuver and shock effect or to a cavalry or reconnaissance organization that performs reconnaissance, provides security and engages in the full spectrum of combat operations.⁵⁸ As part of these organizations, an armor officer directs and controls mounted maneuver and provides expertise on the employment of combined armor forces at all staff levels. The initial focus of armor officers is the development of technical and tactical armor and reconnaissance skills. Following the initial focus on armor and cavalry skills development,

⁵⁷ DA Pamphlet 600-3, 57.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 66.

armor officers should develop a broader focus on mounted maneuver, combined arms and joint warfare as they progress through their careers.⁵⁹

Infantry and armor officers were not assigned to the same battalion prior to the development of the HBCT. Armor officers were not assigned to brigades that had light, airborne, or air assault infantry prior to the IBCT. An infantry captain, unless he has served in a mechanized infantry assignment and task organized to an armor unit, or given armor forces, may never gain the experience of working with armor or cavalry forces. Armor captains that remain in cavalry regiments or squadrons would also not get the experience of working with infantry forces. The creation of combined arms battalions and the presence of RSTA and anti-armor forces within IBCTs and HBCTs have changed this. Now captains need a firm knowledge of not only armor and cavalry but light, airborne and air assault infantry as well since an armor or infantry officer could end up in any of these assignments.

The effectiveness of the MCCC is how well it fosters the integration necessary for armor and infantry officers to be successful in any BCT. The creation of the MCCC, and its integrated curriculum, gives armor and infantry captains a common learning environment before entering into BCTs that have both forces. Armor and infantry officers who have served in vehicular and non-vehicular organizations comprised of armor, cavalry, light, mechanized, airborne, ranger, air assault and Stryker formations within Heavy, Infantry and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams can share their experiences and expertise and learn from one another. In addition to learning from each other, all armor and infantry captains, regardless of their assignment, would have a common point of reference. They would all receive the same education on the same curriculum before assuming duties as battalion, squadron, and brigade staff officer or company and troop commanders. These things make the MCCC effective because they facilitate the required integration of armor and infantry officers into HBCT, IBCT, and SBCT units.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 66.

The creation of a combined PCC for both armor and infantry officers also facilitates integration between armor and infantry branch. As stated earlier, PCC prepares selected officers for command by providing a common understanding of current doctrine and by providing both new and refresher training in selected functions and duties. Since branch and specialty schools focus on tactical and technical proficiency, system proficiency and hands-on training, the Maneuver PCC focus is on the HBCT, IBCT, and SBCT. This allows lieutenant colonels and colonels who have never served within one of these units to gain knowledge of systems unique to each. An example is an infantry colonel who has never served in a vehicular unit or an armor lieutenant colonel who has never served in an IBCT or SBCT. Both officers, if assigned to a BCT that they have no personal experience with, can develop an understanding of the systems, tactics, techniques, and procedures that are specific to either the IBCT, SBCT, or HBCT. Additionally, by placing both branches in an integrated learning environment, and placing that course under a centrally controlled quality assurance and command structure, the center ensures unity of effort for the course.

The measurement of efficiency for DOT's consolidation, and its execution of MCCC and PCCC, is how it facilitates the integration of armor and infantry officers while avoiding loss of resources or waste of energy. Both Armor and Infantry conducted a CCC and PCC. Both focused on branch related technical and tactical information. The combination of the two schools and their creation of a combined CCC and PCC allow the CoE to foster integration between the branches using a common curriculum. A common curriculum, with combined classes, also allows the DOT to reduce the total number of personnel and space required to run the course. This provides the director of DOT the ability to reduce the personnel and resources necessary to run the course. This in turn produces a savings in personnel and space that the Maneuver CoE commander can use in other areas.

Conclusion

The consolidation of DOTD, CDID, and DOT, each under the control of its own central director, allows the center to facilitate the coordination and integration of the directorate's functional responsibilities between both branches in a more effective manner. Additionally, each director can ensure synchronized efforts through a central quality control element. This unity of effort between the branches allows for the effective integration of functions thereby supporting the integration of Armor and Infantry within a BCT.

The consolidation of the directorates proves to be more efficient than if the organizations had simply co-located directorates. By reducing the total number of personnel required to accomplish functions the center provides a savings in money, space, and personnel. The questionable savings is time in regards to the consolidation of DOTD and CDID. Both directorates have the same workload as before the consolidation but fewer personnel to accomplish their assigned mission. This, as stated earlier, could result in an increase in production time.

DOTD, CDID, and DOT are consolidated directorates that effectively and efficiently support the integration of armor and infantry forces within maneuver BCTs. The next chapter discusses the co-located Armor School and Infantry School and how effective their co-location is at supporting the integration of Armor and Infantry.

CHAPTER THREE

Introduction

Chapter Two established the effectiveness and efficiency of the consolidated directorates within the Maneuver CoE that support both Armor and Infantry. This chapter moves to the discussion and analysis of the co-located Armor School and Infantry School. The center organized these subordinate organizations around either armor or infantry branch functions. This chapter begins by providing a background discussion and description of the two branch schools. The next portion analyzes the effectiveness and efficiency of the schools along the functional lines of IMT and Functional Training. The final section of this chapter provides a conclusion to the analysis of these subordinate organizations.

Background

The Maneuver CoE co-located the Armor School and Infantry School in accordance with the TRADOC CG's guidance.⁶⁰ The Armor and Infantry Schools both support the functions of Leader Development and Education, Doctrine, Collective Training, Functional Training, Initial Military Training (IMT), and Training Support. The discussion of Leader Development and Education, Doctrine, Collective Training, and Functional Training occurred previously in this paper. This section discusses the function IMT and Training Support and describes the Armor and Infantry School's organization.

The function IMT requires the Armor and Infantry Schools to set standards for and provide training in the basic skills, knowledge, and task proficiencies needed to become a soldier and subsequently to succeed as a member of an Army unit, contribute to unit mission accomplishment, and survive on the battlefield. IMT consists of Basic Combat Training (BCT),

⁶⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, TAI 3-Redesign for Excellence, *TAI #3 History Summary Nov 05-Jan 06*, 4.

One Station Unit Training (OSUT), Advanced Individual Training (AIT), and the Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC) Phase I-III. IMT also consists of setting standards and ensuring execution to standard for individual training, including individual training in all units, for those skills and tasks inherent in the IMT core function.⁶¹

BCT consists of nine weeks of intense training designed to teach and hone skills, optimize physical and mental performance and prepare new recruits to become soldiers in the U.S. Army. New recruits attend BCT in one of several places and where they attend is relative to the location of their AIT after BCT. AIT provides hands-on training and field instruction to make a BCT graduate an expert in a specific career field. Soldiers who enlist in one of the combat arms MOSs may attend BCT and AIT at one location (OSUT).⁶²

The objective of BOLC is to develop technically competent and confident platoon leaders (regardless of branch), that are grounded in leadership, display basic technical and tactical skill proficiency, physically and mentally strength, and embody the Warrior Ethos. To achieve this objective, BOLC conducts training in three phases that capitalize on experience-based training, build upon, and reinforce previous lessons learned.⁶³

BOLC I is the precommissioning phase for all commissioned officers. It encompasses all military training conducted by the traditional precommissioning sources (ROTC, OCS, and USMA.)⁶⁴ The purpose of precommissioning training is to educate and train cadets and officer candidates, assess their readiness and potential for commissioning or appointment as junior officers, and prepare them for progressive and continuing development. Pre-commissioning training qualifies individuals to serve as officers by providing the foundation of common core

⁶¹ In a multi-branch CoE BOLC II is a center responsibility because training at this level is still non-branch specific while BOLC III is branch specific.

⁶² Accessed online at <http://www.goarmy.com/life/basic/index.jsp> (accessed 10 April 2006)

⁶³ DA Pamphlet 600-3, 8.

⁶⁴ ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps), OCS (Officer Candidate School), USMA (United States Military Academy).

skills, knowledge, and attributes desired of all newly commissioned officers. After commissioning/appointment, officers attend BOLC II.⁶⁵

BOLC II is a common block of instruction designed to develop all new Army Competitive Category (ACC) and special branch officers into competent small unit leaders with a common war fighting focus and Warrior Ethos. It accomplishes this through a six week, field intensive training course that offers challenging and realistic leadership opportunities. BOLC II allows new junior officers to receive integrated instruction with officers from other branches of the Army. Upon completion of BOLC II, officers progress to BOLC III.⁶⁶

BOLC III is a course of branch specific technical and tactical training conducted at branch school locations. The length of this phase varies according to individual branch requirements. The design of each BOLC phase is to produce officers who have a common bond with their combined arms peers and are ready to lead small units upon arrival at their first assignment.⁶⁷

The function of Training Support encompasses the training information infrastructures, products and materials, personnel, services, and facilities that enable training to develop and sustain soldier and leader competence across the institutional, operational, and self-development training domains.⁶⁸ Examples of Training Support are design, development, acquisition, production, reproduction, distribution, maintenance, accountability, and sustainment of training products and materials; training scheduling; and student record maintenance for Army individual and unit training. Training Support also includes training support products, services, and facilities. Examples are instrumentation; training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS); training ammunition; training publications; visual information management; and

⁶⁵ DA Pamphlet 600-3, 25.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ TRADOC Regulation 10-5, 11.

multimedia products; visual information services; range design, targetry and instrumentation acquisition; classroom modernization.

The Maneuver CoE organizes under a two-school model. The Armor School consists of the 1st Armored Training Brigade that conducts all armor and cavalry OSUT and 63 Series MOS (Tracked Vehicle Mechanic) AIT, a Basic Combat Training Brigade, and the 16th Cavalry Regiment which conducts all armor branch specific and leader development training. The Infantry School consists of a One Station Unit Training Brigade, 11th Infantry Regiment that conducts branch specific and leader development training, the 29th Infantry Regiment that provides training support and functional training, and the Ranger Training Brigade that provides MOS specific training to soldiers on assignment to the Army's operational Ranger, Infantry, and Special Operations Forces units.⁶⁹ In addition to the organizations listed above, the co-located Armor and Infantry Schools maintain separate museums, historians, and magazines.

Analysis

IMT

Infantry enlisted soldiers fall into one of two MOSs. An Infantryman (11B) operates in both vehicular and non-vehicular units as either a squad, crew served weapon, or vehicle crewmember. The 11B supervises, leads, or serves as a member of an infantry activity that employs individual or crew served weapons in support of offensive and defensive combat operations. Additionally, the fighting vehicle infantryman leads, supervises, and serves as a member of a fighting vehicle unit that employs vehicular and dismounted weapons in combat operations.⁷⁰ An Indirect Fire Infantryman (11C) serves as a supervisor or as a member of a mortar squad, section, or platoon in either a vehicular or a non-vehicular unit. He employs crew

⁶⁹ Maneuver CoE update to TRADOC CG, 16 March 2006.

⁷⁰ Department of the Army, *DA Pamphlet 611-21, Personnel Selection and Classification: Military Occupational Classification and Structure* (Washington, D.C.: 31 March 1999), 206-209.

and individual weapons in offensive, defensive and retrograde ground combat tactical operations.⁷¹

An armor enlisted soldier also falls into one of two MOSs. A Cavalry Scout (19D) will operate in a vehicular unit that is either wheel (Stryker or HMMWV) or track (M3 Bradley) employed. A 19D leads, serves, or assists as a member of scout crew, squad, section, or platoon in reconnaissance, security, and other combat operations.⁷² An Armor Crewman (19K) operates in a vehicular unit that is either track (M1) or wheel (ATGM) employed. He leads, supervises, or serves as a member of an armor unit in offensive and defensive combat operations as well as serves or assists on staffs at battalion or higher level.⁷³

While both armor and infantry soldiers are ground maneuver forces, they do have relevant and necessary differences. An 11B seeks to close with and destroy the enemy by means of fire and movement to defeat or capture him, or repel his assault by fire, close combat and counterattack. An 11B can be in an infantry, mechanized, airborne, air assault, ranger, or Stryker unit with employment options of movement by foot, M2 Bradley, helicopter, or Stryker vehicle or parachuting from an airplane. A 19K closes with and destroys the enemy using fire, maneuver and shock effect with employment options of a M1 Abrams main battle tank or antitank guided munitions (ATGM) Stryker variant.⁷⁴ A 19D performs reconnaissance, provides security and engages in the full spectrum of combat operations while operating as a member of a cavalry, armed reconnaissance, or RSTA organization.⁷⁵ His employment options are movement by foot, M3 Bradley, helicopter, and Stryker vehicle. Finally, the 11C that serves as a mortar-man and employs crew and individual weapons in offensive, defensive and retrograde ground combat

⁷¹ DA Pamphlet 611–21, 207.

⁷² Ibid., 266.

⁷³ Ibid., 267.

⁷⁴ DA Pamphlet 600–3, 66.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 66.

tactical operations.⁷⁶ His employment options may be from any of the ones mentioned above, with the addition of a M113 Mortar Track and the deletion of the M1 Main Battle Tank.

The focus of 11A and 19K soldiers is to close with and destroy the enemy, the focus of 19D soldiers is to conduct reconnaissance and security, and the focus of 11C soldier is to provide indirect mortar support. These varied areas of focus forces each MOS to concentrate on separate attributes, skills, and knowledge. The initial military, advanced individual training, and/or on station unit training provided to each MOS is important because only in these courses, that are particular to a specific MOS, will the soldier receive the training necessary to become proficient. A 19D does not need to spend the same amount of time focused on dismounted squad attack that an 11B does. An 11C has no requirement to understand how to be a crewmember on an M1A2 Abrams Tank and should focus his time on the basic skills required for an infantryman to become an effective member of a mortar crew.

As with differences between infantry and armor enlisted training so do officers of each branch require specific training. As stated before, an infantry officer is eligible for assignment to a vehicular and non-vehicular organizations comprised of light, mechanized, airborne, ranger, air assault and Stryker formations within Heavy, Infantry and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, with all infantrymen linked through the core competency to close with and destroy the enemy in ground combat. An armor officer's initial assignment is to an armor organization designed to close with and destroy the enemy using fire, maneuver and shock effect or to a cavalry or reconnaissance organization that performs reconnaissance, provides security and engages in the full spectrum of combat operations.⁷⁷ Infantry officers must understand the characteristics of each type of infantry, with the understanding that what differentiates them are the means of delivery to the battlefield. Infantry officers must understand the characteristics of other combat arms, such as

⁷⁶ DA Pamphlet 611-21, 207.

⁷⁷ DA Pamphlet 600-3, 66.

Armor, Field Artillery, Air Defense, Aviation and Special Forces.⁷⁸ An armor officer initially focuses on the development of technical and tactical armor and reconnaissance skills. Following the initial focus on armor and cavalry skills development, armor officers begin to develop a broader focus on mounted maneuver, combined arms and Joint warfare as they progress through their careers.⁷⁹

Armor officers fall into one of three groups. The first is a general armor officer. These officers perform in staff positions requiring skills involving general armor or cavalry practical experience. These officers should possess appropriate technical and tactical institutional Armor School training in both tank and cavalry/scout weapons systems and have developed tactical expertise in mounted combined arms warfare. The second group is a basic armor officer. These officers perform in command or staff positions in mounted maneuver units with tanks or mobile gun systems (MGS) and must complete the BOLC prior to their initial assignment. The third and final group is cavalry officers. They perform in command or staff positions in cavalry and reconnaissance organizations and must have completed either the Scout Platoon Leader Course or the Cavalry Leader Course in addition to the BOLC.⁸⁰

Just as with the enlisted and noncommissioned officers of both branches, infantry and armor officers can be assigned to any of the three BCTs. Infantry lieutenants can serve as rifle platoon leaders within a IBCT, HBCT or SBCT. They can be employed using airborne, air assault, wheeled vehicle or foot march within an IBCT or SBCT and can be employed using wheeled or tracked assets within a HBCT. The initial assignment for an armor officer is a tank platoon leader in a HBCT, a reconnaissance platoon leaders in a HBCT, SBCT, and IBCT, or an ATGM platoon leader in an SBCT. However, with these similarities, infantry and armor officers have unique requirements that separate them.

⁷⁸ DA Pamphlet 600-3, 57.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 66.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

Infantry officers are part of “One Infantry—our Army’s Infantry.”⁸¹ Infantry officers are to be proficient at all forms of Infantry. To develop this proficiency infantry branch attempts to assign every officer to both a vehicular (HBCT and SBCT) and non-vehicular (IBCT) unit during their time as a lieutenant, captain, or major.⁸² Additionally, all infantry officers are to receive extensive training and be experts at the employment of dismounted troops.

The initial focus of armor officers, as stated earlier, is the development of technical and tactical armor and reconnaissance skills.⁸³ Initial training for armor officers is “mounted” focused because all armor officers occupy position within vehicular units. Additionally, all armor officers are to receive training on the employment of tanks as lieutenants.

Infantry provides the capability to close with and destroy the enemy with dismounted and mounted infantrymen. Armor allows us to close with and destroy the enemy utilizing the shock effect of tank and ATGM systems as well as the capability of effective reconnaissance and security through its Stryker, M3 Cavalry Bradley, and HMMWV forces. Each of these capabilities is useful and makes the BCT an effective combined arms unit.

The term integration defines the synergistic combination of individual-to-battalion sized armor and infantry forces within a modular, brigade-sized organization and that the maneuver BCT’s strength is that it utilizes the similarities, and necessary differences, of each branch to create an organization that is greater than the sum of its parts. This paper also established that due the necessary differences of each MOS represented by Infantry and Armor (11B, 11C, 19D, 19K) there is a necessity for separate schools of training education. Therefore, the measurement of the co-located Armor and Infantry School’s facilitation of integration of armor and infantry soldiers and officers is through their separate, but co-located support, of each branches unique capabilities and requirements.

⁸¹ Ibid., 57.

⁸² Ibid., 60.

⁸³ Ibid., 66.

The schools maintain separate OSUT for both Infantry (11B/C) and Armor (19D/K). In doing this, each school ensures the proper training of each MOS. The schools can concentrate their efforts on developing the MOS specific skills required. Additionally, by the Maneuver CoE's focus on the differences in required training, it ensures that each MOS develops the necessary skills to become a beneficial member of the BCT. The schools draw separate lines in regards to officer IMT.

BOLC I and II are the non-branch specific portions of officer IMT. The center's execution of BOLC I is OCS, which, as a preexisting activity from before the development of the CoE, is unchanged. The focus of BOLC II, a common block of instruction focused on developing competent small unit leaders with a common war fighting focus and Warrior Ethos, is on dismounted operations at the small unit level. Because of this, the Infantry School runs a consolidated course.

The Maneuver CoE's approach to BOLC III is along organization, not branch, lines. The CoE divided BOLC III between the two schools. The Infantry School conducts BOLC III for lieutenants going to SBCT and IBCT units. The Armor School conducts BOLC III for lieutenants going to HBCT, as well as, Armed Reconnaissance and RSTA squadrons. What this equates to is infantry lieutenants assigned to SBCT and IBCT units go to the Infantry School BOLC III while infantry lieutenants assigned to HBCT units go to the Armor School BOLC III. All armor lieutenants attend the Armor School BOLC III because the Armor School is responsible for training reconnaissance skills, which includes training for Armed Reconnaissance and RSTA squadrons.

The question of effectiveness here is for the infantry lieutenant going to HBCT. There is the assumption that since BOLC II's focus is on small unit leadership and, in the case of the Maneuver CoE, is taught in the Infantry School, that infantry lieutenants going to HBCTs will receive all the necessary dismounted training before entering BOLC III. It is also a fact that before the creation of a HBCT focused BOLC III infantry lieutenants received little to no

instruction on how to employ a Bradley platoon. The concern is with the Armor School's focus on armor and reconnaissance related skills. Since they maintain a focus on mounted movement then it is reasonable to assume that the course will provide adequate instruction on how to maneuver a Bradley platoon while mounted. The question that remains is who will teach the new lieutenants how to maneuver the entire Bradley platoon's elements (squads and vehicles)?

The measurement of efficiency for the Maneuver CoE's execution of the function IMT is how well it supports the unique capabilities of each branch while avoiding loss of resources or waste of energy. The co-location of IMT is necessary to ensure proper focus on unique, branch related skills. It gains efficiency from its consolidation of BOLC II under the control of the Infantry School. This gained efficiency comes from a reduction in personnel and facilities necessary to instruct two separate courses. The center commander can redistribute these savings to other areas of concern.

Functional Training

Functional training is skill training, outside of IMT, necessary to qualify individuals for assignment to duty positions that require specific functional skills and knowledge.⁸⁴ The Maneuver CoE's responsibilities for functional training consist of developing products and conducting training for soldiers to perform critical tasks and supporting skills and knowledge required to perform a specialty or functional job. This includes training that qualifies individuals for award of a skill identifier, special qualifications identifier, or additional skill identifier. Responsibility for functional training also includes setting standards and ensuring execution to standard for individual training, including individual training in all units, for those skills and tasks inherent in the functional training core function.

Functional training can be both branch and non-branch specific. Examples of branch specific functional training conducted at the Maneuver CoE are Ranger School, the Scout Leader

⁸⁴ TRADOC Regulation 10-5, 10.

Course and the Cavalry Leaders Course. Infantry enlisted, non-commission and commissioned officers are encouraged to attend Ranger School because it provides advanced training in dismounted, small unit tactics. Additionally, any noncommissioned or commissioned officer serving in a Ranger unit is required to attend Ranger school. Lieutenants going to serve in Armed Reconnaissance or RSTA squadrons or selected for scout platoon leader positions within a combined arms battalion are sent to the Scout Leaders Course to develop their skills as a mounted reconnaissance leader. Captains assigned to Armed Reconnaissance or RSTA squadrons attend the Cavalry Leaders Course to develop the skills required for a commander of a mounted reconnaissance unit. Examples of non-branch specific training are courses like Airborne and Pathfinder School.⁸⁵ Any enlisted soldier, non-commissioned and commissioned officer going to an airborne unit attends Airborne School, regardless of branch. Pathfinder coded assignments are found in all BCTs and are for both infantry and armor officers and soldiers.

The measurement of the co-located Armor and Infantry Schools effectiveness at executing functional training and facilitating the integration of armor and infantry soldiers and officers is through their separate, but co-located support, of each branch's unique capabilities and requirements. By its definition, functional training is skill training, outside of IMT, necessary to qualify individuals for assignment to duty positions that require specific functional skills and knowledge. Functional training is focused to support a skill, either branch or non-branch specific, so it meets the criteria of effectiveness.

The measurement of efficiency for the Armor and Infantry School's execution of functional training is how well it supports the unique capabilities of each branch while avoiding loss of resources or waste of energy. The Armor and Infantry Schools only co-located the functional training for which they were responsible. This co-location resulted in no gain to

⁸⁵ In a multi-branch CoE non-branch specific training is a center responsibility while branches control branch specific functional training.

efficiency because the same amount of resources is required to run the programs under the CoE construct as were required before.

Conclusion

The effectiveness of the co-located Armor and Infantry Schools is mixed. The schools maintain separate OSUTs for both branches thereby ensuring that each MOS develops the necessary skills to become a beneficial member of the BCT. The schools draw separate lines in regards to officer IMT. The center consolidates BOLC II under the Infantry School and ensures the effective instruction of small unit dismounted tactics by placing it under that skill's proponent. The question of effectiveness comes from the centers division of BOLC III responsibility between the Armor and Infantry School. Infantry lieutenants assigned to a HBCT will attend BOLC III under the Armor School, thereby offering questionable instruction on employing dismounted and mounted infantry elements simultaneously.

The Maneuver CoE gains efficiency from its consolidation of BOLC II under the control of the Infantry School. This gained efficiency comes from a reduction in personnel and facilities from the amount previously necessary to instruct two separate courses.

The effectiveness and efficiency of the co-located Armor and Infantry Schools' function training was unaltered by the creation of the CoE. Functional training's focus is on unique skills and therefore gains nothing from co-location. Additionally, the co-location resulted in no gain to efficiency because the same amount of resources are required to run the programs under the CoE construct as were required before.

CHAPTER FOUR

Introduction

The final subordinate organization this paper discusses is the consolidated Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA). The NCOA is a consolidated subordinate organization that executes both integrated and co-located activities in support of both armor and infantry soldiers. This chapter begins by providing a background discussion and description of the NCOA. The next portion analyzes the effectiveness and efficiency of the co-located and consolidated schools and courses instructed in the NCOA. The final section of this chapter provides a conclusion to the analysis of these co-located and consolidated schools and courses.

Background

The Maneuver CoE integrated the Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA) in accordance with the TRADOC CG's guidance. The Maneuver CoE NCOA executes the function of Functional Training as well as the function of Leadership Development and Education. The NCOA supports the functions of Leader Development and Education, and Functional Training thorough its execution of the Warrior Leader Course (WLC), the Infantry Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (IBNCOC), the Armor Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (ABNCOC), the Maneuver Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (MANCOC), and the First Sergeant Course (FSC) and integrated Battle Staff NCO Course (BSNCOC).

WLC, formally known as the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC), is the first leadership development course an NCOs attends. WLC is a month-long branch immaterial training course that teaches specialists (SPC) and corporals (CPL) the basic skills to lead small groups of soldiers. Training prepares individuals for leader duties and responsibilities at the team, or sergeant, level and includes such topics as leadership, training management, map reading, land

navigation, drill and ceremony, and warfighting. Successful completion of PLDC is a requirement for promotion to sergeant.⁸⁶

BNCOC is the basic level course of the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) and consists of two phases. Phase I covers common leader training that includes the theories and principles used to teach NCOs the battle-focused, common leadership, and warfighting skills required to lead a squad-sized element. Phase II is performance oriented and incorporates common leader training conducted by the NCOA and MOS-specific training executed by the branch school. Training at BNCOC progressively builds upon the instruction received in PLDC. Successful completion of BNCOC is a requirement for promotion to staff sergeant.⁸⁷

The MANCOC is an integrated Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC) for armor and infantry NCOs. ANCOC is an advanced level military occupational specialty (MOS) specific course for sergeants first class (SFC) and promotable staff sergeants (SSG). Like BNCOC, ANCOC consists of two phases and includes lessons on writing, communication, computers, environmental awareness, outlines, management, military history and MOS-specific leadership lessons. The course utilizes small group instruction to prepare NCOs to assume the duties and responsibilities needed to lead a platoon-sized element. ANCOC has a common leadership core as well as hands-on and performance-oriented training to emphasize warfighting skills. Successful completion of ANCOC is a requirement for promotion to sergeant first class.⁸⁸

FSC is a two-phase course designed to prepare SFCs, or MSGs, for the position of first sergeant (1SG) of a company, battery or troop. Phase I contains 31 self-study lessons and an examination. Phase II includes three weeks of interactive small-group instruction. The instruction

⁸⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, *DA Pamphlet 350-58, The Enduring Legacy: Leader Development for America's Army*, (Washington D.C., 13 October 1994), 24.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 24-25.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 25; Found online at <https://www.atrrs.army.mil/atrrscc/courseinfo.asp> (accessed 20 April 2006).

includes subject areas like unit personnel management and administration, leadership, discipline and morale, logistics, maintenance, security, physical training, operations, and training.⁸⁹

The BSNCOB is a functional, two phased course used to prepare SSG through sergeant major (SGM) for duty in battalion and higher-level positions. Phase I is a computer based instruction consisting of self-paced independent study focusing on subjects like Army operations, intelligence, force protection, electronic warfare, combat service support (CSS), maintenance and personnel service support, and the production of plans, orders and graphics. Phase II consists of performance oriented course instruction that prepares the NCO to perform operationally on the battlefield. The subjects covered during Phase II are an extension of Phase I with the inclusion of training on intelligence processing and dissemination as well as transportation and movement planning.⁹⁰

Analysis

Consolidated Courses (WLC, MANCOC, FSC, and BSNCOB)

Similar to infantry officers, infantry enlisted soldiers and noncommissioned officers are assigned to vehicular and non-vehicular organizations comprised of light, mechanized, airborne, ranger, air assault and Stryker formations within Heavy, Infantry and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. Armor enlisted soldiers and noncommissioned officers are assigned to various types of armor and reconnaissance units depending on their MOS. A Cavalry Scout (19D) may be assigned to HBCT, SBCT and IBCT while a M1 Armor Crewman (19K) is only assigned to armor, armed reconnaissance, and antitank-guided munitions (ATGM) units located within HBCT and SBCT units. The differing units a specific MOS can go to requires different levels of expertise.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

The Maneuver CoE consolidated the WLC and FSC because the schools are non-branch specific and are not functional training. Therefore, the measurement of each course's effectiveness is how well they facilitate integration of infantry and armor forces within a BCT. This analysis starts with the WLC.

WLC is the first leadership development course an NCOs attends and focuses on the basic skills to lead small groups of soldiers. Training prepares individuals for leader duties and responsibilities at the team, or sergeant, level. The NCOA's execution of a combined WLC supports the integration of not just infantry and armor soldiers but the integration of other members of the BCT. Other MOSs residing within the BCT (communications, supply, administration) all attend the WLC side by side with Armor and Infantry to gain experience in small unit leadership skills; skills that both armor and infantry branch possess. This course only enhances the NCOA's ability to develop a combined arms mentality within junior leaders and therefore effectively supports the integration of Armor and Infantry, as well as multiple other branches, within a BCT.

The purpose of the FSC is to prepare senior NCOs for the position of 1SG within a company or troop. Armor and infantry NCOs develop along MOS specific tracks until they reach the rank of master sergeant (MSG) where they lose their previous MOS. Upon reaching the rank of MSG, an infantry NCO becomes an Infantry Senior Sergeant (11Z) and an armor NCO becomes an Armor Senior Sergeant (19Z). 11Z and 19Z, which include the rank of MSG and the position of 1SG, serve as the principal NCO in a company or troop, or in the operations section of combined arms battalions, BCTs and higher level organizations and are responsible for providing tactical and technical guidance and professional support to subordinates and making recommendations to superiors in the accomplishment of their duties.⁹¹ An 11Z or 19Z is available for assignment in any infantry or armor organization regardless of background. An example is a

⁹¹ DA Pamphlet 611-21, 209, 267.

19D (Cavalry Scout) that becomes the 1SG of an armor company after becoming a 19Z. That NCO has no personal experience in an armor company because armor companies do not contain the MOS of 19D. Therefore, an environment where senior NCOs can share knowledge and experience with various forms of armor and infantry employment is beneficial to the integration of Armor and Infantry within a BCT.

The FSC, because it is non-branch specific, offers this ability. The course's common curriculum provides the same level, and focus, of instruction to all MOSs. Moreover, as in the case of the WLC, the future 1SGs can learn from not only armor and infantry NCOs but also senior NCOs from other specialties due to the course's lack of branch specificity. Who better to teach a 19Z with a 19D background about maintenance of a tank than a senior NCO from the 63 MOS series (heavy track mechanic)? This course's integrated curriculum and lack of branch specificity lets the NCOA effectively support the integration of multiple MOSs within the BCT.

The Maneuver CoE created MANCOC and consolidated the BSNOC because the courses represent branch specific, or functional, training. MANCOC is for armor and infantry NCOs while the BSNOC is for NCOs assigned, or pending an assignment, to a battalion or higher-level staff.

This paper already established the MOS specific developmental tracks of armor and infantry soldiers. This paper also established that these MOS specific development tracks might limit a NCO's knowledge of the various forms of employment between armor and infantry forces. Because of this, armor and infantry NCOs require an environment where they can share experiences and learn about the forms of employment in which they have no personal experience. However, unlike the WLC and FSC, they require branch specificity for armor and infantry related tasks and units. The design of the integrated BSNOC and MANCOC curriculums provide the opportunity for armor and infantry NCOs to learn, and share, branch and unit specific knowledge. The integration of the course mirrors the integration of Armor and Infantry within a BCT, thereby adding to its effectiveness.

The measurement of efficiency for the NCOA's execution of these combined courses and schools is how well they avoid loss of resources or waste of energy. The NCOA produced efficiency by combining the courses, thereby producing a savings in personnel and facilities. The WLC and FSC provide one course for all MOSs while the MANCOC and BSNOC provide a combined course for armor and infantry NCOs. Additionally, the center commander can utilize the savings provided by the NCOA's consolidation where he deems necessary.

Co-located Courses (IBNCOC and ABNCOC)

BNCOC is the basic level course of the NCOES designed to develop the skills required of an NCOs to lead a squad-sized element. The NCOA decided to co-locate the courses based on their branch specificity. The measure of this decision's effectiveness is how well this co-location supports the training of the unique capabilities of each MOS.

Each MOS has branch specific requirements that justify the co-location of enlisted initial military training. This justification extends to the co-location of branch specific BNCOC. By co-locating, and not integrating, the courses, the center can focus training on the necessary skills and abilities of each branch. This provides a BCT with junior NCOs that have the branch specific knowledge and skills that make them an integral member of the unit.

The measurement of efficiency for the NCOA's collocation of these courses is how well they avoiding loss of resources or waste of energy while accomplishing their mission. As mentioned earlier, BNCOC consists of two phases. Phase I covers common leader training that includes the theories and principles used to teach NCOs the battle-focused, common leadership, and warfighting skills required to lead a squad-sized element. Phase II is performance oriented and incorporates common leader training conducted by the NCOA and MOS-specific training executed by the branch school. Two phases, one branch specific and one not, yet the NCOA chooses to maintain two separate courses. The efficiency is lost in the fact that the NCOA could combine the Phase I portion of BNCOC. A combination of Phase I training could reduce the total

number of personnel required for the course, thereby providing a savings in personnel and money to the center commander.

Conclusion

The NCOA shows effectiveness in its consolidation of the WLC, FSC, MANCOC and BSNOC. Each of these courses provides an integrated curriculum for two or more MOSs. This integrated curriculum, and common learning environment, facilitates integration because it mirrors the integration of MOSs within a BCT. The NCOA also show effectiveness through its co-location of IBNOC and ABNOC. These courses maintain their branch specific focus, thereby providing a BCT with the MOS specific experienced NCOs required of the combined arms organization.

The NCOA efficiently executes its combined courses. Through the consolidation of personnel and facilities, the NCOA provides a savings that the center commander can use where necessary. The questionable efficiency is in the co-location, not consolidation, of the ABNOC and IBNOC. Since both have a non-branch specific Phase I the course could possibly save money and reduce personnel by combining that portion of the training.

CONCLUSION

Conclusion and Recommendations

The finding of this paper's analysis is that the Maneuver CoE effectively and efficiently supports the integration of Armor and Infantry within combined-arms, maneuver BCTs by supporting the unique capabilities and requirements of each branch while capitalizing on their similarities. However, this analysis did determine several points where the Maneuver CoE could improve effectiveness and efficiency. The following recommendations result from this paper's analysis of the co-located and consolidated subordinate organizations within the Maneuver CoE that directly supports maneuver BCTs. The recommendations cover the consolidation of DOTD and CDID, the course structure of BOLC III, and the course structure of IBNCOC and ABNCOC.

The first recommendation is the Maneuver CoE should reevaluate the consolidation of DOTD and CDID. The center should conduct further analysis of its consolidation of DOTD and CDID since the consolidation of production requirements may require the Maneuver CoE to maintain the same number of personnel as before the creation of the CoE. In order to remain within the commander's guidance, this consolidation may require contracted personnel for augmentation of the staff.

The second recommendation is the Maneuver CoE should reevaluate the course structure of BOLC III. Two options for consideration is ensuring infantry officers and NCOs are part of the instructing staff within HBCT BOLC III. The second option is to divide the Phase III into an two parts (IIIa and IIIb). Phase IIIa would be completely branch focused; Infantry with Infantry and Armor with Armor. Phase IIIb would be unit focused. All officers, regardless of branch, would go to the BCT organization of their initial assignment.

The third and final recommendation results from the questionable efficiency in the co-location, not consolidation, of the ABNCOC and IBNCOC. The recommendation is that the

NCOA combine the non-branch specific Phase I of the ABNCOC and IBNCOC. The consolidation of this Phase would reduce the total number of personnel required to run the school.

The Way Ahead

“The Army is a complex bureaucratic organization. In some ways it is similar to an ecosystem, in that a change to one subsystem can have major and unintended effects across another subsystem.”

OPMS XXI Final Report⁹²

Changing large organizations with well-developed cultures embedded in established hierarchical bureaucracies is incredibly difficult. The mere existence of functioning complex organizational systems and embedded processes tends to resist change. The Army’s systems and processes are no exception. Within the current organizational context, these processes can be more likely to impede than to facilitate change as the Army struggles to incorporate flexible and adaptive processes that will reduce the bureaucracy, inspire creativity and rapidly incorporate technological, cognitive, and organizational innovations.⁹³

Modular conversion of units is just one part of Army transformation. The Army’s doctrine is undergoing a shift to become more compatible with Joint doctrine. An example of this effort is U.S. Army Field Manual Interim (FMI) 5-0.1, *The Operations Process*, where the Army replaces the battlefield operating systems (BOS) found in FM 3-0, *Operations*, with the warfighting functions of intelligence, movement and maneuver, fire support, protection, sustainment, and command and control. The Army created warfighting functions to realign Army functions more closely with the joint functions listed in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0-RSD⁹⁴, and the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Operational Task Areas listed in the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3500.04c.

⁹² Department of the Army, OPMS XXI Task Force, *OPMS XXI Final Report* (Washington, D.C.: 9 July 1997), 1-7.

⁹³ How the Army Runs, 1.

⁹⁴ Revised Second Draft

This shift to warfighting functions is significant because it realigns task between the existing branches of the Army. An example, the definition of the movement and maneuver warfighting function is “the related tasks and systems that move forces to achieve a position of advantage in relation to the enemy. It includes those tasks associated with employing forces in combination with direct fire or fire potential (maneuver), force projection (movement), mobility, and countermobility. The tasks mobility and countermobility are currently the responsibility of Engineer Branch and the Maneuver Support CoE. Further investigation into the new warfighting functions reveals other shifts in existing branch-to-task relationships.⁹⁵ If the CoEs are to support Army efforts to conform to joint doctrine, they may have to realign existing task responsibility to fit emerging doctrine. Obviously, a shift of existing task responsibility is a dynamic process and possibly too difficult to accomplish in the near future. It is, however, a point of concern for the Army’s future.

The Army also seeks transformation in other ways. The Army seeks to increase its readiness by implementing such programs as Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) and Life Cycle Management to assist in the orderly training and employment of a BCT and the stabilization of personnel. The developments of new technologies and the use, or modification, of existing technologies are ways the Army seeks to modernize its force. All have elements that could possibly affect the Maneuver CoE and its support of maneuver, combined-arms BCTs. The CoE must attempt to determine the impact these and future elements of transformation will have on the Maneuver CoE. Regardless of the impact these elements have the Maneuver CoE is still responsible to support the infantry and armor forces within modular combined-arms brigade combat team through effective and efficient integration and support to the unique capabilities and

⁹⁵ U.S. Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, TAI 3-Redesign for Excellence, *Naming of the U.S. Army’s Centers of Excellence*, Unpublished.

requirements of each branch. Things may need to be renovated or replaced but “nevertheless, the Army must continue to run even with systems and processes in need of major revision.”⁹⁶

⁹⁶ How the Army Runs, 1.

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