The Continuing Utility of Phasing Constructs in Operational Planning

Abstract

Some Military Commanders have recently asserted that the nature of warfare in the current operating environment has changed in such a way that phasing in military operations has outlasted its utility and become problematic, requiring it to be eliminated or replaced. This monograph attempts to evaluate whether phasing in U.S. Military doctrine and operational design still has utility in planning military operations. Phasing has been utilized to assist U.S. Military commanders and planners in visualizing plans and arranging forces to conduct military operations since the creation of operational design in the 1920s. Phasing has been applied in planning conventional as well as unconventional military operations. Recent criticisms of phasing have surfaced in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom's failure to rapidly stabilize Iraq in Phase IV of the operation. This paper begins by analyzing phasing in terms of its theoretical and historical underpinnings. Phasing is then reviewed from its first appearance in the 1920s to the present, and historical examples of its use are provided. One of those examples, Mao Tse Tung's use of phasing to visualize his strategy for conducting China's Protracted War against Japan, is analyzed to determine what influence it may have had on U.S. Military doctrine. Criticisms of phasing are presented, and proposed alternatives to it are scrutinized through Systems Theory, Complexity Theory, Logic, and Doctrine. Recent changes to phasing in U.S. Military doctrine are analyzed to understand the logic behind the changes. Specifically, emerging concepts such as Operational Net Assessment, Effects-Based Operations, and Net-Centric Warfare are analyzed through a "system of systems" approach to understand the influences they are having on U.S. Military doctrine and phasing. The author concludes that warfare has not changed enough to make it necessary to eliminate or replace phasing in military planning.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 25, 2006
Accession Number
ADA450635

Entities

People

  • Scott L. Taylor

Organizations

  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • C4I
  • Counter WMD
  • Cyber
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Engineered Resilient Systems

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Civil War
  • Combat Operations
  • Command And Control
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Doctrine
  • Interagency Coordination
  • Iraqi-War
  • Lessons Learned
  • Military Commanders
  • Military Doctrine
  • Military Education
  • Military History
  • Military Operations
  • Military Organizations
  • Military Planning
  • Military Science
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies
  • Systems Analysis and Design