

German General Staff Officer Education and Current Challenges

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

GERMAN GENERAL STAFF OFFICER EDUCATION AND CURRENT CHALLENGES by Lieutenant Colonel (General Staff) Thomas Groeters, German Army, 70 pages including one Appendix and Bibliography.

“German General Staff Officer Education and Current Challenges” examines the institutional education of German General Staff Officers, as experienced by the author, and offers a “Conceptual Competency-Skill-Framework” for professional development. Five competencies (Physical, Intrinsic Motivation, Intrapersonal, Interpersonal, and Cognitive Competency) and five skills (Deduction, Synthesis, Analysis, Induction, and Revaluation Skill) define this model through a process of theory and praxis. A case study of an operational planner for the first German Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan (2003) describes the experiences of the author and identifies competencies and skills that required improvisation, rather than reliance on a model of previous institutional, operational, and personal preparation.

This monograph commends the balanced holistic approach of the German General Staff Officer course at the *Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr* (German General Staff Officer Academy), and recommends several educational venues to improve the specific competencies and skills in an institutional setting. The trinity of premier institutional education, operational experience and practical insight, and a dedicated life-long program for professional self-development, invigorates the military leader for emergent roles in national, regional, and global mission responsibilities. The ultimate value of a conceptual competency-skill framework is the personal assessment, evaluation, and integration for professional learning and performance that results in *how* to think, act, and lead.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

You may not be interested in war ... but war is interested in you.

- Leon Trotsky

Well, we soldiers may not be interested in peace support operations, but peace support operations are interested in us!

Since the “Iron Curtain” came down in 1989, a paradigm shift changed the political world and impacted significantly on the reorientation of security strategies for all global players or as NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner noted at that time: “The collapse of Soviet communism has left us with a paradox: there is less threat, but also less peace.”¹ The dominating conflict between “the West” and “the East”, which suppressed many local minor conflicts, vanished. Suddenly a vast number of minor conflicts erupted throughout the hemispheres², and had in specific cases such a significant impact on global politics, that intervention by major global powers or the international community became necessary. Operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq are characterized by a relative short combat phase and a follow-up peace support phase, including nation building, in which the duration can be counted in decades.³ Consequently, the majority of operations conducted by modern military forces are peace support operations⁴ (PSO) rather than war fighting operations.⁵

Military leaders, specifically general staff officers and equivalent field grade officers, working as operational planners, require specific skills since they work at the operational interface level of this contemporary environment and have to transfer complex politico-strategic

¹ Dennis J. Quinn, editor, *Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994, p.3

² See: Department of Defense, *Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities*, Washington D.C., September 2, 2004

³ Ibid.

⁴ Note: The new FM 1, dated 14 June 2005, uses the terms “Stability and Reconstruction Operations” and “Civil Support Operations”

⁵ Note: FM 1 uses now the terms “Offensive Operations” and “Defensive Operations”

ends, ways and means into precise tactical terms. At first sight, the majority of nations obviously trained and equipped their respective officers appropriately with the skills required for war fighting operations. The question that appears however is twofold: Are the skills required for PSO different from those required for war fighting? If so, are the same officers as well educated with skills required for those PSO? This study will therefore identify the competencies and skills educated by the German General Staff Officers' Education and then identify the required competencies and skills for PSO. Then comparing and contrasting these two sets will determine common, similar, and discrete competencies and skills. In a following step, the author will research whether the current model of the German General Staff Officer education develops leaders to be successful in the contemporary operational environment (COE), or is the educational model mired in antiquated in Cold War requirements. In the case of the latter, this study will make specific proposals to the German General Staff Academy on how to optimize the curricular development of specific competencies and skills. In order to conduct this evaluation, a current PSO conducted by German Forces since October 2003 will serve as a case study to provide a basis for modern requirements. The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the northern Afghanistan Region of Kunduz is therefore an actual case study that illustrates the particular challenges and opportunities for contemporary planners' required competencies and skills.

As a German General Staff Officer, the author worked from September 2002 to June 2004 in the German Operations Command. As the G3/Operations Officer within the J5 (Plans and Policies) branch he was responsible for the PRT. When the German Government decided to contribute to the peace support and nation building process in Afghanistan, significant political, operational, and legal issues confronted the German Operations Command. Existing German military concept did not satisfy the needs to serve as a model for this specific mission. Additionally, multiple legal aspects required clarification from the German national government, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the planned expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mandate. The author conceptualized the design, the plans, and

orders with few guidance from higher military and government authorities to provide the German contingent assigned to accomplish this completely new mission with the best possible preparation for this operation and mission support.

This monograph will examine the required competencies and skills, compare and contrast them based on the academic content of the General Staff educating institutions using a conceptual framework model, and finally identify the relationship of the previously mentioned two sets in order to evaluate the academic and practical sufficiency of those competencies and skills in this new environment. If the education does not meet current requirements, this study will try to provide a contribution to create a German leader development model, which can serve the German General Staff Academy as a conceptual framework for curriculum development to prepare officers for the upcoming operations.

Methodology and Structure

The following question will lead the research of this work: Does the current German General Staff Officer Education support the competencies and skills required to plan and conduct PSO such as the PRT in Kunduz, Afghanistan (KDZ)?

The monograph uses three selected research methodologies to assess and evaluate the research issue. Those methodologies will be description, analysis, and synthesis. Therefore, the design will be explained by chapters.

Chapter 1 will descriptively introduce and frame the work.

Chapter 2 will define the conceptual framework, which will serve as the grid for the further analyses and syntheses of the following chapters. This step is crucial since the practical field, as well as doctrine and common leadership literature, lack a consistent conceptual framework, which enables an orientation and offers a scale for potential comparisons or distinctions. For the same reason, this is a synthetic step. The author analyzed different models, such as the U.S. leadership framework as used in the current U.S. Army Field Manual 22-100 and

the German model of basic competencies. An additional study of general theories from educational, social, and philosophical science provided a scientific foundation to develop a new framework to approach the categorization of competencies and skills. Based on his findings, the author designed a new theoretical framework that can serve as a basis for further leadership development models.

Chapter 3 will be characterized by definitions and analytical research. The author will define the framing factors currently used as the basis for the education. This will base mainly on an analysis of the 2003 and 2004 training plans of the German Armed Forces General Staff Academy. First, a historical background of the German General Staff will give perspective for understanding the General Staff officer's traditional corporate identity and self-conception. A short definition of a "General Staff Officer" in the context of this study will identify the primary group of leaders to which the leader development model will apply. With the context of this group of leaders, the study will identify critical military career phases in selection and education of these officers. A consequence of these preliminary processes illuminates the military background and the competencies and skills present in the officer's capabilities when starting the German General Staff Course. Finally, we will identify the competencies and skills taught during the General Staff Course. A summary will set all identified competencies and skills as they exist at the conclusion of the German General Staff Course into the conceptual competency-skill-framework of this monograph.

In Chapter 4, the author will state concise definitions of peace support operations (PSO) and for the PRT. An analysis of these definitions, German political intent, and German Armed Forces capabilities will provide the rationale of the German responsibility of a PRT in Afghanistan. Recognizing the mainly political setting within Germany and NATO in 2003, the author will identify the overall operational environment in Germany as well as in Afghanistan. The results will form the author's basis for analysis and construction of the required competencies

and skills for PSO, which will then, put into the conceptual framework, be available for comparison and contrast with the available skills as analyzed in Chapter 3.

Chapter 5 will analyze, compare and contrast the identified available skills and required skills based on the developed conceptual framework. If the educational model of the German General Staff Course educates the officers' competencies and skills to handle all of the requirements and tasks in the COE, the value of the academy's curriculum as a conceptual model for other educational systems can be confirmed. If the General Staff Officer Course lacks sufficient development of competencies and skills, the deficiencies will be analyzed and recommendations will be identified for optimizing the curriculum. Either way, recommendations will result and be detailed in Chapter 6.

Chapter 6 will be characterized by the summary of analytical research results and recommendations elaborated during the synthesis within the respective chapters.

Recommendations will be stated clearly to the respective addressees.

As outlined, this monograph will be an analytical balance between present and required competencies and skills. Depending on the findings, proposals will try to help improving the military's capability and quality of dealing with PSO.

Limitations and Clarifications

This work will examine, in first priority, literature written after 1989 when the Berlin Wall started to crack and the shift of the Cold War paradigm was initiated. In exceptional cases, older literature will be used to elaborate a historical overview of the German General Staff and the skills related to these traditional roots.⁶ The monograph will focus on the leadership competencies and skills of German General Staff officers because they are the decisive group of officers responsible for the operational planning level.

⁶ For further limitations and Clarification concerning the used literature, refer to Appendix A: *Literature Review*.

As a basis for the evaluation of their competencies and skills, current programs of instruction will be used. The next chapter will define the terms of competencies and skills. The developed model is an individual conceptualization and is therefore only an initial starting point to describe the complex and mostly practical discussions found in current literature.

The German PRT, as operating in Kunduz, Afghanistan, will be used as a case study in order to distill the required competencies and skills for this kind of PSO. German national restrictions, such as classifications of operational documents, might have a limiting impact on the use of specific sources, although limitations are not very likely concerning information or statements about competencies and skills. Restriction will most likely be operational or political in nature and will therefore not have a significant negative impact on this monograph.

Three clarifications are necessary at this point and will be enhanced in later chapters: First, whenever the term “peace support operation” is used, operations and functions such as peacekeeping or nation building are included. Second, although the term “General Staff Officer” is used and defined from a German Army perspective, its function can equally be translated to all field grade and senior officers who work on operational or higher level. Third, due to a lack of a more precise wording, the terms “skill” or “leadership skills” are used as broad terms describing emotional, cognitive-mental, and physical abilities of individuals⁷ rather than in the narrow sense of “know” as stated in FM 22-100.⁸ The summary of Chapter 2 will develop a conceptual framework which clarifies this important issue.

⁷ See for example Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. <http://www.britannica.com/dictionary>: 1...: CAUSE, REASON; 2a: the ability to use one's knowledge effectively and readily in execution or performance; b: dexterity or coordination especially in the execution of learned physical tasks; 3:a learned power of doing something competently: a developed aptitude or ability <language skills>

⁸ Department of the Army, *FM 22-100*, 1999, Part One. Note: A military audience, specifically U.S. Army personnel, will therefore recognize that the term “skill” in this context needs to be clearly distinct from the way the current U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100 uses the term “skills”.

CHAPTER 2

THE CONCEPTUAL COMPETENCY-SKILL-FRAMEWORK

Es geht auch anders, doch so geht es auch.⁹

- Bertold Brecht, Die Dreigroschenoper

Analyzing the interaction between military theory, the fields of natural science, and philosophical theories one can identify a significant mutual intellectual exchange. As Newton's theories and Kant's philosophical discussions had significant impact on Clausewitz' works, Spencer's philosophical thought had an impact on J.F.C. Fuller.¹⁰ Fuller himself stated that "In the study of war the military student will find that some knowledge of philosophy is of the greatest assistance."¹¹ The interaction of contemporary science and philosophy with the development of contemporary military theory, however, seems to be lacking. This becomes especially obvious when the intellectual exchange of psychological, educational, and social science with the development of "leadership skills" or "skills" in general are concerned. Psychological and social phenomena are always subject to discussion and are barely based on fundamental theoretical frameworks. Even worse, as Alexander Rosenberg stresses in his work *Philosophy of Social Science*, social science and affiliated disciplines have a difficult time being accepted as "real" sciences, especially by representatives of the "hard" sciences such as natural science.¹² This is even more true for the acceptance within the military, which predominantly focuses on facts, results, and practical approaches. The competencies and skills examined in this

⁹ Free Translation: "There is another way to do it, but this way it works too." Note: Bertold Brecht expresses the human tendency to approach complex, if not complicated ways of problem solving, instead of looking for the simple solution first.

¹⁰ See: Robert P. Pellegrini, *The Link between Science, Philosophy, and Military Theory: Understanding the Past, Implications for the Future*, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, Air University Press, August 1997, pp.1ff,15ff,21ff,33ff.

¹¹ Ibid. p.29.

¹² See: Alexander Rosenberg, *Philosophy of Social Science*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995.

work mutually link these sciences. In order to focus and scale the findings, a theoretical framework is indispensable for academic credibility.

The Theoretical Basis

Trying to identify skills requires asking two important questions: Firstly, how can one categorize or classify these phenomena, and secondly, what qualifies a competency versus a skill. Using Koerner's theoretical work *Categorical Framework*¹³ as a theoretical basis for establishing a conceptual framework for this monograph, one can only classify skills since a categorization requires a mutual exclusion¹⁴. This is impossible for psychological and social phenomena since the mental and emotional acts and effects cannot be separated from each other. As Koerner also points out, there is no unified method for these kinds of classification. For example, Aristotle's, Kant's, and other philosophers' refined models "are so heterogeneous that none of them can be regarded as firmly established."¹⁵ This work will approach the classification of skills and competencies from a natural categorial framework based on logical, ontological, and psychological distinctions. The framework will be logical because it "distinguishes between objects which are, and objects which are not 'logically ultimate', which means objects that are the possessors of characteristics but are not themselves characteristics and objectives which are both possessors of characteristics and characteristics."¹⁶ Ontological, because the framework "distinguishes between objects which are and which are not 'ontologically fundamental', which means objects that exist apart from and independently of other objects and objects which do not exist."¹⁷ Psychological, because the framework "distinguishes between objects which are

¹³ Stephan Koerner, *Categorical frameworks*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1970.

¹⁴ Ibid. pp.ix. and 4.

¹⁵ Ibid. p.1

¹⁶ Ibid. p.2

¹⁷ Ibid.

‘psychologically co-ordinate’, which means objects that belong together, and objects that are ‘psychologically disparate’, which are objects that do not belong together.”¹⁸

To answer the second question of what qualifies a competency versus a skill requires emphasizing the importance of meanings of words, or the importance of semantics in general.¹⁹ This is, for example, the reason why the term “education” is the central focus in this work versus the much more restricted term “training”. In order to approach a classification of skills, one needs to identify the lexical relations²⁰ that should serve to cluster and distinguish those phenomena. The question of what is a skill’s source, its origin, and what is its effect become central points for their classification, since it becomes quickly obvious that the configurations are not hierarchical²¹, but more taxonomical²² and meronomical²³: Taxonomical, because they are systematized by the nature of their origin, and meronomical because they are classified as parts and pieces. Hence, for the model which will serve as the framework and grid for identified skills, the origin of skills will be considered as ‘competencies’, while the functional capacities, based on their effects, will be considered as ‘skills’.

The Framework Construct

The proposed framework approaches the issue from a theoretical point, quasi in a deductive manner, while most of the existing praxis-oriented models are of an inductive nature. They examine and analyze empirically and induce constructs or theories. Although they are of highest value for practical purposes, they initiate practical dissonances, which ask for practical

¹⁸ Ibid. p.1f.

¹⁹ See: D.A. Cruse, *Lexical semantics*, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986, p.xiiiiff.

²⁰ See: Ibid. p.86ff.

²¹ Ibid. p.112f.

²² Ibid. p.136ff.

²³ Ibid. p.157ff.

solutions.²⁴ The proposed framework of this monograph offers a theoretical concept that allows locating competencies and skills, comparing and contrasting sets of skills, and making recommendations for curricular purposes.

In this framework the individual, in our case the General Staff Officer or equivalent, is the linking systemic agent between the theoretical, metaphysical world, and the practical, physical world. An analysis of multiple psychological and social science disciplines identifies three interacting sources - for thought and action likewise. This monograph will consider these sources of mental power competencies. The three competencies most of the works refer to can be classified into the cognitive, the intrapersonal, and the interpersonal competency. The cognitive competency can be characterized by knowledge, which includes not only the representation of facts and functions, but also the availability of mental and practical patterns. This competency would also serve, if possible, as the source for strict logical thinking. The intrapersonal competency can be characterized as the source for all internally focused processes, including emotions, emotional control, moral and ethical values, and most important to source the ability of self-reflection. This competency would also serve as the source for purely emotional, or in case of its absence, purely uncontrolled thinking. The interpersonal competency can be characterized by social interaction, which includes social and communicative sensitivity and ability. This does not only refer to one-on-one situations, but also within groups or cultures. This competency serves as the catalyst between internal and external processes. Drawing this competency picture, another question appears to become relevant: What initiates all those mental processes and actions? This question becomes even more critical when we bring it in to context with the overall topic of this monograph. Although at a first glance this initiation seems to be part of the intrapersonal competency, assigning a separate competency to complete the picture becomes necessary: the

²⁴ See for example Emil Kluever et. al., *Striking a balance in leader development - A case for conceptual competence*, National Security Program Discussion Paper Series 92 – 02, Harvard University, 1992.

intrinsic motivation competency, characterized by self-initiative and perseverance serving as the quasi engine for all interactions between the three above-mentioned competencies. Specifically this competency keeps the other three competencies permanently interacting and adjusting.

Finally, one more competency needs to be identified although this monograph will not address it any further in detail: the physical competency, which in the military is commonly called physical fitness. This competency frames all other competencies and has significant impact only when it is not fully developed or intact. For this work, we will assume that the physical competency is established and maintained in a way that it does not affect the research on all other competencies and skills.




Figure 1: The conceptual competency-skill-framework (Source: Thomas Groeters, 2005)

How these competencies now connect the individual to theory and to praxis, defines the person's skills, describing the abilities to deduce, synthesize, analyze, induce, and reevaluate.²⁵ The deduction skill allows the individual to infer logical conclusions and ideas in the classic understanding of "deduction". The main source for this skill is the cognitive competency heavily supported and controlled by the intrapersonal competency. The synthesis skill allows the individual to bring the deduced knowledge together into a new unified higher-level conclusion according to the environment in which the individual currently exists. It is important to understand for this framework, that the synthesis skill exceeds the classical definition, which is generally limited to mental processes. For this framework, the term synthesis is used holistically and includes practical application and transformation of thoughts into action. The sources for this skill, therefore, are a balanced effort of all three competencies. While the cognitive competency provides the knowledge of patterns and facts, the intrapersonal competency controls the flow of thoughts and the ethical implications as well as leveling it with the interpersonal competency in order to communicate the desired action appropriately. Other important functions of the intrapersonal competency are the ability of transfer and the assessment of practicability. In a next step, the analysis skill allows the individual to learn lessons. This skill enables the individual to evaluate objectively the events and the effects of its actions in the real world. This skill delivers the subjective analytical results that may later turn into a mental stage we commonly call experience. Sources for this skill are primarily the intrapersonal competency. On the one hand, this skill controls the disciplined logical flow of thoughts and use of knowledge sourced by the cognitive competency while on the other hand divorcing itself from the assessment. The induction skill can be seen as a mental extension of the analysis skill just as the synthesis skill can be seen as an extension of the deduction skill. The induction skill allows the individual to analyze the facts of newly gained experience – knowledge, filtered by the intrapersonal and interpersonal

²⁵ For fundamental definitions of analysis, synthesis, deduction, and induction as used in this design, see: Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. <http://www.britannica.com/dictionary>

competencies – and transform this into theory as the classical term “induction” defines it. This closes the cycle and allows deducing new thought and enriching the cognitive competency. The revaluation skill now is the ability to enable the individual’s systemic learning. This skill is primarily sourced by the intrapersonal competency and allows the individual to self-adjust, reevaluate and self-modulate their own setting and composition of competencies. This is more than just adjusting actions and thoughts as described in the previous circle. It requires the ability to divorce from thoughts, values, and actions very critically, and to assess from a meta-position.

Figure 1 summarizes the conceptual competency-skill-framework, as it will serve as a model for the further inquiry.

CHAPTER 3

THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF OFFICER EDUCATION

Stupid and industrious officers are dangerous to public safety, therefore they need to be removed immediately. Stupid and lazy officers are good for subordinate positions where they do not do any harm. Clever and industrious officers are appropriate for high staff appointments, but not for the very highest commands; those should be left to the clever and lazy officers. They have the temperament and the requisite nerves to deal with all situations.

- Attributed, circa 1933

General Baron Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord (1878-1943)

German Chief of Army Command (1930-33)

Historical Influences on the Self-conception of German General Staff

Officers

This short historical overview will focus on four significant periods and their respective impacts on the self-conception of contemporary German General Staff Officers.²⁶ The first important period is the initiation and implementation of the general staff in the early years of the nineteenth century. Reformers serving around the Prussian General Scharnhorst established the modern general staff as a response to earlier dramatic defeats of the Prussian army and the realization that one person cannot effectively plan, command, and control modern military operations as an individual anymore. The general staff's relevance was scarcely noticed until the victories of 1866 and 1870 when it demonstrated its decisive edge in war planning, and command and control. During the very early period of establishment, personalities and characters around Scharnhorst defined the basic skills still valued for the modern German General Staff Officers such as aiming for high levels of professional perfectionism and general education, as well as independent thinking and integrity of character.

The second noteworthy period was the inter-world wars period from 1918 to 1939, specifically the time during the Weimar Republic, 1919 to 1930. The General Staff around

²⁶ Note: Due to political reasons, it is absolutely necessary to state at this point that this paper represents the point of view of the author and not necessarily the official policy for traditions of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Germany.

General von Seeckt was able to analyze the events of World War I, learn the lessons, and develop solutions, which were at that time out of the mainstreams of thought and evolving theories. This was only possible due to the tradition of open discussions, tolerance for views outside the mainstream, and the respect owed to junior general staff officers who were already in responsible positions and were assured critical attention of their viewpoints at the highest levels.²⁷ Those enablers remain factors of significant impact on the self-conception of modern German General Staff Officers: communicating and enabling open discussions, encouraging other views especially when they are off the mainstream of thoughts, and presenting thoughts and arguments appropriately to higher levels.

The third noteworthy period is the time of the Third Reich, 1933 to 1945, specifically the resistance movement around General Beck and General von Tresckow who were the driving forces in the assassination attempts of Hitler.²⁸ Their opposition and their ethical responsibility contradicted their duty to oblige their oath towards Adolf Hitler, contradicted what they internalized during their education and socialization, and still represent the metaphor for the absolute responsibility that a general staff officer has: his ethical responsibility as a “morally thinking” human being. This sense of basic ethic responsibility is still an inherent part of the self-conception of modern German General Staff Officers knowing that events like World War II and the killing of innocents must never happen again, and knowing that every recommendation a General Staff Officer makes may have long-term effects and consequences for which he will be ethically responsible. This also means knowing that if he is not the one who stands up and contradicts, nobody will.

²⁷ James S. Corum, *The Luftwaffe: creating the operational air war, 1918-1940*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1997, p.18ff.

²⁸ See : Joachim Fest, *Staatsstreich: Der lange Weg zum 20. Juli*, Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1994. and Wolfgang Benz and Walter H. Pehle, *Lexikon des deutschen Widerstandes*, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, 1994.

The fourth and final significant period was the Cold War between the 1950s and 1989. This was the period of establishing the Bundeswehr as the new German armed forces, completely integrated in alliances, specifically in the NATO. Officers in this era grew up in a society with the inherent notion that they serve in a politically sensitive and multidimensional environment. Specifically, the General Staff Officers as the link between the national strategic and tactical level needed to be aware of the skeptical and critical observation. Not only the national but also the international public watched very closely how the German military integrated and subordinated itself under the primacy of politics. As a side effect, officers inevitably developed regional and global political awareness, as well as mastered the multinational environment and its conception, as fundamental basis for their profession.

As a summary of those historical influences, we can conclude that ideally the following competencies and skills became inherent elements for the self-conception of a German General Staff Officer: Aiming for professional perfectionism and a sound general education. Thinking independently and displaying integrity of character. Communicating and enabling open discussions, executing tolerance for other views especially when they are outside the mainstream. Presenting thoughts and arguments appropriately to even the highest levels, and acting with deep ethical responsibility for personal and organizational actions, political awareness and cooperation, and multinational perspective.

The General Staff Officer in the Contemporary German Army

As in the former German Armed Forces, the General Staff Officers in the modern German Army do not only form the main cadre for future military leaders in the rank of general. General Staff Officers work also at key positions with various tactical, operational and politico-strategic levels. On the tactical level, they primarily man the principal and chief of staff positions of the divisions within a brigade, division, or corps staff. On the operational level, General Staff Officers serve as the principals, but also serve as lead planners for various planning groups. It is

important to understand, that the rank becomes less important, while the function is the critical factor for authority and responsibility. Not uncommonly, a Major (General Staff, GS), working in the G/J 5 Division (the plans and policy division in a General or Joint Staff), for example, is the overall lead planner for a planning group consisting of officers in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. On the politico-strategic level, like in the Ministry of Defense, General Staff Officers work on all levels from desk or action officers to the highest levels of military advisors for the Minister of Defense.

Command postings from battalion level and higher became so rare due to the force reductions that one can observe a tendency to select more General Staff Officers to take over these commands than “Non-General-Staff Officers”. This is actually the only time that General Staff Officers return to their original functional service since they belong to the General Staff Branch after their graduation as General Staff Officers. Since only 44 officers graduate each year from the German Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr (FueAkBw), the German General Staff Officer Academy, there are more General Staff positions than there are General Staff Officers to fill them. Very well performing “Non-General-Staff Officers” can therefore as well enter all mentioned positions.

What does this mean for the required skills of General Staff Officers in the German Army since there is minimal institutional education after graduation from the FueAkBw? This lack means that those officers graduating principally as Majors (GS) after two years of education at the FueAkBw with about 15 years of experience in the services need to be sufficiently equipped for the next 25 to 30 years of staff and command positions on tactical, operational, and politico-strategic level. In view of rapid changes in the contemporary operational environment and the high frequency of postings, the professional challenge is daunting. They need to have the ability of knowing how to learn and adapt as quickly as possible for their next position. The FueAkBw can barely create this ability within only two years of education, if those officers of an average age of 32 to 35 years do not already have specific qualities. Since a military institution in this

situation can only form and shape officers that already possess at least rudimental existing competencies and skills, the selection processes for these individuals becomes of a significant importance.

The Selection Processes

During the career of the General Staff Officers, four significant selection processes form the cornerstones: the selection to enter the officer's career, the selection to become a professional soldier²⁹, the selection for the General Staff Officer career, and the later assessments for possible promotions and advanced responsibilities. For all selection processes, one needs to understand that the focus is always on the officer as a whole and not only on his academic performance or only on his command achievement. The balance and quality of both of these aspects lead most likely to a successful career since his future assignments frequently change between staff work and command.

The German Armed Forces Offizierpruefzentrale (OPZ)³⁰ conducts the first selection, deciding whether or not an applicant will join the officers' career courses and education. The OPZ, an assessment center adopted from civilian companies, assesses the candidates for three days focusing on their knowledge and general intellect, their ability to solve complex problems—individually as well as a member of a group, their communications skills and personality qualities, and their physical fitness. The assessing OPZ personnel consist of experienced and selected military as well as civilian psychologists. Having passed this cornerstone, the young soldiers go through three years of education and training characterized by the permanent and regular cycle between practice and academics. This means they serve with regular military units and attend the section leader courses prior serving as section leaders with troop units until they

²⁹ Note: Officers sign principally up for twelve years. Those officers “on a time based contract” differ from so-called “professional” officers, who, after acceptance, have a life long contract like a civil servant and will retire at the age of 57 or older, depending on their rank. The term “professional” does therefore refer solely to the employment status and not to their professional performance or quality.

³⁰ Officers Candidates Examination Center

attend the next level of training³¹. After two and a half years, the young officer candidates are in the rank of a first sergeant and are not only fully qualified as platoon leaders within their branch, but also tactically educated on the mechanized or armored task force level. If the young soldiers perform well enough as soldiers, as leaders, and as scholars, they are promoted to lieutenant after three years of service. After those three years, the officers attend studies at one of the German armed forces universities. These universities are funded by the Ministry of Defense but are academically linked entirely to the civilian academic educational system. The studies are conducted in Trimesters, and officers are required to graduate with a full diploma after three and a half years. Officers not complying with the academic requirements leave the university immediately and are relieved of duties after a total of six years of service. Officers who graduate from the university return to the troop units and serve as platoon leaders. During the next years, the officers receive additional training and education depending on their functions. The best-performing officers are selected to become company commanders.

The second cornerstone is the selection to become a professional officer. During all the years in service, officers can apply to change their twelve-year contract into a lifelong service status. The decision is generally made after having sufficient data about the military and academic skills as well as his leadership performance. This includes everything from his OPZ results to his last physical fitness tests score. A board of the Army's key leaders decides by having a holistic review of those officers who will be selected for a further professional career. Since the numerical requirements change, the average number of selected officers varies between 20 and 30 percent of the entire year-group, which are about 400 to 500 officers per year. All selected officers, with most of them becoming company commanders, attend the Staff Officer

³¹ Note: This system is currently under revision and changes due to efficiency and capability reasons to a more centralized organization. As of now and after initial studies, the author assesses this process skeptical since it may result in a lack of practical experience of those young officers.

Basic Course³² at the FueAkBw. This roughly four and a half month's course is a rigorous education program focused on teaching the future field grade officers on basic staff work above battalion level, as well as educating them on fundamental political, social, psychological, problem solving, and management skills. Officers not passing the rigid assessments during the course or the tests and examinations at the end of the course will not be promoted to Major. During this course, officers can announce their interest to apply for the General Staff Career which leads to a recommendation by the faculty members.

The third cornerstone, for those officers who applied for the General Staff Officer career, is the selection board headed by the Inspekteur des Heeres, the Chief of the Army. Based on all available personnel data, specifically the performance as company commander and the assessment of the Staff Officer Basic Course by the FueAkBw, only up to 12 percent of the professional officers, generally 44 officers every year, are selected to attend the two year General Staff Officer Training at the FueAkBw. The next sub-chapter will go into detail and summarize the content and main focus of the General Staff Training at the FueAkBw.

To complete the selection processes, the fourth cornerstone is the assessment for possible promotions, specifically to General. This board meets once a year, and a General Staff Officer is assessed the first time when he is 42 years old. Until that time he should have served on General Staff positions in a wide range of functions on tactical, operational, ministerial as well as integrated multinational levels in order to provide a broad and holistic picture of his performance and potential. Based on his efficiency and performance reports, the board conducts an assessment defining his possible future capability and his potential promotion advancement in terms of one-star, two-star, or three-star level. After an initial assessment, General Staff Officers are reassessed by the board every second year.

³² Note: In German, the Term "Stabsoffizier" means both, staff officer as well as field grade officer. Although the course may therefore be translated as staff officer basic course, it may also be considered as field grade officer basic course, since the objective is not to train officers solely for staff work.

Analyzing all those selection processes, the following characteristics summarize the critical aspects for being successful during the career: Cognitive competency and discipline, stress resistance, military proficiency, leadership and cooperation skills, initiative, fitness, and ethical integrity.

The Current Education of German General Staff Officers

The curriculum of the General Staff Officer Course which started in 2004 stated the educational aim as follows:³³

‘The Aim of the education is, to enable the officer to accomplish tasks within General-/Admiral-Staff Duties

- on strategic, operational, and tactical level,
- on the full spectrum of the forces’ tasks, including basic peacetime tasks of the German Armed Forces,
- in national as well an international environment,
- under considerations of the social developments, of efficiency requirements, and of the approach to focus on joint capabilities,
- in a self-reflecting, independent, responsible, and competent manner.’

One needs to recognize the significant stress on independent reflective character, the multinational, specifically NATO and European Union focus, and the three level approaches from tactical to strategic level. General educational breadth and width is valued above specific depth. With this, education aims specifically on enabling the officer to identify a lack of depth by himself and to know how to learn autonomously.

³³ Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, *Lehrplan fuer den nationalen Lehrgang Generalstabs-/Admiralstabsdienst 2004*, Hamburg, 2004. p.6

Before going into the analysis of the General Staff Course in regard content itself, some preliminary analysis of the frameworks are important for the context of this monograph to understand which means are substantial to achieve the aim as stated.³⁴

The first framing aspect, worth analyzing, is the class composition and configuration. Each class generally used to consist of 44 German officers and 15 -16 International officers from NATO and Partnership for Peace countries (PfP). The class (Lehrgang) of roughly 60 officers was organized in four seminars (Hoersaal) with a proportional apportionment of all branches and internationals. The seminars organize themselves concerning all issues that the curriculum or schedule does not clearly state. The faculty consists of one director, a selected full colonel General Staff Officer, who has the overall responsibility for the class, including disciplinary power. He writes the officers' efficiency reports after the two years of education. Four seminar leaders (Tutor) support him. Each Tutor assists one seminar as instructor, as *primus inter pares* and more importantly as an example for a General Staff Officer. These Tutors are therefore hand-selected General Staff Officers who completed their assignment as battalion commanders.³⁵ The small self-organizing groups create a network, where everybody knows everybody of his year group including his strengths and weaknesses. This develops a significant network of trust and becomes specifically important on the joint and multinational arena. The Tutors give examples and to develop thought in a Socratic approach, teaching the officers that there is often more than only one correct answer and thereby educating the ability of discourse for sometimes even unusual approaches and mental flexibility. The class director knows every single officer very well after two years and is able to produce a very accurate evaluation at the end of the course

³⁴ Note: Although considered as very important, we will not look at standard and basic issues like physical training or basic military skills training, which have the sole purpose to maintain military basic proficiency as trained in the years of service prior the course.

³⁵ This organization is currently changing as the class compositions since 2004 are entirely joint and combined from the beginning. Each seminar consists of a group with a proportionate number of Army, Navy, Air force, Medical Corps and International officers. Consequently, the number of seminars and the composition of the faculty changed slightly. The important effects, however, did not change.

highlighting his or her strengths, weaknesses, and most importantly their potential for future assignments.

The second noteworthy aspect is the duration and sequencing of the classes. Since the two-year course starts annually, officers have the opportunity to overlap with students from two other classes during their time at the FueAkBw; the one that is there when they arrive, and the one that arrives during their second year. For the beginning class, this means they are the “younger class” while the class in the second year is the “older class”. This is important to mention because the older class plans, prepares, and conducts almost all exercises the younger class is going through during their first year. The faculty stays in an exclusively supporting role. The exercises during the second year are generally under the lead of the faculty for joint and combined operations or linked with exercises conducted by other staff colleges in the UK, France, U.S., Spain, Italy or Warsaw. The final exercise, the so-called Combined Joint Euro Exercise, is actually conducted at staff colleges in UK, France, Spain, Italy, and Germany at the same time under the same scenario. This educates the officers and emphasizes the importance and necessity of multinational comprehension and proficiency. The above-mentioned overlapping has therefore two major effects: first, it offers the older classes officers a unique chance to train and educate themselves while preparing and executing those exercises. They learn how to plan in a very critical environment. Second, the younger class has the opportunity to exercise in a sound environment since the exercises are not only assessed as a very serious business but also conducted in a realistic setup. Furthermore, this situation allows the younger class to observe its older colleagues and adopt or avoid observed actions or characteristics. Learning from peers proofed to be more effective than learning from instructors. Thirdly, this overlapping principle extends the network. Every officer knows at least three year-groups of General Staff Officers quite well: the older class while he was in his first year, the younger class while he was in his second year, and of course his own class which stays the core group for him.

The third aspect important to mention is the language training. Prior to their General Staff Course, all Army officers attend language training at the federal language school. The primary goal is to ensure that all officers are proficient in English to a clearly defined NATO level. Officers already qualified to that level have the opportunity to learn a third or fourth language. During the General Staff Course, the language training continues with basically two hours per week in order to maintain or even extend language skills. As an effect, officers gain proficiency in the multinational environment and more self-confidence for their future global assignments. As an additional side effect, cultural awareness, cultural flexibility, and other related abilities are taught indirectly when encountering a foreign language.

The fourth aspect noteworthy is the requirement to write a monograph (Lehrgangsarbeit) during their course. The purpose is not only to deepen the officers' knowledge of specific areas of interest, but also to force them to approach a self-selected problem in a scientific manner and to show academic proficiency. Selected works provide input to current scientific development within the forces and will be published.

The fifth and probably most important aspect excluding the contents is the didactical and methodical approach for the General Staff Education. The term education is specifically important at this point since the course exceeds the simple means of training due to its holistic approach. Classes follow the basic idea of teaching fundamental knowledge first and developing it in a second step by seminar type discussions and discourses. Adult education is the fundament of all lessons. All officers attending this course are considered to be some of the most experienced, proficient, and educated officers of their peer group. Ignoring this would insult the basis for this entire educational approach. Therefore participation in the curriculum development, individual exemplary focusing by electives, available time for self-organization, contribution of own experiences or competencies, fundamental discussions of ethical issues, and extensive travels are indispensable pillars of this process.

Based on the aim of the course and the set framework, the content of the course is basically organized into five educational fields nesting the subordinate educational aims. The specific contents of those fields vary from year to year depending on political, social, military, and technical developments worldwide. Those five fields are: 1. State, society, and military; 2. Capabilities and structures of Armed Forces; 3. Basic peacetime tasks of the German Armed Forces; 4. Command, control, and employment of armed forces; and 5. Individual leadership competence.

“State, society, and military” educates the officers on the understanding of the interdependencies of these three aspects and their responsibilities as “citizens in uniform”. This specifically stresses that they are citizens in a democratic society with all the related rights and duties. We see here not only the desire to teach the holistic system as it exists, but also to learn the ethical lessons from past disasters caused by the lacking ethical responsibility of some military leaders. The specific disciplines are political and social science, history, national and international legal affairs, crises management, as well as leadership philosophies. Civilian faculty members or guest academics, external to the FueAkBw teach most of these topics.

“Capabilities and Structures of Armed Forces” teaches the officers on basic organizational principles and force management issues. The aim is to enable the officers to understand all joint and interagency aspects required for transformation and force management. Specific topics are conceptual basics of capabilities and structures of armed forces, personnel and material resources management, and processes within a concept development. Those topics are generally taught by General Staff Officers working in the respective areas or by personnel from other governmental agencies. Travel supports these lessons as they do for other fields. Specifically for this field, trips to the Ministry of defense, to the Pentagon, and to the Allied Command Transformation in the U.S. may be selected.

“Basic Peacetime Tasks of the German Armed Forces” teaches the officers how not only the Army, but also the German Armed Forces operate. The aim is to set a fundamental

understanding of the organization and the operating mode of the German Armed Forces as an organization. The specific topics are basic knowledge of the organization, fundamental national tasks, principles and processes within the German forces, economical and efficiency constraints, controlling, and the principles of process management.

“Command, Control, and Employment of Armed Forces” is the field focusing on the planning and execution of military operations from tactical to strategic level in national and multinational environments. The focus is on planning processes, decision-making, and staff work, national as well as multinational, and orchestration of all different components involved in military operations including all efficiency related constraints. Supporting lessons include detailed classes on the different branches and services, different operations from war fighting and evacuation to peace support operations and humanitarian aid, political-military decision-making, multinational decision-making and staff work, and trips to NATO and European Union headquarters in Europe.

“Individual Leadership Competence” focuses on the personality of the officer and his individual key competencies as a military leader. The aim is to improve his ability to apply appropriately his social, methodical, and professional competences. His thinking and actions should be led by comprehension and judgment focusing on intrinsic self-improvement. They also have to recognize practicability and the leadership principles of the German Armed Forces (Innere F  hrung). The specific topics are planning, decision-making, communication, management techniques, staff work and information management, stress and stress coping techniques, managing change, psychology, motivational and social science, and media training. Trips to institutions educating leadership and communication aspects support these lessons as well as practical applications and exercises throughout the entire course.

The General Staff Course apparently does not intend to educate specialists for specific functions or levels. Instead, based on the selected group of attendees, the course improves the already existing individual capabilities and accomplishes two objectives. Firstly, the course

equips the graduates with a “box” full of tools and knowledge to handle future challenges and to learn autonomously if shortcomings are identified. Secondly, as a result the education provides a network of peers enabling the officer to reach back for any case that the basket may not offer sufficient help.

Summary of Identified Competencies and Skills

This section will abstract the findings of the analysis, classify them based on the competency-skill-framework, and allow placing competencies and skills on this mental map to compare and contrast them with the findings of the following chapter. Based on the description of a contemporary German General Staff Officer, we can already identify a major challenge: the reliance on intrapersonal and intrinsic competencies, which implies autonomy from extrinsic input, and on a sound and balanced basis of all defined skills.

The historical influences set the preconditions for basic selection criteria and education. The identified tenor was aiming for professional perfectionism, balanced general education, independent thought, character of integrity, ability to communicate and enable open discussions, tolerance, the ability to present thoughts and arguments appropriately to even the highest levels, deep ethical responsibility, and political as well as multinational, thus cultural awareness. Evaluating those findings with the developed framework, the focus is more on intrapersonal, intrinsic, interpersonal competencies and the effected revaluation skill than on any other specific skills. Those skills affect the later selection and education processes in a way that they define competencies which need to be at least rudimentarily present just like a ‘seed’ needs to have already all genetic information to become a ‘tree’.

The selection processes are nested in this previous system and transfer the value-like criteria into reality by using organizational selection. The identified tenor of the selection processes was selecting and promoting primarily individuals who possess strong cognitive competency, discipline, stress resistance, military proficiency, leadership, cooperation

capabilities, initiative, fitness, and ethical integrity. Therefore those selection processes do not only select the crucial and fundamental physical competency, but also focus on the identification of those above-mentioned ‘seeds’ such as the intrapersonal, intrinsic and interpersonal competencies, and the effected revaluation skill. Additionally, those processes assess the potential for all other competencies and skills, as they are required in framework. The education conducted prior to the General Staff Training sets the fundamentals required for a holistic and sound personality. Although the view seems to be holistic and the military role is only a part of the individual, the focus in content can be assessed as very ‘military-heavy’. This content aims generally on military professionalism, which in terms of the framework would mean a very specific development of the military part of the cognitive competency.

The analysis of the German General Staff Course identified a vast number of objectives. Those objectives and the underlying training schedule rest on a theoretical model differentiating among four competencies. The first is the self-competency (Selbstkompetenz), could be directly translated into the competency-skill-model’s intrapersonal competency. The second competence is the professional competence (Fachkompetenz), which describes all professional competencies necessary to accomplish military missions. Those competencies are seen as military craftsmanship and can most sufficiently assessed as a specific part of the cognitive competency effecting practical applications such as the synthesis and analysis skill. The third competence is methodical competence (Methodische Kompetenz), which requires knowledge, appropriate selection, and practical application of methods. Using the competency-skill-framework, this competence would describe a cognitive competency of knowing multiple methods, indirectly affecting all other skills. The final competence is the social competence (Soziale Kompetenz), which can be described as a combination of interpersonal and intrapersonal competency.

Evaluating the findings of the German General Staff Course, the following seven conclusions stand out: First, the small number of officers attending the training and the close integration of the faculty members supports and continues the above mentioned holistic

assessment of the future leaders' quality and potential for future assignments. Second, the adult oriented approach and the mutual integration of classes from different year groups stresses and develops, based on the interaction and communication with peers, an atmosphere of 'learning from peers' as well as 'learn to learn'. This significantly enhances the quality of the interpersonal competency as well as the intrapersonal and intrinsic competencies. Third, the language training combined with travel improves cultural awareness and flexibility. This improves intrapersonal competency, and in a wider sense, interpersonal competency which effects the development revaluation skills by being confronted with other points of view or solutions. This has a direct effect on improving the cognitive competency, since newly observed methods are memorized and are potentials for adaptation in their own environment. Fourth, the education on state, society, and military develops the cognitive competency affecting very strongly all four skills of the framework by setting professional actions and decisions into an overarching relative context and by enhancing the comprehension of systemic thinking. Fifth, the education on capabilities, structures, and basic tasks of the German Armed Forces improve the military part of the cognitive competency by establishing basic knowledge and patterns, and improving simultaneously the deduction and induction skills by extensive seminar discussions. A second-order effect of these discussions is the improvement of intrapersonal competency by assessing the moral basis for forces' deployment. Sixth, the very critical part of commanding and controlling forces is educated by an exercise-heavy approach and multiple practical applications. The exercises require a soundly developed status of all competencies as the source for all actions, and effects predominantly the synthesis and analysis skills. As a side effect of the provided feedback, the revaluation skill experiences significant improvement. The significant part of the exercises is the planning part.³⁶ Planning in this context includes planning on all three levels: tactical, operational, and strategic level. The seventh conclusion is that the education on individual

³⁶ Planning in a German understanding does not only mean allocating resources to missions, but also means designing operations without any or with very limited guidance.

leadership competencies, which teaches and practices fundamental communications, management, social, and psychological theories, enhances the intrapersonal as well as the interpersonal competency affecting mainly the synthesis, the analysis, and the revaluation skills.

In summary, the two keys for the German General Staff Officer education are the early identification of all competencies described by the competency-skill-framework and the assessment of the potential for all described skills. While the first factor can be described by the analogy of the ‘seed’ and the ‘tree’, the latter describes a notable future oriented approach that is based on the question of which type of leaders are required on higher than tactical level?³⁷. Undoubtedly, the education process enhances the establishment and improvement of future planners and leaders as a self-sustaining or even self-developing mental system. Evaluating the current German General Staff Officer Education using the competency-skill-framework therefore clearly identifies a focus on the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and cognitive competencies. The main effort within the cognitive competency, however, and the synthesis as well as analysis skills is set on military issues. More specifically, the curriculum indicates a focus on conventional war fighting and U.N.-style PSO, principally excluding any depth of counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations. The following chapter will identify competencies and skills based on the requirements experienced by the author during his last assignment as a operational planner for PSO. Utilizing the competency-skill-framework to identify requirements will enable us to compare and contrast them with the educated competencies and skills of this chapter.

³⁷ See: Kluever, Emil, et. al., *Striking a balance in leader development - A case for conceptual competence*, National Security Program Discussion Paper Series 92 – 02, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1992.

CHAPTER 4

THE GERMAN PRT IN KUNDUZ/AFGHANISTAN AND THE REQUIRED SKILLS FOR THIS SPECIFIC KIND OF PSO

Contemporary peacekeeping is no job for a soldier, but a job only a soldier can do.

- Dag Hammarskjöld, U.N. Secretary General 1953-1961

The German Interpretation of PSO and Nation Building

Soldiers, specifically the ones who grew up during the cold war, can feel very uncomfortable with PSO since they feel not only restraint by stricter and political sensitive rules but also constraint by tasks may not comply with their ‘warrior ethos’. However, as Dag Hammarskjöld recognized in the early 1950s, the military must understand that they possess capabilities that no one else possesses and therefore makes the military a tool available for politics to build, keep, or even enforce peace. Since many terms affiliated to peace support become victim to incautious and unclear use, understanding common expectations and limitations of PSO and nation building in the context of this work is critical.

From the German perspective, for all operations others than physical self-defense, the legitimacy of all actions are crucial. All operations are nested into the legitimization process of the United Nations and its subordinated organizations. The fundamental German Army manual HDv 100/100³⁸ “Truppenführung” states very clearly in its first sentences describing the characteristics of command and control of military forces in support of peace operations: “Peace operations are international crises management activities in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (U.N.). They may be undertaken by the United Nations, regional organizations or coalitions. The military contribution to such missions may cover the entire task spectrum of the

³⁸ Heeresdienstvorschrift 100/100: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Führungsstab des Heeres, *Heeresdienstvorschrift (HDv) 100/100 Truppenführung (TF)*, Bonn, Germany, 2000.

armed forces.”³⁹ Plainly spoken, this means that a U.N. resolution is principally the precondition for any action. Those actions could also be conducted by NATO or a coalition assigned by the U.N., and the missions may span from observer tasks to war fighting tasks. For the purposes of this monograph, military activities supporting peace operations, or PSO, “can include a variety of activities different in purpose and nature. These include:

- conflict prevention
- peacemaking
- peacekeeping
- peace enforcement
- peace building
- humanitarian operations

Employment of the Bundeswehr⁴⁰ will be considered above all for missions aimed at peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building. Humanitarian operations may be conducted as part of these missions or as separate operations.”⁴¹ Nation building is not specifically mentioned for two reasons. First, nation building is not a military mission but an interagency mission and therefore subject to a Grand Strategy. Secondly, within this interagency activity the military is responsible for specific military tasks enabling the interagency officials to accomplish their tasks. Those military tasks can reach from “demonstrative deployment of force” to “enforcement and supervision of compliance with agreements” or “combat operations”, including missions like “negotiation, mediation, liaison”, “exchange of information and cooperation with local civilian agencies and institutions”, “establishing protected zones”, “convoy escorts” or “operating camps and logistical facilities.”⁴² German manuals state very clearly, however, that those multi-faceted tasks and missions can rarely be clearly differentiated from one another and

³⁹ Ibid. Number 3801.

⁴⁰ The German Armed Forces

⁴¹ Ibid. Number 3802.

⁴² See: Ibid. Number 3901ff.

depend therefore on detailed terms of references to be defined for the specific contingents of a peace operation force. The term nation building is therefore only the framing term for the military's responsibility. This understanding differentiates the German approach towards PSO from the American approach in two ways. First, the military subordinates itself under the enabling role. Secondly, every mission is considered unique in terms of references, the role of the military, and the preparatory training for each contingent since every area of operation (AOR) has its specifics that significantly vary from other AOR.⁴³

Germany's Way to Kunduz

After the U.S. led coalition intervention in Afghanistan during the aftermath of the terrorism events of September 11, 2001 it became very quickly obvious that the power vacuum needed to be filled by an Afghan Government as soon as possible. To be successful, the reconstruction of Afghanistan required the involvement of the Afghan people and the coordination of support efforts conducted by international organizations (IOs), international governmental organizations (GOs), as well as international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). "Serious complications arise when international civilian and military personnel are simultaneously involved in providing humanitarian relief or reconstruction assistance in the midst of combat or in other non-permissive environments. Among the concerns that repeatedly arise are security, the proper role of the military in providing assistance, information sharing, coordination, and preservation of the 'humanitarian space' that NGOs and IOs rely upon to perform their tasks."⁴⁴ The coalition identified this need very early in the process and assigned Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells and U.S. Army Civil Affairs Teams – Afghanistan (CAT-A) with

⁴³ Note: Kosovo, for example, with the KFOR mandate does not only differ legally from Afghanistan with its ISAF mandate, but also geographically, culturally, and politico-strategically (different ends, way and means).

⁴⁴: Michael J. Dziedzic and Michael K. Seidl. *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Military Relations with International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan*. Washington D.C.: Special Report 147 by the United States Institute of Peace. September 2005. p.3.

those necessary tasks. After the coalition modified this concept in cooperation mainly with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) into the PRT concept in 2002, NATO assumed responsibility for Kabul with its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission and plans developed in early 2003 to spread the effect of the PRTs throughout Afghanistan.

Germany's political leadership developed initial political ideas for participation but faced a twofold challenge. First, the coalition PRTs worked under the terms of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) that was not mandated by the U.N. This precluded the usual legitimate reason to participate as a U.N. member. Second, the existing U.N. mandate for ISAF limited the NATO forces and restraints German military operations to the area of Kabul City. A need for action outside those limitations, however, was obvious not only for the sake of the Afghan people, but also due to national and international pressure on the German government. From the author's perception, the main sources of internal pressure were the need to maintain political influence in this central Asian region and within NATO, to show responsibility, and to gain more influence in a region, which was the main poppy source for drugs smuggled into central Europe. One more factor significantly influenced the political decision-making⁴⁵. Germany did openly deny any active military participation in the war on Iraq. Once committed to this statement, however, compensating measures were necessary to maintain political relevance on the political stage. One major measure was taking over the security operations for U.S. facilities on German sovereign territory that relieved U.S. forces in place and allowed U.S. forces availability for other commitments around the world. Similarly, more German military responsibility in Afghanistan would enable U.S. Central Command to make U.S. forces capabilities available in other AOR. This is important to understand in order to comprehend the internal and external political sensitivity of all actions conducted in preparation of the German PRT mission.

⁴⁵ Note: Here again it is imperative to state, that this monograph expresses the author's opinion and not the German government's.

After multiple reconnaissance and fact finding missions by German teams with interagency participation from June to September 2003, the German government developed a “German Afghanistan Concept” on September 1, 2003 representing an German interagency approach to support the reconstruction in Afghanistan not only within Kabul, but also throughout Afghanistan. One essential element of this concept was to take responsibility of the PRT in Kunduz as a pilot PRT for ISAF, nested into a NATO long-term strategy for Afghanistan. After receiving the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1510 on October 13, 2003 and the NATO decision on the expansion of the ISAF operation, the German government approved (October 15, 2003) and mandated (October 24, 2003) the deployment of German troops to Kunduz to establish the first ISAF-led PRT in Afghanistan.

The Operational Planning Environment

The operational planning environment consisted of four major factors: first, the absence of a design and concept of operation; second, the politico-social, economical, and geographical environment in Afghanistan; third, the primary Afghan and coalition elements in this specific region of Kunduz; and fourth, the main political and military elements in Germany.

The absence of a design and concept of operation combined with vague political guidance and the high political sensitivity, presented a major challenge for planners at the operational level. Any written word in briefing presentation or operational guidance, in German as well as in English, had significant political impact nationally as well as internationally. This required two major performances from the operational planner. First, the planner had to develop a completely new interagency design outside the traditional military decision making model that clearly defined military tasks and missions based on vague guidance, heavily focused on exit strategy, and subordinated the military role to civilian reconstruction requirements. Second, the planner had to understanding the entire national and international system in order to approach the problems holistically and to anticipate second and third order effects. This challenged not only

the cognitive and interpersonal competencies, but also the deduction, synthesis, analysis, and induction skills. Foremost, intrinsic motivation skills and creativity were required.

The politico-social, economical, and geographical environment in Afghanistan challenged the planning processes due to their second and third order effects on various other disciplines. The politico-social situation in Afghanistan of 2003 was characterized by tribal and mainly local oriented structures. Afghan national institutions and organizations were not established to rely on for the reconstruction. Monopoly of power and loyalty of the security forces, which in our society lies in the hand of the federal government, was located in the individual regional warlords in Afghanistan. Human rights and Western values did not apply as they do for example in a European country. Hence, the training in the conduct of law enforcement was a specific challenge, since the law needed to be newly defined and methods to enforce the law needed to be restricted. An overarching socio-psychological challenge was to influence the people to accept that new type of law and order. Economically, Afghanistan relied entirely on external assistance. This economic help emerged very slowly and was very often attempted by mono-dimensional approaches. As an example, IOs and NGOs supported the province of Kunduz with a significant supply of wheat with the purpose to provide food to the people. Kunduz, however, was later identified as one of the major poppy producing areas during the reconnaissance tours. Further analysis of the situation showed that the delivery of wheat affected the price of wheat so significantly, that many farmers who used to grow wheat could not afford it anymore and shifted to growing poppy. As identified during the initial phase, the best help for Kunduz at that specific time would have been to subsidize the cotton industry, which existed there prior to the Taliban regime. This would have allowed the region, which is geologically favorable to cotton growth, to become at least partially self-sustaining. The geography of this region challenged the planning in four specific terms, of which the first two related directly to the economy. First, no infrastructure was established. The area lacked a capable transportation network, electricity, and a water-sewage system. Second, the geological and climatic environment

limited the growing of specific plants and agricultural products. Third, the regions for which Germany assumed responsibility were characterized by severe geographic restrictions on ground movement and communications. Many regions were accessible only by air assets and units in those regions could only be reached by satellite communications. This had specific impact on emergency and contingency plans. Fourth, the region was separated from the southern part of Afghanistan and her capital Kabul by the mountain ranges of the Hindukush. This generated multiple operational challenges to include the very limited mountain passes through this natural obstacle, long periods of impassibility during the winter months, and the high altitude limitations on helicopter flights that limited the movement of supplies, support, and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). The entire supply and MEDEVAC system for the German forces in Afghanistan needed to be redesigned. All these politico-social, economical, and geographical challenges came together on the operational planner's level since abstract concepts needed to be developed and published as realistic orders and guidance for execution. Those problems challenged specifically the cognitive and interpersonal competencies as well as the previously mentioned skills since understanding and anticipating second and third order effects were just as crucial as finding solutions by communicating with all other players involved in this process.

The primary Afghan and coalition players in this specific region of Kunduz were the provincial governors, police chiefs, intelligence chiefs, mayors, religious leaders, and the former local warlords on the Afghan side, and the coalition forces, embassies, and NGOs on the other side. The main point of contact in the region of Kunduz was the former northern alliance General Daoud. This was a very delicate issue because on the one hand, warlords were not considered official authorities to negotiate with, but on the other hand, hardly anything could have been done without buying him in first. Well knowing the political power, position, and ambition he bore; it was more beneficial to have him sitting at the negotiation table than intimidating him and having him as a political and military counterforce. The leaders of the coalition forces fighting the OEF fight were extremely skeptical of the ISAF approach since neither was from their point of view

the PRT concept robust enough, nor was the chain of command under which the German PRT worked transparent enough to them. The reason was that, as explained earlier, the military element of the PRT sees itself as the security contribution and as an enabler for the interagency elements. Therefore, a double-headed leadership led the German PRT: an embassy official and a military commander. The military commander was responsible for all security assistance and military issues, while the embassy official was responsible for the governmental and institutional reconstruction of the region. This two-man team consequently made all decisions in very close coordination and synchronization. This command structure, based on cooperation and consensus, was out of the OEF mindset and generated endless ‘what-if’ questions pertaining to the practicability of this approach. The embassies in Afghanistan represented the respective national positions. In order to gain a broader basis of legitimacy and burden sharing, the German government decided to offer other nations participation on the German PRT. It was therefore crucial to convince all interested nations that the concept was sound and worth supporting. The German embassy in Kabul was the political decision maker in Afghanistan. For Kunduz the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs decided to establish a separate embassy outpost to have direct impact on the events in this region. Close coordination between the ambassador in Kabul and the embassy official in Kunduz was a key prerequisite for success. Dealing with NGOs and IOs such as the U.N. was very critical since they were the main contributor for success if their actions were coordinated and harmonized. NGOs depended on donations in their home countries and sought to “show their flag” to ensure sufficient support from their nations. Both entities, NGOs and IOs, are very skeptical and sensitive towards any military involvement in their business. Extreme sensitivity existed in negotiations and in the conduct of operations, specifically in the conduct of active reconstruction work. The interaction with the primary Afghan and coalition organizations and leaders in this specific region of Kunduz challenged not only the cognitive competency in term of knowing the facts and the background, but also the interpersonal

competency to communicate with those entities understanding the cultural and intentional differences and nuances.

The fourth group of focus consists of the main political and military players in Germany. Politically it was crucial to include the involved governmental interagency departments that were involved in the PRT process. Those were, in addition to the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Interior responsible for the reconstruction of the police forces, and the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development responsible for the social and economical development. One of the important questions, which never became a real problem, was the determination of who would fund which measures, assets, or capabilities. Within the Ministry of Defense, the main players were the services, the specific branches, and the Joint Divisions within the German Operations Command fighting for their interests and crucial requirements. Naturally, every entity was aiming for the golden solution to meet the anticipated challenges, which had significant impact on the size of the PRT in terms of personnel strength. Since the mandate, given by the Government was topped at a maximum strength of 450 soldiers, hard negotiations and a wide range of creativity was necessary to meet all interests and requirements. Legal constraints such as security requirements, however, set limits and significantly restraint the developed options. At the crucial discussions on safety and security issues, every decision boiled down to the question of ‘who will be responsible if something happens’. This entire dynamic challenged the cognitive and interpersonal competencies, as well as the intrapersonal competency since many proposals for decisions made by the planner for the commander involved ethical issues and questions of responsibility for the lives of the deployed soldiers.

The German PRT – An Overview

This section will very shortly describe the German PRT concept to complete and ensure an understanding of the entire context of this research. As already mentioned, the German PRT

was under ISAF control and involved four different ministries of which the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense were in lead. While the military contingent was responsible for the security assistance, the civilian component was responsible for the reconstruction issues, which required close synchronization. More specifically, the civil mission was to “Support and promote reconstruction in the four Northeastern provinces with own [German] financial and material means”⁴⁶ and “Focus at strengthening the authority of the central Afghan government, promotion of political-administrative structures and the rule of law, strengthening of democratic institutions, and implementation of medium- and long-term reconstruction measures.”⁴⁷ The military mission was consequently nested and stated as: “Deploy a German contingent as military element for the PRT-Pilot Project Kunduz to be prepared to: ensure force protection for the PRT and its civilian reconstruction work, support the improvement of security and stability within the Kunduz area of operation through confidence building measures (show of flag and liaison with provincial authorities), support the Disarmament-Demobilization-Reintegration-(DDR)Process, support the Sector-Security-Reform (SSR), support the Afghan National Army (ANA) training for ANA to be deployed in the Kunduz region, and to support the 2004 elections.”⁴⁸ In praxis, this mission lead to military activities such as liaise to decision makers and opinion formers, monitor security situation and the DDR-process, support the SSR, e.g. DDR and ANA training, gather information to become regional expert, identify quick impact projects and forward them to IOs and NGOs or conduct them where necessary, conduct Information Operations, and protect the force. In order to accomplish its mission in this isolated and non-contiguous environment, the military contingent had to have a wide range of capabilities such as operational capabilities (force protection, presence, liaison, intelligence, information and psychological operations, evacuation,

⁴⁶ Source: Unpublished working draft of the German PRT concept as agreed on by all national participating agencies in September 2003, including specific responsibilities and tasks to the agencies. Note: Emphasis by the author.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

air control), logistical capabilities (infrastructure, supply, maintenance), command, control and communications, medical service, aviation (specifically for MEDEVAC purposes) and other capabilities (press and information, cultural advice, legal advice, pastoral care, etc.).

The developed force package, based on those capability requirements, was however very slim and relied heavily on support based in Germany. The Information Operations element for example was very small and focused on collecting information, assessing the target audience and sending this information via satellite communications back to Germany where the programs and messages were produced. Those products were then sent back to the contingents and were ready for transmission or distribution. The main elements of the military contingent of the German PRT was the command group element at Kunduz consisting of the commander, his chief of staff, a legal advisor, a cultural advisor, the Press- and Information Officer, the Provost Marshall and the Chaplain. The headquarters element consisted of a personnel, an intelligence, an operations, a logistics, a civil-military-cooperation, an administration, and an infrastructure element. The main body of the contingent consisted of an infantry company, a medical treatment facility⁴⁹, a combat service support company, a military police platoon, an engineer (quartermaster) platoon, an information operation / psychological operations platoon, an explosive ordnance platoon, a signal platoon, a human intelligence platoon, and finally, an aviation element which was stationed in Termez, Uzbekistan about 60 minutes in flying time northwest of Kunduz.

The complex command and control requirements of the German PRT, as a German entity responsible for local and regional interagency steering-group-meetings, reported to an Interagency-Steering-Group in Germany that was established on the ministerial level. The military contingent was ordered to coordinate its activities with the German contingent in Kabul and answered for national military issues to the German Operations Command, and for

⁴⁹ Note: This medical treatment facility was qualified NATO level 2, which includes the capabilities of a county hospital including surgeries of all kinds.

operational issues to ISAF.⁵⁰ ISAF was the representative for NATO in the Steering Group Meetings conducted on the Afghan national level. The coordination with OEF and its subordinate PRT was conducted on the national level (Steering Group on Afghan national level) since the missions and mandates of the OEF PRT and the German ISAF PRT were significantly different. This was not the optimal solution from a practical sense, but was politically necessary and was facilitated by direct coordination of desk officers of the respective commands.

Summary of Identified Tasks for the Operational Planner and the Required Competencies and Skills

This section will abstract the tasks identified by the author based on his experiences as the responsible operational planner for the German PRT. These abstracted findings will then be classified based on the competency-skill-framework, allowing the placement of potential competencies and skills on this mental map in order to compare them with the findings of chapter three.

From analyzing the German interpretation of PSO and nation building, four tasks stood out for the planner. The first task was, and this is valid for all PSO specifically under a U.N. mandate, to overcome oneself. For example, most actions once drilled into the soldiers for war fighting become counterproductive. Instead of covering and camouflaging, he has to show himself to enable 'show of force'. Instead of being effective in the use of assets to destroy enemy elements, a sudden requirement may occur to assess and employ proportionality of force. For a planner those sudden contradictions can be 'massing effects' versus 'spreading the effects', or instead of taking action for the sake of efficiency, letting NGOs do the work in a probably much less effective way. Even more, he needs to conduct actions that are, from a conventional point of view, outside the classical military repertoire like demonstrating force, riot control, or mediation.

⁵⁰ Note: The German contingency was under operational command to ISAF.

This challenges not only the cognitive competency but also the intrapersonal and specifically the revaluation skill. Second, the nesting of one's own actions into the legal framework and staying under the legitimization umbrella is a critical ability even though it may not be necessary from a personal perspective. Politically it is necessary, and on the operational level, every soldier is subject to political matters. This challenges the intrapersonal competency and the revaluation skill. Third, the operational planner needs to understand that for many reasons, like legitimacy, exit strategy, or burden sharing, it is imperative to identify his own role. In this specific case, it was crucial to understand that the military was not the lead element, but only the provider of security and therefore the enabler for the civilian components. This requires a settled character and therefore a stabile intrapersonal competency with the ability to allow the revaluation skill to assess himself for the specific task. For this subordination along with the ability to conduct negotiations and mediations, this self-definition has to overcome the military 'win-loose' dichotomy and understand the long-term benefits of possible 'win-win' or 'tie' results. Fourth, by recognizing that every contingent is different depending on its mandate, mission, and AOR, the planner, and even more importantly the organization, has to understand that 'one size does not fit all'. Looking for old solutions in history may help to identify similarities and to identify useful patterns, but it may also help to understand differences about what will most likely not work and what needs to be developed anew. This requires a settled and broad cognitive competency with strong skills concerning deduction and synthesis as well as analysis and induction.

From analyzing Germany's way to Kunduz, three important requirements stick out. First, as the operational planner it was crucial to understand the political sensitivity of this entire process. This required planners to view specific issues from multiple perspectives and to choose a very careful yet precise language. Those two tasks challenged not only the intra- and interpersonal competencies, but also the cognitive competency, specifically the systemic understanding and the mastering of a language not solely in German, but also in foreign languages such as English. Second, the conduct of reconnaissance and fact-finding tours

challenged the ability to conduct operations as a member of a self-sustaining team requiring not only the military craftsmanship, but also the interpersonal competency of working as a team leader of a very heterogeneous group of individuals. A key ability for this specific task was the ability to learn quickly. These reconnaissance tasks therefore challenged the entire spectrum of competencies as well as skills. Third, the task to prepare decisions for the operational commander and provide significant contributions to the political decision-makers challenged the cognitive competency; especially challenging was the understanding of political processes, language and timelines. Even more importantly, it challenged the ethical and moral dimension of the interpersonal competency since every proposal made, and almost every contribution forwarded could have had significant impact on decisions over life. Sometimes the 'right' proposals were not the less work-intensive options.

Analyzing the tasks in connection with the operational planning environment, one can identify seven tasks and implied requirements. First, due to the absence of an operational design or concept of operation, it was critical to possess extensive creativity. This creativity seems to be an interactive mix between the deduction, synthesis, analysis, and induction skills based on a wide and flexible cognitive competency and an active intrapersonal competency. Second, all developed concepts and plans required holistic approaches as well as the anticipation of second and third order effects even outside the specific line of operation, as the wheat example has shown. The prerequisite for those actions is a well-developed cognitive competency and well developed deduction and synthesis skills. Third, the need of cultural awareness became quickly obvious, but more than just awareness of the host nation culture was the awareness of the planner's own culture with its biases. Cultural awareness is obviously more than just awareness towards different geographical or religious cultures, but includes also awareness towards other organizational cultures such as NGOs, the U.N., or the U.S. Army. Best equipped seemed to be the individuals with a settled self-awareness, cultural flexibility, and a basic positive charisma. Those qualities seem to base on a sound intra- and interpersonal competency and very well

developed synthesis and analysis skills. Fourth, the practical challenges in theater, for example planning an infrastructure project, were for the most part outside the professional ability range. It became imperative for the operational planner to know exactly what he did not know but at the same time to know who may know it. Therefore, this challenged the cognitive competency as well as the intrapersonal competency, but foremost highlighted the critical need for a well-developed revaluation skill. Fifth, the task to coordinate with and support NGOs and IOs challenged the understanding of how these organizations work and think. This required a well-defined foundation of their organizational issues for the cognitive competency. However, a second challenge in connection with this was more significant. It was the ability to discipline the planners' military mindset and impatience. Although some organizations may not work as efficiently as military organizations, it is important to pause at a certain point and be patient. It takes a comprehension of the fact that legitimacy and burden sharing has its price: efficiency. This is a great challenge not only for the cognitive and the interpersonal competencies, but foremost for the intrapersonal competency to keep everything, specifically emotions, under control. Sixth, as mentioned earlier, the ability to conduct negotiations, head conferences or meetings and to communicate with others from diverse cultures or organizational structures were critical. The most important reason for this is that the planner himself is not the warrant for a good design or plan. He depends on the contributions of all participants. The planner is only the enabler for creative and constructive discussions who holds all the strings and ties them together at the right spot and the right time. The interpersonal competency and his synthesis as well as analysis skills are therefore the key to his success. Finally yet importantly, many tasks were affiliated to basic military knowledge and abilities. This is worth mentioning since one may get the notion, that in PSO everything is more important than the classical military abilities. All competencies and skills sourcing our military craftsmanship are still equally necessary to survive in theater as well as to provide reliable results in the form of plans and orders to the troops.

In summary, we see by using the competency-skill-framework that the strongest challenges were to the intrapersonal competency and to the revaluation skill. Whatever task was assigned or challenge was met, it was critical to observe the planners' actions and to understand one's own role in the whole system with all effects one's actions may have. The intrapersonal skill was of high importance too, since a lack in ability or inflexibility to interact with others would negatively affect the quality of results. Interpersonal competency, however, clearly became more than just communicating between individuals. It was a broader set of communication skills that fostered interaction between organizations and cultures. The cognitive competency was challenged, but in dimensions that were not specifically trained or educated by the military system. An understanding and knowledge of specific areas, like how to develop an infrastructure concept, how to support an industry development program and so forth, were not immediately available and needed to be learned. Those two examples represent the key issue for the cognitive competency. It needs to be linked very closely to the intrapersonal competency and supported by the revaluation skill. The planner needs to identify exactly what he does not know, or where his cognitive weaknesses are. In a second step, he needs well-educated skills, primarily analysis and induction, to think multidimensional and to learn quickly complete new systems and issues. The ability to know how to learn is a supportive individual capability. Crucial for all the actions of an operational planner in a PSO environment, however, is energetic intrinsic motivation to generate appropriate results, a positive charisma to open and maintain interaction with others, and the intrapersonal strength to subordinate himself consciously to holistic systemic purposes and sometimes restricting legal circumstances.

The next chapter will now compare the identified educated, and the identified required competencies and skills using the competency-skill-framework to identify sufficiency as well as insufficiencies at the German General Staff Education, so that curricular recommendations can be developed.

CHAPTER 5

THE COMPARISON OF AVAILABLE COMPETENCIES AND SKILLS WITH THE REQUIRED COMPETENCIES AND SKILLS

The best tank is the one with the best crew.

- General Israel Tal, Israeli Armor Commander and Tank Designer

This chapter will compare the identified educated competencies and skills with the ones identified as required while working as an operational planner. The most structured way to do this comparison is to follow the competencies first and then to view the skills.

The Physical Competency

The analysis of both the available and the required competencies showed that the physical competency is a critical factor for conventional war fighting as well as for PSO. Although this seems to be obvious, it needs to be highlighted to avoid any misperception. Consequently, it is important to watch the selection and education process and not to lose view of this physical fitness aspect required to complement sufficient mental energy to do an officer's duties.

The Intrinsic Motivational Competency

Here too, comparison showed that the focus on this intrinsic aspect during the selection processes proved to be the key factor to generate the energy for designing, planning, and challenging obstacles during the entire process. This was specifically necessary where the planner met unknown challenges and faced a situation where "learning by doing" became crucial. It was this intrinsic motivation and the challenge that initiated the planner's actions. Consequently, it is critical for the education and the selection processes to maintain this focus on the intrinsic aspect as the internal engine. Since a planner works often independently, there may not be anybody motivating him, and he therefore has to generate this energy by himself.

The Intrapersonal Competency

The comparison showed that this competency is very closely linked and directly influenced by the previous intrinsic motivational competency. Furthermore, the intrapersonal competency is more or less the steering element of the generated energy and influences the interpersonal as well as the cognitive competency. This finding became obvious when the identified ‘learn-to-learn’ aspect had significant impact on the revaluation skill. The German General Staff Officer educational system strongly supports this competency. The education process stresses very clearly the importance of having morally and ethically integer character and promotes the importance of subordinating military means under political strategic ends. This enables the operational planner to locate himself in a system, to assess this system holistically, and to deduce, which role the military plays in the entire orchestra of the instruments of national power and NGOs. Consequently, we can conclude, that the focus on this competency can be confirmed. However, the German General Staff Course may improve the future planner’s abilities by providing some classes on modern philosophical, political, and systemic theories to enrich the cognitive competency and to provide a broader base of knowledge available for the intrapersonal competency.

The Interpersonal Competency

The analysis showed that by improving the ability to interact and communicate, to present results, to be culturally aware and flexible, and to network and lead peers proved to be sufficient for the required abilities. It became clear that the major challenge for the operational planner is to communicate ideas, to mobilize knowledge from others, and finally to synthesize and present it in an appropriate way to either his superiors or other organizational or social cultures. In terms of cooperation, the planner is the enabler for success and needs to be ‘the spider in the net’ making sure that the subject matter experts do not loose the aim of a project. However, this competency could be optimized considering the findings from chapter four. This analysis

identified the need to head working groups and conferences, to mediate, and to network with your peers. A stronger emphasis or a class clearly addressing the specifics of these issues would highlight the importance to the future planners and would enable them to prepare themselves not only mentally but maybe also practically through exercises on these challenges.

The Cognitive Competency

The comparison of educated competencies with the required competencies identified for the cognitive aspect as the major challenged competency. Although the educational and selection system for German General Staff Officers is holistically designed, it is predominantly a military professional course. More specifically, the course focuses on conventional war fighting abilities with some address to PSO and evacuation operations. Military professional craftsmanship is essential to all actions, and must expand situational awareness beyond a narrow viewpoint of military combat and related tasks. Today, military education must include readiness for interdepartmental, interagency, and coalition operations. In Afghanistan, the military contingent was not the lead component of the mission; the military role was rather supportive than decisive. Facing those additional challenges, teaching additional political, social, and organizational knowledge supports the already educated knowledge; for example, a more specific knowledge of the organizational cultures, functions, mechanisms, and structures of other systems such as NGOs would have improved cooperation among functional components. Additional classes on social, political, psychological, philosophical, and operational theories would have provided a broader base of knowledge for PSO.

Further analysis indicates that adding subjects to the curriculum will require priorities of effort within a finite amount of course time. A practical proposal therefore may be to integrate critical learning objectives into the standard course, and offer selected topics elective courses. This method can link the competencies consciously together, improve the ability of the officer to identify operational areas for required professional development, and allow freedom of action to

shape a self-developmental electives program to complement the standard course. It comes therefore back to ‘learn-to-learn’ as an autarkic system.

Summary of the Competency Comparison

In summary, it is a valid conclusion that the German General Staff Officer educational system as a whole meets the key needs for future operational planners. This is possible through the nesting within the general educational and selection processes. The earlier mentioned metaphor of looking for the ‘seed’ that already contains all necessary genes to become a ‘tree’ is a valid picture for selecting officers not only based on their past performance, but also by the competencies they possess that are necessary for future duties.⁵¹ The small group or seminar approach of the FueAkBw, which enables the director to observe and assess every officer individually during a two-year period and gain a holistic view about his potential, supports this process. This potential will be stated very clearly in his efficiency report.

The General Staff Officers Course must maintain a focus on the intrapersonal competency and its link to the revaluation skill based on a strong intrinsic motivational competency. This intrapersonal competency seems to be the key player in this orchestra of competencies since it influences all other competencies and guides them to include their impact on the skills. The intrapersonal competency is the regulating competency for ‘learn-to-learn’ since it initiates the interactive processes between the above-mentioned competencies and skills. In second priority, the educational system needs to maintain the interpersonal competency to enable the planner to interact and to be effective as a designer, facilitator, and enabler. The interpersonal aspect needs to be understood in a broader context. Interpersonal competency needs to include inter-organizational and inter-cultural competency since it proved to be crucial not only to interact with individuals, but also with other organizations and cultures.

⁵¹ Note: This approach can be supported by the results of Emil Kluever et al. in *Striking a balance in leader development - A case for conceptual competence*, National Security Program Discussion Paper Series 92 – 02, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1992.

One more finding needs address. Both the intrapersonal as well as the interpersonal competency generate and source the phenomenon of positive charisma. Although a system cannot teach this ability, it may be part of the selection process and may be reinforced by the educational processes.

The Revaluation Skill

The revaluation skill proved to be connected to the crucial competencies and to be a critical skill since it enforces self-reflection. This self-reflection and relocation on the socio-mental map enables the planner to identify his own shortcomings of awareness, abilities, or knowledge, and helps him to readjust his mental settings. Self-discipline generated by the intrapersonal competency is crucial also. This skill enables the planner not only to regulate his own mental and cognitive functions, but also to put himself in a meta-position. In PSO and acting as a military assistance force, he is the impartial facilitator for other agencies or organization. Specifically here, classes and practical exercises may help the planner to experiment on his ability to mediate as an impartial party in an academic environment. The revaluation skill enables the individual to put himself in a meta-position which favors simultaneously the planner's ability to look holistically and systemically at complex problems. Consequently, the educational system must select officers that possess this skill, and promote the officers' ability to professionally develop themselves to an acceptable level of proficiency.

The Deduction Skill and the Synthesis Skill

The analysis showed that the educated abilities for the deduction and synthesis skills met the requirements. Specifically the flexibility and readiness to think outside of the old patterns, promoted by the methodical setup of the German General Staff Officer Course, proved to be very successful abilities for PSO planning on operational level. Professional military abilities and patterns for deduction and synthesis to include practical application worked very well, but needed

to be modified by the planner. This was made possible by having a broad basis of possible planning and designing processes available at the cognitive competency. It may be helpful to improving the efficiency of planning 'out-of-the-military-box' solutions if a broader knowledge of social, political, psychological, philosophical, and operational theories were available at the cognitive competency. This broader knowledge creates a broader range of available patterns. Paired with the ability of holistic and systemic thinking, and assessing second and third order effects, an ability can develop which is best described by creativity. A planner, being fixed to old and inflexible methodologies either by his cognitive abilities or by the system he is working in, will not have the creativity to design and plan operations in the new and future operational environment. This is specifically true for the synthesis skill, where the practical application is the critical action.

Another finding was that the planner's mindset was not blocked by a dichotomist 'win-loose' mindset. The ability to comprehend and appreciate 'win-win' or 'tie' solutions, based on the education during the General Staff Course, made it easier to conduct and steer negotiations on all levels.

The Analysis Skill and the Induction Skill

A comparison of the findings shows that analysis and induction were not as challenged during the educational process and during the work in a conventional scenario. The education process tends to substitute these two skills by teaching methodologies for analysis and by providing solutions. The conventional war-fighting scenario required only standardized versions of analysis patterns such as standing operational procedures or processes. In PSO however, neither is the case. The education of General Staff Officers must improve their ability to analyze and assess situations, not only holistically and systemically, but also in a multidimensional realm. An education on problem solving methods that includes theories as well as practical exercises

may be useful, especially if combined with some experience with NGOs or other organizations which are considered from a military perspective as probably not as effective as the military.

Summary of the Skill Comparison

Summarizing the results of the comparison of the skills, the German General Staff Officers Education is principally meeting the requirements for PSO. However, as already recognized during the competency comparison, this education cannot be isolated from the entire education and selection processes. The education of General Staff Officers relies on a sound and balanced set of skills which are approached holistically. Of course, the dominating military skills for conventional war fighting is understood as only a part of the entire learning process.

The educational approach recognizes that all skills affect each other as well as influence the competencies. The holistic approach needs to be maintained. Three identified issues however are challenging the system. First, as mentioned above, is the necessity to broaden available analysis and induction patterns to enable the planner to react quicker and to bring the observations into the appropriate perspective. Second, it is not only important to select and promote individuals with a basic ability for creativity, but also to facilitate the improvement and development of this creativity. Third, the education at the FueAkBw was, at least during the time the author attended this course, limited by conventional operations and pure PSO as well as by artificial scenarios. The limitation on conventional operations and pure PSO does not allow any education on counterinsurgency or counter-terrorism operations. At least operational education on counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations are necessary to enable the officers to cope with challenges they may face in later deployments, specifically when those are multinational deployments. This does not automatically mean that the German Armed Forces should conduct those operations. The limitation of artificial versus real world scenarios does not allow gaining knowledge of a specific region or working with real world data and challenges, but creates artificially generated complications that will very likely lack credibility. For obvious reasons,

political implications and restrictions are the sources for those limitations, however it seems to be, not only realistic and practical, but also necessary and within the responsibility of the Armed forces to prepare their future planners as good as possible for those potential future challenges in order to be relevant.

In conclusion, the comparison of available versus challenged competencies and skills show that the current FM 22-100, 1999 does not reflect the current educational environment when it states on page 1-1: “General of the Army Douglas MacArthur in a 1962 speech ... [put it] into a few words that are as true now as they ever were: ‘[Y]our mission ... is to win our wars ... [Y]ou are the ones who are trained to fight. Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory; ...” On the one hand, the contemporary military needs to achieve more than just winning a battle by fighting, and on the other hand we need to redefine the term ‘winning’ as we look for long term solutions.

FM 27-5 as of 1947 already identified general skills⁵² required for personnel encountering PSO. It identifies which levels of personnel require specific capabilities and skills. Staff officers, according to this manual, require specific skills such as knowledge in finance, civil administration, economy, etc. Although this manual formulates those skills as preferred recruiting requirements for such personnel, it shows clearly the importance of early comprehension of non-military or holistic abilities for PSO. Nowadays staff officers therefore should have at least a sufficient basic understanding of all of the disciplines⁵³ mentioned in this chapter.

The final chapter will now draw conclusions and make proposals for the German General Staff Officer Course by transferring the comparison results into recommendations.

⁵² Note: In order to stay coherent during this work, using the competency-skill framework, the appropriate term would be ‘ability’ instead of ‘skill’.

⁵³ See: Department of the Army, *FM 27-5, Civil affairs military government*, Washington, DC, 1947. p.45ff.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON FINDINGS

The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards.

- Sir William Francis Butler⁵⁴

More than ever, a clear differentiation between training and education becomes important, if we use both terms exclusively. While training describes the learning and internalization of specific abilities in depth in order to learn how to do the right thing, which means how to operate correctly and how to accomplish certain missions, education establishes breadth and variations of abilities in order to learn why to do the right thing and envisioning uncertainty. In order to follow a holistic and humanistic view of education, this monograph therefore recommends viewing training as one element of education in order to deepen specific abilities within the entire spectrum of military operations. In terms of German General Staff Officer development, this monograph recommends to maintain the focus on education rather than training. A crucial ability we identified for not only General Staff Officers is to know how to learn. Once this ability is developed, officers are able to identify deficiencies by themselves and focus their self-initiated training on those issues. The contemporary and future challenges and requirements may not be new to the General Staff Officer. The question is not of ‘newly contemporary required’ versus ‘educated competencies and skills’. All contemporary and future requirements are and were integral requirements ever since officers had to plan and make recommendations for their commanders, but due to the situations of WW II and the Cold War, those requirements had not challenged the General Staff Officers intellect. The point is therefore only a question of stressing specific elements of education rather than inventing something new.

⁵⁴ This should, according to the former editor of *Parameters*, Colonel (ret.) Lloyd Matthews, be attributed to Sir William Francis Butler; See Kluever et. al., 1992, p.11

This final chapter will draw conclusions from the conducted analysis and comparison by transferring the identified results into recommendations. The chapter will follow three steps: First, by stating identified conclusions and recommendations for the physical, the intrinsic motivational, the intrapersonal, the interpersonal, and the cognitive competencies; second, by stating identified conclusions and recommendations for the revaluation, the deduction, the synthesis, the analysis, and the induction skills; and third, by distilling six specific recommendations for the German General Staff Officer education based on the previous findings.

Recommendations Focusing on the Identified Competencies

The analysis and comparison of the competencies led to the following recommendations by competency.

The results of this monograph confirm the approach on selecting and maintaining the physical competency and should be maintained as it is. The same confirmation is valid for the intrinsic motivational competency as the critical engine for any mental or physical action. The selection process needs to be rigorous and focused on the officer as a holistic individual, and the education needs to ensure that this intrinsic energy is linked to the revaluation skill.

Concerning the intrapersonal competency, the results of this monograph prove clearly that the moral and ethical focus founded on stress resistance are critical preconditions. The German General Staff Officer needs to make sure that he is life-long self-evaluating and maintaining his status. A clearer verbalized emphasis of this link to the revaluation skill may help future planners to improve the ability of individual self-evaluation, and improve their ability to extend this awareness toward organizational and cultural awareness, including the awareness of personal biases. This enables the General Staff Officers to identify the relevance of military operations within every operational environment or theater, understanding that under some circumstances the military is only the supporting and not the supported effort. This requires a continuation of the holistic educational concept as the FueAkBw is currently conducting it.

Concerning the interpersonal competencies, the German General Staff education needs to maintain the commitment toward open, critical, and tolerant discourse. This is connected to the previous conclusion to improve the ability toward awareness in a broader sense. Because of the small group of attending officers and the adult learner's approach of the FueAkBw, the importance of networking becomes obvious to the attendees by experiencing their dependence on communication and cooperation with their peers who share the same set of language, methods, and standards. This is a critical enabler for the planner. Two issues, however, require improvement. First, additional education on theory, techniques, and practical exercises for mediation and negotiation, specifically as an impartial third party, would improve the planner's ability to deal with those challenges in actual missions. Secondly and in line with the first issue, an improved education on establishing, controlling and coordinating work groups, conferences, or leading a group of peers would be helpful.

Concerning the cognitive competency, we come back to the identified dilemma between general humanistic education and specific military training because both require time and compete therefore on the curriculum. The results of this monograph recommend emphasizing classes on the earlier mentioned variety of theories, operational as well as political and philosophical, languages, and systems. The key is to establish a twofold meta-cognitive capability: Firstly, enabling the General Staff Officer to identify own intellectual shortcomings, to analyze them by himself, and secondly, equipping him with holistic and systemic knowledge providing mechanisms to compensate those shortcomings. In practical terms, this implies adding classes to the already filled schedule of the FueAkBw. The third subchapter will address this already mentioned dilemma in more detail.

Recommendations Focusing on the Identified Skills

The analysis and comparison of the skills led to the following recommendations by skill.

The revaluation skill seems to be the key skill that enables the officer, based on a well-balanced intrapersonal competency, to evaluate and adjust all of his own actions. This skill needs to be therefore in the center of the entire selection and education processes. Both processes, as described in chapter three, need to make sure that they promote the individuals with the highest ability to reevaluate and apply his or her mindset, decisions, and actions. The focus on self-discipline in particular needs to be stressed. For future planners, it may be helpful to have sound bases of theories and methods on self-reflection, and to expand this reflection to the organizational or cultural level to recognize their own biases.

This monograph states to recommendations concerning the deduction skill: First, the German General Staff Officer education needs to keep the holistic and systemic approach, and improve it by an enhanced education on theories. It becomes obvious at this point, how the improvement of skills is connected to the improvement of competencies. The deduction skill, for example, experiences strong improvement by an enhanced education of the cognitive competency as mentioned in the previous subchapter. Second, the identified mind-set determined by a 'win-lose' dichotomy, as identified in chapter five, limits the development of options in between any required decision. A shift towards a mind-set of possible 'win-win' or 'tie' options may contradict the established military tradition of thought, but may also open the required range of options for potential decisions within a PSO scenario.

The synthesis skill, as an extension of the deduction skill, offers some new opportunities in the practical world. First, the planner must practice specific issues prior to real mission situations. General Staff Officers need to practice specifically the role of an impartial mediator, as it will evidently be required in PSO. Second, exercise scenarios need to be capable of dealing with second and third order effects that confront the planner on operational and strategic level issues. Third, and most importantly, an improvement of synthesis offers an opportunity to develop creativity. Two specific measures will support this improvement: On the theoretical level -and here again one identifies the close link between a skill and the cognitive competency- a

broad cognitive basis of theories enables the General Staff Officer to establish flexibility by an increased number of available abstract patterns. On the practical level, exercise scenarios, which offer only broad and abstract political guidance, challenges the General Staff Officers to develop and exercise creativity. This should motivate them positively to be creative in future positions.

Concerning the analytical skill, an extension of analysis patterns may be helpful. The trained military analysis and decision-making procedures are still critical for all military officers, but when dealing with NGOs or other organizations, civilian or non-military analysis and decision-making procedures may make the planner more interoperable with these organizations. Teaching other organizations' procedures, to include their specific civilian needs and interests will develop an appreciation of the benefits for having those organizations within the area of operations for PSO as well as for war fighting missions.

Conclusions concerning the induction skills are principally the same as the ones for the deduction skills. Enhancing the cognitive competency with theories offers a broader variety of abstract induction patterns and facilitates the conduct of any autonomous inductions in the uncertain future. Both, analysis and induction skills need to be maintained or, wherever possible, improved to ensure the General Staff Officer is enabled to learn autonomously in the future, once confronting multidimensional, holistic and systemic challenges.

Specific Recommendations for the German General Staff Officer Education

In summary, this monograph offers six specific recommendations for the German General Staff Officer Education based on the experiences as an operational planner for a PSO.

First, the selection processes, the German officer education, and finally the German General Staff Officer Education prepare officers very well for future assignments as an operational planner. It is important to acknowledge that the first two elements, selection and officer education, set crucial precondition by viewing individuals holistically and promoting soldiers that already possess the seeds of all mentioned competencies and skills. A complete new

creation of any competency or skill within a character is rather unrealistic, leading back to the ‘seed-tree’ analogy as described in chapter three.

Second, it is critical to keep the focus on the intrinsic motivational and the intrapersonal competencies as well as on the revaluation skill since these three factors are critical for establishing integrity in character and a self-learning individual. The contents of the cognitive competency may need some readjustments toward a broader theoretical basis supported by controversial discussions in order to enhance the variety of abstract patterns for all affiliated competencies and skills. Improving these abilities may serve as a basis for creativity required urgently for an operational planner. He is not only a provider of tasks and resources but also more importantly a designer with very vague guidance and a facilitator for the specialists. Here is the point where interpersonal competency and synthesis skills come to the forefront in application.

Third, the objective for the German General Staff Officer Course, as cited in chapter three⁵⁵, needs to be revised to not only orient toward current challenges, but also toward potential future global challenges. This leads directly to the next recommendation.

Fourth, the curriculum should try to incorporate counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, and to exercise learning objectives based on real world scenarios. The author is well aware of the political sensitivity of this proposal. Implementing those topics into the German General Staff Officer Course curriculum does not automatically imply that German Forces or General Staff Officers will participate in such operations. More importantly however, it necessarily enables German planners to understand the ongoing operations of collocated or adjacent allied formations and to de-conflict own forces’ operations within this multi-spectral environment.

⁵⁵ “... to enable the officer to accomplish tasks within General-/Admiral-Staff Duties on strategic, operational, and tactical level, on the full spectrum of the forces’ tasks, including basic peacetime tasks of the German Armed Forces, in national as well an international environment, under considerations of the social developments, of efficiency requirements, and of the approach to focus on joint capabilities, in a self-reflecting, independent, responsible, and competent manner.”; See: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Lehrplan fuer den nationalen Lehrgang Generalstabs-/Admiralstabsdienst 2004, Hamburg, 2004. p.6

Fifth, the Leadership and Management Department (LMD)⁵⁶ should continue to revised the contents and the actuality of the taught theories and methods. Since this department is the responsible faculty element within the FueAkBw to provide the classes concerning leadership and management, it is the agent to develop the identified intrinsic, intrapersonal, and interpersonal competencies as well as the revaluation skill. More precisely, the used theoretical framework, used by the LMD applied to the Conceptual Competency-Skill-Framework. In a next step, the curricular contents should be structured according to the framework and should be used as a basis for all other contents of the two-year curriculum.

The sixth recommendation addresses the previously mentioned dilemma that the majority of proposals imply an addition of contents to the curriculum. Therefore, evaluation of the curriculum is necessary to identify potential to generate curriculum time or alternative methods for an implementation of previous recommendations. The recommendation, based on this monograph and the experiences as an operational planner is to cut parts of military classes that go too much into detail, like branch information, and keep breadth over depth. Although the planner needs to understand and assess the capabilities and limits of military branches and services, there is no need to spend too much time on branch specific and technical content. As mentioned in chapter three, the education of General Staff Officers does unacceptably not continue once graduated from the General Staff Officer Course. The Bundeswehr identified this shortfall and is currently developing a new set of education covering the post graduation time, including postgraduate courses and conferences. Alternative methods like network based distance learning or discussions to include internet-based chat rooms may support and enhance this postgraduate education. Those measures may not only ensure a continued update of even senior officers but also guarantee intellectual exchange and life-long learning for all German General Staff Officers.

⁵⁶ Note: The German term is: Fuehrung und Management (FuM)

In conclusion, if the German Armed Forces want to maintain relevance in the coming decades of the twenty-first century, the expanding leadership role of the German General Staff Officer as staff officer or commander for defines an essential educational requirement of the FueAkBw. The analysis of ongoing curricular adaptation indicates a positive trend to integrate observations and lessons of contemporary operational missions with a doctrine of critical reflection, creative reasoning, as well as a professional expectation of military decision-making with initiative and innovation. However, a challenging professional task remains. This two-year course at the mid-career point of a German General Staff Officer principally marks the last formal institutional education in military service often extending for 15 to 20 additional years of duty. Although operational experiences will provide opportunities to learn and improve professional competencies and skills among diverse military missions, this situational awareness and application is only one part of a comprehensive solution. Each officer needs to commit himself also to progressive professional self-development. The trinity of premier institutional education, operational experience and practical insight, and a dedicated life-long program for professional self-development, invigorates the military leader for emergent roles in national, regional, and global mission responsibilities. More importantly, this trinity fortifies the proven success of the German decision-making process. Institutional and operational settings enhance the art and science of military decision-making with theory, doctrine, and practice. Empowered leadership rises from a mutual trust in the competence and skills conveyed by institution and displayed in operation. Notwithstanding, the ultimate value of a conceptual competency-skill framework is the personal assessment, evaluation, and integration that results in professional learning and performance. In an ever changing, complex, and uncertain operational environment, the German General Staff Officer must recognize situational opportunities, seize initiative, and apply adaptive leadership with keen decision-making. The German General Staff Officer must have the professional competencies and skills that enhance *how* to think, act, and lead.

APPENDIX

Appendix A: Literature Review

The significant number of documents and books that exist about the German General Staff are history oriented and focus primarily on the German General Staff from the early nineteenth century to the end of the Second World War. In exceptional cases, this older literature will be used to elaborate a historical background of the German General Staff. This literature will be used to support historical arguments for competencies and skills inherent to contemporary German General Staff Officers, to define what is understood as a “General Staff Officer” in the German context, and to understand the traditional skills selected and taught by the German General Staff Education. The main works considered in this monograph focus on are Trevor N. Dupuy, *A Genius for War, The German Army and General Staff 1807 – 1945*, New York 2002; B. Condell and David T. Zabecki, *German Art of War: Truppenführung (Art of War)*, Boulder 2001; James S Corum, *The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940*. Lawrence 1997; Joachim Fest, *Staatsstreich: Der Lange Weg zum 20. Juli*, Berlin 1994; Wolfgang Benz and Walter H. Pehle, *Lexikon des Deutschen Widerstandes*, Frankfurt am Main 1994.

Since this monograph focuses on current challenges for the General Staff Officer education, literature written mainly after 1989 and focusing on the modern General Staff will be examined. The current program of training from the German Armed Forces General Staff Academy provides the basis for analysis of actual education structure concerning competencies and skills. See Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, *Lehrplan fuer den Nationalen Lehrgang Generalstabs-/Admiralstabsdienst 2003*, Hamburg, 2003; *Lehrplan fuer den Lehrgang Generalstabs-/Admiralstabsdienst mit Internationaler Beteiligung 2004*, Hamburg, 2004; *Lehrplan fuer den Nationalen Lehrgang Generalstabs-/Admiralstabsdienst 2004*, Hamburg, 2004; and *Vortrag zur Neuordnung der Ausbildung der Stabsoffiziere in der Bundeswehr*, Hamburg, 2004.

The classification of competencies and skills presents a bibliographic challenge. A vast number of books and articles discuss skills and leadership skills. However, a consistent conceptual model or classification of skills is lacking. Most of the works are practical guides and checklists without any systematic and scientific foundations. Therefore, this monograph requires analyzing and applying fundamental works to elaborate a theoretical model of competencies and skills for military leaders. Such fundamental literature as D. A. Cruse, *Lexical Semantics*, Cambridge, New York 1986; Stephan Koerner, *Categorical Frameworks*, Oxford 1970; Emil Kluever et. al., *Striking a Balance in Leader Development - A Case for Conceptual Competence*, Harvard University 1992; Gary Klein, *Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions*, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1998; and of course where applicable Department of the Army, *FM 22-100, Army Leadership, Be, Know, Do*, Washington, DC 1999 serves as a starting point for classification of identified competencies and skills.

Since the average literature, however, uses the term “skills” generally synonymous with the term “leadership skills”, literature focusing on “leadership” or “leadership skills” will also be included to approach the topic from a broader perspective. The main sources for this monograph are Christopher Kolenda, *Leadership: the Warrior’s Art*, Carlisle, PA, 2001; Peter G. Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice*, Thousand Oaks, Calif., 2004; Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach, *Military Leadership, In Pursuit of Excellence*, Boulder, CO, 2000 and C. Brooklyn Derr, Sylvie Roussillon, and Frank Bournois, *Cross-Cultural Approaches to Leadership Development*, Westport, Conn., 2002. This monograph primarily focuses on the analysis of relevant leadership literature within the most recent 15 years. However, some exceptions are necessary in which older field manuals or works prove to be valid and reliable. To reduce the amount of literature, only sources focusing on skills specifically related to modern environment are used as primary sources. Such will be Lloyd J. Matthews and Dale E. Brown, *The Challenge of Military Leadership*, Dulles, Virginia, 1989; Paul David Miller, *Leadership in a Transnational World: The Challenge of Keeping the Peace*, New Hampshire 1993; and Bernhard Bass,

Transformational Leadership: Industrial, Military and Educational Impact, Mahwah, New Jersey 1998. Modern sources include internet sources as well as magazines, scholarly journals and government documents.

Current literature does not clearly differentiate between PSO, reconstruction, peacekeeping, nation-building etc. The primary sources are Gary Dempsey, *Fool's Errands: America's Recent Encounters with Nation Building*, Washington, D.C. 2001; Bruce R. Pirnie, and Corazon M. Francisco, *Assessing Requirements for Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Assistance, and Disaster Relief*, Santa Monica, Calif. 1998; Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario*, Carlisle, PA, U.S. Army War College 2003; Jon Bennett et al., *Meeting Needs: NGO Coordination in Practice*, London 1995; Department of Defense, *Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities*, Washington D.C. 2004 and the classified document by the Department of the Army FM 27-5, *Civil Affairs Military Government*, Washington, D.C. 1947. Although the later document is of an older origin and is officially declared "obsolete", its contents are still valid and of educational value for this monograph. The *Scroll and Sword – The Journal and Newspaper of the Civil Affairs Association* will be used to update those issues by a parallel analysis.

The German PRT, as operated in Kunduz, Afghanistan, is used as a current case study in order to identify the required skills for this kind of PSO. The primary sources therefore will be national documents, speeches, and public releases, supported by current open sources like internet (www.bundeswehr.de and www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de) and articles from magazines such as *Information fuer die Truppe – Zeitschrift fuer Innere Fuehrung* by the Streitkraefteamt, Informations- und Medienzentrale der Bundeswehr, and *Aktuell – Zeitung fuer die Bundeswehr* by Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Presse- und Informationsstab 3. National classifications on documents do not have a limiting impact on the use of specific national sources, since existing classifications are political and operational in nature and do not have a significant negative impact

on this monograph, as its focus is an identification of individual planner's competencies and skills. Despite extensive research, no published book, MMAS paper, or SAMS monograph appear to exist on this specific topic.

Although a vast number of documents and books exist on northern region of Afghanistan, only a selected number of those sources contribute worthy information for this work. These sources provide background information on environmental and cultural aspects, which then allow distilling required competencies and skills for the involved planners. Those are in first priority Cary Gladstone, *Afghanistan Revisited*, New York 2001; Antonio Donini, Norah Niland, and Karin Wermester, *Nation-Building Unraveled?: Aid, Peace, and Justice Afghanistan*, Bloomfield, CT 2004, and James Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, Santa Monica, Arlington, Pittsburgh 2003, supported by the *Foreign Military Studies Homepage* and Shaul Shay, *The endless Jihad: the Mujahidin, the Taliban, and Bin Laden*, Herzliya, Israel 2002.

In some cases, skills elaborated for German General Staff Officers will be compared with other educational concepts of education of general staff equivalent officers. For those cases, the respective schedules and open sources will be used, as well as, unclassified internet and public sources and works produced by those institutions of general character, such as for example Judith Hicks Stiehm, *The U.S. Army War College: Military Education in a Democracy*, Philadelphia 2002, and Robert P. Pellegrini, *The Link between Science, Philosophy, and Military Theory: Understanding the Past, Implications for the Future*, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 1997 will support those curricula and training plans.

In summery, this monograph will utilize a wide range of sources from very theoretical and scientific works to very specific and precise documents. The author's key performance in analyzing the literature therefore is to identify the specific elements contributing to this work and synthesis them into the coherent framework of a model for further leadership development in a field grade officer professional education approach.

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