



**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**CULTURAL TRENDS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BUNDESWEHR**

by

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June 2006

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE June 2006	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: Cultural Trends and the Implications for the Transformation of the Bundeswehr			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Klaus Brust				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) The aim of this thesis is to show that Germany has to enhance its effort to integrate and transform national forces into European armed forces, while it retains the core values of democracy amid a growing emphasis on cultural and ideological conflict. Ultimately this thesis will develop a model that maps out the political consequences of transformation and puts it into an educational framework for practical application in the ranks of the German armed forces and possibly beyond. Above all, it is about the integration of different national military cultures and traditions that are based on different national ideas of soldiering as well as the altered meaning of soldierly service in the period since 1989. However, when looking at the present day German armed forces, the lack of attention to cultural transformation is problematic. The neglect of the dimensions of society, politics and soldiers can cause a danger to the ongoing transformation of the Bundeswehr, not the least because of the problems of the past in German arms as well as the stresses and strains now faced by those armies most directly engaged in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. Taking the goals of the transformation of the Bundeswehr into account, this thesis will illustrate why the German armed forces still have to intensify their efforts for European military integration in the cultural dimension of society.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Transformation, Culture, Security, Trends, Education, "Innere Führung"			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 110	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

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TRANSFORMATION OF THE BUNDESWEHR**

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MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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ABSTRACT

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Professors Donald Abenheim and Robert Looney on the NPS for their support, kindness and help as thesis advisors. Moreover I would like to thank Prof. Wolfgang Royl (Emeritus) of the Bundeswehr University, Munich for sharing his knowledge with me. His ideas about education and military have always been a source of inspiration for me in my development as an officer and as a scholar of military pedagogy and organizational culture in armies.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE

Based on cultural developments and the integration of the European Union, this thesis will explore the impact of these phenomena on security in the German armed forces, while taking into account the constraints of the process of transformation and the goals of the European Security Strategy. The aim of this thesis is to show that Germany has to enhance its effort to integrate and transform national forces into European armed forces. Ultimately this thesis will develop a model that maps out the political consequences of transformation and puts it into an educational framework for practical application.

This thesis is an attempt to find answers to the question of how to make "Transformation" an educational issue of the organizational culture of the German armed forces and how to implement these reforms within the process of training and education of same. Above all, the present study is about the integration of different national military cultures and traditions which are based on different national concepts. So far in the process of European integration, the cultural transformation of the military has been more or less ignored by scholars and theoreticians--even if transformation is conceived as transformation of all members of the Bundeswehr and of the overall organization. However, when looking at the existing German armed forces, the lack of attention to cultural transformation is difficult to understand. It will not be possible to provide a satisfactory orientation toward the future of the Bundeswehr by staying within the limits of the tensions between the structural levels and their interconnections; rather, the social level(s) in these organizations needs to be of paramount importance. Taking the goals of the transformation of the Bundeswehr into account, and considering the necessity that military capabilities have to be adapted in order to meet the requirements of multinational operating

environment, this thesis will illustrate why the German armed forces still have to intensify their efforts for European military integration.¹

B. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS

1. Main Question

How should Germany respond to the cultural trends associated with the transformation of the Bundeswehr and security issues?

2. Secondary Questions

- What are the global cultural trends and their key variables?
- How will these global trends affect German security?
- What are the goals of the transformation of the Bundeswehr in the 21st century?
- How can the goals of the transformation of the Bundeswehr be turned into an educational issue for the organizational culture of the German Army?
- How will the transformation of the German armed forces be influenced by the development of the EU (RMA², equipment, training and organization), taking both threat assessment and cultural development into account?
- What are the measures or models that have to be used in order to mitigate these trends?

This thesis is based on multi-national security structures and multilateralism which follow a political rationale--a cornerstone of German security and defense policy as well as the organizational culture of the German armed forces for five decades³. The principles symbolize the will and the capability of the allies and partners for concerted military action, which makes interoperability in its widest sense a decisive factor of the transformation process of the German military. Multilateralism signifies more than just the establishment of technical, tactical and operational interoperability. Rather, transformation also includes cultural development and multilateralism. Consequently, interoperability

1 Reiner K. Huber (2002): "Armee der Zukunft: Trends und Folgerungen", in: Europäische Sicherheit, 1/2002.

2 Revolution of military affairs.

3 Rolf Clement, et al, 50 Jahre Bundeswehr: 1955-2005 (Hamburg/Berlin, 2005); Detlef Bald, Die Bundeswehr eine kritische Geschichte (Munich, 2005).

extends beyond the sphere of tactical operational concepts and requires the setting of common standards, in such a wide strategic sense.

The overall objectives for transformation of German armed forces should be military efficiency and optimization of benign social/cultural change (holistic transformation and/or future-oriented development).

The criteria for the considerations of the thesis are the European members of NATO, especially those in favor of a unified Europe. This issue, however, has implications for the extension of the institutions of Euro-Atlantic command, leadership, morale and obedience to a wider sphere amid the present crisis, as well.

The forging of a European military identity, then, should be an effective factor for bringing about the common will to secure a European confederation externally and internally. In the context of transformation, education to a common will would be the cultural answer to a changed security environment (changed face of war, technology, inward orientation), parallel to technological, conceptual and structure-related answers.

What is culturally significant is that many European NATO allies have for fifty years entertained an extensive security communications network, the interaction processes of which will be determined by the existing and future European tasks. However, despite a hesitant beginning in the era of the European Defense Community in the early-1950s, the allies have retained emphasis on particular national military principles and organizational culture in a way that may now, in the early 21st century, be ripe for change. Significant in terms of learning is not only military operational readiness, but also the ideal and objective of "leadership and civic education" - the citizen in uniform or Innere Führung⁴ - the development of an awareness directed toward Europe as a whole.

There is, however, the question of whether deepened military integration will entail concessions in the field of leadership and civil education.

⁴ The term Innere Führung cannot be translated into English. The best work on this idea in the English language is Donald Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces* (Princeton, 1988).

According to Royl (1998), in the context of the cultural development considered here, identity and professionalism need to be functionally differentiated (regular military forces versus mercenaries). The concept of leadership and civic education seems to be the proper context by which to approach this challenge in the spirit of the envisaged reform projects, as well as to deal with future questions in a productive manner.

Moreover, the armed forces of most European nations are presently undergoing a transformation process, in order to meet the requirements according to the Defense Capability Initiative of NATO, or to the ESDP of the EU. However, this transformation process, affecting equipment, technology, training and organization issues, collides with government financial requirements as future budgets are expected to be more constrained.

At the same time, this thesis will establish a link between education and the concept of leadership and civic education from a cultural perspective, to include the process of transformation, and present a model which will illustrate the development of a European military identity and intercultural competence. So, this thesis will argue that Germany has to enhance its cultural effort to integrate and transform its national forces into European armed forces.

C. METHODOLOGY

Since 1990 the German armed forces have been in a situation where the cultural circumstances of the organization have radically changed and those forces do not know how far the reorganization will go, nor to what extent and in what way the developments so far will continue to retain validity for an operational force. The Bundeswehr went from its cold war basis as an alliance army concentrated on the defense of central European NATO territory in the classical sense, to the extraordinary tasks of extending western ideals of security and defense in central and Eastern Europe via national unification. Thereupon, the Bundeswehr reinvented itself as an army for crisis intervention beyond the geographical limits of its customary defensive mission.

The "Cold War" was the center of gravity which, until the year 1990, forged the European armed forces together. This was the "guiding concept" at which the feasibility projections of the (inter-)national military met; it determined the way in which players were looked at.

The transformation of a complex organization of armed forces now requires considerably more coordinated inter-organizational effort. Particularities of the military mission and the size and diversity of the military organization mean that the identification of a modified (i.e., transformed) and "cultural" military capacity for performance and innovation, aimed at reducing complexity, clearly appear more difficult. To narrow this broad topic, the analysis for Germany will concentrate on the German military in Europe.

First this thesis will explore the implications for cultural trends such as values and religion. In the next step, these cultural trends will be applied to a threat assessment, in order to define the new challenges for European and German national security. Then, the goals of the transformation of the Bundeswehr will be introduced. Furthermore issues such as training and organization will be discussed.

Following the requirements of mainly multinational units and multilateral operations, the impact on the transformation of the Bundeswehr will be analyzed. In particular, the relationship between the development of the EU and European military leadership will be discussed.

In order to contrast the areas of tension, the next section will examine the impact of a declining Europe on the integration of cultural necessities in a military organization.

Based on these results and constraints, the further development of German and European armed forces will be apparent. Books and articles dealing with these issues support the argument. In order to predict future cultural developments, reports and statistics of organizations such as the CSIS, EU, IMF, OECD, RAND and UN will be used.

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II. CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

A. CULTURE

First this chapter will explore cultural trends⁵ globally, focusing on Europe in order to clarify the different trends. In the next step, these cultural trends will be applied to a threat assessment, in order to define the new challenges for European and German national security, specifically for the transformation of the German armed forces and the embedded concept Innere Führung.

In the present globalized economy⁶, the traditional concept of culture, which equates cultures to homogenous ethnic groups and considers individuals to be totally embedded and enclosed in their cultures, is no longer valid.⁷ In the pre-modern concept, cultures were rigid and tightly closed constructs which permitted only clashes⁸ as intercultural encounters. Today, such a concept is not only wrong, but also fateful and dangerous. The cultures of today are rather like liquids that mix together and generate very different combinations, accentuations, lifestyles, ways of thinking and orientations.⁹

Although cross-border cultural exchange and the change of cultures by external influences constitute no new phenomena, the various globalization processes have not only dramatically accelerated these tendencies, but also transformed them.

5 For the political meaning of culture as a term of art, see: Jacob Burckhardt, *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen* (Stuttgart, 1955); Jan Huizinga, *Gesichte und Kultur*, (Stuttgart, 1954); Norbert Elias, *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation* (Frankfurt, 1997).

6 Thomas Seibert, (2000): "Das Ende der »humanitären Neutralität«. Staatlichkeit, NROs und soziale Bewegung im globalisierten Kapitalismus", in: *ami*, 30. Jg., Nr. 5, Mai 2000.

7 Pauline H. Baker, (2001): "Internal War. Ethnic Conflict. Failed States. Small wars. Genocide. Ethnic cleansing. The Coming Anarchy." in: *The FfP Quarterly*, Vol. I, No. 1, April 2001, Washington D.C., S. 1 u. 7.

8 Samuel Huntington (2001): "Nein, kein Kampf der Kulturen", Interview in: *Die Zeit* 66/2001, retrieved 5/18/06 from www.zeit.de/2001/66/Politik/200166_s-huntington_int.html.

9 Wolfgang Thierse: *Das Zusammenleben der Kulturen in einer globalen Gesellschaft. Risiken, Gefährdungen, Perspektiven. Eine Ermutigung.* In: *Das Zusammenleben der Kulturen in einer globalen Gesellschaft : Congress of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung* on 3 February 1999 in Berlin / Akademie der Politischen Bildung. Bonn, 1999. Retrieved 5/27/06 from <http://www.fes.de/fulltext/akademie/00652002.htm#E9E3> [last accessed 4 June 2006], see also *Global Trends 2002*, op. cit., p. 138f.

The exchange between societies--which may be located far away from one another--is much more intensive than ever before; due to modern mass and communication media, cultural changes proceed much faster and in part more homogenously than in former centuries.¹⁰

The core of cultural globalization is the global establishment of capitalism with its values determined by *Zweckrationalität* (instrumental reason) as a cultural system.

At the same time, value systems like human rights or global environmental protection are not only made known, but also forced on a number of reluctant societies and their leaders.¹¹ Apart from its economically determined facts, this variant of globalization thus leads to a change of civilization time and again.¹²

Cultural globalization also means that, beyond the level of cultural differences, a new and additional global level of cultural community is developing or has already developed, one which has to be considered in the context of transformation--also in the meaning of transformation of the concept of "Innere Führung".¹³ This concept represents the intention to transfer rules of the society and values of the constitutional law into the German military.

Further, it means an exchange and interaction of this global level with cultures at local, regional and *national* levels. In this sense, the existence of a "global culture" can hardly be denied any longer, although its exact form and significance may continue to be disputed.¹⁴

The known symptoms are, for example: the standardization of consumption patterns (e.g., regarding soft drinks, fast food, and fashions), the

10 Global Trends 2002, op. cit., p. 135.

11 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (1993): "Internationales Umfeld, Sicherheitsinteressen und nationale Planung der Bundesrepublik", Teil B Band 1 – 3 / Teil C Band 1 – 12, Ebenhausen.

12 Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 146f and 150.

13 Joachim Krause (2002): "Komplexität heutiger Sicherheitspolitik", Vortrag auf dem Workshop "Szenariotechnik – Zukunftsforschung und strategische Sicherheitspolitik" am 27-28. Mai 2002 in Waldbröl.

14 Weltbevölkerungsbericht 2005. Retrieved 6/2/06 from www.dsw-online.de/kopf1/wbbericht/b_wbb2001_1.html.

globalization of mass communication (e.g., in the form of worldwide satellite television or the internet), and the "westernization" of music and other arts on the one hand and the simultaneous adaptation of foreign cultural elements in western art and popular culture on the other hand.

The fact that people in different societies with very different traditions increasingly listen to the same musicians, drive--or at least would like to drive--the same cars, and watch the same soap operas is both an economic and a cultural fact. TV and music are indeed highly lucrative economic assets and export products.

In addition to local and national cultures, a world culture seems to be developing that has a complex interrelationship with the local and national levels, but does not simply replace them.¹⁵ Depending on the point of view, this tendency is perceived as 'global village' or cultural imperialism.

The word *globalization* underlines how much centrality and decentrality complement each other today and form a unified whole without excluding each other.¹⁶

Fundamentalist movements in all religions and cultures of the world vehemently resist the advances of the modernizing civilization and the real or supposed threats posed to their own cultural traditions by cultural globalization.¹⁷

Fundamentalism is a paradox attempt to combat the cultural foundations of the modern age, i.e. pluralism and rationality, human rights, tolerance, openness and differentiation, with the means of modern organization, communication and weapons technology.¹⁸

15 Weltbevölkerungsbericht, p. 142-145.

16 Ibid., p. 189.

17 Central Intelligence Agency (2000): "Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts", Dezember 2000, Langley. Retrieved 5/27/06 from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/globaltrends2015/index.html>

18 In Huntington. Harvard-political scientist Samuel Huntington put forward the theory that the most important conflicts of the future will occur along the fault lines between different civilizations and culture groups. In his opinion, there is the danger of a struggle between the seven world cultures that each concentrate around one core state. America is the core state of the Western world. Retrieved 5/18/06 from www.zeit.de/2001/66/Politik/200166_s-huntington_int.html

As long as major ideologies (e.g., liberalism, socialism, communism and conservatism) meant hope and identification as sociopolitical projects and value-oriented political lifestyles to many people in our and numerous other societies in the world, culture and religion only seemed to play a minor role in public life. As the importance of these ideologies has faded, cultural and religious differences stand out more clearly as distinguishing features of groups and societies. The membership of ethnic, religious and cultural groups perhaps offers the last "natural" possibilities of collective identification and mobilization.¹⁹

Cultural factors will therefore play a growing role in international politics, since common agreement on desirable value-oriented objectives on the one hand requires intercultural dialogue.

On the other hand, these objectives are also determined by cultural forces and do not only result from practical necessities.²⁰

B. VALUES

German soldiers and civilians have debated for decades the meanings of both the ideal and the practical applications of "Innere Führung²¹". This exchange will be depicted in a detailed way in Chapter IV. In the context of cultural development and transformation, consequently, the implications of values will also be briefly introduced.

During socialization, values are acquired as abstract guidelines of human behavior.²² In concrete situations, they control the individual's perceptions, decisions and actions as object-related attitudes. A requirement for continued existence of a society is a minimum consensus on the values underlying the behavior of its members. In the long term, value systems are subject to gradual changes that gain acceptance in several phases. The phenomenon of non-simultaneousness is also noted here. The decisive phase in the current change

¹⁹ Huntington, Samuel.

²⁰ Global Trends 2002, op. cit., p. 215.

²¹ See Abenheim, cited above. More recently see: Paul Klein et al. Die Zukunfftige Wehrstruktur der Bundeswehr (Baden-Baden, 1997).

²² Jean Callaghan and Jürgen Kuhlmann, (Hrsg.) (2000): "The Military and Society in 21st Century Europe. A Comparative Analysis", Piscataway.

of values in Germany was the period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. The term *change of values*, however, is misleading, because it is not the values themselves that change, but the meaning attributed to them. There was a trend toward a decline of duty and acceptance of values²³, and a rise of self-development values²⁴.

At the individual level, very different combinations of values have developed.

The phenomenon of an increase in the cosmos of values within a society is therefore better described by the term *value pluralism*. According to Helmut Klages, the members of a society who combine the "good properties" of both the duty and acceptance values with the self-development values into a "synthesis of values" constitute the most interesting "human potential of a productive and progressive future development".²⁵

One aspect of value pluralism is the trend toward individualism, which describes a trend toward the development of progressive individual self-determination.

These shifts of value systems from disciplinary, self-denying and performance-oriented norms of the industrial society toward individual self-realization and quality of life are only one component of a major cultural change of structure.²⁶

The increasingly apparent shift from adherence to ethical standards, hitherto considered binding, toward unconcerned pragmatism and sometimes

23 Self-restraint and self-control: Reference to society: discipline, obedience, sense of duty, loyalty, subordination, diligence, modesty; reference to the individual self: self-constraint, selflessness, forbearance, compliance, abstinence. According to: Helmut Klages: Wertewandel oder Wertpluralismus? Von Pflicht- und Akzeptanzwerten zu Selbstentfaltungswerten. Retrieved 5/10/06 from http://www.orga.uni-sb.de/lehre/seminar/9798/Daniela/danys_KK/wertewow.htm.

24 Self-development: Reference to society: IDEALISM: emancipation, autonomy, democracy, participation, equality, equal treatment; reference to the individual self: hedonism: pleasure, excitement, variety; INDIVIDUALISM: self-realization, creativity, spontaneity, freedom. According to: Klages.

25 Klages.

26 Chancen und Risiken der offenen Informationsgesellschaft. Retrieved from <http://www.e-demokratie.at/kapitel3.html>.

hedonism also threatens the functional capability of the successful model of the *social market economy*.²⁷ As far as Germany is concerned, the objective of a more efficient and humane society can hardly be achieved if the trend toward passing on any tasks and problems to government authorities, associations and organizations continues.

Our structures are weakened due to the accelerating replacement of the *consensus of values* by value pluralism and the dwindling control function of values with regard to behavior. A finding by Adam Smith thus becomes relevant to the present situation again: "Values can only be realized, if the respective actors can expect advantages for themselves."²⁸

In this sense, the long-term critical dialogue concerning the implementation of human rights may be effective, since many governments can not afford in the long run to be criticized and to lose legitimacy in the eyes of their own population and the international public. Violations of human rights also affect the image of transnational combines and consequently business as well.²⁹

The asynchronism of the civilization process also leads to different value preferences of the actors involved that first must be recognized and understood, before a joint balancing of interests may be considered.

C. RELIGION³⁰

The share of atheists (who reject God consciously) and non-religious people (who are not interested in religion) declined from 18.9% to 15.1% of the world population between 1970 and 2001. A further reduction to 13.4% is expected by 2025. The percentages of Christians (33%), Hindus (13%) and Buddhists (6%) have remained relatively constant. The share of Islam is

27 Kiehl, Dieter Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft? Nach dem Ende des Wertekonsens. Das Parlament No. 8 / 16.02.2001. Retrieved 5/25/06 from http://www.das-parlament.de/08-2001/aktuelle_ausgabe/p-a-54.html.

28 Ibid.

29 Global Trends 2002, op. cit., p. 167.

30 see Burckhardt and Huntington (2001): "Nein, kein Kampf der Kulturen", Interview in: Die Zeit 66/2001. Retrieved 5/18/06 from www.zeit.de/2001/66/Politik/200166_s-huntington_int.html.

expected to continue to soar: 1970 - 15%, 2001 - 19.8%, 2025 - 22.8%."31 Islam thus constitutes the second-largest religious community in the world. Of the around 1.2 billion Muslims, 0.3% live in North America, 0.1% in Latin America, 1.3% in Europe, 28.6% in Africa, 4% in the former Soviet Union, 65.6% in Asia and 20% in other regions of the world. More and more people convert to Islam. It is actually "booming".

The very high population growth³² among Muslims must be kept in mind as one of the reasons for the expansion of Islam.

The demographic trend in the Islamic nations³³ thus constitutes an immense potential for further spreading of the Islamic faith.³⁴ While the share of children in Western nations is steadily decreasing, they make up between 40% and 50% of the national populations in North Africa and West Asia.

In the debate on the role of Islam in the events of 11 September 2001, four explanation patterns can be distinguished.³⁵

In the xenophobic explanation, Islam as a whole is suspect.³⁶ National, regional, cultural and theological differences are either unknown or ignored. Islam is considered to be a global threat to Euro-Atlantic civilization³⁷; terrorism is only the spearhead of mortal danger from the Middle East, accompanied by a "fifth column" (i.e., the Muslims in Europe). Every Muslim thus becomes a security risk.

31 According to D.B. Barrett and T.M. Johnson, lt. IDEA-Sp. 7'00/2,11. Retrieved 5/15/06 from <http://www.bak-punkt.de/archiv/204.htm>.

32 Statistics retrieved 5/15/06 from http://religion.orf.at/tv/lexikon/le_islam_heute.htm.

33 Johannes Kandel (2002): "Islam und Muslime in Deutschland", in: Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft Online, International Politics and Society 1/2002. Retrieved 5/18/06 from http://fesportal.fes.de/pls/portal30/docs/folder/ipg/ipg1_2002/artkandel.htm.

34 Weltbevölkerungsbericht 2001. Retrieved 3/2/04 from www.dsw-online.de/kopf1/wbbericht/b_wbb2001_1.html.

35 U. S. Center for Research & Education on Strategy & Technology - US-CREST (Hrsg.) (2000): "Coalition Military Operations: The Way Ahead Through Cooperability", Report of a French-German-UK-US Working Group, Arlington. Retrieved 4/22/06 from www.uscrest.org/finalrep.pdf.

36 Huntington.

37 Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Hrsg.) (1999): "Globalisierung – Informationen zur politischen Bildung, Heft 263", München.

In the pragmatic-political explanation, the assassins are described as political extremists and psychopaths. A distinction is made between the extremist political ideology of "Islamism" and Islam as a religion.

The forces of "Islamism" are fighting against "westernization". The relationship between Islam and Islamism is usually not made a subject of discussion. The terrorists are primarily anti-Americans and anti-globalists. They feel chosen to counter "global capitalism" as the main enemy of mankind. The leading nation of this capitalism is the United States who—in the terrorists' perception—is responsible for the misery in the Third World—in particular the mass impoverishment in Arabia—and support for Israel. The strong attachment of the assassins to their religion is explained in terms of individual or social psychology and referred to as insanity.

In the enlightened-secularist explanation, religion becomes the driving force of evil—it always contains substance for aggression and violence and even drives humans to make martyrs of themselves, the peak of religious insanity. Religion thus becomes a security risk for the secular, "enlightened" Western world. In particular, Islam offers Islamists and terrorists a wealth of starting-points and legitimations for their totalitarian ideologies.

According to the degeneration-related explanation, the terrorist have terribly exploited and violated Islam and thus separated from the faithful (*umma*). Consequently, they are no Muslims, but *nihilists* from a religious point of view. When they refer to the Koran, they take its passages out of context and distort their meaning.

There are authentic basic truths of faith shared by all Muslims in the world, according to which Islam is substantially a peaceful religion. Islam means commitment to peace, justice and the welfare of mankind.³⁸ In this explanation pattern, too, "Islamism" as an extremist political ideology is distinguished from Islam as a religion. Islamism is thus a degeneration of Islam; it uses the religion

38 Maximilian Benner (2000): "Weltpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert – Eine außenpolitische Diskussionsgrundlage." Retrieved 6/2/06 from www.homepages.com/compuserve.de/MaximilianK2000/weltpolitik21.htm.

cynically for political purposes. This thesis can now be considered to be generally accepted. The question is what religious interpretation patterns and theological conceptions, used by what groups and persons, permit a legitimation of violence and under what historical conditions such legitimation patterns are activated by some people.

All religions have their "dark side", but the conditions under which this side is revived are very different.³⁹ A generalization of Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Sikhism or modern destructive psycho-cults is not possible.⁴⁰ Instead, the various religions must be viewed in a differentiating manner to identify religious contents that can be used to instrumentalize and justify violence. In order to emphasize the fundamental peaceability of world religions, their leading representatives met in Assisi on 24 January 2002 and adopted a Decalogue for Peace.⁴¹ Under economic and social pressure in times of upheaval, with growing social polarization and discrimination, many people find support and consolation in their traditional religion.⁴² The danger of an increase in radical tendencies also grows with this development.

D. IMPLICATIONS OF CULTURAL TRENDS FOR SECURITY

It is a matter of debate whether groups or leaders refer to religious and cultural differences in a conflict in order to gain advantages for their own interests, or whether religions and cultures inherently promote conflicts, because they lack the essential basis for understanding. The world view created by the US political scientist Samuel Huntington, according to which an unavoidable cultural struggle within and between societies is to determine the fate of the 21st century, is about to become a new ideology in the period after the end of the East-West conflict. The theory has been adopted by groups throughout the world,

³⁹ Werner Ruf (1998): "Zur Privatisierung von Gewalt", gekürzte Version eines Vortrages von 1998. Retrieved 4/10/06 from www.uni-kassel.de/fb10/frieden/science/ruf-gewalt.html.

⁴⁰ Ian Pearson (Hrsg.) (1998): "Der Fischer Atlas Zukunft", Frankfurt/M.

⁴¹ At the meeting in Assisi, representatives of twelve religions and 31 Christian churches and communities declared their desire for peace and justice. In addition, they condemned war, terrorism and violence committed in the name of religion. See: Terror und Gewalt widersprechen dem Geist der Religion, in: Die Tagespost No. 29, 7 March 2002, p. 6.

⁴² Kandel.

and is increasingly used to justify and confirm culturally supported political power strategies.⁴³ But also the work in multinational units and particularly the necessary training for them is mainly effected by these trends.⁴⁴

Taking the goals of the European Security and Defense Policy⁴⁵ into consideration, the same argument works for the German military. Huntington⁴⁶ himself does not regard 11 September as an indicator for a clash of civilizations. He presumes that a clash of civilizations can and must be prevented by cooperation. Moreover it is the aim of Innere Führung, to establish the democratic governmental and social standards within the German armed forces.⁴⁷ As a consequence of this goal there are domestic military, domestic social and international implications of the global cultural developments.

In all parts of the world--in the developing countries as well as in the post-communist societies of Eastern Europe, but also in the democratic societies of the northern world-- various political actors seek to instrumentalize cultural differences for political goals of differing effect, often in a negative sense. Ethnic, religious and cultural affiliations are exploited to polarize groups.

In the disruptions of modernization, in particular if the threat of social decline, cultural uncertainty, economic hopelessness and failure of corrupt political elites coincide, many people consider political fundamentalism to be the only promising way of solving their existential problems.⁴⁸

43 In an essay published in the summer of 1993, Harvard-political scientist Samuel Huntington put forward the theory that the most important conflicts of the future will occur along the fault lines between different civilizations and culture groups. In his opinion, there is the danger of a struggle between the seven world cultures that each concentrates around one core state. America is the core state of the Western world.

44 Hans G. Ehrhardt (2002): "Die Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. Positionen, Perzeptionen, Probleme, Perspektiven", in: Demokratie, Sicherheit, Frieden, Bd. 142, Baden Baden.

45 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Fü S III 2 (2002): "Mit der ESVP zur europäischen Armee. Visionäre Ansätze zur Implementierung einer vitalen und leistungsfähigen ESVP," Berlin.

46 Huntington.

47 Jürgen Kuhlmann and David R. Segal (1994): "Armed Forces at the Dawn of the Third Millennium", in: Forum International, Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München.

48 Wolfgang Thierse, op. cit.

The fundamentalist "revolt against modernism" is thus mainly nourished by development crises and social frustrations that cannot be countered effectively with weapons. The "holy war" requires concepts of enemies that are presented in a religious context but have political, social and cultural-psychological backgrounds.⁴⁹

As a central political task, it is necessary to ensure that the cultural change continues to be bearable, controllable, open to discussion and reactive to the political wishes of the people, in consideration of the globalization processes. General Graf von Baudissin⁵⁰, the chief and "father" of the Innere Führung, already established this concept particularly within a European-Atlantic frame.⁵¹

Today it is even more important to develop effective political, cultural and religious alternative programs to militant fundamentalism: a modernization that is more than a "secularization" by which traditions are destroyed.⁵² By globalizing knowledge, scientific and technological developments accelerate secularization. Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism, however, reject negative modernization effects of secularization (such as materialism or consumerism). It therefore remains questionable how far a process of secularization can proceed without conflicts.

In sum, cultures or religions are not at war with one another.⁵³ They are used as a political weapon in international power struggles and as an instrument of mass mobilization. The overemphasizing of ethnicity and religion is an

49 Reiner K. Huber (2001): "Die Erneuerung der Bundeswehr: Anfang eines weitergehenden Umbauprozesses?" in: Europäische Sicherheit 4/2001, S. 25 – 29.

50 On Baudissin and his ideas, see Abenheim cited above. The context of the original German reform of soldier and politics as well as changed social setting unfolded in the Europe of the early 1950s. This era also saw the failed attempt to create the European Defense Community, with its mixture of western and central European military institutions.

51 Huber: "Armee der Zukunft".

52 Hans Küng: Islam – eine umstrittene Religion. Feindbild – Idealbild – Realbild. Retrieved 5/27/06 from <http://www.eidz.de/downloads/Islam.rtf>.

53 Zeev Maoz (Hrsg.) (1997): "Regional Security in the Middle East. Past Present and Future," Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv.

effective strategy and will be applied time and again. It is to be expected that future (armed) conflicts will also be ideologized in concrete crises for opportunistic reasons.⁵⁴

However, these cultural imaginations give free reign to terror, and the higher the level of ideologizing, the more victims are allowed.⁵⁵

In this connection, Kandel sees no alternative to a "secular democratic state and a civilian society in which various religions and cultures peacefully compete with one another, recognizing fundamental democratic principles of constitution."⁵⁶

Individualization as an aspect of value pluralism still has will have even more to be considered to a larger extent, in particular with respect to recruitment in the armed forces and the concept Innere Führung. As a matter of fact the potential of the concept Innere Führung is partly not only unused, it was even turned into its opposite. At least concerning the depicted cultural trends, the concept is supposed to be re-established in its original meaning and purpose. Therefore, it will become necessary to create a link between this particular German innovation and the level of the European armed forces as a whole.

Innere Führung proved itself in German unification; it has proven itself by its imitation in the enlargement of NATO and its example to other European armies. Innere Führung proves itself, fundamentally, in contrast to the various forms of organized violence for totalitarian ideological goals as well as chaotic forms of organized violence in the 21st century. The defense of the West can not rest on mercenaries, armed fighters for a faceless, malevolent global capitalism, or on the Special Forces fighter gone wrong and become a kind of uncontrolled, undemocratic group of interests. Innere Führung as the ideal of an army in a democracy must continue to play its role in the altered circumstances of the 21st century.

54 Cf. Global Trends 2002, op. cit., p. 141.

55 Cf. Wolfgang Sofsky: Zeiten des Schreckens. Amok Terror Krieg, Frankfurt am Main 2002, p. 95.

56 Kandel, op. cit.

III. TRANSFORMATION

A. CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

Other nations and armies beyond The US Department of Defence⁵⁷ are presently aware of the drastic changes in the global security environment in recent years, nor is the US DoD alone in recognizing that these changes represent the driving factor for the need to adapt the armed forces.⁵⁸

Consequently, the following chapter will summarize the rationale for the transformation process of the German armed forces, how the strategic level of the Bundeswehr defines its national level of ambition and how they derived the newly defined categories of forces in general.

Furthermore, this chapter aims to put some emphasis on the milestones Germany has reached so far and where it stands in the progress of its projects, including an overview of the following conceptual work. It will finish with some aspects of the vision of interagency interaction. So the main purpose of this chapter is to depict the organizational frame for necessary and possible modifications for the concept Innere Führung training within the German armed forces. Later on the focus will be on the training in preparation for the work in multinational units.

In recent years, Germany has witnessed a drastic change in the security environment.⁵⁹ The reorientation of NATO⁶⁰ and the European Union⁶¹ toward

57 U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century – Hart-Rudman Commission (1999): “New World Coming: American Security in the 21 st Century,” Washington D.C. Retrieved 3/24/06 from <http://www.nssg.gov/Reports/reports.htm>.

58 Wolfgang Fechner (2001): “Ohne die USA geht nichts – Ohne die Europäer auch nicht”, in: Europäische Sicherheit 3/2001, S. 10 – 13.

59 Jürgen Schnell (2001): “Allgemeine Entwicklungstendenzen im internationalen System.” Retrieved 4/2/06 from www.unibw-muenchen.de/campus/WOW/v1054/publikation/Zukunft%20BW/Entwicklung_2001.pdf.

60 U.S. Army (2001): “Concepts for the Objective Force“ (White Paper). Retrieved 3/12/06 from www.army.mil/features/WhitePaper/default.htm.

61 Holger Mey (2001): “Der Krieg war und bleibt ein Verwandlungskünstler – Welchen Bedingungen unterliegen die Konflikte der Zukunft?” in: Das Parlament, Nr. 10, 2001. Retrieved 5/25/06 from http://www.das-parlament.de/10-2001/aktuelle_ausgabe/p-a-35.html.

global crisis management⁶², as well as the considerable rise in the number of Bundeswehr missions (from Somalia to the Congo), have led to an increasing need for a fundamental transformation of German forces.⁶³ New challenges include: cultural developments, new forms of conflict (i.e., war against terrorism, small wars), new tasks (i.e., nation building, conduct of semi-police law-and-order functions, such as in the Balkans) and a high degree of joint operation and integration (multinationality), increased speed of technical, cultural and structural innovation (i.e., cyber war, network-centric warfare, digitalization of information).⁶⁴

The priorities in the Bundeswehr's spectrum of tasks have structurally been adapted by German makers of strategy—both civilian and uniformed—to the most likely future missions. Conflict prevention and crisis management, as well as support of allied partners, will be of top significance. This study will come back to this fact in the following chapter, when the necessary consequences for the concept *Innere Führung* will be drawn.

To address the changing security environment, this chapter recalls the “chain of events” that has led to the overarching aim to initiate a transformation process in the German armed forces. In the early 1990s, the Bundeswehr began to face more and more commitments outside Germany.⁶⁵ It is easy to imagine that these missions immediately constituted new challenges for the German armed forces—in terms of the types of mission as well as their geographic extension (1990 6,000 MBT, decision of constitutional court 1994).⁶⁶

62 Jens van Scherpenberg (2001): “Transatlantische Asymmetrien. Die USA als "benign hegemon"? Ein Angebot findet keine Nachfrage”, in: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, März 2001. Retrieved 5/18/06 from www.swp-berlin.org/fgs/06/tr-asymB.html.

63 Jan Vollert (Hrsg.) (2002): “Zukunft der Bundeswehr”, Schriftenreihe des Wissenschaftlichen Forums für Internationale Sicherheit e.V., Bd. 18, Bremen.

64 Edward Waltz (1998): “Information Warfare – Principles and Operations,” Boston/London, p. 7.

65 Ralph Thiele and Hans-Ulrich Seidt (Hrsg.) (1999): “Herausforderung Zukunft. Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik in und für Europa,” Frankfurt/M/Bonn.

66 Scherpenberg.

Culturally and structurally considered, the missions became more demanding.⁶⁷ The contingents to be sent abroad grew in size and the scope and the number of multinational-joint operations became more comprehensive. With respect to the most recent challenges, however, the German ministry of defence finally realized that they wouldn't be able to cope with these ever more demanding missions in an old-fashioned way. On search for a new mission for the Bundeswehr--derived from the experiences of ongoing missions and to be reached within a couple of years--Germany would fall short and be overtaken by events. Instead, a transformation process is required that will not lead to a predetermined final status to be reached within a certain timeframe, but will be an ongoing process of adaptation.⁶⁸ The overarching aim of the transformation is to improve the operational readiness of the German armed forces in a process step by step. With the "Defence Policy Guidelines" and the "Directives for Further Development"⁶⁹ these fundamental changes in German security policy environment have been taken into account.⁷⁰

Based upon these, the new concept of the Bundeswehr was signed by the Minister of Defence on 9 August 2004. It constitutes the basic document for the future Bundeswehr transformation process, mainly focused on structures and technology.

67 Hans-Christian Beck (1999): "Die Zukunft gewinnen," in: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, Stabsabteilung I 1 (Hrsg.), Reader Sicherheitspolitik 10/99, Bonn.

68 Martin Burke (2000): "Information Superiority, Network Centric Warfare and the Knowledge Edge." Retrieved 6/2/06 from www.dsto.defence.gov.au/corporate/reports/DSTO-TR-0997.pdf.

69 Roland Kaestner (2001): "Gedanken zu neuen Streitkräften," in: Griephan Spezial Wehrdienst, Bonn, 05/2001.

70 German MOD (ed), Defence Policy Guidelines. Retrieved 9/26/05 from http://www.bmvg.de/C1256EF40036B05B/vwContentBykey/N264XJA925MMISDEFile/030521_V PR-ENGLISH.pdf.

This new concept of the Bundeswehr defines the national level of policy, describes the important role of network-centric operations and defines the new force categories.⁷¹ Furthermore the general framework for the future force structure and the personnel body as well as the planning for new material and equipment is laid out.

With the new concept of the Bundeswehr the conceptual basis for the transformation process is laid down, at least regarding the technology and the basic structures. Obviously, transformation of the Bundeswehr has to be more than only new structures or weapon systems.

It also includes: thinking as a globally engaged force, training–mission oriented, concepts–conflict termination and stabilization, economy of resources and use of potentials for innovation. However, so far there is no identifiable process at work, which reflects the soft factors of transformation. In other words: the institution “Innere Führung” did not adjust to the particular requirements based upon the cultural developments and the ongoing transformation process. Consequently, the following part will at first stress the aim of the transformation process.

Basically, it is to improve on an enduring basis the Bundeswehr’s operational readiness across the entire mission spectrum. Therefore structures, organization and training will have to be adapted to that goal. In addition, materiel and equipment planning will concentrate on it, while reflecting the scarce resources. As a consequence of this, anything that does not support the goal of improved operational readiness is regarded to be of secondary importance.

This implies a quick discarding of aging equipment designed to deal with the threats of the cold war era in central Europe—a unique challenge especially for the Bundeswehr.⁷²

⁷¹ Martin Burke (2000): “Information Superiority, Network Centric Warfare and the Knowledge Edge.” Retrieved 6/2/06 from www.dstod.defence.gov.au/corporate/reports/DSTO-TR-0997.pdf.

⁷² Herfried Münkler (2001): “Die brutale Logik des Terrors. Wenn Dörfer und Hochhäuser zu Schauplätzen von Massakern werden – Die Privatisierung des Krieges in der Moderne.“ Retrieved 6/3/06 from www.sueddeutsche.de/aktuell/sz/artikel82183.php.

The comprehensive realignment of the Bundeswehr to conflict-prevention and crisis-management operations abroad, to include the fight against international terrorism, necessitates an adapted capability profile for the German armed forces. They must be responsive, effective, robust, sustainable and capable of conducting combined operations with other nations' armed forces.

To achieve this, Germany defined the capability profile as comprising six interlinked capability categories: command and control capability, intelligence and reconnaissance, mobility, operational effectiveness, support and sustainability, and survivability and force protection.

The improvement of existing capabilities must take into account both the joint approach of the Bundeswehr and its multinational integration.⁷³

Overall, the six capability categories will be fleshed out in such a way that the armed forces are gradually enabled to conduct network-centric operations. Interoperability is the key to both jointness and multinationality.⁷⁴ For this adaptation process toward operational readiness, Germany has defined the "National Level of Ambition".⁷⁵ As explained before, Germany has of course pledged to maintain the most important international commitments. These consist of possible contributions of various sizes and capabilities to the NATO Response Force. This requires a pool of some 15,000 troops at any time. Additionally, Germany provides its share of the European Headline Goal with 18,000 soldiers. This includes the contribution to the new "European Battle Group Concept".⁷⁶

And finally, the commitment to the United Nations Standby Arrangements System will be maintained, totalling roughly 1,000 troops.

⁷³ Linzer Magazin für Europäische Sicherheit LIMES (Hrsg.) (2001): "Europäische Verteidigungsdoktrin", Dezember 2001. Retrieved 6/2/06 from <http://members.nusurf.at/609609/inhalt.htm>.

⁷⁴ Amt für Studien und Übungen der Bundeswehr, Arbeitsgruppe Studie "Streitkräfteeinsatz 2020" (1996): "Streitkräfteeinsatz 2020 – Abschlussbericht der Arbeitsgruppe", Waldbröl.

⁷⁵ Thiele and Seidt.

⁷⁶ Franz-Josef Meiers (2000): „Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsidentität (ESVI) oder Gemeinsame europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (GESVP)?“, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung ZEI, C 79, Bonn.

Germany wants to be able to field up to 14,000 soldiers in future Stabilization Operations in up to 5 different operational areas. Thus, it will post a considerable contribution to global peacekeeping operations, which in turn underlines the German ambition to shoulder growing responsibilities in and for the international community. Furthermore, the Bundeswehr will have some 1,000 troops available for Rescue and Evacuation Operations under national command.⁷⁷ All German forces will be used for their main task--the protection of Germany and its citizens⁷⁸--whenever necessary. All forces will take their share in supporting the necessary operations in the case of catastrophic accidents or other scenarios where German armed forces capabilities are needed. All of these efforts will be made within the constraints of the German constitution.

In past as well as in current operations, Germany has usually built up self-sufficient contingents, containing all the capabilities needed for a certain mission.

They included national support elements, and were usually were exchanged entirely after a six-month tour of duty. The ministry of defence believes it is no longer either necessary or feasible to field these exclusively nationally supported contingents.

Instead, Germany will send modular capability packages that have been synchronized with allies and other partner nations.⁷⁹ However, so far these packages are not specifically trained for this multinational environment.

As a result, in the same operation a German force might have modular packages with differing endurance periods. The kinds of modules depend on the mission's requirements and capabilities of partners. Germany will gain the structural flexibility to put certain key-capability packages into operation on shorter notice, which strengthens the responsiveness vis-à-vis the global crisis scene. German forces' spectrum of tasks varies from war fighting to

⁷⁷ Linzer Magazin.

⁷⁸ Baker.

⁷⁹ Linzer Magazin.

humanitarian support, and includes peacekeeping missions. Even missions to assist with humanitarian support have to be considered.

This broad spectrum of tasks⁸⁰ calls for more specialized and differentiated forces that are able to meet specific mission needs and are trained and equipped accordingly.⁸¹ This has finally led to the development of new categories of forces that will now be described.

As shown, the Bundeswehr has to be able to employ troops with warfighting capabilities⁸² for joint- and network-based operations of the highest intensity and complexity. A 35,000-strong Response Force seems to be adequate and affordable.⁸³

Stabilization Operations will be the most likely and majority of operations conducted by German troops. These operations will last over a period of time and require continual troop rotation. Germany aims for a four-month tour as an average. Stabilization forces will prepare the ground for political solutions to conflicts, consequence management and nation-building tasks.⁸⁴ A total of 70,000 will be considered sufficient to meet the National Level of Ambition. A maximum of 14,000 deployed troops at a time will be able to conduct Stabilization Operations. They need to be trained and equipped on a mission-tailored basis, which makes a difference in comparison with the reaction forces (example: Engineer, Intelligence, Patrol). They also need to be able to take part

80 Ingomar Hauchler, Dirk Messner and Franz Nuscheler (Hrsg.) (2001): "Global Trends 2002 – Fakten, Analysen, Prognosen", Frankfurt/M.

81 Mary Kaldor, Ulrich Albrecht, and Genevieve Schmeder (Hrsg.) (1998): "Restructuring the Global Military Sector. The End of Military Fordism", London.

82 Herfried Münkler (1999): "Den Krieg wieder denken. Clausewitz, Kosovo und die Kriege des 21. Jahrhunderts", in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, Volume 44, Nr.6, S. 678 – 688.

83 German MOD (ed), Defence Policy Guidelines.

84 German MOD (ed), The Bundeswehr in 2002 – The current situation and perspectives (chapter 3: The Bundeswehr reform – an investment in the future). Retrieved 9/26/06 from [http://www.deutschesheer.de/C1256B6C002D670C/vwContentByKey/N25MAGP3024Swinde/\\$File/bw2002_english.pdf](http://www.deutschesheer.de/C1256B6C002D670C/vwContentByKey/N25MAGP3024Swinde/$File/bw2002_english.pdf).

in network-centric operations to work together with Response Forces and with other multinational forces, if required.⁸⁵

The Support Forces will comprise 147,500 soldiers--including 2,500 reservists. They are supplemented by the majority of the Bundeswehr's 75,000 civilians. The Support Forces will, for example, ensure logistics and transport, run depots, and provide military police forces and command-and-control capabilities.

The main aim is to support ongoing operations of the German Response-and-Stabilization Forces. Furthermore, the training facilities, schools, academies, and peacetime command structure will be part of the Support Forces. But only regarding the training facilities – not concerning the training tasks – the support forces are connected to the multinational environment..

In relation to the National Level of Ambition⁸⁶, this means that, with the Response Forces, the Bundeswehr will take on the tasks deriving from its commitments to the NATO Response Force⁸⁷, the European Headline Goal⁸⁸ and other international commitments. Additionally, it will provide the assets for Evacuation Operations under national command as part of the national level of ambition.

Stabilization Forces will form up to five contingents, with a maximum total of 14,000 troops. These will take on tasks in the broad spectrum of peace-keeping and stabilization operations and take their share of the national level of ambition.

⁸⁵ Max G. Manwaring (2000): "Deterrence and Conventional Military Forces", Small Arms & Insurgencies, Volume 11, Nr. 2, in: Deterrence and the Twenty - First Century, 2000, London, S. 60 – 71.

⁸⁶ Linzer Magazin.

⁸⁷ Erich P. Hochleitner (Hrsg.) (2000): "Das europäische Sicherheitssystem zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts", Wien.

⁸⁸ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Fü S III 2 (2002): "Mit der ESVP zur europäischen Armee. Visionäre Ansätze zur Implementierung einer vitalen und leistungsfähigen ESVP", Berlin.

Last, but certainly not least, the third category of support forces will ensure timely and comprehensive support of all ongoing operations in the complete spectrum of intensity.

Furthermore, they will also take care of the basic services for the daily routine in the Bundeswehr. In this context it will also become necessary to develop the Innere Führung to an institution, which delivers particular services to the military--especially taking into consideration that the armed forces have to face the dramatically changed preconditions given by the society and the new political environment in general. Basically the military has to become more competitive with civilian enterprises and companies.

B. CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

The following pages will explain the capabilities of the Bundeswehr requiring equipment that is efficient and commensurate with the mission. In order to comprehend the whole background of necessary and possible modifications, it is important to depict the general intentions and requirements for the German military.⁸⁹ Basically it is very important to understand, that the process of transformation does go beyond equipment also to human factors and questions of professional identity.

First of all, the modernization of materiel and equipment will be rigorously geared toward the capability-oriented joint overall approach. The respective scope of procurement is oriented on the three newly introduced force categories, with first priority on the reaction forces, followed by strategic mobility and C2.

The following paragraph will present selected milestones of high significance for the transformation of the Bundeswehr. On 1 November 2004 the Minister of Defence released the new Stationing Concept for the Bundeswehr⁹⁰. Besides the already decided closure of 76 garrisons, a further 105 garrisons will be closed. Thus the Bundeswehr in 2010 will be comprised of 392 garrisons, chosen solely by their military relevance and by economic criteria. The former

⁸⁹ Harald Kujat (2001): "Zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr", in: Wehrtechnik II/2001.

⁹⁰ German MOD (ed), The Bundeswehr in 2002.

concept, with many widespread—and often small—garrisons of the cold war era, was deemed not to meet future requirements. Units and command posts will be collocated and concentrated wherever feasible—thus enabling force integration for missions and the joint use of common training facilities. The CD&E⁹¹ process will produce important impulses for the innovation, modernization and flexibility of the Bundeswehr. The different relevant levels for transformation in general and CD & E in specific are depicted on the Figure 2.

CD&E from the German point of view is the “engine“ for innovation and transformation of the armed forces. Transformation must focus on delivering the products of Transformation: new capabilities; good ideas won’t serve any purpose unless they can be rapidly converted into capabilities.⁹² The German armed forces cannot afford to get stuck in a process of endless staff concepts that never yield capabilities for the Joint Operator. The ability to conduct Network-Centric Operations represents one of the main pillars of the Bundeswehr Transformation. With its implementation, Germany will have a new dimension of a system of command and control, reconnaissance and effects at its disposal.

The national Concept will cover all aspects of national understanding on NCO, analyze the consequences for German Forces and outline the required changes in their capability profile, in concepts, procedures, exercises and training. It is currently developed and will be issued later in 2006. Germany has developed and evaluated the first concepts of how to realize the technical solution—an IT system for the Bundeswehr, so to speak.

With CD&E Germany will gain experience--a “first grip”--on how to do networks. In the adapted procurement-planning, highest priority has been given to those projects that are vital for networked operations.⁹³ Efficiency is an

91 Concept, development and evaluation.

92 Mey: “Der Krieg”.

93 Amt für Studien und Übungen der Bundeswehr, Arbeitsgruppe Studie “Streitkräfteeinsatz 2020“ (1996): “Streitkräfteeinsatz 2020 – Abschlussbericht der Arbeitsgruppe“, Waldbröl.

important prerequisite for transformation.⁹⁴ Therefore, the Bundeswehr will be relieved of all tasks that can be performed more economically using modern forms of co-operation and financing.⁹⁵ However, it must be clear that economic considerations are strictly limited by operational requirements.

Thus, Germany identified areas that are suitable for outsourcing to third parties.

The Development, Procurement and Management Group assumed a central role in the coordination and co-operation with trade and industry and in creating additional leeway for investments. The vehicle pool and the clothing management are examples.

Secondly, the Bundeswehr's management procedures are replicated in a process-oriented integrated software system utilizing the management procedures of business enterprises.

Finally, Germany is about to establish the army equipment repair and maintenance organization, a private-public partnership between the Bundeswehr and industrial partners.⁹⁶

In the process of transformation the requirement has evolved to adapt regulations and procedures concerning political responsibilities and military leadership at the highest level. Therefore, the new "Berlin Decree" was signed by the Minister on 21 January 2005. Being a successor document to the former "Blankenese Decree", it aims at strengthening the joint approach and honors changing requirements.

As a consequence, the position of the Generalinspekteur (CHOD) has been strengthened considerably. In the future, he will be responsible for the

94 Karl Haltiner (2001): "Polizisten oder Soldaten? Organisatorische Dilemmata bei der Konstabilisierung des Militärs", in: Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift ÖMZ 3/2001, Jg.39, Wien.

95 Christian Hacke (2001): "Interessen und die Legitimation nationaler Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik", in: Olaf Theiler (Hrsg.), "Deutsche Interessen in der sicherheitspolitischen Diskussion", Baden-Baden.

96 Wolfgang Ischinger (2001): "Against Whom and With Whom? The Transatlantic Relationship Redefined", in: Euro-Forum, Hrsg.: CSIS, Volume 4, Number 1, Fall 2001, S. 1 – 2.

overall defence conception, including all aspects of force planning and further development, as well as the processes of planning, preparation, execution and evaluation of all Bundeswehr operations. Furthermore, the CHOD takes on the overall responsibility for the force's operational capabilities by defining the required abilities and assigning them to the respective services as tasks. In acting as the highest ranking military advisor to the Minister of Defence and the government, he is supported by three panels specialized to deal with questions concerning procurement, operations and joint military aspects. The Chiefs of Staff of the different services remain in command of their subordinate military bodies and are responsible to the CHOD for the operational readiness of their services' forces.

However, the Chiefs of Staff of the services still report directly to the minister and the defence secretaries in their responsibility concerning personnel, training, education and related matters.

As a summary, the "Berlin Decree" consequently contributes to the aim of strengthening the operational capabilities and readiness of German forces, as it has been initiated with the Defence Policy Guidelines and thus supports the aims of the transformation of the Bundeswehr.⁹⁷ All these challenges associated with Transformation also demand some changes in the German MOD. Therefore, last summer, Germany established a high-level Transformation Steering Group, with an attached Transformation Working Group. The main goal is to assure a better coordination of all the widespread activities in the frame of Transformation and to give advice to the CHOD where appropriate. When compared to the record of the era 1955 until 1990, such reforms under the modern flag of transformation signifies an almost revolutionary change in the command and leadership of the Bundeswehr. However, it is also a mark of national normalcy in the decade and a half of Germany as a unified nation with the heritage of democracy and alliance cohesion, that this reform has garnered so little notice.

97 Linzer Magazin.

Among other subjects⁹⁸, so far the group has achieved the following: identification of all ongoing projects in a transformation-relevant activities catalogue; delimitation of objectives, aims and means of the Bundeswehr Transformation from the services' activities for further development of their capabilities, and; definition of objectives for a national simulation and experiment test bed.

Another project is the identification and evaluation of ways to incorporate a basic capability to create and use CROP⁹⁹—and make it available for the NRF 7 earmarked forces. In order to support these increased efforts with the necessary manpower, the German armed forces have converted the Center for Analysis and Studies into a Center for Transformation.

The conceptual basis for how this center will be utilized in the future has been worked out under the Steering Group's direction and guidance and approved by the CHOD. For the conceptual work the Concept of the Bundeswehr, with its capability profile and the force categories, is the basis for detailed concepts and sub-concepts. The capability profile with its overarching capability categories is broken down into sub-capabilities and sub-sub-capabilities in these concepts.

As a result, Germany has a more or less structured architecture of concepts. Some people might call it a sort of conceptual "patch-work" or "puzzle". A list of concepts and sub-concepts is part of the annex in the concept of the Bundeswehr. They have to be written and issued by the responsible branches in the MOD and will be approved by the CHOD, in the case of sub-concepts approved by the chiefs of the services.

The concepts describe the identified capability on an abstract level, determine how the capability should be filled in within the joint approach and give

98 Manfred Gehrig (1998): "Infanterist der Zukunft", in: Soldat und Technik, 11/1998, S. 717.

99 Common Relevant Operational Picture.

responsibilities to the services. The concepts are basis for the further capability analysis within the strategic planning process of the Bundeswehr.¹⁰⁰

Writing concepts and harmonizing them is a time-intensive discipline within the German MOD but it is, in consequence, also the motor for transformation.

Finally, the following paragraphs will give some remarks on the conceptual work concerning the EBA¹⁰¹. The dynamic global environment creates new, developing and complex security issues. Future challenges require a wide spectrum of instruments and the military is only one of them. The collaboration of the different departments, GOs and non-government organizations is necessary. From the German point of view a governmental commitment in a crisis region must not necessarily involve a military operation, particularly in consideration of crisis prevention. What is important is to use all instruments available for the purpose of achieving the desired effect. The degree of collaboration that is realistically possible will vary and range from full integration to deconfliction.¹⁰²

Germany therefore sees the effects-based approach (EBA) as a concept of purposeful, effects-based cooperation between different departments and organizations (governmental and non-governmental, civilian and military), to include multinational forces, with a view to achieving a common objective.

There is a requirement for a new way of thinking, eventually leading to an overall national security concept that provides the conceptual basis for EBO, so to speak.

100 George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (1999): "Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World: Vulnerabilities and Opportunities", Garmisch-Partenkirchen.

101 Effects Based Approach: "Orientation at the result is more important than just to be active", is briefly explained the philosophy of EBO. To reduce the complexity in possible scenarios does not work any more. Hence it is necessary to integrate also NGOs and other international, organizations.

102 Günter F. C. Forsteneichner (2001): "Neue Formen der Bedrohung der internationalen Sicherheit: Terrorismus – Proliferation – Organisierte Kriminalität – Migration. Erscheinungsformen – Bewältigung – sicherheitspolitische Aspekt", Sonderbroschüre IAP-Dienst Sicherheitspolitik, Oktober 2001, Bonn.

In order to foster the interagency interaction process, Germany started the national project STRATEGIC UMBRELLA. The partner--The German Federal Academy for Security Policy--provides a platform for discussions with experts from all different organizations and agencies. What the German armed forces are looking for are actionable recommendations on how to achieve the utmost mutual benefit in providing the products to the people, friends and partners. The aims are to contribute to the development of a common understanding about interagency interaction processes in order to be able to most efficiently apply all elements of national power as appropriate when measured against a certain scenario. In addition, it is also an aim to explore actionable recommendations to facilitate interagency interaction through a small-sized discovery experiment, involving experts from all different organizations likely involved in crisis management and conflict termination.

The results will be integrated in a national concept for interagency interaction and then shared with multinational partners.

C. SUMMARY

The core of the transformation in the German armed forces of the 21st century is made up by the creation of three force categories: Response Forces, Stabilization Forces and Support Forces. These force categories will be properly trained and equipped for their respective missions. The full development of their overall capability will stem from joint action. The Bundeswehr must now be consistently oriented to the enhancement of its capabilities. Most of the respective measures will find expression in new structures, adapted materiel and equipment planning, and demand-oriented stationing. Newly shaped along these lines, the Bundeswehr will be better prepared to meet the challenges of the 21st century and ensure security and protection for Germany's citizens. Interagency interaction seems to be one of the big elephants that have to be eaten bite by bite – in addition to the increasing part of multinational obligations even on the tactical levels. As Germany tries to do so, it also needs to agree on some more assumptions based upon the trends explained in the first chapter. This chapter suggested an overview of who may be involved in dealing with this specific

problem of a radical reorganization, reform and finally transformation in the NATO sense of the word of the German military establishment.

Every organization follows its own agenda and, more than that, every single individual has more-or-less personal goals and options, and these influence the overall process of action and interaction. The starting point for thinking through the jungle of what the different goals and options may look like and how action and interaction may occur must be the analysis of the scenario in which action and interaction are required¹⁰³: A humanitarian or disaster-relief scenario will have different impacts on interagency interaction than will a high-intensity conflict scenario, even if the set of partners earmarked to deal with it stays the same.

If this all sounds reasonable, Germany can move on to the structure within which action and interaction take place.¹⁰⁴ Again there are a variety of organizations and individuals involved to varying degrees in the overall process. These include the international community, national governments and their ministries and organizations, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and, most likely, players not yet addressed.

All of these organizations can be supportive, neutral or defective, depending on their goals and options for responding to the scenario in question.

There can be economic coalitions, social coalitions and the kind of most interest from the military standpoint--military coalitions. How to act and interact within this very complex environment, and how supportive organizations can each get the most out of the situation on a mutual basis, is the problem that has to be addressed with interagency interaction concepts. While the tasks and the composition of the German Response and Stabilization Forces can be defined

¹⁰³ American Council for the United Nations University / The Foundation of the Future (Hrsg.) (2002): "Millennium 3000 Scenarios – Excerpt from the State of the Future at the Millennium". Retrieved 4/17/06 from www.geocities.com/~acunu/millennium/m3000-scenarios.html.

¹⁰⁴ Karl Kaizer and Hanns W. Maull (Hrsg.) unter Mitarbeit von Brenke, Gabriele (1995): "Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik – Band 2 Herausforderungen", Schriften des Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, München.

relatively clearly and easily, this has to be done a bit more comprehensively for the Support Forces.¹⁰⁵ As previously mentioned, the 39,000 billets for personnel undergoing training and education are accounted for within the Support Forces. Besides this, however, a share of the 2,500 reservists of the Bundeswehr belongs to the Support Forces as well.

Therefore, one must consider the category of Support Forces as consisting of soldiers on active duty as well as personnel under training and reservists. Of the total of 195,000 professional soldiers, 156,000 will be on active duty. A further share of 39,000 slots is designated for professional soldiers under training, which helps to maintain the strength of the units on a very high degree of presence. Additionally, the Bundeswehr includes 55,000 conscripts. Of these, 30,000 will serve their basic duty time of 9 months in Germany in order to take some of the burden off the shoulders of the deployable force. Twenty-five thousand conscripts will serve an individually selected voluntary duty time of up to 23 months in order to be able to take part in operations abroad--mainly because their duty time allows them to be trained accordingly. Consequently, the Bundeswehr's mission needed to be adapted to the new challenges. The new mission is seen as an instrument of comprehensive and proactive security and defence policy.

The Bundeswehr's mission¹⁰⁶ is to:

- Ensure Germany's freedom of action in the field of foreign policy
- Contribute to stability on a European and global scale
- Ensure national security and defence and help defend allies
- Promote multinational cooperation and integration

The defence of Germany against external threats continues to be the constitutional and political mission of the Bundeswehr. Defence as defined by the Constitutional Law, however, is not solely limited to defending the borders but

¹⁰⁵ Huber: "Die Erneuerung der Bundeswehr.

¹⁰⁶ German MOD (ed), The Bundeswehr in 2002.

must apply wherever risks and threats to Germany's and its Allies' security occur.

The Bundeswehr's spectrum of tasks is derived from this mission:

- International conflict prevention and crisis management, including the fight against international terrorism
- Support of Allies
- Protection of Germany's territory and its citizens
- Rescue and Evacuation operations
- Partnership and Cooperation
- Disaster Relief operations including official assistance, natural disasters and catastrophic accidents

The transformation of the Bundeswehr aims at increasing its operational capabilities in order to cope with the rapidly changing security and political parameters. Thus, Germany adapted the planning for development and acquisition of new equipment to the most probable scenarios.

In the following, an overview on selected major projects in relation to the six categories of the shown capability profile will be presented, projects that Germany will realize in the near future. In order to enhance capabilities in command and control, the German armed forces work with a joint-forces C4I system.¹⁰⁷

Together with a secure satellite communication system, this will enable Germany to lead operations in all possible theatres. This will, in particular, support the principle of network-centric operations. To ensure its abilities to gather detailed intelligence and reconnaissance information, Germany will take part in the planned NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance system AGS. Furthermore, Germany will develop a UAV¹⁰⁸-based solution for signal intelligence in the electromagnetic spectrum. Mobility will play a key role in the aim to safeguard national security wherever it may be at risk. Therefore,

¹⁰⁷ Command, control, communications, computers and intelligence system.

¹⁰⁸ Unmanned Air Vehicles.

Germany ordered 60 Airbus A-400 M transport aircraft. This project is being carried out in conjunction with other European countries.

The German transport capabilities will be complemented with 125 multi-use transport helicopters (NH-90) to support the in-theatre mobility. Eighty-three of these will be for the army and 42 for the air force. This multinational European helicopter will be able to execute a broad spectrum of roles with its modular fittings. These include transport, EW-support, and Combat Search and Rescue. The Navy's 30 NH-90 will be specialized to fulfill maritime tasks. High-endurance vehicles are of the highest importance for support of deployed troops. They need the ability to fulfill their tasks using reliable vehicles over a longer period of time.

In order to enhance the forces' Support and Endurance in theatre, Germany will speed up the deliveries of 830 DINGO and 100 DURO protected vehicles for personnel transport. Survivability and Protection for German troops conducting operations certainly is one of the highest priorities.

With the development and procurement of special equipment, the future needs of infantrymen are considered.¹⁰⁹ Survivability will be significantly enhanced with a new portable system discriminating between friend and foe. This Change will support the fighting elements even in difficult environments such as urban terrain. Various equipment and components for specialized roles will support and protect the soldiers in all kind of operations. These will be especially derived from their needs and include special operations. This will include components that enable certain troops to link up every individual into a new C4I-system in order to enable network-based operations.

All this will be complemented by other projects to improve personnel protection. Last but not least, Germany continually strives to improve Mission Effectiveness. To do so, Germany will purchase 180 EUROFIGHTER 2000

¹⁰⁹ Zalmay Khalilzad and Ian O. Lesser (1998): "Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century: Regional Futures and U.S. Strategy", Hrsg.: RAND, Santa Monica. Retrieved 5/27/06 from www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR897/.

aircraft. This is a four-nation, modern fourth-generation fighter. Other nations in this program are Great Britain, Italy and Spain.¹¹⁰

In the long run, the Eurofighter will be the backbone of the air force. It will be complemented by a reduced number of TORNADO bombers for specialized roles.

The army's capabilities will be significantly enhanced with 80 new TIGER helicopters.¹¹¹ This European co-production helicopter will take over a number of different tasks. The most important will be anti-tank operations, using various modular equipment and armament.

Germany plans to participate in the multinational project to develop the new generation tactical air defence system MEADS. With this system, German capabilities to counter a conventional air threat will be increased significantly. But even more important, the Bundeswehr will take a considerable step forward in its potential for missile defence.

Finally, the Navy will achieve important capabilities with the introduction of six new submarines of the U-212 class, and the future purchase of four F-125 frigates.

Basically, this chapter has suggested how much effort the German armed forces have invested into technology and structures.

However, the first chapter already underlined the changing priorities for security policy and the armed forces in general. To sum up, the lack of necessities, based upon the cultural challenges and certain multinational requirements, is evident. Particularly in comparison to the purely structural and technologically orientated attempts, the need for an additional cultural approach is pretty obvious. Nevertheless, the first steps have been taken in the right direction—but they symbolize only the starting point of a long journey of many

110 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, FÜ S III 2 (2002): "Mit der ESVP zur europäischen Armee. Visionäre Ansätze zur Implementierung einer Vitalen und Leistungsfähigen ESVP," Berlin.

111 Sam C. Sarkesian Robert E. Connor (Hrsg.) (1996): "America's Armed Forces. A Handbook of Current and Future Capabilities", Westport.

different steps. In order not only to critique this situation, but also to offer a suggestion as to how it could be possible to deal with this current situation, the following chapter will introduce a certain model. In terms of improvement of the cultural environment (Innere Führung) within the German armed forces, it will show a way how transformation can deal with the challenges based upon the cultural developments explained in the previous chapter. Based upon the simple diagram depicted in the figure below, the lack of transformation – that means of possible improvements - for the organizational culture becomes quite obvious. It depicts the different relevant levels for the transformation process. The micro level represents the tactical and the meso the operational level; the macro level finally symbolizes the political level. The different areas of interest (strategy, structure and culture) are self evident.




Figure 1. Levels of Transformation

IV. A PROPOSED MODEL: INNERE FÜHRUNG, EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND TRANSFORMATION

A. “INNERE FÜHRUNG” THE CORE IDEALS OF THE BUNDESWEHR

The term “Innere Führung” describes the concept of citizenship, identity, leadership, command, morale, and obedience within the Bundeswehr. It is closely linked to the concept of the “citizen in uniform,” an idea drawn from ancient Rome, revived by Machiavelli in the Renaissance and given its modern meaning by the French Revolution. The best description of Innere Führung can be found in the central field manual ZDv 10/1 “Innere Führung”¹¹². Goals, principles and areas of practical use are pointed out in this directive which does not exist in English translation. The main task of Innere Führung is to balance the tension between the individual rights of a citizen on the one hand and the military duties on the other hand. In other words, to reconcile the central clause of the German Basic Law that human dignity is inviolable with the necessities of military hierarchy and the demands of the battlefield. Innere Führung represents the idea of an army in a democracy, especially in view of the conflicts of soldier and politics in the European past. Yet it is also an idea and reality that has well adapted to the needs of the past fifteen years.

In addition to that, this concept has also the promise of resolving an age-old hostility of certain German military figures to the march of technological progress, via an emphasis on adjustment to the needs of technological, non-estate based society. Based upon the disastrous experiences of the Wehrmacht in National Socialism during the Second World War, and the particular criteria of nuclear warfare in the face of a divided Germany and the Soviet threat, the question of the sense and meaning of being a soldier arose—the question about a new tension between military and modern society.¹¹³ To be sure, the conditions of a half century ago have changed, but the imperative to adapt soldierly service

¹¹² Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (1993): Innere Führung : “Die Grundsätze der Inneren Führung sind verpflichtende Vorgaben fuer das Handeln aller Soldaten.” Also see discussion in Abenheim, cited above.

¹¹³ Abenheim, see above.

to the here and now has only grown more intense, something which also applied to the figures who created the Bundeswehr and anchored it in the Federal German state.

The founders of the Bundeswehr established Innere Führung in order to fulfill three requirements: legitimization, integration and identity. After 1945, the use of the military appeared politically sound within the context of territorial national defence within Western integration.¹¹⁴ The “fathers” of the Innere Führung—General von Baudissin, de Maiziere and von Kielmansegg—created this concept specifically within a European political frame, meaning in an international sense. Second, the military has to be both politically integrated and under democratic control within a pluralistic society. This goal requires a specific military identity.¹¹⁵ One of the leading institutions of this ideal for fifty years has been the school for Innere Führung in Koblenz, established in 1956/7. It has its own capabilities for scholarly research and prepares officers for new challenges, such as women in the military or the effects of overseas deployments on matters of leadership and morale in the widest sense.¹¹⁶

Innere Führung, that is, the institution of leadership, command, morale and obedience of an army in a German democracy has been the hall mark of the Bundeswehr for more than a half century. The experience of the last decade and more, especially the advent of the Bundeswehr as an expeditionary force for security building and low intensity conflict within an even more integrated, European and Euro-Atlantic context, has raised new challenges for the core cultural ideals of German soldiers. As in the US, the institutional reform of the German armed forces now proceeds under the title of Transformation.¹¹⁷ How is

114 Joachim Krause (2002): “Komplexität heutiger Sicherheitspolitik”, Vortrag auf dem Workshop “Szenariotechnik – Zukunftsforschung und strategische Sicherheitspolitik” am 27-28. Mai 2002 in Waldbröl.

115 Peter Imbusch (2001): “Krieg: Eine besondere Konfliktform,” Bibliographisches Institut & F.A. Brockhaus AG, Mannheim.

116 Wikipedia, “Zentrum Innere Führung.” Retrieved 6/11/06 from de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zentrum_Innere_Führung.

117 Hans Buch, Reiner Huber and Ronald Kaestner (2001): “Jenseits der ESVP: Anmerkungen zu einer Transatlantischen Strategie“, in: Die Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, Hrsg.: Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Baden-Baden, S. 283 – 294.

this idea reconciled with the process of the present day character of the German soldier as a defender of the Euro-Atlantic area, no longer on the North German plain but on the Hindu Kush and, in the spring of 2006, in the land of the African great lakes? Further, as German soldiers serve with regularity in multi-national units of its allies, an old problem re-emerges of considerable importance for the culture of transformation in NATO and European armies more generally, that is, how do Germans avoid the revival of destructive practices that undermine an army in a democracy, make a mockery of Innere Führung in its best sense, and damage the strategic effectiveness of Germany's contribution to collective defense in the Global War on Terror.¹¹⁸ The phrases Abu Ghraib and Haditha suffice to indicate the potential risks that obtain when the soldierly self image, linked with the idea of culture is sacrificed in the name of ideology and a wrong-headed efficiency.

Nevertheless, the concept of Innere Führung was, right from the beginning, doubted by many conservative officers and those in society raised in the old school of soldierly virtues¹¹⁹. The main criticism focused on the lack of a clear definition and the missing link to reality especially as such unfolds on battlefields that might have resembled those of Russia circa 1943 or some other pitiless and relentless site of death, chaos and confusion.

In the years since the 1980s, emphasis on Innere Führung lost some of its focus, not the least because the fear among some hearts and minds that the Bundeswehr would endanger democracy proved to be quite empty. At least the first tasks have been forgotten, and as a consequence of this fact the concept became one of a technique for motivation. Many are convinced that there is neither a harmony between a civilian and military life nor between a military and civilian profession. Even nowadays certain figures in the Bundeswehr complain that the concept is not completely put into practice.

¹¹⁸ Hans Kleinsteuber and Barbara Thomaß (2000): "Kommunikation, Medien, Wissensgesellschaft", in: Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden; Messner, Dirk; Nuscheler, Franz, "Globale Trends 2000", Frankfurt/M.

¹¹⁹ See Abenheim cited above.

Since 1990, there are new challenges for the concept of Innere Führung. Unfortunately it has been little discussed in the public, partially because the Bundeswehr has been so effective in its adaptation for the military realities of the early 1980s to that of the year 2006. Due to their increasing out-of-area deployments, which began amid much political controversy in the early-1990s, the German armed forces have to manage a new kind of leadership in the face of a radically different series of risks and threats. In the past, leadership was strictly decentralized in terms of freedom of movement on the lower tactical levels. However, being involved in many deployments of the dimension of peace enforcement, counter terror, and security building requires a more centralized political control because of the fusion of the tactical and strategic levels in these kinds of missions. Even the leader of a small unit can cause political trouble if he does not execute the political strategy in his area of responsibility. This procedure is heavily criticized because it ignores the knowledge, education and skills of the soldiers on the ground. Auftragstaktik is seen as a core ideal within the greater core idea of Innere Führung, and the manner in which the political imperative for the least application of force in such present-day missions amid political chaos represents a real challenge for Innere Führung. However, the answer cannot be the resort to a micro-managed soldier with the cult of Befehlstaktik that gutted the most cherished principles of German soldierly even before the creation of the Bundeswehr.¹²⁰

The crucial change is based upon the cultural development and the specific environment in multinational units.¹²¹ The culture varies in certain scenarios and armies, very often completely. On the one hand allies such as France, Great Britain and the USA still refuse to adjust to this particular German concept of maintaining a military culture.¹²² On the other hand, the German armed forces are not willing to sacrifice the most important elements of the concept of Innere Führung.

¹²⁰ For example in Dirk, Oetting (1993), S. 308., "Auftragstaktik".

¹²¹ Linzer Magazin.

¹²² Alfred Zänker (2001): "Die geheimen Wege des Fortschritts", in: MUT Forum für Kultur und Politik und Geschichte, Nr. 401 Januar 2001, S. 22 – 33.

It seems urgent that, to meet the needs of an increasing number of international missions, Innere Führung be reinvigorated.¹²³

B. IMPLICATIONS OF CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT FOR SOLDIER'S SERVICE AND MILITARY INSTITUTIONS

The following discussion is an attempt to find answers to the question of how to make "Cultural Development" and "Transformation" educational issues of the organizational culture of German armed forces (the concept of Innere Führung) and implement it in practice.

The discussion will focus on the presentation of a model aimed at turning the necessary consequences for the transformation to practical use--making them operational--in the cultural field. At the same time, this chapter will also try to establish a link between education and the concept of leadership and civic education from a cultural perspective, to include the process of transformation, and present a model that will illustrate the development of a European military identity and intercultural competence. This concept departs from a broad, scholarly reliable basis and relates initially to security structures such as NATO and the EU and multilateralism, which follow a political rationale: they symbolize the will and the capability of the allies and partners for concerted military action--interoperability thus becoming a decisive factor of the transformation process. Multilateralism, indeed, signifies more than just the establishment of technical, tactical and operational interoperability.¹²⁴ Above all, it is about the integration of different national military cultures and traditions that are based on different national concepts of order. Therefore, the standpoint this assumption is going to maintain in the course of the following discussion will break with elementary assumptions taken for granted. Here, the thesis suggests that tentative formal orientation of interoperability extends beyond the sphere of tactical operational concepts and requires the setting of common standards. The overall objectives, however, continue to be military efficiency and optimization of social benignity (holistic transformation and/or future-oriented further development).

¹²³ Krause.

¹²⁴ Jean Callaghan and Jürgen Kuhlmann (Hrsg.) (2000): "The Military and Society in 21 st Century Europe. A Comparative Analysis", Piscataway.

There is, however, the question of whether deepened military integration will entail concessions in the field of leadership and civil education. The allied armies of Germany do not embrace such enlightened ideals, in all cases, and there exists a wide variety of interpretations of the principles of citizenship, leadership, and command in the context of the cultural development simulated here, identity and professionalism need to be functionally differentiated (civic responsibility versus mercenaries). To be honest, the institutions of leadership¹²⁵ and civic education seems to be the proper context by which to approach this challenge in the spirit of the envisaged reform projects, and to deal with the ensuing future-oriented questions in a productive manner.

But first, the relationship of identity and organization has to be introduced.

The objective is to find rational solutions to the current range of questions by means of a simple model. The reference parameters for the following considerations are the European members of NATO, especially those in favor of a unified Europe.¹²⁶ European military identity, then, is an effective factor in bringing about the common will to secure a European confederation¹²⁷ externally and internally. In the context of transformation, and according to Baudissin's logic, it would be the *cultural* answer to the changed security environment (changed face of war, technology, inward orientation), parallel to technological, conceptual and structure-related answers.

Culturally significant is that many European NATO allies have maintained an extensive security communications network for 50 years¹²⁸, the interaction processes of which are determined by the existing and future European tasks.¹²⁹

125 Arnulf Kopeinig (1999): "Information Warfare. Versuch eines definitorischen Zugangs im Rahmen politikwissenschaftlicher Untersuchungen", in: Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift ÖMZ 1/1999, S. 23 – 36.

126 Heinz Gärtner, Adrian Hyde-Price and Erich Reiter (Hrsg.) (2001): "Europe's New Security Challenges", Boulder.

127 Karl Kaizer and Hanns W. Maull (Hrsg.) unter Mitarbeit von Brenke, Gabriele (1995): "Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik – Band 2 Herausforderungen", Schriften des Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, München.

128 Sonja Puntcher-Riekmann (2001): "Europas Rolle in der Welt – Perspektiven einer europäischen Außenpolitik", in: Frankfurter Hefte, Die neue Gesellschaft 48/2001, S. 420 – 425.

129 Ch. III, p. 26.

Significant in terms of learning is not only military operational readiness, but also the ideal and objective of "leadership and civic education"—"the citizen in uniform"—the development of an awareness directed at Europe as a whole.¹³⁰

In the following pages a possible model tailored to the national armed forces organization will be discussed. A purposeful utilization of models always requires detailed knowledge about the respective players. Consequently, it must be stated as a fact that the qualities, capabilities and characteristic features of the players have not yet been sufficiently specified.¹³¹ Since 1990, the organizational members of the armed forces have been in a situation where—"in the middle of the game", so to speak--the cultural circumstances of the organization (meaning the previously mentioned general conditions) are changing, nobody knows how far, or even if, the reorganization will go on nor to what extent and in what way the developments brought about so far will continue to retain their validity for an operational force. Yet the record thus far gives one some cause for hope that the German soldier has been, and shall be able to master these tasks in manner of Kant's categorical imperative.

The "Cold War" was the centre of gravity that, until the year 1990, forged the armed forces together. The German armed forces had been conceived as an improved version of the Wehrmacht (in the operational sense) and fitted within German democracy integrated within the whole of the Atlantic alliance.

This was the "guiding concept" where the feasibility projections of the (inter)national military met; it determined the way in which players were looked at and fed capability analyses. The transformation of a complex organization of armed forces, however, requires considerably more coordinated interorganizational effort (for example, between the different institutional

¹³⁰ Hans G. Ehrhardt (2002): "Die Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. Positionen, Perzeptionen, Probleme, Perspektiven", in: Demokratie, Sicherheit, Frieden, Bd. 142, Baden Baden.

¹³¹ Max G. Manwaring (2000): "Deterrence and Conventional Military Forces", Small Arms & Insurgencies, Volume 11, Nr. 2, in: Deterrence and the Twenty - First Century, 2000, London, S. 60 – 71.

agencies and levels).¹³² Such tasks also unfolded with great success in the cold war period, as by the 1970s, the Bundeswehr grew into the second leading force.

Particularities of the military mission and the size and diversity of the military organization, moreover, made the identification of an eventually modified (i.e., transformed) and "cultural" military capacity for performance and innovation aimed at reducing complexity appear clearly more difficult.

This means, for instance, that orientation will move away from a hierarchical order toward cooperation and project structures. So far, cultural transformation continues to be more or less ignored¹³³--even if transformation is conceived as transformation of all members of the organization and of the overall organization as such. To some, however, this limitation is hardly comprehensible when looking at the existing armed forces and the goals of the transformation explained in the previous chapter. Thus, it will not be possible to provide a satisfactory description and solution of the orientation toward the future by staying within the limits of the tensions between the structural levels and their interconnections; rather, the meso- and macro-social levels in such organizations are of paramount importance.

The multi-level model in Figure 1 represents coordinated interorganizational relationships and further specifies properties of actors or mainly organizational-culture "capabilities" (conceptual responsibility rests with the Zentrum fuer Innere Fuehrung in Koblenz/Leadership Development and Civic Education Centre), is used as another point of reference, and will be shown again for illustration purposes.¹³⁴

As far as the organizational culture--the concept Innere Führung--of the Bundeswehr as an organization is concerned, a specific complex of problems has emerged in the grammar, which means within the process of transformation structuring. The basic cultural consensus striven for by way of the leadership

132 Linzer Magazin.

133 Ch. III, p. 27.

134 Wikipedia.

and civic education concept wants to accomplish something almost impossible, which is a general acceptance of the purposes of the organization despite its diversity of interests at all command echelons (a balancing act between the military, political, and social fields). While certain processes of change are always taking place and clearly have a functional character in terms of the respective interest structures, the idea of an armed forces organizational culture is to put to work these processes as organizational knowledge and as a coordinated option on future challenges, and to interconnect them appropriately.

What this boils down to is that the Bundeswehr will also, of necessity, have to tackle the cultural tasks involved in reaching the transformation development¹³⁵ level. The background was and continues to be primarily the changed framework conditions: there have been changes in the face of war¹³⁶, international cooperation, developments in cultures and societies, new types of operations (including the process of getting accustomed to them), and eventually the discussion of conscription versus "Cosmopolitan in Uniform".

Another - permanent - challenge resulting from Innere Führung is the development of a professional identity¹³⁷ in the armed forces and its members in an ever changing society and world order. The guiding question for the following discussion therefore aims at the HOW, the operational implementation. What are the conceptual inferences that avoid a functionalist, market-oriented adaptation of leadership and civic education, a by-product, so to speak, of transformation?

The attempt so far to capture cultural capabilities can be seen in Figure 1. In the future, the requirements regarding the soldiers' personality structure will be higher.¹³⁸ In the Figure 2 the German armed forces are depicted based upon the

135 Simon Davies, Ben Bolland, Kirsty Fisk and Mike Purvis (2001): "Strategic Futures Thinking: meta-analysis of published material on drivers and trends" DERA, June 2001. Retrieved 5/29/06 from www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/innovation/2000/strategic/meta.shtml.

136 Douglas A. Macgregor (1997): "Breaking the Phalanx: a new Design for Landpower in the 21st Century", Westport.

137 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (1993): "Internationales Umfeld, Sicherheitsinteressen und nationale Planung der Bundesrepublik", Teil B Band 1 – 3 / Teil C Band 1 – 12, Ebenhausen.

138 Millennium Project (Hrsg.) (1998): "Global Exploratory Scenarios", an excerpt from the '1998 State of the Future: Issues and Opportunities'. Retrieved 6/1/06 from www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Senate/4787/millennium/scenarios/explor-s.html.

multilevel model depicted at the end of the previous chapter. The lack of activities in the area of culture becomes again pretty evident, especially on the higher levels.¹³⁹ That means, conceptual work has to be done and new training programs have to be established in order to face the new requirements and tasks of the transformation.




Figure 2. Case Study "German Armed Forces"

Talking about a complex and multifunctional profile of soldierly competence while, at the same time, being able to respond to different role requirements is only the start. The question now is how to balance these different poles in an individual qualification and identification profile?

C. IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSFORMATION

A European military identity¹⁴⁰ is already being imparted across a transnational and military NATO infrastructure, which carries educational content

¹³⁹ Linzer Magazin.

¹⁴⁰ Krause.

into each military unit.¹⁴¹ This occurs on the basis of wilfully renouncing national sovereign rights in order to deepen military and political integration.¹⁴² The aim is to arrive at a personal mindset regarding the idea of Europe being worth defending (e.g., using the concepts of liberty and justice from European intellectual history, which must be continued). According to Royl (1998) these cultural pedagogical elements will then form the basis for the development of a European military identity. The point of departure is the *raison d'être*¹⁴³ of the armed forces, according to Baudissin: the armed forces will provide services to protect the European culture, to secure it and to shape peace in a society willing and ready to intervene. The soldiers must be able to draw on the contents of the European culture to develop the necessary frame of mind. Soldiers from one country must develop a mindset regarding the positive contributions made by the countries of other soldiers--from a current point of view--toward the development of Europe, in order to provide a basis for restructuring the requirements motivating the use of military force.¹⁴⁴ Taking these fundamental idealistic motifs and the implications of current cultural trends for national security (Chapter II) as a starting point, the development of a European military identity is an educational event that could also include reservists, particularly as leadership and civic education were designed as a steady, individual and social formation process. Therefore, this explanation will continue by going into more detail regarding the cultural development and its impact on the military field, in order to elucidate the connection between transformation, culture-related organizational development and the leadership and civic education concept. In the year 2005, the members

141 Rudolf Scharping (2002): Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung anlässlich der Veranstaltungsreihe "Berliner Dialog – Internationale Sicherheit" zum Thema "Europa in einer sich wandelnden Weltordnung" am 23. April 2002 in Berlin.

142 U.S. Center for Research & Education on Strategy & Technology - US-CREST (Hrsg.) (2000): "Coalition Military Operations: The Way Ahead Through Cooperability", Report of a French-German-UK-US Working Group, Arlington. Retrieved 4/22/06 from www.uscrest.org/finalrep.pdf.

143 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (1999): "Bestandsaufnahme", 03.05.1999

144 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (1993): Innere Führung.

of the Bundeswehr find themselves in a situation¹⁴⁵ where it is unclear to what degree the cultural codes they have until now learned and experienced during phases of tactical and operational dominance, and the way in which this happened, will retain their validity for the future¹⁴⁶ and even current operational spectrum. Such an uncertainty not only demands but provides the opportunity for a conceptual reorientation (=transformation), which was therefore already depicted in the previous chapter.

For the German armed forces, this means—even forced by the cultural development—a dynamization boost to be resolved not only through functional and technical, but also through further adaptation patterns. The more these factors have in common, the more Germany has occasion to assume that the interactive processes taking place during operations will generate results compatible with transformation. Every process of change—hence, the transformation, too—is based on this information processing and identification process and, to prevent *Innere Führung* from dwindling to a mere leadership philosophy in the tactical sense, its services may also be enlisted to support the concept for identity formation. The recommended revision of *Innere Führung* would then contradict the alleged lack of purpose and disorientation since 1990 or 2001 (organized crime, terrorism, civil war). What is the aim of further cultural development, meaning, what are the specific development tasks to be handled in connection with transformation or to be derived for the purpose of such complex interplay of effects?

The structural changes of the asymmetric military-terrorist threat in connection with the events of 11 September 2001 also changed the cultural requirements¹⁴⁷ for a European defence system, to be inferred from the

145 Francis W. Carter, Peter Jordan, and Violetta Rey (Hrsg.) (1996): “Central Europe after the Fall of the Iron Curtain. Geological Perspectives, Spatial Patterns and Trends”, 2. Edition 1998, Wiener Osteuropa Studien Band 4, Österreichisches Ost- und Südosteuropa-Institut, Wien.

146 E.V. Hiik, (Hrsg.) (2001): “Konfliktbarometer 2001. Krisen – Kriege – Putsch – Verhandlungen – Vermittlungen – Friedensschlüsse. 10. Jährliche Konfliktanalyse.” Retrieved 5.28.06 from www.hiik.de/konfliktbarometer/index.htm.

147 John D.K. Russell (2002): “Asymmetry” – A Thinkpiece by the Director General Development and Doctrine GBR, 1st Draft vom 10.01.2002.

emancipative potential that has so far been considerably underestimated.¹⁴⁸ In the context of the cultural development of the armed forces organizations, and in order to be successful in operation, the requirements for each serviceman (as well as the entire organization) to make substantial adaptation efforts quickly becomes evident due to the sudden integration and cooperation in multinational contingents. If the leadership and civic education concept--in the context of cultural change and the original purpose of the concept Innere Führung--is to master this change, situations must be diagnosed, possible future developments anticipated, necessary changes recognized, leeway for action gained, and approaches to solutions evaluated and implemented. For its purposeful implementation in the Bundeswehr, the pedagogical interest in a European military identity will have to be fleshed out by way of the rekindled popularity and applicability of the concept of education (identity + competence). It will be necessary to identify learning objectives and determine which behaviour will be adequate in connection with certain subject contents in order to do justice to the delicate situation of the special pedagogical role claimed by the Bundeswehr. The following treats the development of a European military identity.

1. European Military Identity¹⁴⁹

Basically, cultural development takes place by means of symbols, according to interests and habits, yet primarily in a cultural and social context. Culture is reprocessed by fellow members of society according to the stereotypes they encounter. Therefore, culture is an outsider's view of what the insider produces. This is contrary to popular opinion that argues that culture is a group who demonstrate similar qualities. Different definitions of culture reflect different theories for understanding - or criteria for evaluating - human activity. Instead of highlighting the differences, the present model therefore focuses on common European features. In this context, it must be noted that the concept of education used to be highly controversial, and has always been quite

¹⁴⁸ Ch. II, p. 6.

¹⁴⁹ Wolfgang Roysl. Retrieved 6/10/06 from www.fachportal-paedagogik.de/fis_bildung.

questionable, because it includes problematic connotations.¹⁵⁰ Still, this train of thought has to be discussed in more detail by looking more closely into dispositional and detailed learning objectives (following Strittmatter).

Together, members of the organization develop common assumptions regarding the aspired reality of the organization and its goals. They come to an agreement concerning these reality assumptions or negotiate them with one another. This understanding shakes the assumption, taken for granted, that all members of an organization always have a clear understanding of the common reality (rationality of political education) in its foundations. During the "Cold War", for instance, certain forms of interaction and communication (but still the East German army and Russia were not "enemies") in the Bundeswehr rigidified, so that they could no longer be experienced in context and were no longer challenged due to their habitual, routine use. From this perspective, cultural learning would thus be linked with a reactive learning concept.

This form of education challenges the institutional context of action, while standards and objectives need to be redefined. This redefining process is based on opening up, assessing and propagating new knowledge while exercising constructive criticism and abandoning obsolete knowledge. This, of course, includes saying goodbye to ingrained action patterns and assumptions.¹⁵¹

Cultural interoperability is thus the target projection for the cultural development within the context of the transformation of the Bundeswehr, which will prevent right away any suspicion of operational forces--also from different countries--being favored or disfavored over others. Intercultural appreciation is attributed to equality in operations¹⁵² and when expected to make sacrifices. Preparing a military organization for contingencies of this type during times of

150 Jürgen Kuhlmann and David R. Segal (1994): "Armed Forces at the Dawn of the Third Millennium", in: Forum International, Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München.

151 This idea is also present in Carl von Clausewitz: "Vom Kriege", Hinterlassenes Werk des Generals Carl von Clausewitz. Vollständige Ausgabe im Urtext, drei Teile in einem Band, 19. Auflage, Bonn 1980 und 1991 (1. Auflage 1832-1834).

152 Klaus-Jürgen Gantzel (2002): "Neue Kriege? Neue Kämpfer?", Arbeitspapier 2/2002 der Forschungsstelle Kriege, Rüstung und Entwicklung, Universität Hamburg.

peace requires both weapons handling (functionality through skill) and, above all, mental training. This leads to the definition of dispositional learning objectives.

Dispositional learning objectives are differentiated from operation-specific objectives in that they set the internal conditions for a number of different behaviors instead of tying behavioral elements to teaching contents.¹⁵³ Such dispositional objectives have their didactic worth in making personnel who will be part of a European military identity sensitive to the fact that positive behavior on the outside must be rooted in a corresponding mental attitude.

- Having developed an awareness for the necessity of internal and external security for Europe
- wanting to make a contribution to European security
- deeming the people of past or present opponents worth of the same degree of protection as one's own people
- considering security problems in a pan-European perspective
- developing an awareness for something
- identifying with something
- setting one's mind on something
- accepting something as a positive value
- combining individual and organizational objectives for the purpose of transformation

An example of a specific objective is: How could the planned process be recognizably reflected in the individual person's behavior? The standard didactic procedure to use is the operationalization of learning objectives. The following examples are used to illustrate this point:

Security Policy Awareness: being able to name present crisis areas; being able to describe the changes in military threats; assessing Europe's position.

Cultural Identification: being able to describe France's accomplishments in the development of universal human rights; being able to explain the

¹⁵³ Hermann Hagen and Reinhard Mutz (2001): "Streitkräfte und Strategien. Sicherheitspolitik kontrovers diskutiert", in: Demokratie, Sicherheit, Frieden, Bd. 138, Baden Baden.

connection between the USA and European development of human rights (Statue of Liberty); being able to judge the mental barriers separating Turkey and Greece.

Development of Knowledge: staying informed on security policy; visiting military units; participating in military exercises; dealing with the arguments brought forth by peace initiatives in an objective way.

Acceptance of Values: being able to establish the connection between the oath of office or enlistment and routine duty; being able to show recognition of and commitment to the common good in one's conduct of life; supporting the upkeep of war graves.

In the Figure 3 the correlation of those elements is depicted as an interaction between (intercultural) awareness, (personal) will, (individual) thinking and (individual) identification.

For instance, these elements could be focused by the new established training for change management at the German staff and command college in Hamburg.

154 General von Kirchbach wrote a book about the use of the military for civilian purposes ("Mit Herz und mit Hand"). The retired general Schoenbohm wrote in his book "Zwei Armeen und ein Vaterland. Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee" about his experiences in this specific field.




Figure 3. European Military Identity (1) - Curricular Concept

The idea is to expand the concept of defence readiness that is rooted in national identity to include a sense of European security needs. It is through communication that the *notion of transformation* is eventually strengthened and

developed and its organizational effectiveness increased.¹⁵⁵ All efforts an army is engaged in are eventually legitimized by the overarching purpose pursued by the organization, which they serve.

Defence in a purely nationally oriented form is evidently no longer enough of a purpose in view of the known threats.¹⁵⁶ Therefore, the pedagogical interest is first and foremost directed at the formation of the individual self. Now, the question arises as to the model that might be the underlying concept for such a development task, and what kind of support could be helpful to promote this development in the context of transformation.

From a learning theory perspective, the questions must be answered how the desire for defence and military defence competence, firmly rooted in a sustainable organizational culture, can be taught.




Figure 4. European Military Identity (2) - Curricular Concept

155 U.S. Center for Research & Education on Strategy & Technology - US-CREST (Hrsg.) (2000): "Coalition Military Operations: The Way Ahead Through Cooperability", Report of a French-German-UK-US Working Group, Arlington. Retrieved 4/22/06 from www.uscrest.org/finalrep.pdf.

156 Hoffmann.

Hence, the Bundeswehr is the place where the spirit of European military identity can be formed and be communicated, at first as a role identity with the possibility of integrating essential elements of this identity as segments into the formation of the self. Numerous autobiographies are proof of this process. The serviceman of the Bundeswehr organization who sharpens his awareness of identity in this way will stand up for tolerance toward dissenters and consequently maintain the *openness of the political system* typical of a democracy.¹⁵⁷ This task should be integrated into the curriculum dealing with the practical application of the concept of *Innere Führung* (leadership and civic education) during military training, but should also be found in other learning locations outside of the sphere of the Bundeswehr and in the context of state institutions. One aspect of European military identity is the establishment of the Franco-German Brigade, for instance, which is aimed at improving alliance qualities (and the differentiation from NGOs in the theatre of operations). Owing to its manageable size and political weight, this bi-national brigade provides an area for perfecting of the European military identity in the context of a sustainable organizational culture, to practice the considerable stress generated by multi-nationalism, and to give the highly fragile and unstable identity of the armed forces a profiling mark.¹⁵⁸ The established multinational airborne elements last, but not least, provide the chance to apply the program for the development of a European military identity, not just under the conditions of two interacting partners as is the case with the Franco-German Brigade, but entering into relationships with more different nations (care must, however, be taken to prevent the formation of exclusive rights or extreme elites within the military ethics as could occasionally be observed to happen within the leadership of the Special Forces Command). The Europeans, moreover, should take advantage of their common operation in the Balkans to seek ways for intensifying effective cooperation. Not only is training

¹⁵⁷ U.S. Secretary of Defense (2001): "Transformation Study Report. Transforming Military Operational Capabilities", Washington D.C.

¹⁵⁸ Huber, "Armee der Zukunft".

together the best basis for tackling common tasks, but it would be beneficial to everyone and signal awareness of security interests.¹⁵⁹

Variations of this basic pattern always tend to show up when, for instance, the commander in theatre is of different nationality. The commitment to Europe derives thus from the personnel's roots in the European culture and the dependence of the European culture on those ties. Eventually, this commitment will serve the Bundeswehr by making the development of military identity part of the transformation in an everyday military culture.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁹ Yonah Alexander and Michael S. Swetnam (2001): "Usama bin Laden's al-Qaida: Profile of a terrorist network", Portland.

¹⁶⁰ Stefan Mair (2002): "Die Globalisierung privater Gewalt. Kriegsherren, Rebellen, Terroristen und organisierte Kriminalität", SWP-Studie, April 2002, Berlin, S. 10.

Making European security interests (in this case caused by the cultural developments), and the European defence readiness¹⁶¹, part of the personality means therefore developing a European military identity. The establishment of cultural interoperability is aimed at creating innovative prerequisites which will enable military personnel to cope with future conflicts.¹⁶² Hence, creating cultural interoperability means reaching a common understanding of the quality military defence readiness is to have in the future. Being a member of the European armed forces will then mean the cultural integration of the readiness to loyally serve and bravely defend Europe and make it relevant to any action. This approach intentionally avoids the image of Europe as a supranational edifice, because this would easily blur the phased nature of the inductive structure of European military identity.




Figure 5. European Military Identity (3) - Curricular Concept

¹⁶¹ Daniel Plesch and Jack Seymour (2000): "A Conflict Prevention Service for the European Union", British American Security Information Council, Research Report 2/2000.

¹⁶² Ch. II, p. 11.

Based upon the prospects of a European military identity depicted in the figure above, the following description turns to the target projection established in connection with the development of--so to speak--cultural capabilities.

The awareness of Europe's common ground¹⁶³ will have to be planned in a didactically stringent manner and supported by using effective methods of logical communication processes. Cultural development is aimed at creating new cultural (problem-solving) capabilities (also to support and accompany structural optimization measures in a social context) by detecting, correcting and, above all, establishing or altering organizational operational relationships ("group-specific identity potential"). Taking the current speed at which multinationalization of major units (MND, European Corps, ARRC¹⁶⁴, etc.) is taking place, the act of transforming in a purely reactive, semantic (i.e., rhetorical) manner does not suffice.

Particularly as, until now, no tangible concept of leadership and civic education can be recognized as cultural response to the requirements of on-going operations¹⁶⁵, and, so far, the connection between state, armed forces and society has not undergone further substantial development (this lack can also be noticed in politics/society, not only at the Leadership Development and Civic Education Centre. The concept of leadership guidance, however, seems to be the only innovation coming from Koblenz {Zentrum Innere Fuehrung} so far, which has unfortunately no relevance to culture-related development.) As has already been discussed, it is of considerable importance that the discussion of leadership and civic education and transformation that, so far, has been lacking any distinctive quality, will time and again preventively clarify and demonstrate what is being transformed--when, with what practical consequences, for whom, by whom, with what effort in terms of time and technology, and with what further consequences.

163 Puntscher-Riekmann.

164 Allied rapid reaction corps.

165 German MOD (ed), Defence Policy Guidelines.

2. Cultural Awareness

The following part of this chapter will deal with the details of the concept on the development of intercultural competence. Owing to the nature of a dynamic and innovative society¹⁶⁶, the future demands a complex self-image and capability profile of soldiers. Therefore, a few ideas will be presented on why "intercultural competence" during education and training, at least for officer candidates/officers¹⁶⁷, is absolutely imperative. The fact that the "Bundeswehr" as an organizational system is overly complicated is currently also reflected in the way the complexity of the system is perceived and in the fact that too much is expected of the servicemen, for instance, on operations or even during pre-deployment training.¹⁶⁸ This excessive inherent complexity appears in the forms of diversity (the amount of data is too much to handle), in the form of multiplicity (alternative courses of action bear numerous uncertainties), and in the form of multi-ethnic and multi-religious oppositions (the individual must deal with conflicting requirements).¹⁶⁹

What is lacking so far is a well arranged, practice-oriented, exemplary and methodical answer.¹⁷⁰ If this chapter treats the European military identity and intercultural competence for the military commander as a consequence of learning processes rooted in an organizational culture in the Bundeswehr, this will be done against the background of international crisis management as a part of the task spectrum, with intercultural encounters inevitably happening in this environment. Possible training concepts are depicted in the figure below. In addition, anticipatory crisis awareness may be recognized as an element of cultural development, and corresponding interfunctional qualifying programmes are demanded that aim at shared strategic responsibility. The close links

166 Jan-Phillipp Weisswange (2002): "Innere Sicherheit als Aspekt des erweiterten Sicherheitsbegriffs", in: ÖMZ 2/2002, S. 153 – 162.

167 Mannhardt, 1999.

168 Bernard von Plate (1999): "Grundelemente der Globalisierung", in: Informationen zur politischen Bildung, Nr. 263 "Globalisierung"; Bonn.

169 Reiner K. Huber, (2001): "Die Erneuerung der Bundeswehr: Anfang eines weitergehenden Umbauprozesses?", in: Europäische Sicherheit 4/2001, S. 25 – 29.

170 Ch. III, p.13.

between the armed forces, the economic sector and economic thinking now also influence the command and organization processes, and sometimes even lead to a dangerous estrangement, even separation, of leadership and civic education. Multilateralism in this case rests between the conflicting areas of military efficiency and the integration of political objectives (e.g., national rules of engagement, staff work, military action by the different contingents).¹⁷¹ Which positive experience from trade and industry can be transferred to the armed forces? This idea, further, was originally in Graf Baudissin's idea in the 1950s, and followed the lead of Ludendorff in 1917 in his re-invention of the tactical level for defensive war, that is, a functionalist levelling of hierarchy and an equality of task organization. Take, for instance, experience gained from overcoming communication barriers between down-to-earth, everyday, and expert cultural views of problems.




Figure 6. Cultural Awareness

¹⁷¹ Hoffmann.

The following culture-dependent orientations may be mentioned as primary elements of such a cognitive pattern and, thus, important features of intercultural competence:

- initiative to take up contact
- willingness to communicate
- purposeful interaction
- appreciative interaction
- emotional stability

For the purpose of an elementary framework condition, the entire exchange of information and communication--by way of an analysis of the new security environment¹⁷²--is to focus initially on the learning measures aimed at the attainment of intercultural skills, and the resulting structural consequences and special issues, within a foreseeable period of time for all participants in an operation abroad.¹⁷³ All the above, however, do not exist as isolated subjects, but will mutually interact and support each other, especially since education is a key issue for the armed forces and the development of leadership and civic education. Intercultural competence has a guiding, as well as motivating and coordinating, effect. Especially in situations which are largely unsettled and uncertain, causing traditional orientation, motivation and coordination patterns to dissolve and lose their social binding force, it may help to manage such situations. Possible training concepts are, for instance: Information-, culture-, interaction-, and comprehension-oriented training. In all cases the aim is to impart a cognitive orientation structure. The method pursued in Innere Führung should therefore not only be applied to analyses, but also to the conclusions to be drawn from within the transformation process! Which framework parameters must be considered? The world is obviously becoming increasingly complicated.

At the social level it is the tendency toward individualism, but also the conditions of ever-rising standards, such as "new wars" and internationalization. In addition, there are surges of knowledge, with increasing amounts of

¹⁷² Plesch and Seymour.

¹⁷³ Vollert.

information becoming obsolete within ever-shorter periods of time. Consequently, confidence-building structures are needed. Under the confusing conditions outlined, cultural learning builds up confidence that has gotten lost in time and space. Transformation is therefore becoming increasingly necessary as a rationalization strategy within the rapid changes in the global security environment¹⁷⁴, because the organization in its false primacy of the market as the sole arbiter of all norms cannot handle uncertainty. Cultural learning is one way now to put an end to this feeling of powerlessness. Cultural development, moreover, offers new leeway for consensus and harmonization. And thus, conceptually, many hopes are raised by, and much is projected into, this rationalization type. In the future, the armed forces organization will distinguish itself by its interlinking and networking, and the use of all its potentials.¹⁷⁵

Transformation appears, then, in an optimistic sense to be a metaphor for change based on distinguishing between knowledge and ignorance. To one way of thinking, this is all about filling the system with knowledge, meaning basing networked organizations on knowledge--and with the equipment mode being set to transformation for the time being. The "citizens in uniform" are--so far--the ones who keep knowledge available for the system, thus making it accessible.

Accessibility of the knowledge will be ensured and purposefully organized through networking. The organization "transforms", in as much as the accessibility of knowledge is well organized by way of a holistic access to the subjects. Not only must knowledge about transformation be acquired and taught, but this knowledge must also be made available to the organization, and the consequences of this knowledge must be made accessible. Moreover, this knowledge must be organized and distributed via networking processes ("homo connectus"). The aim is to reach a higher efficiency through better use of the human resources available and the social conditions. From the perspective of theory, only a learning concept reduced with respect to system theory and

¹⁷⁴ Peter Truscott (2000): "European Defence. Meeting the strategic challenge." in: Institute for Public Policy Research (Hrsg.), London.

¹⁷⁵ Scherpenberg.

constructivism seems to be conceivable for the implementation of transformation in the cultural sphere of the overall organization.¹⁷⁶ For that purpose, learning necessitates a differential impulse, i.e., a perception of a difference of the awareness system or the social communication system: the observation of difference (integration of differential impulses into existing structures and the possibilities of future processes that permit updating). The effect of the cultural development is the subjective and communication-based competence--and that is the desired product of the systemic rationalization intentions of transformation, and will be the result of coupling subject-related processes with communication-related processes. As a concept, it is especially designed to rationalize this context. Without soldiers who keep learning--more precisely, who are receptive to learning and also willing to learn--there will be no transformed and transforming organization.¹⁷⁷ Learning defies delegation, which is indicative of the fact that transformation will always be fraught with uncertainty.¹⁷⁸ And it is exactly this uncertainty that appears to be the driving and productive factor.

Transformation and understanding its necessity are therefore the consequences of modernization through transformation, but they are also in the service of a systemic modernization and reflexive rationalization of the armed forces themselves who, in return, produce results and follow-up capabilities, render possible the finding of meaning, and organize complexity. On the other hand, the organization also needs reductions in complexity. Thus, the operationalization of the modernization problems proceeds in accordance with the principles of leadership and civic education. Owing to this conversion into a business-like structure (that is, the connection with economic realities and their purposeful control) the form of specialist military training will also change. This type mostly requires adjustments regarding future-oriented leadership and management and the design of strategic changes.

¹⁷⁶ Martin Hoch (2001): "Krieg und Politik im 21. Jahrhundert", in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Zeitschrift 'Das Parlament' 20/2001, Berlin.

¹⁷⁷ Günter Joetze (1999): "Außen- und sicherheitspolitische Aspekte der Globalisierung", Arbeitspapier zur Tagung 'Globalisierung als Aufgabe' – Handlungsmöglichkeiten und Gestaltungsoptionen der Politik, Loccum.

¹⁷⁸ U.S. Secretary of Defense.

It is no longer merely a functional, selective compensating and designing agency, but is intended to give more and more modernization impetuses, affecting the overall organization. Cultural development will be the normal situation for each individual and a standard requirement for all members of the organization. It thus represents a mode that is assigned almost universal performance of processing accelerated modernization dynamics in the organization. Transformation is therefore the permanent expectation of the organization's leadership regarding the adjustment requirements in view of cursory changes during the modernization process.¹⁷⁹ Consequently, the term transformation also serves to designate consistent and permanent optimization of the capabilities of the Bundeswehr organization in a holistic-systemic perspective.¹⁸⁰ Innere Führung education is thus to an increasing extent approached with the expectation of a far-reaching catalogue of tasks wholly drawn from the unchanging requirement of soldiers to adjust to the altered political and social conditions of their service, not the least of which is the imperative for a single European armed force and a transformed ideal of the soldier.

¹⁷⁹ Michèle Griffin (2000): "Where Angels Fear to Tread. Trends in International Intervention", SAGE Publications, Vol. 31(4), S. 421 – 435.

¹⁸⁰ Kleinsteuber and Thomaß.




Figure 7. General Conditions

In a consistent manner, transformation organizes the forms of operation toward a self-organization capability through high-value networking.¹⁸¹ These means and forms will in future allow for flexible and short-notice coordination. To sum up, the figure above shows the interaction of military identity, intercultural awareness and cultural development – managed by transformation.

The organization management¹⁸² must now, to an increasing degree, also find ways to deal with new confusions that it has helped generate, as has been proven several times. The figure above depicts the correlation – as cause and effect at the same time.

This idea not only implies the theory of education and training as established by Scharnhorst¹⁸³, but also sensitizes individuals for the importance of knowledge, its storage, classification, structuring and immediate availability to

¹⁸¹ U.S. Secretary of Defense.

¹⁸² U.S. Center for Research & Education on Strategy & Technology.

¹⁸³ Carl von Clausewitz, "Über das Leben und den Charakter von Scharnhorst," in *Historisch-politische Zeitschrift* 1 (1832).

each and everyone as an imperative prerequisite for the capabilities of an organization. Today, in this context, the establishment of a culture of learning/knowledge is discussed, a "system of systems", or "knowledge management". It is to be followed by a necessary expansion of the performance of cultural and pedagogical processes for the modernization of the organization (ongoing operations) in everyday communication (MND, Euro Corps, ARRC, etc.)

One could only truly speak of a transformed Bundeswehr organization if cultural developments were to introduce a certain reflectivity into the system and if that capacity for self-reflection were to become part of a strategy of changing one's own identity¹⁸⁴. Such a capacity for self-reflection would then be a characteristic feature of a systemic, rationalized and transformed Bundeswehr organization. Indications of modernization would then be reflected in the educationally rather attractive terms of European military identity and intercultural competence. In this context it must, however, be emphasized that getting this aspect organized is not "for free". It is rather a question of cultural development being tied to a number of progressive pre-conditions. The benefit of the suggested concept reveals itself especially here, in the fact that "soft" parameters, too, are of equal analytical importance. It also builds on essential communication prerequisites such as, for instance, readiness for coordination, motivation to perform, capability for innovation and, last but not least, mutual trust between leaders and followers at all command echelons. The issue here is in part one of mental pre-conditions that, realistically speaking, will in parts at least only be the results of corresponding learning processes. Once again, cultural development--meaning the implementation of transformation in leadership and civic education placed on a pedagogic footing--is meant as a preventive approach, allowing the Bundeswehr to continue into the future by enabling systematic learning and reflection steps regarding the Bundeswehr-relevant environmental conditions.¹⁸⁵ Within the Bundeswehr, the aspects of security

¹⁸⁴ Franz Uhle-Wettler (2001): "Der Krieg – gestern, heute – morgen?" Hamburg/ Berlin/ Bonn.

¹⁸⁵ Seibert.

policy, structure and organizational culture will develop their optimum networking quality¹⁸⁶ only if everyone involved is adequately informed of the challenges "their" organization may possibly face in the future, and included in the corresponding planning. The only "counter-chance" here is to retain the hierarchy and establish a uniform team structure (cp. DSO¹⁸⁷), which permits the assumption that an improved internal understanding and confidence building will be possible due to "streamlined" conditions of communication and cognition.

Second, the growing importance of cultural development indicates that, in socially and technologically highly condensed contexts of modern military command structures and multinational bodies of forces, adaptability and innovation gain will have to be necessarily reconstructed and re-organized completely in terms of individual and organizational interests, if they are to be successful regarding strategic-operational objectives. Consequently, in order to be successful, transformation must always aim at the highest degree of synergistic effects between the existing specialized technological, structural and socio-cultural variables. For the success of multinational cooperation¹⁸⁸ with allies, it is evidently of growing importance as well to what level of precision the essential structural and intercultural parameters can be reflected and stably maintained. With this "new" view of international cooperation, obsolete ideological patterns--leftovers from the era of the "cold war"--would be left behind for good and hitherto unknown chances for cultural synergy could be discovered.

Here, the transformation concept depicted in the previous chapter serves as a platform and basis for reflection, providing the chance for the organizational orientation to undergo spiritual regeneration and to make positive use of the potential for performance of the individual members of the organization. What this chapter intended to demonstrate here is that there are promising prospects and learning achievements; in practice, however, the military and political

186 U.S. Center for Research & Education on Strategy & Technology.

187 Division for Special Operations.

188 Vollert.

leaderships are only beginning to create and implement lasting cultural development as a medium of improved efficiency of the overall organization.

Based on this, the guiding questions--how transformation can be learned through cultural development tasks, how the relevant knowledge can be stored and made accessible, how knowledge management can be established and what communicational exchange processes could look like--were formulated.

Hence, what is organized is no longer culture, but organizations that are in the process of "learning" culture; culture is therefore "in" and is an attractive label for all those organizations who wish to be at the "vanguard of progress" (according to Clausewitz) and, on the other hand, possess high connective value for business and economic contexts.

Nevertheless, modesty is called for when it comes to the practical implementation of the idea or concept of cultural development in the context of transformation. For one cannot force cultural development. Therefore, what is needed en route to transformation is, above all, time; time is, however, conceded to an ever-increasing degree in view of today's dynamic environments. This applies not only to personnel, but also to the organization itself. The transformation of the force organization is therefore primarily a target concept for organizations undergoing a modernization, that is, a transformation process.

Yet, transformation would be doomed to fail if it were reduced to a fleeting, spontaneous and superficial project already dependent on declarations of goodwill, networking euphoria and noble objectives of humanitarian intervention.

Furthermore, it became evident that the involved subjective identities would have to harmonize different framework conditions on the one hand, and cognitive and social dispositions on the other hand, if "transformation" were not only to be calculable, but a real, factual, integral part of organizational learning.

Again, it can be predicted that the intermediate significance of a concept of cultural development for the military community and also for the state will continuously grow. It is at this point already that transformation has an essential

importance for the Bundeswehr, as it makes "learning" a central metaphor of adaptability and innovation. This will undoubtedly increase its chances to organize sufficient learning in view of the complexity of the environment.

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V. CONCLUSION

At the beginning of the 21st century, neither the fears of pure high-tech wars conducted by automated “warfighters” nor the utopia of a world (or at least a Europe) without conflict have come true. After the 11 September 2001 assaults on the symbolic centers of US financial and military power, the existence of worldwide terrorist networks seems to be one of the most apparent political, social and cultural threats, not only to international security but also to individual safety.

However, there are other dangers lurking as well. Twenty-first-century conflicts cannot easily be summarized or defined under a catchphrase. It is, however, possible to describe general conditions and individual cases, draw lessons from them in a sense valuable for the soldier, and thus infer future options and alternatives. In this context, such phenomena as religion and values plainly loom larger today than thirty years ago as elements of cultural development and communication. The discussion or evaluation of some of these phenomena is controversial because of the latent potential to radicalize and polarize all sides into the worst kind of ideological war that tends toward Clausewitz’s postulate of absolute war. However, in order to face future requirements for transformation, one must surely be able to think about them on the conceptual level.¹⁸⁹

As far as knowledge of contemporary conflicts is concerned, the following can be asserted: the main reason for conflicts all over the world seems to be unresolved issues of power and society, often filtered through ethnic affiliation (i.e., ethnicity), religion and economic interests. At any rate, ethnicity and religion easily lend themselves to being weaponized in the course of armed conflicts. Conflicts are still carried out with the help of conventional weapons, but also with the help of high-tech weapons and advanced technology. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction into irregular armed groups in conflict for all

¹⁸⁹ Stefan Hartwig, *Konfliktpotentiale der Zukunft (Conflict Potentials of the Future)*, Eckartschift 158, Wien 2001, p. 3.

encompassing ideological ends poses a threat to societies unaccustomed to armed conflict and through their ever greater complexity and interconnectedness, possibly more vulnerable to some kind of knock-out blow--however this idea has been undermined by the record of the 20th century. Nonetheless, one can surely assert that the distinctions between crime, war and civil war are becoming blurred. The repercussions of these conflicts directly threaten Europe and Germany.

A great number of conflicts in Europe are taking place largely unnoticed because they are of no interest to great powers or Western media and relief organizations who think in economic terms. In addition, people receive distorted impressions of many conflicts that are presented in the European media on account of propaganda/disinformation, media control and misinterpretation.

The unexploited potential within the institution of Innere Führung requires reform within the ideal of transformation. The neglect to exploit the full potential of Innere Führung amid the transformation of the Bundeswehr has led to a lowering of the individual skills in multinational units that goes beyond the different languages. This phenomenon actually calls the purpose of transformation into question, creates areas of different perception/misunderstandings and consequently leads to a partial loss of efficiency on the part of the military. Finally, the conditions in multilateral missions, which will become a permanent fixture, will provide a growing challenge for recruitment.

Transformation processes and international units show that highly developed military organizations not only exert a large influence on their own environment and resources, but also on national problems as well as on the European level. To be sure, those who experience service in multi-national units derive more profit from it than not; in more cases than not such service allows the mastery of retrograde nationalist and particularist impulses and fosters a sense of common purpose, identity and values in those who have direct experience of such service. Failure to exploit this phenomenon within the institutions of

education and training of the Bundeswehr has such consequences as: limitation of financial freedom of movement, recruitment problems, growing importance of language skills and the development of Euro-military identity and intercultural awareness. Additional key problems include the technology and training on the tactical level.

However, the more time goes by for necessary modifications of Innere Führung, the higher the potential for ensuing insecurity in inefficient work will be. It is in particular the work in multinational units of the developing and transforming European battlegroups that are affected by the interdependencies of an intercultural environment. These new forces, which can surely draw on more than a half century of positive experience in the realm of identity, command, leadership and morale

In many parts of the German army, the original approach for the innovation of the concept Innere Führung has gone astray and requires a renewed emphasis. Innere Führung cannot be merely a motivational tactic divorced from its more central professional purpose as a core ideal of the German soldier. Moreover, one can find many misperceptions and misunderstandings regarding the meaning of Innere Führung¹⁹⁰. In this context the original essence of Innere Führung became debased from its original purpose and became its opposite. Nevertheless amid the perils of the present and with the positive opportunities thrown open to European soldiers by transformation, Germans and Europeans may give Innere Führung and use it in the context of cultural development for democratization of the military in general and preparation of multilateral missions.

It is expected that by 2025 multinational units will become normal even on the battalion level. At present, more than half of the European armies are deployed with multinational units into an international environment—so far without any kind of focused cultural training. The lack of proper execution of the core ideal of leadership and command is consequently quite evident. Particularly in

¹⁹⁰ Carl Gero von Ilsemann, "Die Innere Führung in den Streitkräften," Regensburg 1981, S. 232, 284 f.

reference to the change of the new preconditions for the use of military, it seems to be highly important to improve the concept of Innere Führung in the framework of the transformation.

To face the new cultural challenges, the German armed forces have to become more competitive with civilian companies. Therefore expressions such as identity and awareness need to get more attention in the training. In particular the element “intercultural awareness”, as depicted in the previous chapter, can profit from an intense cooperation with the civilian sector. Furthermore, central elements of Innere Führung are supposed to be established on the European level. This can only be reached by an interinstitutional approach supported by the German DoD and government. Maybe in as little as 15 years, even smaller European armies and non-governmental organizations or individuals/groups will be able to operate with a newly established “Task Force Innere Führung”.¹⁹¹

While on the one hand the European harmonization already developed by the foundation of different European units such as the battlegroups in particular offers certain financial advantages, consequently cultural differences run the risk of being marginalized in this process. However, modifications have to be limited there where they do adjust to a lower level. Thus, transformation—on the European level—does offer underdeveloped structural capabilities/assets new conceptual opportunities, but it also threatens the concept of Innere Führung with potential marginalization. Marginalization results in instabilities that potentially jeopardize the process of further democratization of the existing armed forces. The consequences of the ensuing crises and (armed) conflicts will, for the reasons already mentioned, also affect the Bundeswehr.

Fundamentalist movements vehemently resist both the successes of the modernizing civilization process and the real or putative threat to their own cultural traditions from the cultural globalization taking place in all religions and civilizations of the world. In this context, the following questions arise: Which religious interpretations and theological paradigms allow for a legitimization of

¹⁹¹ Universität Kassel, “Demokratie Hort Nicht am Kasernentor auf,” p. 3. Retrieved 6/4/06 from <http://www.uni-kassel.de/fb5/frieden/themen/Bundeswehr/wehrbericht-ifsh.html>.

violence? Which groups and persons use them? What are the historical circumstances under which individuals employ such legitimization patterns? The history of Europe in the last five hundred years, when seen in an analytical manner, offers many suggestions at how at least a significant part of the world has mastered these issues and moved from perpetual conflict to greater peace and prosperity without mass murder.

The conditions under which the “dark side” of a religion appears in the political and social realms seem to vary. However, it is undeniable that on account of the economic and social pressure prevalent in times of change, and increasing social polarization and discrimination, many individuals find security and comfort in their traditional religion. During these times of modernization and change, when people are threatened with social degradation, cultural uncertainty, economic hopelessness and the failure of corrupt political elites, many people regard political fundamentalism as the only remaining solution to their existential problems. In principle, religions or civilizations do not wage war against each other. Rather, they are employed as a political weapon in international power struggles and as an instrument to mobilize the masses. Ethnification and de secularization are an effective strategy and will continue to be employed again and again. Therefore, the radicalization via extreme ideologies in (armed) conflict to legitimize, motivate and recruit a following is also to be expected in the future. This development suggests an emerging multipolar world order whose design, however, can on the one hand lead to the cooperation of the main players, but does on the other hand involve various risks of confrontation.

In addition many minorities, especially in the eastern part of this region, are living under conditions that represent a considerable potential for possible ethnic conflicts.

All these factors are converging in the field of cultural trends that, on account of its importance, is of central interest to many states, and in particular to

the developed European industrial nations. Also, in view of the events of 11 September 2001, particular attention must be once again paid to cultural trends as depicted in Chapter II.¹⁹²

The beginning of the 21st century represents part of a transformation phase that will shape the future—for the military and the state. The times where individual training was primarily focused on national conditions seem to be coming to an end. Security interests can only be addressed through the further democratization of the military. In a multi-national context toward a certain supranational idea of Europe and beyond Alliances extend this democratization (among other things, via a political solidarity effect). The distinction between national and international units and deployments seems to be becoming increasingly blurred and such a phenomenon represents a considerable potential for a positive outcome, if soldiers and defense civilians approach the task with the right ideas and suitable tools. The network of relations in international policy will become much more complex. And those with the most at stake, that is we in the West, have the greatest requirement to overcome the destructive effects of just this change. On account of the numerous interrelations between the many cultural trends, particularist solutions can no longer be effective. Therefore, there is an increasing need for national solutions and beyond, for example in the areas of Euro-military identity and intercultural awareness of the establishment of *Innere Führung* on the European level, and at the level of the international organizations.¹⁹³

This is why the cultural challenges that are faced in the 21st century represent not only the defense against risks and dangers but above all the active development of the existing concept of *Innere Führung*. Another challenge that must be coped with is the new forms of leadership.

¹⁹² Huntington. Fundamental Islamic terrorism has become more transnational – it is no longer predominantly national.

¹⁹³ Global Trends 2002 (Global Trends 2002), op. cit., p.199.

The second challenge, prevention of civilian conflict management¹⁹⁴, involves the training and preparation for the work in multinational and first of all especially in European, units and headquarters. In large parts of the world, a development leading to the multinationalization of deployments can be observed. The clearly discernible trend of the last fifty years (NATO, Eurocorps, European battlegroups) will continue.

In order to cope with the changes in the security-relevant environment, the military needs new types of forces that are characterized by a high degree of flexibility, learning ability and professionalism, and a leadership willing to question existing structures and concepts in order to promote the further development of the forces and to contribute to the task of shaping future security policy. The military leadership must also be willing to deal with the necessity to develop armed forces into learning organizations implementing knowledge management, especially with the potential vested in Innere Führung as a means of Transformation in the crises of the 21st century.

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