Information Operations during the Malayan Emergency
Abstract
Today, Information Operations (IO) is an area of emerging importance in military science. However, IO is not new. Many of the elements of IO have existed for thousands of years, including military deception (MILDEC), psychological operations (PSYOPs), and operational security (OPSEC). IO becomes more and more important in dealing with the conflicts the United States faces today, particularly as modern wars transition away from the large force-on-force encounters of the past. This thesis focuses on the IO lessons the British Army learned during the Malayan Emergency. The thesis also examines the IO implications of the British Army's organizational and cultural adaptation to counter the insurgents, and the most recent U.S. Joint Doctrine governing how the individual services train, equip, and resource forces for counterinsurgency.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2006
- Accession Number
- ADA451360
Entities
People
- James R. Bortree
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School