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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**THE CASAMANCE SEPARATISM: FROM
INDEPENDENCE CLAIM TO RESOURCE LOGIC**

by

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June 2006

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**THE CASAMANCE SEPARATISM: FROM INDEPENDENCE CLAIM TO
RESOURCE LOGIC**

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ABSTRACT

In the 1980s, Senegalese ethnic harmony was tarnished by the emergence of the *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance* (MFDC). The major demand of this organization was the independence of Casamance, a southern province of Senegal. In the initial years of the movement (1980-1990), the MFDC capitalized upon the grievances of the local populations, and received support from them. In the first half of the 1990s, it began to receive substantial support from neighboring countries and in response came to rely less upon the support of local constituents. It escalated the violence not only against the state but also against local populations, which reinforced its growing dependence upon external patrons rather than popular support. In the 1990s, the government of Senegal worked to cut off both external and internal support to the MFDC, by improving its relations with the neighboring countries and by practicing a politics of “charm” *vis à vis* the local populations. In response, the MFDC has become engaged in the illegal exploitation of the natural resources. As the MFDC has shifted from one support base to another, it has pragmatically altered tactics and objectives. This demonstrated adaptability of the MFDC has important implications for our understanding of post-Cold War civil conflicts, and for the governments’ efforts to resolve them. It suggests that the distinction between “greed” and “grievance,” which motivates much of the recent scholarly debate on ethnic conflict, is largely a false one, and that governments must address both in their efforts to resolve such conflicts.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Scholars have long considered Senegal exceptional among African states. First, Senegal is unique in its preservation of a form of multiparty democratic politics since independence, in contrast to many other African countries where democracy has faltered. Second, the country is singular for its creation of effective state power, having established an especially successful institutional network for the assertion of an authentic ("empirical") statehood over most of the national territory.¹ Finally, Senegal is exceptional because of its ethnic harmony. The country is comprised of approximately 17 ethnic groups.² One of the several factors maintaining this harmony is the use of Wolof as a lingua franca. As an ethnic group, the Wolof comprises about 40 percent of the population. However, the Wolof language is spoken by the great majority (perhaps 80 percent) of Senegalese citizens, and it is the dominant spoken language of all the country's large towns. In urban areas, the Wolof have incorporated other identities by assimilation, migration or intermarriage.³

Unfortunately Senegalese excellence was seriously challenged and tarnished in the 1980s by the *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance* (MFDC). The major demand of this organization was the independence of Casamance, a southern province of Senegal. According to the MFDC, Casamance was never a part of Senegal during the colonial period, since it was administered first by Portugal, then by France under a special status conferred on the region. In addition, the MFDC articulates other grievances including:

- appropriation, by local authorities representing the central government, of the region's lands, at the expense of local populations;
- imposition of laws which do not take into account the customs and traditions of the region's populations;

¹ Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, "The Senegalese Exception," *Africa: Journal of the International African Studies* 66, no. 3 (1996): 458.

² Mamadou Diouf, "Between Ethnic Memories and Colonial History in Senegal: The MFDC and the Struggle for Independence in Casamance," in *Ethnicity and Democracy*, ed. Bruce Berman et al (Oxford: James Currey Publishers, 1994).

³ O'Brien, "The Senegalese Exception," 460.

- victimization of Casamance's ethnic groups through cultural contempt;
- disadvantage suffered by the region of Casamance in the area of investment;
- and the absence, for several decades, of natives of Casamance from local government in the region.

Despite the military, social, economic, political, and diplomatic efforts of the Senegalese government to address these grievances, the MFDC has been fighting state forces since 1982. What really drives the MFDC insurgency in southern Senegal? This thesis will show that the MFDC insurgency has fundamentally remade itself twice, both times in response to successful government initiatives to cut off its support base. From a popular grievance-based insurgency in the 1980s, it transformed itself into a proxy force of neighboring countries during the 1990s, and then into a resource-driven movement after the turn of the century. As the MFDC has shifted from one support base to another, it has pragmatically altered tactics and objectives. This demonstrated adaptability has important implications for our understanding of post-Cold War civil conflicts, and for governments' efforts to resolve them.

The literature on the causes of ethnic conflict and secessionism is vast. Three sets of variables are commonly identified as causes of secession.⁴ The first comprises structural aspects of the country itself, such as geography, age, and the size and configuration of its population. Intuitively, the younger a country is, the less likely it is to have passed through the growing pains of nation-building and national integration and the more vulnerable it is to dismemberment.⁵ Countries that consist of two or more distinct land masses (as was Pakistan before the secession of Bangladesh) provide particularly favorable geographies to would-be separatists. Similarly, the larger a country's

⁴ Pierre Englebert and Rebecca Hummel, "Let's Stick Together: Understanding Africa's Secessionist Deficit," *African Affairs* 104, no. 416 (2005): 403-406.

⁵ James D. Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 84.

population is, the greater the potential for break-up. Finally, the more culturally heterogeneous a country's population is, the more likely it is that there will be demands for self-determination.⁶

The second set of factors deals with the nature and dynamics of the political system. While many theorists argue that democratic systems contain separatist tendencies better than autocratic, the persistence of separatist movements in Canada, France, India, Spain and the United Kingdom suggests that there may be little relationship between the level of democracy and secessionism. However, rather than the nature of the regime, the extent and intensity of political change may matter a great deal for would-be separatists. Political transitions often make states vulnerable and can create climates that foster separatist movements. Furthermore, when the central state is weakened, overthrown or collapsed, its ability to prevent a secessionist drive is greatly reduced.⁷ Saideman, for example, argues that periods of democratization and economic transition tend to intensify ethnic identities and the security dilemmas that ultimately drive secessionism.⁸

The third set of factors, highlighted by recent scholarship, involve individual and group motives that lead to civil war and secession. Within this school of thought scholars are divided between those who support the 'grievance' hypothesis and those who prefer the 'greed' hypothesis. The former emphasize the predominance of communal 'grievances,' and thus point to the importance of political and social motives driving civil war and secessionism. Richards thus describes the Sierra Leonean civil war as "a drama of social exclusion."⁹ Le Billon argues more generally that "while significant, it is important not to over-emphasize the financial aspects of a conflict and lose sight of

⁶ Englebert and Hummel, "Let's Stick Together," 404.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Stephen M. Saideman, "Is Pandora's Box Half-Empty or Half-Full? The Limited Virulence of Secessionism and the Domestic Sources of Disintegrations," in *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion and Escalation*, ed. David Lake and Donald Rothchild (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).

⁹ Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone* (London: James Currey, 1996).

political and social aspects."¹⁰ Sambanis similarly argues that identity wars are due predominantly to political grievances rather than lack of economic opportunity.¹¹

The new literature on 'greed' argues that recent rebellions have a far more explicit economic agenda than was the case before 1989. Keen suggests that in the post-Cold War period, "war has increasingly become the continuation of economics by other means."¹² Clapham posits that the weakening of the African state by various forces, including structural adjustment programs (SAPs), has made it a less worthwhile target, so that in recent conflicts "insurgents found it easier just to capture the trading networks on which states had depended, and use them for their own purposes."¹³ Collier and Hoeffler find that opportunity provides considerably more explanatory power than grievance.¹⁴ Thus, the availability of natural resources, mainly oil and other mineral products, appears to be an important factor in civil conflicts. However, Michael Ross finds that different resources have sharply different effects on the kind of conflict that is likely to arise, depending upon whether or not they are "lootable"-- that is, whether it can be easily appropriated by individuals or small groups of unskilled workers. Lutable resources -- such as diamonds and drugs -- are more likely to ignite non-separatist conflicts, which once begun are harder to resolve; but they pose little danger of igniting separatist conflicts. On the other hand, "unlootable" resources -- like oil, natural gas, and deep-shaft minerals -- tend to produce separatist conflicts, while seldom influencing non-separatist conflicts.¹⁵

This work is motivated largely by debates about which of the proposed causal factors best explains ethnic conflict and secessionism. Much less attention has been

¹⁰ Philippe Le Billon, et al, "The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies Need to Know," *Humanitarian Practice Network Paper* No. 33, (2000): 36.

¹¹ Nicolas Sambanis, "Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical Inquiry (Part 1)," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 3 (June 2001): 259.

¹² David Keen, "The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars," *Adelphi Paper* no. 320 (1998): 11.

¹³ Christopher Clapham, "Introduction: Analyzing African Insurgencies," in *African Guerillas*, ed. Christopher Clapham (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998).

¹⁴ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Center for the Study of African Economics Working Paper. World Bank, 2001.

¹⁵ Michael L. Ross, *Natural Resources and Civil War: An Overview*, (Los Angeles: University of California, Los Angeles, Department of Political Science, 2003).

given to considering the interaction of these factors and the extent to which the motivations of rebellions and secessionist movements may shift from grievance to greed over time. My research will build upon Duffield's analysis of how rebel strategies reflect shifting internal and external relations, arguing that the foundation of Casamance rebellion in Senegal has changed fundamentally over time, from grievance, to opportunity, to greed, in response to shifting balances of available resources (specifically, local support, regional arms/support, and international markets).¹⁶

MFDC leaders are now driven by resource logic, but it has not always been so. In the initial years of the movement (1982-1990), the MFDC capitalized upon the grievances of the local populations, and received support from them. It used low-level violence against the state in the name of these populations. In the 1990s, it began to receive substantial support and benefits from neighboring countries and in response came to rely less upon the support of local constituents. With the change in the source of its support, the MFDC demonstrated an increased inclination to use violence not only against the state but also against local populations, which reinforced its growing dependence upon external patrons rather than popular support.

In the early 2000s, the government of Senegal worked to cut off both external and internal support to the MFDC, by improving its relations with the neighboring countries and practicing a politics of 'charm' vis à vis the local populations, while buying off MFDC leaders (i.e., paying them not to fight). The rebellion lost its remaining popular support and the support of external actors as a result of these government initiatives. Weakened, the leadership signed a ceasefire agreement with the Government in which the word "independence" was not mentioned. In exchange, the movement received financing for economic projects from the state and from some internationally-based Senegalese partners. Unfortunately for the peace process, the MFDC subsequently moved beyond these initial legal initiatives to become increasingly engaged in the illegal exploitation of natural resources. The movement has not disarmed or demobilized. Some minor skirmishes occur from time to time. In other words, a situation of "neither peace nor war" prevails in Casamance, as the MFDC has become increasingly driven by greed.

¹⁶ Mark Duffield, "Post-Modern Conflict: Warlords, Post-Adjustment States and Private Protection," *Civil Wars* 1, no. 1 (1998): 84.

In the following chapters, I undertake a comparative analysis of the MFDC insurgency in three different time periods, showing how the nature of the rebellion varies with the nature of its primary resource base across the three periods. Chapter two presents the MFDC as popular secessionist movement from 1982 to 1990; chapter three demonstrates the shift to externally supported and more generalized violence from 1990 to 2000; and chapter four shows the shift to profit driven insecurity from 2000 to the present. I hope to demonstrate how the nature of resources available to the movement (my independent variable) restructured elites' cost-benefit analyses (my intervening variable), and thereby led to the transformation of the motivation of the rebellion (my dependent variable) from grievance, to opportunity, to greed.

II. FROM PEACE TO POPULAR SECESSIONIST MOVEMENT (1981 – 1990)

This chapter will explain the first strategy of the MFDC in the 1980s when the movement operated as a popular secessionist insurgency by capitalizing, in its own interests, upon the resentment of the population. I begin with a background sketch of the situation in Senegal and in Casamance region. I then review the different grievances of the local populations, and show that these grievances engendered an ethnic consciousness that united the population in the region. Finally, I argue that this minority consciousness was articulated and exploited by the local elites who sought to mobilize local popular support in opposition to the state, with the ultimate goal of (re)gaining positions in the state apparatus for themselves.

A. SENEGAL AND CASAMANCE REGION

1. Senegal

The Republic of Senegal is located in the western part of the African continent between Mauritania to the north, Mali to the east, Guinea Conakry and Guinea Bissau to the south and the Atlantic Ocean to the west. The Republic of Gambia is an enclave stretching into the southern part of the Senegalese territory, separating the Casamance from the rest of Senegal.

Senegal is divided into ten administrative regions: Saint Louis, Louga, Diourbel, Thies, Dakar, Ziguinchor, Fatick, Kolda, Tambacounda and Kaolack. Its population is currently estimated at ten million inhabitants.



Figure 1. Administrative divisions of Senegal (From ECOWAS PART 2 DEF, SENEGAL).

Two major religions are practiced in Senegal, namely:

- Islam practiced by 94% of the population;
- Christianity practiced by 5% of the population;
- Animism and others practiced by 1% of the population.

The Senegalese population is comprised of 17 major ethnic groups, which can be classified into four larger groups. The first among these, the Sahelian-Sudanese group, is the largest numerically, consists of the Wolofs (over 40% of the population) and Sereres (about 15% of the population). The Wolofs live in all regions, notably in towns, and are the majority in the Northwest and the West, while Sereres are found especially in the central regions (Fatick, Kaolack, and Thies). The second group, the Hal pulaar, consists of the Peuls and Toucouleurs (about 15% and 10% respectively) and is scattered throughout the country with the largest concentration in the Senegal river valley and the Ferlo. The third group, the sub-Guinean, (about 13% of the population), consists of the Diolas, Balants, Mandiaks, Mankagnes, Bainouks in the Lower Casamance, the Bassaris, Bediks, Koniaguis in the Tambacounda region. The final group, the Mande group, is numerically the smallest: it consists of the Soninkes, Bambaras, and Malinkes, who live in certain areas of Casamance and in Tambacounda region.

Table 1 shows that the Senegalese freely settle throughout the national territory, as is allowed by the constitution.

	Wolof	Serere	Pulaar	Joola	Mandingo
Total Regions	2,946,792 43.5%	1,009,925 14.9%	1,629,039 24.1%	357,666 5.3%	288,675 4.2%
Cumul Kolda+Ziguinchor	37,9921 3.9%	12,342 1.3%	317,703 32.8%	270,666 28%	172,378 17.8%
Kolda	19,170 3.3%	2,980 0.51%	283,399 49.2%	33,928 5.89%	136,190 23.58%
Ziguinchor	18,751 4.8%	9,362 2.4%	34,304 8.8%	236,738 60.7%	36,188 9.2%
Diourbel	411,977 66.7%	153,242 24.8%	42,804 6.9%	1,055 0.2%	1,538 0.24%
Saint Louis	197,552 30.1%	4,368 0.7%	401,857 61.3%	2,109 0.3%	1,497 0.22%
Tambacounda	33,133 8.8%	11,346 3.0%	174,854 46.4%	2,081 0.6%	41,007 10.8%
Kaolack	500,512 62.4%	94,447 11.8%	155,048 19.3%	5,124 0.6%	11,302 1.4%
Thies	505,178 54.0%	282,228 30.2%	102,219 10.9%	6,992 0.7%	8,451 0.9%
Fatick	151,423 29.8%	278,896 55.06%	45,038 8.8%	1,772 0.3%	14,577 2.8%
Louga	342,256 70.04%	8,531 1.7%	122,675 2.51%	536 0.10%	578 0.11%
Dakar	765,869 53.8%	164,521 11.6%	262,915 18.5%	67,312 4.7%	37,347 2.6%

Table 1. Distribution of the Senegalese population per ethnic groups and residential areas.
The figures are from the latest population and habitat census of 1988.

Languages	Percentage
Wolof	43.5%
Pulaar	24.1%
Mandingo	4.2%
Joola	5.1%
Sarakhole	1.5%
Serere	14.9%

Table 2. Linguistic Distribution of the Population

The six main languages are recognized by the constitution as national languages.

Percentage of the Population Speaking Selected Languages:

A language can be spoken not only by its ethnic group but also by other ethnic groups. For example, as an ethnic group, the Wolofs as ethnic group represent 43.5 percent of the population; however, Wolof as language is spoken by about 70 percent of the Senegalese population. Below are the percentages of the population speaking a selected language, as indicated in the 1988 census: Wolof: 70.9 %; Pulaar: 24.1 %; Serere: 13.7 %; Joola: 05.7%; Manding: 06.2 %; Sarakole-Soninke: 01.4 %.

2. Casamance

Casamance is the most southern region of Senegal. Due to its specific characteristics, Casamance contrasts with the rest of Senegal. Unlike the northern part of Senegal, this region belongs to the tropical humid zone, receiving more rain than the rest of Senegal. The rainy season, which is longer in Casamance region than in the rest of Senegal, extends from June until October. This region can receive up to three to four times more precipitation than the north of Senegal. This fact explains why the area is so green and fertile. Casamance region also enjoys dense forests and is shaped by a network of very tight backwaters.

Since 1984, Casamance has been divided into two administrative regions: Ziguinchor and Kolda. The region of Kolda has three departments: Kolda, Sedhiou and Velingara. It represents the Upper and Middle Casamance. It covers 21,011 sq km and has a population of 577,385 inhabitants. The upper Casamance is the country of the Peul whereas the Middle Casamance is mainly the land of the Mandingo, but it is also possible to find Joola, Balant or Peul in this area.




Figure 2. Lower Casamance (Ziguinchor region), Middle and Upper Casamance (Kolda region)

	Kolda		Sedhiou		Velingara		Overall	
	Pop.	%	Pop.	%	Pop.	%	Pop.	%
Balant	1,950	1.1	36,960	13.4	120	0.1	39,260	6.8
Joola	2,840	1.6	30,060	10.9	870	0.7	34,070	5.9
Mandingo	17,210	9.7	108,940	39.5	10,310	8.3	136,260	23.6
Manjaak	710	0.4	22,890	8.3	120	0.1	23,670	4.1
Peul/Pulaar	130,410	73.5	54,880	19.9	99,320	80.0	284,650	49.3
Wolof	13,480	7.6	4,410	1.6	1,490	1.2	19,630	3.4
Sarakole	4,260	2.4	1,930	0.7	5,460	4.4	11,550	2.0
Mancagne	710	0.4	4,410	1.6	250	0.2	5,200	0.9
Others	5,860	3.3	11,310	4.1	60,080	4.9	23,100	4.0
Total	177, 432	100	275,797	100	124,156	100	577,385	100

Table 3. Distribution of the resident Senegalese population in the Kolda region by ethnic group (*Source: 1988 Census*).

The region of Ziguinchor has three departments: Ziguinchor, Bignona and Oussouye. According to the 1988 census, Ziguinchor, also known as Lower Casamance, covers an area of 7,339 sq km. The population of 390,252 is mostly Joola, though there are also Bainuk, Mandinka, Manjak and Mankagn. The Joola however, are the most important element in the region of Ziguinchor, with over 60 percent of the resident Senegalese population.

The ethnic composition of each of the three departments in the Ziguinchor region is shown in Table 4 below.

	Bignona		Oussouye		Ziguinchor		Overall	
	Pop.	%	Pop.	%	Pop.	%	Pop.	%
Joola	147,630	80,6	30,420	82.4	58,680	34,5	236,740	60.7
Mandingo	11,200	6.1	560	1.5	24,590	14.4	36,350	9.3
Pulaar	9,530	5.2	1,750	4.7	23,020	13.5	34,300	8.8
Wolof	3,260	1.8	1,750	4.8	13,740	8.2	18,750	4.8
Manjaak	1,580	0.9	260	0.7	12,840	7.5	14,670	3.8
Mancagne	380	0.2	120	0.3	9,540	5.6	10, 040	2.6
Balant	1,550	0.8	110	0.3	8,150	4.8	9,810	2.5
Serere	2,210	1.2	1,290	3.5	5,860	3.4	9,360	2.4
Other Ethnicities	1.1	460	1.2	5,430	3.2	7,980	2.0	
2,100								
Others	3,670	2.0	210	0.6	8,360	4.9	12,240	3.1
Total	183,117	100	36,925	100	170,210	100	390,252	100

Table 4. Ethnic Composition of the three Departments of Ziguinchor

Tables 3 and 4 show that despite the ethnic diversity of the Casamance region, one ethnic group is dominant in each of the sub-regions: the Joola in the three districts constituting the Ziguinchor region (Lower Casamance) while being a minority in the districts of Kolda, and the Peul being the majority in the district of Velingara and the Manding in Sedhiou.

Religion	Bignona Department	Oussouye Department	Ziguinchor Department	Region of Ziguinchor
Khadria brotherhood	51.2	3.3	17.6	32.0
Layene brotherhood	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.3
Mouride brotherhood	3.3	2.5	5.0	4.0
Tidiane brotherhood	17.0	14.6	31.2	22.9
Other Muslims	18.1	6.0	16.0	16.0
Catholics	7.9	26.1	23.8	16.6
Other Christians	0.3	1.6	0.4	0.5
Other Religions	1.8	45.8	5.8	7.7
Total	100	100	100	100

Table 5. Distribution of the Senegalese population by department according to religion and brotherhood in the region of Ziguinchor (%). Source: *Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat de 1988*.

Table 5 shows that Muslims and Christians represent a majority in the department of Bignona (90% Muslims, 8.2% Christians) and Ziguinchor (70% Muslims, 24.2% Christians), whereas in Oussouye there is a higher proportion of the population who are from other local religions (45.8%).

B. THE ORIGINS OF JOOLA GRIEVANCES

The first dissatisfaction of the Joola ethnic group appeared with the imposition of a French colonial administration in the Lower Casamance. The French, like other colonial powers in West Africa, generally tried to impose a system of indirect rule through local

intermediaries. Outside Casamance, in much of the rest of Senegal, hierarchical, strongly Islamized societies, after some resistance, proved highly co-optable by French colonialism. But in Casamance, the French faced two problems. First, the fragmented, anarchical nature of societies there meant that clear and co-optable local power structures were lacking. French attempts to install chiefs, therefore, often Wolof or Mandingo, failed: the Joola communities refused to recognize their authority and the "chiefs" abused their positions. Second, Islam - such a powerful ally in the north - came to Casamance relatively late, around the turn of the 19th to 20th century.¹⁷

The idea of establishing non-natives as chiefs within Joola groups was perceived by the Joola as an attack on their liberty and as such could neither be accepted nor respected. When the French realized that their appointed chiefs had no authority and that the Joola were obeying the orders of chiefs unknown to the French administration, they decided to undertake an energetic repression against the Joola.¹⁸ In 1906, in a letter to the General Governor of French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Française - AOF), the Governor of the Colonies of Senegal confided that "...it is advisable to adapt from now on a real programme of pacification and progressive penetration for the Casamance."¹⁹ Moreover, in 1917, the governor-general of the AOF, Van Vollenhoven, admitted that "we are not the masters of the Lower Casamance. We are only tolerated there."²⁰ Furthermore, the relationship between the French and Joola worsened during the two Great Wars (World War I and II). Indeed, during WW I and II the recruitment of Joola Forces, as well as the payment of taxes towards the wars, encountered strong opposition. Products such as rice were requisitioned by the French administration. This requisition was very badly accepted by the Joola for whom rice represented their way of life and was at the heart of their culture.²¹

¹⁷ Martin Evans, *The Casamance Conflict, 1982-1999* (London: African Research Group, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1999).

¹⁸ Christian Roche, *Histoire de la Casamance. Conquête et Résistance: 1850-1920* (Paris: Karthala, 1985).

¹⁹ CAOM, 13 G 380, Casamance Affaires Politiques diverses. 1904-1909.

²⁰ Evans, *The Casamance Conflict*.

²¹ E.P.R. Nicole, "A Separatist Issue in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of the Casamance (Senegal)" (Thesis, University of Birmingham, 1997), 80.

The Joola were also hostile to the post-colonial state, since the modern Senegalese state has maintained the colonial power structure of bureaucratic authoritarianism and clientelism. The main feature of the administration was its high degree of centralization, the outstanding legacy of the Jacobin background of metropolitan France. The Senegalese equivalents of metropolitan circles, subdivisions and cantons were regions, prefectures, sub-prefectures and districts. These territorial structures were supposed to bring rulers closer to their subjects, and to facilitate the participation of the people in development activities.²² As Brown puts it, all developing states have experienced political tensions between attempts by central governments to expand their influence and attempts by peripheral communities to defend their autonomy.²³

Following independence, the Senegalese government undertook a number of unwelcome new policies that further alienated the Joola. Among them were the 1964 National Domains Act completed by the 1972 reform of the territorial administration, and the Family Code of 1972. The 1964 National Domains Act established the State's proprietary rights over all land for which no legal deed existed. By withdrawing recognition of "customary" communal land tenure rights, the reform aimed to do away with ethnic homelands.

This law violated Joola traditions and customs. As a result of this law, the Joola would no longer be able to distribute their land in the way they had done traditionally. Hence, when Dakar failed to take into consideration the local traditions, government decisions were either not applied by the people of Casamance or were circumvented by them. Moreover, due to the new law there was - through the rural council created in 1972 - an increase in the demand on land in Casamance by people coming not only from Casamance but also the rest of Senegal.²⁴

However, the 1964 law on national land states that to be awarded land, one must reside in the *communauté rurale* (rural community). Nicole suggests that rural councils prefer to award some land to those who are financially sound and as a result tend to come

²² Diouf, "Between Ethnic Memories and Colonial History in Senegal," 237.

²³ David Brown, *The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia* (New York: Routledge, 1996).

²⁴ Nicole, "A Separatist Issue in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of the Casamance (Senegal)," 124.

from the city rather than to the local villagers, who tend to be less financially secure.²⁵ Therefore, this law led to a new wave of immigration from the north of Senegal (people fleeing drought) towards Casamance, and to an increase in expropriations in order to establish tourist facilities such as Club Méditerranée in Cap Skirring. The redistribution of urban and rural spaces increased misunderstandings between the people of Casamance and the immigrants from the north.²⁶

Many examples of injustice toward the Joola can be cited. In 1975, the Cabrousse villagers were expropriated of their paddy fields to allow Club Méditerranée to extend its domain. Meanwhile, the northerners working in the hotel were allowed to build huts nearby. The local populations protested in vain. The authorities responded by taking repressive measures against the protesters, arresting more than twenty of them.²⁷ It seems also that the luxurious hotel “Nema Kadior” was constructed on a cemetery, despite the opposition of the indigenous population.

In some instances, the exploitation of land rights was so extreme that it caused individuals to turn to the MFDC. For example, in Kaolack city (in central Senegal), a young Joola professor saw his land request rejected, and when he tried to find out the reason, he was told to return to the Casamance if he was not satisfied (“Si tu n’es pas content, retourne chez toi”). He was later posted to Ziguinchor, where he built a house in Nema Kdior on a plot of land offered by his father. He was then expropriated without compensation in favor of the owners of hotel “Nema Kadior.” He then joined the MFDC.²⁸ Other MFDC leaders, including Diamacoune Senghor, general secretary of the movement, were also victims of land expropriation.²⁹

The Senegalese government was conscious of this phenomenon. A land distribution commission was created on October 23, 1990, to increase equity and

²⁵Nicole, “A Separatist Issue in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of the Casamance (Senegal),” 124.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Diouf, “Between Ethnic Memories and Colonial History in Senegal,” 196.

²⁸ Independent Newspaper *Le Temoin*, May 7, 1990.

²⁹ Diouf, “Between Ethnic Memories and Colonial History in Senegal,” 197.

transparency. It affected 670 parcels.³⁰ However, the commission worked only on illegal expropriation cases. Although this structure still exists on the paper, it is no longer operational.

The land reform was supplemented by a new social code, the Family Code. Passed in 1972 by the National Assembly, the Code was designed to boost State influence at the expense of local dignitaries by giving many of the powers so far retained by the latter to the former. For instance, the celebrations of marriage, the delivery of certificate of marriage, or the certificate of heritage, are only under state jurisdiction. However, the government tolerated the unilateral decision of the caliph of the Mouride brotherhood to ‘suspend’ the application of the Code in his religious centre. Yet when the Joola tried to refuse to implement this 1972 Family Code, they were forced to apply it. This perceived double standard frustrated the Joola, who refused to apply the Family Code in the Casamance region.³¹

Political centralization in post-colonial Senegal has been an additional source of resentment among the Joola in Casamance. In effect, during most of the colonial period, political debates in Senegal were only possible in the Four Communes of Gorée, Saint Louis, Rufisque and Dakar. The “originaires” of the Four Communes were French citizens, while people living elsewhere in the colony, such as in Casamance, were subjects, without any avenue for expressing their opinions.³² In 1946, citizenship rights were extended to the entire Senegalese population. Elites in Casamance used the opening to demonstrate their discontent by creating the M.F.D.C. (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance) in 1947.

This movement is now known as the “historical” MFDC to distinguish it from the modern-day MFDC. The historical MFDC wanted Casamance to be able to exercise its own political responsibilities, by electing local representatives, instead of having them imposed from the outside. According to Cayla, this first movement “... had no separatist pretension.... The first movement was gathering all the ethnic groups of Casamance in an

³⁰ Newspaper *Le Soleil*, January 5-6, 1991.

³¹ Souleymane Bachir Diagne, “The Future of Tradition,” in *Senegal, Essays in Statecraft*, ed. Momar Coumba Diop (Dakar: CODERIA, 1993).

³² Nicole, “A Separatist Issue in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of the Casamance (Senegal),” 95.

effort to affirm the identity of Casamance within the Senegalese entity, and to obtain a financial, administrative and territorial autonomy.”³³ Nevertheless, the current MFDC, formed in the early 1980s, argues that the historical MFDC and the modern-day MFDC have always had the same aspiration for Casamance, which is independence. This “historical” MFDC joined the Senegalese dominant party, the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (BDS) in 1954 and became one of its regional branches. Its leadership believed that this move would give Casamance more political and economic opportunities and help develop the resources of the region.

In 1954 and 1958, the political life of Casamance was enriched by the creation of the MAC (*Mouvement Autonomiste de la Casamance*) and PRA-Senegal (*Parti du Regroupement Africain-Senegal*). These parties would also integrate into the party of former president Senghor in the early 1960s. Although the policy of dialogue and assimilation of political parties undertaken by former President Senghor in 1950s and 1960s seemed to have been successful in most parts of Senegal, it was less so in Casamance. Indeed, Dakar had difficulties in co-opting an anarchical society into its elite-fusion system of rule.³⁴ As Boone suggests, “the Senegalese government was unable to apply its fusion-of-elites policy in Casamance, despite its successes in the Wolof groundnut basin, because here, the Dakar regime found no rural leaders with whom to broker a stable and secure political alliance; there are no castes, no monarchies or aristocracies, and no hierarchal or bureaucratic state structures.” Consequently, Senegalese officials appointed non-Joola individuals in the local administration. In addition, the few Joola cadres working at the national level lacked local roots. This brought MFDC leader Diamacoune Senghor to refute the legitimacy of these so-called representatives of Casamance people.³⁵

A closer look at the “historical” MFDC leadership shows that it also had relatively tenuous links with Casamance region. The “historical” MFDC was created in

³³ Nicole, “A Separatist Issue in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of the Casamance (Senegal),” 101.

³⁴ Pierre Englebert, “Compliance and Defiance to National Integration in Barotseland and Casamance,” *Afrika Spectrum* 39, no. 1 (2005): 16.

³⁵ Catherine Boone, “States and Ruling Classes in Postcolonial Africa: The Enduring Contradictions of Power,” in *State Power and Social Forces* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), cited in Englebert, “Compliance and Defiance”, 16; and in Marut, *La Question de Casamance (Sénégal)*, 187.

Sedhiou (Casamance), by Emile Badiane, Ibou Diallo, and Victor Diatta. Faye argues that it is impossible to consider Emile Badiane and Ibou Diallo as leaders rooted in their land because their names do not typically come from Casamance.³⁶ Boone notes that the founders of the “historical” MFDC set up the party with “121 literate notables in search for their region disenclavement, or integration into Senegal.”³⁷ It is also interesting to point out that the M.A.C. (*Mouvement Autonomiste de la Casamance*) leaders Djibril Sarr and Assane Seck were Casamançais who emigrated from northern Senegal.³⁸ Thus, Casamance remained underrepresented or ill-represented in the post colonial state apparatus.

The modern-day MFDC considers the integration of political parties from Casamance into Senegalese political structures accepted by their predecessors as the first big mistake of the movement and condemns this decision, because Senegal and its leaders were not faithful to the promises they made to the “historical” MFDC over the development of Casamance. Casamance had no other basis for organizing regional grievances, since the Senegalese constitution forbids the association of any political party with a region, an ethnic group, a race, a sex or a language.

Another concern for the Joolas during the 1980s was the “Wolofization” of Senegalese society, which accompanied increasing administrative centralization. Although the Senegalese constitution recognizes six national languages listed intentionally in alphabetical order (Diola, Malinke, Pular, Serere, Soninke, and Wolof), Wolof is referred to by most people as *the* national language. The figures from the 1988 census show that more than eighty percent of the Senegalese population speaks Wolof, while only 43.7 per cent are ethnic Wolofs. The 1988 census also indicates that only

³⁶ Ousseynou Faye, “La Crise Casamançaise et les Relations du Sénégal avec la Gambie et la Guinée-Bissau (1980-1992),” in *Le Sénégal et ses Voisins*, ed. Momar-Coumba Dop (Dakar: Societes-Espaces-Temps, 1994).

³⁷ Boone, “States and Ruling Classes”, 112.

³⁸ Martin Evans, *The Casamance, Senegal: ‘War Economy’ or Business as Usual?* (PhD dissertation, University of London, King’s College, 2003), 104.

twenty-five percent of the population is literate in French. For these reasons, some scholars conclude that Senegal may more accurately be considered as a Wolofphone than a francophone country.³⁹

Wolofization, or the spread of Wolof as a lingua franca, can be explained by recent Senegalese history. The steady expansion of Wolof began during the colonial period. The first contacts between colonial Europe and Senegal took place in Dakar and Saint Louis, areas of Wolof speakers. These people were used as interpreters and merchants in the trade of gum Arabic. The spread of Wolof continued also thanks to the migration of rural populations from the countryside into the cities. Furthermore, Wolofization can be explained by the social and economic influence of the Mouride brotherhood, whose origins are in the Wolof heartland, and who exploited new lands in areas traditionally occupied by animist Serers (e.g., Baol, Sine Saloum) for the cultivation and commercialization of groundnut production. This has favored the spread of the Wolof language, since the Sereres who converted to Islam adopted the language of their new religious guide.⁴⁰

The MFDC blames Wolofization for the fact that the Joola language is being used less. The attachment of the Joola to their language is reflected in the fact that more Joola speak their own language as a first language than any other group in Senegal (97.4% -- see Table 6). However, the non-Joola in Casamance generally prefer Wolof and Mandinka as second languages over Joola (see Table 7). Moreover, most Joola consider Wolofization a second form of colonization. For the Wolof speakers consider themselves superior to the Joola speakers.⁴¹

³⁹ Fiona McLaughlin, "Dakar Wolof and the Configuration of Urban Identity," *Journal of African Cultural Studies* 14, no. 2 (December 2001): 159.

⁴⁰ Diouf, "Between Ethnic Memories and Colonial History in Senegal," 66-67.

⁴¹ Centre des Archives d'Outre-Mer, 2 G 50-95, Sénégal (Rapports annuels d'ensemble).

Ethnic Group								
First spoken language	Balant	Joola	Mandingo	Mancagne	Manjaak	Pulaar	Serere	Wolof
Balant	76.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Joola	1.8	97.4	2.5	0.7	2.2	3.6	10.3	3.1
Mandingo	16.4	1.2	93.8	0.2	0.6	5.5	6.8	2.5
Mancagne	0.1	0.0	0.1	96.9	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.0
Manjaak	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	91.7	0.0	0.1	0.0
Pulaarl	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	80.4	0.4	0.3
Serere	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	45.8	0.0
Wolof	3.5	1.0	2.9	1.1	2.0	9.9	35.6	93.3
Other	1.5	0.4	0.4	0.9	3.2	0.5	0.9	0.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number	9,809	236,738	36,351	10,035	14,674	34,303	9,362	18,751

Table 6. Distribution of the Senegalese population according to the first spoken language and the ethnic group of origin in the region of Ziguinchor (%) *Source: 1988 census*

Ethnic Group									
Second spoken language	Balant	Joola	Mandi	Manc	Manj	Pulaar	Serere	Wolof	Others
Balant	3.3	0.0	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1
Joola	4.6	1.1	14.2	2.4	10.5	11.3	9.3	9.1	16.8
Mandi	39.9	13.3	2.5	3.2	9.8	13.5	8.8	13.1	16.5
Manj	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Pulaar	0.5	0.3	1.8	0.1	0.1	3.7	0.7	2.4	1.6
Serere	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	3.6	0.5	0.0
Wolof	17.9	28.0	32.9	34.3	26.7	37.5	37.5	5.1	26.2
Other	33.2	57.1	48.1	59.0	51.6	33.8	39.9	69.8	38.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number	9,809	236,738	36,351	10,035	14,674	34,304	9,362	18,751	20,228

Table 7. Distribution of the Senegalese population according to the second spoken language and the ethnic group of origin in the region of Ziguinchor (%) *Source: 1988 census*

Wolofization is also evident in education policies. A student has to leave his local home area to advance his education because the universities are situated in Dakar and Saint Louis. By moving to these northern towns for his higher education, a Joola student becomes part of Wolof culture, and in order not to stand out or to be treated as rustic, he tends to modify his dress, speech, and living pattern so that he fits in.

The MFDC also deplores the disadvantage suffered by Casamance region in the area of investment, especially in the farming sector, despite the region's huge potential.

Like many developing countries, Senegal is characterized by a strong concentration of its economic activities near the capital. In 1975 for instance, income per capita was as follows: Cap Vert (current Dakar region): 253,000 Francs CFA; Thies: 80,400 Francs CFA; Fleuve (current Saint Louis and Louga regions): 55,000 Francs CFA; Senegal Oriental (current Tambacounda region): 49,200 Francs CFA; Casamance (current Ziguinchor and Kolda regions): 48,000 Francs CFA; Diourbel: 41,200 Francs CFA. These data show that at the time that the movement was forming, Casamance was at the bottom of the pyramid.⁴² Moreover, what might be the granary of Senegal has in fact never played this role because its numerous natural resources are not properly exploited. Diouf argues that in the 1960s and 1970s the region of Casamance, under the national development plans and public investment programs, benefited from significant investments aimed at ending the major constraints facing the region. However, most of the economic projects failed in the 1980s.⁴³ As Nicol writes, “whereas the economic development of Casamance took an important place in the first plan in 1961, no follow-up was given to these projects and many workers from Casamance had to migrate to the north of Senegal or to Europe to find employment.”⁴⁴ At the industrial level, Ziguinchor has only two production units: La SEIC and Amerger.⁴⁵ The former existed since the colonial period. It produces electricity and transforms groundnut oil. The latter, more recent, processes shrimp. Casamance is not the poorest region of the country, and Evans finds little evidence that the Casamance region has been the most “abandoned” among the provinces of Senegal.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, the relative underdevelopment of Casamance region, in the context of its other grievances, contributed to the feelings of discrimination, negligence, and relative deprivation. The Joola have the perception that they do not deserve this “unjust” abandonment.

Finally, having the country of Gambia between Casamance and the rest of Senegal has reinforced the isolation of Casamance. Until World War II, poor transport

⁴² Diouf, “Between Ethnic Memories and Colonial History in Senegal,” 178.

⁴³ Ibid., 179.

⁴⁴ Nicole, “A Separatist Issue in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of the Casamance (Senegal),” 120.

⁴⁵ Diouf, “Between Ethnic Memories and Colonial History in Senegal,” 180.

⁴⁶ Evans, *The Casamance, Senegal*, 80.

links had left Casamance relatively isolated from the north of Senegal. There was and still is no railroad in Casamance. Until the transgambienne highway, which links Dakar and Casamance was completed in 1957, the only "rapid" connection between the two areas had been by sea.⁴⁷ It is therefore not surprising to hear Joola people traveling to Dakar say "I am going to Senegal" as if Casamance were not a part of Senegal.

C. THE EMERGENCE OF ETHNIC CONSCIOUSNESS

All the grievances identified contributed to the development of a single Joola consciousness, despite the fact that there had never been a united Joola kingdom, but rather a multiplicity of sub-groups with both commonalities and divisions. Indeed as Evans writes,

the Joola are certainly a diverse grouping: their language group comprises some 14 dialects, not all mutually intelligible. The contrasts and, in some cases, tensions between Joola groups are evident, notably between the Fogny (predominantly Muslims) and the Kasa (mainly Catholic or animist). In fact, what one calls the Joola ethnic group appears to be largely a modern invention.⁴⁸

The consolidation of a Joola ethnic group is a response to the assimilationist and centralizing character of state penetration. It is indeed the perception of the assimilationist implications of state penetration that has provided a locus, at the level of consciousness, for the Joola rebellion. To quote Silverstein, we can say about the Joola that "what moved them were their common fears of Wolofization, loss of cultural identity, interferences in their affairs by the national government and a belief that the Wolofs were creating an internal colonial system in which they would not share the wealth of the country, the growth of the economy and the right of self-determination."⁴⁹

Indeed, the process of incorporation into and penetration by the Senegalese state is clearly a major situational change for Casamance populations, and it has produced correspondingly major changes in their communal identities. The Joola have come to see the state as the dominant influence upon them, and to identify themselves in relation to

⁴⁷ Lambert 2002 as quoted in Evans, *The Casamance, Senegal*, 62.

⁴⁸ Evans, *The Casamance, Senegal*, 75.

⁴⁹ Brown, *The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia*, 50.

this dominant other. They were labeled as subordinate groups having the marginal status of “second-class citizens,” were designated as a minority in someone else’s homeland rather than inhabitants of their own, and were subject to policies which led to the deprivation of their region and community. They began, therefore, to modify their sense of identity, and to develop an awareness of their relative deprivation within the state. This became the basis for an incipient sense of ethnic identity. Ironically, the Senegalese state policies of centralization and assimilation have engendered a sense of minority consciousness in which the recognition of disunity itself provided a basis for ethnic unity.

Why did the consolidation of this new Joola consciousness, hardly unique in postcolonial Africa, result in a separatist rebellion? To answer this question, we need to explain how minority consciousness at the mass level became linked to, and mobilized by, political elites.

D. ARTICULATION AND EXPLOITATION OF THE GRIEVANCES BY THE MFDC

Whether minority consciousness leads toward political acquiescence or rebellion depends on whether, and how, it is ideologized by political elites. Brown posits that “in the absence of any such mobilizing elite within the community, the inchoate minority consciousness at mass level would not be ideologized, and would thus fail to develop into politically salient ethno nationalism.”⁵⁰ In August 1980, while the government was in recess, Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, a Catholic priest from Casamance, gave a lecture on the Joola resistance to colonization at the Dakar Chamber of Commerce. This marked the beginning of Joola elites' creation and propagation of a Joola pan-ethnic nationalism by referring to history, geography and Joola culture.

In November 1981, a group of Joola leaders including Diamacoune held a secret meeting in the sacred forest near the Ziguinchor airport where they decided to revive the MFDC. In 1982, shortly before Christmas, approximately 1000 people marched from the sacred forest to several government buildings where they replaced the Senegalese flag with a white flag. Carrying signs that said “Free Casamance,” the demonstrators

⁵⁰ Brown, *The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia*, 54.

demanded independence. The government responded violently with mass arrests including the organizers of the demonstration.

To cope with a dire economic situation, in 1979 Senegal had sought economic help from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Conditionalities attached to IMF assistance required drastic austerity policies, which affected hiring in the civil service, public corporations and parastatals. Foucher finds that

having recruited an average of 3,000 people per year in the 1960s and 1970s, the civil service only managed to recruit the same number over the whole period of 1981-1990. This hit Casamance particularly hard, since the niche they [Casamançais] had established for themselves, through a particular educational trajectory, was in the lower echelons of public service: the little recruitment now occurring was instead usually the result of natural wastage, and hence to more senior posts.⁵¹

Thus, many Joola state employees lost their jobs during the 1980s.

Foucher notes that trade historically had been a 'blocked road' for the Joola because it was largely outsiders who formed the backbone of local commercial networks (Wolof, Peul, Mandingo and Europeans traders). He concludes that the only option for economic advancement for the Joola was public employment. After the Second World War, growing urban job opportunities (through the "Africanization" of the colonial administration, suppression of salary inequalities between French and Africans, and increased French investment) began to draw large numbers of young Joola to Dakar. After independence, the growth of the public sector was significant: between 1960 and 1981 the Senegalese administration increased from 6,000 to 67,000 employees.⁵² It is difficult to establish precisely how many Joola worked in this administration because Senegal does not publish data based on the regional or ethnic origins of its employees. Foucher analyzes the results of recruiting exams in the public sector published in the 1977 "Journal officiel de la République du Senegal," and bases on an analysis of 4181 names, he claimed that at least 383 were Joola, corresponding to 9.2% of the total.⁵³ If we consider that the Joola represent 5.3% of the Senegalese population according to the

⁵¹ Foucher, "Les Evolués la Migration," 394; Evans, *The Casamance, Senegal*, 66.

⁵² Vincent Foucher, "Les Evolués la Migration, l' Ecole: Pour une Nouvelle Interprétation de la Naissance du Nationalisme Casamançais," in *Le Sénégal Contemporain* (Paris: Karthala 2002), 386.

⁵³ Foucher, "Les Evolués la Migration," 386-387.

1988 census, we can conclude that they were over-represented. Foucher finds also that the Joola were concentrated in the lowest qualified employments: Categories C (secondary school brevets) and D (primary school certificate).

Thus, a kind of “social pact” linked the Joola cadres to the Senegalese state. The Joola elites were loyal to the State because they were employed by it. When the retrenchments began in the 1980s, they felt betrayed by the state and decide to oppose it. They promoted Joola unity and identity so as to establish themselves as Joola spokespeople, and ultimately to accede to state employment by coalescing as a local dominant political class. Englebert argues that the MFDC elites were not only trying to negotiate their (re)integration into Senegal, but more so their local hegemony within Senegal.⁵⁴ As the newspaper “Le Soleil” puts it, the members of the MFDC were “...disappointed in their political or professional ambitions and trying to manipulate the population for their own profit.”⁵⁵

Thus, in Casamance, the MFDC arose because the development of a mass Joola consciousness was accompanied by the emergence of new Joola elites, in search of opportunities and legitimacy. Casamance separatism might have been inhibited had Senegal been willing to maintain the Joola cadres in their jobs. But since Senegal was limited by its economic policies, the Joola cadres had to look elsewhere for means to pursue their ambitions. By giving voice to a sense of resentment against the dominating state in the form of a demand for increased autonomy, the Joola elites have been able to assert their right to act as the spokespeople and leaders of the community. Indeed, popular grievances are very much like natural resources: both are simply resources that elites appropriate in pursuit of their immediate self-interest.

In constructing a pan-ethnic Joola identity, the rebel leaders found fertile soil in a population whose security was threatened by the assimilationist and centralizing state. To begin with, there was, in the early 1980s, a widespread and organized support from local populations. This took the form of subscriptions: in cash, with many locals buying MFDC membership cards for 1000 CFA, or in-kind, usually rice. These subscriptions

⁵⁴ Englebert, “Compliance and Defiance,” 17.

⁵⁵ *Le Soleil*, December 30, 1983.

were channeled through local support committees, which also organized fundraising events such as dances, all to support political activism or to feed activists in hiding.⁵⁶

Second, one can infer the popularity of the rebellion from the fact that MFDC members did not extort money from the civilians or commit robberies against traders or farmers. There were no attacks on passenger or goods transport vehicles, either. This situation shows that the rebels easily obtained supplies.

Third, support for the MFDC was visible through the ease with which they were able to recruit. For example, a non-separatist told Marut that there was not a single family where separatists did not exist.⁵⁷ MFDC leaders assert that the violence of the army has driven many young Casamançais to join the rebellion: “*La brutalité aveugle de l’armée Sénégalaise a poussé la majeure partie des jeunes Casamançais à rejoindre la rébellion.*” Moreover, members of the Casamance Catholic church attested that the MFDC benefited from the support of the majority of the population.⁵⁸

Fourth, although the social basis of the movement is predominantly Joola and the combats are located in the Lower Casamance (Le Kasa, Le Blouf, Ziguinchor agglomeration), mainly inhabited by the Joola (see map), the sociological composition of the MFDC confirmed the popular character of this organization. The list of the persons arrested for rebel activities has revealed a majority of peasants and fishermen. But there were also waged workers, functionaries (schoolteachers mainly), and students from *collèges and lycées*.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Evans, *The Casamance, Senegal*, 147.

⁵⁷ Jean-Claude Marut, *La Question de Casamance (Sénégal). Une Analyse Géopolitique*. (PhD Dissertation, Saint Denis: Université de Paris, 1999), 165: Il n’est pas une famille où n’existent des séparatistes.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 165.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 167.




Figure 3. Main zones of combat between MFDC and Senegalese Forces.

Finally, when the government over-reacted during an MFDC demonstration, and then sub-divided Casamance region in 1984, local sympathy with and support for the rebels increased further.

The MFDC has therefore capitalized upon the grievances of the local populations. They manipulated the ethnic consciousness and got near universal popular support. However, the repression of the movement by the state and the arrest of MFDC leaders combined with the indiscriminate escalation of violence lead to a decline in the amount of locally-derived revenue, and hence drove the MFDC to seek external support by taking advantage of the tensions between Senegal and its neighbors in the 1990s. The next chapter argues that the MFDC's new dependence on external military support in the 1990s caused a change in strategy and tactics, which redefined the rebellion.

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III. FROM POPULAR SECESSION TO EXTERNAL DEPENDENCE (1990-2000)

There are many different ways neighboring states can be affected by and become involved in internal conflicts. Although neighboring states can be the passive victims of turmoil in their regions, they are often active contributors to military escalation and regional instability: opportunistic interventions are common.

(Michel E. Brown, Ethnic and Internal Conflicts: Causes and Implications, page 214)

Neighboring states find it difficult to avoid becoming enmeshed in nearby conflicts and supporting one side or the other.”

(Alexis Heraclides, “Secessionist Minorities and External involvement,” page 343)

A. INTRODUCTION

The preceding chapter demonstrated that in the initial years of the movement (1982-1990), the MFDC capitalized upon the grievances of the local populations and received support from them. This took the form of subscriptions, either in cash, with many locals buying MFDC membership cards for 1,000 francs CFA, or in-kind support. These were channeled through local support committees, which also organized fundraising events such as dances, all to support political activism or to feed activists in hiding. However, sustained government repression, particularly the numerous arrests of MFDC activists and suspected supporters in the mid-to-late 1980s, ended such funding, and with the militarization of the conflict the insurgents had to seek revenues elsewhere.⁶⁰

The rebellion soon found an alternative source of revenue, taking advantage of the hostile relations between Senegal and three of its neighboring countries, Mauritania, The Gambia, and Guinea Bissau. Although Senegal suspects Mauritania of supporting the MFDC as a consequence of their 1989 border conflict, there is little evidence to corroborate this accusation. For this reason, we will limit this chapter to the external

⁶⁰ Martin Evans, “Sénégal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC),” Armed Non-State Actors project. AFP BP 04/02. (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2004), 10.

support that the MFDC received from The Gambia and Guinea Bissau. Indeed, the MFDC began to receive significant assistance from these two neighboring countries in the early 1990s; this new source of support permits the rebellion to compensate for the evaporation of its popular support. With modern weaponry received from neighboring countries, the MFDC escalated the level of violence, not only against the Senegalese state but also against the local population. This change of strategy and tactics further reduced popular support for the movement. The present chapter analyzes this second phase of the MFDC, during which growing dependence upon external patrons led to a fundamental redefinition of the rebellion.

B. CHANGE IN STRATEGIES AND TACTICS

1. Factors Leading to Changes in Strategies and Tactics

In the 1990s, a number of factors led to changes in the tactics and strategies of the MFDC. Among these, alliances with neighboring governments provided the MFDC with modern weaponry for the first time. Second, the signing of a peace accord with the Senegalese government in 1990 caused the movement to split into two fronts (*Front Nord* and *Front Sud*), which, along with access to new technologies led to an escalation of violence in the region and the targeting of local populations. Local populations were targeted (1) as a strategy to prevent them from cooperating with the central government; (2) as a result of the factionalized MFDC moving into areas that supported the rival faction, and (3) because the movements could rely more on foreign backing. Finally, because the movement had split, the two factions were forced not only to compete against the central government but also against themselves, and in the resultant confrontations, both sides lost popular support.

2. Escalation of Violence and Negotiations

The rebel offensive escalated in the early 1990s. Previously limited to sporadic attacks against the posts of the national police and the gendarmerie, MFDC assaults were now extended to the national army, border posts, and official buildings. These attacks occurred over the entire Lower Casamance territory, both north and south of the Casamance River (*see map*).




Figure 4. Escalation of violence over the entire Lower Casamance (from Marut 1999, 47).

Throughout the two-year offensive (1990-91), the MFDC retained the initiative in the attacks. The organization had visibly improved its military capacity, and its attacks became more and more deadly for the security forces. For instance, on June 19, 1990, a group of government soldiers fell into an ambush led by the MFDC between Santhiaba and the Lower Casamance Park.⁶¹

On June 6, 1990, the government responded to the escalation of the rebellion by appointing a retired General, Amadou Abdoulaye Dieng, as Casamance Military Governor with a mission to repress the rebellion. General Dieng responded to the

⁶¹ Nicole, "A Separatist Issue in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of the Casamance (Senegal)," 183.

MFDC's attacks by arresting hundreds of people accused of harboring terrorists or of being sympathetic to their cause. By the beginning of 1991, around three hundred people, including Diamacoune Senghor and other MFDC leaders, had been charged with sedition and sent to Dakar for trial.⁶²

Negotiations for a ceasefire soon began, and on May 31, 1991 the first ceasefire agreement was signed by Sidy Badji, commander of the military wing of the MFDC (Attika), and the Senegalese Defense Minister, Medoune Fall, in Cacheu, Guinea Bissau. The agreement provided for the full withdrawal of military forces and an end to hostilities, as well as the free movement of people and goods. Diamacoune Senghor and 350 Casamançais detainees were released.⁶³

However, signing the agreement augmented the ambitions of the MFDC, which made new demands such as an end to political activities by national parties in Casamance, the abolition of rural taxation in the area, and restrictions on government troop movements.⁶⁴ Moreover, the MFDC leaders appeared to be politically and morally the winners of this episode. They not only proved that they could militarily confront the Senegalese army, but also that they could be invited by the government to undertake negotiations. In addition, official recognition of the existence of a genuine separatist claim in the region granted the movement a measure of political legitimacy. This success convinced the MFDC that it would win if the fighting resumed.

Nevertheless, the military success of the MFDC was tarnished by a split of the movement into two factions: the MFDC (*Front Nord*) and the MFDC (*Front Sud*), named for their regional areas of operations, north and south of the Casamance River. This division emerged following a second round of accords signed in April 1992 in the Bissau town of Cacheu, which aimed to consolidate the May 1991 ceasefire.

The issue at stake in the split, initially, was Diamacoune Senghor's denunciation of the Cacheu Accords for failing to address the MFDC's central demand for Casamance independence. Badji, however, who had negotiated the first accords and advocated a

⁶² Nicole, "A Separatist Issue in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of the Casamance (Senegal)," 183.

⁶³ Evans, *The Casamance Conflict*, 6.

⁶⁴ Nicole, "A Separatist Issue in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of the Casamance (Senegal)," 187.

cooperative approach to dealings with the Senegalese government, disagreed. Therefore, as Senghor split his followers from the MFDC, creating the *Front Sud*, Badji and his followers regrouped as the MFDC (*Front Nord*) and retired from active combat against Senegalese forces. In exchange, they were allowed to retain de facto control of much of the northwest of Bignona department, with few or no Senegalese forces present in the area covered. The MFDC (*Front Nord*) claimed a greater autonomy for the Casamance within Senegal. Under the nominal command of Kamougue Diatta, it has its main base at Diakaye, on the Bignona-Diouloulou Road, near the Gambian border. Ostensibly pacified and engaged in economic development of its zone, the MFDC (*Front Nord*) is now regarded by some as a positive political force of its region.⁶⁵ The MFDC (*Front Sud*) under the command of Leopold Sagna (and later under the command of Salif Sadio) operated south of the Casamance River with its rear bases mainly along both sides of the Casamance's porous forested border with Guinea Bissau. The MFDC (*Front Sud*) meanwhile committed itself to continue fighting for all-out independence.⁶⁶

The two factions were based along borders with neighboring countries: approximately 2,000 MFDC (*Front Sud*) members were located close to or in neighboring Guinea Bissau, while 1,000 MFDC (*Front Nord*) were located on both sides of the border with The Gambia.⁶⁷ There was no cooperation between the two entities. Each faction claimed it is the real MFDC and tried to discredit the other. The MFDC has significantly increased the number of its soldiers, from 700 men in the early 1980s to an estimated 3,000 in the 1990s.⁶⁸

The MFDC (*Front Sud*) resumed violence in late 1992 in order to disrupt the 1993 presidential elections. During this time, systematic persecution of noncombatant Casamançais became common, aimed to prevent them from cooperating with central government initiatives, especially electoral processes. The MFDC (*Front Sud*) considered

⁶⁵ Evans, "Sénégal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)," 5, argues this is naïve since the Front Nord has not laid down its arms.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Nicholas Florquin and Eric G. Berman, eds., *Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region*, Chapter on Senegal. (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005), 360. Accessed online at <http://hei.unige.ch/sas/Books/Full%20Manuscript.pdf>

⁶⁸ Marut, *La Question de Casamance (Sénégal)*, 43.

any whom they found in possession of a polling card traitors, and a landmine campaign was aimed at discouraging voters from going to the polls. Militarily, the MFDC (*Front Sud*) launched a rocket attack on the Ziguinchor airport and blew up an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) vehicle with an anti-tank mine. In November 1992, seven fishermen from northern Senegal were killed in the village of Pointe-Sainte-George.⁶⁹ Despite its efforts at intimidation, the MFDC (*Front Sud*) did not prevent the organization of the elections in Casamance, but they did impact electoral turnout: the turnout at the presidential election was 40 percent in Casamance, as opposed to 51.46 percent nationwide.⁷⁰

Following the presidential elections, violence subsided for a time, but picked up again in 1995 when the Senegalese army decided to undertake an attempt to eradicate the MFDC (*Front Sud*) from Casamance. In January 1995, the Senegalese government interrupted food supplies to the MFDC (*Front Sud*). Until this point, MFDC (both factions) fighters had been provided food by international NGOs with the tacit accord of the Senegalese government. This decision by the Senegalese government hit the MFDC (*Front Sud*) fighters who were camping in the bush more than the MFDC (*Front Nord*) members who were undertaking economic activities in their area. Deprived of food supplies by the government as a response to the escalation of the violence, the MFDC (*Front Sud*) rebels increased their raids on local villages.⁷¹ *Marchés Tropicaux* pointed out that the responsibility for these raids was effectively that of the *Front Sud* and not of the *Front Nord*.⁷² *La Voix de la Casamance* confirmed this assertion in these terms: “the confrontation of Sunday took place after the assault on the village in Niaguiss by some members of the MFDC who have stolen foodstuffs. Since the ceasefire agreement, several dozens of them live clandestinely and have difficulties in feeding themselves; it was clarified by the same sources.”⁷³

⁶⁹ *Le Monde*, November 14, 1992.

⁷⁰ Evans, *The Casamance Conflict*, 7.

⁷¹ *Marchés Tropicaux*, January 27, 1995.

⁷² *Marchés Tropicaux*, April 14, 1995.

⁷³ *La Voix de la Casamance*, January 1995, 25: “L’affrontement de dimanche a eu lieu après l’attaque du village de Niaguiss par des membres du MFDC qui aurait dérobé des produits alimentaires. Depuis l’accord de cessez de feu, plusieurs dizaines d’entre eux vivent dans la clandestinité et éprouvent des difficultés pour se nourrir, a-t-on précisé de même sources.”

As a result, the MFDC increased its military activities. The resumption of the combat extended the violence to the East (le Balantacounda) and the South of Ziguinchor (*see map supra*). The redeployment of the rebellion to the East extended the frontier, facilitating the retreat of the rebels into Guinea Bissau. In April, four French tourists disappeared at Cap Skirring, and the Senegalese government accused the MFDC (*Front Sud*) of being responsible for their kidnapping. The MFDC (*Front Sud*) accused the Senegalese army of being responsible. As a result of this incident, five officials of the MFDC (*Front Sud*), including Diamacoune Senghor, were arrested on April 21 and 22.

Even seriously weakened by the Senegalese offensive, the MFDC (*Front Sud*)'s military capacity remained intact. For example, in July 1995, the insurgents ambushed, captured, and then killed 23 Senegalese soldiers at Babonda, near the Guinea-Bissau border. Two years later, in August 1997, the Senegalese army's biggest single loss in the whole Casamance conflict occurred at Mandina Mancagne, just southeast of Ziguinchor, where 25 soldiers were killed in another ambush. However, many of the MFDC (*Front Sud*)'s bases on both sides of the Guinea Bissau border were destroyed, causing a partial deployment to the North of the Casamance River.⁷⁴

In 1995, there were new attempts at dialogue. However, the series of ceasefires signed by MFDC leaders during the 1990s were intended primarily to buy time to prepare for new offensives. The MFDC was not really interested in an end to the violence.⁷⁵

Indeed, the MFDC pursued its escalation of violence, despite regular ceasefire agreements signed with the government. To illustrate, in August 1997, it initiated a surprise attack on the local military barracks of Kandialan, south of Ziguinchor. The army declared that it had killed more than 30 rebels, but had lost 25 government soldiers. The fighting expanded in Niaguiss sector and in Lower Casamance Park area (*see map*). Because of the offensive of the army, The MFDC (*Front Sud*) moved to the North, near

⁷⁴ Evans, "Sénégal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)," 9-10.

⁷⁵ Jean-Claude Marut, "Casamance: Les Assises du MFDC à Banjul (22-25 Juin 1999)." *Afrique Contemporaine* no. 191 (1999), 79: "La régularité de l'alternance entre épisodes d'affrontements et épisodes de retour au calme n'a pas manqué d'alimenter à Dakar une représentation du conflit dans laquelle ce scénario était censé profiter au MFDC: tout se passer en effet comme si la rébellion utilisait les périodes de répit pour reconstituer ses forces en vue d'une nouvelle phase d'affrontements."

the Gambian border.⁷⁶ The Senegalese forces followed the movement of the MFDC to the North. The *Front Nord* initially tried to prevent the army from establishing a military post at Djanaki, north of the Casamance River, but an agreement was reached through negotiation with the civilian leaders of this faction.⁷⁷

C. THE MFDC BECOMES LARGELY DEPENDENT ON EXTERNAL MILITARY PATRONS

During this time, both fronts of the MFDC received support from The Gambia and Guinea Bissau. As the *Front Sud* expanded operations into the northern parts of the Casamance, and as they increasingly attacked local populations in order to prevent them from cooperating with the central government, the *Front Sud* needed to find other sources of support. It found that support in the form of basing and financial support from Guinea-Bissau. *Front Nord*, because of its cooperative relationship with the Senegalese government, did not rely as much on foreign backing, but nevertheless did receive support from The Gambia. This section shows how these countries were helping the MFDC and how this movement became dependent upon them.

1. The Gambia

The collapse of the Senegambian Confederation in August 1989 significantly increased tensions between the two countries. Senegal accused The Gambia of allowing the secessionists to use its territory as a transit point for Libyan and Iraqi weapons, providing a meeting point for representatives of the MFDC, serving as a base from which the military wing of the MFDC could launch its attacks on the Lower Casamance, and serving as a meeting point between Mauritanian officers and members of the MFDC.⁷⁸ Gambian President Yahya Jammeh, a Joola who came to power in a military coup d'état in 1994, is believed to "have close links with the Joola-dominated MFDC's Front Nord ...The Front Nord is alleged to form the presidential guard at Jammeh's residence, just 2

⁷⁶ Marut, "Casamance: Les Assises du MFDC à Banjul," 73.

⁷⁷ Foucher 2003, 115.

⁷⁸ Nicole, "A Separatist Issue in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of the Casamance (Senegal)," 234; Florquin, 358; Evans 2004, 655.

kilometers across The Gambian border in his home village of Kanilaye, also said to act as a supply and trafficking depot for that faction.”⁷⁹

The lines between rebels, refugees and local Joola communities in The Gambia are blurred. The fluidity of nationality status was well illustrated in 2001 when many Casamance Joola - estimated by some to be in the tens of thousands - were registered to vote as Gambians in the seriously flawed election that legitimized Jammeh's power.⁸⁰ For a number of years, MFDC leaders such as spokesman Alexandra Djiba; Edmond Bora, one of the four national secretaries of the MFDC; and Laurent Diamacoune, a nephew of Diamacoune Senghor, were publicly based in Banjul, the capital of the Gambia. Jammeh's ambivalent and at times duplicitous position is comparable to Liberian president Charles Taylor's dealings with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone.⁸¹ Moreover, Gambian president Jammeh is a good friend of Guinea Bissauan Brigadier General Mane, whose support for the MFDC later became even more critical, as discussed below.

Although the importance of the Gambian territory lessened after 1992 when the MFDC (*Front Nord*) decided to opt for economic projects (fishing and farming) financed by the government, it regained its crucial role in 1995 when the official government of Guinea Bissau began reducing its assistance to the rebels. Indeed, beginning in 1995, increasing cooperation between Guinea Bissau and Senegal in the fighting of the Casamance rebellion forced the MFDC (*Front Sud*) to relocate to the Gambian border, previously controlled by the Front Nord. As a result, the Front Nord then found itself fighting the Front Sud to protect its territory.⁸²

The Gambia has demonstrated an ability to coordinate activities in support of the MFDC to put pressure on Senegal. In the midst of a Senegalese government offensive against the MFDC in 1995, for example, Banjul interrupted communications between Northern Senegal and Casamance, first by increasing the fares of the ferries crossing the

⁷⁹ Martin Evans, “Briefing: Senegal, Wade and the Casamance Dossier,” *African Affairs* 99, no. 397 (October 2000), 655.

⁸⁰ Evans, “Sénégal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC),” 7.

⁸¹ *Africa Confidential*, June 23, 2000, describes Taylor as ‘negotiator and ...godfather-quartermaster of the RUF (Revolutionary United Front).’

⁸² Marut, *La Question de Casamance (Sénégal)*, 349.

Gambian River, and then by declaring that the ferries were out of order. At the same time, the MFDC (*Front Sud*) attacked the Senegalese custom post at the Gambian border. Observers believe these efforts were coordinated actions between the MFDC (*Front Sud*) and The Gambia because the Gambian authorities wanted the Senegalese to decrease the custom controls at the border.⁸³

The Gambians are also determined to block a Senegalese hegemony in West Africa. For instance, to embarrass the Senegalese involvement in the 1998 civil war in Guinea Bissau, the Gambians vehemently opposed the ECOMOG intervention, led by Senegal, and only condemned the military coup there after the ceasefire was signed.⁸⁴

2. Guinea Bissau

In the early 1990s, the Senegalese government was also involved in a 12-year dispute with Guinea Bissau over their maritime border. Although both the International Arbitration Court in Geneva and the International Court of Justice in The Hague awarded the disputed area (believed to be rich in oil) to Senegal, tensions between the two countries remained.

Guinea Bissau has been accused of serving as a safe-haven, staging post and major weapons supplier for the MFDC.⁸⁵ In fact, until the 1998 civil war in Guinea Bissau, the most important arms supplier to the MFDC had been the Guinea-Bissauan government and military officials.⁸⁶

Some facts seem to confirm the Senegalese government's accusations against Guinea Bissau of harboring and supporting the MFDC. First, the press publicized a letter dated March 30, 1986 and signed by several MFDC leaders, which was an appeal to a neighboring country for arms and explosives. Most observers believed that the country in

⁸³ Marut, *La Question de Casamance (Sénégal)*, 349.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 379.

⁸⁵ Lawrence Woocher, "The Casamance Question: An Examination of the Legitimacy of Self-Determination in Southern Senegal," *International Journal of Minority and Group Rights* 7, no. 4 (2000): 342.

⁸⁶ Martin Evans, "Briefing: Senegal, Wade and the Casamance Dossier," *African Affairs* 99, no. 397 (October 2000), 649.

question was Guinea Bissau.⁸⁷ Second, the start of the separatist offensive in 1990 coincided with Guinea Bissauan army attacks against Senegalese objectives at the border. Indeed, the so called '*guerre du pétrole*' (Oil War), during which the Guinea Bissauan and Senegalese armies fought at the border, began one month after the MFDC offensive. Furthermore, the retreat of MFDC (*Front Sud*) rebels into Guinea Bissau while the artillery of the Guinea Bissau army was in action could be interpreted as Guinea Bissau providing cover for the withdrawal of the rebels. Third, the Guinea Bissauan army has sometimes supported or even taken part in combat operations in the Casamance. For example, in April 2000, the MFDC attacked a Senegalese army post on the southern border. Three Senegalese soldiers died, and a Guinean Bissauan soldier was found among the 15 attackers also killed, together with the remains of a Guinea-Bissauan army vehicle.⁸⁸

Finally, and most important, the 1998 civil war in Guinea Bissau was in part a result of the Casamance conflict. Although the government of Guinea Bissau, or at least President Vieira, began reducing support to the MFDC in 1995, the military under Brigadier General Ansumane Mane, chief of staff of the army, continued their support. To illustrate, in June 1998 Mane launched a military coup after being scapegoated by President Viera for arms supply to the MFDC. The MFDC (*Front Sud*) sent a contingent to Guinea to help Mane's forces against the Senegalese troops that had been dispatched to support President Vieira.⁸⁹ During this conflict, the MFDC (*Front Sud*) acquired 82 mm mortars, B-10 82 mm recoil-less guns and DShK-38 12.7 mm heavy machine guns.⁹⁰ In May 1999, the Guinea Bissauan parliament undertook an investigation on arms trafficking to the MFDC (*Front Sud*). The parliamentary report cleared General Mane,

⁸⁷ *Le Témoin*, May 18, 1986.

⁸⁸ Evans, "Briefing: Senegal, Wade and the Casamance Dossier," 651.

⁸⁹ Marut, *La Question de Casamance (Sénégal)*, 345 ; Foucher 2003 (a), 115.

⁹⁰ Evans, "Sénégal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)," 8.

but accused 40 of President's Vieira's aides of arming the separatists. The Bissau parliament threatened to put the president on trial for failure to halt the illicit arms trade.⁹¹

Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s, the MFDC received substantial support and benefits from The Gambia and Guinea Bissau and in response came to rely less upon the support of local constituents. With the change in the source of its support, the MFDC would militarize the conflict by escalating the violence not only against the state but also against the local populations. The changes in strategies and tactics would reinforce its growing dependence upon external patrons rather than popular support.

D. EROSION OF POPULAR SUPPORT

Along with these external factors, internal developments also decreased popular support for the MFDC. Internally, as the MFDC (*Front Sud*) moved north of the Casamance River, it spread violence to the entire Bignona department, which had been calm since 1992 when the *Front Nord* had begun to cooperate with the central government. As *Front Sud* guerillas fled the army offensive and established new bases in Bignona, they came into direct confrontation with both the *Front Nord* and the Senegalese army. Sporadic clashes between them continued into early 1998, as well as attacks on civilians mainly by the *Front Sud*.

Indeed, removed from their usual areas of operations, the *Front Sud* was having difficulties in obtaining food supplies. MFDC (*Front Sud*) separatists began to collect "contributions" from villagers in the name of the MFDC as a whole, despite the disunity of the latter. Villagers were given the choice between 'subscription' (or, for young men, joining the rebellion), or being beaten or killed. Amnesty International declared that villagers who refused to provide food or money to the MFDC, or were suspected of collaborating with the Senegalese authorities, were killed by the separatists.⁹²

⁹¹ L. J. Beck, "Sovereignty in Africa: From Colonial Inheritance to Ethnic Entitlement? The Case of the Casamance Secessionist Movement" (paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Atlanta, GA, September 2-5, 1999), 22.

⁹² Amnesty International, February 28, 1996.

Public opinion about the separatists started to shift when they began attacking fishermen from northern Senegal in the name of ‘ethnic purification’ and raiding villages, eliminating traitors, robbing peasants of all ethnic and political stripes, and committing a battery of human rights abuses. The massacre of 13 civilian travelers at Niahoump, on the Transgambienne, on February 16, 1997 shocked many Casamançais. This incident was followed, one month later, by the killing of seven more under similar circumstances at Belaye, on the Bignona-Diouloulou road. Wolofs were separated from other passengers on the basis of their identity cards, and then executed. These atrocities were committed by *Front Sud* fighters displaced from Guinea Bissau.⁹³

The erosion of the movement’s popular support led to the creation of self-defense groups to protect the villagers from the extortions and armed robberies committed by the MFDC. Lambert asserts that “at times Joola opposition to the MFDC has been violent. For instance, in May 1992 a village paramilitary group in Cabanaou engaged Atika [the armed branch of the MFDC] in a military confrontation that reportedly claimed the lives of twenty rebels. Another village chased representatives of Atika out of the village when they arrived to collect a revolutionary tax.”⁹⁴ Moreover, the Collectif des Cadres Casamançais, created in 1998 and representing entrepreneurs and professionals from Casamance, asked the MFDC to “have the modesty to admit that Casamançais did not mandate it to demand the independence of the Casamance... Casamançais are tired of the escalation of violence, its endless cycle...We are for the development of the Casamance and not for its independence.”⁹⁵ Moreover, in July-August 2000, following protests along Kolda region’s southern border about growing insecurity, the local populations close to the border demanded better protection and the restitution of stolen livestock, vehicles and other possessions.⁹⁶

The conflict became too costly for the local population. According to the World Bank, many thousands of lives have been lost, hundreds of people injured by mines and

⁹³ *Sud Quotidien* February 23 and March 3, 1997.

⁹⁴ Michael C. Lambert, “Violence and the War of Words: Ethnicity v. Nationalism in the Casamance,” *Africa* 68, no. 4 (September 1998): 586.

⁹⁵ *Sud Quotidien*, February 19, 2001.

⁹⁶ Evans, “Sénégal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC),” 115-116.

unexploded ordnance (UXO), and tens of thousands displaced either internally or externally.⁹⁷ In addition, major constraints on agricultural productivity are now emerging as a result of natural resource damage inflicted by salinization, erosion, and deforestation. The regional directorate for agriculture in Ziguinchor announced a 19.7 percent drop in cereal production—from 41,673 to 33,479 tons—over the 1990-96 periods. According to the regional inspectorate for Water and Forest Resources, revenues from public lands fell from CFAF 45 million in 1991 to CFAF 17 million in 1997. The fishing and livestock sectors have also been affected by the violence. Tourism has been negatively affected, with many investors shunning the region for fear of potential customer flight.

The negative human, social and economic impact of the conflict made the population long for peace and stability, which the government promised along with a list of other economic and social advantages if the rebellion ended. Indeed, the Senegalese officials announced in May 1999 a development package of CFAF 114 billion investment in Casamance over the next five years. This important allocation of resources was to be devoted to demining, reinforcing border security, providing assistance to displaced people, seed supplies, health assistance and the reconstruction of ruined infrastructure. The promised bridge across the River Gambia should transform Casamance's communications with the rest of Senegal.⁹⁸

Additionally, in 1997 the Government adopted a policy of regionalization as a solution to the Casamance conflict. The reform gives to local leaders more authority, responsibility, and control over their regional institutions. The regions became *collectivités locales*; that is, elected structures of government with some independence from the center. The 10 regions created in 1996 (later expanded to 11 when the region of Saint-Louis was divided to create the region of Matam) have both elected councils and a state-appointed governor, making them both semi-independent and under the purview of the state. Below the regions come two levels of state administration, the *départements* and the *arrondissements*, which have oversight power over local governments. At the local level, governments are elected. Local governments consist of urban communes on the one hand and *communautés rurales* on the other.

⁹⁷ World Bank Report No T 7636, August 13, 2004.

⁹⁸ Evans, *The Casamance Conflict*, 12.

In order to further isolate the MFDC, Senegal had already persuaded the neighboring countries against cooperating with the organization. The Senegalese government had signed a bilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation with The Gambia on May 25, 1991. Immediately following the signature of this treaty, the Senegalese Foreign Affairs Minister met the President of the Gambia, during which they discussed problems of stability in the Casamance. In relation to this, the governmental Newspaper *Le Soleil* mentioned that according to a law recently enacted by the Gambian parliament, “Banjul was determined to serve neither as sanctuary nor rear base to terrorist groups aimed at one or another country in the area.”⁹⁹ The desire for cooperation shown by the Gambian government, more particularly following the wave of violence that occurred in the Casamance in 1990 and 1991, was not only due to the fear of seeing this problem spread to the whole sub-region, or the pressure from Dakar, but also the possibility that the trade routes from Banjul to Bissau had been periodically disrupted by fighting in the Casamance. This cooperation continued when the new Gambian leader, Yaya Jammeh, took power in a military coup on July 22, 1994. He has already been pushing The Gambia closer to Senegal, speaking of the “one-ness” of the Sene-Gambian people on Senegalese television. In an interview with the Senegalese daily *Le Soleil*, Jammeh also declared his intention to fight against tribalism and regionalism.¹⁰⁰

Although in the same year a ruling by the International Court of Justice on the maritime border dispute between Senegal and Guinea Bissau granted Senegal control over the contested oil reserves, Senegal signed an agreement with Bissau in 1993 that provided for joint management and exploitation of the oil reserves. Senegal also supported Guinea-Bissau’s entry into the CFA zone, a regional currency that is tied to the French franc.¹⁰¹ The two countries signed an agreement reinforcing border controls between Senegal and Guinea Bissau. The agreement included the undertaking of joint patrols along the border, an exchange of liaison officers and the right of Senegalese troops to pursue the separatists into Guinea Bissau territory. Improved relations with Senegal might have prompted Bissau to encourage Diamacoune Senghor, the Secretary

⁹⁹ *Le Soleil*, May 28, 1991.

¹⁰⁰ *Le Soleil*, August 31, 1994.

¹⁰¹ Beck, “Sovereignty in Africa,” 17.

General of the MFDC, to return to Ziguinchor in 1993 from his covert base in Guinea-Bissau. Upon his return, Diamacoune called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and negotiated a new ceasefire.¹⁰² Moreover, Guinea Bissau was the guarantor of the ceasefire of May 31, 1991 and July 8, 1993 between the MFDC and the Senegalese government. Following the signing of the 1991 ceasefire, Guinea Bissau's President, J. B. Vieira, declared he had no intention of letting the territory of Guinea Bissau be used by the Casamance separatists. However, if President Vieira seems ready to cooperate with Senegal, it does not mean that his entire government agrees with him (see above).¹⁰³ Still, the MFDC did become increasingly isolated from The Gambia and Guinea Bissau.

Thus, Senegal seemed to have the upper hand, not only in terms of the international context but also with regards to its public opinion. The MFDC was severely weakened. Although these governmental efforts reduced external and popular support for the MFDC, this movement remained, however, potentially dangerous in the Casamance since it was not disarmed and still created a semi-permanent insecurity in the region through calculated occasional skirmishes against the Senegalese forces and the army.

In the 1990s, despite the evaporation of popular support, the MFDC had maintained itself thanks to the assistance received from The Gambia and Guinea Bissau. This external support allowed the rebellion not only to escalate the violence against the state and the populations but also to sustain itself. While Senegal eventually succeeded in persuading both local populations and the neighboring countries to abandon their support of the MFDC, the MFDC was able to remake itself again by engaging in the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the territories under its control. The next chapter analyzes the 'war economy' of the MFDC from 2000 onwards, showing how a movement initially motivated in large part by grievance, then opportunity, has become one driven almost entirely by greed.

¹⁰² *Marchés Tropicaux*, October 13, 1995.

¹⁰³ Senegal improved its diplomatic relations with the neighbors in the 1990s. However, it was in the early 2000s that the cooperation became more productive. In this period, The Gambia and Guinea Bissau armies launched offensives against the MFDC inside their territory. These actions also included the forced removal from parts of the border zone of refugees believed to be linked with the MFDC fighters.

IV. FROM VIOLENT REBELLION TO WAR ECONOMY (2000-PRESENT)

Movements are led by politicians seeking power, and the influence and wealth that flow from it. Few would hold ideals to the point of losing everything, even if most have only hope to rely on that they will gain something in the future.

Bruce Baker, "Separating the Sheep from the Goats among Africa's Separatist Movements. Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, No.1, Spring 2001, 82.

War has increasingly become the continuation of economics by other means.

David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence on Civil wars," 1998, 11.

The preceding chapter analyzed how the MFDC changed its strategy and tactics in response to its growing dependence upon external patrons rather than popular support, and how this, in turn, redefined the rebellion. The present chapter explains another shift, this time from the externally supported, generalized violence of the early 1990s to the profit driven insecurity that has prevailed since the early 2000s. Senegal has isolated the MFDC (both fronts)¹⁰⁴ from its external support by improving its relationship with The Gambia and Guinea Bissau and by promising peace and economic development to the populations if they abandon their assistance to the rebellion. Despite the fact that Senegal's strategy of undermining popular and external support for the MFDC succeeded in its immediate goal, Dakar's policy did not lead to a final resolution of the conflict because the MFDC's civilian and military leaders have adopted new strategies to sustain themselves. There is a situation of semi-permanent insecurity in Casamance, which provides the MFDC with new resources for its survival. Both fronts of the MFDC are now engaged in the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of Casamance because it is in the interests of the separatists to prolong the conflict and the geography and abundant natural resources in Casamance provide the MFDC with new means of survival.

¹⁰⁴ For the remainder of this thesis, when MFDC appears on its own, it refers to both Front Nord and Front Sud. When specifically discussing one of the fronts, I will specify which one I am referring to.

First, the MFDC engages in the 'war economy' because its bush fighters' immediate economic interests lead them to continue to fight to maintain informal control of Casamance territory in order to exploit its economic resources. As Keen put it, "war has increasingly become the continuation of economy by other means. War is not simply a breakdown in a particular system, but a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power, and even protection."¹⁰⁵ Most of the estimated 2,000-4,000 remaining rebels are school drop-outs, who would not get the opportunity to work in a Casamance civil service.¹⁰⁶ For them, profiting from the war economy has become an end in itself. They joined the MFDC not because they believed in the independence of Casamance region in a near future but because joining the MFDC was the only remaining option to improve their personal situations.¹⁰⁷ This reality has not changed.

As MFDC fighters began to be motivated more by profit than the ideological goal of Casamance independence, they began a new strategy of occupying different economically advantageous areas. In this new phase of the conflict, they spread violence to perpetuate the insecurity that facilitated their economic enterprises in the region.¹⁰⁸ Rather than occupying all of Casamance, since the early 2000s, MFDC forces have concentrated their efforts on controlling only the areas in which natural resources and related economic activities are located. The geographical position of Casamance, which provides easy access to trade with neighboring counties, and the diverse array of resources (discussed below), provide material with which the MFDC can support itself.

In order to monopolize these resources, however, the movement has had to displace the local populations who had already been using the assets to sustain themselves. Evans says for instance that "the MFDC (*Front Sud*) holds areas, particularly in the border zone, from which it has displaced civilian populations through exaction, robbery, terror or sowing landmines, and has destroyed their houses. Some IDPs in

¹⁰⁵ Keen, *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars*, 15; Charles King, "The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States," *World Politics* 53, no. 4 (2001), 525; Addison, Le Billon, and Murshed 2002, 365-386; Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," 868-869. Recall from chapter two that the number of rebels at the height of the movement was estimated at around 7,000 individuals.

¹⁰⁶ Evans, "Briefing: Senegal, Wade and the Casamance Dossier," 653.

¹⁰⁷ Nicole, "A Separatist Issue in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of the Casamance (Senegal)," 209.

¹⁰⁸ Evans, "Briefing: Senegal, Wade and the Casamance Dossier," 653.

Ziguinchor report that they or their family members have been attacked by MFDC fighters when they had tried to return to their home villages.”¹⁰⁹ Likewise, in parts of the Buluf, in the Ziguinchor region, the MFDC (*Front Nord*) prevents the villagers from exploiting timber trees, particularly cail-cedrat (*Khaya Senegalensis* or red wood). The MFDC (*Front Nord*) controls its areas through an informal network of associates. Sometimes, it tries to comply with the 1964 National Domain Act by requesting, for example, an authorization to use communal land from the rural council. However, people argue that the council did not decide freely since a representative of the rebel movement was present during the deliberations. Most of the time, the MFDC (*Front Nord*) uses intimidation and force in support of its economic activities, instead.¹¹⁰

The MFDC has been able to engage in these activities because Casamance has abundant natural resources. Indeed, Casamance is the most fertile region of Senegal. The “green” Casamance (as it is often called) is considered as the granary of Senegal. Its dense vegetation contrasts with the semi-arid character of the remaining Senegalese territory. It is sandwiched between *Guinea Bissau* and *The Gambia* which serve as driving forces in the regional war economy because both countries provide the two factions of the MFDC with buying power, access to national and international markets, and processing facilities for the conflict goods. Moreover, the economic activities between Casamance and these two countries are facilitated by strong, secular, sociocultural ties.¹¹¹

The MFDC (*Front Nord*) and the MFDC (*Front Sud*) extract timber and wood fuels in the territories under their respective control. Evans argues that “the most lucrative and certainly the most contentious economic activity of the MFDC (*Front Nord*) is the exploitation of the rich forests of Bignona department. The Front Nord has a sawmill at its main base at Dikaye, just off the main road between Bignona and the Gambia’s urban centers.”¹¹² MFDC (*Front Sud*) cuts timber in Bayot and Bissine *Forêts classées* for sale

¹⁰⁹ Martin Evans, “Ni Paix ni Guerre: The Political Economy of Low-level Conflict in the Casamance,” in *Power, Livelihoods and Conflict: Case Studies in Political Economy Analysis for Humanitarian Action* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2003), 15.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid., 9.

in Guinea Bissau and in Ziguinchor. It processes and sells timber in bordering Guinean Bissau towns such as Sao Domingos, Ingore, and Farim. Overall, timber is more important as a 'conflict good' to the MFDC (*Front Nord*) than to the MFDC (*Front Sud*). In effect, most of the roads under MFDC (*Front Sud*) are mined, making the use of vehicles as a means of transport more dangerous.¹¹³

Wood fuels, while important to both factions, are also more important for the Front Nord than the Front Sud. Although the extraction and trade of wood fuels near the Gambian border began before the Casamance conflict, they increased significantly with its onset. Indeed, travelers going or coming by car to The Gambia can easily see charcoal production on the Senegalese side of the border.¹¹⁴

Cashews and other tree crops are also exploited by the MFDC fighters. The Casamance region annually produces about 10,000 tons of cashews.¹¹⁵ The orchards are more abundant in the Guinea Bissau border zone than in other areas, which makes this resource more lucrative for the Front Sud than the Front Nord. In fact, the MFDC (*Front Sud*) obtains most of its revenue from cashews. The Front Sud annually harvests about 200-300 tons that it sells either to dealers in Ziguinchor and the Guinea Bissau towns of Sao Domingos and Ingore, or which it exchanges for rice or arms. Cashews are the main crop export of Guinea Bissau, representing around 20 per cent of the country's GDP and 90 percent of export earnings.¹¹⁶ In 2000, world cashew prices were 300-500 CFA (\$0.45-0.75)/kg.¹¹⁷ Because Guinea Bissau relies heavily on cashew exports, it provides a ready market for the rebel's productive efforts, to the point that *Sud Quotidien* described the border zone as the 'granary' of the rebels.¹¹⁸ No data are available to evaluate extent of harvesting cashews by the Front Nord; the degree of this movement's involvement is, however, probably less because there are fewer cashew orchards north of the Casamance River.

¹¹³ Evans, "Ni Paix ni Guerre," 12; *Sud Quotidien* May 18, 2000; *Le Soleil* July 19, 2001, 9-10, Evans, *The Casamance, Senegal*, 136.

¹¹⁴ Evans, *The Casamance, Senegal*, 138.

¹¹⁵ *Sud Quotidien*, June 7, 2001.

¹¹⁶ ARB-EFT, June 9 and October 12, 2000.

¹¹⁷ *Le Pais*, June 8, 2001.

¹¹⁸ *Sud Quotidien*, May 18, 2000.

The rebels dominate the trade in some landmined zones near the Guinea Bissau border and around Ziguinchor, in areas abandoned by, or inaccessible to civilians, and their domination of the cashew industry can be measured by how patterns of warfare correspond to the harvest and trade seasons. For example, according to Marut, during the cashew season (April-June), MFDC combatants can often be seen harvesting, trading or processing locally. So many of the militants are involved in the trade that this period often witnesses intensified fighting before the season as the MFDC fighters attempt to gain control over the orchards, followed by a short ceasefire as they harvest and trade the crops.¹¹⁹ At other times, the fighters escalate violence to get access and control of a zone rich in cashews. This is the explanation by Marut of the increased attacks by MFDC (*Front Sud*) on villagers in the Balantacounda. This area is known for the diversity and richness of its orchards.¹²⁰

Mangoes and citrus fruits are similarly harvested by the factions of the MFDC, mainly from orchards abandoned or inaccessible because of landmines. These trees fruits are sold through the black market. For example, the *Front Sud* fighters harvest mangoes and oranges from the border zone, and market them via retailers in Sao Domingos or Ziguinchor.¹²¹ Other existing channels that MFDC factions could use include smuggling Casamance mangoes to The Gambia and Guinea Bissau.¹²²

Cannabis is another crucial conflict good in the Lower Casamance, particularly in the Karone Isles, between Kafountine and the lower reaches of the Casamance River (see map). This area is difficult to reach by road but offers good access by boat to the river and the sea, and proximity to The Gambia. Cannabis cultivation is well organized in this area; despite government and NGO attempts to stop it through prosecution, anti-drugs publicity and incentives for legal crops, it remains more profitable than alternative, legal livelihoods, so farmers are unwilling to give it up.¹²³ (See Map)

¹¹⁹ Evans, *The Casamance, Senegal*, 140.

¹²⁰ Marut 1999, quoted in Evans. *The Casamance, Senegal*.

¹²¹ Evans, "Ni Paix ni Guerre," 10.

¹²² Sud FM Ziguinchor broadcast, May 6, 2001.

¹²³ *Sud Quotidien*, March 7, 2002.




Figure 5. Cannabis cultivation and Casamance Conflict (From Marut 1999, 283).

Since the early 1980s, MFDC fighters have reportedly earned revenue from cannabis directly or by claiming taxes to other producers.¹²⁴ MFDC fighters produce and trade cannabis in their respective zones, taking advantage of the little or no presence of Senegalese forces. For example, the Front Nord grows cannabis in its ‘pacified’ zone (Kafountine and Sindian districts) and possesses an *entrepôt* in the Gambian President’s Kanilaye village, where it exchanges cannabis for arms and other supplies. The MFDC (*Front Sud*) grows cannabis along the Guinea border.¹²⁵ Both factions sell their product through existing channels in Lower Casamance, Dakar, and other northern Senegalese cities as described by several reports from the Senegalese press.¹²⁶ However, the largest market is The Gambia; the cannabis from Lower Casamance is transported to that country via maritime and overland routes.¹²⁷ The Lower Casamance cannabis trade is also linked to extensive drug and arms-trafficking networks along the West African coast. According to Evans, “MFDC fighters have reportedly exchanged cannabis for weapons, and fishing boats carrying both weapons and drugs, including hard drugs, have been seized by Senegalese authorities near the Gambian border and Dakar.”¹²⁸

Livestock and bushmeat are another component of the war economy. The Senegalese press often reports theft of cattle at the Guinea Bissau border.¹²⁹ During the escalation of violence in the 1990s, MFDC (*Front Sud*) fighters have been accused of taking the livestock left by owners fleeing the combat zones. Furthermore, those fighters have also intentionally attacked border villages in order to acquire their livestock.¹³⁰ Moreover, the deliberate cattle raiding in southern Kolda border villages by the MFDC (*Front Sud*) is considered the main factor that forced local populations to picket the border in the 2000 rainy season.¹³¹

¹²⁴ Evans, *The Casamance, Senegal*, 143; Marut 1999; Margaret Hall, *The Casamance Conflict, 1982-1999*.

¹²⁵ Marut 1999.

¹²⁶ Walfadjri, and *Sud Quotidien* May 16, 2001.

¹²⁷ Marut 1999.

¹²⁸ Evans, *The Casamance, Senegal*, 145.

¹²⁹ *Sud Quotidien*, July 2, 2001; ARB-PSC, October 25, 1999.

¹³⁰ Walfadjri, December 22, 2000 ; *L’Info*, August 13, 2001.

¹³¹ *L’Info*, August 13, 2001.

Bushmeat is another conflict good in Casamance. Indeed, hunting and consuming or selling game such as antelope, porcupine, and monkey are parts of the Joola culture. Evans believes that “the *Front Sud* exploits bushmeat from abandoned areas as a source of revenue; on forest bases, at least during past ceasefire periods, maquisards made doeskin bags, purses and shoes for sale, via intermediaries, at Ziguinchor’s tourist market. Rebels of both camps fish: the Front Nord was given fishing equipment by donors.”¹³² The Lower Casamance National Park covers an area of about 5,000 hectares in Oussouye department, near the Guinea Bissau border. Its rich fauna is exploited for bushmeat by the Front Sud.¹³³

Nevertheless, the illicit trading by the MFDC is jeopardizing the natural resource base of the Casamance region. According to some estimates, fishing resources are being over-exploited and the fisheries sector is in need of a general reorganization. Similarly, the forestry and arboriculture sector must be revitalized so that it can achieve its full potential. Forests, including those that are classified, have been under intense pressure.¹³⁴ There is considerable evidence of impoverishment of some species (ven and cail-cedrat) in the Lower Casamance forests. Overexploitation of forests in the Front Nord zone is now so widespread that the rebels themselves called a meeting in June 2000 to address the problem.¹³⁵

The MFDC (*Front Sud*) also gains revenue through exactions and armed robberies on its constituencies. But this was not always so: as mentioned earlier, in the

¹³² Evans, *The Casamance, Senegal*, 11.

¹³³ Evans, “Ni Paix ni Guerre,” 12; *Sud Quotidien* May 18, 2000; *Le Soleil* July 19, 2001.

¹³⁴ World Bank Report No T 7636, August 13, 2004.

¹³⁵ Evans, *The Casamance, Senegal*, 164; minutes of the meeting:

Addressing the first on the agenda, the participants at the meeting, after a long debate about the situation of the forest, admitted with regret that they are the first and foremost enemies of the forest heritage of the zone.

Following critical examination of this question and analysis of its implications for the economy of the Casamance, the livelihoods of combatants and those of the zone’s inhabitants, the following decision were taken:

- Immediate stop to wood-cutting by combatants,
- Interdiction on any other person cutting trees,
- Surveillance of the whole zone in order that the measure be respected by everyone,
- Information to and raising awareness of populations in line with this forest protection project.

1980s the MFDC as a unique organization at first enjoyed wider support from the Lower Casamance populations, who funded the movement through subscriptions or ‘gifts.’ Harsh exactions only became frequent when the MFDC lost its popular support. It then gave the population a choice between ‘subscription’ or being beaten or killed.¹³⁶ In the era of the war economy, such exactions assume the form of armed robberies and looting of shops and houses often after attacks on state symbols, which have become relatively common sources of funds for the Front Sud separatists. After stopping the vehicles, the rebels dispossessed the passengers of their belongings (cash, luggage, wares, and sometimes even their clothing). Passengers trying to resist or escape are beaten or killed. A vehicle and some selected passengers are sometimes temporarily taken to help move the loot to a safe location. The loot is used by the Front Sud rebels for their own needs or sold through existing channels in Guinea-Bissau, The Gambia, and Ziguinchor.¹³⁷

Humanitarian aid is also a component of the war economy. Humanitarian aid may exacerbate conflict in four ways: feeding militants, sustaining and protecting militants’ dependents, providing legitimacy to combatants, and supporting a war economy.¹³⁸ Direct assistance to militants relieves them of having to find food themselves. Even if assistance does not directly sustain the militants, it can support their war aims by aiding their civilian families and supporters. In addition, humanitarian assistance shapes international opinion about the actors in a crisis by providing international legitimacy to a group’s political goals. Finally, militants can use relief resources to finance conflict. It is not uncommon for rebel leaders to levy a war tax on the refugee population, commandeering a portion of all rations and salaries. Rebel leaders can also divert aid when they control the distribution process.

During the Rwanda refugee crisis, for example, militant leaders diverted large amounts of aid by inflating population numbers and pocketing the excess. Armed groups often raid warehouses and international compounds to steal food, medicine, and equipment. Thousands, if not millions, of dollars of relief resources, including vehicles

¹³⁶ Amnesty International, 1998; Raddho, 1997.

¹³⁷ *Sud Quotidien*, February 3, 2001; Evans, *The Casamance, Senegal*, 151.

¹³⁸ Sarah K. Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

and communication equipment, are stolen every year. For example, in the mid-1990s, aid organizations curtailed their operations in Liberia after the theft of \$20 million in equipment during the civil war there. The International Committee of the Red Cross reported that:

the level of diversion by the factions had reached a systematic and planned level, that it was integrated into the war strategy...It was obvious that the factions were opening the doors to humanitarian aid, up to the point where all the sophisticated logistics had entered the zones: cars, radios, computers, telephones. When all the staff was there, then the looting would start in a quite systematic way.¹³⁹

Because of the large numbers of IDPs and refugees from the Casamance conflict, humanitarian assistance has become a factor in the war economy. A census in 1998 by the NGO Caritas gave a total of 62,638 internally displaced persons and refugees. UNHCR sources estimate that there are 10,000-13,000 Senegalese refugees in The Gambia and 30,000 in Guinea Bissau.¹⁴⁰ Although the MFDC is not an aid dependent organization like the SPLA in Sudan, it was supplied food by some agencies with official support during ceasefires. This was to ensure that rebels would not be forced into banditry by hunger (thus protecting the civilian population) and as an act of goodwill, all to facilitate dialogue. Medicines have similarly been supplied to the rebels with government permission. Lists of requirements, sent by one *Front Sud* element to agencies in Ziguinchor at the start of the wet season in recent years, included antibiotics, antimalarials, vermifuges and rehydration salts. The government continues to deliver food to the MFDC fighters. The independent newspaper *Walfadjri* reported that on December 20, 2005, at a meeting held in Guinea Bissau between the Association of the Cadres Casamançais, the Front Nord, and Guinea Bissau officials, a representative of the MFDC (*Front Nord*) recommended that the rice be delivered to the Front Nord through the Gambian Red Cross and to the Front Sud through local businessmen chosen by the Front Sud.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹Sarah K. Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 8.

¹⁴⁰ Evans, "Sénégal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)," 4; Marut, *La Question de Casamance (Sénégal)*, 93.

¹⁴¹ *Walfadjri* December 25, 2005.

MFDC fighters have also benefited indirectly from relief aid for civilians. In effect, food given to refugees in both Guinea Bissau and The Gambia has supported rebels there to a limited extent. Moreover, the humanitarian aid designated to rural populations has sometimes been targeted by the rebels.¹⁴² In an interview, a Red Cross officer countered that, normally, soldiers are dispatched to protect civilian populations still in place after an attack and hence secure aid distribution.¹⁴³ The economic stakes in reconstruction and demobilization are relatively high. There is increasing contest for control of aid flowing into the region in support of peace and development, with various political, civil and MFDC actors vying to secure benefits.

MFDC leaders also have their eyes on the Dome Flore oil fields discovered in 1965 and containing up to one billion barrels of heavy crude.¹⁴⁴ (see map)




Figure 6. Dôme Flore Oil and Casamance conflict (From Marut 1999, 397)

¹⁴² Foucher 2003, chapter 7.

¹⁴³ Evans, "Sénégal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)," 12.

¹⁴⁴ The Oil and Gas Journal, October 28, 1985.

In comparison, rebel groups in Chad and Angola seemed to be motivated by the same resource logic. In the south of Chad where oil fields have been discovered, movements like the Armed Forces for a Federal Republic (FARF) accepted the signature of a ceasefire agreement only when they were offered share in the oil production. In the UNITA case, Le Billon asserts that “aside from directly financing the conflict, continuing oil and diamond revenues act as strong disincentives for rival groups to reach any sustained agreement on political and economic reforms...”¹⁴⁵

A. SPLITS WITHIN THE MFDC

Sources of revenue are important not only because of their impact on the functioning of the movement, but also because they can be linked to internal splits within the MFDC, as well. Unlike the MFDC military leaders whose economic interests lead them to continue to fight, the MFDC civilian leaders, who need access to state employment or support, have become dependent on financial transfers from the Senegalese government. Senegal provides money to MFDC political leaders who abandon separatist claims. The privately owned daily, *Le Quotidien*, revealed in September 2005 that the government had allocated FCFA 16 million to the movement's fighters and FCFA 5.5 million to "MFDC political leaders" during the previous one and a half years.¹⁴⁶ In addition, critics of Krumah Sane, chief of the external wing of the MFDC who is living in France as a French citizen, assert the reasons he opposes a peaceful resolution to the war have less to do with the MFDC's commitment to an independent Casamance than the financial benefit that Sane receives by pocketing contributions for the MFDC. In return, Nkrumah Sane accused some MFDC leaders such as Jean Marie Biagui and Ansumane Badji of receiving millions of CFA Francs daily from the Senegalese government.¹⁴⁷ Others in the MFDC hold the Senegalese government responsible for having corrupted some of its members, dating back to the creation of a *Front Nord* and a *Front Sud* in the early 1990s. Thus, the distribution of

¹⁴⁵ Le Billon, et al. *The Political Economy of War*, 55-80.

¹⁴⁶ *Le Quotidien*, September 1, 2005.

¹⁴⁷ *L'Observateur*, April 7, 2005.

finances has become a divisive issue, with accusations of misappropriations of external funds exchanged between factions of the political wing.

However, having been deprived of external and internal support, the funding of the MFDC civilian leaders by the government is crucial. The importance of this funding explains the panic among the MFDC civilian leaders when President Wade threatened in 2000 to end their subsidies. The MFDC civilian leaders demonstrated an unusual willingness to compromise to avoid such a dramatic outcome. Some of them went to Dakar to meet with President Wade's staff. Others contacted the RADDHO (Rencontre Africaine Des Droits de L' Homme), a human rights Senegalese NGO, or the Collective des Cadres Casamançais, for a continuation of aid and negotiations.¹⁴⁸ In November 2000, Diamacoune complained to President Wade that he was no longer receiving state subsidies while having "important local charges."¹⁴⁹ On April 18, 2003, he again sent a letter to the Senegalese President to demand a plane for the transport of its delegation to Banjul and CFA 3 million to cover the expenses of their sojourn in The Gambia (see letter attached).¹⁵⁰ The civilian leadership of the *Front Nord* and *Front Sud* are all trying to get recognized by Dakar as separatist leaders willing to compromise. The leaders of the MFDC (both civilian factions) wanted to have access to state resources and use these transfers to reinforce their local power, wealth, and influence.

Clearly, in the 2000s, the MFDC has demonstrated, once again, its capacity to sustain itself by adapting to any governmental policy aimed at neutralizing it. When the government finally succeeded in undermining its popular and external support, the MFDC simply adopted another new strategy to sustain itself. This strategy is twofold: the civilian leaders accept money from the government, while the military engage in a 'war economy' by exploiting the natural resources in the areas they control. The question is therefore how to solve the Casamance conflict since the MFDC constantly manages to circumvent the different strategies of the Senegalese authorities.

¹⁴⁸ Foucher 2003, 111.

¹⁴⁹ *Le Soleil*, October 4, 2001.

¹⁵⁰ See Letter dated April 18, 2003.

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V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This thesis has demonstrated that fundamental changes in the strategies of the secessionist organization “Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance” (MFDC) in the Casamance region over the last two decades have been caused by changes in the nature of resources available to it. From a popular grievance-based insurgency in the 1980s, “living off the land” with the support of its constituency, it transformed itself into an instrument at the disposal of neighboring countries during the 1990s. However, as the geopolitics of the region shifted, external sources of support began to dry up, and having squandered the good will of the local population, the MFDC became increasingly reliant on revenue derived from the growing ‘war economy’ in the early 2000s. Moving from one support base to another, it has pragmatically altered tactics and objectives. This adaptability has important implications for our understanding of post-Cold War civil conflicts, and for governments' efforts to resolve them.

A. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MFDC CASE FOR THE GREED V. GRIEVANCE DEBATE

The greed v. grievance debate tends to present grievance-based rebellions as being driven by a moral commitment to redressing the grievances of a mass constituency, and greed-based rebellions as being driven by narrow profit-seeking. In other words, rebels are either criminals motivated by private greed or are political actors seeking to ameliorate collective grievance.¹⁵¹ In the Casamance case, the elite leadership of the MFDC has been consistently motivated by its own political and economic ambitions. As circumstances and available resources have changed over time, elites shifted strategies, without changing the ultimate goal: their own empowerment. This suggests that the very distinction between greed and grievance requires closer examination. In Casamance, popular grievances have been a resource at the disposal of ambitious elites; very much like externally supplied arms or illicitly traded commodities. Which resource they have

¹⁵¹ Mats R. Berdal and David M. Malone, *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).

chosen to rely upon at any given time had very little to do with moral commitments or ultimate objectives. Rather, the choice reflected a simple rational cost-benefit analysis.

In the first instance, MFDC leaders instrumentalized the perceived and legitimate grievances of the local population as a platform from which to reinsert themselves into positions of state power. In the early 1980s they were very successful in mobilizing the masses, and popular support for the MFDC was nearly universal. In the late 1980s, however, popular support for the MFDC started eroding due both to the repressive actions undertaken by the Senegalese government and the lassitude of the population. The MFDC also understood that it could not reach its goals with its rudimentary weaponry. Then, it took advantage of the difficult relationship between Senegal and its neighbors in the 1990s to get money and arms from the latter. This external support permitted the rebellion to maintain military and political pressure on the government of Senegal. The MFDC leaders hoped its increased military capacity would allow them to leverage better terms of integration into the state for its members and/or derive material benefits in continuing low-intensity warfare in the Casamance region.¹⁵²

However, the government succeeded in getting the civilian leaders of both factions to move away from their independence claim. Since the 1999 Banjul Congress, they no longer called for independence; instead they demanded better investment and support from Dakar. In exchange for their willingness to cooperate, the Senegalese government provides the civilian leaders of both MFDC factions with monthly payments.¹⁵³ The MFDC civilian leaders use these transfers to reinforce their local power. In effect, the flow of resources from the state enhances the separatists' local control and gives them credibility as local patrons. Thus, the conflict remains a vehicle for the different MFDC civilian leaders to achieve elite status and benefit from state resources.

With Gambian support beginning to wane, the government also succeeded in purchasing the defection of some MFDC military leaders, who, as the MFDC (*Front Nord*), in 1992 agreed to abandon violence in return for funding of their socio-economic

¹⁵² Genevieve Gassere, *Manger ou s'en aller": Le Conflit Ethnoregional Casamançais et l'Etat Sénégalais* (Thesis presentation, Dept of Political Science, Faculté des Arts et Sciences, 2002), 459-498.

¹⁵³ Foucher 2003 (a), 103; *Le Quotidien*, September 1, 2005.

projects in the northern areas of Casamance that they controlled. This faction of the MFDC leadership calculated that with external and local support declining, its ambitions would be best served by establishing *de facto* autonomy in the area under their control.

The remaining MFDC leadership, as the MFDC (*Front Sud*), continued to receive external support from Guinea Bissau throughout the 1990s, mostly as a result of the instability and state collapse in that country. (The withdrawal of support by the President did not translate into the withdrawal of support by the armed forces or other important political elites.) As a result, the MFDC (*Front Sud*) fought on. However, the increased cooperation between Guinea Bissau and Senegal in the late 1990s would eventually weaken and isolate the MFDC (*Front Sud*). The organization then opted for a strategy more similar to that of the MFDC (*Front Nord*), e.g. by exploiting the resources in the areas it controlled.

Moreover, by the end of the 1990s, the civilian leaders of both factions moved away from *both* the extensive use of violence *and* their independence claims. In effect, since the 1999 Banjul Congress, they have no longer called for independence; instead they have demanded better investment and support from Dakar. In response to the MFDC civilian leaders' shift to resource logic, the Senegalese government provides the civilian leaders of both MFDC factions with monthly payments.¹⁵⁴ The MFDC civilian leaders use these transfers to strengthen their local power. In effect, by redistributing government resources through informal networks, they establish themselves as informal sources of authority. So, the flow of resources from the state enhances the separatists' local control and gives them credibility as local patrons. It permits them at the same time to achieve elite status and benefit from state resources.

As the civilian leadership moved to establish a political-economic power base for itself, both MFDC military factions split from their respective political wings, and continued to use low-intensity warfare tactics in support of their own resource extraction strategies. This is not surprising since most of the fighters are school drop-outs who would have few employment options in a Casamance administration. Where civilian elites have been consistently motivated by political ambitions, most MFDC fighters have

¹⁵⁴ Foucher 2003 (a), 103; *Le Quotidien*, September 1, 2005.

been consistently motivated by short term economic gain rather than moral commitment to the cause. As early as 1995, MFDC fighters began a new strategy of occupying different economically advantageous areas at harvest time, while expanding insecurity in the entire Casamance region. By the early 2000s, these activities had become the mainstay of the insurgency, as earlier strategies fell away. Illicit trade provides combatants with enough resources to resist repeated Senegalese attempts to fully demobilize and disarm them.

Although both grievance and greed do exist in Casamance, what the case study suggests is that insurgent leaders (driven by individual and class interests) have used grievances, imported arms, and natural resources in much the same way. At the end of the day, the Casamance case reaffirms Baker's assertion that "movements are led by politicians seeking power, and the influence and wealth that flow from it..."¹⁵⁵ In Casamance, they have done so by whatever means are available. Thus, a final solution to the Casamance conflict requires that the Senegalese government find a way to integrate the MFDC leaders in the short term, while working toward establishing an institutional order which cannot be hijacked by the next set of ambitious elites. In consolidating such an institutional order, the government of Senegal must simultaneously address grievances, forestall greed, and maintain good relations with its neighbors. Identifying the precise means by which this might be accomplished is beyond the scope of this research. However, I hope that the analysis presented here will be helpful to Senegalese government officials in their efforts to design such a strategy and finally bring lasting peace to Casamance.

¹⁵⁵ Bruce Baker, "Separating the Sheep from the Goats Among Africa's Separatist Movements," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 82.

APPENDIX A: BANJUL NEGOTIATION BETWEEN SENEGALESE GOVERNMENT AND MFDC IN 1999.

NEGOCIATION GOUVERNEMENT DU SENEGAL/MFDC

POUR LA PAIX EN CASAMANCE (1999)

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Résolution relative à une cessation des hostilités en Casamance.

Le gouvernement sénégalais et les représentants attitrés du MFDC se sont retrouvés à Banjul (Gambie) le 26 décembre 1999 en vue de recherches des solutions pour le retour de la paix en Casamance.

Le gouvernement de la République du Sénégal et le MFDC condamnent avec la plus grande énergie la violence armée comme mode d'expression.

En prélude aux travaux et pour manifester davantage leur engagement sans faille pour le retour immédiat d'une paix définitive en Casamance,

Les deux parties décident :

- La cessation immédiate des combats, des actes armés isolés et ou collectifs, des enlèvements de personnes, des pillages des biens et tous autres actes de violence en Casamance.
- Elles s'engagent ainsi à respecter le cessez-le-feu conclu le 08 juillet 1998 à Ziguinchor.
- Dans ce cadre, les deux parties s'engagent solennellement à créer, à maintenir et à garantir les conditions réelles d'une paix définitive en Casamance.

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APPENDIX B: 2000 BANJUL PEACE ACCORD BETWEEN SENEGAL AND MFDC

NEGOCIATIONS DE PAIX POUR LA CASAMANCE ENTRE LE GOUVERNEMENT DU SENEGAL ET LE MOUVEMENT DES FORCES DEMOCRATIQUES DE LA CASAMANCE

RESOLUTION

à l'issue de la rencontre des 24, 25 et 26 janvier 2000

Le Gouvernement de la République du Sénégal et le Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance, conformément au programme établi le 27 décembre 1999, se sont retrouvés à Banjul le 24 janvier 2000, pour poursuivre les négociations de paix en Casamance.

Cette rencontre, placée sous l'égide de Son Excellence le Dr. Alhaji Yahya A. J. J. Jammeh, Président de la République de Gambie a été co-présidée par le Dr. M. L. Sedat Jobe, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Gambie et M. Jose Pereira Batista, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale de la République de Guinée-Bissau.

Partant de l'ordre du jour précédemment adopté, les deux parties ont examiné les points proposés au sujet desquels, les résolutions ci-après ont été prises:

1. Contrôle et suivi des accords

- 1.1 les deux parties sont convenues de la mise sur pied de mécanismes opérationnels pour consolider l'Accord de cessez-le-feu du 8 juillet 1993 et la Résolution de cessation des hostilités du 27 décembre 1999.

Sur la base de l'organigramme présenté, discuté et joint en annexe, les deux parties recommandent:

- la mise en oeuvre à titre expérimental de ces mécanismes: cette opération sera entreprise dans un court délai;

- l'élaboration d'un document juridique ad hoc traitant de l'organe de contrôle et de suivi dont le caractère mixte a été affirmé;
- ledit organe est structuré à deux niveaux: politique et opérationnel.

1.2 Levée des interdictions qui frappent le Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance:

- les libertés de circulation, de réunions publiques et de détention de documents du Mouvement sont reconnues comme ne posant pas de problème; pour les réunions publiques, l'autorité administrative doit être sollicitée.

1.3 Libération des villages et de tous les lieux publics occupés du fait du conflit, par les forces armées et de sécurité sénégalaises ou par les forces combattantes du Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance.

Les deux parties sont convenues d'examiner en détail cette question, à la prochaine rencontre.

D'ores et déjà, les mécanismes à mettre en place devront la prendre en compte.

Malgré les derniers incidents constatés sur le terrain, les deux parties s'engagent à poursuivre leurs efforts de recherche de la paix.

2. Le déminage et la dépollution des zones

La priorité, l'urgence, et la volonté à coopérer dans ce domaine ont été clairement affirmées par les deux parties.

3. Problèmes des réfugiés et des personnes déplacées

Le Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance a exprimé sa préférence pour le recensement numérique au dépens de l'identification nominative.

Toutefois, le Gouvernement du Sénégal a mis en exergue la nécessité de se conformer dans ce domaine, aux normes des organismes internationaux à caractère humanitaire tel que le Haut Commissariat aux Réfugiés.

Du reste, chaque partie dispose d'un programme qu'elle soumettra en temps opportun.

En ce qui concerne les opérations de déminage, de dépollution, et de retour des réfugiés, les deux parties font un appel pressant aux bailleurs de fonds internationaux en vue d'obtenir leur assistance.

Par ailleurs, le Gouvernement du Sénégal a pris la décision suivante:

- il reconnaît le Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance en tant qu'interlocuteur dans la recherche d'une solution définitive au problème de la Casamance.


Fait à Banjul, le 26 janvier 2000

Pour le Gouvernement de la
République du Sénégal



Général Lamine Cissé
Ministre de l'Intérieur

Pour le Mouvement des Forces
Démocratiques de la Casamance




L'Abbé A. Diamacoune Senghor
Secrétaire Général



Dr. M. L. Sedat Jobe
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères
de la République de Gambie

Pour les parties garantes



M. Jose Pereira Batista
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères et
de la Coopération Internationale de la
République de Guinée-Bissau

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APPENDIX C: 2004 PROTOCOL ON DDR BETWEEN SENEGAL AND MFDC

PROTOCOLE D'ACCORD SUR LA DEMOBILISATION-REINSERTION

Entre

L'Etat du Sénégal et le Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) pour la mise en oeuvre de certains aspects du Programme de Démobilisation-Réinsertion des combattants du MFDC et familles de l'Agence Nationale pour la Relance des Activités économiques et sociales en Casamance.

Dans le présent protocole d'accord, l'Etat du Sénégal et le Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance sont dénommés les parties. Vu l'Accord de paix du trente décembre deux mille quatre, les parties conviennent de leur participation respective au programme de Démobilisation-Réinsertion des combattants du MFDC et familles par l'ANRAC ainsi qu'il suit:

Article premier: Objectifs.

L'objectif opérationnel du programme de Démobilisation-Réinsertion est de:

- démobiliser et de réinsérer les ex-combattants du MFDC;
- réintégrer de façon durable ces démobilisés, les déplacés et réfugiés ou tout autre groupe rendu vulnérable par le conflit dans le tissu socio-économique de la région naturelle de Casamance.

A son terme, ce programme aboutit à la disparition totale des effectifs militaires du MFDC.

Article 2: Mise en oeuvre du programme de Démobilisation-Réinsertion.

Conformément au décret 2004-822 du 1^o juillet 2004, l'ANRAC est chargée de la mise en oeuvre du programme de Démobilisation-Réinsertion, en liaison avec les partenaires au développement et organisations internationales et non gouvernementales. Elle dispose à cet effet de la Direction de la Démobilisation-Réinsertion-Réintégration.

Article 3: Participation des Forces Armées au programme de Démobilisation-Réinsertion-Réintégration (DRR).

Les forces Armées participent directement à la première phase du DRR, celle dite de Recensement-Désarmement. Elles désignent à cet effet un officier qui compose avec un représentant du MFDC et un tiers neutre un Comité de désarmement chargé de délivrer des titres d'identité civile provisoires aux démobilisés et de récupérer leurs armes au fur et à mesure.

En outre les Armées mettent sur pied une Equipe de destruction des armes exclusivement composée de militaires chargés de détruire au jour le jour, après enregistrement, les armes collectées.

Il peut être créé selon les besoins plusieurs comités de désarmement et plusieurs Equipes de destruction des armes. Dans ce cas, la participation est modulée en conséquence.

Article 4: Participation du MFDC au programme de Démobilisation-Réinsertion-réintégration.

Le MFDC met sur pied et en oeuvre un Bureau de Démobilisation pour gérer les aspects militaires du programme. Le personnel et la gestion de ce Bureau sont de sa responsabilité en liaison avec des représentants d'organisations parties au processus. Il travaille avec la direction compétente de l'ANRAC auprès de laquelle il assure une

fonction d'appui et de conseil. A cette fin un document définira formellement les termes et procédures retenus pour le cadre de leurs relations et la coordination constante nécessaire au déroulement du programme.

Fait à Dakar le 30 décembre 2004

Pour le Mouvement des Forces

Démocratiques de la Casamance

Abbé Augustin Diamacoune SENGHOR

Pour la république du Sénégal

S.E M. Ousmane NGOM, Ministre

de l'Intérieur

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APPENDIX D: 2004 GENERAL PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN SENEGAL AND MFDC

ACCORD GENERAL DE PAIX ENTRE LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU SENEGAL ET LE MOUVEMENT DES FORCES DEMOCRATIQUES DE LA CASAMANCE (MFDC)

Préambule

Le gouvernement de la République du Sénégal (ici désigné par l'Etat) et le Mouvement Démocratique des Forces de la Casamance (ici désigné par le MFDC) les deux ici désignés par "les Parties", en présence d'ambassadeurs d'Etats amis, de représentants d'organisations régionales, internationales, humanitaires et non gouvernementales :

Conscients des effets désastreux provoqués par plus de vingt ans de conflit et de combats en Casamance, notamment la régression économique de la région, des souffrances des populations ainsi que des risques encourus du fait de la présence de mines anti-personnel
Conscients des raisons de l'échec des accords précédents et déterminées à en tenir compte
présentement;

Convaincus de l'inutilité d'une solution militaire et que seul un engagement solennel des combattants du MFDC derrière l'Abbé Auguste Diamacoune SENGHOR peut mettre un terme aux hostilités;

Convaincus de la nécessité d'instaurer un climat de confiance entre interlocuteurs responsables et déterminés à aller de l'avant après deux décennies de méfiance;

Réaffirmant la justesse des frustrations ressenties par une partie des populations de la Casamance mais aussi la nécessité d'y apporter des mesures correctives par la mise en oeuvre d'un programme de développement spécifique à cette région naturelle.

Conviennent de ce qui suit :

Article premier : DE L'OBJET DU PRESENT ACCORD

1. La loi d'amnistie déjà entrée en vigueur, l'Etat s'engage à assurer, en Casamance comme partout sur l'ensemble du territoire, la sécurité générale, la libre circulation des personnes et des biens, à garantir en conformité avec la constitution l'exercice des libertés fondamentales, en particulier celles de pensée et d'expression afin de promouvoir le dialogue politique dans la région naturelle de Casamance.

2. Le MFDC décide solennellement de renoncer définitivement à la lutte armée et à l'usage de la violence pour mener le combat politique qu'il estime devoir conduire

Article 2 : DE LA GARANTIE ET CONSOLIDATION DE L'Accord

1. Afin de veiller sur le processus de paix et de régler de façon pacifique les éventuels litiges pouvant survenir, il est créé un Conseil de Surveillance de l'Accord de Paix (CSAP) composé de représentants de l'Etat, du MFDC, de la société civile, et de toute organisation ressource. Seule l'interprétation des dispositions de l'Accord de Paix et des protocoles annexes à l'exclusion des infractions pénales et litiges manifestement civils relèvent de la compétence du Conseil. Il s'autosaisit d'initiative pour prévenir les difficultés et peut être saisi par toute personne ou structure impliquée dans le processus de paix et la reconstruction de la Casamance.

2. Les Parties s'engagent à mettre sur pied un groupe d'observation composé de représentants du gouvernement, de militaires, d'ex combattants du MFDC et de représentants de l'aile politique du MFDC chargé de mettre en oeuvre le processus de démobilisation de l'aile militaire du MFDC et du stockage de ses armes sous le contrôle du CICR, de la RADDHO et de l'AJAC.

3. Le MFDC s'engage à cantonner, désarmer et démobiliser sa composante militaire selon les procédures objet du protocole sur la démobilisation - réinsertion - réintégration.

4. Les Parties fourniront à l'ANRAC toute information de nature à faciliter le programme de dépollution de la région. Dans ce cadre, la participation de chacune des Parties à ce volet pacifique de la reconstruction fait l'objet d'un protocole annexé au présent accord.

5. Les Parties s'engagent à désigner immédiatement des délégués dans la Commission de concertation chargée de démarrer sans délais, les négociations sincères. Le MFDC peut se faire assister par toute personne ressource, s'il le juge utile et nécessaire.

ARTICLE 3 : DE LA REINSERTION DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

1. L'Etat du Sénégal accepte à titre exceptionnel d'intégrer à leur demande les ex-combattants du MFDC remplissant les conditions d'instruction, d'aptitude physique et médicale et âgés de moins de 25 ans dans les corps paramilitaires.

2. Les Parties acceptent le principe d'organiser avec le concours de l'Agence Nationale pour la Relance des Activités économiques et sociales en Casamance, l' ANRAC, l'encadrement nécessaire en vue d'aider les ex combattants du MFDC qui le souhaitent à monter et faire financer des projets générateurs de revenus dans les secteurs qui les intéressent.

3. Les Parties engagent le Collectif des cadres casamançais, les notabilités coutumières et religieuses de la Casamance à développer une dynamique de pardon et de réconciliation permettant le retour et la réintégration des ex combattants du MFDC dans leurs villages d'origine.

Article 4 : DE LA RELANCE DES ACTIVITES ECONOMIQUES ET SOCIALES

1. L'Etat engage l'ANRAC à mobiliser les ONG et les organismes spécialisés dans la dépollution en partenariat avec l'armée et les ex combattants du MFDC à débiter sans délais le déminage humanitaire de la Casamance afin de faciliter la reprise des activités économiques.

2. L'Etat s'engage à prendre toute mesure permettant de faciliter le retour dans leur foyer des réfugiés et personnes déplacées et d'apporter l'appui nécessaire à leur réinsertion sociale.

3. L'Etat s'engage à assurer la reconstruction de la Casamance comme prévu dans le Protocole portant programme de reconstruction de la Casamance annexé au présent accord.

Article 5 : DES DISPOSITIONS FINALES

Le présent accord entre en vigueur à la date de sa signature. En foi de quoi, les Parties ont signé le présent accord en deux originaux.

Fait à Dakar, le trente décembre deux mille quatre

Pour le Mouvement des Forces

Pour la République du Sénégal

Démocratiques de la Casamance

S.E.M. Ousmane NGOM

Abbé Augustin Diamacoune SENGHOR

Ministre de l'Intérieur

**APPENDIX E: MFDC SECRETARY GENERAL REQUESTS TO
SENEGALESE PRESIDENT MONEY AND A PLANE TO
ORGANIZE A MFDC MEETING IN BANJUL, THE GAMBIA.**

Ziguinchor, le 18 Avril 2003.

Monsieur le Président
de la République
du Sénégal,

Dans le cadre de nos activités pour la Paix
en Casamance, Veuillez nous accorder :

- Un Avion pour le transport de notre
Délégation ZIGUINCHOR BANJUL Aller et
Retour, le 23 Avril 2003.
- La Sécurité pour le déplacement de nos
Combattants à l'intérieur du Territoire
du Sénégal.
- La Facilitation par les Autorités de la
Gambie de la Rencontre du MFDC en
terre de Gambie.
- Une aide de trois millions de Francs CFA
pour l'organisation de la Rencontre, l'heber-
gement et la nourriture des Délégués.

Dans l'espoir d'une réponse favorable à
notre requête, la Casamance entière vous
prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président de la
République, l'expression sincère de sa
profonde et dévouée gratitude.



Adjoint au Président



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**APPENDIX F: MFDC CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP (BOTH FACTIONS)
INVITES THE MFDC FIGHTERS FOR A MEETING IN GUINEA
BISSAU.**

Ziguinchor, le 16 Avril 2003. C

Chef de l'Etat - Major Général,
Chef de KASSOLOL,
Chef de la Zone Nord,
Chef du Front Nord,

J'ai le plaisir de recevoir l'occasion de revenir dans cette lettre pour avoir de vos nouvelles et de vous tenir au courant de l'évolution du processus de Paix.

Depuis un certain temps, les choses semblent évoluer dans le sens de la consolidation de la Paix :

- L'accalmie des Combats.
- La multiplication des contacts entre les Autorités Sénégalaises et les Responsables du MFDC.
- Le Rapprochement et le Renforcement de l'Unité au sein du MFDC (Aile Civile et entre les différentes factions).
- La mobilisation et l'engagement des Populations à la Paix à travers le repeuplement de Villages jadis abandonnés, la reconstruction des infrastructures.
- L'Appel et la main tendue du Président Abdoulaye WADE.

Fort de toutes ces considérations, je voudrais, au Nom de notre Mouvement, MFDC, vous convier à une Journée de Réflexion et d'Echange sur la position et la Vision du MFDC quant à la poursuite des Négociations avec l'Etat du Sénégal pour le retour définitif de la Paix dans notre

11. Casamance.

(2)
Je voudrais vous convier tous à cette
Rencontre qui aura lieu à BANJUL le
23 Avril 2003 ; et qui va regrouper les
principaux Responsables de l'Aile Civile
et les différents chefs de l'Aile Combattan-
te du CFDC, en collaboration avec ses
partenaires dans la gestion de Paix se
chargera de votre Sécurité.

Les Délégations sont attendues la
veille de la Réunion, c'est-à-dire le
22 Avril 2003.

Les Destinataires de cette Lettre sont :

Salif SADIO

KASSOLOL

Etat-Major Général

2^e Compagnie.

Zone Nord.

Front Nord. (Magne, Vieux FAYE,
Kamougue).

• Ziguinchor, le 16^e Avril 2003.



Adjoint au Chef



Qui sommes-nous

un seul risque !!!

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APPENDIX H: THE COVER OF THE MFDC NEWSPAPER, "LA VOIX DE LA CASAMANCE".



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