The Political Economy of the United States Military Market: 1963-2005
Abstract
This dissertation examines the economic and socio-political forces that influence behavior within military organizations. The tenets of Public Choice economic theory are utilized along with special emphasis on the institutional and cultural frameworks of the military environment in order to better understand why the military market succeeds and fails. Much of the existing literature related to military science proceeds from a holistic approach, which often glosses over the micro phenomena that are crucial in understanding the dynamics of military organizations. Thus, the approach used in this research emphasizes methodological individualism and allows us to better understand the incentives and constraints that individual agents face in their decision calculus. Chapter two lays out the nature of the military market and highlights the significant economic challenges inherent in the organizational structure and the vulnerability of this market to the political environment. Of particular interest are difficulties the military faces in achieving contract performance of its members under perilous combat conditions. Chapter three develops a club-good model to explain how free-riding is constrained in a combat setting where standard economic theory would suggest contract breaches en masse. Extant empirical research is used to evaluate the validity of the theoretical model. Chapter four describes what military culture is, how it channels behavior toward more efficient outcomes and how it has evolved over the years. Additionally, game theory is used to illustrate the impacts of culture. Chapter five concludes the dissertation.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2006
- Accession Number
- ADA452147
Entities
People
- Judson M. Fussell
Organizations
- University of Alabama