

Closing the Discovery Learning Gap: A Leader Development Training Strategy for Company-Grade Officers for the Conduct of Stability and Reconstruction Operations

**A Monograph
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Abstract

CLOSING THE DISCOVERY LEARNING GAP: A LEADER DEVELOPMENT TRAINING STRATEGY FOR COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS FOR THE CONDUCT OF STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS by MAJ Erik N. Anderson, Army, 65 pages.

Failed or failing states present a significant challenge to United States security in the early years of the 21st Century. Army units increasingly find themselves deploying to far-flung regions of the globe to conduct a variety of missions under the umbrella of Stability and Reconstruction Operations (SRO). However, current Institutional Domain education and training methods for company grade officers fail to adequately address the variety of challenges these officers face during operational deployments. As such, the officers embark on discovery learning during the deployment in order to accomplish the unfamiliar tasks and missions set before them. The U.S. military cannot afford such a haphazard approach in the context of the Contemporary Operating Environment, as it prosecutes the Global War on Terror, or as it seeks to alter perceptions and beliefs about American interests abroad and protect our citizens at home.

Division Commanders must take a more active role in the development of company grade officers within their organizations. The change comes as a result of the significant role these young officers play in the conduct of SRO. Three areas within the existing Army division require change in order to better prepare company grade officers for operational deployments involving SRO. These areas include the role the division commander plays regarding company grade officer development, the content and context of existing leader development and training programs, and an overarching systems and cultural change within the division. Incorporating these changes increases individual and organizational learning and knowledge, provides a division-wide common level of understanding, instills a culture embracing SRO as a core mission set, and better utilizes scarce resources.

This monograph examines the nature of the COE and the increased role company grade officers play during the conduct of SRO. Further, it identifies the learning gaps that exist in current leader development programs. Finally, it recommends methods to address identified deficiencies in three areas: senior leader involvement, changing the content and context of organizational learning, and instilling a cultural shift embracing SRO and the fundamentals of transparent leadership.

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Introduction

The United States government expects its military officers to demonstrate innovative and adaptive solutions to complex and challenging problems. At the same time, officers must work with other national and international agencies or multinational partners to achieve success across the full spectrum of operations. Throughout all events, they must continually learn, grow, and develop the subordinate leaders around them.¹ Consider the mission given to a captain by his higher headquarters.

The officer received instructions to deploy with ten to twelve men on a mission of unknown duration as the first U.S. government representative into a significantly underdeveloped region. Because of international political sensitivities, little was known about how other nation-states would respond to the team's mission. The group had a number of key tasks to accomplish during the course of its operations. First, they were tasked to assess status of the international border and determine if any countries were violating the host nation's sovereignty or international treaty obligations. Second, the party's higher headquarters wanted an evaluation of the region's transportation infrastructure for potential use by U.S. forces in the future. The soldiers also received specific instructions to interact with the indigenous population, to work with local political, tribal, and religious leaders promoting economic development and positive trade and political relations with the United States. Lastly, senior leaders imposed stringent rules of engagement on the force, desiring to maximize force protection and limit the possibility of mission failure domestically or internationally.²

During the course of the mission the captain faced a number of daunting challenges. He had to organize, train, and equip the small force. Additionally, they had to deploy from the United States to an intermediate staging base to link up with the rest of their equipment and

¹ Department of the Army, *DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 14 October 2005), 2.

² The full citation for this reference can be found in footnote 8.

soldiers. The party conducted their various assessments to include attempting to establish positive relationships on behalf of the United States. An unsuccessful encounter with one of the regional ethnic groups, however, almost led to the unit's destruction by a significantly larger force. A cultural misunderstanding, exasperated by language barriers and the perception of unequal treatment between the Americans and other tribal clans, brought tensions to a boiling point between the local leaders and the soldiers. While the unit enjoyed a significant technological advantage in weapon superiority, indigenous forces could have easily overwhelmed the small force by sheer numbers. Fortunately, the captain was able to defuse the situation without physical damage to either party.³ However, the emotional, political, and cultural relationships between the groups remain strained to this day. In the end the unit completed its mission and returned home successful.

The above story highlights the challenges facing junior officers on a weekly basis when conducting military operations in support of national political objectives. In the past, higher headquarters or specialized units coordinated and conducted operations and decisions such as these.⁴ Today, however, company grade officers, without the benefit of subject matter experts or large trained staffs, execute similar operations as part of their day-to-day operations while deployed. Unfortunately, in a majority of the cases, these junior officers were unprepared for the non-traditional challenges initially presented to them. Instead, circumstances forced them to adjust rapidly to the changing conditions and situations around them.⁵ The absence of understanding stems not from a lack of professionalism or poor duty concept, but rather from an integration and execution deficiency within the Army's Leader Development Doctrine.

³ The full citation for this reference can be found in footnote 8.

⁴ Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales, Jr., *The Iraq War: A Military History* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2003), 249 and Leonard Wong, *Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, July 2004), 3-4.

⁵ Dan Baum, "What the Generals Don't Know," *The New Yorker*, 17 January 2005, 42-48, available on-line from: http://www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/050117fa_fact. Accessed on 09 Sep 05.

Since the end of World War II, U.S. Army doctrine and training concentrated on defeating an attack from the former Soviet Union and her Warsaw Pact allies. The near sole concentration on the conduct of major combat operations (MCO) as the Army's primary mission shaped the thinking of an entire generation of officers. Today, MCO education remains in the spotlight even in the face of the significantly different and more complex environment presented during the conduct of Stability and Reconstruction Operations (SRO).⁶

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Gehler points out in, *Agile Leaders, Agile Institutions: Educating Adaptive and Innovative Leaders for Today and Tomorrow*, that the Institutional Domain's (ID) curriculum review and refinement process does not effectively produce company-grade officers capable of leading in the current environment. He believes this stems from the continued MCO focus and unwieldy bureaucratic processes. Moreover, it is exactly these bureaucratic processes that inhibit rapid institutional change. He offers a new educational strategy that includes senior leader involvement, curriculum content and context review, and addresses a systems or cultural change.⁷

Gehler's model provides for change within the ID. However, in the interim, Division Commanders need to address changes within the Operational Domain (OD) in order to close the learning gap. The lack of emphasis in the ID on SRO forces subordinate unit commanders and individual officers to make-up their knowledge shortfall in the other two developmental domains—the Operational Domain (OD) and the Self-Development Domain (SD). As currently organized, however, this practice provides inconsistent learning. Further, it inefficiently uses resources, fails to maximize the existing body of professional knowledge resident within and external to a Division, and does not adequately address the long-term operational problem of creating and sustaining a learning organization. Only through the development of a specifically

⁶ John D. Waghelstein, *Preparing for the Wrong War: The United States Army and Low Intensity Conflict, 1755-1890*. (Ph.D. diss., Temple University, 1990), 6-7 and 291-292.

⁷ Christopher Gehler, *Agile Leaders, Agile Institutions: Educating Adaptive and Innovative*

designed training program, targeted on the competencies required of company grade officers for success during SRO, will the Division develop agile, adaptive leaders capable of independent, full-spectrum operations.

This monograph examines the nature of the strategic environment, highlighting the increased role of SRO in U.S. foreign policy and the importance of company grade officers as the primary agents for executing successful operations. Next, it highlights the knowledge gap between what captains and lieutenants learn within the ID and the skills, expertise, and competencies required of them during the conduct of SRO during operational deployments. Through identifying the shortfall, it provides a different way to conceptualize the knowledge base junior leaders require in SRO. Lastly, it examines how to organize these knowledge requirements using Gehler's framework—*Senior Leader Involvement, Curriculum Content and Context Review, and Addressing a Cultural Change throughout the Organization*—as part of a Division's leader development plan. The proposed method offers several potential solutions. First, it maximizes use of resources and flexibility for subordinate organizations. Second, it broadens organizational understanding, learning, and shared common experience. Third, it provides increased development opportunities outside traditional branch roles and functions prior to actual deployment. Finally, it decreases the amount of discovery learning occurring during the conduct of a deployment.

Placing great responsibility in junior officers for the completion of ambiguous, complex tasks is not a new occurrence. The story related at the beginning of the introduction concerns one of the most challenging missions presented to a company grade officer by a senior headquarters. President Thomas Jefferson gave possibly one of the most ambiguous, dangerous, and politically important tasks in U.S. history to a company-grade officer—Captain Meriwether Lewis.⁸ From

Leaders for Today and Tomorrow, (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, August 2005), 3, 7.

⁸ Information supporting footnote 2 comes from The Thomas Jefferson Foundation, "Jefferson's Instructions to Meriwether Lewis," available on-line from:

1802, when Lewis began his education and planning for the trip to explore the Northwest Territory, until he submitted his report to the President in December 1806, Lewis operated in a complex and uncertain environment. He received infrequent guidance from President Jefferson, especially after beginning the expedition. He exercised an incredible amount of latitude in the development his own campaign plans, task organization, concept of the operation, and concept of support to include controlling funds for the trip. He engaged Native American tribes in an information campaign to achieve their friendship as allies to the United States. He accomplished all these tasks as part of a SRO for the fledgling United States. Today, as then, company grade officers continue to blaze the trail through the murky and complicated waters of SRO.

<http://monticello.org/jefferson/lewisandclark/instructions.html>, accessed on 5 February 2006; information supporting footnote 3 comes from Stephen E. Ambrose, *Undaunted Courage* (New York, New York: Touchstone, 1996), 165-175. Information supporting note 8 also found in Ambrose, 76.

Chapter 1: What's the Mission and Who's in Charge?

The unexpected hijack of four airplanes over the United States on a Tuesday morning in September 2001 and subsequent death of 2,986 civilians and military service members significantly changed the nation's view of the new strategic reality. While other countries also fell victim to terrorist attacks before and after 9/11, the attacks definitively illuminated the fallacies of clinging to the *Conquest Paradigm* as an organizing construct for U.S. military affairs⁹. Catastrophic failure forced the military to overcome its organizational blindness to operations other than MCO and develop new strategies and ways to solve problems.¹⁰ Army leaders finally acknowledged that the predominant enemy facing the U.S. is part of a, "new strategic reality that...is a permutation within [the] COE. It recognizes that the threat challenges we are engaging now are more narrowly focused in an irregular warfare category employing unconventional and asymmetrical methods."¹¹ Therefore, Army leaders faced a transformation within the transformation process, "the implications are clear. We must understand the character of the irregular warfare we now face and adapt accordingly."¹²

Key components of the post-9/11 security environment include the increased international role that radical Islamic terrorists, criminal organizations, insurgent groups, and outlaw regimes play within developing countries.¹³ The international community recognizes that these groups suffer from a lack of basic human services, diminishing natural resources, and

⁹ The *Conquest Paradigm* refers to a conflict model focused on MCO: "The conquest paradigm is rigorously fight-centric and almost obsessed with the big fight, wherein the armed forces concentrate on physically destroying opposing military forces...The conquest paradigm assumes relatively clear and abrupt transitions between war and peace." Edward C. Mann, Gary Endersby, and Thomas R. Searle, *Thinking Effects: Effects Based Methodology for Joint Operations*, (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 2002), 14.

¹⁰ Mary Jo Hatch, *Organization Theory: Modern Symbolic and Postmodern Perspectives* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 114.

¹¹ Gehler, 2.

¹² Francis J. Harvey and Peter J. Schoomaker, *Our Army at War—Relevant and Ready . . . Today and Tomorrow: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 2005*, posture statement presented to the 109th Cong., 1st sess., (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, February 6, 2005), 2.

¹³ Peter J. Schifferle, "Teaching Revolutions to Conservative People: Using History, Theory, Doctrine, and Practice in Educating Senior U.S. Military Officers," Paper presented to the Society for

poverty. These conditions set the stage for a fragile state to become a failed state. In a speech outlining the U.S. strategy for prosecuting the Global War on Terror, President George Bush stated:

Defeating a militant network is difficult because it thrives like a parasite on the suffering and frustration of others. The radicals exploit local conflicts to build a culture of victimization in which someone else is always to blame and violence is always the solution. They exploit resentful and disillusioned young men and women... [Capitalizing on these conditions] the militant network want to...gain control of a country, a base from which to launch attacks and conduct their war against nonradical Muslim governments.¹⁴

Combating this challenge requires greater assistance and support to friendly governments as they seek to defeat the spread of Islamic radicals and promote peace.

Referred to over the years using a variety of different names such as Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC), Counter-Insurgency Operations (COIN), Security Assistance (SA), Nation-Building, Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW), and Stability and Support Operations (SASO), the most recent version of Field Manual 1, *The Army*, incorporates previous concepts, capabilities, and operations under the umbrella of Stability and Reconstruction Operations (SRO). Unfortunately, it fails to provide a simple definition and instead offers a wide range of concepts related to the conduct of SRO.¹⁵ Fortunately, the Department of Defense's (DoD) release of Directive 3000.05 in November 2005 alleviates some confusion by providing the following definitions for Stability Operations and Military support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR). Stability Operations refer to "Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions." Further, Military support to SSTR includes, "Department of Defense activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead

Military History, May 2004. Received from the author, 02 August 2005, 3.

¹⁴ Speech presented by President George W. Bush to the National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, D.C. 06 October 2005, available on-line from: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051006-3.html>, accessed 10 October 2005.

¹⁵ U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual, FM 1, The Army*, (Washington D.C., June 14,

to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.¹⁶ Unfortunately, the addition of another acronym—SSTR—merely changes the terminology associated with previously identified conceptual missions and requirements. Though DoD published Directive 3000.05 more recently than the current version of FM 1, this monograph continues to use SRO in keeping with current Army doctrine.¹⁷

Not only has the Army's operational emphasis changed within this new environment, the primary agent responsible for executing successful operations has changed as well. The Army's transformation process creates lighter, more capable, and easily deployable formations centered on the Brigade Combat Team (BCT).¹⁸ The BCT's increased functional capability allows for greater dispersion on the battlefield. Greater dispersion, in turn, provides greater responsibility and challenges for junior officers than in the past. Junior officers fill a number of roles on a daily basis. Contact with higher headquarters is infrequent while the frequency of contact with local civilians remains high. Junior officers must be aware of embedded media's capability for near-instantaneous global transmission. Regarding the central role company grade officers play in the

2005), 3-7 and 3-9.

¹⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, *Directive 3000.05, Military Support of Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, 28 November 2005, available on-line from:

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d300005_112805/d300005p.pdf; accessed 25 January 2005.

¹⁷ The 9/11 terror attacks, subsequent threats, and possible commitment of military forces to support civil authorities following domestic natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina demonstrate that the U.S. Army must be prepared to conduct Civil Support Operations (CSO). See FM 1 for a specific CSO definition FM 1, 3-7. While differing for legal reasons within U.S. territorial boundaries, units that conduct SRO and CSO perform a number of closely related functions and tasks. Military support provided during OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, to JTF KATRINA, by CJTF-76 and the on-going efforts of Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) to restore civil government and defeat the on-going insurgency demonstrate the similarities. For a discussion of the similarities see U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, *Weathering Katrina: The Debate for an Operational Level Framework for Domestic Incident Management*, unpublished report, as of November 7, 2005. For a discussion of the legal differences see Max Moore, "Rescuing DoD From Too Much of a Good Thing: The Wrong Kind of Disaster", (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2006).

¹⁸ Francis J. Harvey and Peter J. Schoomaker, ii.

conduct of the GWOT, one battalion operations officer remarked, “This is entirely a bottom-up war. It is the platoon leaders and company commanders that are fighting it.”¹⁹

As current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate, SRO offers a non-contiguous, open battlefield. Additionally, political decisions, current Army force structure, and unit recovery and redeployment requirements limit the number of troops deployed to conduct operations. This leads to a greatly dispersed battlefield. In situations such as these, subordinate level leaders have little or infrequent contact with their higher headquarters, “the vast geography of the region is one reason young officers are given such latitude to innovate and make decisions....[one battalion with four maneuver companies] is responsible for about 1,500 square miles...[an area ten times the size allocated during MCO].”²⁰ As such, junior leaders make many independent decisions relying on their own understanding of the situation within the AOR and the higher commander’s overall intent. In fact, “today, a captain can be the pseudo-mayor of a town in Bosnia or the only U.S. representative in a potential flash point in Latin America.”²¹

Company grade officers today routinely face difficult questions regarding not only the exact nature of their role, but more importantly juggling between the number of “hats” they concurrently wear. Leonard Wong found that among junior officers serving in OIF, “one significant source of complexity is the number and nature of roles that junior officers must fill in counterinsurgency and nation-building operations. When examining the roles required of our junior officers in OIF, the question is not *which* role, but *how many*? One officer commented, ‘You are not just trying to learn one job, you are trying to learn several dozen jobs. Everything

¹⁹ Then Major John Nagl as quoted in Greg Jaffe, “On Ground in Iraq, Capt. Ayers Writes His Own Playbook,” *Wall Street Journal*, 22 September 2004, A-16. Major Nagl’s remark holds credibility regarding the significant role the company grade officers play not only because of his operational experience, but also because of his academic credentials as well. Prior to serving in Iraq he published, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* a critical analysis of counter-insurgency operations by the British and the United States in separate engagements. The second edition, revised upon his return from Iraq, addresses some of the new lessons he gained while serving in OIF.

²⁰ Jaffe, “Captain Ayers”, A-16.

²¹ Leonard Wong, *Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps* (Carlisle,

from being a politician to being a war commander.’’²² Such complexity places a premium on building and training junior leaders capable of independently making decisions and rapidly adjusting to changing conditions in unfamiliar circumstances.

One key function company grade officers must strive to instill, as part of the GWOT, is a change in popular beliefs within developing countries. The desired belief system rejects radical Islamic terrorism as a voice for change, supports and promotes democratically elected governments, advocates universal human rights, and conducts open and peaceful dialogue with Western nations. Internalization of these beliefs by local citizens represents a fundamental change in attitude.²³

Experimental psychologist Robert Gagne states that an individual’s attitude consists of three components. The first, a cognitive component, concerns what the individual thinks about a task. The second, an affective component, entails how the individual feels about the task. Third, the behavioral component controls how the person behaves. The basic characteristic of human nature to avoid painful situations or experiences makes an assessment of attitudes particularly difficult because an individual may think negatively about a task internally, but behave in a way that portrays the desired attitude. Gagne contends that a consistent message, frequently conveyed, by a credible source provides the best method to use to achieve an attitudinal change. To ensure the efforts truly accomplish the desired effect, and not merely compliance, the target population must demonstrate the desired attitude a number of times in a variety of situations and

Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2000), 5.

²²Leonard Wong, Developing *Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, July 2004), 3-4. Adding to the role confusion issue is the fact that many junior officers are filling roles outside their traditional branch mission. A recent study found, “artillerymen, tankers, and engineers serving as infantrymen, while infantrymen were building sewer systems and running town councils.” Baum, “Generals”.

²³ This particular function applies not only to company grade officers, but all members of the U.S. government or its citizens who deploy to, work in, or travel to developing countries. Thoughts derived from Bush, *Democracy Speech*; U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The 16th Chairman’s Guidance to the Joint Staff: Shaping the Future*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1 October 2005), 3; and a presentation by a senior Army Public Affairs Officer in non-attributional setting at the U.S. Army School for Advanced Military Studies during AY 05-06.

circumstances.²⁴ Authors Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr agree with the difficulty of undertaking a behavioral change endeavor, “conversion-type campaigns can be difficult to implement; they are also resource intensive, and generally take the longest time to prepare and execute.”²⁵

Company grade officers engage the local populace more frequently in a particular area than higher headquarters’ commanders and staffs. In some cases, contact between junior officers and local citizens occurs daily as a result of routine missions and patrols. As such, they provide a more credible and direct message that influences a greater number of people. It is these same people, the common man or woman on the street, who provide active or passive support for insurgents. T. E. Lawrence notes that a successful insurgency only needs 2 percent active support from the population while the remaining 98 percent ‘coexists’ with the insurgents.²⁶ Changing the perceptions and attitudes of a fraction of this 98 percent toward the host government and U.S. efforts, significantly hampers the insurgents’ ability to wage the GWOT on their own terms.

Senior Al Qa’ida leaders also recognize the importance of shaping the local population’s perception. A captured letter confirms this fact, “If we look at the two short-term goals, which are removing the Americans and establishing an Islamic emirate in Iraq...then, we will see that the strongest weapon which [we] enjoy...is popular support from the Muslim masses in Iraq, and the surrounding Muslim countries. So, we must maintain this support as best we can...In the absence of this popular support, the Islamic mujahed movement would be crushed in the shadows.”²⁷ In a culture based on relationships and trust, company grade officers play a key role with the population. They interact with the populace on a frequent basis. In conjunction with

²⁴ Robert M. Gagne, *The Conditions of Learning and the Theory of Instruction*, 4th ed. (Fort Worth: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc, 1985), 219-230 and 232.

²⁵ Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr, *Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle Against Terrorism*, (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 2005), 19-20.

²⁶ Ian F. W. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750* (New York, New York: Routledge, 2001), 20.

²⁷ Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 9 July 2005, transcript captured during counterterrorism operations in Iraq and published by the United States Government on 11 October 2005, Available on-line from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ODNI News Release Number 2-05, at http://www.dni.gov/release_letter_101105.html, accessed on 15 October 2005.

local Iraqi security forces, lieutenants and captains organize local security. They also have a great deal of independent control over civil work and reconstruction projects within their AOR. These aspects provide the populace with two of the three requirements for attempting an attitudinal change—frequent contact and credible messenger. Company grade officers provide an even more vital link with the third component—consistency of the message.

An organization's ability to maintain popular support for its activities holds a prominent position during SRO. The global information network provides an incredible arena to in which to wage an influence campaign. Interestingly, both sides of the current conflict perceive the media as working for their opponent.²⁸ Coincidentally, Al Qa'ida's leadership also recognizes the significant contribution the media makes to the GWOT and the advantage the United States enjoys, "we are in battle, and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media... [no matter how] far our capabilities reach, they will never be equal to one thousandth of the capabilities of [the United States] that is waging war on us."²⁹ When the message locals receive contradicts the desired theme, the credible messenger and frequent contact provided by the local company grade officer works to break the cycle of misunderstanding.

²⁸ Both President George W. Bush's speech to the National Endowment for Democracy and al-Zawahiri's captured letter to al-Zarqawi criticize the media's role for the opposing party. President Bush objects to the Arab news media spreading rumor and discontent while failing to acknowledge America's efforts to assist Muslim people world-wide. al-Zawahiri denounces the media as "malicious, perfidious, and fallacious" providing deceptive and fabricated stories.

²⁹ al-Zawahiri.

Chapter 2: The Learning Gap

Leader development holds a critical place in today's Army. In the 2004 Posture Statement, Army Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker, articulated "training and equipping Soldiers and growing leaders" as the primary core competency required of the Army.³⁰ Contrary to leadership theories of old which held that great leaders were born, Army doctrine portrays leadership as a developmental process occurring over time as individual officers react to internal and external influences, operational experiences and training, and educational opportunities. Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, the guiding document for officer professional development and career management states that through the developmental process, the Army grows "competent, confident, self-aware leaders who are prepared for the challenges of the future."³¹

This chapter addresses the Army's leader development process for junior officers in preparation for their role in SRO. It examines the responsibilities within the three developmental domains articulated by doctrine. It then identifies SRO related tasks on which company grade officers receive training and education. Finally, this chapter identifies the skills, attributes, and competencies required of company grade officers involved in the conduct of SRO. The comparison between what company grade officers learn while in the Institutional Domain (ID) and what current and future SRO demand these officers actually accomplish demonstrates the extent of an SRO learning gap.

Two key Army documents, Field Manual 7.0, *Training the Force* and Department of the Army Pamphlet, DA PAM 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* outline leader development roles and responsibilities. FM 7.0, presents the Army

³⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, *United States Army 2004 Posture Statement* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 05 February 2004), 1.

³¹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 14 October 2005), 2.

Training and Leader Development Model centered on the three learning domains—Institutional (ID), Operational (OD), and Self-Development (SD). These three domains lie at the core of the Army’s Training and Leader Development Model because they “shape the critical learning experiences throughout a soldier’s and leader’s career.” Presented in Figure 1, the model conveys that within each domain lie certain development responsibilities independent of the other two domains. However, the model also conveys integration among the three domains and within the individual leader. Concurrently, leader development also occurs as a result of constant assessment and feedback from a number of different formal and informal mechanisms independent of a specific domain. Bounding the entire process together are the Warrior Ethos; the Army’s culture, values, principles and imperatives, and standards; and the Professional Military Ethic (PME).




Figure 1: The Army Training and Leader Development Model³²

FM 7.0 outlines the following specifics regarding the independent responsibilities of the three domains. Doctrinally speaking, the three developmental domains provide an integrated developmental program preparing leaders for the roles they will face during the conduct of operational deployments. The ID provides education and affords the opportunity for leaders to *practice* learned concepts in a controlled environment. The OD reinforces ID education by

³² U.S. Department of the Army. *Field Manual, FM 7.0, Training the Force* (Washington, D.C.,

adding the leader's specific operationally assigned roles and responsibilities at the unit level in a more challenging, complex environment. Finally, SD serves as a period of individual learning and reflection in order to capitalize on gained knowledge and skills or improve on personal deficient areas.³³

It is important to clarify the definitions of two words used within these various responsibilities. Unfortunately, Army doctrine often uses the words education and training interchangeably when in fact, they are fundamentally different, and should be used for different purposes. Education refers to, "the knowledge and development resulting from a process [focused on] human maturation, school learning, teaching methods, guidance and evaluation of aptitude and progress." Alternatively, training refers to "the skill, knowledge, or experience acquired by one who [is made] prepared (as by exercise) for a test of skill."³⁴ Thus, one sees that **education** refers to a **learning process** focused on the acquisition of knowledge whereas **training** involves a **physical action or demonstration** of acquired skill. Education focuses on the cognitive development of intellectual skills, while training provides opportunities to demonstrate gained knowledge in various situations. Educational psychologist Robert Gagne supports the distinction between the two concepts.

Gagne states that all learning occurs within five varieties of learned capabilities—Intellectual Skills, Verbal Information, Cognitive Strategies, Motor Skills, and Attitudes. Each of these capabilities refers to an internal methodology to understand instruction due to the differences in the information being presented. Additionally, the student's mind stores each type of information differently for later use.³⁵ Figure 2 outlines the various learning capabilities with associated Army examples:

22 October 2002), 1-5-1-6.

³³ FM 7.0., 1-5.

³⁴ Merriam-Webster's *Deluxe Dictionary*, Tenth Collegiate Edition, s.v. "education" and "train."

³⁵ Gagne also refers to these learned capabilities as *Domains of Learning*. To avoid confusion with the Army's doctrinal definition for the three developmental domains, this monograph does not utilize

<i>Learned Capability</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Example</i>
Intellectual Skills (IS)	Understanding/Using Rules & Symbols	Understand/Apply Army Regulations to a given situation
Verbal Information (VI)	Knowledge or facts repeated from memory	Knowing the effective range of an M-4 rifle
Cognitive Strategies (CS)	Ways of thinking and problem solving techniques.	Application of Troop Leading Procedures or the Military Decision Making Process to a given problem
Motor Skills (MS)	Performance of physical activities to complete a task.	Weapons Qualification, conducting a road march, and navigating from one point to another
Attitudes (A)	Internal choices to act or not to act in a certain manner in relation to the environment or the task	Living in accordance with the Army Values

Figure 2: Learning Capabilities

Thus, the learned capabilities of Intellectual Skills and Verbal Information best fit into the category of **education**. Conversely, Motor Skills best fits into the realm of **training**. The remaining two capabilities fall within the two definitions. Correct application of Cognitive Strategies first requires an understanding of the methods and techniques used. Once understood, the techniques are then demonstrated when solving a particular task. Similarly, in order to live in accordance with the Army Values, an internal choice, one must intellectually understand the desired behavior choices available and then demonstrate those choices in practice. Because individuals retain new information differently based on the presented learned capability, organizations wishing to impart new knowledge in group members must vary instructional techniques. Use of the same method to convey all tasks does not ensure adequate learning.

A glaring discrepancy becomes apparent when one examines the learning gained by company-grade officers in the ID for SRO. TRADOC currently does not categorize SRO within the realm of common core tasks requiring specialized skills, attributes, and knowledge. As such, of the 189 individual and collective tasks on its Common Core Task List, none of them specifically relate to SRO. The same fact holds true for the 71 tasks comprising the program of

Domains of Learning, but rather the term *Learned Capabilities*. Gagne, 47-49.

instruction within all phases of the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC). Additionally, because TRADOC does not consider SRO part of the common core tasks, the Captains' Career Courses (CCC) are not required to present formal instruction, education, or training related to SRO. Nevertheless, some CCC Commanders have incorporated SRO into field exercises.³⁶ While field exercises meet the criteria for *training*, they fail to provide the necessary prerequisite *educational* instruction to enhance and retain learning.

From an educational design perspective, the exercises do not tie into an overall, clearly defined learning objective but rather serve as a *feel-good measure* to demonstrate incorporation of emerging operational lessons. To be truly integrated and worthwhile, instruction requires students to complete informational and education requirements prior to demonstrating proficiency on a given task.³⁷ Additionally, because a leader's responsibility during SRO focuses primarily on cognitive skills and processes, not motor skills, the instructional methodology of placing students in exercises, where they physically perform tasks, in order for them to *learn* does not ensure quality learning nor long-term retention. The encoding processes, mental storage of knowledge from short to long-term memory, required for cognitive capabilities are not the same as those required for motor skills. A flawed encoding process hampers future search and retrieval.³⁸ Sadly, until recently, the Army has failed to adequately address shortfalls in ID

³⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Army Training Support Center, *Common Core Task List*, available on-line from <http://www.atssc.army.mil/itsd/comcor/alphacomcor.asp>. Accessed on 28 November 2005; U.S. Department of the Army, Army Accessions Command, *BOLC Common Core Tasks (18 May 2004)*, by Dennis Cavin, Memorandum for Distribution, Fort Monroe, Virginia; the information regarding exercises at the Captains' Career Courses comes from an unknown document believed to be part of an information paper provided by the Center for Army Leadership to the incoming Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center. These documents were published and in effect prior to the issuance of Department of Defense Directive 3000.05. As such, it remains to be seen how TRADOC and the branch schools will design their subsequent instruction. As Gehler points out, however, unless there is direct senior leader involvement in the change process within TRADOC, such changes could take years to implement, thus not offering a viable solution to current operational problems.

³⁷ This concept represents the theory of systematic instructional design as presented by Dick and Carey; Walter Dick and Lou Carey, *The Systematic Design of Instruction*, 4th ed. (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., 1996), 2, 9.

³⁸ Gagne, 81-83.

education claiming that leaders who demonstrate an ability to react on the fly to unforeseen challenges, to “make it happen” through sheer brute force and personal will, are Adaptive, Agile Leaders. The exercise of direct level leadership skills may work in many situations. However, the complex environment of SRO, requires an officer with more tools in their cognitive kit bag than a hammer.³⁹

Fortunately, the Army recently recognized the SRO learning gap. In April 2005, the Director of the Army Staff established Army Focus Area Stability and Reconstruction Operations (AFA SRO) under the direction of TRADOC and the Combined Arms Center. AFA SRO’s mandate required an examination of capability trade-offs between establishing standing, constabulary-force model SRO units or improving SRO capabilities across the current force; identification of opportunities to increase Army SRO planning and execution capabilities in a joint and interagency environment; and identification of shortfalls within the current force to conduct SRO.⁴⁰ AFA SRO recommended that the Army not create standing forces whose sole role was the conduct of SRO, but rather to increase SRO capability across the total force. Further, the focus group identified 25 initiatives and over 160 actions across the total Army structure to correct identified capability gaps. Lastly, AFA SRO established a “baseline” standard of collective tasks required to successfully conduct SRO.

Following their analysis, AFA SRO recommended eight collective tasks required of units in the conduct of SRO. Figure 3 presents these recommended tasks. Further, the task force developed a number of sub-tasks associated with each collective task found in Appendix A.⁴¹

³⁹ Concepts presented by a division commander in a non-attributional setting to students in the School of Advanced Military Studies during AY 05-06. His comments directly refer to the need for officers to go beyond personally exercising direct level leadership to work through obstacles. Officers have a responsibility to exercise personal influence throughout the unit in order to achieve the proper outcome.

⁴⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, Combined Arms Center, *OPORD 05-007A, Task Force Stability and Reconstruction Operations*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Headquarters, CAC, 15 April 2005) version 7.3, 1.

⁴¹ Before discounting AFA SRO’s recommendations consider two factors. First, 97 percent of the personnel assigned to Civil Affairs units serve in the Army Reserve while the one active duty battalion consists of 250 soldiers. Worldwide deployments on the scale of OIF, OEF, OPERATION UNIFIED

- Task 1 – Assess, repair and reconstruct critical infrastructure
- Task 2 – Minimize immediate threat to the affected populace and enable transition to broader humanitarian operations
- Task 3 – Provide command and control for SRO (includes coordination with other government agencies and non-governmental agencies)
- Task 4 – Facilitate orderly transition to indigenous security forces
- Task 5 – Support transition to accountable self-governance
- Task 6 – Support the development of culturally appropriate institutional systems (e.g., judicial, corrections, police, civil administration)
- Task 7 – Set conditions for and support economic development
- Task 8 – Support DoD and Regional Combatant Commander (RCC) effort to amplify indigenous voices

Figure 3: AFA SRO Recommended Baseline Tasks⁴²

Unfortunately, the mindset that conventional military forces do not conduct SRO still persists today in units deployed to OIF even after all the emphasis placed on the subject in the media, the government, and within the DoD. During the preparation phase leading up to transfer of authority from OIF-4 to OIF-5, an incoming division focused primarily on traditional tasks during its train-up period paying little attention to what the deployed force conveyed back about actual roles and missions. As such, when the incoming unit arrived in Iraq, they were not effectively organized or trained to conduct a seamless transition with the departing unit. This amounted to on-the-job training in theater for six to seven weeks and decreased effectiveness within the AOR.⁴³

ASSISTANCE, JTF KATRINA, or CJTF-76 demonstrate that continued reliance solely on Civil Affairs to carry the SRO load is unrealistic. Second, as a former division commander during Operation Iraqi Freedom pointed out, “industrial strength reconstruction requires more than just Civil Affairs units, it requires the entire unit’s involvement.” His comments refer specifically to the sheer scope and degradation of infrastructure within Iraq. Similar deficiencies also exist within many Third World countries. For info on Civil Affairs see: Rob Schultheis, *Waging Peace: A Special Operations Team’s Battle to Rebuild Iraq*, (New York: Gotham Books, 2005); AFA’s Task List from U.S. Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Army Focus Area Stability and Reconstruction Operations (AFA SRO) briefing to the Army Chief of Staff, 31 May 2005, 100.

⁴² U.S. Department of the Army, Combined Arms Center, *FRAGO 1 to OPORD 05-007A, Task Force Stability and Reconstruction Operations*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Headquarters, CAC, 28 June 2005), version 1.4, 1.

⁴³ Remarks made in a non-attributional setting by a former Division Operations Officer (G-3) for

Another factor to take into account regarding AFA SRO's task list derives from a national political desire to defeat the underlying conditions that promote the growth of radical Islamic fundamentalism world wide. Doing so promotes the rise of democratic institutions, encourages economic growth, and increases basic human rights and freedoms.⁴⁴ While responsibility for achieving these objectives lies throughout the federal government, Army forces often provide immediate rapid-response capability, logistics infrastructure, and security before other agencies and organizations arrive on the ground in a crisis area. Additionally, economic and political disparity throughout the Third World, particularly in the Middle East, virtually guarantees that prosecuting the GWOT with U.S. military forces also entails significant SRO related activities.

The second of the Army's key documents dealing with leader development, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, (DA PAM 600-3), outlines the Army's leader development process. It delineates key activities, goals and objectives for each rank and branch. Further, it establishes the key and developmental professional experiences believed to be important at each rank. It focuses on the human dimension of development.

Before going further, an important developmental distinction within the current officer corps must be addressed. As noted above, developmental and social learning psychologists believe that early learning experiences, defined as experiences gained in the pre-adult years, play a dominant role in overall individual development. These early experiences shape individual psychological processes to include self-concept, world-view, value set, and coping strategies to name but a few. Processes develop as the child attempts to adapt to and make sense of the world

Operation Iraqi Freedom to students in the Advanced Military Studies Program, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas during Academic Year 2005-2006. This trend was also captured by the Center for Army Lesson Learned as part of the AFA SRO study. As part of the discussion relating to a recommended initiative to Refine Modular Force Doctrine (Initiative #4), CALL noted, "Units are not training on tasks required of them in theater prior to deployment." *AFA SRO briefing*, 57.

around him. Once established, these processes become deeply seated and firmly held patterns of behavior.⁴⁵ Wong's October 2000 monograph entitled, *Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps* examines the impact of pre-adult experiences of Army officers.⁴⁶

Wong outlines the significant differences between the belief systems of two distinct groups within the officer corps—officers born from 1943 to 1960 (The Boomers) and officers born from 1960 to 1980 (Generation Xer's). He identifies that pre-adult developmental experiences, external social issues and pressures, and internal Army cultural issues differed significantly for each generational group. These differences subsequently shaped each respective generation's belief system and patterns of behavior. Further, Wong anticipates the impending arrival of a third group, labeled *Generation Next*, predicting that “while it is too early to tell how they will approach the workplace, our experience with Generation X tells us that we had better be ready. Understanding generational differences will become even more critical with three unique generations in the officer corps.”⁴⁷ Taking into account promotion timelines, *Nexter* officers have just started to enter the Captain ranks.⁴⁸ The pre-adult experiences of current and future company grade officers associate military force use primarily for combating non-state entities and organizations in far flung regions of the globe or supporting first responders within the United States in the aftermath of natural disasters.⁴⁹ Just as Wong concluded that senior officers need to

⁴⁴ Bush, *Democracy* Speech.

⁴⁵ Geraldine Leitt Orton, *Strategies for Counseling with Children and Their Parents* (Pacific Grove, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1997), 42-62.

⁴⁶ Wong, *Generation Xer's*.

⁴⁷ Wong, *Generation Xer's* 25-26.

⁴⁸ The promotion timeline from Second Lieutenant to Captain currently sits at 40 months, thus year group 2001 officers recently entered the Captain ranks and are preparing to take command of companies if they have not done so already. Generation X officers currently occupy the post-command Captain, Major, and Lieutenant Colonel ranks.

⁴⁹ In his 30 November 2005 speech at the United States Naval Academy, President Bush identified a key component to characterize the *Nexter* Generation, “This is the first year that every class of midshipmen at this Academy arrived after the attacks of September the 11th, 2001. Each of you has volunteered to wear our nation's uniform in a time of war—knowing all the risks and dangers that accompany military service.” While the President directed his comments to midshipmen at the United States Naval Academy, the observation remains true for cadets enrolled at the United States Military Academy at West Point or in Reserve Officer Training Corps programs nationwide. Such an occurrence

reach out to Generation Xer's within the ranks, attention must also be paid to the starting developmental experiential set of company grade officers as it differs significantly as well. Chapter 5 addresses the critical components senior leaders must utilize to bridge the generational gap between themselves and junior officers.

The AFA SRO study identified the need to change the way company-grade officers think about, are educated for, and train a number of tasks previously belonging in the Civil Affairs arena. Three other learning capabilities, not commonly associated with operations at the company level, also require reconceptualized thinking during SRO. Like previously addressed Civil Affairs functions, these roles and responsibilities formerly belonged within the realms of staffs and higher echelons of command. SRO in 21st century conflict add Information Operations, Intelligence Analysis, and the need for increased understanding of the Human Dimension to the junior officer's rucksack.

No one recognizes the linkage between Information Operations (IO) and Civil Affairs functions or the importance of understanding and incorporating them throughout the battlespace better than Captain Daniel Morgan. As an infantry company commander in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) during OIF-1, he writes

Company [Civil Affairs] operations and information operations deserve serious attention from senior leaders. [Junior level leaders] lack the experience, training, and resources in these areas at the brigade level and down. We need to implement this facet of full-spectrum operations more into our Army education system and equip the boots on the ground soldiers with these capabilities. These shortcomings are not an excuse for a lack of a company effort in civil-military and information operations. Creativity and initiative by company commanders must make the difference.⁵⁰

has happened only two other times in the history of the Army, in June 1968 during the Vietnam War and in June 1945 during the waning months of World War II. President Bush remarks taken from a speech presented by President George W. Bush at the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 30 November 2005. Available on-line from: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051130-2.html>. Accessed 30 November 2005. Information regarding the two other times in U.S. history where all members of the service academies volunteered subsequent to the start of hostilities comes from Robert Cowley and Thomas Guinzburd. Eds. *West Point: Two Centuries of Honor and Tradition* (New York, New York: Warner Books, Inc., 2002), 104 and 184.

⁵⁰ Daniel Morgan, "Going to Fight in Iraq? Lessons From an Infantry Company Commander" *Army Magazine*, 4 April 2004, 25.

Successful Information Operations at the company level greatly enhance organizational capabilities and serve as a combat multiplier. As shown from the captured Al-Qa'ida letter, the enemy recognizes the impact and importance of shaping not only the local population's perceptions, but more importantly, perceptions within the United States. Due to the overarching local and global impact they have on influencing attitudes and behaviors, company-grade officers must have a better understanding of how to utilize IO. All though a debate rages in the media regarding the relationship and legality of various IO functions, the fact remains that the leader on the ground must have a coherent message, understood by all.⁵¹

Company grade officers also need an increased understanding of intelligence collection, processing, and detective work when conducting SRO. The willingness of insurgents to actively hide within a civilian populace requires commanders on the ground to change their methodology for seeking information and actionable intelligence. As one battalion commander put it, "I tell my captains you have to understand the inner workings of the communities in your area...[you] have to figure out who the key leaders are, you need to know who their relatives are, and what businesses they are involved in."⁵² His thoughts demonstrate that traditional methods of templating symmetrical, like-equipped forces, do not apply during SRO. Instead, company-grade officers must spend more time learning about the underlying subtleties of their area of operations.

Peacekeeping operations conducted by U.S. forces deployed to Kosovo offer a method to gather actionable intelligence. The collapse of viable civilian institutions and law enforcement within Kosovo following the Serbian withdrawal led to a reemergence of organized crime and corruption among the population. Charged with maintaining order and keeping the peace

⁵¹ For an overview of the public and Congressional debate regarding integration of PSYOP units and Public Affairs Officers under the overarching umbrella of Information Operations see Eric Schmitt and David S. Cloud, "The Struggle for Iraq: Propaganda, Senate Summons Pentagon to Explain Effort to Plant Reports in Iraqi News Media," *New York Times*, 02 December 2005, available on-line from: <http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F30814FE39550C718CDDAB0994DD404482>. Accessed 13 December 2005.

between rival ethnic groups, junior officers routinely took pictures of suspected criminals encountered during security patrols. Upon return to the operating base, the officers updated a database establishing links between various suspects and criminal activity. As they pieced together various quantities of information they sought to develop patterns of behavior. Their continued analysis drove subsequent operations⁵³ However, the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 'best practices' learned after months of trial and error in an SRO environment were not institutionalized Army-wide, but merely retained by individual officers. Officers responsible for maintaining peace, order, and security following the collapse of the Iraqi regime found they had to learn similar lessons all over again.

John Nagl, serving as an armor battalion operations officer on an OIF deployment, never expected to serve as a crime scene investigator, yet he often filled that role, "I understood intellectually that counterinsurgency is an intel-driven event...You have to have the local nationals tell you who the bad guys are, and then you act on that information. But the steps between there were not clear to me."⁵⁴ Like the Kosovo peacekeepers, he experienced many of same difficulties as his predecessors when collecting and assessing intelligence. Due to the significant lack of counter-intelligence specialists, investigative burden fell to junior officers on top of their normal troop leading responsibilities. Unless they developed innovative investigation and interrogation methods during the course of operations, they would not be able to develop any actionable intelligence enabling future operations.⁵⁵ Rather than stumble upon best investigative practices in theater, junior officers can gain a greater understanding by spending time studying and observing local law enforcement counter-drug or organized crime task forces at their home station prior to deployment.

⁵² LTC Thomas Hollis, as quoted in Jaffe, "Ayers", 16.

⁵³ Dana Priest, *The Mission*, (New York, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 278, 311, 315, 316, 321-342.

⁵⁴ Peter Maass, "Professor Nagl's War," *The New York Times Magazine*, 11 January 2004.

⁵⁵ Greg Jaffe, "On Ground in Iraq, Soldier Uses Wits to Hunt Insurgents," *Wall Street Journal*, 10

The last learning capability in which company grade officers require additional education involves an improved ability to understand and react to the human dimension during conflict. Junior officers need greater interpersonal and counseling skills than ever before, not only to deal with their own internal challenges and struggles, but also to provide better, more immediate support to their subordinates. Soldiers, leaders, and their families face the prospect of repeated deployments to conflict areas as part of the ongoing GWOT. The high stress environment soldiers experience during SRO presents unique challenges for some of these soldiers. A recent report noted that, “more than one in four U.S. troops have come home from the Iraq war with health problems that require medical or mental health treatment.” The number of troops seeking care roughly hovers about 23percent.⁵⁶ As units prepare for return rotations, personal untreated combat stress issues may cause cohesion problems among soldiers. This stems from a perception that unit members consider soldiers who seek help ‘weak’ and therefore a potential liability during combat.⁵⁷

A leader’s ability to relate to soldiers on a deeper level through understanding their individual struggles and challenges can significantly reduce a small unit’s non-battle related injuries, improve unit cohesion, and retain quality soldiers beyond their initial enlistment. Further, better interpersonal skills enhance leader listening and communication abilities with subordinates. Leaders must recognize that “stress in combat is the body’s normal reaction to a highly abnormal situation.”⁵⁸ While combat stress injuries potentially occur during any military operation, the challenges, complexity, and seemingly random nature of violence and destruction during SRO add a greater layer of anxiety to a soldier’s situation. Retaining soldiers and leaders

September 2004, A-1 and A-8.

⁵⁶ Gregg Zoroya, “1 in 4 Iraq Vets Ailing On Return,” *USA Today*, 19 October 2005, 1. Available from <http://ebird.afis.mil/ebfiles/e20051019397316.html>. Accessed on 19 October 2005.

⁵⁷ Email received by the author from a brigade surgeon whose brigade is preparing to redeploy to Iraq in the future. For the story of how a negative reaction to combat stress effected the career of a promising company grade officer see Greg Jaffe, “The Aftermath: For Nate Self, Battlefield Hero, Trauma Takes a Toll,” *Wall Street Journal*, 06 October 2005, A-1 and A-12.

with operational experience remains the key ingredient for successful operations in the future. Junior officers can, and must, play a role relating to their soldiers' human dimension as never before.

Thus we see that, "the role of training and education is to prepare the officer corps...for the most likely form of warfare, but for two centuries that education and training has been largely misdirected."⁵⁹ The ID currently does not provide a timely or effective method to prepare junior officers "how" to think about their roles in SRO thereby making them less, not more, adaptive and agile. Intellectual change does not occur because the organization does not spend enough time **educating** officers and instead seeks to **train** them. Successful operations in complex environments require an ability to understand not only the current situation, but also an ability to visualize potential outcomes in the future. Further, the leader must know when and how to act in order to achieve desired gains. This only occurs when a leader possesses " *structure knowledge*, knowledge of how the variables in the system are related and how they influence one another".⁶⁰ Such knowledge occurs best through an integrated development process that informs and educates prior to testing and evaluating.

The knowledge requirements presented in this chapter—AFA SRO's recommendation for greater understanding of Civil Affairs roles and missions; conceptual and actual integration of information operations throughout the battlespace; intelligence collection, processing, and detective work, and an ability to understand and react to the human dimension in ways not appreciated in the past—predominately concern cognitive learning capabilities and not motor skills. As such, reactive exercise scenarios, as presented currently in some CCC's, might prove effective if the Army expected its officers to physically perform the tasks recommended rather

⁵⁸ Dr. (MAJ) Michael Oshiki, in-class presentation on Combat Stress to students at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Fall 2004.

⁵⁹ Waghelstein, 292.

⁶⁰ Dietrich, Dörner, *The Logic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding Error in Complex Situations*, Translated by Rita and Robert Kimber, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Perseus Books, 1996), 37 and 41.

than “[influence] people—by providing purpose, direction, and motivation—while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization.”⁶¹ The challenge then for OD commanders remains how to best address identified **educational** needs of company grade officers in order to make them better leaders.

⁶¹ U.S. Department of the Army. *Field Manual 22-100, Army Leadership* (Washington, D.C., 31 August 1999), 1-4.

Chapter 3: Implementation—The Senior Leader

Now that the emerging challenges within the COE facing company-grade officers and the lack of specific educational knowledge these same officers receive during professional military education experiences within the ID are understood, focus shifts to offering recommendations on how to close the learning gap and improve performance during the conduct of SRO. Using Gehler's framework for implementing curriculum review and change within the CCC, the next three chapters each highlight one particular area within the model. Chapter 3 addresses involvement of the senior leader, in this case the division commander, in leading the change process. Chapter 4 discusses implementing change to OD leader development program content and components by significantly leveraging technology and knowledge sharing to create double-loop learning organizations. Finally, Chapter 5 concentrates on instilling a systemic and organizational cultural change within military organizations that embraces SRO as a core mission requirement, promotes transparent leadership, and provides a true focus on leadership development.

Before going further, however, a significant question needs to be answered—***Why is company grade officer development a Division Commander's concern?*** Especially since *FM 7.0* states "Commanders are responsible for training their own unit and one echelon below. Commanders evaluate units two echelons below."⁶² Junior officer development, specifically related to SRO, requires Division Commander involvement, contrary to Army doctrine and practice, for several reasons.

First, company grade officers serve at the focal point for SRO. Typically, these officers are also the most institutionally and operationally inexperienced leaders within a military organization. As such, these leaders cannot rely heavily on intuitive decision making and must

⁶² This same sentiment was echoed by a former OIF division commander during an interview with the author; *FM 7.0*, 2-29.

instead wait for instructions from higher headquarters or embark on *discovery learning* endeavors.⁶³ The United States Army cannot afford such a *laze faire* approach in the context of modern mass communications; the ever-pressing demand to retain popular support for continued U.S. operations internally and abroad; and the need to retain indigenous support for the recognized local government within a potentially failing state. Demands previously placed at higher levels of command now fall to more junior officers. What once was the purview of Corps headquarters now falls to Divisions while Division responsibility now falls to Brigades and Battalions. While the responsibilities have shifted, the rank structure and experience level of the officers in the lower command echelons remains the same. Thus, the experience gained over a lifetime of service for a senior Army leader must be conveyed in some method to junior officers within the organization who possess a fraction of the same service time.

Second, TRADOC does not currently consider SRO part of common core training. Therefore, little to no common understanding, learning, or educational baseline exists regarding how to conduct SRO among junior officers throughout the various branches. Today's non-linear, non-contiguous battlefield demands that leaders be able to physically and mentally lead soldiers facing challenges once thought to be the purview of only *front line* or specialized units. The Officer Education System (OES) changed specifically to address some of these challenges by introducing Phase II of the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC II).⁶⁴ The situations and exercises presented to junior officers during BOLC II are a significant step in the right direction.

⁶³ Reporter Malcolm Gladwell offers an interesting argument regarding the development of intuitive thinking capacity. He believes that adults can effectively use intuitive thinking, but such endeavors require significant experience, years of practice, and exposure to a variety of situations. Malcolm Gladwell, *Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking*, (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2005), 10-15, 97, 141, 184.

⁶⁴ Implementation of BOLC II was not originally intended to address SRO shortfalls within the officer education system, but rather, "to develop competent, confident and adaptable Lieutenants, grounded in warrior tasks, able to lead Soldiers in the contemporary operational environment. [emphasis part of original]" The eight week course provides a common developmental experience for all lieutenants, regardless of branch, focused on achieving training and leadership proficiency on 39 Warrior Core Tasks and 9 Warrior Drills. Operations occur largely within a field environment. U.S. Department of the Army, 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry Regiment, *BOLC II Overview*, available on-line from

However, as Gagne notes, physical performance of a cognitively based learned capability does not provide the best method for learning retention. Nor does it ensure that the correct learning occurs merely because the learner developed a solution. Educational strategies that coincide with internal retention embedding mechanisms facilitate rapid and accurate recall of prior knowledge during later use.⁶⁵ Identifying learning gaps and creating initiatives within the ID to address the issues represents a significant advancement toward building future knowledge. Unfortunately, as former TRADOC Commander, General Kevin Byrnes, noted initiatives in the ID will not provide a timely, responsive answer because “our current doctrine production cycle is about 5 years from inception to effect in the education system... [and] the standard for review of institutional common core curriculum is triennially.”⁶⁶ Thus, operational units must look to themselves to solve SRO learning gaps. A division commander has a vested interest to ensure a common level of understanding for SRO throughout the division battlespace.

Third, FORSCOM Reg 350-1 mandates that specific training for SRO will not begin “earlier than 90 days prior to the day of deployment to the culminating Predeployment Training Exercise and/or Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE)” so as to limit degradation of the unit’s warfighting capabilities. When such training does occur, FORSCOM directs that the unit successfully complete 73 specific tasks. When a unit prepares for a Peace Enforcement mission, FORSCOM REG 350-1 adds an additional 23 tasks.⁶⁷ While each task does not require a full day

<https://www.infantry.army.mil/BOLC/content/419,1>, BOLC II Overview. Accessed on 30 December 2005.

⁶⁵ Gagne refers to learning in such situations as “Trial and Error” or Reinforcement learning. Largely based on the works of B.F. Skinner and I.P. Pavlov, these theories propose that learning occurs through conditioned responses to stimuli, however human learning and embedding are much more complex endeavors. Gagne, 10 and 72-73.

⁶⁶ LTG Kevin P. Byrnes, speech during Major Command presentations, Training and Doctrine Command as part of the Association of the United States Army Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., October 27, 2004. Available from <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/CGMACOMspeechAUSA04.htm>. Accessed 20 February, 2005 and *U.S. Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Regulation 350-10, Institutional Leader Training and Education*, (Fort Monroe, Virginia: TRADOC, 12 August 2002), 2-21. Both sources cited in Gehler, 3.

⁶⁷ Under the heading of *Stability Operations-Peace Operations*, FORSCOM Regulation 350-1 specifically addresses *Peace Operations*. As mentioned in the introduction to this monograph, the 2005 version of FM 1, applies the SRO definition to the type of operations described in the FORSCOM

to achieve training proficiency, required tasks still demand a substantial investment of time to accomplish properly. Anyone with deployment experience recognizes that the last 90 days prior to the actual deployment are filled with activity ranging from unit packing and manifest preparation, to final soldier readiness processing and storage of personal goods. When a unit faces competing demands, while concurrently trying to meet deployment timelines, educational learning and development opportunities will likely fall by the wayside as physical tasks take precedence. Therefore, the division carries a responsibility to set the proper conditions before and during operational deployments to ensure the best trained units and leaders deploy on-time, capable of achieving mission objectives and requirements.

Junior officer development also holds importance for a Division commander in light of recent events in OIF. Due to the hierarchy of command layers, directives from division and brigade commanders pass through a series of gates before reaching the implementer. At times, these directives may be filtered or not passed on at all, especially if an intermediate commander does not agree with the senior commander's assessment. In such cases the original importance or intent may not be conveyed at all. Two such situations occurred recently in Iraq. A division commander recognized the need to change from strictly kinetic operations to a more balanced approach when dealing with Iraqi civilians. After conveying this thought throughout the command, he found that in one battalion, the battalion commander did not agree with the division's assessment. As such, the battalion commander never conveyed the importance of the division commander's intent to his subordinates. Thus, the officers with the most frequent contact with civilians were not operating within the senior commander's new guidelines.⁶⁸

Regulation. The tasks fall into a number of different categories—Individual General Training, Individual Theater Specific Training, General Collective Training, Theater Specific Collective Training, and Leader Orientation Training. U.S. Department of the Army. *FORSCOM Regulation 350-1, Active Duty Training For FORSCOM Units* (Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command: Fort McPherson, Georgia, 25 October 2002), 26-28.

⁶⁸ Former OIF Division Commander interview with the author under the School for Advanced Military Studies non-attribution policy, 06 December 2005.

Similarly, *New York Times* reporter Dexter Filkins, reported the downfall of a notable battalion commander serving in Iraq. Filkins records the challenges facing a unit trying to reconstruct a country, restore essential services, and instill democratic principles while concurrently fighting an insurgency. However, when the battalion commander didn't agree with his senior commanders things began to get out of hand leading to the drowning death of an Iraqi civilian and the court martial of a noncommissioned officer and a lieutenant.⁶⁹ A common understanding of SRO throughout the division, provides junior officers a 'comparison other', endorsed by the division commander, when faced with conflicting information or situations. Having such an endorsement greatly enhances response time and ability.⁷⁰

Finally, as Major J. Bryan Mullins points out, many units do not develop effective leader development programs due to time constraints, conflicting priorities, and different skill sets and knowledge base of attending officers. Thus, unit development programs are not integrated efforts at the company/troop and battalion/squadron level or with those of higher headquarters. What results is a hodgepodge effort focusing on the immediate task or mission at hand, such as the next training cycle and not focused on long term development needs.⁷¹ As the senior trainer in the division, the commanding general has the responsibility to ensure coherent linkage of development programs throughout the division and the institutional domain.

Gehler postulates that senior leader involvement provides a vital component to organizational change. He expands this concept by highlighting senior leader authority in three areas. First, positional authority provides the senior leader an ability to communicate a vision throughout the unit noting the need for organizational change. Second, senior leaders possess the

⁶⁹ Dexter Filkins, "The Fall of the Warrior King," *New York Times Magazine*, 23 October 2005, 52-59.

⁷⁰ Gladwell, 183.

⁷¹ J. Bryan Mullins. "Thoughts on Leader Professional Development Programs in Armor and Infantry Battalions." [On-line] Available from https://s3-xonet.army.mil/s3xo/ev_en.php?ID=1590_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC; Internet: accessed 28 January 2005.

legal and regulatory authority to carry out and oversee change processes. Finally, senior leader authority also provides the necessary energy to overcome institutional or external inertia slowing or derailing change processes. Unfortunately, Gheler's model falls short in that it fails to provide further examples illustrating exactly how a senior leader involves him or herself other than by providing an overarching commander's intent.⁷² While his proposed commander's intent statement serves as a good start, it requires refinement in order to truly be effective when designing unit leader development programs. This chapter offers further improvement regarding a senior leader's involvement in the areas of commander's intent refinement, redefining 'white space', leveraging contacts with external resources, and willingly accepting risk from bottom-up learning and OES/NCOES opportunities.

As mentioned previously, many view unit level development programs primarily as *training* rather than *educational* opportunities. Chapter two highlighted the need to understand the various learned capabilities and how students gain and retain knowledge. It also briefly introduced the educational design concept articulated by Walter Dick and Lou Carey. The first area in which a senior leader influences junior officers rests within the instructional design concept.

Instead of thinking about unit Leader Development programs as isolated events, commanders should view programs as a part of the overall organizational training strategy (Army through Company level) where each component plays a role and influences the other components. Referred to the systems approach, this approach favors a learning environment because it focuses on the endstate to be achieved; it specifically integrates and sequences various tasks to the overall objective; and it is easily transferred to other learners and environments.⁷³

Implementing a new system into an already overworked organization seems like a daunting task. However, the systems approach is not as foreign as it may seem at first glance. In

⁷² Gehler, 7-8.

reality, units already conduct many of the functions required by the model as part of the normal Training Management Process--they just need to carry them over into the Leader Development arena. Appendix B outlines the Systems Approach Model for Designing Instruction and shows the comparisons with the Army Training Management Cycle and Eight Step Training Model.

In the first step of the process the commander determines the outcome goal for the program. The decision comes from a variety of inputs: a list of unit goals, a needs assessment with regard to a particular upcoming unit mission or event (Unit METL), the commander's personal experience observing and working with previous junior officers, or from other officers already in the unit.⁷⁴ The list of possible sources is endless, but it must answer the question:

What must a Lieutenant be able to do by the time he/she is promoted to Captain in this unit?

Similarly, the same question must be answered for Captains. Note the long-term focus of promotion to the next rank, not just immediate unit needs.

Outcome goal development is arguably the most important component of the systems model because subsequent steps all link back to achieving the desired endstate. The obvious starting point ties back to Army Regulations. DA PAM 600-3 offers branch specific expectations for officers at each grade. However, these requirements are not refined enough to continue the design process. Consider the following characteristics required of a Signal Corps Lieutenant during the first duty assignment:

The focus during this phase should be on acquiring and refining troop leading, coordination, logistics, technical and administrative skills, as well as the branch unique technical skills required to plan, install, operate, and maintain signal equipment and systems. In addition to branch unique tasks, Signal lieutenants should also become proficient in common core tasks. Before promotion to captain, officers should possess knowledge of the Signal branch and a basic knowledge of combined arms principles. This includes practical experience in signal activities and missions, and in tactics and combined arms operations.⁷⁵

⁷³ Dick and Carey, 2, 9.

⁷⁴ Dick and Carey, 5.

⁷⁵ DA PAM 600-3, 165.

This description provides a good general portrayal, but it does not address specifics for the unit or, more importantly, dealing with the nuances of operating in the COE. Nor does the description address any SRO related responsibilities or functions.

When complete, an instructional goal identifies the learners, describes what they will be able to accomplish, addresses the environment in which the tasks are performed, and describes the assets available during the program of instruction for the trainee. For a unit program it might look something like this:

Lieutenants within this division are capable of conducting full-spectrum operations at the platoon level either independently or as part of a combined arms, joint, or coalition force anywhere in the world; they demonstrate adaptability and flexibility in changing environments; they technically and tactically employ their organization in accordance with its capabilities; their platoons have achieved a “T” in the 40 Warrior Tasks and 9 Battle Drills; they are knowledgeable of the challenges inherent in Stability and Reconstruction Operations and are capable of providing initial assessment, management, and oversight in such situations until transfer to another government agency occurs; they are experts in troop leading procedures, coordination, maintenance, and logistical support at the platoon and company level; they demonstrate an understanding of the administrative systems within the division; they are physically fit and develop programs to improve the fitness level of their soldiers; and they are capable of commanding their company in the absence of the commander.

Note that completed goal statements are precise, measurable statements of demonstrated behavior that include the context in which the behavior will occur.⁷⁶ This example again highlights a possible solution for lieutenants. A similar statement found in Appendix C exists for captains as well. From these precise, measurable standards, subordinate units can develop and tailor their own organizational development plans.

The second area in which a senior leader within the division can influence company grade officer development lies in the area of redefining the ‘white space’ on the unit training calendar. Here the commander must determine the important tasks from the irrelevant tasks. While training guidance has always been a function of Army doctrine, an Army at war must

⁷⁶ Dick and Carey, 20 and 27.

change the way it views what is important. It is possible that in today's environment, command inspection programs might not carry as much weight for a unit as convoy live-fire proficiency. As it relates to SRO and the specific organization's traditional mission, this represents a significant challenge because of the skill sets and tasks associated with each mission. Another factor contributing to the confusion and need for specific guidance relates to the implementation of the Army's new readiness model—Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN).

Under the ARFORGEN construct a unit goes through three readiness phases—a Reset and Train Phase, the Ready Force Phase, and the Available Force Phase. Within each phase of readiness, the unit reports different readiness levels, completes different tasks, and reports to potentially different headquarters. The key organizing construct, as related to readiness, stems from a unit being designated, “ready for what mission/phase” thus driving the unit being “resourced for what mission/phase.” Figure 4 provides a graphic depiction of various organizations as they pass through the ARFORGEN construct.




Figure 4: ARFORGEN readiness construct⁷⁷

⁷⁷ U.S. Department of the Army, G-3, Army Transformation Office, *ARFORGEN Training Templates and Training Events Matrices*, updated 21 December 2005, email received by author 10 January

However, some problems exist with regards to planning, resourcing, and executing a training strategy for future operations. It is possible that the core Mission Essential Task List (METL) tasks agreed upon by the division headquarters exercising administrative training oversight for a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) or supporting brigade during one phase does not match what the gaining headquarters views as METL tasks in subsequent phases. Additionally, while core METL proficiency drives transition from the Reset/Train phase to the Ready Force phase, these tasks might not match the anticipated *real* tasks for that organization during the Ready Force or Available Force phase.⁷⁸ Should this occur, complete retraining of the unit is required wasting valuable time and resources. The experience of a Fires Brigade Commander deployed to OIF provides a relevant example. Serving as a Division Effects Coordinator, the Brigade Commander currently has responsibility to plan, implement, and oversee the conduct of provincial elections within Iraq. These tasks are a far cry from any of the Fires Brigade Tasks associated currently under the ARFORGEN model. The changing task proficiency list, in conjunction with changing administrative training and readiness oversight for BCTs and supporting BDEs, requires the division commander to accurately convey to subordinate organizations what is important and what is irrelevant.

Ideally, FORSCOM resolves the potential conflict described above during the bi-annual sourcing conference before it becomes a training distracter. The ARFORGEN Sourcing Conference assigns specific “troops to task” for known operational requirements such as rotations to Bosnia, OEF, or OIF. Once assigned to a specific mission, units become a Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF) under the Operational Control (OPCON) of a Divisional or JTF headquarters for training oversight. Concurrently, units not designated as part of a DEF, become

2005, slide 3.

⁷⁸ The above description of the ARFORGEN process is oversimplified for brevity in this monograph. Additionally, the current Army Regulation for readiness, AR 220-1 is under revision and the current version, dated 10 June 2003, does not incorporate any ARFORGEN readiness concepts. For more information regarding ARFORGEN see the ARFORGEN 101 Brief on the Army Knowledge On-Line

part of a Ready Expeditionary Force (REF) and are available to serve in either a surge capacity for a committed DEF or deploy on a contingency operation.⁷⁹ Unfortunately, at this time, senior level commanders cannot agree when administrative control (ADCON) for DEFs or REFs shifts from the home station installation division headquarters to the gaining DEF/REF division headquarters.⁸⁰

DEF/REF task organization should go into effect immediately upon conclusion of the ARFORGEN Synchronization Conference or as early in the ARFORGEN phasing process as possible. Doing so allows the gaining DEF/REF Commander the opportunity to establish training priorities and build a cohesive team prior to meeting for the first time during the deployment. Using this method, DEF/REF Commanders must overcome the challenge of providing training oversight for units not collocated on the same installation. However, for years some divisions have demonstrated an ability to properly accomplish this task.⁸¹ The 1st Infantry Division, 3rd Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division, and 1st Armored Division headquarters' successfully exercised ADCON over subordinate brigades located on installations away from divisional garrisons.

The third area in which a division commander can successfully influence junior officer development rests with an ability to leverage contacts with external resources. As mentioned in both the AFA SRO study and in Chapter 2, a large portion of the learning deficiencies related to SRO tasks stems from inadequate *education* and expertise within the force. One method to significantly improve this learning deficiency would be to develop partnerships and centers of excellence with local institutions of higher learning and civilian government entities. As

website.

⁷⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, G-3, Army Transformation Office, *ARFORGEN/IGPBS Update "Leveling the Bubble"*, updated 10 November 2005, email received by author 10 January 2005, slide 33.

⁸⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, G-3, Army Transformation Office, email received by the author 10 January 2005.

⁸¹ U.S. Department of the Army, G-3, Army Transformation Office, email received by the author 10 January 2005.

Appendix D demonstrates, a major metropolitan area with a population greater than 100,000 people lies within one hundred miles of every Army installation housing a division headquarters or its subordinate brigades. Additionally, each division headquarters enjoys at least one major college or university offering graduate degree programs related to SRO-type activities within the same distance radius. Contact with local institutions of higher learning provides the academic background and expertise to examine current and future problems beyond the scope of purely military solutions. Contact with local government agencies facilitates unit and individual leader understanding of the practical challenges officials face on a daily basis during operations. Combining information gathered from both sources allows divisional leaders to make informed decisions, grounded in theory, balanced by another's practical experience. In most cases, the distance to a potential SME is less than one hour's travel by car. Clearly, distance is not a limiting factor.⁸²

The division commander, either personally or through staff members, provides the best opportunity to establish these outreach programs for two reasons. First, for half of the active division headquarters, the commanding general serves as the senior Army representative in the

⁸² Establishing partnerships and centers of excellence not only improves organizational ability to gain knowledge, it also enables other key aspects for combating the GWOT as well. The initiative expands the scope of involvement for defeating international terrorism beyond offering purely military solutions. Recently, senior military and political leaders have spoken out regarding the need to involve other government and national entities to a greater extent in SRO-related missions. Inviting local government and educational organizations to collaborate with military units in the development of potential solutions to SRO-related problems, inherently gains "buy-in" from participating agencies because they assume a level of ownership and responsibility for the ideas generated. Noel Tichy describes organizations capable of generating such a level of support as *Winning Organizations* that are more likely to work toward successful outcomes rather than have members who stand on the outside offering nothing but criticism. Greater cooperation and involvement between civilian institutions and military organizations creates a foundation of increased understanding about the military for people with little or no prior contact with service members. Building such a foundation is necessary because of the decreased number of Americans, especially policy makers, who serve in uniform today. Seeking a foundation for understanding also enhances recruiting and retention efforts and military policy initiatives due to an increased awareness, education, and involvement of the populace. For information specifically related to senior military leaders' comments refer to *Chairman's Guidance*, 4; regarding the need to involve other entities of national power in Iraq refer to National Security Council, *The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2005), 7-9; for information on *Winning Organizations* see Noel M. Tichy, *The Leadership Engine: How Winning Companies Build Leaders at Every Level* (New York, N.Y.: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997), 129-130.

local area. As such, he commands a great deal of respect, prestige, and authority outside the gates of the installation for addressing Army issues related to civil-military relations. He likely already enjoys relationships with local government leaders due to the symbiotic association that exists between a local community and a military installation. Second, the division commander controls the two most important resources when it comes to establishing new programs, time and the budget. As with *redefining the white space*, the commander possess the authority to determine priorities and allocate resources where they will achieve the greatest impact. Opening the potential knowledge gained and shared to the entire division greatly increases the scope of the effort extending it far beyond the reaches of the typical target audience for unit level professional development programs—one battalion.

The final area where a division commander can influence junior officer development addresses mitigating risk in two areas—the generation of ideas and unit personnel strength. As Wong points out, junior officers today possess much greater access to information than their senior leaders enjoyed during similar points of a career path. In fact, emerging doctrine and operational procedures promote information superiority and increased situational awareness at lower levels in order to provide a “[dramatic] increase in mission effectiveness.”⁸³ Technology provides junior officers with the ability to remain connected to information sources, family, and friends on a near-real time basis even when operationally deployed. Access affords company grade officers information with which to make educated decisions and share ideas among unit members.

However, propagation of ideas from lower echelons, without official sanction from higher headquarters, upsets some senior officers within the Army. Some believe that the concept degrades the ‘expert’ authority afforded to senior commanders because of their years of service.

⁸³ Wong, *Generation X’ers*, 5 and U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation, *The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 5 January 2005), 7.

While senior leader expertise may have been true during the years of infrequent operational deployments and conflict, especially as related to SRO, the post-9/11 era reality demonstrates that increasingly, junior officers are learning and adapting more rapidly than senior leaders. Operations in Iraq provide a *crucible* leader development learning experience for significant portions of the junior officer corps where those same officers become subject matter experts in the conduct of SRO. While deployed, junior officers enjoy a great deal of latitude and responsibility in their authority and decision making. Wong believes one of the greatest challenges facing the Army is the return of these junior leaders to a garrison environment, “The leader development gains of OIF will be lost if...battalion and brigade commanders in tactical units, and division chiefs of headquarters staffs fail to recognize that these junior officers are quite capable of operating within broad boundaries of commander’s intent, instead of being told what to do and how to do it.”⁸⁴ Division commanders must recognize and leverage lower level expertise in order to build a winning organization. Similar to incorporating civilian organizations, co-opting, rather than directing, junior officers instills a desire to succeed in difficult and challenging situations.

The second area of risk mitigation involves a willingness to release officers from operational assignments for educational opportunities, both professional military education (PME) and the pursuit of advanced civil degrees. A long-time component of the professional officer corps, PME currently lags behind “operational experience” or “operational requirements” when considering “the needs of the Army”. Under the Force Stabilization and Life-Cycle Management Concepts, the unit commander controls when subordinates attend OES/NCOES schooling opportunities unlike previous years where Branch Assignment Officers determined an

⁸⁴ Assessment of potential senior leader resistance to a loss of hierarchical authority comes from Baum, “What the Generals Don’t Know” in which two different officers responsible for education of the officer corps and organizational learning reject the opportunities presented within information sharing communities favored by junior officers as “free for all...[which] does nothing to raise the education level of the officer corps.” Wong, *Adaptive Leaders*, 2,16-19.

officer's CCC date. Now, instead of a Permanent Change of Station move, officers attend the CCC in a temporary duty status then return to their unit. Unfortunately, unit commanders are defaulting to operational requirements in lieu of PME opportunities. As of this writing, 45percent of the active duty officers eligible for the Captain's Career Course have not attended.⁸⁵

Proponents of ARFORGEN, the 36 month unit life-cycle manning initiative, and unit stabilization program for active component BCT's advocate that the cyclical nature of the system better facilitates educational opportunities.⁸⁶ When fully implemented, the system provides unit commanders with the ability to release leaders for schooling opportunities during the reset and train phase. However, units currently do not enjoy 24 months between operational deployments as depicted under the ARFORGEN concept. Instead, units return from operational deployments, reset and immediately begin training for redeployment within a year. Thus, units and junior leaders experience a very limited operational pause. Based on the fact noted above regarding CCC attendance, units are not sending leaders to school opportunities even when a small window of opportunity exists. Such a discrepancy is not only short sighted; it also belittles the importance of formal education on an officer's total development and future operational deployments.

Assuming short-term operational risk pays dividends in two areas involving both the unit and the individual officer. Vacant leadership positions provide units the opportunity to develop greater responsibility and abilities within more junior leaders and soldiers. Retired Lieutenant General Hal Moore related the importance of having, "every man trained for and capable of taking over the job of the man above him" by implementing leader reaction drills which took leaders out of action during field exercises and placed junior leaders in their place in order to

⁸⁵ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 600-XX, The New Manning System-Force Stabilization, Final Coordinating Draft*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 7 October 2004), 25, available on AKO from: TRADOC/Schools/Signal Center/Symposium/2004/Workshops/Warrant Officer/Read Ahead/Publications; accessed on 27 January 2006; Information regarding attendance at the Captains' Career Course was obtained through the author's contact via phone and email with U.S. Department of the Army, Human Resources Command on 05 January 2006.

⁸⁶ Non-attribution interview with a senior Army leader within TRADOC responsible for

learn the job.⁸⁷ In many cases, advanced civil schooling provided officers now occupying significant leadership positions within the Army key developmental opportunities. In a recent presentation to students at the School for Advanced Military Studies, one Lieutenant General remarked that graduate school provided one of two experiences that best prepared him for the challenges he faced later during combat and SRO as a division commander.⁸⁸

Thus, contrary to doctrine, one sees that a division commander has the potential to play a significant role in the development of company-grade officers. Senior leader involvement at the division level helps overcome inexperience at the critical echelon during the conduct of SRO. Further involvement overrides bureaucratic processes put in place for a peacetime Army. Finally, involvement overcomes filtering by intermediate level commanders and provides focus for subordinate echelon development programs. An involved senior leader provides specific and measurable intent in the form of targeted outcome goals for developmental programs, prioritizes competing or irrelevant tasks on the training calendar's 'white space,' involves community and educational leaders in the generation of SRO-related solutions, and mitigates risk by implementing changes recommended by the lowest levels of the organization and by releasing officers from operational assignments for educational opportunities.

overseeing officer education, 30 December 2005.

⁸⁷ The importance of Moore's actions became apparent for SGT Ernie Savage and members of "The Lost Platoon," who within the first ninety minutes of combat on LZ X-Ray, sustained 9 killed and 13 wounded soldiers, were isolated from the remainder of the battalion, and unable to receive support, other than artillery, for three days. SGT Savage organized a defensive position, repeatedly called in fire support, and defeated numerous attacks on the platoon position. After three days, members of a sister battalion rescued the 20 remaining soldiers of the platoon. Harold Moore and Joseph Galloway, *We Were Soldiers Once...And Young*, (New York: Random House, 1992) 23, 91, and 175.

⁸⁸ Throughout the AY 2005-2006 school year for the School for Advanced Military Studies, a number of military speakers made remarks about the importance advanced degrees to their personal and professional development. Remarks were made under the school's non-attribution policy; see also Scales and Murray, 251.

Chapter 4: Implementation—Content and Context

Gehler's next area of concentration concerns curriculum content and the environmental context in which students learn at the CCC and in which they will perform acquired knowledge. Using Gehler's model as a start point, this chapter addresses how to incorporate the SRO learning gaps into pre-existing unit professional development programs. The proposed framework offered here shares propensity of the various areas between BCT and subordinate level commanders and the division staff. Content refers to the specific information conveyed by instruction. Context refers to both the learning environment in which instruction occurs and the execution environment where junior officers perform newly acquired knowledge. Figure 5 outlines three Core Focus Areas for division leader development programs. Because learned capabilities differ between the focus areas, the development strategy differs as well.

Focus	Core Focus Area I	Core Focus Area II	Core Focus Area III
	The BCT	Doctrine and Processes (Current and Emerging)	Today's Challenges
Prepare for what role?	Integration of Combined Arms within the BCT	Integration of organizational capabilities across the Division	Deployment during Available Force Phase of ARFORGEN
What is learned?	How the BCT conducts operations	How the Division conducts operations in a Joint, Coalition, and Interagency environment	Regional orientation based on designated DEF commitment and task organization
What level is emphasized?	Squad to BCT	Platoon through Division	Platoon through Division based on DEF task organization
Basis	Doctrine	Division SOPs, Established Centers of Excellence, discussions and simulations	AARs, VTCs, visits, Created Centers of Excellence, discussions
Propensity	TF and BCT Commanders	Division	Division and subordinate Commanders
When Learning Occurs Under ARFORGEN	Primarily Reset/Train; Sustained during Ready and Available Phases	End of Reset/Train through end of Ready Phase	Begins when Task Organized as a specific DEF

Figure 5: Building Integration into Division Leader Development Programs

Instructional design experts Dick and Carey advocate an integrated instructional strategy such as the framework proposed in Figure 5 because it links previously learned capabilities with

new educational opportunities and environments. Instruction is focused on an articulated and measurable outcome goal based on the anticipated context in which the learner demonstrates proficiency. Simply put, through thorough analysis of the learner (i.e. the company-grade officer), the environmental context (i.e. the COE), the desired performance outcomes (i.e. adaptive leaders), and the instructional context (i.e. home station facilities and resources) the instructor may design and sequence instruction in such a way that enhances learning and improves overall individual performance.⁸⁹

As demonstrated in Figure 5, Battalion and Brigade commanders still retain responsibility for Core Focus Area I. Training and education conducted within this focus area is designed to create a cohesive, battle-ready BCT capable of conducting full spectrum operations anywhere in the world. The content for this phase primarily addresses units and officers achieving training proficiency on core unit METL tasks. The context for training involves units and echelons at the BCT level and below. Under the ARFORGEN construct the preponderance of this training occurs during the Reset and Train Phase. Sustainment training occurs throughout remaining phases unless committed as an REF or DEF. Very little should change within Core Focus Area I regarding training methodology, resource allocation, or planning as existing division training management programs routinely center on the BCT and below.

The content of Core Focus Area II addresses current and emerging operational doctrine and procedures across the division. It seeks to instill among all divisional officers a common understanding of how the division plans to conduct SRO in a coalition, joint, and interagency environment. Understanding the interrelationships and operating principles of these often disparate entities is critical because company grade officers throughout the division perform many interrelated tasks and missions. Learning occurs through the creation of communities of practice engaged in double-loop learning. Because common understanding across the division's

⁸⁹ Dick and Carey, 34

battlespace involves all members of the division, the division commander (through the division staff) serves as the primary proponent for instruction. Programs within this Core Focus Area begin during the Reset and Train Phase and continue through the Ready Force and Available Force Phases of ARFORGEN.

Finally, Core Focus Area III relates specifically to the division's designated regional operational area as a DEF. The significant difference between Core Focus Area II and III lies in the fact that the potential operating environment is no longer abstract but concrete—the unit knows where it is going. Conversations with the Regional Combatant Commander and staff, deployed units, and other regional experts as well as site surveys, provide divisional leaders an understanding of the tasks required of them with the AOR. Understanding allows modification of existing processes, systems, and procedures throughout the division to address specific needs. Because Battalion and BCT commanders also have needs based on the specific operational context, subordinate commanders share proponentcy for developmental programs with the division commander.

The proposed framework should not be viewed as a mandatory training task list requiring 100 percent completion in order for the division to receive 'certification' like so many of the pre-deployment programs that currently exist, "process is important, but excessive focus on process versus product significantly impedes innovation...A process-dependent organization like the Army can quickly lose the product forest in the process trees."⁹⁰ Rather, one should view the proposed framework as a way to conceptualize improving and integrating the body of professional knowledge throughout all leaders of the division and its battlespace.

Identified SRO-related learning gaps primarily fall within the cognitive rather than the physical realm of Gagne's Learned Capabilities. These areas concern understanding and using rules and symbols (Intellectual Skills), recalling and using knowledge or facts from memory

⁹⁰ David A. Fastabend and Robert H. Simpson, "The Imperative for a Culture of Innovation in the

(Verbal Information), ways of thinking and employing problem solving techniques (Cognitive Strategies), and internal choices to act or not according to accepted norms of behavior as related to the environment or task at hand (Attitudes). While teaching cognitive functions, or *how to think*, often occupies a position of primary importance in educational institutions, “it has not been easy to show that deliberate attempts to teach cognitive strategies result in consistent and substantial learning and transfer of learning...the evidence that this goal can be successfully accomplished by deliberate teaching of cognitive strategies is quite meager.”⁹¹ Only by linking the various learned capabilities together, within an integrated instructional strategy that utilizes numerous instructional approaches and offers multiple opportunities for the learner to synthesize and demonstrate performance, can education be deemed successful.⁹²

Thus far this chapter has highlighted the importance of improving individual company grade officer learning on the premise that if individuals learn better, then so too will the organization become a learning organization. In order for an organization to truly become a learning organization, it must first extend learned capabilities, particularly cognitive strategies, beyond the individual level and instill “within the organization a thirst for creativity and a hunger for challenge.”⁹³ Changes in the CCC as suggested by Gehler, represent what Chris Argyris and Donald Schön refer to as single-loop learning and do not create learning organizations.

Single-loop learning occurs when members of the organization identify a problem or situation that does not conform to existing organizational assumptions, procedures, or norms. These members then develop strategies to solve the issue at hand while keeping organizational policies and practices intact. If the organization does not recognize the need to adopt the new solutions throughout as an institutional answer to a potential organizational problem, then

U.S. Army: Adapt or Die,” *Army Magazine*, February 2004, 17.

⁹¹ Gagne, 138, 151 and Fastabend and Simpson, 20.

⁹² John Dewey, *How We Think*, (Lexington: Massachusetts: D.C. Heath, 1910; Reprint Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1991), 96-98, 114.

⁹³ Fastabend and Simpson, 21.

organizational learning does not occur. In this case only certain individual members learn, thus creating a single-learning loop.⁹⁴

One sees that changing the curriculum at the CCC, which focuses primarily on how *individuals* learn, not how *organizations* learn, only accomplishes single-loop learning. Similarly, conceptualizing a division training strategy in which new information is presented to or addressed by only a limited number of personnel constitutes single-loop learning. Individuals and small units may learn, but at the conclusion of the subordinate unit's training event, the newly acquired or expanded body of professional knowledge does not extend beyond the organization that conducted the event. For true organizational learning to occur, individual learning must become a part of the unit's institutional memory and embedded into organizational processes and practices.⁹⁵ The organization must create a second, or double-loop, learning experience.

Double-loop learning entails constant organizational adaptation to changing environmental circumstances. As conditions change, members of the organization recognize potential solutions to the new situation. Solutions are modified and implemented by other group members. Successful solutions are propagated throughout the organization. However, possible solutions may cause friction within the organizational structure and identity forcing a critical examination of organizational policies, practices, and procedures by all group members. If, after examination, group leaders recognize the need to change some aspect of the organization, to include basic underlying assumptions, and the required changes become institutionalized throughout the organization for embedding into new members, then double-loop learning occurs.⁹⁶ Developing communities of practice at the division level by leveraging technology will build a double-loop learning organization.

⁹⁴ Chris Argyris, and Donald A. Schön, *Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective*, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978) 18-19.

⁹⁵ Argyris and Schön, 19; Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*. 2d Edition. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1992) 372-373.

⁹⁶ Argyris and Schön, 20-23.

Communities of practice are, “peers in the execution of real work. What holds them together is a common sense of purpose and a real need to know what each other knows ...communities are defined by knowledge rather than task. Further, a community life cycle is determined by the value it creates for its members, not by project deadlines.”⁹⁷ Members of communities of practice decide among themselves, through the collaborative effort, what provides value. In essence, members learn from each other the best TTPs for success. At first glance, this doesn’t seem like a new idea, Officer Calls and AARs share a long tradition within the Army culture. However, many of the opportunities used by previous generations of officers where information sharing occurred, such as weekly Officer’s Club visits, no longer exist. Further, as ARFORGEN Sourcing Conferences assign organizations from various installations under a DEF Headquarters, divisional commanders must develop innovative ways to share information and gain shared-common experience for DEF members. Units must capitalize on the opportunities presented by technology.

Technology provides the opportunity to expand communities of practice and create an organization’s double-loop learning ability at an exponential rate. Websites such as CompanyCommand.army.mil, PlatoonLeader.army.mil, and S3-XOnet.army.mil provide working examples of functional communities of practice in which community members drive knowledge requirements and pose solutions to organizational problems. At these sites members share ideas, tools, have professional discussions, and make contacts with other members around the globe. The sites provide first hand information obtained from other group members’ experience. The information available is especially relevant to an individual who receives non-traditional or unfamiliar tasks such those associated with SRO.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Verna Allee. “Knowledge Networks and Communities of Practice.” OD Practitioner, Journal of the Organization Development Network. Vol. 32, Number 4 (2000), available on-line from <http://www.odnetwork.org/odonline/vol32n4/knowledgenets.html>; accessed 05 October 2004.

⁹⁸ Tom Woodie, “Learning Together: The Role of the Online Community in Army Professional Education” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2005), offers extensive analysis of the

Operationally deployed units recognize the importance of sharing near-real-time tactical information. Currently, deployed units establish secure, tactical networks sharing intelligence, operational updates and to pass routine information. However, units should also employ the practice at home station rather than routinely dismantling the network infrastructure when they redeploy. While all divisions maintain a division web-page at their home installation, these pages serve primarily as Public Affairs information sources, and not as professional forums or repositories of institutional knowledge. The professional forum established in support of the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT), provides an excellent example of the potential for double-loop learning to occur between distant organizations while at their home station locations. Created to maintain and share knowledge between the three geographically separated SBCTs, StrykerNet, offers a professional forum which stores TTPs, multimedia interviews with combat-tested leaders, and community discussions all in an effort to improve the best practices of the organization.⁹⁹

At home station installations, divisions should establish on-line professional forums connecting leaders throughout the organization within a community of practice. The on-line professional forum serves several purposes. First, it provides a communication portal connecting geographically separate unit leaders. The communication ability gained with distant organizational members greatly enhances team building and organizational problem solving prior to operational deployment as an DEF/REF. This also includes connecting members of established centers of excellence. Academics, civil government leaders, interagency representatives and military officers can all interact and contribute in the virtual community without departing their work place. Second, on-line professional forums serve as a continual

value of on-line professional forums and the development of officer education. For additional insight on see, Nancy M. Dixon, Nate Allen, Tony Burgess, and others, *Unleashing the Power of the Army Profession*, (West Point, New York: The Center for the Advancement of Leader Development and Organizational Learning, 2005).

⁹⁹ The StrykerNet professional on-line community of practice requires an AKO log-in to access

repository of information capable of recall at a later date. Previously OPDs, AARs, or briefings presented information only to the live audience in attendance. Due to technological advances, these same activities may now be recorded and stored as multimedia archives on-line. Thus, any leader with access to the division's professional forum can access the information at any time—day or night, at home or deployed.

One possible example for use as related to SRO might include: An information briefing presented by the local City Manager to discuss the various challenges the administrator deals with on a daily basis. The division DIOM digitally records the hour long discussion, also capturing any other multimedia products presented, then posts the products to the division's on-line professional forum in the section dealing with *City Management*. Any leader not present for the original presentation now has the ability to watch the SME's briefing at a later date from his/her own computer. The City Manager agrees to conduct a live on-line 'chat' during lunch-time a month later with divisional leaders as a follow-up to the presentation. The month time period allows other unit leaders to view the initial presentation and develop their own questions. DIOM establishes the network connection on the day of the 'lunch time chat' and captures the ensuing discussion threads again posting them as a follow-up for later viewing.

The presentation of information, the open discussion among all community members, and the expanded body of professional knowledge, allow the division to develop a common understanding of operational procedures, even when separated by time and space. As the division incorporates new knowledge into its policies, procedures, and routine practices it becomes a double-loop learning organization. Because unit members continually contribute to the collection of knowledge, the organization continues to learn and grow together. Additionally, the storage and recall capability allows new members to quickly acquire the same knowledge as prior members. Given the cognitive nature of the SRO knowledge shortfalls, on-line communities of

and is available on-line from: <https://strykernet.lewis.army.mil/index.htm>; accessed 29 January 2006.

practice provide the best instructional mechanism to reach a large target population, engage them in the learning process, and achieve the overarching outcome goal of increased individual and organizational learning. Once leaders have the educational background for SRO related tasks, training exercises provide proper reinforcement and practical experience to better enhance learning.

Creating learning organizations entails more than just expanding the organization's conceptual learning ability. It requires a shift in how the organization views itself, its members, the internal and external environment, and the methods of interaction between these entities.¹⁰⁰ Units that successfully cultivate communities of practice, recognize contributions of individual effort, but focus on making the entire organization better. Members have an opportunity share ideas and information, while at the same time receive feedback from their peers who are as influential, if not more so, than their immediate commander. Using technology in this way serves two purposes. First, it ensures that multiple learners gain the same information as originally conveyed without losing its original content, context, or intent. Second, information storage in an on-line professional forum provides leaders from other units the opportunity to partake in their own unit training events, for example a field exercise, and not miss other educational opportunities because the information still exists in its original form on-line. Officers can download the presentations or read the on-line professional forum 'chat' on their own time.

¹⁰⁰ Fastabend and Simpson, 16.

Chapter 5: Implementation—Systems and Cultural Change

The last area of implementation involves a Systems Change within the organization. Gehler notes, that continued leader involvement remains a key ingredient in maintaining the momentum gained by organizational change.¹⁰¹ However, changing only one aspect within a system merely starts the organizational change process. The process does not end there. Instead, leaders must address other aspects of the organization's culture in order to create lasting change, innovation, and ultimately better leaders and organizations.

Creating a double-loop learning organization within an Army division requires a change to the Army culture in two specific areas not already addressed. Neither concept is new; previous authors, publications, studies, and doctrine have addressed both. However, as an organization, the Army continues to fall short in fully incorporating these changes. These changes include embracing the importance of preparing for SRO and effectively exercising *Transparent Leadership* at all levels throughout the division.

It is important to develop a common understanding of what constitutes an organization's culture and how it develops over time. Management Professor Edgar Schein defines organizational culture as "a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid, and therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems."¹⁰² Shared basic assumptions consist of those ideas and solutions presented by organizational members as they confront internal and external challenges. Over time, the collective experience and understanding of group members, based on how proposed ideas and solutions resolve problems, becomes an embedded and unconscious belief system for dealing with organizational realities. As new members join the organization,

¹⁰¹ Gehler, 11.

¹⁰² Edgar Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 2d ed. (San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1992), 12.

formal and informal educational systems instill these behavioral patterns ensuring organizational continuity, loyalty, and survival. FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*, shares Schein's view of the importance and impact of organizational culture, "culture consists of the shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterize the larger institution. It's deeply rooted in long-held beliefs, customs, and practices."¹⁰³ Two hundred and thirty years of successfully supporting and defending the United States has established a deeply embedded culture within the Army as an organization and its individual members.

The problem with a deeply embedded culture, especially one with a high success rate over time, rests in the difficulty of instilling a need for change—even in the face of a new reality. Group members seek to maintain the organization's institutionalized status quo, barring catastrophic failure, for as long as possible because existing systems and procedures represent the success and traditions of the past and a sense of accomplishment.¹⁰⁴ The Army cannot afford to succumb to such organizational inertia, for as Fastabend and Simpson point out, "Our 'competitors' are living, thinking and adaptive adversaries who mean to destroy us and the society we defend. Our choice is quite clear: 'Adapt or Die.'"¹⁰⁵

The first area of the Army's culture that must change is a willingness among leaders to accept SRO as a critical role and mission for the organization. As such, proper preparation for future deployments requires time, effort, resources, and education. Waghelstein argues that throughout its history, Army leaders have viewed irregular wars as ugly, irrelevant distractions, which shift the central focus from preparing for, or conducting the next major combat operation against a peer-competitor based on a European model. The most recent manifestation of this basic underlying assumption concerning the Army's *raison d'être* occurred following the Vietnam War, "initially after Vietnam, the Army preferred to ignore the whole unpleasantness...The

¹⁰³ U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual FM 22-100, Army Leadership* (Washington, D.C., 31 August 1999), 3-14.

¹⁰⁴ Schein, 322.

Army's failure in coping with guerrilla warfare was ignored." In an effort to remake itself following failure in Vietnam, Army leaders advocated the preeminence of major combat operations as the primary mission in order to justify budgets, personnel strength and organizational structure, and procurement programs.¹⁰⁶ More recently, the emergence of the 'Powell Doctrine' in the 1990's, placed significant conditions regarding the use of military force in all but the direst major combat operations.¹⁰⁷

Regrettably, such a view neglects the entirety of the Army's history and the strategic reality following the end of the Cold War in the early 1990's. As Snider, Nagl, and Pfaff argue the Army exists to fulfill any role and function deemed necessary by the civilian leadership and American society.¹⁰⁸ Advocating otherwise violates Article II of the U.S. Constitution. Further, AFA SRO members recognized a need to change for senior leaders to change how they view SRO as a mission for the Army. The primary reoccurring theme provided in feedback to AFA SRO members stated that "embracing SRO requires a cultural mindset change to the Army."¹⁰⁹ In essence, the organization must change not only the way it views SRO, but also the way it views preparing junior officers to become more agile and adaptive.

In November 2005, the Department of Defense published DoD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction*, which outlined SRO as a "core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly

¹⁰⁵ Fastabend and Simpson, 15.

¹⁰⁶ Waghelstein, 291, 7, and 292.

¹⁰⁷ For information about the very open and bitter public debate between then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell and Secretary of State Madeline Albright see, Michael Gordon, "Powell Delivers a Resounding No On Using Limited Force in Bosnia," *The New York Times*, 27 September 1992, A-1 and A-5; Colin Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous" *The New York Times*, 8 October 1992, A35; and Richard Kohn, "Upstarts in Uniform" *The New York Times*, 10 April 1994, E19.

¹⁰⁸ Don Snider, John Nagl, and Tony Pfaff, *Army Professionalism, the Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century*, (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, December 1999), 9-11.

¹⁰⁹ AFA SRO briefing, 218.

addressed and integrated across all DoD activities”¹¹⁰ It remains to be seen the full impact of this new directive and the Army’s willingness to embrace it through organization-wide cultural change.

Unfortunately, the recent DoD Directive notwithstanding, the future only looks slightly optimistic in this regard. The Quadrennial Defense Review, DoD’s strategic planning document for the next five years, states that, “while some new lessons [from OIF] will be incorporated into the Pentagon review, the spending blueprint for the next four years will largely stick to the script Pentagon officials wrote before the Iraq war.”¹¹¹ While the report does highlight the increased possibility of irregular warfare and SRO in the future, it continues a predominantly MCO focus for the military, “officials say that the requirements for the U.S. military will not be scaled back or changed drastically...the Pentagon is also spending billions to hedge against the rising military threat posed by China...it is funding futuristic Air Force and Navy weapons such as the F/A-22 fighter and the Navy’s DDX destroyer, which are primarily geared to taking on a large force like the Chinese military.”¹¹² The future is not all bleak, however.

Fortunately, some former OIF Division Commanders advocate an SRO approach. One noted that the division commander’s primary responsibility always revolves around the division’s organizing principle—How the unit task organize’s and what are the areas of responsibility and focus. Further, he highlighted the extreme importance regarding the tone the commander sets between balancing kinetic and non-kinetic operations while achieving mission objectives, especially in an SRO environment.¹¹³ Another wrote,

¹¹⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, *Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support of Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: USD(P), 28 November 2005), 2; available on-line from: <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/300005.htm>, accessed 3 December 2005.

¹¹¹ Mark Mazzetti, “Pentagon Planning Document Leaves Iraq Out Of Equation,” *The Los Angeles Times*, January 24, 2006, available on-line from: <http://ebird.afis.mil/cgi-bin/ebird/displaydata.pl?Requested=/ebfiles/e20060124412955.html>; accessed 30 January 2006.

¹¹² Massetti, “Pentagon Planning”

¹¹³ Non-attribution interview with author, 30 December 2005, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, transcribed notes.

“Synchronization and coordination of the battlespace was not to win the war, but to win the peace. Penetration did not occur merely through synchronization of the battlefield functions, but that and more: local infrastructure improvement; training of security forces, understanding and educating the fundamentals of democracy; creating long-lasting jobs that would carry beyond the short-term infrastructure improvement; and, an information operations (IO) campaign that supported the cultural realities of the area of operations.”¹¹⁴

Another encouraging indicator of the Army’s organizational cultural shift towards embracing SRO as a core mission set involves the *Unified Quest 2006* exercise. A multi-faceted war game that incorporates various command echelons, *Unified Quest 2006*, began in December 2005 by conducting an exercise involving company commanders in a post-conflict environment. The scenario placed junior officers in non-traditional roles and missions requiring them to interact with NGOs and other non-military organizations.¹¹⁵

While these efforts are steps in the right direction, in order for a true cultural shift to occur, institutional processes, must change inculcating the changes into incoming members.¹¹⁶ At the division level, how the organization develops training events and conferences, allocates resources, and what divisional leaders highlight as important, informs new members of the organizational culture. In this case, a division that establishes communities of practice and centers of excellence focused on developing solutions for SRO challenges builds a repository of information for future use. Additionally, a division commander who directs and resources training events conducted specifically related to and incorporating SRO, NGOs and other government agencies, and requires participants to perform tasks other than purely kinetic operations demonstrates embracing this cultural shift. Finally, creation of recurring or sustained

¹¹⁴ Peter Chiarelli and Patrick Michaelis, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations,” *Military Review* (July-August 2005): 4.

¹¹⁵ *Unified Quest 2006* examines “Exploiting our Asymmetrical Advantage,” and will be conducted at various locations through March 2006. U.S. Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Future Warfare Studies Division, *Unified Quest* Newsletter, January 2006, available on-line from: <https://unifiedquest.army.mil/default.htm>, accessed 16 January 2006.

¹¹⁶ Schein, 231.

educational opportunities related to SRO ensures that information consistently and routine reaches new organizational members.

The second area requiring change within the Army's culture concerns incorporating what former Dial CEO Herb Baum calls, *Transparent Leadership* throughout the organization. According to Baum, transparent leaders practice and cultivate personal and organizational integrity. They listen to input and learn from members throughout all levels of the organization in an open and honest environment. Lastly, a transparent leader willingly serves as a mentor to subordinate organizational leaders helping them make sense of their reality.¹¹⁷ One can argue that Army leaders already engage subordinates as transparent leaders, however, the 2001 Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Study disputes that argument. The Panel's report identified a number of inconsistencies regarding the Army's performance as transparent leaders. The report noted that,

The Army is not meeting the expectation of officer cohorts. Junior officers are not receiving adequate leader development experiences...There is diminishing, direct contact between seniors and subordinates. This is evidenced by unit leaders who are often not the primary trainers, leaders who are focused up rather than down, and leaders who are unwilling to turn down excessive and late taskings. This diminishing contact does not promote cohesion and inhibits trust.¹¹⁸

The panel's report generated a flurry of organizational activity to address the highlighted shortfalls. However, implementation of Baum's principles by senior divisional leaders will produce a more significant return on leader development investment.

Cultivating personal and organizational integrity requires more than living ethically or in accordance with the Army Values. Living ethically and putting the Army Values into daily practice merely establish the expected baseline standard of performance. Personal and organizational integration entails operating in such a way that what the leader says matches what

¹¹⁷ Herb Baum, *The Transparent Leader: How to Build a Great Company Through Straight Talk, Openness and Accountability*, (New York, New York: HaperCollins Publishers, 2004), 32-45.

¹¹⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, *The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer*

he and the organization physically do. As it relates here, integration involves individual officer and the organizational self-concept matching individual and organizational reality. It entails answering the questions “*Are individual and organizational self-concepts congruent? Does the individual/organization really do what he/she/it says it will do?*” Incongruence between the values, roles, missions, organizational culture, and individual officers’ self-concept leads to disgruntled leaders, soldiers, and less effective units. More significantly, disgruntled leaders do not remain in the Army.

The 2005 attrition rate for Army Competitive Category (ACC) Captains stands at 8.7 percent a slightly higher rate than the ten-year average of 8.43 percent.¹¹⁹ While the number might not seem like a significant difference, the increase is worthy of a brief examination. As part of the transformation process, the Army redesigned its force structure increasing the number of BCTs and the total officer strength within the BCT. Therefore, an attrition rate comparable to previous years’ rates that fails to take into account the new force structure, actually provides a net decrease in the number of available officers. Furthermore, because of uncharacteristically high attrition rates from 1999 to 2001, on average 9.8 percent over the three year period, a shortage of officers already exists within the Major and senior Captain ranks compounding the potential officer shortage problem.¹²⁰ Wong notes the incredible organizational learning opportunity deployments such as OIF and OEF present to young officers and the future of the Army.¹²¹ However, if the Army fails to retain quality officers, their individual learning experiences count for naught.

Study Report to the Army, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001), OS-2.

¹¹⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, Strength Forecasting Department, email to author, 10 January 2006.

¹²⁰ Mark Mazzetti, “Army’s Rising Promotion Rate Called Ominous,” *The Los Angeles Times*, January 30, 2006; available on-line from: <http://ebird.afis.mil/ebfiles/e20060130414040.html>; accessed 30 January 2006.

¹²¹ Wong, *Adaptive*, 17-20

An officer's self-concept plays a significant role in his perception of the military profession, the military's role for society, and his willingness to fulfill that role. If the perceived self-concept diverges from the environmental reality, the officer more likely than not departs from the service.¹²² Recent steps toward changing self-perceptions such as the introduction of BOLC II attempt to rectify possible misperceptions.

Senior organizational leaders must portray an integrated personal and professional lifestyle that matches organizational reality. Incorporating SRO into daily home-station training events and educational opportunities demonstrates organizational integrity. Conversely, continued focus on MCO with a near-peer competitor at the expense of all other training opportunities fails to demonstrate organizational integrity.

Transparent leaders create an open and honest organizational climate that involves a working dialogue between leaders and subordinates. As part of the conversation, leaders express a willingness to listen and learn from others as well as conveying personal thoughts. Donald Schön refers to such an environment as *Reflective Practicum* in which, "the student and coach achieve a convergence of meaning evident in the ease with which they appear to understand each other, finishing each other's sentences, speaking elliptically in ways that mystify the uninitiated."¹²³ Such a relationship between a senior and a subordinate does not occur overnight. Nor does it occur easily. On the contrary, the relationship requires a significant investment of time and energy on both the part of the leader and the subordinate. Trust and communication play significant roles in the development of a *Reflective Practicum*.

In order for a worthwhile dialogue to develop, the learner must place a great deal of trust in the instructor. In the beginning of a *Reflective Practicum*, the learner possesses theoretical knowledge gained in large part from institutional processes and some practical experience in

¹²² Snider, Nagl, and Pfaff, 18-19.

¹²³ Donald Schön, *Educating the Reflective Practitioner*, (San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass, Inc., Publishers, 1987), 163.

limited, controlled situations. The student depends on the instructor to present alternative ways of looking at new problems based on the common institutional knowledge they both share. The instructor, as the ‘master practioner’, has the responsibility to effectively communicate with the learner—determining specifically what knowledge the learner possesses, gaining insight into the challenges currently facing the student, and conveying the expert knowledge to the student gained from years of practical experience in various situations. As the two interact, the learner experiences, a *Reflection-in-Action*, in which he adopts previously successful solutions to current unrelated problems.¹²⁴ As the student conducts the *Reflection-in-Action*, he gains a better understanding of what it means to physically perform the task verses possessing only theoretical knowledge of successful completion.

The last area of transparent leadership comes to the forefront during the generation of conversation and ensuing dialogue between leader and subordinate. Transparent leaders have what Noel Teach describes as a *teachable point of view* and take a genuine interest in developing and mentoring others, “they have a teachable point of view...they personally act as coaches and role models, and they share their mistakes as well as their victories” telling their stories to help subordinates make sense of the current reality.¹²⁵ The ATLDP highlighted that, “officers believe mentoring is important for both personal and professional development, yet a majority of officers report not having mentors.”¹²⁶ The Army must develop effective mentors in order to retain quality junior officers for the duration of the GWOT.

Mentoring builds on the establishment of an integrated lifestyle and reflective practicum. Mentors look past fixed organizational roles or block-and-wire diagrams and instead focus on building relationships, “Mentoring relationships...are usually long-term, and the two individuals develop a personal closeness. Over time, mentors are likely to play a number of roles: sounding

¹²⁴ Schön, 101.

¹²⁵ Tichy, 20.

¹²⁶ ATDLP, OS-10.

board, counselor, feedback provider, assignment broker, cheerleader, reinforcer, role model.

Mentors usually end up having a profound influence on the protégé's learning and development."¹²⁷ Transparent leaders serving as mentors willingly let their guard down and show subordinates all their warts, their fears, and their concerns. Such transparency directly addresses and influences the human dimension of leadership.

A 2004 *New England Journal of Medicine* report focusing on mental health issues of returning OIF and OEF veterans reported that individuals who experienced personal cares and concerns, that they perceived as isolated or abnormal within their peer group, were more likely to pull away. Further, a perception existed that seeking mental help assistance made the individual weak and a liability to others within the unit.¹²⁸ However, individuals who observe similar cares, concerns, and desires expressed by others, especially leaders, become more at ease and excepting of their current feelings as "normal."¹²⁹ As a relationship develops between a mentor and a subordinate, the junior officer validates his own self-concept. He sees that others have similarly experienced all the cares and concerns he has regarding his soldiers, his family, and his future.

The Army must overcome the stigma associated with having concerns of this nature if it hopes to retain quality officers, especially among the company grade ranks, who possess incredible amounts of operational experience. Failure to retain these officers presents significant risk in the future both to fight a protracted war against Islamic radicals or a potential near-peer adversary. Embracing the principles of transparent leadership within the Operational Domain addresses these risks for company grade officers because it demonstrates integrity between deeds and words, it establishes an honest and open command climate focused on learning, and seeks development and education of subordinates.

¹²⁷ The Center For Creative Leadership, *Handbook of Leadership Development*, (San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass, Inc., Publishers, 1998), 168.

¹²⁸ Charles W. Hoge, Carl A. Castro, Stephen C. Messer, and others, "Combat Duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mental Health Problems, and Barriers to Care" *The New England Journal of Medicine* 351, (1 July 2004): 20-21

¹²⁹ Oshiki presentation.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

In September 2002, President Bush unveiled the United States' national response to the strikes of September 11, 2001. In the National Security Strategy, he recognized that the contemporary operating environment presented a significantly different set of challenges and threats than in the past:

[The] great struggle [of the Cold War] is over. The militant visions of class, nation, and race which promised utopia and delivered misery have been defeated and discredited. America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few. We must defeat these threats to our Nation, allies, and friends...Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.¹³⁰

Unfortunately, educational and training practices utilized in the development of junior officers in both the Institutional and Operational Domains have not fully addressed the roles and missions facing junior leaders during the conduct of operational deployments. For the United States' Army, major combat operations serves as the focal point for all training and development even though actual conduct of MCO is an anomaly throughout its entire organizational history. The Army must change in a number of areas in order to remain relevant and ready as the premier land combat force in the world.

The first area in which the Army needs to refocus its efforts concerns understanding the role Stability and Reconstruction Operations play in the context of the COE. As the number of operational deployments in the post-Cold War era demonstrate, Army units that conduct SRO serve as the 'norm' rather than an anomaly. The Army must also recognize the dominant role company grade officers play during the conduct of SRO. They hold this position because the dispersed nature of the non-contiguous battlefield offers them an incredible amount of autonomy in which to make independent decisions. Senior commanders, who do not have as much routine

¹³⁰ U.S. President, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington,

exposure to the local population, must depend more than ever on junior officers to make correct decisions. The near-instantaneous global reach of the modern media further reinforces the significant role junior officers play during daily operations. They have the capacity to influence not only the local situation, but also the international political situation, based on how their unit conducts operations.

In spite of their important role, a number of gaps exist in what company grade officers learn during their professional military education within the Institutional Domain. TRADOC does not currently identify SRO as part of the common core training, therefore a common educational opportunity does not occur across the total force. Instead, individual training centers apply operational lessons learned in exercise scenarios offering ‘training’ as opposed to educational opportunities. Fortunately, the Army is taking steps to rectify the current learning gaps. The Army Focus Area SRO identified eight baseline SRO tasks on which units should maintain proficiency. However, experiences in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq demonstrate that individual officers need education beyond merely improved Civil Affairs expertise. These areas include an increased understanding of Information Operations, improved intelligence gathering and analysis, and increased interpersonal skills to deal more effectively with the human dimension challenges present in SRO.

Incorporating these changes entails modification in three distinct areas of an existing division training management strategy. First, the division commander must become involved in junior officer development to a greater extent than in previous eras. Involvement entails developing and articulating clear developmental outcome goals for company grade officers prior to their promotion to the next grade. Secondly, division commanders must work through training and readiness oversight challenges presented under the ARFORGEN construct in order to delineate relevant from irrelevant tasks for subordinate commanders. Third, they must seek to

D.C.: GPO, 2002), 1.

build centers of excellence and outreach programs with local institutions of higher learning and local government entities. Finally, division commanders must mitigate risk by accepting and incorporating recommended changes from the lowest levels of the organization and by sending officers to PME opportunities. Generating 'buy-in' from these subordinate leaders creates winning organizations focused on achieving solutions to SRO challenges. Concurrently, sending subordinate leaders to PME opportunities enhances their individual learning as well as improving the overall leadership potential of the organization during future operational deployments.

The second area within the operational domain requiring change focuses on the content and context in which organizations learn. Incorporating three Core Focus Areas, each targeting a different command echelon, different knowledge requirements, and a different learning context offers the best way to provide a shared common experience across the division and utilize scarce resources. Further, leveraging technology by developing on-line communities of practice creates double-loop learning opportunities for the division. In these virtual communities, the impact of educational opportunities increases at an exponential rate because material is available to a larger training audience, it is retained in its original form from the subject matter expert, and it is available at times and locations that best suit the learning audiences' needs.

The last operational domain area requiring modification involves changing the organizational culture to embrace SRO as a core mission set and the exercise of transparent leadership by senior divisional leaders. Recent DoD directives mandate change related to viewing SRO as a key mission set. However, other organizational documents and budget decisions do not necessarily convey the same reality. It falls to organizational leaders to view SRO as viable missions which require increased educational opportunities in order to ensure mission success. Additionally, transparent leaders recognize that cultivating individual and organizational integrity leads to the development of a congruent self-concept in which what the individual and organization does, matches what leaders convey as important. Transparent leaders also actively seek to build communities of practice in which all members of the organization learn

and grow through the flow of ideas. Lastly, mentoring helps subordinate leaders make sense of their personal reality through a senior leader's willingness to openly express similar cares, concerns, desires outside normal organizational block and wire diagrams.


Appendix A: AFA SRO Recommended Consolidated Task List

Task #	Task
Task 1	Assess, repair and reconstruct critical infrastructure
	Coordinate, synchronize, command and control reconstruction of critical infrastructure
	Plan, coordinate and manage contracts associated with improving infrastructure
	Mobilize civilian capabilities in support of UEy (USACE, IMA, Defense Contracting Command) for reach back or deployment on a contingency basis
	Integrate government and non-government agency's efforts in infrastructure critical response (e.g., FEMA)
	Leverage DoD and USG engineering capacity
	Synchronize DoD capabilities required for infrastructure reconstruction (e.g., Red Horse, Seabees)
	Transition reconstruction projects to local labor and/or contractors
Task 2	Minimize immediate threat to the affected populace and enable transition to broader humanitarian operations
	Manage refugees and IDPs
	Secure and distribute emergency food aid and water
	Prevent or react to medical disaster
	Provide emergency shelter
	Encourage communication with NGO/IO/ PVOs
	Prevent or react to environmental disasters (manmade or natural)
Task 3	Provide command and control for S&RO (includes coordination with OGA and NGO)
	Integrate military, IA, NGO efforts
	Design and implement C2 architecture
	Coordinate S&RO efforts across the JIM environment
	Integrate CMO vertically and horizontally through each echelon
	Conduct Full Spectrum C2
	Develop metrics for evaluating S&RO environment

Task #	Task
Task 4	Facilitate orderly transition to indigenous security forces
	Establish C2 among security forces
	Disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate combatants (DDR)
	Monitor and analyze internal and cross-border movements
	ROTE indigenous security forces
	Protect key infrastructure, individuals,
Task 5	Support transition to accountable self-governance
	Establish and conduct military government until civilian authority or government can be restored
	Integrate DoD / IA resources to help plan and develop emergency / transitional local governance (e.g., IMA, USACE, S/CRS)
	Develop metrics for evaluating progress toward accountable self-governance
	Support elections
	Assess the influence on culture, religion, politics, and economics on government systems
Task 6	Support the development of culturally appropriate institutional systems (e.g., judicial, corrections, police, civil administration)
	Recruit, organize, train, and equip indigenous civil servants
	Provide technical assistance (e.g., administrators, infrastructure, information systems)
	Identify and integrate other DoD resources to help plan and develop transitional local institutions (e.g., IMA, USACE, DOS, DOE)
	Execute missions with sensitivity to the cultural environment
	Support institutions and initiatives to endorse human rights
Task 7	Set conditions for and support economic development
	Assess situation to determine immediate economic needs and high-payoff priorities
	Pay host nation government and military employees
	Generate local employment for the indigenous population to enhance security
	Seize, secure, and account for illicit funds

Task #	Task
Task 8	Support DoD and RCC effort to amplify indigenous voices...
	Nest IO effects from tactical to strategic levels
	Evaluate the impacts of all operations in the informational domain
	Assess population's perception of the legitimacy of institutional systems
	Identify and assess influential indigenous voices
	Support establishment or restoration of information mediums
	Coordinate IO, PA, PSYOP, and CA efforts
	Integrate lethal and non-lethal processes
	Plan, conduct, and assess IO to gain support of target audiences

Appendix B: Comparison of Models



Appendix C: Possible Outcome Goal Statement

The Outcome Goal answers the questions: *What must a Captain be able to do by the time he/she is promoted to Major in this unit?*

Captains within this division are capable of conducting full-spectrum operations at the company level either independently or as part of a combined, joint, or coalition force anywhere in the world. They are masters of company level operations able to technically and tactically employ their organization in accordance with its capabilities; as experts in small-unit, direct level leadership they demonstrate mastery in troop leading procedures, coordination, maintenance, administration, and logistical support at the company and battalion level; they are capable of planning, organizing, resourcing and executing training programs at the company level in accordance with the Army Training Management System; they have an in-depth understanding of tactics and combined arms operations at the brigade level and below and can readily integrate into a joint, coalition, or interagency environment; they are knowledgeable of the challenges inherent in Stability and Reconstruction Operations and are capable of organizing and leading their unit to provide initial security, assessment, and oversight in such situations until transfer to another agency occurs; serving as staff officers at the battalion, brigade, or division level they demonstrate expertise, adaptability and flexibility in their specific branch or functional area; they are knowledgeable of the requirements to alert, marshal, and deploy their unit in support of expected or contingency operations; they understand the impact of information operations on military actions and civilians both at home and abroad; at all times, they uphold and enforce ethical, moral, and legal standards; and they take a personal interest in the development of their subordinates and prepare them for future responsibilities.

Appendix D: Unit Locations, Metropolitan Areas, and Institutions of Higher Learning

Unit	Home Station	Local Metropolitan Area Distance (Miles) /Population	Local University (Distance)
1st Armored Division	Fort Bliss, TX	El Paso, TX <5/700,000	- University of Texas-El Paso (< 5 Miles) - Main Campus University of New Mexico (41 Miles)
1st Cavalry Division & 3rd Cavalry Regiment	Fort Hood, TX	- Killeen, TX <5/96,943 - Austin, TX 57/656,562	- Baylor University (52 Miles) - University of Texas-Austin (57 Miles) - Tarleton State University of Central Texas* (Branch @ Ft. Hood)
1st Infantry Division	Fort Riley, KS	- Manhattan, KS 15/47,916 - Wichita, KS 103/344,284 - Kansas City, KS & MO 116/588,411	Kansas State University* (14.25 Miles)
	Fort Knox, KY	Louisville, KY 27/256,231	- University of Louisville (27 Miles) - Sullivan University (Branch @ Ft. Knox)
2nd Infantry Division	Camp Red Cloud, Republic of Korea	Uijeongbu, Korea <5/417,915	Kyungmin College
	Fort Lewis, WA	Tacoma, WA 12.5/196,094	University of Washington-Tacoma (12 miles)
3rd Infantry Division	Fort Stewart, GA	Savannah, GA (33/131,510)	- Armstrong Atlantic State* (33 miles) - Savannah State (33 miles)
	Fort Benning, GA	- Columbus, GA (7/185,781) - Atlanta, GA (101/486,474)	- Columbus State* (5 miles) - Georgia Tech (102 miles) - Auburn University (39 miles)

Unit	Home Station	Local Metropolitan Area Distance (Miles) /Population	Local University (Distance)
4th Infantry Division	Fort Carson, CO	• Colorado Springs, CO (7/360,890)	• United States Air Force Academy (22 miles)* • University of Colorado at Colorado Springs (8 miles)
10th Mountain Division	Fort Drum, NY	• Syracuse, NY (75/147,306) • Rochester, NY (125/219,773)	• Syracuse University (75 miles) • University of Rochester (125 miles)
	Fort Polk, LA	• Shreveport, LA (106/200,145)	• Louisiana State University-Shreveport (95 miles) • Lamar University-Beaumont (95 miles) • Grambling State University (108 miles)
25th Infantry Division	Schofield Barracks, HI	• Honolulu, HA (25/371,657)	• Hawaii Pacific University (20 miles)* • University of Hawaii-Manoa
	Forts Wainwright & Richardson, AK	• Fairbanks, AK (<5/30,224) • Anchorage, AK (<5/260,283)	• University of Alaska-Fairbanks (<10 miles) • University of Alaska-Anchorage (<10 miles) • Alaska Pacific University (<10 miles)
82nd Airborne Division	Fort Bragg, N.C.	• Fayetteville, N.C. (<10/121,015)	• North Carolina State University-Raleigh (55 miles) • University of North Carolina-Pembroke (32 miles)
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)	Fort Campbell, KY	• Clarksville, TN (<10/103,455) • Nashville, TN (60/545,524)	• Austin Peay State University* (10 miles) • Tennessee State University (55 miles) • Vanderbilt University (57 miles) • Murray State University (58 miles)

Unit	Home Station	Local Metropolitan Area Distance (Miles) /Population	Local University (Distance)
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Fort Irwin, CA	• Las Vegas, NV (100/478,434) • Barstow, CA (40/21,119) • San Bernardino, CA (95/185,401) • Riverside, CA (108/255,166)	• University of Nevada-Las Vegas (100 miles) • California State University-San Bernardino (95 miles)

Table Notes:

1. Information in the table represents final unit locations based on the 2005 Base and Realignment Commission Report and the Army's Transformation Roadmap. Information on unit locations collected from <http://www.army.mil/modularforces>; accessed on 12 January 2006.
2. Information on city locations, population, and local universities collected from City-Data.Com. Available from <http://www.city-data.com>; accessed on 12 January 2006.
3. Universities selected only have graduate or doctorate degree programs related to the AFA SRO Baseline Task List and nation-building activities.
4. Universities annotated with a (*) already conduct educational exchange programs with the military, mostly affiliated with on-post education centers.

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