

CBO PAPER

MAKING PEACE WHILE
STAYING READY FOR WAR:
THE CHALLENGES OF
U.S. MILITARY PARTICIPATION
IN PEACE OPERATIONS

December 1999



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PREFACE

In recent years, the U.S. military has contributed more and more forces and funding to operations designed to provide humanitarian assistance or keep the peace. The United States' growing role in peace operations worldwide raises two major concerns: how well prepared are U.S. troops to participate in such operations, and how does that participation affect their ability to fulfill their primary mission—to fight and win two major regional wars that break out nearly simultaneously?

This Congressional Budget Office (CBO) paper reviews U.S. contributions to peace operations and examines the challenges that the military faces in carrying out those operations while trying to stay ready for conventional war. The analysis looks at how the Army and Marine Corps have responded to those challenges and examines four alternative approaches that the Army, in particular, could take to improve its ability to perform both missions. The paper responds to a request from the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. In keeping with CBO's mandate to provide objective and nonpartisan analysis, it contains no recommendations.

Laurinda Zeman of CBO's National Security Division prepared the paper with the assistance of Delia Welsh and the supervision of Christopher Jehn and R. William Thomas. Former CBO analysts Frances Lussier, Neil Singer, and Elizabeth Stanley performed much of the analysis and wrote earlier drafts of the paper. Jo Ann Vines, Jeannette Deshong, and Matthew Martin of CBO's Budget Analysis Division performed the cost analysis under the supervision of Michael Miller. Marvin M. Smith thoroughly reviewed the manuscript before publication. The authors would also like to thank the numerous people from the Army, the Marine Corps, RAND, and the Army's Peacekeeping Institute who provided essential information and comments. Of course, all responsibility for the analysis lies with the authors and CBO.

Christian Spoor edited the manuscript, and Sherry Snyder proofread it. Kathryn Quattrone produced the figures, Cindy Cleveland prepared the paper for publication, and Laurie Brown prepared the electronic versions for CBO's World Wide Web site (www.cbo.gov).

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SUMMARY

In the past decade, U.S. military forces have deployed more frequently to operations other than war. Those operations include missions to provide humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, or the forced cessation of hostilities in areas of conflict. Geopolitical changes and shifts in U.S. foreign and security policies since the end of the Cold War—combined with the U.S. military’s ability to project power around the globe—may have contributed to the growing role for the United States in peace operations worldwide. And as the nation’s role has grown, so has the amount it spends on such operations.

The U.S. military’s increasingly frequent involvement in peace operations raises two key questions. First, are U.S. forces well structured and prepared to meet the challenges involved in carrying out those operations on a routine basis? A military that is designed for conventional war may have trouble continually performing other missions. In particular, it may have trouble providing the right kinds of forces in the required numbers, at the right time, and with the necessary training and equipment for peace operations.

Second, does participating in peace operations detract from the ability of U.S. forces to carry out their primary mission—fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous major theater wars? This question is a relatively recent one. During the Cold War, military planners assumed that forces capable of defending Europe against Soviet aggression would be more than adequate to meet U.S. commitments elsewhere without significantly affecting the military’s ability to perform its primary conventional mission. But lately, signs have emerged that peace missions could be taking a toll on the military’s ability to pay for routine operations, maintain the combat skills needed for conventional wars, and keep its equipment and personnel ready and available for such wars.

Those challenges are of particular concern to the Army, which provides the majority of funding for peace operations and thousands of ground troops to take part in them. In this analysis, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) examines four options for restructuring or expanding the active-duty Army to improve its ability to conduct peace operations while staying ready for conventional war. Those options are by no means the only possibilities that exist. Rather, they illustrate the main types of approaches that the Army could consider.

U.S. MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS

During the Cold War, the U.N. Security Council rarely approved the creation of peace operations. The United Nations implemented only 13 such operations between 1948 and 1978, and none at all from 1979 to 1987. Since 1988, by contrast, 38 peace operations have been established—nearly three times as many as in the previous 40 years.

The U.S. contribution to international peace operations, in both military forces and funds, has risen dramatically during that period. Major deployments of U.S. forces have increased in both frequency and size, reaching roughly 50,000 troops last year (see Summary Figure 1). At the same time, U.S. funding for peace operations has grown substantially—from less than \$100 million in 1988 to almost \$4 billion 10 years later (see Summary Figure 2). That funding is provided through several vehicles: contributions to the United Nations for peace operations, funding to carry out other international peace missions outside the United Nations' aegis, and appropriations for the Department of Defense (DoD) to support the use of its forces in peace operations.


HOW WELL PREPARED ARE THE ARMY AND MARINE CORPS FOR PEACE OPERATIONS?

Forces from all of the U.S. military services have taken part in peace missions, but this paper focuses on the ground forces of the Army and Marine Corps. Those two services often play similar roles in peace operations and face similar challenges in preparing for and participating in them. The fundamental differences in their purposes and operational structures affect how the two services respond to those challenges.

Differences Between the Marine Corps and the Army

The Marine Corps's primary purpose is to be ready to respond rapidly to crises around the world. The main tool it uses for rapid response is the Marine expeditionary unit (MEU). A MEU normally has a strength of about 2,200 personnel and is built around a reinforced infantry battalion, a squadron of aircraft, and a service-support group. It requires three to five naval amphibious ships to deploy. The Marine Corps follows a rotation schedule that usually keeps three MEUs deployed around the world at any given time. MEUs have taken part in numerous peace operations, including those in Lebanon, Iraq and Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

SUMMARY FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF U.S. FORCES DEPLOYED TO MAJOR PEACE OPERATIONS, CALENDAR YEARS 1982-1998




SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Nina M. Serafino, *Military Interventions by U.S. Forces from Vietnam to Bosnia: Background, Outcomes, and "Lessons Learned" for Kosovo*, CRS Report for Congress RL30184 (Congressional Research Service, May 20, 1999); Richard F. Grimmett, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1999*, CRS Report for Congress RL30172 (Congressional Research Service, May 17, 1999); General Accounting Office, *Peacekeeping: Assessment of U.S. Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers*, GAO/NSIAD-95-113 (August 1995); General Accounting Office, *Military Operations: Impact of Operations Other Than War on the Services Varies*, GAO/NSIAD-99-69 (May 1999); Alfred B. Prados, *Iraq Crisis: U.S. and Allied Forces*, CRS Report for Congress 98-120 F (Congressional Research Service, September 2, 1998); Maureen Taft-Morales, *Haiti Under President Preval: Issues for Congress*, CRS Issue Brief IB96019 (Congressional Research Service, April 15, 1999); Stephen Daggett, *Bosnia Peacekeeping: An Assessment of Administration Cost Estimates*, CRS Report for Congress 95-1165 F (Congressional Research Service, December 4, 1995); Robert L. Goldich and John C. Schaefer, *U.S. Military Operations, 1965-1994 (Not Including Vietnam): Data on Casualties, Decorations, and Personnel Involved*, CRS Report for Congress 94-529 F (Congressional Research Service, June 27, 1994); General Accounting Office, *Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and Transition Strategy of NATO's Stabilization Force*, GAO/NSIAD-99-19 (October 1998); General Accounting Office, *Bosnia: Military Services Providing Needed Capabilities but a Few Challenges Emerging*, GAO/NSIAD-98-160 (April 1998); and Theodoros S. Dagne, *Somalia: Prospects for Peace and U.S. Involvement*, CRS Report for Congress RL30065 (Congressional Research Service, February 17, 1999).

The primary purpose of the Army, by contrast, is to fight and win the nation's wars. It does not routinely deploy forces according to a schedule. Instead, the Army responds to each peace operation separately, putting together a package of deploying forces to meet the specific mission. That package is typically built around a core combat unit, which serves as the staff headquarters to coordinate operations; additional support units are attached as needed for the particular mission. Army forces have taken part in many peace operations, including those in the Sinai, Iraq and Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Macedonia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

The Challenges of Participating in Peace Operations

As the number of peace operations involving U.S. forces has increased, so has the complexity of those operations. Today's peace missions are apt to involve such tasks as supervising elections, protecting specified safe areas, interacting extensively with

SUMMARY FIGURE 2. U.S. FUNDING FOR PEACE OPERATIONS, FISCAL YEARS 1981-1998



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Stephen Daggett and Nina M. Serafino, *Costs of Major U.S. Wars and Recent U.S. Overseas Military Operations*, CRS Report for Congress 94-995 F (Congressional Research Service, May 5, 1997); Nina M. Serafino, *Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement*, CRS Issue Brief IB94040 (Congressional Research Service, September 13, 1999); Nina M. Serafino, *The U.S. Military in International Peacekeeping: The Funding Mechanism*, CRS Report for Congress 94-95 F (Congressional Research Service, February 8, 1994); General Accounting Office, *Peacekeeping: Assessment of U.S. Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers*, GAO/NSIAD-95-113 (August 1995); and Marjorie Ann Browne, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress*, CRS Issue Brief IB90103 (Congressional Research Service, August 20, 1999).

local people, guarding surrendered weapons, ensuring the safe delivery of food supplies, and helping rebuild government agencies or police forces. Many of those tasks are far removed from the ones U.S. forces expect to perform during conventional warfare. The Army and Marine Corps face five major challenges in preparing for such missions: readying personnel for deployment, providing enough of the right kinds of forces, using reservists, training personnel sufficiently for peace operations, and providing the necessary equipment and supplies.

Readying Personnel for Deployment. The Army has had trouble providing units that have a full complement of personnel for some peace operations. During peacetime, Army units are often staffed below the level required for deployment, with personnel constantly coming and going for leave, school or other training, and scheduled job rotations. If a unit has to deploy on relatively short notice, it can borrow personnel from nondeploying units. But those depleted units in turn can suffer a decline in readiness, and the loaned soldiers may not be suited to the positions they are asked to fill.

The Marine Corps faces the same challenge but does not have the same problems as the Army because its personnel practices are geared toward routine, scheduled deployments. The Marines stabilize staffing early in a unit's predeployment training cycle, and personnel remain in the unit until the deployment has ended.

Providing Enough of the Right Kinds of Forces. Certain kinds of combat-support and combat-service-support capabilities—such as transportation, civil affairs, and water purification—are critical for peace operations. As a result, those specialties are in much greater demand for peace operations than other specialties are. In the Army, however, a large percentage of those high-demand specialties are in the reserve component (the National Guard and Reserve). Thus, the few units of that type in the active force can experience frequent deployments, which can have a deleterious effect on their troops' morale and willingness to stay in the service (retention). The Army's experiences in Somalia and Haiti suggest that several specialties in the active Army have inadequate, or just barely adequate, rotation bases to support extended or continuous peace operations. (The rotation base is the units that are available to deploy to an operation.)

Unlike the Army, the Marine Corps has traditionally incorporated rotation-base requirements into its structure. That approach allows the service to maintain its regular MEU deployments and the schedule that keeps marines overseas for six months followed by about 18 months at home. Nevertheless, the Marine Corps has also faced shortages of certain types of personnel, such as linguists and joint communications systems specialists.

Using Reserve Forces. Because the Army has put many of its high-demand support units in the reserve component, it has had to depend increasingly on reservists to help

with peace operations. The Army has been able to use some volunteer reservists in those operations, but it has also had to rely on involuntary call-ups to obtain particular specialties or fully staffed reserve units. Both approaches present problems. There is no guarantee that the reservists who are willing to volunteer for a specific peace operation will have the capabilities and training needed for that operation. But calling up reservists involuntarily requires Presidential action, which is sometimes not forthcoming for political reasons. And when it is, frequent or extended use of reservists could ultimately hurt recruitment and retention in the reserves.

Perhaps because the Marine Corps is structured to deploy regularly, it has not had to use reservists frequently in peace operations. But additional deployments or extended operations could force it to do so, in which case it could face the same difficulties that the Army has encountered.

Providing the Right Training for Peace Operations. For many types of units, particularly those whose primary purpose is combat, the skills needed for peace operations may be different from the skills needed to fight conventional wars. Thus, a growing number of military and nonmilitary officials and observers are acknowledging that units likely to take part in peace missions need additional training in the skills particular to those missions.

The Army does not have a standardized training program that all units follow. Instead, commanders choose the training for their unit on the basis of its stated purpose and expected missions. As a result, the amount of routine training that a unit receives in the skills needed for peace operations can vary according to the commander. Marines, in contrast, train for a standard set of missions, which include many tasks that might be required during peace operations.

Providing the Necessary Equipment and Supplies. Forces deploying to peace operations need not only the right personnel and training but also sufficient equipment and supplies. Army units are not always fully equipped in peacetime, and the Army has had some difficulty getting units equipped before they deploy. In past peace missions, some units had to take equipment from nondeploying units, and some did not have the kinds of equipment they needed to operate in the theater to which they were sent.

The Marine Corps has experienced trouble with equipment resupply. Each Marine Corps unit is outfitted by its commander on the basis of probable missions and shipboard space available. One source of resupply is stocks located on board prepositioned supply ships. The peace operation in Somalia exposed some shortcomings in the Corps's prepositioning system involving shortages of certain types of equipment and some equipment that was returned to the ships in poor condition. The Marine Corps is working to fix those problems, and the Army is trying to overcome some of its difficulties with supplies by enhancing its own prepositioning program.

HOW DO PEACE OPERATIONS AFFECT READINESS FOR CONVENTIONAL WAR?

Some observers have questioned whether increased U.S. participation in peace operations has affected the military's ability to carry out its primary combat mission. They worry in particular about the costs of such operations, their effects on the military's warfighting skills and the readiness of its personnel and equipment, and whether the United States will still have enough forces available to fight two major regional wars.

Paying for Peace Operations

Funding peace operations while trying to maintain readiness for conventional war poses challenges for the Department of Defense. The costs to DoD of carrying out peace operations have risen dramatically in the past decade: from about \$200 million in 1990 to over \$3.6 billion in 1998. DoD covers some of those costs by transferring or reprogramming money within its budget. Some funding is also available from the department's Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund. But DoD must often rely on supplemental appropriations from the Congress to pay for peace operations.

The costs of such operations are small compared with the overall defense budget, and DoD typically does receive supplemental appropriations to cover them. But those appropriations frequently arrive late in the fiscal year, by which time costs have already been incurred. In the meantime, DoD must pay the costs from its regular budget—generally from the operation and maintenance account. That account also pays for such things as training exercises, equipment maintenance, and basic supplies for troops, so diverting funds from it for peace missions can harm U.S. forces' readiness for conventional war.

Maintaining Conventional Warfighting Skills

Another serious challenge for the military services is trying to maintain the conventional warfighting skills of units that participate in peace operations. In some cases, taking part in those operations could actually improve warfighting skills by providing "real" deployment experience and "real" missions, thus increasing a unit's cohesion, leadership skills, and opportunities to work in environments more like those of wartime. Moreover, some of the tasks that troops perform are common to both conventional missions and peace operations. However, participating in peace operations can take time away from training for conventional war. And even when tasks or missions overlap between conventional and peace operations, the manner in which they are performed, the rules of engagement, and the goals are often different.

Army units have shown a clear drop in their training readiness for conventional war after taking part in peace operations. Not surprisingly, those units with the greatest overlap between the conventional warfighting tasks that they train for routinely and the tasks that they performed during peace operations suffered the least degradation in training readiness. The Army has concluded that combat-support and combat-service-support units suffer less degradation in readiness than combat units do.

The Marine Corps does not appear to have had as much trouble as the Army in maintaining training readiness, which probably reflects the difference in the two services' primary roles. Whereas the Army focuses on fighting and winning large conventional wars, the Marine Corps tries to prepare for any mission it might encounter while deployed at sea. As a result, the Marine Corps includes peace operations as one of the 29 missions it routinely trains for.

Maintaining Equipment Readiness

While taking part in peace operations, units need to keep their equipment ready for war. The effect of peace operations on equipment readiness varies, depending on such things as the service, the length and type of peace operation, and the type of unit.

Army units that deploy to peace operations with their own equipment have experienced declines in equipment readiness after operations. However, the units have usually restored their equipment to predeployment levels of readiness within two to four months after their return.

The Marine Corps has also experienced problems with equipment. Some commanders have been reluctant to lend out their troops to clean, recondition, and return equipment borrowed from prepositioned supply ships. And in some instances, after returned equipment was clean and ready to be loaded onto those ships, commanders sent their mechanics to remove parts in order to improve the readiness of their own similar equipment.

Managing Personnel Readiness

Another major problem that the services face is managing personnel readiness (keeping enough people in the right places) while participating in peace operations. In the Army, deployment of a unit can have a negative ripple effect on the personnel readiness of many other units, because the deploying unit may have to borrow individual soldiers or groups of soldiers from nondeploying units. That means the readiness of those nondeploying units will usually decline. Moreover, those units will still be expected to carry out their mission regardless of their decrease in personnel,

and in some cases, they may even have to take on some of the duties of the deploying unit.

For its part, a deploying unit can face serious declines in personnel readiness when it returns from a peace operation. Any personnel losses from rotation or leave that were delayed because of the deployment are likely to occur all at once after the unit's return. In addition, soldiers who were temporarily attached to the unit for the deployment generally go back to their original unit. That sudden exodus can have a significant impact on a unit's leadership, institutional memory, and personnel stabilization.

Marine Corps units also experience a sharp decline in personnel readiness following a deployment. When a MEU returns to port after its six-month stint at sea, the readiness of its various components drops significantly as individual marines take leave, change assignments, or undergo training. However, that decline is expected as part of the normal rotational cycle. Another MEU is dispatched to take the place of the returning one, so overall regional capability is not diminished.

Having Enough Forces Available to Fight Two Major Regional Wars

Another significant challenge for the services is ensuring that a sufficient number of forces are available to fight two major regional wars. Participating in peace operations could mean that some forces needed to carry out that national military strategy would not be available to do so. Under current doctrine, if a major regional war erupted, units deployed to a peace operation might need to make the transition to wartime duties quickly. But experience has shown that some forces returning from peace operations need a lengthy recovery period. During that time, they would not be fully ready for conventional war.

That problem is compounded for the Army because of the ad hoc manner in which it creates task forces for peace operations. Nondeployed units that loan personnel to deploying units can suffer a decrease in readiness either directly because of the loss of personnel or indirectly because of the inability to train with their full complement of people. In such a situation, both deployed and some nondeployed units could be unavailable for conventional war. That potential shortage could be an especially great concern to Army planners because the Army's analysis shows that the service would need every deployable unit in its active component, and all of the support units in the reserve component, to fight two major theater wars nearly simultaneously.

Once again, the Marine Corps does not face the same problems as the Army because of the differences in the two services' primary purposes. Whereas the Army's main purpose is to fight and win the nation's wars, the Marine Corps focuses on

preparing for a variety of crises. The Marine Corps would have a role in any conventional conflict, but its main purpose would remain to respond to crises whenever needed. Since more than one MEU is deployed at all times, the Marine Corps would still have forces available to respond to a crisis if some of its troops were involved in peace operations.

ALTERNATIVES TO IMPROVE BOTH THE ARMY'S CONDUCT OF PEACE OPERATIONS AND ITS READINESS FOR CONVENTIONAL WAR

The Army could take a variety of steps to improve its ability to participate in peace operations while maintaining its readiness for conventional war. CBO examined four potential approaches that represent the range of possibilities that the Army could consider (see Summary Table 1). Each approach has advantages and drawbacks, and some would be easier to implement than others. All of them would involve changes to the active-duty Army. Alternatively, the Army could choose to rely more routinely on reserve units for peace operations. But CBO concluded that such an approach would not address many of the concerns outlined above, and the impact of a fundamental change in the use of the reserves is beyond the scope of this analysis.

Option I: Cycle the Readiness of Some Active Army Units

The Army could put some of its active units on a cyclical readiness schedule similar to the one used for Marine expeditionary units. The units on that schedule would train to a high state of readiness and would be "on call" for a specified amount of time (perhaps six months) to deploy on short notice. During that time, the ready units would be fully manned and equipped, with no personnel rotations or absences for individual training.

One way to carry out this option would be to put three brigades—one from each of three existing divisions—in the pool of units on the new schedule. One brigade would be fully ready and on call to deploy for six months. During that period, the second brigade would be training and preparing to be on call for the next six months. The third brigade, having been on call for the previous six months, would be in a recovery period, when its readiness would be low.

Advantages of Option I. The most obvious advantage of this approach is that the Army would have forces ready to deploy to peace operations on fairly short notice. In addition, the turbulence that now occurs when Army units need to deploy to peace operations would decline for both deploying and nondeploying units. For their part, soldiers would have the benefit of increased predictability: those in the on-call units would know that they might have to deploy at any time in the next six months.

Another advantage of this option would be improved training for peace operations. Since units in this cycle would be more likely to be sent to such operations, their training could focus on the tasks needed for that mission. Finally, since this option would not add forces to the Army or require any change in equipment, its costs would be negligible.

Disadvantages of Option I. Army divisions typically have command and support elements that brigades do not. Thus, if brigades deployed to peace operations, they might need to take along some of their divisions' support assets. That problem reflects a larger drawback of this option: since the number of units and the size of the

SUMMARY TABLE 1. FOUR ILLUSTRATIVE APPROACHES TO IMPROVE THE ARMY'S CONDUCT OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Approach	Changes	Costs or Savings (-) (Millions of 1999 dollars)	
		One-Time	Annual Recurring
Option I: Cycle the Readiness of Some Active Army Units	Select three existing active Army brigades; cycle each through high state of alert every six months; rely on alert brigade to carry out peace operations.	n.a.	-2
Option II: Reorganize Existing Active Army Forces for Peace Operations	Designate four existing brigades to carry out peace operations, and create three standing headquarters to lead them. (Increase size of active Army by 750 to 900.)	30	90
Option III: Convert Some Combat Units in the Active Army into Support Units	Convert one active-duty heavy division into support units.	940	-60 to -210
Option IV: Add Forces to the Active Army for Peace Operations	Create four brigades designed to carry out peace operations and three standing headquarters to lead them. (Increase size of active Army by 20,000.)	n.a.	1,900

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

NOTE: n.a. = not applicable (negligible costs).

Army would not change, the personnel to increase the readiness of the on-call units would have to come from other units. As a result, although the readiness of some units would increase, the readiness of others would inevitably decline. Another disadvantage is that if the units in this cycle concentrated their training on peace operations, their conventional warfighting skills could degrade. Those units might then be less ready if they were needed for a major theater war. In addition, personnel in the on-call units could be subject to frequent deployments, which could hurt their morale and retention.

Option II: Reorganize Existing Active Army Forces for Peace Operations

This option would reorganize four existing brigade-sized units specifically to deploy to peace operations. Unlike the rotating units in Option I, which would be ordinary combat brigades on call for contingencies, these brigades would tailor all of their training, equipment, and special capabilities for peace operations. Therefore, they would contain more support forces, civil affairs personnel, and military police than a traditional combat brigade, but they would also need enough armored equipment to protect themselves during peace enforcement missions. The brigades would be maintained at full strength since they would be expected to deploy on short notice. In addition, this option would create three standing task-force headquarters that would devote their full attention to peace operations. They would develop doctrine and recommended groups of forces and would command the forces that actually deployed to such operations.

Creating the new headquarters units would entail one-time costs of about \$30 million. Operating the headquarters and the four brigades would add about \$90 million per year to the Army's recurring costs.

Advantages of Option II. By creating specialized units for peace operations and keeping at least one of them fully ready at all times, this option would enhance the Army's preparedness to conduct such operations on short notice. In addition, having standing headquarters would ensure that the planning and execution skills needed for peace operations were practiced on a regular basis. This option would also benefit the remaining Army forces by allowing them to focus full time on preparing for conventional war without the distraction of peace operations.

Disadvantages of Option II. This alternative would have two main drawbacks. First, it would reduce the Army's overall capability for conventional war, since some units would not train for that as their primary mission. Second, as with Option I, the soldiers assigned to units designated for peace operations would probably have to deploy overseas often, which could cause morale and retention problems.

Option III: Convert Some Combat Units in the Active Army into Support Units

This alternative would convert one active-duty Army division entirely into support units. The division's existing support units would remain as they are, but its combat units, such as artillery and tank units, would be converted into the types of forces most needed for peace operations, such as civil affairs and military police units. That conversion would yield about 15,000 active-duty support troops, who could provide skills in high demand for peace operations and also help fill the Army's identified shortage of support forces.

Reorganizing and reequipping combat units to become support units would cost about \$940 million, which could be spread over several years as the conversion took place. After that, this option would save the Army between \$60 million and \$210 million per year, primarily by avoiding the costs of calling up support units in the reserves for active duty.

Advantages of Option III. This approach would make the Army's active-duty force structure better suited to carry out peace operations without relying on the reserves. And by creating more high-demand support units in the active Army, it could reduce the rate of deployment for existing support units. This option would also enhance, to some extent, the Army's capability and readiness for conventional war. The Army has determined that it lacks enough support forces to fight two major theater wars; this alternative would alleviate some of that shortage.

Disadvantages of Option III. The greatest drawback of this option is that the United States would no longer have sufficient combat forces in the active Army to fight two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. Instead, the Army would have to rely on combat units in the reserves to take part in the second conflict. Those reserve units might not provide the same total combat capability as the active units they replaced. In addition, they would need more time to prepare for combat and thus would probably not be available as quickly as active units.

Option IV: Add Forces to the Active Army for Peace Operations

The final option would expand the size of the active-duty Army by adding 20,000 soldiers in units designed and designated for peace operations. Those additional personnel would be enough to create the four specialized brigades and three headquarters described in Option II (adding the brigades outright rather than reorganizing existing brigades). Two of the new units would be light infantry or military police brigades and two would be armored or mechanized infantry brigades. Each would also have a complement of the high-demand support units necessary for most peace operations. That force could probably handle the majority of peace operations, al-

though it might need to be augmented from the rest of the Army in times of particularly heavy activity, when several large operations were occurring simultaneously.

The new units could be equipped mainly with weapons and vehicles that the Army is retiring from National Guard combat units that it plans to convert into support units. Thus, the one-time costs to equip the units would be negligible. Operating the new brigades and headquarters would cost the Army an extra \$1.9 billion a year.

Advantages of Option IV. As with Option II, having forces trained and designated for peace operations would improve the Army's ability to conduct such operations. And as with Option III, adding some support units to the active component would let the Army reduce its reliance on reserve units during peacetime and avoid the potential problems associated with frequent call-ups of the reserves. The advantage unique to Option IV, however, is that adding new units for peace operations would give the Army enough forces to fight two major regional wars and conduct peace operations at the same time. This approach would thus allow existing units in both the active and reserve components to focus on their wartime mission, thereby improving the Army's readiness for conventional war as well as for peace operations.

Disadvantages of Option IV. The greatest drawback of this option is that it would add significant costs at a time when the defense budget may not increase substantially. Also, since the new brigades would be equipped and trained for peace operations, they would not be thoroughly trained for combat. Some observers could argue that forces that are obviously trained for combat are more intimidating to potential aggressors, thus making them more effective at keeping the peace.

CHAPTER I

U.S. MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS

In recent years, the U.S. military has taken part in a growing number of military operations other than war—operations designed to provide humanitarian aid, separate warring parties or otherwise force an end to hostilities, or monitor an existing peace agreement. As the number of such missions has increased, so have the resources that the United States devotes to them. That increase reflects international geopolitical changes since the end of the Cold War as well as changes in U.S. foreign and national security policies. Because of those changes, and because the United States can deploy its military forces to far-flung locations, the nation is now extensively involved in peace operations worldwide—a situation that worries some defense analysts.

CONCERNS ABOUT U.S. PARTICIPATION

The U.S. military's growing role in peace operations raises two major concerns. How well prepared are U.S. forces to participate in such operations? And how does that participation affect their ability to fulfill their primary mission, waging conventional wars?

During the Cold War, U.S. military forces were sized and structured to defend against the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Once the Cold War ended, the focus of U.S. force planning changed. Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) structures its forces to fight and win two major regional conflicts that break out almost simultaneously (on the theory that a regional aggressor might take advantage of U.S. involvement in one war to launch another war). Overall, U.S. military forces today are roughly one-third smaller than at the end of the Cold War. But for the most part, they include the same types of troops and weaponry that dominated U.S. military planning during that era.

One concern that arises from the increasing frequency of U.S. participation in peace operations is whether the military as now structured can meet the challenges involved in carrying out such operations on a routine basis. Peace operations may require a different mix of skills, equipment, and forces than conventional combat. Thus, a military designed for conventional war may have difficulty performing other missions on a continuing basis. Other issues of concern include whether the U.S. military contains too few of certain types of units to conduct peace operations, and whether capabilities are appropriately distributed between the active and reserve

components if U.S. forces are going to be deployed overseas frequently or for long periods of time.

A separate, though related, concern is whether taking part in peace operations will detract from the U.S. military's ability to carry out its main mission of winning two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. That concern is a relatively recent one. During the Cold War, planners assumed that the forces capable of defending Europe from Soviet aggression would be more than adequate to meet U.S. commitments elsewhere without significantly affecting the military's ability to perform its primary conventional mission. Today, however, many analysts wonder how paying for and participating in peace operations affects both the readiness and the availability of U.S. military forces to conduct conventional warfare. Those types of concerns and various ways in which DoD could address them are the focus of this paper.

TYPES OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Defense planners use a variety of terms when referring to peacetime military operations. The U.S. military, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United Nations all employ different terms, and even when they use the same ones, those terms can have different definitions.

The phrase "military operations other than war" encompasses the use of military forces short of all-out warfare. When conducted in a relatively benign environment, those operations include activities such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, security and advisory assistance, arms control, and peacekeeping. Other military peacetime operations attempt to keep situations from escalating into larger or more dangerous conflicts. Conducted in more hostile environments, they can include activities such as emergency evacuations of noncombatants and peace enforcement missions.¹ The phrase "military operations other than war" can be used interchangeably with "contingency operations" and "small-scale contingencies."

This paper is concerned primarily with peace operations. According to the Army's definitions, those operations come in three types.²

- o *Peacekeeping operations* monitor and maintain an agreement between disputing parties. They occur in an area where fighting has ceased and where all former combatants have consented to a peace agreement and to the presence of peacekeeping forces. The Multinational Force and

1. Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 100-5 (June 14, 1993), pp. 2-0 and 13-0.

2. Department of the Army, *Peace Operations*, Field Manual 100-23 (December 30, 1994), pp. 2-7.

Observers (MFO) operation that has helped maintain peace in the Sinai Peninsula since Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty governing the area is a classic example of a peacekeeping mission.

- o *Peace enforcement operations* use military force, or the threat of military force, to compel disputing parties to cease hostilities. Such operations are usually undertaken with international agreement but often without the agreement of one or more of the disputing parties. The 1994 U.N. operation to restore Haiti's legitimate government is an example of a peace enforcement operation. Activities carried out during such operations include restoring and maintaining order and stability, protecting supplies and providers of humanitarian aid, enforcing sanctions, establishing and supervising protected zones, and forcibly separating belligerents.
- o *Support to diplomacy* involves deploying military forces to deter violence in areas of potential conflict and to help resolve disputes peacefully. The deployment of U.N. forces to the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia could be considered an example of support to diplomacy.

Those Army definitions are largely consistent with the ones in the *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (DoD Joint Publication 1-02), although that source does not include support to diplomacy as a type of peace operation. The definitions are also consistent with U.N. definitions and usage, although the United Nations also includes humanitarian and other operations among peace operations. This paper uses the Army definitions, except that it considers support-to-diplomacy missions a subset of peacekeeping operations.

Even when definitions are agreed upon, categorizing operations is not always a clear-cut exercise. Some operations are easily classified; others are not. Some can change from one type of mission to another over time. The current NATO operation in Bosnia is a good example of a mission that is difficult to classify. It could be considered a peacekeeping operation since a peace agreement is in force. However, it could have been considered a peace enforcement operation in its early stages since the possibility that hostilities would break out was very real. Moreover, the degree of commitment by the various parties to the peace agreement was questionable. In many cases, how an operation is classified depends on the classifier's perceptions about conditions on the ground and the parties' intent.

U.S. POLICY ON PEACE OPERATIONS

The United States has participated in an increasing number of international peace and humanitarian operations since the Persian Gulf War ended in 1991. In the aftermath of that conflict, President Bush noted in a speech to the United Nations that he had directed the Secretary of Defense to place new emphasis on peace operations.³ That emphasis included training military units for peace operations and working with the United Nations to make the best use of U.S. military logistics and communications capabilities to support U.N. operations. President Bush also pledged direct U.S. support for U.N. peacekeeping and humanitarian activities, including a renewed commitment to help fund them. Since taking office, President Clinton has continued to support U.S. involvement in peace operations, with various provisos.

Presidential Directives

In May 1994, President Clinton issued a directive spelling out his Administration's policies on peace operations. The *Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations* (Presidential Decision Directive 25) argued that the United States should participate in a peace operation if that operation advances U.S. interests, its conclusion is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria, and the consequences of inaction are unacceptable. The directive also proposed that, given mounting costs, the United States reduce the portion of U.N. peacekeeping costs for which it is responsible. Furthermore, the statement asserted that although the President might place U.S. forces under the "operational control" of a foreign commander, he would always retain ultimate command of those forces.

Directive 25 also reformed and clarified the management of peace operations within the U.S. government. One provision stated that the State Department would retain authority for peace operations that did not involve U.S. combat units and the Department of Defense would take the lead in any operation likely to involve combat or in which U.S. combat forces were participating. President Clinton also called for greater cooperation between the executive branch, the Congress, and the public in supporting U.S. efforts to maintain international peace.

Although the Administration supports peace operations as contributing to U.S. security and furthering U.S. policy interests, it acknowledges that such operations cannot substitute for the ability to fight and win wars. Former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake stated in February 1994 that although peace operations could advance some interests and foreign policy goals, they were "not at the center of our

3. Mark M. Lowenthal, *Peacekeeping in Future U.S. Foreign Policy*, CRS Report for Congress 94-260 S (Congressional Research Service, May 10, 1994), p. 3.

foreign or defense policy. Our armed forces' primary mission is not to conduct peace operations but to win war."⁴ More recently, in its October 1998 publication *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, the Administration reiterated both the likelihood of continuing military involvement in peace operations and the primacy of the military's mission to fight and win two major theater wars that occur nearly simultaneously.

Congressional Guidance

The Congress has also taken steps to clarify and limit the U.S. military's role in international peace operations. In January 1995, two bills were introduced in the House and Senate (the House National Security Revitalization Act, H.R. 7, and the Senate Peace Powers Act, S. 5) that would have clarified various reporting requirements and allowed DoD to credit certain expenditures in support of U.N. Security Council resolutions against the U.S. peacekeeping assessment. The bills would also have required that, before placing U.S. troops under the operational control of a U.N. commander, the President certify that doing so is necessary to protect national security interests. Neither bill was enacted, but they helped set the terms of the debate about the place of peace operations in national security strategy.

Since then, the Congress has codified its concerns in authorization and appropriation acts. Legislation for fiscal year 1999 included requests for reports from the Secretary of Defense to:

- o Clarify the interests involved in and the objects of peace operations,
- o Discuss the effects of such operations on personnel and equipment,
- o Define an end for peace operations,
- o Delineate the costs of the operations, and
- o Describe efforts to obtain reimbursement from the United Nations for costs and credits associated with past operations.

More recently, the Congress has debated U.S. participation in military operations in Yugoslavia. That debate focused on costs and funding and on the extent to which the President can use military forces in such operations without approval from the Congress.

4. Victoria K. Holt, *Briefing Book on Peacekeeping: The U.S. Role in United Nations Peace Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Council for a Livable World Education Fund, December 1994), p. 14.

HOW MILITARY OPERATIONS DURING PEACETIME HAVE CHANGED

Although the United States has conducted military operations in peacetime throughout its history, the nature of those operations has changed appreciably in recent decades in several ways. First, since 1980, most of the major operations involving U.S. forces have been conducted with assistance from other countries (see Table 1). Some of those operations occurred under the auspices of the United Nations, and others took place outside the U.N. umbrella but in concert with international partners. Only one—the U.S. intervention in Panama—was a unilateral action.

Second, international peace operations have grown more frequent in the past decade. The U.N. Security Council approved the creation of only 13 peace operations between 1948 and 1978 and none at all from 1979 to 1987. But since then, the pattern has changed.⁵ The Security Council established 38 peace operations between 1988 and 1999—nearly three times as many as in the previous 40 years.

Third, as the number of U.N. peace operations began increasing in the late 1980s, the character, scope, and size of those missions changed as well. More recent operations have involved a much wider variety of activities, many of which are completely new to U.N. peace efforts. They include supervising or monitoring elections, protecting designated safe areas from the threat of force, ensuring the partial demilitarization of specific regions, guarding confiscated or surrendered weapons, ensuring delivery of humanitarian relief supplies, and helping to reconstruct governmental or police functions after a civil war.⁶ Moreover, the number of troops engaged in U.N. peace operations has soared, from about 13,000 in 1988 to almost 80,000 in 1993.⁷

Last, but not least, major deployments of U.S. forces for peace operations have increased in both frequency and size in recent years (see Figure 1). During the 1980s, the largest-scale U.S. military operations were the one conducted in Grenada in 1983, when a force of about 9,000 intervened after a coup to restore order and a democratic government, and the one conducted in Panama in 1989, when about 14,000 troops joined the 13,000 already in Panama to depose and arrest General

5. That change could reflect a change in the use of vetoes in the Security Council. The five permanent members exercised their veto power 72 times during the 1980s but only nine times between 1990 and February 1999.

6. Adam Roberts, "The Crisis in U.N. Peacekeeping," *Survival*, vol. 36, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), p. 97.

7. That number has since declined to about 14,000 in November 1998. However, that figure does not include the 31,000 troops in Bosnia under the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR), which was authorized by the U.N. Security Council. For information about current and completed peace operations, see the Web site of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (www.un.org/Depts/dpkco).


TABLE 1. MAJOR U.S. PEACE OPERATIONS SINCE 1980

Location	Dates (Calendar years)	Peak Number of U.S. Forces Involved
Unilateral Operations		
Panama ^a	1989-1990	14,000 ^b
Operations Initiated by the United Nations		
Iraq and Kuwait	1991-present	35,000 ^c
Somalia	1992-1994	25,800
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	1993-1999	600 ^d
Rwanda	1994	3,600
Haiti	1994-present	21,000
Bosnia ^e	1996-present	26,000
Kosovo	1999-present	7,100
East Timor	1999-present	1,300 ^f
Other International Operations		
Sinai (Multinational Force and Observers)	1982-present	1,200
Lebanon	1982-1984	1,900
Grenada ^a	1983	8,800

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Nina M. Serafino, *Military Interventions by U.S. Forces from Vietnam to Bosnia: Background, Outcomes, and "Lessons Learned" for Kosovo*, CRS Report for Congress RL30184 (Congressional Research Service, May 20, 1999); Richard F. Grimmett, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1999*, CRS Report for Congress RL30172 (Congressional Research Service, May 17, 1999); General Accounting Office, *Peacekeeping: Assessment of U.S. Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers*, GAO/NSIAD-95-113 (August 1995); Alfred B. Prados, *Iraq Crisis: U.S. and Allied Forces*, CRS Report for Congress 98-120 F (Congressional Research Service, September 2, 1998); Maureen Taft-Morales, *Haiti Under President Preval: Issues for Congress*, CRS Issue Brief IB96019 (Congressional Research Service, April 15, 1999); Robert L. Goldich and John C. Schaefer, *U.S. Military Operations, 1965-1994 (Not Including Vietnam): Data on Casualties, Decorations, and Personnel Involved*, CRS Report for Congress 94-529 F (Congressional Research Service, June 27, 1994); United Nations Department of Public Information, Peace and Security Section, *United Nations Preventive Deployment Force* (March 16, 1999), available at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/Missions/unpred_p.htm; Steven Woehrel and Julie Kim, *Kosovo and U.S. Policy*, CRS Issue Brief IB98041 (Congressional Research Service, September 13, 1999); and Bill Gertz, "Additional Troops Sent to East Timor," *Washington Times*, September 30, 1999, p. 1.

- a. Not everyone would classify the operations in Panama and Grenada as peace operations, but they are included here for completeness.
- b. Does not include 13,000 U.S. forces already in place in Panama.
- c. Does not include troops involved in Operation Desert Storm.
- d. Does not include forces supporting operations against Yugoslavia or relief efforts for Kosovar refugees. The U.N. Preventive Deployment Force mission officially ended on February 28, 1999.
- e. NATO, rather than the United Nations, controls military operations in Bosnia. The peak number of U.S. forces involved includes troops stationed in the region but outside Bosnia who are supporting Bosnia operations.
- f. Planned as of September 30, 1999.

FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF U.S. FORCES DEPLOYED TO MAJOR PEACE OPERATIONS, BY OPERATION, CALENDAR YEARS 1982-1998



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Nina M. Serafino, *Military Interventions by U.S. Forces from Vietnam to Bosnia: Background, Outcomes, and "Lessons Learned" for Kosovo*, CRS Report for Congress RL30184 (Congressional Research Service, May 20, 1999); Richard F. Grimmett, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1999*, CRS Report for Congress RL30172 (Congressional Research Service, May 17, 1999); General Accounting Office, *Peacekeeping: Assessment of U.S. Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers*, GAO/NSIAD-95-113 (August 1995); General Accounting Office, *Military Operations: Impact of Operations Other Than War on the Services Varies*, GAO/NSIAD-99-69 (May 1999); Alfred B. Prados, *Iraq Crisis: U.S. and Allied Forces*, CRS Report for Congress 98-120 F (Congressional Research Service, September 2, 1998); Maureen Taft-Morales, *Haiti Under President Preval: Issues for Congress*, CRS Issue Brief IB96019 (Congressional Research Service, April 15, 1999); Stephen Daggett, *Bosnia Peacekeeping: An Assessment of Administration Cost Estimates*, CRS Report for Congress 95-1165 F (Congressional Research Service, December 4, 1995); Robert L. Goldich and John C. Schaefer, *U.S. Military Operations, 1965-1994 (Not Including Vietnam): Data on Casualties, Decorations, and Personnel Involved*, CRS Report for Congress 94-529 F (Congressional Research Service, June 27, 1994); General Accounting Office, *Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and Transition Strategy of NATO's Stabilization Force*, GAO/NSIAD-99-19 (October 1998); General Accounting Office, *Bosnia: Military Services Providing Needed Capabilities but a Few Challenges Emerging*, GAO/NSIAD-98-160 (April 1998); and Theodoros S. Dagne, *Somalia: Prospects for Peace and U.S. Involvement*, CRS Report for Congress RL30065 (Congressional Research Service, February 17, 1999).

- a. Average figure for 1991 through 1997.
- b. Actual peak forces in 1984 were less than 1,900.

Manuel Noriega.⁸ During the 1990s, in contrast, U.S. forces were engaged in peace operations at strengths of 20,000 or more in Somalia (1993), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1996), and Iraq and Kuwait (1998).⁹

FUNDING FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

Besides deploying more and more soldiers for peace operations, the United States has spent an increasingly large amount of money on such operations. Between 1988 and 1998, appropriations for those operations soared from less than \$100 million to almost \$4 billion (see Figure 2). The United States provides that funding through several vehicles: by helping to pay for U.N. peace operations, by providing funds to carry out international peace operations outside the aegis of the United Nations, and by allocating money directly to DoD to support the use of its forces in peace missions.


As the number and scale of U.N.-sanctioned peace operations have increased, so have their costs to the United States. Since 1992, the country has been assessed between 30 percent and 32 percent of the total costs of U.N. peace missions. The United States provides that funding directly to the United Nations through the State Department's appropriation (under "contributions to international peacekeeping activities" in the international organizations and conferences account). U.S. payments to the United Nations for peace operations increased from less than \$40 million in 1988 to a peak of more than \$1 billion in 1994, although they have since decreased to about \$260 million in 1998.

Those payments have been controversial for many years. Some observers believe that the United States is paying more than its share of the costs. The amount of U.N. assessments to the United States grew so dramatically between 1988 and 1994 that the Congress balked at paying the full assessment. As a result, in the conference report accompanying the State Department appropriation bill for fiscal year 1994, the Congress told the Administration to notify the United Nations that the country would not accept an assessment greater than 25 percent for new or expanded peace operations. Since then, the Congress has seldom authorized payment of the

8. The United States conducted the Grenada operation at the request of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, with a small group of forces from Caribbean nations, whereas the Panama operation was unilateral. Although one could argue that those operations were designed to bring peace and stability to the region, such missions would probably not be considered peace operations. Nevertheless, they are included here for completeness.

9. For additional information about operations that have involved U.S. forces, see Richard F. Grimmett, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1999*, CRS Report for Congress RL30172 (Congressional Research Service, May 17, 1999); and Robert L. Goldich and John C. Schaefer, *U.S. Military Operations, 1965-1994 (Not Including Vietnam): Data on Casualties, Decorations, and Personnel Involved*, CRS Report for Congress 94-529 F (Congressional Research Service, June 27, 1994).

FIGURE 2. U.S. FUNDING FOR PEACE OPERATIONS, BY TYPE OF COST, FISCAL YEARS 1981-1998



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Stephen Daggett and Nina M. Serafino, *Costs of Major U.S. Wars and Recent U.S. Overseas Military Operations*, CRS Report for Congress 94-995 F (Congressional Research Service, May 5, 1997); Nina M. Serafino, *Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement*, CRS Issue Brief IB94040 (Congressional Research Service, September 13, 1999); Nina M. Serafino, *The U.S. Military in International Peacekeeping: The Funding Mechanism*, CRS Report for Congress 94-95 F (Congressional Research Service, February 8, 1994); General Accounting Office, *Peacekeeping: Assessment of U.S. Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers*, GAO/NSIAD-95-113 (August 1995); and Marjorie Ann Browne, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress*, CRS Issue Brief IB90103 (Congressional Research Service, August 20, 1999).

full U.N. assessment. As a consequence, the country was more than \$970 million (in 1998 dollars) in arrears on its payments for U.N. peace operations at the end of 1998.¹⁰ The issue of how much the United States should contribute is likely to continue to be contentious during future authorization and appropriation debates.

Besides funding U.N. operations, the United States also makes voluntary contributions to help support international peace operations outside the auspices of the United Nations. One such operation is the Multinational Force and Observers mission in the Sinai Peninsula, which is an independent international coalition created by Egypt and Israel with help from the United States. The MFO has been in place since 1982. Funding for that type of contribution is paid from State Department funds

10. For more details about the ongoing dispute, see Marjorie Ann Browne, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress*, CRS Issue Brief IB90103 (Congressional Research Service, August 20, 1999).

appropriated for peacekeeping operations. Annual appropriations for that account have amounted to less than \$100 million for the past five years.

The Department of Defense also incurs costs when the United States deploys its own forces to peace operations. Because of the increased participation of U.S. forces in such operations, the incremental costs to support those forces have risen even faster than the costs of supporting international peace operations. (Incremental costs are the costs above what DoD would have spent in the absence of any peace operations.) Since 1990, the annual cost to DoD of participating in peace operations has risen from about \$200 million to more than \$3.6 billion. However, the exact figures may be somewhat uncertain because calculating incremental costs can be difficult. Although it may be fairly straightforward to identify extra costs such as imminent-danger pay, it can be less so with consumable items such as food or fuel. In the case of fuel, calculating the incremental cost for peace operations would involve taking the total amount used in a given year and subtracting from it the amount that DoD would have used under normal operating conditions—something that is possible in theory but has proved difficult in practice.¹¹

11. In a report about DoD's process of estimating incremental costs for fiscal years 1994 and 1995, the General Accounting Office (GAO) identified about \$100 million in overstated incremental costs, primarily because the services failed to adjust for normal operating and training costs that were not incurred because of special deployments. However, GAO also found \$171 million in understated incremental costs, including personnel costs such as imminent-danger pay and family-separation pay. GAO could not conclude whether the overall costs reported by DoD were, on balance, too high or too low, only that DoD's system did not lend itself to calculating the incremental costs of specific operations and therefore could not determine with any precision what costs should be attributed to peace operations. See General Accounting Office, *Contingency Operations: DoD's Reported Costs Contain Significant Inaccuracies*, GAO/NSIAD-96-115 (May 1996), p. 4.

CHAPTER II

HOW WELL PREPARED ARE THE ARMY AND MARINE CORPS FOR PEACE OPERATIONS?

As U.S. troops deploy more frequently to carry out peace operations, concern is rising about how well the military is adapting to its new role. In particular, the Army and Marine Corps, which supply the ground troops for peace operations, face a number of operational and logistical challenges in carrying out such operations successfully. Those challenges include readying personnel for deployment, providing enough of the right kinds of forces, using reservists, training troops sufficiently for peace operations, and providing the necessary equipment and supplies.

Although Marine Corps and Army units often play similar roles in peace operations, the two services approach those operations differently. As a result, comparing the different ways they structure, deploy, and train their forces can teach lessons about how to integrate the ability to conduct peace operations with the need to prepare for conventional war.

MILITARY FORCES USED IN PEACE OPERATIONS

Forces from all of the U.S. military services have participated in peace missions, but this paper focuses on forces in the Marine Corps and Army, which conduct most of the ground operations in such missions. The Army has borne a large share of the burden of peace operations. On average over the past five years, it has paid 53 percent of the Department of Defense's incremental costs for such operations (see Figure 3).

The two services face similar challenges when preparing for and participating in peace operations. But they respond to those challenges very differently, at least in part because of fundamental differences in their operating philosophies and primary purposes.

The Marine Corps's main purpose is to be ready to respond quickly to crises at any time, and its response to peace operations reflects that approach. The Marine Corps is an expeditionary force. Its troops deploy regularly, whether or not they are required for a specific operation. The Marine Corps's personnel, training, and equipment practices are designed to support regular deployments. Marines expect to be sent overseas, so they schedule leave and individual training around deployments. Once deployed, Marine forces are designed to be self-contained and to sustain themselves for at least two weeks without additional supplies.


In contrast, the Army's primary purpose is to fight and win the nation's wars. During the Cold War, that meant having forces permanently stationed in and prepared to defend Europe and South Korea. Army forces do not plan to deploy from their home station for long periods on a routine basis. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the number of Army troops based overseas has decreased, while the number deployed to contingencies has increased.

Marine Corps

As a sea-based force deployed around the world, the Marine Corps has the ability to respond to events rapidly. Marine units at sea include their own support equipment and troops along with combat forces. Those units are organized into Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs), each of which includes air, ground, support, and command-and-control elements.

MAGTFs are established to carry out specific missions or in anticipation of a wide range of possible missions. They come in three varieties—the Marine expeditionary force, the Marine expeditionary unit (special-operations capable), or

FIGURE 3. INCREMENTAL COSTS OF PEACE OPERATIONS,
BY SERVICE, FISCAL YEARS 1994-1998



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense.

MEU(SOC), and the special purpose MAGTF.¹ The Marines usually deploy three MEUs at any given time in the Mediterranean Sea, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and the Persian Gulf region.

With a strength of about 2,200 personnel, a MEU is normally built around a reinforced infantry battalion, a squadron of aircraft, and a service-support group. It requires three to five naval amphibious ships to deploy. The usual cycle for MEUs is six months of deployment, followed by about 18 months of preparations for the next cruise. Those preparations include six months of training for missions that range from humanitarian assistance to amphibious assaults. That six-month training span includes several periods of training at sea. In addition, all MEUs train to become capable in several special-operations missions, including rescuing hostages in emergency situations, interdicting ships at sea, seizing or recovering off-shore gas and oil platforms, and recovering downed aircraft and personnel.² MEUs have deployed to many peace operations in the past two decades, including those in Lebanon, Iraq and Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

Army

The Army responds to the requirements of each peace operation separately, tailoring the deploying force to meet the specific mission. Although the Army has a few units “on call” in the 18th Airborne Corps, it usually rotates deployment for such operations among many units based in the United States and abroad. Therefore, for each mission, a group of Army units must be packaged to go. That package is typically built around a core combat unit (such as an infantry, armor, or mechanized infantry unit), which serves as the staff headquarters to coordinate operations. Additional support units are attached as needed for the particular mission.

The type of core unit can depend on the nature of the mission. The Army has generally deployed an infantry unit to serve as the core force in both peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. More recently, however, the Army has chosen to send armor and mechanized infantry units to peace enforcement missions in Bosnia and Kosovo and mechanized infantry units to the peacekeeping mission in Macedonia.³ Such units provide additional firepower and protection for Army forces.

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1. All MEUs are capable of special operations when they deploy. As used in this paper, the terms MEU and MEU(SOC) mean the same thing. MEU is used for the sake of brevity.
 2. U.S. Marine Corps, *Concepts and Issues 99: Winning in the 21st Century*, p. 208, and *Policy for Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)*, MCO 3120.9A (November 24, 1997), section 8(c).
 3. Infantry units include fewer armored vehicles (such as tanks and armored personnel carriers) than mechanized infantry or armor units do.

The size of the core force also depends on the type of peace operation. Peacekeeping missions usually require a battalion-sized force, ranging from 300 to 1,000 soldiers. Larger peace enforcement operations—such as those in Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia—often need a division-sized force, ranging from about 11,000 to 18,000 troops.

READYING PERSONNEL FOR DEPLOYMENT

One challenge that the services face in responding to peace operations is providing forces that are ready to deploy. The warning that forces will be needed can come as little as a few days in advance or as much as several months. Within that time, the service must assemble enough forces to carry out the operation successfully.

The Army has had trouble providing units that have a full complement of personnel. In peacetime, its staffing is often not sufficient to keep unit readiness at a level required for deployment. Many units are 10 percent to 20 percent below their authorized personnel levels. That situation was reflected in a survey by the Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), which asked leaders for their judgment of the personnel readiness of their units. Overall, the three personnel categories in the survey—number of personnel in required military specialties, number in required ranks, and total number overall—were rated as below “good” readiness (4 on a scale of 7) during normal staffing conditions.⁴

Typically, Army leaders try to bring their units as close to full strength as possible before deploying overseas. One way to do that is to stop all personnel departures, such as for leave, school attendance, or rotations out of the unit. (If that does not increase the unit's personnel readiness, at least it keeps readiness from getting worse.) A unit commander may also try to fill shortages by “cross-leveling,” or borrowing personnel from other units that are not deploying. Army units that were sent to Bosnia from Europe, for example, cross-leveled about 900 soldiers.⁵

Although such measures may improve the personnel readiness of the deploying unit, they are not perfect solutions. The nondeploying units that lose staff will suffer a decline in readiness. Moreover, the unit that deploys may not be lent soldiers who are best suited to the positions they are asked to fill. For example, during deployments to Bosnia, some military police (MP) units had trouble filling crews with soldiers qualified to operate the units' weapons. That occurred because the soldiers on

4. The CALL survey data are based on the subjective perceptions of the respondents. The survey asked for ratings on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 as “outstanding,” 4 as “good,” and 7 as “poor.”

5. U.S. Army Europe Headquarters, *After Action Report: Operation Joint Guard* (Heidelberg, Germany, November 1998), p. 8-1.

loan from other units were not trained to assume the positions that were vacant in some MP units.⁶ Similarly, a truck unit that deployed to Haiti at less than full strength needed augmentation to fill a shortage of 19 drivers. But the soldiers it received from another unit had to be trained to drive the vehicles in the new unit and to learn the new unit's procedures.⁷

Generally, when units have long warning times before deployment, they can use the various methods discussed above (rescheduling training, filling vacancies early, and delaying moves out of the unit) to boost their personnel readiness before deploying. The longest warning times usually occur with long-standing peace operations, such as the peacekeeping mission in the Sinai. In such cases, units generally have six months to get ready, and the deployments last for about six months.

In other cases, such as the operations in Haiti and Somalia, warning time is insufficient to fill all but the most critical personnel shortages in deploying units. In some of those cases, units deployed at low personnel strengths but were still required to provide services as if they were fully staffed. For example, one field service company that deployed to Haiti at approximately 65 percent strength was supposed to provide support services at three locations, but it had only enough soldiers to operate two sites.⁸

Further problems can arise if units do not suspend their normal personnel actions. In some instances, the Army may continue to rotate people—including leaders—in and out of the unit, both just before and during a deployment. As a result, those units may experience a significant turnover in leadership. And by trading experienced leaders for newcomers, the Army can lose cohesive leadership during the operation.

The Marine Corps faces the same challenges, but it does not have the problems the Army has because its personnel practices are geared toward regular, scheduled deployments. The Marines manage personnel shortfalls by stabilizing their staffing early in the predeployment training cycle. Personnel remain in a unit until its deployment has ended. Moreover, most marines work in their occupational specialty

6. U.S. Army Europe Headquarters, "Soldier Skills—TCS Soldier Preparation," Operation Joint Endeavor Lesson Learned No. 19970064.

7. See Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions, vol. 2* (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: CALL, April 1995), p. 84.

8. Field service units provide many services to deployed soldiers, including cooking, purifying water, doing laundry, maintaining shower facilities, and performing mortuary duties.

while deployed, according to respondents to a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) survey of Marine Corps units.⁹

In short, because Marine units deploy according to a predetermined schedule, their personnel readiness cycle is in rhythm with the deployment cycle. Army units, by contrast, expect to stay in garrison during peacetime and to attain full strength only at deployment, whether for peace missions or full-scale combat operations. Thus, Army units must go to much greater lengths to become ready to deploy.

PROVIDING ENOUGH OF THE RIGHT KINDS OF FORCES

A second, related challenge in conducting peace operations is ensuring that the right kinds of forces are available in the necessary quantities. The ground units needed for peace operations are not necessarily the same types or quantities needed for major theater wars. Military forces are configured in specific ways to perform particular missions. The U.S. military is currently designed to carry out its most challenging mission—fighting two major theater wars nearly simultaneously. The forces that are well designed for that mission might not be as well designed to conduct peace operations, even though such operations are seen as less difficult.

One reason for the difference is that certain kinds of combat-support and combat-service-support specialties—such as transportation, civil affairs, and water purification—are critical for peace operations. Thus, those specialties are in much heavier demand during peace operations than other specialties are.¹⁰ Another reason is that more units than the ones deployed to a peace operation may be needed to support it. At any given time, a peace operation can affect up to three times the number of troops that are actually deployed to it.¹¹ For each unit taking part in the operation, another unit will be preparing to replace it when its deployment is over, and a third unit (the unit that was previously deployed) will be recovering from its deployment. (The units that are available to deploy to an operation are referred to as the rotation base.)

Some military and civilian leaders have voiced concern about the high deployment rate and operating tempo of military forces in contingency operations.

9. Almost three-quarters of the respondents said that at least 99 percent of the marines in their units worked in their specialty while deployed. Only one respondent indicated that less than 70 percent of the marines in that unit worked in their specialty. For more details about the survey, see the appendix.

10. Combat-support units include aviation, military police, chemical, intelligence, and communications units. Combat-service-support units include supply, maintenance, medical, civil affairs, psychological operations, transportation, and quartermaster units.

11. Center for Army Lessons Learned, *The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness* (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: CALL, February 1996), p. A-7.

Others might question the validity of that concern, noting that the average number of Army soldiers deployed during 1998 was about 28,000, which represents 6 percent of the total active Army, or 9 percent of the deployable Army.¹² However, the reason for concern about operating tempo becomes clearer when deployments are analyzed by type of unit.

In the Army, a large percentage of the high-demand capabilities in the combat-support and combat-service-support areas are in the reserve component (the Army Reserve and Army National Guard). Thus, the active-duty Army may contain very few of those types of units. Such “high-demand/low-density” units can be subject to frequent deployments, which can have a deleterious effect on their morale and retention. In the past, some of those units have deployed more than once in a short period of time, either to the same operation or to consecutive ones. In some cases, nearly all of the active units with a particular support capability have had to deploy to a specific operation. For example, 100 percent of the teams that control movement in and out of air terminals and 75 percent of the petroleum supply companies in the active Army deployed to Somalia.¹³

The Army’s experiences in Somalia and Haiti suggest that several types of units in the active Army have inadequate or just barely adequate rotation bases to support extended or continuous peace operations. They primarily include units in the quartermaster and transportation branches, such as general supply companies and water purification units.¹⁴ The Army considers deployments of more than 120 days in a year to be a strain on soldiers and their families.¹⁵ To limit deployments to that length, the Army needs a rotation base with at least three times as many units as the number deployed.¹⁶ For several types of support capabilities, however, the Army has four or fewer units in its active component. That makes deploying more than one unit at once or supporting extended operations very difficult.

12. Army forces can be divided into three categories. Deployable forces, or operating forces, are those soldiers assigned to units that can deploy. Institutional forces do not deploy but support the operating forces in fields such as acquisition and training. The third category consists of soldiers who are moving from one assignment to another, are in training, or are medically unavailable. All soldiers are assigned to one of those categories, but the actual numbers in each category change daily. For 1999, the Army assumes that operating forces constitute 63 percent of the active Army, institutional forces make up 24 percent, and trainees, transients, holdees, and students compose 13 percent.

13. General Accounting Office, *Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts*, GAO/NSIAD-95-51 (March 1995), p. 4.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

15. See G.E. Willis, “Army Leaders Seek More Funds for ‘98,” *Army Times*, March 23, 1998, p. 8.

16. That rotation base would allow one-third of the units to be deployed while one-third prepared to deploy and one-third recovered from just having been deployed. For a more detailed treatment of the relationship between the size of the rotation base and the deployment cycle, see Ronald E. Sortor, *Army Forces for Operations Other Than War*, MR-852-A (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1997).

Unlike the Army, the Marine Corps has traditionally incorporated rotation-base requirements into its structure. That approach allows it to maintain both the regular MEU deployments and the schedule that deploys Marines for six months and then gives them 18 months at home.

Nevertheless, the Marine Corps has also faced personnel shortages in certain specialties because it either does not have enough of those forces in its active component or the forces are stretched thin helping other services meet their shortfalls. One type of personnel that is heavily taxed is experts in dealing with civilian populations; they are part of the Marine Corps's civil affairs units, which are entirely in the reserves. In addition, the Marines have faced personnel shortfalls for linguists and joint communications systems specialists during some operations.¹⁷

USING RESERVISTS

As the previous section indicated, some types of high-demand units are scarce in the active-duty military. As a result, the services may need to rely on reservists in such units for peace operations. They can get access to reservists either by seeking volunteers or by asking the President to authorize an involuntary call-up of reservists using his Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) authority. Both alternatives present obstacles.

Many reservists have volunteered for peace operations in the past. Although comprehensive data are lacking, the General Accounting Office estimates that at least 18,000 volunteer reservists from all services took part in such operations from 1992 through 1996.¹⁸ For its part, the Army has used volunteer reservists in most peace operations since Desert Storm. Notable examples include a 49-member postal company that deployed to Somalia and an infantry battalion that went to the Sinai in early 1995 with 446 reservists, who made up 80 percent of the unit's personnel and half of its leadership.¹⁹

The services have no guarantee, however, that the reservists who are willing to volunteer will possess the capabilities and training needed for the specific peace operation. In the absence of involuntary call-ups, the Army has had trouble fielding reserve support units that are fully staffed. Obtaining complete reserve units on a

17. Adam B. Siegel, *Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations: Insights from Seven Case Studies*, CRM-94-74 (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, March 1995), pp. 88-89.

18. General Accounting Office, *Peace Operations: Reservists Have Volunteered When Needed*, GAO/NSIAD-96-75 (April 1996), p. 3.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 8; and David R. Segal and Ronald B. Tiggel, "Attitudes of Citizen-Soldiers Toward Military Missions in the Post-Cold War World," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 23, no. 3 (Spring 1997), p. 375.

voluntary basis is difficult because each member must consent to serve in the mission. But the alternative—molding a unit from individual volunteers—is time consuming and requires much advance notice. For example, it took the Army an entire month to assemble the postal company for duty in Somalia and to train its members to work as a unit.²⁰ Another problem is that officials of the Army Reserve and National Guard oppose taking volunteers out of their home units to create a new unit because the officials fear that the readiness of the home unit will suffer. If entire reserve units are required, they argue, the President should use his PSRC authority.

Calling up the reserves involuntarily—as was done for the operations in Haiti and Bosnia—involves a number of difficulties as well. Political obstacles might discourage the President from issuing an involuntary call-up. For example, in the case of Somalia, the Army did not get PSRC authority when it asked for it. And even if the President does call up the reserves, frequent or extended call-ups can be self-defeating: by affecting the civilian careers and lives of reservists, they could ultimately hurt retention and recruitment in the reserves. The Army has already sent soldiers from every public affairs unit in its reserve component to Bosnia. If that mission is extended, the Army could have a difficult time providing public affairs specialists for deployment there.

For all of the above reasons, the Army's preferred practice is to use active-duty personnel whenever possible, particularly when operations are of uncertain length or complexity. However, with many of the support units that are in high demand for peace operations located primarily in the reserves, it is having to rely increasingly on reservists to help with such operations.

The Marine Corps, by contrast, is structured to deploy regularly, so it has not needed to use reservists frequently in peace operations. But additional deployments or extended operations might force it to do so, in which case it could face the same difficulties that the Army has encountered.

PROVIDING THE RIGHT TRAINING FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

Another challenge that the Army and Marine Corps face is training forces in the skills needed for peace operations—which may be different from those needed for conventional wars. The amount of specific training that a unit receives for peace operations can vary depending on the extent to which such training is included in its regular training regimen and on the amount of time the unit has between being assigned to a peace operation and actually deploying (a time when specialized training could occur).

20. General Accounting Office, *Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts*, p. 24.

Of course, some units may not need as much of that training as others. Combat units, for example, perform very different functions—or perform the same functions very differently—during war and during a peace operation. Thus, they could particularly benefit from training in tasks unique to peace operations, such as protecting supplies of humanitarian aid, separating warring factions, or enforcing U.N. sanctions. But combat-service-support units perform much the same tasks in much the same way during both conventional war and peace operations.²¹ Thus, they might not need to train specifically for such operations.

A growing number of military and nonmilitary officials are suggesting that some training in skills particular to peace missions be incorporated into standard unit training for the forces likely to perform those missions. Two conferences that the Army's Peacekeeping Institute held to review participation in the Bosnia peace operation recommended that peace-operations tasks in general—and planning and coordinating with civilian organizations in particular—be included in unit training.²² The Center for Army Lessons Learned also recommends that units assigned to peace operations train in a variety of specific tasks before deployment (see Box 1 for a list of those tasks).

Although mission-specific training is generally considered desirable, the General Accounting Office has found little hard evidence to link a lack of specific training with failure to perform a task or to respond effectively to a particular situation in a peace operation.²³ The reason may be that it is difficult to assess the effect that receiving or not receiving such training has on a unit's ability to carry out its mission. A unit's performance can vary according to the nature of the operation and whether it has had any prior experience with similar operations. In addition, identifying ways to measure the success of a peace operation is not easy. Nevertheless, it would be logical to conclude that training for tasks specific to peace operations would improve the performance of those tasks. The reviews that the services frequently perform after an operation confirm that conclusion.

The amount and kinds of training that a unit needs before deployment vary not only by the type of unit but also by the type of mission it is assigned. Peacekeeping missions typically involve tasks that are farther removed from combat than peace enforcement missions do (see Box 1). Therefore, it will generally take longer to train

21. General Accounting Office, *Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability*, GAO/NSIAD-96-14 (October 1995), p. 16.

22. U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, *Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review (BHAAR I) Conference Report* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa., May 19-23, 1996), pp. A-2 and A-7, and *Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review (BHAAR II) Conference Report* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa., April 13-17, 1997), pp. 7 and 9-10.

23. General Accounting Office, *Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability*, p. 26.

BOX 1.
RECOMMENDED ARMY TRAINING FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

Peace Enforcement Missions

Fight a meeting engagement
 Conduct a movement to contact/
 search and attack
 Perform air assault
 Enforce U.N. sanctions
 Protect human rights of minorities
 Protect humanitarian relief efforts
 Separate warring factions
 Disarm belligerents
 Restore territorial integrity
 Restore law and order
 Open secure routes
 Cordon and search

Peacekeeping Missions

Understand nature of peacekeeping
 Understand regional orientation/culture of
 belligerents
 Learn negotiating skills
 Identify mines, booby traps, and
 unexploded ordnance
 Operate checkpoints
 Investigate and report incidents
 Collect information
 Patrol
 Interact with media
 Perform staff functions
 Perform relief in place
 Establish lodgement
 Establish a buffer zone
 Supervise a truce or cease-fire
 Contribute to maintenance of law and order
 Assist in rebuilding infrastructure
 Demilitarize cities or geographical areas
 Monitor boundaries
 Understand political mandates
 Understand rules of engagement

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operations Other Than War, Volume IV: Peace Operations*, Newsletter No. 93-8 (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: CALL, December 1993), pp. V-1 and V-2.

units for peacekeeping missions than for peace enforcement missions. Fortunately, units usually have a substantial amount of time (up to 12 months) to prepare for peacekeeping missions because most of those missions, such as the ones in the Sinai and Macedonia, are long-standing operations with deployments planned far in advance. That gives assigned units enough time to train intensively for two to three months before deploying. Units assigned to peace enforcement missions, by contrast, typically get far less advance notice. They may have only enough time to prepare for deployment, with very little time for specialized training, which suggests the need to provide training for such missions on a routine basis.

The Army's training philosophy for peace operations is "just enough and just in time."²⁴ The service does not have a standardized training program that all units

24. Department of the Army, *Peace Operations*, Field Manual 100-23 (December 30, 1994), p. 86.

follow. Instead, each unit commander develops the unit's training program around the list of tasks that he or she considers essential for the unit to succeed in its assigned mission. That list, known as a mission-essential task list (METL), can include tasks for conventional warfare, peace operations, or both. In designing their programs, units can draw on the Army's mission training plans, which outline the skills, conditions, and evaluation standards for the critical tasks that a particular kind of unit is supposed to be able to perform successfully.

Thus, the amount of routine training that an Army unit receives in the skills needed for peace operations varies with the unit's commander. Some commanders feel that a unit that is well trained in warfighting skills can make the transition to a peace operation rapidly, so training for such operations should be conducted only after the unit is assigned to a specific operation.²⁵ Other Army commanders, by contrast, have incorporated training for peace operations into their standard training regimen. They cite several reasons for doing so: their unit is likely to be involved in peace operations in the near future; routine training for peace operations will, in their view, ensure that their unit is prepared if deployed to a peace operation on short notice; and some tasks typically associated with peace operations, such as dealing with the media and controlling civilian populations, are likely to be part of any future conventional war as well.²⁶

Experience has shown that Army units do train for some tasks essential for peace operations (such as carrying out reconnaissance and conducting patrols) in the course of their regular training. As a consequence, some Army commanders are comfortable about their basic preparation for the tasks required for peace operations. That is especially true if their METL includes negotiation skills and relations with nongovernmental organizations. In a survey of 57 active-duty Army officers at the Army War College, 64 percent reported that "most" or "all" of the tasks required by peace operations were in their unit's METL. (The remainder said "few" or "none" of their METL tasks supported peace operations.)²⁷ Nonetheless, a significant portion—37 percent—of those surveyed believed at least one task that was "critical" for peace operations was outside the scope of their METL. Those "critical" tasks included crowd control, route clearing, negotiating skills, riot control, use of graduated force, civil affairs, law enforcement, coordination with nongovernmental

25. General Accounting Office, *Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability*, p. 4.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-21. The commander of U.S. forces in Europe incorporated training for peace operations in both home-station training and rotations to the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Germany. To help Army units stationed in Germany prepare for possible deployment to Bosnia, the 7th Army Training Command, which operates the CMTC, wrote the *Mission Training Plan for Stability Operations* and distributed it in draft form in June 1995.

27. Lt. Col. Alan D. Landry, *Informing the Debate: The Impact of Operations Other Than War on Combat Training Readiness* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, April 7, 1997), p. 5.

organizations, humanitarian assistance, and movement of small units (such as convoys with two or three vehicles).²⁸

The Marine Corps takes a different approach to training for peace operations. Because the Corps wants its deployed forces to be ready for almost anything, each MEU trains for a standard set of 29 missions before deployment (see Box 2). Those missions include many tasks that might well be required during peace operations, such as evacuation of noncombatants; show-of-force, reinforcement, and security operations; and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The training program culminates in a certification exercise designed to evaluate the MEU's warfighting and general-purpose expeditionary skills, as well as its maritime special-operations capabilities.

CBO's survey of Marine Corps units indicates that most units did not alter their training regimens to prepare specifically for peace operations. Because many of the tasks performed in such operations are part of the 29 missions that MEUs train for, those tasks are probably not seen as outside the Marines' area of expertise.

PROVIDING THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

In addition to all of the challenges described above, the services must ensure that forces deploying to peace operations have the equipment and supplies they need. Units should be fully equipped before departing and should be able to sustain their troops and equipment once they have deployed. Forces can take equipment and supplies with them when they deploy, draw on prepositioned stocks once deployed, or get supplies locally or have them transported in.

Army units are not always fully equipped in peacetime, and the Army has had some trouble getting them equipped before deployment. CALL found that some units going to Haiti, for example, had to take equipment from nondeploying units; also, some units did not have the kinds of equipment they needed to operate in that theater. Likewise, in Somalia, many units deployed without necessary field sanitation equipment.

Although the Marine Corps recommends a basic set of equipment for a MEU deployed at sea, individual commanders outfit their units on the basis of probable missions and the shipboard space available. Commanders choose the mix of tank, artillery, and engineer support they believe will best meet their needs. Since the amount of materiel that will fit on board ship is limited, by adding weapons such as tanks, a commander forgoes the opportunity to take extra supplies beyond the 15

28. Ibid., p. C-1.

BOX 2.

THE TWENTY-NINE CAPABILITIES OF A MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT

Before deploying, all Marine expeditionary units (special-operations capable) are required to train for the following missions:

- Amphibious assaults
- Amphibious raids
- Amphibious demonstrations
- Amphibious withdrawals
- In-extremis hostage recovery
- Seizure and recovery of offshore energy facilities
- Maritime interception operations
- Specialized demolition operations
- Tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel
- Seizure and recovery of personnel or material
- Counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- Peace operations (including peacekeeping and peace enforcement)
- Security operations
- Noncombatant evacuation operations
- Reinforcement operations
- Mobile training teams
- Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
- Tactical deception operations
- Fire-support planning, coordination, and control
- Signal intelligence/electronic warfare operations
- Military operations in urban terrain
- Clandestine reconnaissance and surveillance
- Initial terminal guidance
- Counterintelligence operations
- Airfield and port seizure
- Limited expeditionary airfield operations
- Show-of-force operations
- Joint task force enabling operations
- Sniping operations

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on U.S. Marine Corps, *Policy for Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)*, MCO 3120.9A (November 24, 1997).

days' worth that each unit carries. Generally, commanders choose greater firepower over additional supplies because resupply can come more rapidly than reinforcements.

One source of supplies to augment what a MEU can carry is the equipment stored on board ships assigned to the Maritime Prepositioning Forces (MPF). Those ships are cargo vessels stationed at various locations around the world that are prepared to steam to flash points. Because the supplies associated with the MPF are integral to maintaining the Marine Corps's sea-based ability to fight, the performance

of the MPF has important implications for the overall equipment readiness of the Corps.²⁹

The experience of a MEU that deployed to Somalia underscored the importance of the equipment stored on MPF ships. Within its first week ashore in Somalia, the MEU virtually depleted its on-hand supplies of various common items (such as tires for Humvees, batteries for Global Positioning System devices, and batteries and image intensifiers for night vision goggles) because of the severe environmental conditions and a lack of resupply resulting from long transit times. Since most supplies were transported from the United States, even items that were readily available off the shelf could not be requisitioned fast enough. Consequently, the Marines concluded that commonly used supplies should be included in prepositioned stocks of equipment.³⁰

The Marines' experience in Somalia also exposed two shortcomings of the MPF program as it existed then. First, half of the supporting MPF ships that arrived in Somalia carried equipment that had been used in the Persian Gulf War but not reconditioned. On those ships, bladders for fuel and water and several tents had suffered from dry rot, and vehicles and equipment were in disrepair. Amphibious assault vehicles, for example, lacked radios or feed trays for their weapons.³¹

Second, unanticipated shortages occurred in various types of MPF stocks, including concertina wire for crowd control, 25mm ammunition, and spare parts for repairing equipment. Those shortages were exacerbated by confusion about the location of specific parts and supplies on the MPF ships, which forced the Marines to conduct item-by-item searches for critical supplies. The Marine Corps is addressing that problem by improving the automated tracking and packing procedures for equipment stored on its MPF ships.

The Army has had less experience in using sea-based prepositioned equipment. Its prepositioned ships, Green Harbor and Green River, were unable to unload in Somalia because they needed a deep port and lacked the equipment to ferry items from farther offshore. After the Marines' experience with prepositioned equipment in Somalia, the Army is trying to enhance its own prepositioning program by expand-

29. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, "The Long Term Outlook for the MPF Program," Report No. 50753-27520.

30. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, "Inter-Theater Supply Support in the Central Command Area of Responsibility," Report No. 21255-78266.

31. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, "Maritime Prepositioning Force Liabilities," Report No. 21256-60264, and "Frequency of MPS Use and the Adequacy of Current Maintenance/Supply Support," Report No. 50753-23823.

ing its fleet and working to overcome the problems that kept the fleet from operating in Somalia.³²

CONCLUSIONS

The primary purposes of the Army and the Marine Corps are different. The Army's main purpose is to prepare for, fight, and win two major regional conflicts that occur nearly simultaneously. Although the Marine Corps would have a hand in such conflicts, its main purpose is to prepare for and respond quickly to a wide range of crises around the world.

Participating in peace operations requires deploying often, sometimes with little warning, to many parts of the world, which is what the Marines do as part of their normal operations. Their personnel, training, and equipment practices are set up to support regular deployments. Thus, it is not surprising that the Marine Corps has not had to change its practices significantly to accommodate deployments to peace operations.

The Army, in contrast, has suffered more difficulties in deploying to peace operations. Its forces and practices are designed to respond to larger conventional conflicts with enough warning time to activate reserve forces, staff its combat units fully, and deploy large numbers of soldiers. As a result, the Army has adapted less well to deploying to frequent peace operations, which require different types of forces and different skills than conventional combat. The many deployments in recent years and the heavy demand for support forces have stressed the Army's ability to respond.

32. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, "The Long Term Outlook for the MPF Program."

CHAPTER III

HOW DO PEACE OPERATIONS AFFECT

READINESS FOR CONVENTIONAL WAR?

Some defense experts, military leaders, and Members of Congress have questioned whether increased U.S. participation in peace operations has affected the military's ability to carry out its primary mission, combat. Staying ready for conventional war while taking part in peace operations involves numerous challenges. Those challenges include finding ways to pay for peace operations, maintaining conventional war-fighting skills, maintaining the readiness of equipment and personnel, and having enough forces available to fight two major regional wars. (Unless otherwise specified, the term "readiness" in this chapter refers to readiness for conventional war.)

PAYING FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

Some observers are concerned about the impact on the U.S. military of diverting defense funds from scheduled peacetime activities, such as training exercises, to pay for peace operations. The costs of peace operations are small compared with the total defense budget, and the Department of Defense typically receives supplemental appropriations for those costs. Nevertheless, delays in receiving additional funds and the fact that the costs of peace missions are concentrated in the budget's operating account—which pays for near-term readiness—can have a deleterious effect on the readiness of U.S. forces.

The Costs of Peace Operations


The costs that DoD incurs to provide troops for peace operations have increased dramatically in the past decade—from about \$200 million in 1990 to more than \$3.6 billion in 1998 (see Figure 4). Those costs soared in 1993 because of operations in Somalia (which cost \$1 billion that year) and because of higher costs for operations in Iraq and Kuwait (which cost \$800 million more in 1993 than in the previous year). Costs jumped again in 1996 because DoD spent more than \$2.6 billion that year to implement the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia.

Most of those expenses in the past 10 years have been associated with peace operations in five regions: Iraq and Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and the nations that were formerly part of Yugoslavia. In recent years, the largest costs have come from ongoing efforts in the former Yugoslavia. The additional (or incremental) costs to DoD of supporting operations there totaled more than \$7.7 billion between fiscal

years 1992 and 1998 (see Table 2), not including costs for operations in Kosovo. The next most expensive efforts were the various peace operations in Iraq and Kuwait, with incremental costs to DoD of more than \$5.9 billion between 1991 and 1998. Besides those major peace operations, DoD has incurred lesser costs carrying out several smaller or shorter-lived contingencies in the past eight years (see Figure 4).

Although the total costs of peace operations are not large compared with DoD's overall budget, paying them can cause some difficulties in specific parts of the budget. Most of the additional costs associated with peace operations fall into areas funded by the operation and maintenance (O&M) account. That account pays for training, fuel, and supplies for troops overseas, among other things. Between 1994

FIGURE 4. INCREMENTAL COSTS TO DoD OF MAJOR PEACE OPERATIONS, BY OPERATION, FISCAL YEARS 1981-1998



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Nina M. Serafino, *Military Contingency Funding for Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and Other Operations: Questions and Answers*, CRS Report for Congress 98-823 F (Congressional Research Service, March 29, 1999); Stephen Daggett and Nina M. Serafino, *Costs of Major U.S. Wars and Recent U.S. Overseas Military Operations*, CRS Report for Congress 94-995 F (Congressional Research Service, May 5, 1997); Nina M. Serafino, *Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement*, CRS Issue Brief IB94040 (Congressional Research Service, September 13, 1999); General Accounting Office, *Peacekeeping: Assessment of U.S. Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers*, GAO/NSIAD-95-113 (August 1995); and data from the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of Defense.

and 1998, O&M costs made up at least 80 percent of the annual incremental costs of peace operations (see Figure 5). Most of the other incremental costs were paid from DoD's personnel accounts, for such things as imminent-danger pay and pay for reservists called to active duty. Those costs generally constituted between 4 percent and 17 percent of the total annual costs of peace operations.

Sources of Funding

Funds to cover those costs can come from several sources. Some costs are paid by transferring or reprogramming funds within DoD's budget. Operations that DoD can anticipate before it submits its annual budget can be paid for from the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund. But if circumstances change (for example, if an unanticipated operation occurs or if costs exceed estimates), then DoD might need supplemental appropriations.

Transfers, Reprogramming Actions, and Supplemental Appropriations. DoD's annual appropriation contains funds to pay for planned activities, not unanticipated peace


TABLE 2. INCREMENTAL COSTS TO DoD OF SELECTED PEACE OPERATIONS, FISCAL YEARS 1991-1998 (In millions of 1999 dollars)

Region of Operation	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	Total, 1991- 1998
Former Yugoslavia ^a	0	7	152	313	365	2,603	2,327	1,985	7,752
Iraq and Kuwait	398	118	917	456	909	687	808	1,658	5,951
Somalia	0	2	1,031	566	52	0	0	0	1,651
Haiti	0	10	3	399	599	90	0	0	1,101
Rwanda	0	0	1	115	39	0	0	0	155
Total	398	137	2,104	1,849	1,964	3,380	3,135	3,643	16,610

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Nina M. Serafino, *Military Contingency Funding for Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and Other Operations: Questions and Answers*, CRS Report for Congress 98-823 F (Congressional Research Service, March 29, 1999); Stephen Daggett and Nina M. Serafino, *Costs of Major U.S. Wars and Recent U.S. Overseas Military Operations*, CRS Report for Congress 94-995 F (Congressional Research Service, May 5, 1997); Nina M. Serafino, *Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement*, CRS Issue Brief IB94040 (Congressional Research Service, September 13, 1999); General Accounting Office, *Peacekeeping: Assessment of U.S. Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers*, GAO/NSIAD-95-113 (August 1995); and data from the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of Defense.

a. Excludes operations in Kosovo.

FIGURE 5. INCREMENTAL COSTS TO DoD OF PEACE OPERATIONS, BY BUDGET ACCOUNT, FISCAL YEARS 1994-1998



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense.

operations. If the additional O&M and personnel costs associated with such operations are small, DoD may seek to cover them by transferring funds between accounts in its budget or by reprogramming funds within an account.¹ If the costs are high, however, DoD generally seeks additional funding through supplemental appropriations.

Since 1993, DoD has submitted several sizable requests for supplemental appropriations to cover peace operations, ranging from about \$1 billion in 1993 to \$1.8 billion in 1998. Although the Congress has routinely approved those requests, doing so can sometimes take several months. In fiscal year 1993, for example, supplemental funding to cover the costs of peace operations was not approved until July, the beginning of the fourth quarter of that fiscal year.

Contingency Funds. To avoid the delays associated with waiting for the Congress to approve additional funds for peace operations, the Administration proposed creating a Readiness Preservation Authority in its 1996 budget request. That authority would have allowed DoD to obligate funds (up to a certain limit) for essential readiness

1. The Congress must approve any supplemental appropriations and agree with transfers and reprogramming actions of any significant amount. That amount is set by Congressional authorization and appropriation committees and can vary from year to year.

activities during the last half of the fiscal year without prior appropriation approval.² Many Members of Congress objected to the proposal, however, on the basis that it would have loosened what leverage the Congress has over peace operations through the appropriation process.

Instead, the Congress established the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund in the 1997 defense appropriation bill. That fund was designed to meet the requirements of contingency operations without disrupting approved defense programs by transferring assets to the services on the basis of actual events during the year in question. The fund has fallen short of that goal, however. Although the Congress appropriated \$1.1 billion for it in 1997, primarily to pay for ongoing operations in Bosnia and the Middle East, the costs of those operations exceeded the budgeted amount by \$2 billion in that year. Similarly, in 1998, the costs of peace operations were \$1.7 billion higher than the \$1.9 billion in the fund.

Effects on Readiness

DoD officials contend that the budgetary uncertainties associated with paying for peace operations hurt the readiness of U.S. forces. The reason is that money that would otherwise be spent on training activities has to be set aside in case it is needed to fund peace operations. In 1995, then Secretary of Defense William Perry testified that because passage of a supplemental funding bill did not occur until late September 1994 (the very end of that fiscal year), field commanders had to take drastic steps to save money.³ In particular, they canceled training, deferred maintenance, and allowed supplies to dwindle. As a result, he contended, the readiness of three Army divisions fell that year.

The Army's experience provides a good example of how delays in receiving supplemental funds can make it difficult for the services to carry out their budgets. The incremental costs of peace operations to the Army in 1994 through 1998 represented a very small portion (from 1 percent to 3 percent) of the service's total budget. But more than 80 percent of those costs were paid for out of the O&M account, primarily out of the portion—known as Budget Activity 1—that pays the operating costs of the Army's forces. Between 1994 and 1998, the share of total O&M spending accounted for by peace operations grew from 4 percent to 8 percent, and the share of O&M Budget Activity 1 increased from 8 percent to 20 percent. Because the Army must pay for peace operations out of appropriated O&M funds

2. The amount obligated could be up to one-half of that year's appropriation for O&M Budget Activity 1, which provides funds for operating military forces.

3. Statement of Secretary of Defense William J. Perry before the Subcommittee on National Security of the House Committee on Appropriations, January 25, 1995.

until it receives supplemental funding or approval for transfers or reprogramming actions from the Congress, it often has to draw on funds earmarked for Budget Activity 1 for the fourth quarter. Measured against such fourth-quarter funds, peace operations accounted for a significant and rising share of spending: from roughly 30 percent in 1994 to 80 percent in 1998.

As Secretary Perry testified, the Army must sometimes cancel activities, such as training exercises, or defer replenishment of supplies that are funded out of the same accounts as peace operations while awaiting supplemental funds. In fiscal year 1994, the Army's 2nd Armored Division could not complete some of its training, and the 1st Infantry Division deferred purchases of supplies to maintain its training schedule.⁴

A recent analysis by the General Accounting Office (GAO) suggests that such problems have become rarer.⁵ The study indicates that operating commands have been spending their funds as planned rather than holding some back for contingencies. That approach only works, however, when those commands trust assurances from headquarters that supplemental funding will be provided. If such funding becomes less certain, spending patterns could change again. And although the Congress has been providing supplemental funds to cover the costs of peace operations, GAO notes, those funds could have been used to pay for other defense needs, such as readiness and modernization, if the costs of peace operations had been lower.

Defense analysts disagree about how severe a squeeze unanticipated contingencies place on DoD's operating funds. At least one expert has argued that, given the size of the defense budget, there should be ample room to accommodate the costs of contingencies, which usually represent no more than about 1 percent of that budget. An opposing view says that paying for contingencies seriously detracts from DoD's ability to modernize and train its forces. Two opinion pieces published in succeeding issues of *Defense News*, each by a former high-ranking official in the executive branch, clearly delineate the opposing arguments about the impact of such costs on DoD's ability to fulfill its national security role (see Box 3 on pages 36 and 37). Debate about that issue will probably continue as long as U.S. military forces are involved in major peace operations overseas.

4. General Accounting Office, *Peace Operations: DoD's Incremental Costs and Funding for Fiscal Year 1994*, GAO/NSIAD-95-119BR (April 1995), p. 21.

5. General Accounting Office, *Military Operations: Impact of Operations Other Than War on the Services Varies*, GAO/NSIAD-99-69 (May 1999), p. 56.

MAINTAINING CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING SKILLS

A serious challenge facing the military services is how to maintain the conventional warfighting skills of troops engaged in peace operations. Although many defense observers fear that participating in such operations could diminish a unit's training readiness for conventional war, the real effect may be more complex.

In some instances, taking part in peace operations could actually improve warfighting skills. Unlike training exercises, peace operations could provide "real" deployment experience and "real" missions and thereby increase a unit's cohesion, leadership skills, and opportunities to work in environments that more closely approximate those of wartime. Moreover, there may be significant overlap in the skills needed for conventional missions and peace operations—skills such as setting up and maintaining checkpoints, conducting military operations in urban terrain, carrying out airlift and airdrop missions, and setting up encampments and support activities in the field. Units participating in peace operations might also be likely to encounter situations similar to those experienced in higher-intensity conventional warfighting, such as controlling civilian populations and uncovering potential acts of terrorism. If units can practice those skills during peace operations, they may be better prepared for some of the requirements of higher-intensity conflict.

On the other side of the argument, critics cite at least three reasons why military participation in peace operations might degrade readiness for conventional warfare. First, they say, participating in peace operations takes time away from preparing for conventional war. When those operations involve different tasks from the ones considered critical for wartime missions, the units that take part may not be able to train for their primary mission while deployed. In particular, they may not be able to practice combat skills such as firing weapons. In addition, small units may not be able to practice collective skills as part of a larger unit.

Second, even when tasks or missions overlap between conventional and peace operations, the manner in which they are performed is different. For example, military personnel may be trained to adopt a less aggressive attitude for peace operations than for conventional warfare because the rules of engagement and the goals are usually different. Settlement, not victory, is often the ultimate measure of success in peace operations. Consequently, units that have grown accustomed to peace operations may have trouble adapting quickly to the different requirements of warfighting.

Third, military units must interact with different players in peace operations—such as other nations and nongovernmental organizations—which have their own agendas and restrictions. Because those players are outside the military hierarchy, the military must typically negotiate its missions, tasks, and operational command relationships with each group involved. Learning such negotiating skills, critics say, is just another thing that takes time away from training for conventional warfare.

BOX 3.
TWO VIEWS OF HOW FUNDING PEACE OPERATIONS
AFFECTS MILITARY READINESS

Defense experts are divided about whether participating in and paying for peace operations has an adverse effect on U.S. military capability. Two 1998 articles by former high-ranking officials of the Reagan and Clinton Administrations demonstrate that schism.

In the first article, Dov Zakheim, former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense in the Reagan Administration, argues that U.S. peacekeeping obligations around the globe are straining the country's military capability.¹ He admits that the costs associated with peacekeeping and related operations make up only a small portion of the overall defense budget, but he argues that the impact of those costs is far greater than might be assumed. The reason is that paying for such operations detracts funds from "other needed operations and maintenance activities" or "lead[s] to lower procurement spending, and, in particular, force[s] the postponement of new defense programs."

Zakheim concludes by lamenting that the current Administration seems unable to "come to grips with the implications of a national security posture that maintains long-term commitments to peacekeeping around the world." He predicts dire consequences, such as that the United States "will find that, like Gulliver's enfeeblement by the Lilliputians, it will be tied down in so many parts of the world for so long that it will be hard-pressed to respond to major threats against which only overwhelming force would prove effective."

Gordon Adams, former associate director for national security and international affairs at the Office of Management and Budget in the Clinton Administration, challenged Zakheim's arguments in an article that appeared a week later.² Adams argues that the United States initiates and participates in contingency operations around the world because those operations are in defense of national security interests. He asserts that operations

The Effect on the Army's Training Readiness

In theory, the greater the overlap between the tasks critical to a unit's mission in peace operations and its mission in wartime, the less harm taking part in peace operations should have on that unit's training readiness for war. Thus, one way to measure the potential impact of peace operations is to determine the extent of that overlap. In analyzing the issue, the Congressional Budget Office compared training regimens for peace operations and combat to see how much overlap exists between the two, used the results of its own and the Army's surveys of troops to gauge the degradation in training readiness from peace operations, and then attempted to determine whether any relationship was clear between the extent of overlap and degradation.

Surveys of Army leaders who took part in peace operations suggest a drop in training readiness for conventional war after participation in peace operations. (For more information about the surveys, see the appendix.) Almost two-thirds of

BOX 3.
CONTINUED

such as the ones in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia will not destroy U.S. military readiness. Rather, such missions—particularly the one in the Gulf—are the “sort of thing one should expect from the world’s most capable military, funded by the largest military budget.”

Adams cites two reasons for his belief that funding peace operations need not cause hardship to the military. First, he asserts, the services have the budgetary flexibility to pay for unbudgeted contingency operations out of their operating accounts. He suggests that the Department of Defense (DoD) set priorities and manage its fiscal resources by planning to delay year-end training and exercises to make sure that funds are available for contingency operations. Second, he argues, the Congress should not be surprised by or resentful of DoD’s requests for supplemental funding for contingency operations because the occurrence and costs of those operations cannot possibly be predicted during the regular budget cycle. Rather, he says, if the Congress approves supplemental appropriations in a timely fashion—as it has done for the most part in recent years—year-end training will not be compromised.

Adams argues that the real issue of contention with contingency operations is whether they serve U.S. interests, not how much they cost: “If the cost critics oppose the [Gulf] deployment, they need to say so openly. The affordability question is a red herring.” He asserts that it is in the United States’ interest to carry out certain operations in peacetime and that the “Congress clearly can find the necessary funds to do so.”

1. Dov Zakheim, “Global Peacekeeping Burden Strains U.S. Capability,” *Defense News*, April 6, 1998, p. 19.
2. Gordon Adams, “Contingencies Serve Role,” *Defense News*, April 13, 1998, p. 21.

respondents said their unit’s training readiness had declined. The largest negative effect was reported for units assigned to traditional peacekeeping duties. In those units, perceived training readiness dropped during the operation and did not return to predeployment levels until four to six months after the unit returned. Units involved in peace enforcement reported a much smaller drop in training readiness and returned to predeployment standards faster.

Type of Mission. Several factors are probably responsible for the different impact of peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions on training readiness. First, Army units tend to spend a longer time in peacekeeping operations than peace enforcement operations. Peace enforcement missions have generally lasted only three or four months, whereas peacekeeping rotations to operations in the Sinai and Macedonia last six months. That pattern may change after the effects of the Bosnia deployment are fully understood, since both the 1st Armored Division and the 1st Infantry Division were deployed there for about a year.

Second, peacekeeping tasks are generally much farther removed from conventional warfare than peace enforcement tasks are (see Box 1 on page 23). In fact, some Army units whose conventional combat missions include operating and firing heavy weapons—such as artillery, mechanized infantry, or armored units—have deployed to peacekeeping operations without their equipment. For example, a mechanized infantry battalion that took part in peacekeeping efforts in Macedonia left its Bradley infantry fighting vehicles behind in Germany. Thus, its six-month deployment provided no training in some of the unit's most crucial combat tasks: loading, maneuvering, communicating, and fighting in its armored vehicles.

Third, peacekeeping units tend to have more notice before deployment than peace enforcement units. That means peacekeeping units stop their regularly scheduled training in warfighting tasks sooner. In general, the longer a unit cannot train in its warfighting skills, the more those skills will degrade and the longer the unit will take to return to acceptable readiness levels.

On the whole, those units with the greatest overlap between the conventional warfighting tasks they train for routinely and the tasks they perform during peace operations suffered the least degradation in training readiness during an operation. Fewer than a third of the respondents to a survey by the Army War College said that peace operations “improved” their unit's training readiness, but the vast majority of those who did reported a “great degree” of skill overlap between peace operations and conventional warfighting skills (see Figure 6).⁶

Type of Unit. Another factor that influences the effect of peace operations on training readiness is the type of unit. Within the Army, peace operations seem to affect combat units, combat-support units, and combat-service-support units differently. That results in part because the skill overlap between warfighting and peace operations is greatest for combat-service-support units and least for combat units, which need collective training in integrated fire and maneuver to hone their combat skills. Based on the experiences of numerous units that have taken part in peace operations since 1980, the Army has concluded that combat units suffer much more degradation in readiness during and after such operations than combat-support and combat-service-support units do (see Figure 7).


Size of Unit. Participation in peace operations also has different effects on training readiness depending on the level of aggregation. That level increases as more smaller units are combined to make larger units. The individual would be the lowest level of aggregation, with squad and platoon being higher and company and battalion higher still. (For more information about the size of Army units, see Box 4.) According to

6. Lt. Col. Alan D. Landry, *Informing the Debate: The Impact of Operations Other Than War on Combat Training Readiness* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, April 7, 1997), pp. 9, 18.

data from the Army War College survey, combat units show the greatest degradation of skills at higher aggregate levels, such as company and battalion (see Figure 8). That means combat units could be less able to perform collective tasks such as attacking a position or holding a piece of terrain against an assault after taking part in a peace operation. In contrast, combat-support units (such as military police, signal, or intelligence units) show the greatest skill degradation at the duties outside their military specialty during the deployment. Finally, combat-service-support units (such as quartermaster, transportation, medical, and maintenance units) report generally low levels of skill degradation across the spectrum from individual to battalion level. That result is not surprising since the tasks such units perform in peace operations are very similar to those they would perform in combat.


Lack of Opportunities for Training. One reason that conventional warfighting skills can degrade during peace operations is that units have little chance to train while deployed. Survey results indicate that past operations have offered few opportunities for training of any kind. In the War College survey, 72 percent of respondents said

FIGURE 6. EFFECT OF PEACE OPERATIONS ON UNIT TRAINING READINESS, BY AMOUNT OF OVERLAP BETWEEN UNIT'S SKILLS FOR PEACE OPERATIONS AND CONVENTIONAL WAR



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Lt. Col. Alan D. Landry, *Informing the Debate: The Impact of Operations Other Than War on Combat Training Readiness* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, April 7, 1997), pp. 9, 18.

FIGURE 7. EFFECT OF PEACE OPERATIONS ON UNIT READINESS, BY TYPE OF UNIT



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Army.

they had fewer training opportunities while on peace missions than at their home station—and slightly more than a third of that 72 percent characterized their training opportunities during peace missions as “non-existent.”

The Army has tried to remedy that problem during its operations in Bosnia. For that deployment, the 1st Armored Division took along more than its usual number of Tank Weapons Gunnery Simulation Systems and gunnery trainers. Those systems allow gun crews for Abrams tanks to practice firing at simulated targets using their own weapons. Moreover, the division was able to use a former Yugoslavian training range in Glamoc, Bosnia, as a gunnery range for artillery, tanks, and helicopters.⁷

The Army also borrowed a training range across the border in Hungary that had formerly been used by Warsaw Pact forces. That range allowed Army commanders to rotate in units for week-long training periods to maintain proficiency. Units also returned to that range as they left Bosnia, which accelerated their return to high

7. Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Sustainment Training While Employing: Lessons Learned from Operation Joint Endeavor*, Newsletter No. 97-12 (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: CALL, June 1997), p. III-4. The commander of the 2nd Brigade—who conducted a live-fire training exercise at Glamoc that integrated Apache helicopters, tanks, artillery, and soldiers—said the training was one of the few times in his career in which no restrictions were placed on the type of weapon that could be used. See Robert Holzer, “U.S. Army Units Stay Sharp in Bosnia,” *Defense News*, June 2, 1997, pp. 28, 30.

BOX 4.
THE STRUCTURE OF U.S. ARMY UNITS

The following units, listed in ascending order of size, constitute the major elements of the U.S. Army's force structure.

Squad. A squad is the smallest element in the Army's organizational structure. It is led by a noncommissioned officer and typically contains nine or 10 soldiers.

Platoon. A platoon is the smallest standard formation commanded by a commissioned officer, typically a lieutenant. It contains two to four squads. The size of a platoon can vary from 16 to 44 soldiers depending on the type of unit.

Company. The next-largest standard unit is a company, which is typically commanded by a captain and consists of three to five platoons. Its strength varies from 62 to 190 soldiers.

Battalion. A battalion consists of four to six companies and is normally commanded by a lieutenant colonel. The size of a battalion can range from 300 to 1,000 soldiers.

Brigade. A brigade consists of two to five battalions and is usually commanded by a colonel. Brigades may be employed independently or as part of a division. Each brigade typically includes 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers.

Division. The typical division includes three combat brigades and is commanded by a major general. In addition to the combat brigades, a division usually includes a headquarters unit; artillery, aviation, air-defense, and engineer units; and several other units that provide medical, maintenance, supply, and other types of support. A division contains between 11,000 and 18,000 soldiers depending on its type.


Corps. A corps usually consists of two or more divisions and is commanded by a lieutenant general. In addition to its divisions, a corps includes other support units such as artillery, aviation, communications, supply, engineer, and intelligence units.

states of readiness. In light of those opportunities, the training readiness of deployed forces remained fairly high.

Although training opportunities helped crews, squads, and platoons in Bosnia maintain their combat skills, few such opportunities existed for the command staffs of large units such as brigades. Because of heavy workloads during their deployment, those staffs had little time to work on simulated combat planning for joint operations or combined arms missions.⁸

8. Holzer, "U.S. Army Units Stay Sharp in Bosnia."

FIGURE 8. DEGRADATION OF SKILLS BECAUSE OF PEACE OPERATIONS, BY TYPE OF UNIT AND LEVEL OF AGGREGATION



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Lt. Col. Alan D. Landry, *Informing the Debate: The Impact of Operations Other Than War on Combat Training Readiness* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, April 7, 1997), p. 11.

The Effect on the Marine Corps's Training Readiness

The Marine Corps does not seem to have had the same problems as the Army in maintaining training readiness. That situation may reflect the difference in the primary roles of the two services. As discussed in Chapter II, before deployment all Marine expeditionary units train for 29 missions, which include missions found in peace operations as well as combat settings. Perhaps as a result, 62 percent of the respondents to CBO's survey of Marine units said that peace operations had little effect on their unit's training readiness. (Another 9 percent said readiness declined during peace operations, 2 percent said it increased, and the rest did not answer the question.)

When the Marines cited problems with training readiness, those problems were usually associated with operations of a more extended duration. The longer personnel participate in a peace operation, the more their conventional warfighting skills degrade—especially if they lack opportunities to train in or use those skills during the operation. For example, the region of Somalia where the Marines were deployed contained no areas where air-to-ground ordnance could be fired to assess the accuracy of weapons or maintain the proficiency of crews for rotary- and fixed-wing

aircraft.⁹ Therefore, helicopter and fixed-wing pilots were unable to train on their combat weapons.

MAINTAINING EQUIPMENT READINESS

Another challenge that the services face is keeping their equipment ready for war while participating in peace operations. Equipment readiness has two dimensions: the amount of equipment on hand and its condition (that is, whether the equipment is operable or needs maintenance or repair work, something known as maintenance readiness). Peace operations could affect those two dimensions differently. Because deploying units usually receive higher priority for equipment and supplies, deployment to a peace operation could, in theory, improve the amount of equipment a unit initially has on hand. However, if that equipment is used during the peace operation and is broken, left behind, or has its maintenance deferred, equipment readiness could suffer.

The effect of peace operations on equipment readiness can vary on the basis of such factors as the duration and type of peace operation, the service involved, and the type of unit. For example, long peace operations may mean that equipment cannot undergo depot-level maintenance for an extended period of time, requiring a sustained effort to bring it back to a ready state when the unit returns. And of course, extreme climates or harsh environments will place more stress on equipment. Also, vehicles that are driven many miles during a deployment will often need repair upon their return.

Army units that deploy to peace operations with their own equipment have reported lower equipment readiness when they returned from deployments. According to the survey by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, levels of maintenance readiness were generally low immediately after a peace operation but steadily increased over the next six months. The drop was caused by heavy equipment use during the deployment, deferred maintenance, and overuse and poor maintenance by those detachments remaining at home.¹⁰ According to the survey, however, most units restored their equipment to predeployment levels of readiness within two to four months of their return. Nevertheless, 28 percent of respondents to the War College survey said they did not have enough time to return their equipment readiness to standard.

9. Although a few uninhabited offshore islands would have made suitable targets, requests to use them as target areas were always denied because the islands were beneath commercial airways. See Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, "24th MEU (SOC) Operations in and Around Kismayo, Somalia," Report No. 42928-83407.

10. Center for Army Lessons Learned, *The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness* (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: CALL, February 1996), p. A-23.

The units in the CALL survey that experienced the most dramatic drop-off in maintenance readiness were those that went to Macedonia but left their Bradleys stored at home during their six-month deployment. Those units quickly recovered their readiness, however, in part so that they could conduct deferred gunnery exercises as soon as possible.¹¹ The units with the slowest return to predeployment readiness levels were the ones that deployed to Somalia. Those units generally did not show steady improvement in maintenance readiness during their first six months back home and reported problems even 10 months after their return. Two factors contributed to that slow recovery: high operational tempo while deployed, and long delays in transporting the equipment home from Somalia.¹²

Although the condition of equipment often suffered, the amount of equipment on hand for most units was not significantly affected by their return from deployment. Most units had built up necessary stocks before the deployment, when they had benefited from a higher priority for resources. Army units that deployed to Somalia, however, proved an exception to that pattern because of high equipment wear and tear during their deployment, slow return transit, and the fact that many of the units left equipment in place for the next rotation to inherit. Much of that equipment was transferred to successor units and never returned. Thus, the first units had to request replacements through routine channels—a very time-consuming process since those units lost their priority status for equipment when they came home. Almost a year after returning from Somalia, one combat-service-support unit still lacked its required equipment and so was not available when needed to deploy to Haiti.¹³

Although the Marine Corps deploys equipment to peace operations differently than the Army does, it has also experienced equipment problems. A Marine expeditionary unit is designed to deploy with only as much equipment as it can carry on board its ships and to be resupplied within two weeks. Although that setup allows MEUs to be relatively mobile, they must rely on other sources for resupply. One such source is Maritime Prepositioned Forces ships, which proved their usefulness for resupply during the Marine deployment to Somalia, but they too have their problems. Prepositioned equipment is often not treated as well as “one’s own” and may require more maintenance after being used in a deployment than equipment owned by a unit would. After the operation in Somalia, for example, Marine commanders were reluctant to lend their troops to clean, recondition, and return equipment borrowed from MPF ships. Then, once the equipment was clean and ready to be loaded onto

11. Ibid., p. B-7.

12. Ibid., p. B-7.

13. Ibid., p. A-21.

the prepositioning ships, commanders sent their mechanics to remove parts in order to improve the readiness of their own similar equipment.¹⁴

MANAGING PERSONNEL READINESS

Another type of readiness that the services must worry about when taking part in peace operations is personnel readiness—how well a unit is staffed in terms of the number of personnel and mix of those personnel by grade and skill. Peace operations can have various, sometimes long-term, effects on the services' personnel readiness for conventional war. Some of those effects may be positive. For instance, when a unit is selected to participate in a peace operation, it may be assigned a higher priority for obtaining personnel as well as equipment. But other activities outside the normal course of events can have negative effects.

The deployment of an individual Army unit can have a negative ripple effect on personnel readiness in many other units. The reason is that peace operations often require a task force to be organized around one combat unit augmented by detachments from several other units. The size of those detachments may vary from individual soldiers to entire company-sized units. The units that donate personnel or subunits will experience a drop in readiness because they will have fewer soldiers than before. Nevertheless, the nondeploying unit will be expected to carry out its mission as before and, in some cases, may have to take on some of the duties of the deploying unit as well.

The Army's personnel practices are not set up to support routine deployments. Whereas the Marines rotate troops only during the 18 months that their units are stationed at home port, the Army's rotation schedule is tied more to the calendar year than to a deployment and training schedule. Thus, when something out of the ordinary happens—such as a deployment to a peace operation—Army units can experience serious effects on their personnel readiness if the deployment disrupts the regular rotation schedule.

In particular, personnel readiness can be seriously degraded when a deployed Army unit returns from a peace operation. If all of the personnel losses because of rotation or leave that would have occurred just before and during deployment were put on hold until after the mission, those losses are likely to occur all at once after the unit returns. Moreover, soldiers who were temporarily attached to the unit for the deployment generally return to their parent unit. The resulting losses can have signi-

14. Although regenerating MPF equipment may not be part of a peace operation per se, commanders returning equipment have the responsibility to ensure that it is ready for the next mission. In order to address that issue, one Marine Corps officer has suggested adding a prepositioned-equipment-regeneration phase to MEUs' deployment doctrine. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, "Adequacy of Current MPF Doctrine Based on Restore Hope Experience," Report No. 50753-25718.

ficant implications for a unit's leadership, institutional memory, and crew stabilization. That postponed attrition and turnover in leadership may be exacerbated by a backlog of professional training for officers and noncommissioned officers, many of whom missed the opportunity to attend school while deployed.

According to the CALL survey, personnel readiness is the slowest type of readiness to return to predeployment levels.¹⁵ Both the amount of warning time a commander has before a deployment and whether regular personnel rotations continue during the deployment affect how quickly the unit regains its predeployment readiness.

Units that take part in long-standing operations—which are frequently peacekeeping missions such as those in the Sinai or Macedonia—plan their personnel actions around the deployment. With such missions, deployments tend to have long warning times (usually six months or more) and predetermined durations. The long warning time allows unit commanders to freeze personnel into leadership and staff positions by transferring or extending the tours of soldiers who were scheduled to move or leave the service. Because the deployments are planned far in advance, whole units—not individuals—rotate in a manner similar to the Marines. Upon return, however, those units face significant personnel turbulence, according to the CALL survey, because their personnel actions were frozen for so long. As a result, such units generally take longer to recover than units deployed to missions with less warning time.

Operations that offer little lead time for planning—such as many peace enforcement missions—generally do not allow Army units to reach high levels of personnel readiness before deploying. But if normal rotations can take place during the deployment, less turbulence occurs afterward. For deployments to Haiti, most Army units filled only their critical shortages before deploying and allowed normal personnel rotations to continue. That caused much less disruption when the unit returned to its home station and thus had a smaller impact on personnel readiness overall.

The Marine Corps also experiences a sharp decline in personnel readiness after a unit returns from deployment. Once a MEU returns to port after its six-month stint at sea, its readiness drops significantly as individual marines take leave, change units, or undergo training. However, that decline is expected as part of the normal rotational cycle. Another MEU will take the place of the returning one, so overall capability is not degraded.

15. Center for Army Lessons Learned, *The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness*, p. B-3.

HAVING ENOUGH FORCES AVAILABLE TO FIGHT TWO MAJOR REGIONAL WARS

Besides finding ways to pay for peace operations and to maintain conventional warfighting skills, equipment readiness, and personnel readiness, the services need to ensure that they have a sufficient number of forces available to carry out the national military strategy of fighting two major regional wars. Participating in peace operations could mean that some forces needed for that task might not be available. Under current doctrine, if a major regional war erupted, units deployed to a peace operation would be expected to make the transition to wartime duties quickly. In its Quadrennial Defense Review, DoD contended that U.S. forces must be able to “withdraw from smaller-scale contingency operations, reconstitute and then deploy to a major theater war in accordance with required time lines.”¹⁶

But forces that return from peace operations may need a lengthy recovery period, which could have serious implications for their ability to make the transition to conventional war. Returning forces suffer declines in training, equipment, and personnel readiness. Reversing those declines by refreshing degraded combat skills, regaining or reconditioning equipment, and acquiring personnel takes time. The amount of time necessary appears to depend on the type of peace operation and the type of unit, but experience shows that the recovery period can be measured in months. During that period, the unit would not be fully ready for conventional war.

In February 1996, CALL published a time line for the reconstitution of Army units after peace operations before a major regional conflict.¹⁷ It determined that a combat unit would require at least 30 days to ready itself—a length of time that would probably not allow the unit to conduct live-fire exercises or perform any but the most mission-essential maintenance. Better results would be achieved if a unit had 75 to 90 days, which would permit live-fire exercises, more thorough maintenance, and detailed collective training through the battalion level.

Recommended reconstitution times vary more widely for support units than for combat units, probably because support units perform a wide range of tasks with a variety of equipment. CALL recommended a recovery period of at least 30 to 45 days for combat-support units (such as military police or communications units) because they have a large number of vehicles that require significant maintenance time. A 90-day period would allow such units time to conduct refresher training in the skills that had deteriorated during the peace operation. The CALL study did not make the same types of recommendations for combat-service-support units, which vary widely

16. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review* (May 1997), p. 12.

17. Center for Army Lessons Learned, *The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness*, pp. 15-16.

in mission and equipment, as it did for combat and combat-support units. Rather, it concluded that the appropriate recovery period varies between 15 and 60 days, depending on the type of support unit and the amount of equipment it has. As discussed earlier, combat-service-support units normally perform their wartime mission—or something very similar—during peace operations, so they will require less refresher training. Their biggest delay will be in reconstituting equipment, especially for support units that do not have surplus pieces of key equipment.

The problem of reconstitution for conventional war is compounded for the Army because of the ad hoc manner in which it creates task forces for peace operations. Because individuals or groups of soldiers might be pulled out of their parent units to fill gaps in deploying units, their parent units may suffer a decrease in readiness—either directly because of the loss of personnel or indirectly because of their inability to train without their full complement of personnel. In such a situation, both the recently deployed and the nondeployed units would be unavailable for conventional conflicts.

The potential shortage of units for conventional wars because of peace operations could be a large problem for the Army and military planners. According to the Army's analysis, the service would need every deployable unit in the active component, and all support units in the reserves, to fight two major theater wars nearly simultaneously.¹⁸

Even if the necessary number of forces was available for combat, the Army could experience shortages of particular types of units needed for a major theater war. As discussed in Chapter II, some kinds of units are in high demand for peace operations, and some of those are in very short supply in the active component. If a major theater war broke out while one or more peace operations were under way, the Army might be faced with an unpleasant choice: deploying units that had recently returned from peace operations and might not have had enough time to reconstitute, or deploying reserve units that might not have had enough time to prepare.

The Marine Corps does not face the same problems with reconstitution and availability that the Army does because of the difference between the two services' primary purposes. Although the Marine Corps would have a role in any conventional war, its main purpose is to respond to crises whenever needed. Since there is more than one Marine expeditionary unit deployed at all times, the Marine Corps would still have forces available to respond to a crisis if some forces were involved in peace operations.

18. See Congressional Budget Office, *Structuring the Active and Reserve Army for the 21st Century* (December 1997), p. 11.

CONCLUSIONS

Participating in peace operations affects the combat readiness of both the Army and the Marine Corps. But because their purposes are different, the implications of those readiness effects are also different. The readiness of Marine Corps units may be lower when they return from a peace operation, but that decline is expected. Since the Marines deploy regularly, another unit will be ready to take the place of the returning one. The ability of the Marines to respond to other crises, which is their main role, will not be adversely affected to any significant degree.

Peace operations are not part of the Army's primary mission, however. The declines in readiness that occur with deploying Army units could hurt the Army's ability to fight and win two major regional wars. In particular, the warfighting skills of Army combat units degrade during peace operations. Even the readiness of non-deploying units can decline because deploying units must sometimes borrow soldiers and equipment for the duration of the deployment.

CHAPTER IV

ALTERNATIVES TO IMPROVE BOTH

THE ARMY'S CONDUCT OF PEACE OPERATIONS

AND ITS READINESS FOR CONVENTIONAL WAR

For years, the Department of Defense has maintained that the force structure it needs to fight major theater wars is also capable of carrying out peace operations. Those operations, it contends, do not require either increasing the force structure or earmarking particular units for peace missions. But recent experience has raised questions about the validity of DoD's assertions, particularly for the Army. The diverse challenges that the Army faces in conducting peace operations while maintaining readiness for conventional war—which were outlined in Chapters II and III—suggest that alternatives to the service's current practices may be worth considering.

The Army could take many different approaches to improve its ability to participate in peace operations while staying ready for conventional war. For this analysis, the Congressional Budget Office chose four approaches as representative of the range of possibilities that the Army could consider (see Table 3). Each approach has advantages and drawbacks, and some approaches would be easier to implement than others.

These options would change either the force structure of the active Army, the training and readiness cycles of some active-duty units, or both. The first option would place some of the Army's deployable units on training and readiness cycles similar to those of Navy and Marine Corps forces. A second approach would train and reorganize some of the Army's existing active-duty units specifically for peace operations. The third approach would add more of the support units that are in high demand for peace operations to the active Army. That option would address the shortage of such units that the Army sometimes faces and the subsequent need to call on the reserves for peace operations. The fourth alternative would expand the size of the active-duty Army so it was large enough to conduct long-term peace operations and still keep enough forces available to fight two nearly simultaneous major theater wars.

Another approach that some analysts have suggested is for the Army to rely more routinely on the reserves to conduct peace operations. But, as Chapter II noted, using reservists raises a host of problems in its own right. Thus, for reasons that are spelled out at the end of the chapter, CBO did not include that approach in this analysis.

TABLE 3. FOUR ILLUSTRATIVE APPROACHES TO IMPROVE THE ARMY'S CONDUCT OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Approach	Changes	Costs or Savings (-) (Millions of 1999 dollars)	
		One-Time	Annual Recurring
Option I: Cycle the Readiness of Some Active Army Units	Select three existing active Army brigades; cycle each through high state of alert every six months; rely on alert brigade to carry out peace operations.	n.a.	-2
Option II: Reorganize Existing Active Army Forces for Peace Operations	Designate four existing brigades to carry out peace operations, and create three standing headquarters to lead them. (Increase size of active Army by 750 to 900.)	30	90
Option III: Convert Some Combat Units in the Active Army into Support Units	Convert one active-duty heavy division into support units.	940	-60 to -210
Option IV: Add Forces to the Active Army for Peace Operations	Create four brigades designed to carry out peace operations and three standing headquarters to lead them. (Increase size of active Army by 20,000.)	n.a.	1,900

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

NOTE: n.a. = not applicable (negligible costs).

OPTION I: CYCLE THE READINESS OF SOME ACTIVE ARMY UNITS

This option would place some active-duty Army units on a cyclical readiness schedule similar to the one employed for the components of Marine expeditionary units. As such, those units would train to a high readiness status and would be ready for a specific amount of time, perhaps six months, to deploy on short notice. During that time, the "on-call" units would be fully manned and equipped, personnel rotations would not take place, and individual training would not be scheduled. Units assigned to this schedule could train preferentially (though perhaps not exclusively) for peace operations. The Army would then be assured of having at least one suitably trained, cohesive unit ready to deploy on short notice for such operations.

At the end of their on-call period, the units would be placed on a less ready status, perhaps for 12 or 18 months. During that recovery period, members of the unit could attend to administrative duties, such as leave or school attendance, and personnel rotations could occur. The unit could also spend time performing any necessary equipment maintenance that had been deferred because of a deployment.

One way to carry out this option would be to place three brigades—one from each of three existing divisions—in the pool of units on this schedule. One brigade could be fully ready and on call to deploy for six months. During that period, the second brigade would be training and preparing to be on call for the next six months. The third brigade, having been on call for the previous six months, would be in a recovery period in which its readiness was low.

Since this option would not add forces to the Army and would not require any change in equipment, the costs of implementing it would be negligible. In particular, it would not significantly change the Army's annual operating costs.

Advantages of Option I

The most obvious advantage of this approach is that the Army would have forces ready to deploy to peace operations on fairly short notice. Thus, cross-leveling of personnel and subunits would be reduced, and the turbulence that now occurs when Army units deploy to peace operations would decline for both deploying and non-deploying units.

From the point of view of the soldier, this option would have the advantage of increased predictability. Troops in the on-call units would know that they might have to deploy at any time. Conversely, troops in the units that were not on call would know that they were unlikely to deploy for some time, so they could plan for leave or individual training during those periods.

Another advantage of this approach would be improved training for peace operations. Since units in this cycle would be more likely to be sent to such operations, their training could focus on tasks needed for that mission. Moreover, the Army's increased capabilities for peace operations would come at little or no extra cost—an important advantage at a time when many priorities are competing for space in the service's budget.

Disadvantages of Option I

The Army is organized to fight primarily using divisions. A division typically has command and support staff that a brigade does not. But cycling the readiness of

entire divisions is probably not practical. So, if a brigade deploys to a peace operation, it may also need to take some of its division's support units, causing difficulties for those units and leaving the rest of the division less capable.

That problem points up a larger drawback of this option: because the size and structure of the Army would not change, the personnel needed to increase the readiness of units in this cycle would have to come from other units. Thus, although the readiness of some units would increase, the readiness of others would inevitably decline. If the less ready units were needed for a major theater war or for other contingencies, they could take longer to get ready for deployment.

Another disadvantage is that if the units in this cycle concentrated their training on peace operations, their conventional warfighting skills could decline. Those units might then be less ready if needed for a major theater war. They could retrain to improve their warfighting skills, but that would mean delays before they were available for combat. The length of the delay would depend on how much training in combat skills the unit had while deployed and how much overlap existed between its combat skills and the skills it used during peace operations.

With this approach, the Army might also face some challenges in maintaining levels of morale and retention. The units in this cycle could be subject to frequent deployments, sometimes lasting for their entire six-month ready period. However, the Army could probably manage those challenges—for example, by providing the soldiers in these units and their families with extra support services or by offering them pay incentives.

OPTION II: REORGANIZE EXISTING ACTIVE ARMY FORCES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

Another option would be to restructure the Army's current active-duty forces to make them better able to meet the needs of peace operations. Like the previous approach, this option would be intended to ensure that at least some units in the Army were always prepared to deploy to unanticipated peace operations and that they could do so without the turbulence that now occurs in the Army when units are needed for such operations.

This option would take two steps to improve the preparation of some units for peace missions. First, it would establish standing headquarters that would devote their full attention to those missions. Second, it would adopt, for a small part of the Army, practices similar to those employed by the Marines. Specifically, the option would create units organized along the lines of MEUs that could deploy to peace operations with little notice.

To establish a pool of leadership skills to conduct peace operations, this option would create standing task-force headquarters that would devote all of their attention to such operations—developing doctrine and suggested “force packages” and commanding the forces that actually deploy. Personnel serving in those headquarters would become specialists in peace operations. Each headquarters would be about the size of an Army division headquarters’ staff—roughly 250 to 300 people—but it would not have any operational units attached. Rather, units with appropriate capabilities would be assigned before each specific operation. Those assigned units would include the traditional staff elements for personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, and communications, as well as additional public affairs, civil affairs, and military police units, which are usually needed during a peace operation.

The headquarters units would have to deploy often because their staff would coordinate the forces deployed for all peacetime contingencies. To provide a rotation base for repeated or long-term peace operations, this option would create three such headquarters. Each could be assigned a different regional specialty, which would help to focus its staff’s analysis and planning. Creating three such standing headquarters would require roughly 750 to 900 additional personnel.

This option would also make a more drastic change to the Army by organizing four units specifically to take part in peace operations. Unlike the rotating units in Option I, which would be regular combat brigades on call for contingencies, the brigade-sized units in this option would tailor all of their training, equipment, and special capabilities for peace missions. Therefore, they would contain more support forces, civil affairs units, and military police than traditional combat brigades, but they would also need enough armored equipment to protect themselves during peace enforcement missions. Those brigades would be maintained at full strength since they would be expected to deploy on short notice, which would avoid the need to cross-level before a deployment.

If the United States continues its recent pattern of involvement in peace operations, those specialized brigades would probably have to deploy often. Although the Army does not have an official ceiling for the amount of time a unit can be deployed, it uses 120 days per year as an unofficial benchmark. That benchmark would require a rotation base of at least three brigades. A fourth brigade would provide a cushion to cover simultaneous deployments. When needed for a peace operation, the deploying brigade would be assigned to one of the three standing headquarters.

The Army could fashion those brigades from existing third brigades that are located far from the headquarters of their active divisions. Examples include the 1st Armored and the 1st Infantry Divisions (headquarters in Germany, third brigades in Kansas); the 10th Mountain Division (headquarters in New York state, third brigade in Alaska), and the 25th Light Infantry Division (headquarters in Hawaii, third brigade in Washington state). As nonstandard, task-organized brigades, those units would

focus on missions essential for peace operations. But in the case of a major theater war, they could revert to serving as the third brigades of their associated divisions.

The costs of this approach would not be large. Creating new headquarters units would entail one-time costs of about \$30 million. In addition, paying for extra active-duty soldiers to staff the three headquarters and to operate the headquarters and the four fully staffed brigades would add about \$90 million per year to the Army's recurring costs.

Advantages of Option II

This approach would directly address concerns about readiness by giving some active units primary responsibility for peace operations and giving others primary responsibility for conventional deterrence and warfighting. Thus, each pool of forces could focus on always being ready to carry out its main mission. The advantages of that approach would be apparent for both staff and operational units.

At the staff level, tasks performed in peace operations have relatively little overlap with conventional warfighting tasks. Planning and executing a peace operation involves significantly different kinds of analysis, coordination, and negotiation, which are usually carried out by the task-force commander and his or her staff. By creating a pool of staff with primary responsibility for peace operations, people with different skills would not have to be pulled from all over the Army. Moreover, having standing headquarters would ensure that the planning and execution skills for peace operations would be practiced on a regular basis. (At the same time, traditional division headquarters would be able to focus on their conventional missions.) By training together regularly, the staff assigned to the new headquarters would develop cohesion, which would increase their flexibility during deployments. And the skills and knowledge base needed for peace operations would develop over time and would remain concentrated in those headquarters.

Similarly, having brigades specifically organized for peace operations would allow soldiers to train routinely for such operations, thus preparing them for unanticipated deployments as a matter of course. The advantages of such a brigade would be similar to those of a Marine expeditionary unit. Each brigade would already be organized to train in the manner in which it would deploy, which would enhance its cohesion as well as its personnel and training. A soldier assigned to one of those brigades would remain in that assignment for a full tour. That would not only allow the soldier to become proficient in the skills necessary for peace operations but also minimize the personnel disruptions that the Army has experienced with past contingencies. Many of the peace operations in which U.S. ground forces have taken part have been small enough for one brigade to handle.

This option would also help the Army's ability to conduct conventional war. It would minimize the disruption to other units from cross-leveling personnel and attaching units in an ad hoc manner, as the Army does now. And it would allow the units outside the four specialized brigades and three designated headquarters to concentrate on training for major regional conflicts.

Disadvantages of Option II

This approach would have two main disadvantages. First, it would reduce the military's overall capability to wage conventional war, since several units in the Army would not train for that as their primary mission. Those units could eventually be trained and readied for conventional conflicts, but doing so would take time. (Although that time would be significant, it would probably still be less than the time needed to mobilize a National Guard brigade.)

Second, the soldiers assigned to units specializing in peace operations would probably have to deploy overseas frequently. Theoretically, those soldiers could be under increased strain, suffer from low morale, and be likelier to leave the Army. That problem might not turn out to be significant, however, since troops would presumably rotate in and out of those units.

OPTION III: CONVERT SOME COMBAT UNITS IN THE ACTIVE ARMY INTO SUPPORT UNITS

This alternative would convert one active-duty heavy division entirely into support units. In the conversion, units in that division that already perform support services would remain as they are. Combat units, such as artillery and tank units, would be turned into the types of units most needed for peace operations, such as civil affairs and military police units. Personnel in those units would be retrained and reequipped. The change would yield about 15,000 active-duty support troops, which, if configured correctly, could provide skills necessary for peace operations and also help fill the Army's shortage of support forces.

Creating more support units in the active Army without expanding the Army's overall size or budget would require reassigning some combat duties to the reserve component. With one fewer heavy division, the Army would arguably no longer have enough combat forces in its active component to fight two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. As a result, it might have to rely on National Guard combat units to help make up the force needed if a second conflict broke out.

This option would entail a one-time cost of \$940 million to reorganize and reequip the combat units for support roles. Much of that money would be spent on

new equipment, primarily trucks and other materials-handling equipment. That one-time cost could be spread over several years as the conversion took place; it would also be offset to some extent by avoiding the costs of activating reservists for peace operations and by reduced operating costs (because the support units would be cheaper to operate than the combat units they would replace). After the conversion, the Army would see recurring savings of \$60 million to \$210 million per year, mostly because of avoided costs for activating reservists.

Advantages of Option III

This approach would increase the Army's readiness for peace operations by making its active-duty force structure better suited to carry out such operations without relying on reservists. Peace operations are the most probable, if not the most demanding, missions that the military is likely to face in the near future. Thus, some defense analysts would argue that the military should be designed (at least in part) to conduct them. Furthermore, by creating more high-demand support units in the active Army, the rate of deployment of existing support units could be reduced.

To some extent, this option would also enhance the Army's capability and readiness to conduct conventional war. Adding more support forces to the active Army would ensure their early availability in the event of a major regional conflict. A study by the Army has determined that the service does not have enough support forces to fight two major theater wars; this option would alleviate some of that shortage.¹

Adopting this approach would also allow the Army to avoid some of the costs of activating reserve units for peace operations. Those costs, although small compared with the Army's total budget, are not trivial. Indeed, the Army's incremental costs to activate reservists in 1997 totaled over \$230 million. Furthermore, in some cases, the costs of using reserve units could be higher than the costs of using comparable active-duty units.²

Disadvantages of Option III

The greatest disadvantage of this option is that the United States would no longer have enough combat forces in the active Army to fight two major theater wars nearly simultaneously. Some observers might argue that reserve combat troops are less responsive or less capable than active-duty combat troops. If that is the case, this

1. Congressional Budget Office, *Structuring the Active and Reserve Army for the 21st Century* (December 1997), p. 11.

2. See Ronald E. Sortor, *Army Forces for Operations Other Than War* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1997), p. 85.

option would put the United States at greater risk of being unable to win (or win easily) a second conflict. Although the same total number of forces might eventually be available to take part in that conflict, the reserve units might not bring the same total combat capability as the active units they replaced. In addition, the reserve units would need time to prepare for combat, so they would probably not be available as early as active units.

Another disadvantage of this option is that it would run counter to DoD's Total Force Policy, which seeks to integrate the reserves more fully into all aspects of DoD operations. Indeed, the military's recent trend is to involve the reserves to a greater extent in day-to-day operations. Reducing the role of reserve support units in peace missions would, by contrast, decrease the integration of the Army's active and reserve components (although, as noted above, reserve combat units could end up playing a greater role in Army operations if two major wars erupted).

OPTION IV: ADD FORCES TO THE ACTIVE ARMY FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

Although DoD policy assumes that forces can switch quickly from peace operations to a major theater war if necessary, doing so may not be feasible. Forces that take part in peace operations, particularly Army combat units, may need considerable time to regroup and recover before being ready to fight a conventional war. Moreover, the Army would need all of its active forces and its reserve support forces to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional wars, even in the absence of peace operations.

To address those concerns, CBO examined a final option that would expand the size of the active-duty Army so it could conduct sizable peace operations for extended periods while keeping enough forces available to fight two major theater wars. Because peace operations frequently require different forces and training than conventional war, this option would expand the Army by adding units designed and designated for peace operations.

Specifically, Option IV would increase the Army's active force by 20,000 soldiers—enough to create the four specialized brigades and three headquarters described in Option II. The four brigades—two with light infantry or military police and two with armored equipment—could be deployed singly or in combination, depending on the requirements of the particular peace operation. In addition, each of the brigades would have a complement of the other high-demand support units needed for most peace operations.

Those brigades would provide most of the Army's response for peacetime deployments. For large peace enforcement operations such as the ones in Haiti or Bosnia, where the U.S. contribution exceeded 20,000 soldiers, all of the brigades

could be deployed simultaneously until the need for forces decreased. For smaller operations such as the one in Rwanda, one headquarters and one brigade of 5,000 soldiers could be sent on each rotation.

A dedicated force of 20,000 soldiers, however, would probably not be sufficient to carry out all of the operations that might occur in peacetime. The pace of such operations has increased significantly since the late 1980s. And although most of those operations required less than 20,000 soldiers at one time, the Army could participate in more than one operation at once. The Army's deployments since 1990, and recent attempts by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to project the forces needed to conduct future small-scale contingencies, suggest that an average of about 8,500 Army personnel will be deployed to contingencies at any one time.³ Nevertheless, operations requiring more than 20,000 personnel at one time have occurred every two years or so, and DoD projects them to continue at a similar pace through the foreseeable future. Thus, a contingency force of 20,000 soldiers would have to be augmented in times of heavy activity.

If the Army does need to deploy about 8,500 troops to contingencies at any one time, this force would provide a thinner rotation base than the service desires and would not be able to meet the Army's goals for personnel deployments. With an average of 8,500 soldiers deployed, a force of 20,000 soldiers would provide a rotation base of almost 2.5 to 1. That is less than the Army's preferred rotation base of 3 to 1 and would allow a typical unit to spend just eight months at home for every six months deployed, rather than the Army's preferred 12 months at home. However, since soldiers would not spend their entire career serving in the contingency force, one assignment with a higher-than-desired deployment rate might not prove too onerous.

The four new brigades could be equipped with many of the weapons and vehicles that are being retired from National Guard combat units that the Army plans to convert into support units. The Army estimates that 600 tanks, 1,300 armored personnel carriers, 50 attack helicopters, and 260 artillery howitzers will be retired when those units are converted. Although that equipment is not the newest in the Army's inventory, peace enforcement operations rarely need the firepower and high-tech weaponry that conventional warfare does. For example, the Army's older armored personnel carrier, the M113, may actually be better suited to peace operations than its replacement, the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. The M113 can carry more personnel and supplies and lacks the more powerful weapons on a Bradley, which may not be necessary in most peace operations.

Because the new brigades would use equipment that the Army already has, the one-time costs to equip them would be negligible. However, operating the four

3. Based on average deployments from 1990 to June 1998 and projected deployments from 2000 to 2010.

brigades and three new headquarters would add an extra \$1.9 billion a year to the Army's recurring costs. (That figure is substantially higher than the \$90 million recurring cost of Option II because that option would reorganize existing brigades, which the Army is already paying to operate, rather than add new ones.)

Advantages of Option IV

This alternative would add to the Army's overall military capability in two ways. First, like Option II, it would improve the service's ability to conduct peace operations. By creating units that were fully manned at all times and trained primarily for peace operations, it would ensure that those units would be ready to deploy to such operations on short notice. In addition, by adding support units to the active component, the Army could reduce its reliance on reserve units during peacetime and avoid the potential problems associated with frequent call-ups of reservists.

Second, and perhaps more important, this option would increase the Army's capability and readiness for conventional war. Because the Army would have enough forces both to fight two major theater conflicts and to conduct most peace operations, forces would not have to extricate themselves from a peace operation to take part in a conventional war. Adding new units dedicated to peace operations would also allow existing units to improve their readiness for conventional war. It would reduce personnel disruptions throughout the Army and lower the rate of deployment for units whose primary mission is preparing for conventional war. Those units could improve their training in warfighting skills without the frequent distractions of preparing for and deploying to peace operations. They could also maintain their equipment in a higher state of readiness, since it would not have to be used as intensively. Moreover, by providing enough forces in the active Army that reserve units would not be needed for peace operations, this option would let the reserves focus on their wartime mission, thus improving their readiness for conventional war as well.

Disadvantages of Option IV

The greatest drawback of this option is that it would add significant costs to the defense budget. Paying 20,000 additional active-duty personnel and operating the new headquarters and brigades would cost almost \$2 billion annually. The Army would avoid the costs of putting reservists on active duty, but those costs would offset the costs of the new forces to only a very small extent.

The other disadvantages of this option are similar to those of Option II. The additional forces, being designated for peace operations, could be subject to a high rate of deployment. If the United States conducted multiple operations simultane-

ously, most or all of the units could be needed. Such frequent deployments would be hard on the morale of the soldiers in those units and their families.

Finally, since the new units would be equipped and trained specifically for peace operations, they would not be thoroughly trained for combat. Some observers might argue that forces that are obviously trained for combat are more intimidating to potential aggressors, thus making them more effective at keeping the peace.

COULD THE RESERVES PLAY A LARGER ROLE IN PEACE OPERATIONS?

Many analysts have suggested another approach to alleviate some of the strain on active-duty forces that results from peace operations: call on the reserves more routinely for such operations. But critics argue that a larger role for the reserves is not a practical idea. As Chapter II noted, volunteer call-ups do not always yield the numbers or types of forces needed for a particular operation. In those circumstances, assembling entire units from disparate volunteers can be difficult and time consuming. But involuntary call-ups, which require action by the President, can be politically difficult to obtain and, if too frequent, can harm retention and recruitment in the reserves. An equally important issue regarding reservists is cost. The General Accounting Office has noted that using reservists in an operation increases costs, in part because reservists are paid extra for active duty.⁴ And two recent RAND studies have concluded that because fast-breaking operations or those in hostile environments do not lend themselves to the use of reserve units, routine dependence on the reserves to shoulder a greater share of peace operations is not a cost-effective approach.⁵

For all of those reasons, increasing the use of reserve forces would probably not address many of the challenges outlined in Chapters II and III. Moreover, significantly changing the role of reserve forces would have effects well beyond their use in peace operations, including effects on training, pay, and retention. The implications of such a change should be the subject of a separate analysis. Thus, CBO did not examine in detail the increased use of Army reserve forces for peace operations as an alternative to current practice.

Nevertheless, some ways exist to use Army reservists more effectively within existing constraints. For example, the Army could avoid some of the problems with volunteer call-ups by making individual or small groups of reservists a permanent part of some active-duty support units. Those units are typically maintained at less than

4. General Accounting Office, *Peace Operations: Reservists Have Volunteered When Needed*, GAO/NSIAD-96-75 (April 1996), p. 9.

5. Sator, *Army Forces for Operations Other Than War*; and Roger Allen Brown and others, *Assessing the Potential for Using Reserves in Operations Other Than War* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1997).

full strength, so before they deploy overseas to a peace operation, the Army must try to fill their personnel shortages. Identifying and obtaining filler personnel and integrating them into the units can take time and delay deployment. The Army could keep the positions permanently filled with full-time soldiers, but doing so would be expensive. A less costly alternative would be to authorize the assignment of reservists to fill out the active-duty units' rosters. That would also be less disruptive than borrowing personnel from other active-duty units. In certain cases, it might be more practical to assign entire reserve units than individual reservists to round out an active-duty unit.

Using reservists as permanent fillers would allow them to train with their active unit and become familiar with the people in it. If the unit deployed to a peace operation, the associated reservists would provide a local pool of volunteers either to accompany the unit or to fill in at its home station. That practice could be much less disruptive than some of the Army's past attempts to find reserve fill-ins. (In one instance, it called on a reserve unit from California to provide fill-ins for an active-duty unit that had deployed overseas from Fort Drum in upper New York state.) However, relying on reservists as fillers might not be practical because the President would probably have to call up the reserves to ensure that the required personnel were available.

Another suggestion would link selected reserve units and potential volunteers with theater contingency plans.⁶ That would let reserve units and individual reservists know what region of the world they might be deployed to, so they could focus their planning and training on that region and perhaps respond more quickly to selected contingencies there.

The primary benefit to the active Army of those changes would be a decline in the personnel turbulence among nondeploying units that now occurs when units go overseas. As an added benefit, the deployment rate for some active-duty soldiers would decrease, and the strain on active-duty units that are currently in high demand would ease. Reserve units and personnel would also benefit through closer integration with active-duty units. And in general, those changes would provide greater integration between the active and reserve components, particularly in training and planning for contingencies—something that official DoD policy advocates.

But even those more limited suggestions would have some drawbacks. To institute them on a permanent basis, the Army would have to budget funds in advance for the cost of activating reservists during peacetime, which could increase its budget. Other costs would result from reconfiguring the policies for integrating active-duty

6. Brown and others, *Assessing the Potential for Using Reserves in Operations Other Than War*.

and reserve personnel. Finally, calling on reservists routinely has the potential to hurt their retention as well as employers' support for hiring and retaining reservists.

CONCLUSIONS

The Army's primary purpose is to fight and win two major regional conflicts that occur nearly simultaneously. Because undertaking peace operations requires different types of forces, different skills, and more frequent deployments than preparing for such conflicts does, it is not surprising that the Army faces some trade-offs in capability and readiness as it tries to perform both missions. (Since the Marine Corps's primary purpose—responding to crises—is closer in character to peace operations, the Corps has not faced those trade-offs to the same extent that the Army has. If the Corps has to deploy more often or for longer periods in the future, it will probably encounter many of the same problems as the Army.)

If frequent deployments to peace operations continue, the Army may need to consider changing some of its organizations or practices to improve its ability to deploy while minimizing the associated disruptions. Possible changes include putting some active-duty Army units on a readiness cycle similar to that used by Marine expeditionary units; converting some combat units in the active Army into support units, which are in high demand for peace operations; reorganizing some existing active brigades into brigades that specialize in peace operations (and creating specialized headquarters for such operations); and expanding the active force structure by adding those specialized brigades and headquarters while retaining all of the Army's current forces. In addition, many other approaches exist, including relying on reservists more routinely for peace operations.

As long as the Army must deploy often to peace operations, it will continue to run the risk of being less ready for conventional combat than it would be otherwise. If that level of risk is considered unacceptable, decisionmakers may face a choice: either increase funding enough to provide the means for responding to peace operations while maintaining readiness for conventional war, or decrease U.S. commitments to peace operations.

APPENDIX

SOURCES OF DATA FOR THE ANALYSIS

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) used data from various sources to prepare this analysis. Those sources include surveys of Army and Marine Corps personnel, training manuals, and the services' own reviews of their experiences in peace operations.

CBO'S SURVEY

To analyze the impact of participation in peace operations on military readiness, CBO developed a survey and asked for responses from units in the Marine Corps and the Army. The survey was designed to track those units' experience before, during, and after deployment to peace operations. Participants were asked the following questions about their preparation for deployment and the process of restoring their military readiness after they returned home.

Deployment History

1. What was the average and maximum strength over the period of the deployment (active and reserve personnel listed separately)?
2. What percentage of the unit's TOE [Table of Organization and Equipment] or TDA [Table of Distribution and Allowances] strength was deployed?
3. Of the personnel deployed, how many were in combat, combat-support, and combat-service-support echelons, respectively (active and reserve listed separately)?
4. What was the duration of the deployment, from initial deployment to final return of personnel and equipment?
5. Adding to the actual deployment the length of time required to prepare the unit and then—upon its return—to restore it to normal operational readiness, how long was the unit unavailable for its normal assignment?

6. Of the personnel deployed, what percentage were trained for their duty assignment (rather than being assigned out of their principal MOS [military occupational specialty])?
7. If available, what was the unit's SORTS [Status of Resources and Training System] rating before and after deployment?
8. Did the unit prepare for the deployment in a special rotation at JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center], NTC [National Training Center], or elsewhere?
9. What percentage of the unit's major equipment was deployed, on average? (Examples of major equipment include aircraft, major weapons and combat vehicles, and other vehicles.)
10. What method was used to deploy the unit (airlift, sealift, use of PPN [prepositioned] equipment, other)?
11. How much lift was used (sorties, ship tonnage, fraction of available PPN used)?
12. How long did the deployment require, from initial departure from home station to full readiness in theater?

Training Programs

1. How have unit training programs incorporated the requirements of OOTW [operations other than war]? For example, have additional training tasks been added to unit training schedules? If so, how much additional training time is required for those tasks? Please identify unit by echelon (combat, CS [combat support], CSS [combat service support]).
2. Have OOTW training requirements been substituted for conventional unit training? For example, are some conventional warfighting unit training tasks not being accomplished as frequently because of the need to use training time or facilities for OOTW training programs? Again, please identify unit as combat, CS, or CSS.
3. Has there been any measured change in SORTS ratings because of the addition of OOTW tasks to unit training programs? If so, please indicate the magnitude of the change (but not the level, to protect classified data) and the SORTS category (e.g., training readiness, equipment on hand).

4. Has a JRTC rotation been added to unit training programs? Has the nature of JRTC or NTC training been modified to reflect OOTW training requirements? If so, how much additional training does the unit receive during rotation (e.g., how much additional time does it spend at the training site)? If no additional time is spent in rotations, please estimate the length of time during a typical rotation that is devoted to OOTW rather than conventional warfighting.
5. Have unit strengths changed as a result of anticipated OOTW deployments? Is the unit maintained at a higher ALO [authorized level of organization]? Please indicate the amount of additional resources, measured by number of personnel, amount of equipment, or unit budget.
6. Have reenlistment rates changed among personnel in units heavily affected by OOTW deployments?

Other

Additional maintenance required by equipment deployed to OOTWs or used in training for such deployments.

Commander assessments of changes in conventional warfighting readiness, even if not captured in SORTS ratings.

Reconfiguration of units to meet OOTW requirements, resulting in changes from conventional TOE/TDA.

Additional equipment provided to a unit or units to meet the requirements of OOTW.

Responses to CBO's Survey

Fifty-three units in the Marine Corps responded to the survey in March 1996. CBO received information about the readiness of Army units from the Army's Forces Command in late 1995 and then followed up with its survey. The Army provided its responses to the survey and further readiness data in July 1996. The nine responses came primarily from units that had participated in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. The Army also said it was still waiting for some units to complete the survey and would forward the responses to CBO as they arrived. However, CBO never received additional responses from the Army.

The survey results were limited in several ways. First, the response rate was limited by personnel turnover, the passage of time, and incomplete recordkeeping

between the end of the peace operation and the unit's receipt of the survey. Second, not all respondents completed the entire survey. And third, the rate of return was far greater from Marine Corps units than from Army units. For that reason, CBO used the results of its survey to draw implications only about the experience of Marine units in peace operations.

OTHER SURVEYS

CBO also obtained data from two surveys conducted by the U.S. military. One was a poll of 57 Army officers with experience in operations other than war taken by a researcher at the Army War College in 1997.¹ The second survey was conducted by the Center for Army Lessons Learned in 1996 and included data from 221 Army commissioned and noncommissioned officers with experience in peace operations.² Like CBO's survey, those polls represented attempts to distill the experience of participants in peace operations into a series of conclusions about specific issues such as training time, the overlap between peace operations and conventional warfighting, and the time required to restore a unit to its predeployment readiness.

TRAINING AND DOCTRINE MANUALS

The services' training and doctrine manuals set forth the tasks that each type of unit must be able to complete in various missions. CBO compared the specific tasks required in conventional warfare and peace operations for different types of units at different levels. For the Marine Corps, CBO examined the missions that a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) is certified to execute and the certification process that each MEU must complete before its deployment at sea. For the Army, CBO compared mission training plans for conventional warfighting with those for peace operations and with training certification checklists that commanders use before actual deployments.³

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1. Lt. Col. Alan D. Landry, *Informing the Debate: The Impact of Operations Other Than War on Combat Training Readiness* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, April 7, 1997).
 2. Center for Army Lessons Learned, *The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness* (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: CALL, February 1996).
 3. U.S. Army Europe Combat Maneuver Training Center, *Mission Training Plan for Stability Operations* (Hohenfels, Germany, June 1995), and *Stability Operations: STX Plan* (Hohenfels, Germany, October 12, 1995); Department of the Army, *Brigade and Battalion Operations Other Than War Training Support Package (Draft)*, Training Circular 7-98-1 (May 1995).

LESSONS LEARNED

To see whether the military has begun to apply the lessons learned in previous deployments to current operations, CBO reviewed after-action reports and situation reports from peace operations in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia.⁴ CBO also searched numerous entries in Army and Marine Corps databases about units' experiences in those operations.⁵ Finally, CBO reviewed the training given to units deployed to Bosnia (both before and during deployment) to evaluate the readiness of those units upon their return.

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4. Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operations Other Than War, Volume IV: Peace Operations*, Newsletter No. 93-8 (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: CALL, December 1993), *Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report* (November 1993), *Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions, vol. 1, Haiti D-20 to D+40* (December 1994), *Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions, vol. 2, Haiti D-20 to D+150* (April 1995), and *Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions, vol. 3, Haiti* (July 1995); U.S. European Command, *After Action Review Operation Support Hope 1994* (Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany); U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, *Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review (BHAAR I) Conference Report* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa., May 19-23, 1996), and *Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review (BHAAR II) Conference Report* (April 13-17, 1997).
 5. Available in the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (a database maintained by the Warfighting Development Integration Division of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command located in Quantico, Va.) and the Web site of the Center for Army Lessons Learned (<http://call.army.mil/call.html>).