Truman and MacArthur: The Winding Road to Dismissal
Abstract
The Truman-MacArthur command interaction went through three stages in the Korean War. Stage 1, from the onset of the conflict in late June 1950 to the Inchon operation in late September, was one of implicit bargaining and compromise. Stage 2, from late September to China's full-scale intervention in late November, was one of de facto abdication by the president. The military commander, Commander in Chief Far East (CINCFE), made policy as recalled Richard Neustadt, then a member of the White House staff: Truman "passively await[ed] the outcome of MacArthur's plans for victory." In Stage 3, after China pushed the United Nations forces back from the Yalu River, Truman handled MacArthur as best he could by ignoring the CINCFE's outbursts against his policy war and shifting operational authority for the war to the commander of the Eighth Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The general might snipe and complain to the press, even sabotage potential peace negotiations in late March 1951, without provoking the president toward the confrontation he long tired to avoid. In early April, MacArthur, very frustrated with his status and the stalemate in the war, wrote an embittered letter to Congressman Joe Martin, the leader of the Republican opposition in the House, that seemed to brand the general as a partisan politician at least in Truman's eyes. One could argue that MacArthur had thereby done what only he could do, ensure his dismissal from command.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2006
- Accession Number
- ADA453948
Entities
People
- Michael D. Pearlman
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College