Mixed Strand Spaces

Abstract

Strand space analysis is a method for stating and proving correctness properties for cryptographic protocols. In this paper we apply the same method to the related problem of mixed protocols, and show that a protocol can remain correct even when used in combination with a range of other protocols. We illustrate the method with the familiar Otway-Rees protocol. We identify a simple and easily verified characteristic of protocols, and show that the Otway-Rees protocol remains correct even when used in combination with other protocols that have this characteristic. We also illustrate this method on the Neuman- Stubblebine protocol. This protocol has two parts, an authentication protocol (I) in which a key distribution center creates and distributes a Kerberos-like key, and a reauthentication protocol (II) in which a client resubmits a ticket containing that key. The re-authentication protocol II is known to be flawed. We show that in the presence of protocol II, there are also attacks against protocol I. We then define a variant of protocol II, and prove an authentication property of I that holds even in combination with the modified II.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 2006
Accession Number
ADA456351

Entities

People

  • F. J. Fabrega
  • Jonathan C. Herzog
  • Joshua D. Guttman

Organizations

  • MITRE Corporation

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Energy and Power Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Abstracts
  • Authentication
  • Communication Channels
  • Corporations
  • Cryptography
  • Environment
  • Explosives Initiators
  • Guarantees
  • Information Operations
  • Materials
  • National Security
  • Security
  • Security Protocols
  • Sequences
  • Text Messaging

Fields of Study

  • Computer science
  • Mathematics

Readers

  • Calculus or Mathematical Analysis
  • Computer Networking
  • Nuclear Civil Defense.

Technology Areas

  • Space