Analysis of NASA's Post-Challenger Response and Relationship to the Columbia Accident and Investigation
Abstract
The investigatory findings of the Space Shuttle "Challenger" and *Columbia" accident investigation boards are analyzed and evaluated relative to one another, with the goal of determining if there are lessons applicable to organizations that manage technically complex programs. An analysis is conducted of the recommendations from the "Challenger" investigation and NASA's actions taken to correct problems within the organization. The effectiveness of both the recommendations and NASA's response in terms of preventing the "Columbia" accident are then examined. In the intervening years between the "Challenger" and "Columbia," several unofficial analyses of the "Challenger" accident and investigation were published. The findings of these independent works are presented to determine if they have any relationship to the "Columbia" accident and subsequent "Columbia" investigation. The investigations of the "Columbia" and "Challenger" accidents are compared to determine if any of the investigatory findings indicate that there were common factors in the accidents. An evaluation of NASA's organizational structure and culture, and their impact on the implementation of changes recommended after "Challenger" also is examined. This analysis results in several conclusions and recommendations applicable to organizations that manage technically complex programs.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 01, 2006
- Accession Number
- ADA456946
Entities
People
- Robert G. Gregory
- Scott J. Marcellino
- Seth A. Moyer
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School