Why the United States Underestimated the Soviet BW Threat

Abstract

Biological weapons have the ability to inflict mass casualties while keeping existing infrastructure intact. They are inexpensive to manufacture, difficult to detect, and have a low signature for attribution. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union began amassing the largest stockpile of biological weapons worldwide. The U.S. Intelligence community repeatedly failed to detect the scope and character of this large-scale Soviet development effort despite implausible explanations for outbreaks of unexplained disease, credible ground reports from informants, and strange behavior patterns viewed through reconnaissance efforts. Toward the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Intelligence community realized its grave error. Unfortunately, the majority of these weapons are unaccounted for today. By examining the reasons the Soviet Union's biological weapons program went undetected, the United States may gain a better advantage for future assessments and prevent the large-scale stockpiling and development of biological weapons.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Sep 01, 2006
Accession Number
ADA457274

Entities

People

  • James S. Jaehnig

Organizations

  • Naval Postgraduate School

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Cyber
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Ground and Sea Platforms
  • Space

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Biological Weapons
  • Chemical Warfare Agents
  • Chemical Weapons
  • Cold War
  • Employment
  • Genetics
  • Governments
  • Human Population
  • Infectious Diseases
  • Intelligence Collection
  • Medical Personnel
  • National Security
  • Personnel Management
  • Signals Intelligence
  • United States
  • Ussr
  • Weapons Of Mass Destruction

Readers

  • Critical Infrastructure Protection in CBRN and WMD Threats.
  • Educational Psychology
  • Strategic Security Studies