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THESIS

**OFFLINE FORENSIC ANALYSIS OF MICROSOFT®
WINDOWS® XP PHYSICAL MEMORY**

by

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September 2006

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**OFFLINE FORENSIC ANALYSIS OF MICROSOFT® WINDOWS® XP PHYSICAL
MEMORY**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

The rise of cyber crimes combined with the recent use of computer viruses and malicious programs that reside only in volatile main memory demand further development of appropriate forensic tools. Existing forensic tools that analyze non-volatile memory are not capable of analyzing volatile memory and the few tools that are capable of detailed analysis of volatile memory are not openly available to the public. In this thesis, an open source tool is developed to analyze images of physical memory originating from the Windows XP and Windows 2003 Server operating systems. The tool, named Windows Physical Memory Offline Analyzer (WPMOA), scans the memory image and, utilizing input from the user, extracts relevant data from the various structures maintained by the Windows operating system. The WPMOA program automatically generates reports about the image and provides key information necessary for a user to perform additional manual investigation of the image beyond what is done automatically. This thesis details instructions on the preparation and use of the program, initial testing results of the program with actual physical memory images, and C language code for the program itself.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. CYBER CRIME TODAY

No one can deny the continuing rise in the rate of computer crime with each passing year. Reading about a new computer virus or worm in the newspaper has become a common occurrence in recent history. Computer attacks such as the *I Love You* worm in 2000 [1], *Code Red* worm in 2001 [2], and *Blaster* worm in 2003 [3] proved the reality of this type of threat. As the technology of computer security advances, so too does the sophistication of the attacks on computers. A recent article in “Core Security Technologies” discusses a computer exploit that remains entirely in volatile memory, leaving no trace on a computer system's hard drive [4]. An example of malicious software that resides in volatile memory only is the *W32.Witty.Worm* worm [5]. When a malicious program is capable of residing solely in volatile memory, it will leave no evidence of itself on the compromised system [4]. Without evidence of its activity and origin, an attack can continue to wreak havoc upon businesses, government agencies, and private citizens unchecked by law enforcement agencies.

B. COMPUTER FORENSICS

The impact forensic science has had on countless criminal investigations and trials make it a crucial part of law enforcement [6]. Therefore, it is necessary to continue advancing the forensic science to meet the increasing demand of law enforcement against cyber crime. In cyber crime investigations, the crime scene can consist of one or more computers perhaps spanning one or more computer networks. A cyber criminal may affect a system locally or remotely. A local attacker may leave physical evidence at the scene such as witnesses or fingerprints in addition to electronic evidence. Via the Internet, a remote attacker can penetrate other systems connected to the Internet from anywhere in the world, leaving only electronic evidence. In either case, digital forensic evidence can be gathered from the criminal's computer, the victim's computer, or both. This digital evidence can be broadly categorized in two ways, non-volatile and volatile.

Non-volatile electronic evidence can be recovered after a system is powered down and is found on hard drives, USB flash drives, and floppy disks. It is in non-volatile memory where most of the electronic evidence originates. System logs, network logs,

malicious code, corrupted files, emails, internet browser cached files and history, and deleted files are all forensic evidence stored in non-volatile memory. Network logs may contain TCP session logs indicating the source IP address from where the attack originated. The malicious code may be analyzed to determine exactly what the attacker did to the system. Emails may contain incriminating records of criminal activity and possibly reveal accomplices. Analysis of the disk drive's file system can lead to the recovery of deleted files, which may contain further evidence. Electronic evidence gathered from non-volatile memory can be used to determine how and when a system was infiltrated, what files were corrupted and how, and how much damage, if any, was done to the system. For the criminal's computer, email and browser history and cache can prove the criminal's intent, expose any accomplices, and even give further evidence of how an attack, if any, occurred [7]. However, a careful cyber criminal may have permanently erased any incriminating evidence from non-volatile memory, thereby making its recovery impossible. In the case of an infiltrated computer running malicious code, there is other evidence that can be useful.

The other type of electronic evidence is in volatile memory. Unlike data stored on hard drives, electronic evidence found in main memory disappears once power is removed from the system. Information about each running process, such as create times, exit times, open files, executing code, and child process are stored in main memory. This type of evidence is useful if a malicious program is running or another program has been corrupted on a live system. Unlike the non-volatile memory, this evidence cannot be erased from memory as long as malicious code is running. Additionally, trusted programs may be used to gather data from a live system such as open network ports, established network connections, logged on users, and list of running processes.

As with other forms of forensic evidence, special tools are necessary to analyze computer crime scenes. At present, there exist few computer forensic tools capable of performing anything other than a rudimentary analysis of non-volatile evidence gathered from running computer systems. Jorge Urrea researched and offered a method for forensically analyzing physical memory images for Linux systems. Urrea's method combined the use of a hexadecimal editor, some Perl scripts developed by Urrea, and knowledge of the Linux kernel memory manager provided by his research. Other than

the work done by Urrea, the computer forensics field lacks the tools necessary to analyze RAM contents for forensic evidence.

The Digital Forensics Research Workshop (DFRWS) issued a challenge prior to their 2005 conference in hopes of addressing the lack of tools for analyzing physical memory for Windows 2000 systems. One of the questions posed by the challenge required finding hidden processes given a physical memory dump of a Windows 2000 system. Additionally respondents were asked to consider what other types of forensic evidence one could gather from physical memory dumps. The two winners of the challenge created their own tools to analyze the physical memory dumps, but neither of the tools has been made available to the public [8].

Inspired by the DFRWS 2005 challenge, this thesis will discuss the details involved in creating an open source C program to analyze Windows XP physical memory dumps for digital forensic evidence. To begin, the methods, tools, and challenges associated with obtaining a snapshot of physical memory will be discussed in chapter II. Once a physical memory image is obtained, its contents must be understood in order to obtain meaningful forensic information from the image. The structures maintained in physical memory will be described in chapter III. Once the contents of memory are understood, the software used to automate the analysis of the image will be covered in chapter IV and chapter V will describe how to use the Windows Physical Memory Analyzer (WPMOA) program developed for this thesis. The results from using the program to analyze actual physical memory images will be discussed in chapter VI. The final chapter will provide areas for further research on the topic of automating forensic analysis of physical memory images.

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II. THE PHYSICAL MEMORY IMAGE


To analyze forensic evidence from physical memory, one must be able to extract the contents of RAM. Ideally, when a process reads from or writes to a location in its virtual address space, that address is available in physical memory for immediate use. But no system is capable of providing enough physical addresses in main memory to map to every address of each process' virtual address space. So, when virtual memory space exceeds physical memory space, non-essential data mapped to physical memory is transferred to the system hard disk, to free physical addresses for remapping. This process is known as paging out. The data is paged to a file on the system hard disk called a swap file. On Windows systems, the swap file is named pagefile.sys and is located in the root directory of the C drive (C:\). The swap file is conceptually just an extension of physical memory to meet the capacity of virtual memory. For ease of management, main memory is divided into fixed sized chunks called pages. While a system is powered on, pages in memory are swapped to and from the swap file as new processes are created and as the existing processes run, as needed to meet the demand of the running processes. Because of the constant swapping of pages in physical memory, the total address space of virtual memory is rarely contained entirely within physical memory, nor is it ever constant.

When a forensics imaging program is used to copy the contents of physical memory to a file, that same memory will be altered by the operating system which must create data structures to manage the newly created imaging process. Furthermore, the imaging program itself will alter physical memory as it copies the data in memory to a file which typically requires a large number of data transfers between various memory resident input/output buffers. Besides affecting memory, it is possible that the program could be receiving false data from a corrupted operating system since a memory imaging program can only access physical memory through the operating system. Thus, with software tools alone, it is not possible to obtain a snapshot of physical memory unaffected by the tool used to measure it. Simply stated, the act of capturing the state of memory causes changes to the state of memory. However, it is possible to obtain a snapshot of physical memory without altering its state by using a bus mastering hardware

device connected to the system's memory bus. The device must be connected to the system prior to intrusion, when the system is powered down, but because it communicates with physical memory through the host controller and not the operating system, the problems discussed with software acquisition of physical memory are eliminated. For those who do not have a bus mastering device to capture memory or did not have the foresight to install said device before an intrusion, snapshots of the unaltered physical memory image are not possible. An undisturbed snapshot is not necessary for forensic analysis because, as will be shown in this document, useful forensic evidence can be extracted from a physical memory image captured with the software tool dd [9].

Since there are no native tools on Windows XP to dump the contents of system memory to a file, a third-party program must be used. One such tool is George Garner's variant of the GNU dd utility [10]. George Garner's dd is used in a manner similar to the way in which the standard version of dd is used on Linux systems [11]. The dd program copies data in blocks from one file to another. In the case of Garner's version, the input file is `\\.\PhysicalMemory`, which represents the device name for physical memory in Windows. It is important to use the *noerror* option to ensure all readable blocks of data are copied from physical memory. Without the *noerror* option, the dd program will stop copying after a read error. As for the output file, it is recommended that no output file is specified in favor of piping the output of dd to netcat via the command line (see Figure 1). The netcat program sends and receives data via the host's network connection, thus allowing the copy of physical memory to be sent directly to an external, network connected computer. This method will produce the best results for forensic analysis because it will not alter the target system's hard disk.

Figure 1. Using dd to obtain physical memory image



```
C:\>dd if=\\.\PhysicalMemory conv=noerror ! nc 192.168.0.1 1234
Forensic Acquisition Utilities, 1, 0, 0, 1035
dd, 3, 16, 2, 1035
Copyright (C) 2002-2004 George M. Garner Jr.

Command Line: dd if=\\.\PhysicalMemory conv=noerror
Based on original version developed by Paul Rubin, David MacKenzie, and Stuart Kemp
Microsoft Windows: Version 5.1 (Build 2600.Professional Service Pack 2)
14/06/2006 07:57:39 (UTC)
14/06/2006 00:57:39 (local time)
```


After obtaining an image of Windows physical memory using George Garner's dd program, forensic analysis can be performed on the image just as traditional forensic analysis is performed on hard disk images. The fundamental problem with analyzing physical memory structures however is that unlike disk partition images which contain well structured file systems, the layout of data in RAM must be carefully reconstructed by locating and properly parsing operating system data structures that are also resident in the RAM image. Therefore, in order to analyze physical memory and its relationship with virtual memory, the internal structures scattered throughout the RAM image must be understood first.

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III. WINDOWS VIRTUAL MEMORY

The Windows operating system provides every running process with a virtual private memory space. The virtual space is an abstract representation of each process' memory space. In reality, there is only physical memory (RAM) and it is shared among all processes on a system. All virtual address references must be translated to physical address addresses before data can actually be read or written.

Figure 2. Layout of virtual address space



A. VIRTUAL MEMORY LAYOUT


Virtual memory for Microsoft Windows XP and Windows 2003 Server on the Intel x86 architecture is the subject of this entire document and is assumed constant unless otherwise noted. Each active process on a system has its own virtual memory address space, separate from all other processes' virtual memory address space. Within each virtual address space, there is a portion dedicated for the user application and a portion for the operating system as shown in Figure 2. The user virtual address space is for use by the application itself (e.g. Internet Explorer) and contains the application code, global variables, thread stacks, and dynamically linked library code. It spans from virtual addresses (in hexadecimal) 0x00000000 to 0xBFFFFFFF. The system address space is for use by the operating system and is accessible by all processes. The system address

space ranges from virtual addresses 0xC0000000 to 0xFFFFFFFF. It contains the necessary information for system management of the virtual memory space, including the process' page directory and the page table entries (PTEs) used for translating virtual addresses to physical addresses in memory.

B. VIRTUAL MEMORY STRUCTURES

There are numerous structures within the process' virtual address space and not all of them relate to the work described in this document. Therefore, the following discussion of memory structures is limited to the structures of interest in our forensic analysis of Windows physical memory. Each structure discussed is defined as a C structure in the win32structs.h file in Appendix A.

Figure 3. Structure of an EPROCESS block



1. Executive Process

The executive process (EPROCESS) block is the most important structure found in memory for forensic analysis because it is the starting point of any further investigation of that process. Figure 3 shows an abbreviated version of its structure, listing the fields of interest for forensic analysis. All EPROCESS blocks are part of a doubly linked list, which includes blocks for active processes, although it is not uncommon to encounter exited processes in the list. This phenomenon occurs when an exited process is still opened as a handle by another active process, as an exited process'


EPROCESS block is deleted only when the last handle to the process is closed. See Table 1 for a description of key EPROCESS block fields [12][13].

Table 1. Description of EPROCESS block fields [13]

Field Name	Description
Kernel Process Block or Process Control Block (PCB)	Contains information about thread user and kernel times, process state, the pointer to the process page directory, and the pointer to the list of active threads for that process.
Process ID	A unique number identifying the process.
Parent Process ID	The process ID of the process' parent process. Where the parent is the process that spawned the process in question.
Create and Exit times	Values representing the date and time the process was created and, if applicable, exited. Note: The System process does not have a valid Create Time and this field is null.
Active Process Links	This field is a structure containing a forward and backward link that facilitates the doubly linked list of all processes.
Device Map	This field contains the address of the process' object directory, which is used to resolve object names for the process.
Image File Name	This field contains the process' name limited to 16 characters (e.g. explorer.exe).
Image Base Address	The preferred base address of the process in the user address space.

Field Name	Description
Virtual Memory Information	This field is a pointer to the process' Memory Manager Support structure

Figure 4. Handle table hierarchy




2. Handle Table

Each process accounts for every object it currently has open and it does so via the handle table. The process' EPROCESS block contains a pointer to its handle table structure (see Figure 4). Within the handle table structure, there is a table code field, which contains the address of the actual handle table(s). The address in the handle code field is that of a sub handle table by default. The handle number is an index of the handle table entry for an object. Each entry in a sub handle table is represents a pointer to an opened object and a 32-bit value used to determine access control to that object. There can be up to 511 entries in one sub handle table. When more than 511 objects are opened in a process, the object manager creates a middle-level handle table, which contains pointers to a maximum of 1024 sub handle tables (see Figure 4). Additionally, one top-level handle table can be created, which contains pointers to a maximum of 1024 middle-level handle tables. A handle table's type is indicated in the least significant 3 bits of its table code field. The method is as follows: 0 indicates address is of a sub handle table, 1

indicates the address is of a middle-level handle table, and 2 indicates the address is of a top-level handle table [13].


Figure 5. Generic object structure



3. Objects

Figure 5 shows the generic structure of all objects found in memory. Every object has an object header structure. The object header stores the address of that object's object type structure. The object type structure is common among all objects of the same type; some common examples of object types are file, process, and thread. Most objects have a body and a name, which precedes the object header, but where an object's name is stored is ultimately dependant on its type. The object names facilitate finding objects by name and the sharing of objects between processes. If the object is not to be shared, the process' object manager will not assign a name to it and it will be referred to by object handle only [13].

Figure 6. Executive thread block structure



4. Executive Thread

Threads are entities within a process that represent executable code of the process. Every process created begins with a single thread, which can create other threads. Multiple threads allow a process to perform several tasks in parallel, with each thread executing a separate task. Windows represents a thread by the executive thread (ETHREAD) block stored in the physical memory. Threads are important to forensic analysis because threads are scheduled for execution by the operating system, not processes. A thread's creation and exit times are stored in its ETHREAD block. The initial execution address for a thread is also stored in the ETHREAD block. Figure 6 shows an abbreviated ETHREAD block structure [13].


5. Process Working Set

A process' working set is the set of virtual pages currently residing in main memory. When a thread references a virtual page that is not in the working set, a page fault occurs. The page fault triggers the memory manager to make room for the desired page by moving a resident page from main memory to the system swap file. Once space is made available, the desired virtual page is loaded into memory and the working set is updated to include the newly loaded virtual page [14].

The working set list structure contains fields for the memory manager to update the working set list easily. The addresses of the first free slot, the last entry, and last initialized entry are kept in the structure (see Figure 7). These are used by the WPMOA program to determine when to stop searching for working set addresses. The working set list entry field

contains the virtual address of the working set list entry table. In this table are the virtual addresses of every resident page of the process.

Figure 7. Working Set List structure



Each structure maintained in physical memory stores a small amount of data about the overall system. The aggregation of that data is what leads to profound information about a system. Therefore, it is essential to understand where to find and how to interpret the many structures scattered throughout physical memory in order to recover useful information. Once these structures are understood, a program can be implemented to automate the recovery of relevant forensic data from a physical memory image.

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IV. SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION

The source code for the Windows Physical Memory Offline Analyzer (WPMOA) software is included in appendix A. The WPMOA program was developed using ANSI standard C for UNIX-based operating systems and has been successfully compiled and executed on SuSE Linux 10.0 and Mac OS X Tiger (Intel) Darwin 8.0.

A. PROGRAM OVERVIEW

The WPMOA program consists of two C source files named `wpmoa.c` and `dissector.c` and two C header files named `wpmoa.h` and `win32structs.h`. The `wpmoa.h` file contains all of the function prototypes, global variables, and include statements, while the `win32structs.h` file contains struct definitions based on those defined in the `Ntddk.h` file included in the Windows Driver Development Kit (DDK). Functions scanning for and manipulating the data found on the memory image are located in the `dissector.c` source file, while all other functions are in the `wpmoa.c` source file.

Figure 8. WPMOA program flow chart




Figure 8 shows the general flow of the program, which is described in words below. The program uses the user command line inputs to initialize the program global variables setting the start address of the active process list and the page size for the

physical memory image. The program then enumerates each process in the active process list by copying each EPROCESS block into a dynamically allocated array, along with the open handles and working set of each process. Once completed, the program prints the main menu and awaits user input for the next action. The user may choose to translate a virtual address to a physical address, print a report of one or all processes, or quit the program. After the chosen action is completed, the program will return to the command prompt awaiting further action until the user chooses the quit option. When quit is chosen, the program cleans up all dynamically allocated memory and closes all opened handles before exiting.

B. INITIALIZING AND MAIN MENU

There is no constant value for the address of the first EPROCESS block in the active process list; therefore, this value must be set manually via the command line arguments. The names of the physical memory image file and the output file are passed to the program via the command line arguments as well. On startup, the program scans a physical memory image, and allocates a dynamic array to hold all EPROCESS blocks found in the image. The size of the array is determined by the `process_count` function, which traverses the active process list, found using the address provided via the command line argument, in the physical memory image, keeping count of the number of processes traversed. The program then utilizes the `enumerate_processes` function, described later, which fills the allocated array with data read from the EPROCESS blocks. If the `enumerate_processes` function executes successfully, the interactive menu will display a command prompt preceded by a table of all processes found. There is also a help menu, showing all available options to the user (see Figure 9).

Figure 9. WPMOA help menu

```
Commands are not case sensitive
HELP - prints this menu
PRINT ALL11-999 - prints information about a process
QUIT - exits program
TRANSLATE - translate a virtual address to physical address
```

C. ENUMERATING PROCESSES

The `enumerate_processes` function, found in `dissector.c`, copies the contents of each EPROCESS block found in the active process list into an array allocated in `main`. Traversing the list is relatively straight forward because the virtual addresses of each

EPROCESS block did not require process specific address translation. The virtual addresses of the EPROCESS blocks differ from the physical addresses by the kernel offset of 0x80000000 and are determined by Equation 1, where VA is the virtual address and PA is the translated physical address. To determine the end of the list, the program checks the forward link of each EPROCESS block against the address of the head of the list. If the two are equal, the EPROCESS block is the last process in the list.

Equation 1

$$PA = VA - 0x80000000$$

Enumerating a process' open file handles requires process specific virtual to physical address translation. The translation function, described later, enables further enumeration of a process. A process' open file handles are found by the `enumerate_handle_table` function, also located in `dissector.c`. As mentioned in chapter II, the open file handles are kept in a hierarchy of handle tables. The `enumerate_handle_table` function traverses any mid-level and top-level handle tables, eventually reaching all sub handle tables. Each object pointed to by the file handles is visited and its name and type is recorded. Since each object of the same type points to a common object type structure in memory, a cache is kept of the object type names to save time wasted by repetitive disk reads visiting the same object type structure. Once the object type is known, the object's name, if one exists, is determined based on its type. A process object's name resides in the process object's body, as does a file object's name. The thread object does not have a text name; therefore, it is referred to by its unique identification number and by the process name that spawned it. All other object types, except key objects (used to access registry data), maintain their object names in the object name block, preceding the object header block. All object names are stored as Unicode, which are converted to ASCII strings and stored for later printing.

Enumerating file objects does not mean the contents of that file can be discovered as well. File objects are references to files stored on a hard drive or any other block device. If the file name is known and the system hard drive is possessed, then the file's entire contents could be inspected for forensic evidence. However, if the system hard drive is not in possession or the process' executable file was wiped from the hard drive,


then the process' executable code cannot be examined. Once mapped into memory by the operating system loader, a process' executable file is generally not opened for I/O and has no assigned file descriptor; therefore, in order to view the process' executable code, the process' working set must be enumerated. A process' working set is cached data referenced by its threads. This data includes the executable code each thread is currently referencing. The working set is arranged in a list of virtual addresses. Each address refers to a location in memory containing at most one page of data or code. The WPMOA program copies the working set list into an array containing both virtual addresses and their translated physical addresses, which is then sorted based on the virtual addresses from lowest address to highest. The list is then traversed, comparing each address to the address before it to determine contiguous addresses. If addresses are found to differ by the size of a page in memory (typically 4K bytes), then they are considered contiguous, but contiguous addresses that differ in the twelve most significant bits are put into separate files. All contiguous address ranges are then extracted to files named after the address ranges contained in the file (e.g. 00400000h-00402000h). The files created are placed in a directory named according to the owning process name and unique ID number. Including the process identification number is necessary because a program can be executed several times and be referred to by the same image name, but each process will have a unique identification number.

Each working set item from the working set list is the size of one page. Depending on the system settings, the page size could vary from the typical 4096-byte value. If the physical memory image page size is not 4096 bytes, then the actual size, in bytes, must be set via the command line arguments. Additionally, each working set is a referenced section of data from the virtual address space of the process. Therefore, when viewing the files it is normal to see large spaces of zeroes even though there is a much smaller space of zeroes in the file containing the original data. This is due to the difference in the layout of an executable image on disk as defined by the Portable Executable (PE) file specification, and the way in which that image is mapped into memory by the operating system loader. Program file images consist of various sections and the headers of a PE file detail the difference in size of each program section as it exists on disk with the size of that section as it exists one mapped into memory.

D. VIRTUAL ADDRESS TRANSLATION

All pages in a process' private address space are located by a virtual address. For the program to read locations in the physical memory image referred to within a process, that virtual address had to be translated to a physical one. The address translation begins with the virtual address to be translated. The first (most significant) 10-bits of the virtual address is an index in the process' page directory. The page directory is found in the Kernel Process block and is referred to by its physical location. The entry in the page directory contains the valid address of a page table, if the desired page table resides in physical memory, where page tables contain addresses of page frames. The next 10-bit value of the virtual address is an index to the page table entry containing the desired page frame address. If the page is not actually in physical memory, because it has been swapped to the page file, then the page table entry will indicate this by setting the least significant bit of the page table entry and the contents of that page will not be recovered by the WPMOA program. There are a total of twelve bits in the page table entry that are used by the memory manager and are not part of the physical address (see Figure 10). The final 12-bits of the virtual address take the place of the 12-bits lost to the memory manager to form a translated 32-bit physical address [13].

Figure 10. Page Table Entry



E. THE REPORT

The print command of the program prints a report of data found in the physical memory image and calls the function that enumerates the process' working set. Although there is much data found on the image, the program was designed to display only the

most relevant data found. The program generates a report, which displays the virtual address, image name, process ID, the parent process' name, the parent process ID, time of creation, time of exit, virtual size, peak virtual size, page directory address, handle count, number of active threads, and the types and names of every open handles of every process found in the image file. The information displayed was chosen to give as much relevant forensic data to the user as possible and provide flexibility for further analysis.

The process ID numbers can be used to trace how a process was executed. For example, if a process' parent process ID was that of cmd.exe, then that process was executed from the Windows command line. Therefore, each process in the open handle table has a number in parenthesis, which is the unique process ID of the opened process. For threads in the open handle table, the parent process of the thread is shown with the unique ID number of the thread following a semicolon.

The process creation and exit times are useful for recreating a timeline of system events. All times are shown as Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). Since the target system originated the times in the physical memory image, their accuracy depends on the accuracy of the target system's clock. If the reported process was exited, then a time will occupy the space next to the Exited Time field, otherwise that space will indicate that no time was reported (see Figure 11).

Figure 11. WPMOA report of exited process

```
-----
Virtual Address:      0x85a06330    Page Directory:      0x2e070000
Process:             POWERPNT.EXE  Process ID:          2924
Parent Process:      explorer.exe  Parent Process ID:   1968
Created:  2006-05-16 08:20:42 UTC   Exited:  2006-05-16 08:27:54 UTC
Virtual Size:         67 MB        Peak Virtual Size:    161 MB
Handle count:         Nonexistent  Number of threads:    0
Open Handles:
TYPE                NAME(if one exists)
None Found
-----
```

For users desiring more information than the WPMOA program provides, the report gives the necessary information to do so. Specifically, the page directory address is intended to be used with the virtual address translation feature of the WPMOA program. The virtual address translation feature provides necessary functionality to

explore the physical memory image beyond the basic analysis of the WPMOA program. With it, the virtual addresses referencing every structure in RAM can be translated to physical locations in the image file. To analyze a process further, its virtual address is provided so that its location can be found in the image file. To navigate through the physical memory image, use the virtual address translator feature of the WPMOA program in conjunction with the Windows system header files. Some portions of the header files are included in the win32structs.h file (see Appendix A) used by the WPMOA program.

Figure 12. Example report of smss.exe

```

-----
Virtual Address:      0x86534900    Page Directory:      0x10a9f000
Process:              smss.exe     Process ID:           724
Parent Process:      System       Parent Process ID:    4
Created:  2006-05-28 04:03:13 UTC  Exited:              No time reported
Virtual Size:         3 MB         Peak Virtual Size:    11 MB
Handle count:         20          Number of threads:    3
Open Handles:
TYPE                 NAME(if one exists)
KeyedEvent            CritSecOutOfMemoryEvent
File                  Windows HD\WINDOWS
Port                  SmApiPort
Port
Directory             GLOBAL??
Directory             Sessions
File                  Windows HD\WINDOWS\system32
SymbolicLink          KnownDllPath
Directory             KnownDlls
Key
Event                 UniqueSessionIdEvent
Event
Process               csrss.exe(788)
Process               csrss.exe(788)
Port
Port
Port
Port
Process               winlogon.exe(824)
Process               svchost.exe(1052)
-----

```

A sample report of the smss.exe process is shown in Figure 12. The working set information is not printed to the screen, but is printed to files labeled by the virtual address ranges each file contains. Although a small amount of information is shown in the example, more can be displayed in future versions of the software.

E. QUITTING THE PROGRAM

When the user chooses the quit option from the command prompt, the program de-allocates all dynamically allocated memory and closes all opened file handles before returning with a value of zero to indicate successful execution.

V. SOFTWARE USE

A. PRE-EXECUTION

Before using the Windows Physical Memory Offline Analyzer (wpmoa) program, the head of the process list must be determined manually. This is accomplished by using the `grep` and `hexdump` tools found on UNIX or UNIX-like operating systems. The necessary steps follow.

1. Find the `smss.exe` EPROCESS block

The active process list maintained in physical memory begins with the System process, but because the word “System” is found in countless locations throughout memory, it is not practical to search directly for it. The next process executed at system startup is `smss.exe`, which is a word not commonly used throughout memory and it is a process guaranteed to be running since it is responsible for starting user sessions. Thus, to find the System EPROCESS block, the `smss.exe` EPROCESS block must first be found. Once the `smss.exe` EPROCESS block is found, the System EPROCESS block can be found by traversing the active process list backwards one link.

To find the `smss.exe` EPROCESS block, use the `grep` command to search the image file of the physical memory for the string “`smss.exe`” treating the file as ASCII text, ignoring case, and reporting only the byte offset of the line containing the desired string (see Figure 13). The `grep` search will most likely return several addresses, so each one must be evaluated until the `smss.exe` executive process block is found. Examine each potential address of the physical memory image using `hexdump` with the `display hex+ASCII` and `offset` options (see Figure 14). Set the offset of `hexdump` to one of the byte offsets returned by `grep`. Find the string “`smss.exe`” and note the address where it begins. Subtract the hex offset of the process name field (0x174) from the hex address of “`smss.exe`.” The new address marks the beginning of the EPROCESS block and the location of the block’s type field. Verify that the first byte starting at the new address is 0x03, which indicates that the following type is of EPROCESS block type (see Figure 15). If the byte matches, then the address at which it is found is the beginning address of the `smss.exe` EPROCESS block.

Figure 13. Use of grep to find smss.exe

```
bash$ grep -abi smss.exe pmem.dmp
27767252;46154142;102015767;smss.exe
102015863;smss.exe
smss.exe
227127165;smss.exe
237550365;smss.exe
bash$
```

Figure 14. Use of hexdump command to view smss.exe EPROCESS block

```
bash$ hexdump -Cv -s 27767252 pmem.dmp | more
```

Figure 15. hexdump view of smss.exe EPROCESS block

```
01a7b1d4 50 72 6f e3 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 30 11 bf 81 |Pro.....0...|
01a7b1e4 00 00 00 22 01 00 00 00 86 16 00 e1 00 00 1b 00 |...".....|
01a7b1f4 00 00 00 00 f8 b1 a7 81 f8 b1 a7 81 00 b2 a7 81 |.....|
01a7b204 00 b2 a7 81 00 d0 0b 06 00 e0 0b 06 00 00 00 00 |.....|
01a7b214 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ac 20 00 00 |.....|
01a7b224 00 00 00 00 32 00 00 00 07 00 00 00 30 b2 a7 81 |...2.....0...|
01a7b234 30 b2 a7 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d0 31 b2 81 |0.....1...|
01a7b244 58 cf ab 81 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 0b 06 |X.....|
01a7b254 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 ac 81 ed |.....@....|
01a7b264 73 42 c6 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |sB.....|
01a7b274 38 01 00 00 b0 81 9f 81 58 cc bc 81 80 02 00 00 |8.....X.....|
01a7b284 80 14 00 00 29 00 00 00 18 03 00 00 10 34 00 00 |.....).....4...|
01a7b294 2b 00 00 00 29 00 00 00 00 60 bc 00 00 60 3b 00 |+...)).....;..|
01a7b2a4 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....|
01a7b2b4 08 d8 3c e1 36 a9 40 e1 01 00 00 00 ac ec f3 f9 |...<.6.@.....|
01a7b2c4 00 00 00 00 01 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 d0 b2 a7 81 |.....|
01a7b2d4 d0 b2 a7 81 00 00 00 00 00 63 00 00 01 00 00 00 |.....c.....|
01a7b2e4 ac ec f3 f9 00 00 00 00 01 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 |.....|
01a7b2f4 f4 b2 a7 81 f4 b2 a7 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....|
01a7b304 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 e6 a3 81 e0 e6 a3 81 |.....|
01a7b314 00 00 00 00 1b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....|
01a7b324 00 00 00 00 48 b4 38 e1 00 00 58 48 80 05 56 80 |...H.8...XH.V..|
01a7b334 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....|
01a7b344 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 02 00 e1 50 b3 a7 81 |.....P.....|
01a7b354 50 b3 a7 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |IP.....|
01a7b364 53 4d 53 53 2e 45 58 45 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |SMSS,EXE.....|
01a7b374 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 32 b2 81 |.....L2.....|
01a7b384 d4 cf ab 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 |.....|
01a7b394 ff 0f 1f 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f0 fd 7f |.....|
01a7b3a4 00 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 |.....|
01a7b3b4 00 00 00 00 a6 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 1a 10 00 00 |.....|
01a7b3c4 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 26 03 00 00 |.....&.....|
01a7b3d4 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 2b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....+.....|
01a7b3e4 60 fa 9e 81 10 25 80 ed 73 42 c6 01 04 00 01 00 |...%.sB.....|
01a7b3f4 ca 00 00 00 70 00 00 00 59 00 00 00 32 00 00 00 |...p...Y...2...|
01a7b404 59 01 00 00 00 30 50 c0 fc 30 f6 f9 ec cd bc 81 |Y...OP...0.....|
01a7b414 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....|
01a7b424 ca 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 |.....|
01a7b434 00 00 00 00 40 08 0c 00 03 01 00 00 b3 82 01 05 |...@.....|
01a7b444 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 00 01 00 |.....P.....|
```

2. Find System EPROCESS Block

Note the address located +0x08c relative to the start of the smss.exe EPROCESS block. This address marks the location of the EPROCESS block's back link, pointing to the previous EPROCESS block in the active process list. Since the smss.exe process is always the second process executed in Windows XP, the back link pointer points to the System

process: the first process in the active process list. Since the back link actually points to the back link of the previous EPROCESS block, the address contained in the back link field must be adjusted to the starting address for the System EPROCESS block. Subtract 0x088 from the back link address to compute the virtual address of the head of the process list. The new address should be verified to be that of the System EPROCESS block to ensure that the program will function properly. Repeat the steps used to view the smss.exe EPROCESS block and look for the “System” string in the hexdump view (see Figure 16). Be sure to compute the physical address by subtracting the kernel offset of 0x80000000 from the virtual address when using hexdump.

Figure 16. hexdump view of the System EPROCESS block

```

01bccbd0 03 00 1b 00 00 00 00 00 d8 cb bc 81 d8 cb bc 81 |.....|
01bccbe0 e0 cb bc 81 e0 cb bc 81 00 90 03 00 00 00 00 00 |.....|
01bccbf0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....|
01bccc00 ac 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 05 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....|
01bccc10 10 cc bc 81 10 cc bc 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....|
01bccc20 08 cb bc 81 b8 18 a7 81 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 |.....|
01bccc30 29 00 08 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....|
01bccc40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....|
01bccc50 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 78 b2 a7 81 d8 04 56 80 |.....x...V..|
01bccc60 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....|
01bccc70 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 07 00 00 00 00 80 29 00 |.....).|
01bccc80 00 50 1d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |...P.....|
01bccc90 00 00 00 00 50 1d 00 e1 dd 17 00 e1 01 00 00 00 |...P.....|
01bccca0 98 b9 dd f8 00 00 00 00 01 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 |.....|
01bcccb0 b0 cc bc 81 b0 cc bc 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....|
01bccc00 01 00 00 00 b0 aa e9 f9 00 00 00 00 01 00 04 00 |.....|
01bccd00 00 00 00 00 d4 cc bc 81 d4 cc bc 81 00 00 00 00 |.....|
01bccc00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e8 81 bc 81 |.....|
01bccf00 e8 81 bc 81 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....|
01bccd00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....|
01bccd10 80 05 56 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |...V.....|
01bccd20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 02 00 e1 |.....|
01bccd30 30 cd bc 81 30 cd bc 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |0...0.....|
01bccd40 00 00 00 00 53 79 73 74 65 6d 00 00 00 00 00 00 |...System....|
01bccd50 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....|
01bccd60 84 cb bc 81 34 19 a7 81 50 43 79 e1 00 00 00 00 |...d...Pfu....|

```

3. Compile

Compile the program using the make command, if not already compiled, and the program will be ready for use.

B. EXECUTION

After successful compilation, run wpmoa to begin the program. If the file name of the physical memory image is valid and the address of the PS_ACTIVE_PROCESS_HEAD correct, the program prints a greeting to the screen and displays the number of processes found in the image file. If the

PS_ACTIVE_PROCESS_HEAD was incorrect for the image being analyzed, then the program will appear to hang and must be interrupted or killed by the user to stop. After printing the number of process blocks found, the program displays a table associating a number with each process found followed by a command prompt (see Figure 17).

Figure 17. Welcome screen and process table

```
Windows Physical Memory Offline Analyzer
Use the help command for information

49 processes found in bmem.dmp

[001] System           [002] smss.exe         [003] csrss.exe       [004] winlogon.exe
[005] services.exe     [006] lsass.exe       [007] ati2evxx.exe    [008] svchost.exe
[009] svchost.exe      [010] svchost.exe     [011] svchost.exe    [012] svchost.exe
[013] ccEvtMgr.exe     [014] spoolsv.exe      [015] scardsvr.exe    [016] inetinfo.exe
[017] mdm.exe          [018] NAVAPSVc.EXE     [019] NPROTECT.EXE    [020] NODDB.EXE
[021] svchost.exe      [022] vmware-authd.ex  [023] vmount2.exe      [024] vmmat.exe
[025] SymWSC.exe       [026] vmnetdhcp.exe   [027] alg.exe          [028] ati2evxx.exe
[029] explorer.exe     [030] StatusClient.ex [031] jusched.exe      [032] SOUNDMAN.EXE
[033] ccApp.exe        [034] qttask.exe       [035] point32.exe     [036] CLI.exe
[037] iTunesHelper.ex [038] iPodService.exe [039] DevDetect.exe    [040] MsgPlus.exe
[041] javaw.exe        [042] CLI.exe          [043] CLI.exe          [044] WINWORD.EXE
[045] OIS.EXE          [046] MALWARE.exe     [047] cmd.exe          [048] dd.exe
[049] nc.exe

>
```

At this stage, the available commands are help, quit, print, and translate. Commands are not case sensitive and only the first letter is required in order to execute a command. The help command prints the help menu. The quit command ends the program. The print command, which is followed by a number 1-999 or the word *all* prints information about one of the processes or all of the processes found. This number can be found on the main menu process list table. The number corresponds to the order in which the processes occurred in the EPROCESS list (e.g. the System process always corresponds to number 1 because it is always at the head of the process list). The print command prints to a file specified by the command line argument, or standard out if no argument was given. There is no limit to the use of the print command. Any one of the processes can be printed to the same place multiples times. The output, STDOUT or a file, is updated once the print command is executed, so that the process information can be viewed with the program still running. Once the print command is finished executing, the command prompt appears again for the next user command.

The translate command provides virtual address translation to the user. Upon execution of the translate command, prompts for necessary information appear for the user to follow. The required information is the virtual address and page directory address, where the page directory address is provided in the printed report of the process of interest. If the virtual address maps to a valid physical address, then that address is printed to the screen and the user is returned to the command prompt.

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VI. FORENSIC ANALYSIS OF PHYSICAL MEMORY DUMP

To verify the operation of the Windows Physical Memory Offline Analyzer, a test C program was run on a system running Windows XP during a live capture of the physical memory and the image was analyzed with the WPMOA program. In addition, the WPMOA program was used to analyze the physical memory images provided in the DFRWS challenge.

A. THE TEST PROGRAM

The test program was named MALWARE.exe and the source code for it is included in Appendix A. This program was intended to be very simple and not demand a lot of CPU time, but it was also desired that the program execute continually during the main memory capture. Reading input from STDIN achieved all of that with only a few lines of code. The program reads a string from STDIN and prints it to STDOUT. If the input string is “quit” then the program prints the string followed by “Hello World!” to STDOUT and then exits normally. For the test, the program was executed and left running while physical memory was captured from the target system.

B. THE FORENSIC RESULTS

Figure 18. MALWARE.exe WPMOA report

```
Virtual Address: 0x86365bf0 Image name: MALWARE.exe
ID: 3628 Parent ID: 1184 Created: 2006-05-28 04:25:52 UTC
Virtual Size: 6 MB Exited: No time reported
Peak Virtual Size: 10 MB Handle count: 8
Number of active threads: 1
Open Handles:
Type Name(if one exists)
File Windows HD\Documents and Settings\John\My Documents\Visual
Studio 2005\Projects\MALWARE\release
WindowStation WinSta0
Event
File Windows HD\WINDOWS\WinSxS
\x86_Microsoft.VC80.CRT_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_8.0.50727.42_x-ww_0de06acd
Port
Directory Windows
Directory KnownDlls
KeyedEvent CritSecOutOfMemoryEvent
```

The PS_ACTIVE_PROCESS_HEAD address was found in the physical memory image in accordance with the instructions from Chapter IV and the WPMOA program was compiled successfully. The forensic report of MALWARE.exe was found and

printed to a file (see Figure 18). The created time correlated to the time that it was executed and the exit time does not exist because the program had not been exited. The MALWARE process reported a file handle to the directory 'Windows HD\Documents and Settings\John\My Documents\Visual Studio 2005\Projects\MALWARE\release', which was the base directory of MALWARE.exe. From the report, it is known that the MALWARE program was executed at 04:25 GMT on May 28, 2006 and was still running at the time of the capture. In this example, the MALWARE.exe file was executed from the system hard drive, but if it were run from a removable drive, the report would indicate that. In a test where MALWARE.exe was executed from a floppy disk, the WPMOA report reflected the new base directory of the program (see Figure 19). This information would indicate where the malicious code was executed from, which may reveal how the malicious code was transferred to the attacked system. In the report shown in Figure 19, an investigator would have learned that the source of the attack was a floppy disk and that the intruder had physical access to the floppy drive.

Figure 19. MALWARE.exe WPMOA report showing removable drive

```

Virtual Address:      0x85796da0      Image name:      MALWARE.exe
ID:      4060      Parent ID:      692      Created:      2006-05-28 09:03:27 UTC
Virtual Size:      6 MB      Exited:      No time reported
Peak Virtual Size:      6 MB      Page Directory:      0x3ef83000
Handle count:      8      Number of threads:      1
Open Handles:
Type      Name(if one exists)
KeyedEvent      CritSecOutOfMemoryEvent
Directory      KnownDlls
File      \Driver\Floppydisk
Directory      Windows
Port
File      Windows HD\WINDOWS\WinSxS
\X86_Microsoft.VC80.CRT_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_8.0.50727.42_x-ww_0de06acd
Event
WindowStation      WinSta0

```

Beyond knowing where and when the malicious code was executed, the report does not help investigators understand how the code worked or even what the actual code was. For that information, the WPMOA program creates files from the working set found in the malicious program's EPROCESS block. In the MALWARE.exe test, the WPMOA program created thirteen files with various virtual address ranges. The virtual address range of interest was the range 0x00400000 to 0x7FFFFFFF because within this

range is kept application and dynamically linked library machine code, thread stacks, and global variables. The file expected to contain the application machine code was the one named 00400000h-00405000h. The 00400000h-00405000h was compared with the MALWARE.exe file. This comparison revealed that the first 1024 bytes were identical between the two files. Because the working set pages represent sections of data referenced by threads, there are large spaces of zeroes in the 00400000h-00405000h file, where there are none in the original MALWARE.exe file. At the 4096-byte offset, the size of a page in the tested system, the 00400000h-00405000h file is identical to the next section in the MALWARE.exe for 2048 bytes. The final section of the executable file is loaded into the working set of the MALWARE.exe process similarly to the manners of the first two sections.

Figure 20. WPMOA dd.exe report

```

Virtual Address:      0x857e6020      Image name:          dd.exe
ID:      2996      Parent ID:      152      Created: 2006-06-11 21:38:45 UTC
Virtual Size:      14 MB      Exited:      No time reported
Peak Virtual Size:      14 MB      Page Directory:      0x2f87c000
Handle count:      23      Number of threads:      1
Open Handles:
Type      Name(if one exists)
File      Windows HD\Documents and Settings\John
Mutant      DBWinMutex
File
Section      PhysicalMemory
Port
Key

```

The results from the MALWARE.exe test were ideal because all of the executable code was recovered from the process' working set. A larger program will not likely yield in such ideal results as obtained from the MALWARE test. Using the WPMOA program to generate a report on George Garner's dd.exe program demonstrates this issue. The printed report does indicate data that correlates with facts pertaining to its use for copying physical memory (see Figure 20).

In addition to the report generated by the WPMOA program, the working set files were created. It is in the working set files where the discrepancies exist. Comparing the dd.exe executable file with the 00411000h-004f1000h file generated by the WPMOA program does not give the same results as the MALWARE test. Not all of the sections of

dd.exe were part of the working set at the time of the physical memory capture and must have been swapped to the system swap file.

C. RESULTS FROM DFRWS CHALLENGE

The WPMOA program was unable to analyze the physical memory images provided by the DFRWS 2005 challenge because the images were obtained from a Windows 2000 system. Windows 2000 differs from Windows XP and Windows 2003 Server enough to prevent forensic analysis by the WPMOA program. When executed, the program appears to hang and does not reach the interactive menu.

VII. FUTURE WORK

Future work for this topic includes expanding the forensic analysis of Windows virtual memory to the system swap file. Non-resident virtual pages are stored to the system swap file located on the system hard disk to create free space in main memory. With the program developed for this report, only resident pages in main memory are analyzed for forensic evidence. An executable file being executed by a process is loaded into memory by sections. If the file is very large or the working set is very small, some sections of the file may be copied to the swap file and removed from main memory. The WPMOA program would only be able to extract the resident pages containing the file content and the complete original file may not be recovered. This problem would be eliminated by combining both the physical memory image with the system swap file. Their combination yields a complete view of the virtual address space for all processes running on the system.

The current manual process of locating the head of the active process list in the memory image may intimidate users inexperienced with hexdump and grep commands. Future work could be done to automate this process to relieve the burden from the user. The instructions for manually locating the address could be translated to machine language for the computer to carry out. As 1 GB RAM capacities is not uncommon in many modern computers, the automation should be efficient to minimize the time required to locate the address in question.

Unfortunately, the results of this work could not verify the findings of the DFRWS challenge because the tool developed does not support RAM images for Windows 2000 systems. Future work could expand the compatibility of the WPMOA program to be able to analyze physical memory images obtained from Windows 2000 systems. The work could then be verified against the findings posted on the DFRWS 2005 challenge website in Ref.8.

Another area of research would be integrating the WPMOA program functionality into another forensics tool, such as Autopsy. It would be convenient to have the

functionality of Autopsy include to the ability to analyze physical memory images in addition to analysis of file systems already supported.

APPENDIX A. WPMOAH

```
/******
Name: Windows Physical Memory Offline Analyzer
File: wpmoa.h
Version: 1.0
Author: John Schultz

Description: Console Program which enumerates the processes running on
a Windows PC. The program reads an offline copy of the physical memory
for all the information gathered about the running processes.
*****/

#include<stdlib.h>
#include<stdio.h>
#include<string.h>
#include<strings.h>
#include<ctype.h>
#include<unistd.h>
#include<time.h>
#include"win32structs.h"

/*kernel offset of 0x80000000 set for WinXP & Win2K3 Server*/
#define KERNEL_OFFSET 0x80000000
/*value set on case by case basis see chapter IV for instructions*/
#define PS_ACTIVE_PROCESS_HEAD 0x867c6660 /* 0x81bccbd0 */
/*PAGESIZE set to the pagesize of system RAM image was taken from
  4096 bytes is typical*/
#define PAGESIZE 4096

void print_report(struct EPROCESS *[] , int , FILE * restrict );

void win_time(long long , char [] );

void unicode_to_ascii(char *, unsigned short );

int process_count(FILE * restrict );

int enumerate_processes(FILE * restrict, struct EPROCESS ** );

long virtual_to_physical(long , long , FILE * restrict );

void *enumerate_handle_table(FILE * restrict , struct EPROCESS *);

int enumerate_workingsetlist(FILE * restrict , struct EPROCESS * );

int longcmp(const void * , const void * );
```

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APPENDIX B. WIN32STRUCTS.H

```
/******  
Name Windows Physical Memory Offline Analyzer  
File win32structs.h  
Version 1.0  
Author John Schultz
```

```
Description Console Program which enumerates the processes running on a  
Windows PC. The program reads an offline copy of the  
physical memory for all the information gathered about the  
running processes.
```

```
*****/
```

```
#include<sys/cdefs.h>
```

```
#ifndef __WIN32STRUCTS_H  
#define __WIN32STRUCTS_H
```

```
__BEGIN_DECLS
```

```
/*Each struct is defined based on that given by the Windows(R) Kernel  
Debugger with few exceptions, which are noted*/
```

```
struct _unnamed {  
    /* +0x000 */ long double var01;  
    /* +0x00a */ long double var02;  
    /* +0x014 */ long double var03;  
    /* +0x01e */ long double var04;  
};
```

```
struct LIST_ENTRY {  
    /* +0x000 */ void *Flink;  
    /* +0x004 */ void *Blink;  
};
```

```
struct UNICODE_STRING {  
    /* 0x000 */ unsigned short Length;  
    /* 0x002 */ unsigned short MaximumLength;  
    /* 0x004 */ unsigned short *Buffer;  
};
```

```
struct STRING {  
    /* 0x000 */ unsigned short Length;  
    /* 0x002 */ unsigned short MaximumLength;  
    /* 0x004 */ char *Buffer;  
};
```

```
struct DISPATCHER_HEADER {  
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned char Type;  
    /* +0x001 */ unsigned char Absolute;  
    /* +0x002 */ unsigned char Size;  
    /* +0x003 */ unsigned char Inserted;  
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long SignalState;  
    /* +0x008 */ struct LIST_ENTRY WaitList;
```

```

};

struct KEVENT {
    /* +0x000 */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER Header;
};

struct KDEVICE_QUEUE {
    /* +0x000 */ short Type;
    /* +0x002 */ short Size;
    /* +0x004 */ struct LIST_ENTRY DeviceListHead;
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned long Lock;
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned char Busy;
};

struct KDPC {
    /* +0x000 */ short Type;
    /* +0x002 */ unsigned char Number;
    /* +0x003 */ unsigned char Importance;
    /* +0x004 */ struct LIST_ENTRY DpcListEntry;
    /* +0x00c */ void *DeferredRoutine;
    /* +0x010 */ void *DeferredContext;
    /* +0x014 */ void *SystemArgument1;
    /* +0x018 */ void *SystemArgument2;
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned long *Lock;
};

struct MMWSLE_HASH {
    /* +0x000 */ void *Key;
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long Index;
};

struct MMSUPPORT_FLAGS {
    /* +0x000 */ int Sessionspace : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int BeingTrimmed : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int SessionLoader : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int TrimHard : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int WorkingSetHard : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int AddressSpaceBeingDeleted : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int Available : 10;
    /* +0x000 */ int AllowWorkingSetAdjustment : 8;
    /* +0x000 */ int MemoryPriority : 8;
};

struct MMWSL {
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned long Quota;
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long FirstFree;
    /* +0x008 */ unsigned long FirstDynamic;
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned long LastEntry;
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned long NextSlot;
    /* +0x014 */ void *Wsle; /*points to MMWSLE*/
    /* +0x018 */ unsigned long LastInitializedWsle;
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned long NonDirectCount;
    /* +0x020 */ struct MMWSLE_HASH *HashTable;
    /* +0x024 */ unsigned long HashTableSize;
    /* +0x028 */ unsigned long NumberOfCommittedPageTables;
    /* +0x02c */ void *HashTableStart;
    /* +0x030 */ void *HighestPermittedHashAddress;
};

```



```

    /* +0x034 */ unsigned long      NumberOfImageWaiters;
    /* +0x038 */ unsigned long      VadBitMapHint;
    /* +0x03c */ unsigned short     UsedPageTableEntries[768];
    /* +0x63c */ unsigned long      CommittedPageTables[24];
};

struct MMSUPPORT {
    /* +0x000 */ long long          LastTrimTime;
    /* +0x008 */ struct MMSUPPORT_FLAGS Flags;
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned long      PageFaultCount;
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned long      PeakWorkingSetSize;
    /* +0x014 */ unsigned long      WorkingSetSize;
    /* +0x018 */ unsigned long      MinimumWorkingSetSize;
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned long      MaximumWorkingSetSize;
    /* +0x020 */ struct MMWSL       *VmWorkingSetList;
    /* +0x024 */ struct LIST_ENTRY   WorkingSetExpansionLinks;
    /* +0x02c */ unsigned long      Claim;
    /* +0x030 */ unsigned long      NextEstimationSlot;
    /* +0x034 */ unsigned long      NextAgingSlot;
    /* +0x038 */ unsigned long      EstimatedAvailable;
    /* +0x03c */ unsigned long      GrowthSinceLastEstimate;
};

struct FAST_MUTEX {
    /* +0x000 */ long              Count;
    /* +0x004 */ void              *Owner;
    /* +0x008 */ unsigned long     Contention;
    /* +0x00c */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER Event;
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned long     OldIrql;
};

struct CURDIR {
    /* 0x000 */ struct UNICODE_STRING DosPath;
    /* 0x008 */ void                  *Handle;
};

struct PEB_LDR_DATA {
    /* 0x000 */ unsigned long      Length;
    /* 0x004 */ unsigned char      Initialized;
    /* 0x008 */ void              *SsHandle;
    /* 0x00c */ struct LIST_ENTRY   InLoadOrderModuleList;
    /* 0x014 */ struct LIST_ENTRY   InMemoryOrderModuleList;
    /* 0x01c */ struct LIST_ENTRY   InInitializationOrderModuleList;
    /* 0x024 */ void              *EntryInProgress;
};

struct KSEMAPHORE {
    /* +0x000 */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER Header;
    /* +0x010 */ long              Limit;
};

struct KGDTENTRY {
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned short     LimitLow;
    /* +0x002 */ unsigned short     BaseLow;
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long      HighWord;
};

```

```

struct KIDTENTRY {
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned short    Offset;
    /* +0x002 */ unsigned short    Selector;
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned short    Access;
    /* +0x006 */ unsigned short    ExtendedOffset;
};

struct HANDLE_TABLE {
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned long      TableCode;
    /* +0x004 */ struct EPROCESS    *QuotaProcess;
    /* +0x008 */ void                *UniqueProcessID;
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned long      HandleTableLock[4];
    /* +0x01c */ struct LIST_ENTRY  HandleTableList;
    /* +0x02c */ unsigned long      HandleContentionEvent;
    /* +0x030 */ void                *DebugInfo;
    /* +0x034 */ long                ExtraInfoPages;
    /* +0x038 */ unsigned long      FirstFree;
    /* +0x03c */ unsigned long      LastFree;
    /* +0x040 */ unsigned long      NextHandleNeedingPool;
    /* +0x044 */ long                HandleCount;
    /* +0x048 */ unsigned long      Flags;
};

struct OWNER_ENTRY {
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned long      OwnerThread;
    /* +0x004 */ long                OwnerCount; */
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long      TableSize;
};

struct OBJECT_TYPE_INITIALIZER {
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned short      Length;
    /* +0x002 */ unsigned char        UseDefaultObject;
    /* +0x003 */ unsigned char        CaseInsensitive;
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long        InvalidAttributes;
    /* +0x008 */ void                *GenericMapping;
    /* +0x018 */ unsigned long        ValidAccessMask;
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned char        SecurityRequired;
    /* +0x01d */ unsigned char        MaintainHandleCount;
    /* +0x01e */ unsigned char        MaintainTypeList;
    /* +0x020 */ void                *PoolType;
    /* +0x024 */ unsigned long        DefaultPagedPoolCharge;
    /* +0x028 */ unsigned long        DefaultNonPagedPoolCharge;
    /* +0x02c */ void                *DumpProcedure;
    /* +0x030 */ void                *OpenProcedure;
    /* +0x034 */ void                *CloseProcedure;
    /* +0x038 */ void                *DeleteProcedure;
    /* +0x03c */ void                *ParseProcedure;
    /* +0x040 */ void                *SecurityProcedure;
    /* +0x044 */ void                *QueryNameProcedure;
    /* +0x048 */ void                *OkayToCloseProcedure;
};

struct ERESOURCE {
    /* +0x000 */ struct LIST_ENTRY    SystemResourcesList;
    /* +0x008 */ struct OWNER_ENTRY    *OwnerTable;
    /* +0x00c */ short                ActiveCount;
    /* +0x00e */ unsigned short        Flag;
};

```

```

    /* +0x010 */ struct KSEMAPHORE      *SharedWaiters;
    /* +0x014 */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER *ExclusiveWaiters;
    /* +0x018 */ struct OWNER_ENTRY      OwnerThreads[2];
    /* +0x028 */ unsigned long           ContentionCount;
    /* +0x02c */ unsigned short          NumberOfSharedWaiters;
    /* +0x02e */ unsigned short          NumberOfExclusiveWaiters;
    /* +0x030 */ void                    *Address;
    /* +0x030 */ unsigned long           CreatorBackTraceIndex;
    /* +0x034 */ unsigned long           SpinLock;
};

struct SEGMENT {
    /* +0x000 */ struct CONTROL_AREA *ControlArea;
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long       TotalNumberOfPtes;
    /* +0x008 */ unsigned long       NonExtendedPtes;
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned long       WritableUserReferences;
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned long long  SizeOfSegment;
    /* +0x018 */ long                SegmentPteTemplate;
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned long       NumberOfCommittedPages;
    /* +0x020 */ /* struct MMEXTEND_INFO */void *ExtendInfo;
    /* +0x024 */ void                *SystemImageBase;
    /* +0x028 */ void                *BasedAddress;
    /* +0x02c */ long                u1;
    /* +0x030 */ long                u2;
    /* +0x034 */ long                *PrototypePte;
    /* +0x038 */ long                ThePtes[1];
};

struct CONTROL_AREA {
    /* +0x000 */ struct SEGMENT      *Segment;
    /* +0x004 */ struct LIST_ENTRY   DereferenceList;
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned long       NumberOfSectionReferences;
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned long       NumberOfPfnReferences;
    /* +0x014 */ unsigned long       NumberOfMappedViews;
    /* +0x018 */ unsigned short      NumberOfSubsections;
    /* +0x01a */ unsigned short      FlushInProgressCount;
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned long       NumberOfUserReferences;
    /* +0x020 */ long               unnamed;
    /* +0x024 */ struct FILE_OBJECT  *FilePointer;
    /* +0x028 */ /*struct EVENT_COUNTER*/void *WaitingForDeletion;
    /* +0x02c */ unsigned short      ModifiedWriteCount;
    /* +0x02e */ unsigned short      NumberOfSystemCacheViews;
};

struct SUBSECTION {
    /* +0x000 */ struct CONTROL_AREA *ControlArea;
    /* +0x004 */ long               unnamed;
    /* +0x008 */ unsigned long       StartingSector;
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned long       NumberOfFullSectors;
    /* +0x010 */ /*struct MMPTE*/void *SubsectionBase;
    /* +0x014 */ unsigned long       UnusedPtes;
    /* +0x018 */ unsigned long       PtesInSubsection;
    /* +0x01c */ struct SUBSECTION  *NextSubsection;
};

struct SEGMENT_OBJECT {
    /* +0x000 */ void                *BaseAddress;

```

```

    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long      TotalNumberOfPtes;
    /* +0x008 */ long long          SizeOfSegment;
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned long      NonExtendedPtes;
    /* +0x014 */ unsigned long      ImageCommitment;
    /* +0x018 */ struct CONTROL_AREA *ControlArea;
    /* +0x01c */ struct SUBSECTION  *Subsection;
    /* +0x020 */ /*struct LARGE_CONTROL_AREA*/void *LargeControlArea;
    /* +0x024 */ /*struct MMSECTION_FLAGS*/ void *MmSectionFlags;
    /* +0x028 */ /*struct MMSUBSECTION_FLAGS*/ void
*MmSubSectionFlags;
};

struct SECTION_OBJECT_POINTERS {
    /* +0x000 */ void *DataSectionObject;
    /* +0x004 */ void *SharedCacheMap;
    /* +0x008 */ void *ImageSectionObject;
};

struct SECTION_OBJECT {
    /* +0x000 */ void *StartingVa;
    /* +0x004 */ void *EndingVa;
    /* +0x008 */ void *Parent;
    /* +0x00c */ void *LeftChild;
    /* +0x010 */ void *RightChild;
    /* +0x014 */ struct SEGMENT_OBJECT *Segment;
};

struct OBJECT_TYPE {
    /* +0x000 */ struct ERESOURCE      Mutex;
    /* +0x038 */ struct LIST_ENTRY     TypeList;
    /* +0x040 */ struct UNICODE_STRING Name;
    /* +0x048 */ void *DefaultObject;
    /* +0x04c */ unsigned long         Index;
    /* +0x050 */ unsigned long         TotalNumberOfObjects;
    /* +0x054 */ unsigned long         TotalNumberOfHandles;
    /* +0x058 */ unsigned long         HighWaterNumberOfObjects;
    /* +0x05c */ unsigned long         HighWaterNumberOfHandles;
    /* +0x060 */ struct OBJECT_TYPE_INITIALIZER TypeInfo;
    /* +0x0ac */ unsigned long         Key;
    /* +0x0b0 */ struct ERESOURCE      ObjectLocks[4];
};

struct OBJECT_HEADER {
    /* +0x000 */ long PointerCount;
    /* +0x004 */ long HandleCount; /*
    /* +0x004 */ void *NextToFree;
    /* +0x008 */ struct OBJECT_TYPE *Type;
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned char NameInfoOffset;
    /* +0x00d */ unsigned char HandleInfoOffset;
    /* +0x00e */ unsigned char QuotaInfoOffset;
    /* +0x00f */ unsigned char Flags;
    /* +0x010 */ /* struct OBJECT_CREATE_INFORMATION *ObjectCreateInfo;
*/
    /* +0x010 */ void *QuotaBlockCharged;
    /* +0x014 */ void *SecurityDescriptor;
};

```

```

struct VPB {
    /* +0x000 */ short                Type;
    /* +0x002 */ short                Size;
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned short       Flags;
    /* +0x006 */ unsigned short       VolumeLabelLength;
    /* +0x008 */ struct DEVICE_OBJECT *DeviceObject;
    /* +0x00c */ struct DEVICE_OBJECT *RealDevice;
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned long        SerialNumber;
    /* +0x014 */ unsigned long        ReferenceCount;
    /* +0x018 */ unsigned short       VolumeLabel[32];
    /*Unicode name*/
};

struct DEVICE_OBJECT {
    /* +0x000 */ short                Type;
    /* +0x002 */ unsigned short       Size;
    /* +0x004 */ long                 ReferenceCount;
    /* +0x008 */ struct DRIVER_OBJECT *DriverObject;
    /* +0x00c */ struct DEVICE_OBJECT *NextDevice;
    /* +0x010 */ struct DEVICE_OBJECT *AttachedDevice;
    /* +0x014 */ /* struct IRP */ void *CurrentIrp;
    /* +0x018 */ /* struct IO_TIMER */ void *Timer;
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned long        Flags;
    /* +0x020 */ unsigned long        Characteristics;
    /* +0x024 */ struct VPB           *Vpb;
    /* +0x028 */ void                 *DeviceExtension;
    /* +0x02c */ unsigned long        DeviceType;
    /* +0x030 */ char                 StackSize;
    /* +0x034 */ struct _unnamed       Queue;
    /* +0x05c */ unsigned long        AlignmentRequirement;
    /* +0x060 */ struct KDEVICE_QUEUE DeviceQueue;
    /* +0x074 */ struct KDPC           Dpc;
    /* +0x094 */ unsigned long        ActiveThreadCount;
    /* +0x098 */ void                 *SecurityDescriptor;
    /* +0x09c */ struct KEVENT         DeviceLock;
    /* +0x0ac */ unsigned short        SectorSize;
    /* +0x0ae */ unsigned short        Spare1;
    /* +0x0b0 */ /* struct DEVOBJ_EXTENSION */ void
    *DeviceObjectExtension;
    /* +0x0b4 */ void                 *Reserved;
};

struct DRIVER_OBJECT {
    /* +0x000 */ short                Type;
    /* +0x002 */ short                Size;
    /* +0x004 */ struct DEVICE_OBJECT *DeviceObject;
    /* +0x008 */ unsigned long        Flags;
    /* +0x00c */ void                 *DriverStart;
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned long        DriverSize;
    /* +0x014 */ void                 *DriverSection;
    /* +0x018 */ /* struct DRIVER_EXTENSION */ void *DriverExtension;
    /* +0x01c */ struct UNICODE_STRING DriverName;
    /* +0x024 */ struct UNICODE_STRING *HardwareDatabase;
    /* +0x028 */ /* struct FAST_IO_DISPATCH */ void *FastIoDispatch;
    /* +0x02c */ void                 *DriverInit;
    /* +0x030 */ void                 *DriverStartIo;
    /* +0x034 */ void                 *DriverUnload;
};

```

```

    /* +0x038 */ void                                *MajorFunction[28];
};

struct FILE_OBJECT {
    /* +0x000 */ short                                Type;
    /* +0x002 */ short                                Size;
    /* +0x004 */ struct DEVICE_OBJECT                *DeviceObject;
    /* +0x008 */ struct VPB                          *Vpb;
    /* +0x00c */ void                                *FsContext;
    /* +0x010 */ void                                *FsContext2;
    /* +0x014 */ struct SECTION_OBJECT_POINTERS      *SectionObjectPointer;
    /* +0x018 */ void                                *PrivateCacheMap;
    /* +0x01c */ long                                FinalStatus;
    /* +0x020 */ struct FILE_OBJECT                  *RelatedFileObject;
    /* +0x024 */ unsigned char                        LockOperation;
    /* +0x025 */ unsigned char                        DeletePending;
    /* +0x026 */ unsigned char                        ReadAccess;
    /* +0x027 */ unsigned char                        WriteAccess;
    /* +0x028 */ unsigned char                        DeleteAccess;
    /* +0x029 */ unsigned char                        SharedRead;
    /* +0x02a */ unsigned char                        SharedWrite;
    /* +0x02b */ unsigned char                        SharedDelete;
    /* +0x02c */ unsigned long                        Flags;
    /* +0x030 */ struct UNICODE_STRING                FileName;
    /* +0x038 */ long long                            CurrentByteOffset;
    /* +0x040 */ unsigned long                        Waiters;
    /* +0x044 */ unsigned long                        Busy;
    /* +0x048 */ void                                *LastLock;
    /* +0x04c */ struct KEVENT                        Lock;
    /* +0x05c */ struct KEVENT                        Event;
    /* +0x06c */ /* struct IO_COMPLETION_CONTEXT */ void
*CompletionContext;
};

struct EX_PUSH_LOCK {
    /* +0x000 */ int                                Waiting : 1; //LSB
    /* +0x000 */ int                                Exclusive : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int                                Shared : 30;
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned long Value;
    /* +0x000 */ void                                *Ptr;
};

struct OBJECT_DIRECTORY_ENTRY {
    /* +0x000 */ struct OBJECT_DIRECTORY_ENTRY *ChainLink;
    /* +0x004 */ void                                *Object;
};

struct OBJECT_DIRECTORY {
    /* +0x000 */ struct OBJECT_DIRECTORY_ENTRY *HashBuckets[37];
    /* +0x094 */ struct EX_PUSH_LOCK            Lock;
    /* +0x098 */ struct DEVICE_MAP              *DeviceMap;
    /* +0x09c */ unsigned long                  SessionId;
    /* +0x0a0 */ unsigned short                 Reserved;
    /* +0x0a2 */ unsigned short                 SymbolicLinkUsageCount;
};

struct DEVICE_MAP {

```



```

/* +0x01c */ struct RTL_CRITICAL_SECTION *FastPebLock;
/* +0x020 */ void *FastPebLockRoutine;
/* +0x024 */ void *FastPebUnlockRoutine;
/* +0x028 */ unsigned long EnvironmentUpdateCount;
/* +0x02c */ void *KernelCallbackTable;
/* +0x030 */ unsigned long SystemReserved[1];
/* +0x034 */ unsigned long AtlThunkSList;
/* +0x038 */ struct PEB_FREE_BLOCK *FreeList;
/* +0x03c */ unsigned long TlsExpansionCounter;
/* +0x040 */ void *TlsBitmap;
/* +0x044 */ unsigned long TlsBitmapBits[2];
/* +0x04c */ void *ReadOnlySharedMemoryBase;
/* +0x050 */ void *ReadOnlySharedMemoryHeap;
/* +0x054 */ void **ReadOnlyStaticServerData;
/* +0x058 */ void *AnsiCodePageData;
/* +0x05c */ void *OemCodePageData;
/* +0x060 */ void *UnicodeCaseTableData;
/* +0x064 */ unsigned long NumberOfProcessors;
/* +0x068 */ unsigned long NtGlobalFlag;
/* +0x070 */ long long CriticalSectionTimeout;
/* +0x078 */ unsigned long HeapSegmentReserve;
/* +0x07c */ unsigned long HeapSegmentCommit;
/* +0x080 */ unsigned long HeapDeCommitTotalFreeThreshold;
/* +0x084 */ unsigned long HeapDeCommitFreeBlockThreshold;
/* +0x088 */ unsigned long NumberOfHeaps;
/* +0x08c */ unsigned long MaximumNumberOfHeaps;
/* +0x090 */ void **ProcessHeaps;
/* +0x094 */ void *GdiSharedHandleTable;
/* +0x098 */ void *ProcessStarterHelper;
/* +0x09c */ unsigned long GdiDCAttributeList;
/* +0x0a0 */ void *LoaderLock;
/* +0x0a4 */ unsigned long OSMajorVersion;
/* +0x0a8 */ unsigned long OSMinorVersion;
/* +0x0ac */ unsigned short *OSBuildNumber;
/* +0x0ae */ unsigned short *OSCSVersion;
/* +0x0b0 */ unsigned long OSPlatformId;
/* +0x0b4 */ unsigned long ImageSubsystem;
/* +0x0b8 */ unsigned long ImageSubsystemMajorVersion;
/* +0x0bc */ unsigned long ImageSubsystemMinorVersion;
/* +0x0c0 */ unsigned long ImageProcessAffinityMask;
/* +0x0c4 */ unsigned long GdiHandleBuffer[34];
/* +0x14c */ void *PostProcessInitRoutine;
/* +0x150 */ void *TlsExpansionBitmap;
/* +0x154 */ unsigned long TlsExpansionBitmapBits[32];
/* +0x1d4 */ unsigned long SessionId;
/* +0x1d8 */ unsigned long long AppCompatFlags;
/* +0x1e0 */ unsigned long long AppCompatFlagsUser;
/* +0x1e8 */ void *pShimData;
/* +0x1ec */ void *AppCompatInfo;
/* +0x1f0 */ struct UNICODE_STRING CSDVersion;
/* +0x1f8 */ void *ActivationContextData;
/* +0x1fc */ void *ProcessAssemblyStorageMap;
/* +0x200 */ void *SystemDefaultActivationContextData;
/* +0x204 */ void *SystemAssemblyStorageMap;
/* +0x208 */ unsigned long MinimumStackCommit;
};

```



```

struct HARDWARE_PTE {
    /* +0x000 */ int Valid : 1; //LSB
    /* +0x000 */ int Write : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int Owner : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int WriteThrough : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int CacheDisable : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int Accessed : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int Dirty : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int LargePage : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int Global : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int CopyOnWrite : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int Prototype : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int Reserved : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int PageFrameNumber : 20;
};

struct KPROCESS {
    /* +0x000 */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER Header;
    /* +0x010 */ struct LIST_ENTRY ProfileListHead;
    /* +0x018 */ unsigned long DirectoryTableBase[2];
    /* +0x020 */ struct KGDTENTRY LdtDescriptor;
    /* +0x028 */ struct KIDENTENTRY Int21Descriptor;
    /* +0x030 */ unsigned short IopmOffset;
    /* +0x032 */ unsigned char Iopl;
    /* +0x033 */ unsigned char Unused;
    /* +0x034 */ unsigned long ActiveProcessors;
    /* +0x038 */ unsigned long KernelTime;
    /* +0x03c */ unsigned long UserTime;
    /* +0x040 */ struct LIST_ENTRY ReadyListHead;
    /* +0x048 */ void *SwapListEntry;
    /* +0x04c */ void *VdmTrapHandler;
    /* +0x050 */ struct LIST_ENTRY ThreadListHead;
    /* +0x058 */ unsigned long ProcessLock;
    /* +0x05c */ unsigned long Affinity;
    /* +0x060 */ unsigned short StackCount;
    /* +0x062 */ char BasePriority;
    /* +0x063 */ char ThreadQuantum;
    /* +0x064 */ unsigned char AutoAlignment;
    /* +0x065 */ unsigned char State;
    /* +0x066 */ unsigned char ThreadSeed;
    /* +0x067 */ unsigned char DisableBoost;
    /* +0x068 */ unsigned char PowerState;
    /* +0x069 */ unsigned char DisableQuantum;
    /* +0x06a */ unsigned char IdealNode;
    /* +0x06b */ KEXECUTE_OPTIONS Flags;
    /* +0x06b */ unsigned char ExecuteOptions;
};

struct EPROCESS {
    /* +0x000 */ struct KPROCESS Pcb;
    /* +0x06c */ unsigned long ProcessLock;
    /* +0x070 */ unsigned long long CreateTime;
    /* +0x078 */ unsigned long long ExitTime;
    /* +0x080 */ unsigned long RunDownProtect;
    /* +0x084 */ void *UniqueProcessId;
    /* +0x088 */ struct LIST_ENTRY ActiveProcessLinks;
    /* +0x090 */ unsigned long QuotaUsage[3];
};

```

```

/* +0x09c */ unsigned long      QuotaPeak[3];
/* +0x0a8 */ unsigned long      CommitCharge;
/* +0x0ac */ unsigned long      PeakVirtualSize;
/* +0x0b0 */ unsigned long      VirtualSize;
/* +0x0b4 */ struct LIST_ENTRY   SessionProcessLinks;
/* +0x0bc */ void                *DebugPort;
/* +0x0c0 */ void                *ExceptionPort;
/* +0x0c4 */ struct HANDLE_TABLE *ObjectTable;
/* +0x0c8 */ unsigned long      Token;
/* +0x0cc */ struct FAST_MUTEX   WorkingSetLock;
/* +0x0ec */ unsigned long      WorkingSetPage;
/* +0x0f0 */ struct FAST_MUTEX   AddressCreationLock;
/* +0x110 */ unsigned long      HyperSpaceLock;
/* +0x114 */ struct ETHREAD      *ForkInProgress;
/* +0x118 */ unsigned long      HardwareTrigger;
/* +0x11c */ void                *VadRoot;
/* +0x120 */ void                *VadHint;
/* +0x124 */ void                *CloneRoot;
/* +0x128 */ unsigned long      NumberOfPrivatePages;
/* +0x12c */ unsigned long      NumberOfLockedPages;
/* +0x130 */ void                *Win32Process;
/* +0x134 */ void                *Job; /*Points to EJOB*/
/* +0x138 */ void                *SectionObject;
/* +0x13c */ void                *SectionBaseAddress;
/* +0x140 */ void                *QuotaBlock; /*points to EPROCESS_QUOTA_BLOCK*/
/* +0x144 */ void                *WorkingSetWatch; /*points to PAGEFAULT_HISTORY*/
/* +0x148 */ void                *Win32WindowStation;
/* +0x14c */ void                *InheritedFromUniqueProcessId;
/* +0x150 */ void                *LdtInformation;
/* +0x154 */ void                *VadFreeHint;
/* +0x158 */ void                *VdmObjects;
/* +0x15c */ struct DEVICE_MAP    *DeviceMap;
/* +0x160 */ struct LIST_ENTRY    PhysicalVadList;
/* +0x168 */ struct HARDWARE_PTE  PageDirectoryPte;
/* +0x16c */ unsigned long        Filler;
/* +0x170 */ void                *Session;
/* +0x174 */ char                ImageFileName[16];
/* +0x184 */ struct LIST_ENTRY    JobLinks;
/* +0x18c */ void                *LockedPagesList;
/* +0x190 */ struct LIST_ENTRY    ThreadListHead;
/* +0x198 */ void                *SecurityPort;
/* +0x19c */ void                *PaeTop;
/* +0x1a0 */ unsigned long        ActiveThreads;
/* +0x1a4 */ unsigned long        GrantedAccess;
/* +0x1a8 */ unsigned long        DefaultHardErrorProcessing;
/* +0x1ac */ long                LastThreadExitStatus;
/* +0x1b0 */ struct PEB           *Peb;
/* +0x1b4 */ unsigned long        PrefetchTrace;
/* +0x1b8 */ unsigned long long   ReadOperationCount;
/* +0x1c0 */ unsigned long long   WriteOperationCount;
/* +0x1c8 */ unsigned long long   OtherOperationCount;
/* +0x1d0 */ unsigned long long   ReadTransferCount;
/* +0x1d8 */ unsigned long long   WriteTransferCount;
/* +0x1e0 */ unsigned long long   OtherTransferCount;
/* +0x1e8 */ unsigned long        CommitChargeLimit;
/* +0x1ec */ unsigned long        CommitChargePeak;
/* +0x1f0 */ void                *AweInfo;

```

```

    /* +0x1f4 */ unsigned long      SeAuditProcessCreationInfo;
    /* +0x1f8 */ struct MMSUPPORT    Vm;
    /* +0x238 */ unsigned long      LastFaultCount;
    /* +0x23c */ unsigned long      ModifiedPageCount;
    /* +0x240 */ unsigned long      NumberOfVads;
    /* +0x244 */ unsigned long      JobStatus;
    /* +0x248 */ unsigned long      Flags;
    /* +0x24c */ long               ExitStatus;
    /* +0x250 */ unsigned short      NextPageColor;
    /* +0x252 */ unsigned char       SubSystemMinorVersion;
    /* +0x253 */ unsigned char       SubSystemMajorVersion;
    /* +0x254 */ unsigned short      SubSystemVersion;
    /* +0x256 */ unsigned char       PriorityClass;
    /* +0x257 */ unsigned char       WorkingSetAcquiredUnsafe;
    /* +0x258 */ unsigned long      Cookie;
};

struct CLIENT_ID {
    /* +0x000 */ void *UniqueProcess;
    /* +0x004 */ void *UniqueThread;
};

struct KAPC_STATE {
    /* +0x000 */ struct LIST_ENTRY    ApcListHead[2];
    /* +0x010 */ struct KPROCESS      *Process;
    /* +0x014 */ unsigned char        KernelApcInProgress;
    /* +0x015 */ unsigned char        KernelApcPending;
    /* +0x016 */ unsigned char        UserApcPending;
    /* +0x017 */ unsigned char        Trailer;
};

struct KQUEUE {
    /* +0x000 */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER Header;
    /* +0x010 */ struct LIST_ENTRY        EntryListHead;
    /* +0x018 */ unsigned long            CurrentCount;
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned long            MaximumCount;
    /* +0x020 */ struct LIST_ENTRY        ThreadListHead;
};

struct KTIMER {
    /* +0x000 */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER Header;
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned long long        DueTime;
    /* +0x018 */ struct LIST_ENTRY        TimerListEntry;
    /* +0x020 */ struct KDPC              *Dpc;
    /* +0x024 */ long                     Period;
};

struct KAPC {
    /* +0x000 */ short                  Type;
    /* +0x002 */ short                  Size;
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long          Spare0;
    /* +0x008 */ struct KTHREAD          *Thread;
    /* +0x00c */ struct LIST_ENTRY        ApcListEntry;
    /* +0x014 */ void                   *KernelRoutine;
    /* +0x018 */ void                   *RundownRoutine;
    /* +0x01c */ void                   *NormalRoutine;
    /* +0x020 */ void                   *NormalContext;
};

```

```

    /* +0x024 */ void                *SystemArgument1;
    /* +0x028 */ void                *SystemArgument2;
    /* +0x02c */ char                ApcStateIndex;
    /* +0x02d */ char                ApcMode;
    /* +0x02e */ unsigned char       Inserted;
    /* +0x02f */ char                Trailer;
};

struct KWAIT_BLOCK {
    /* +0x000 */ struct LIST_ENTRY   WaitListEntry;
    /* +0x008 */ struct KTHREAD      *Thread;
    /* +0x00c */ void                *Object;
    /* +0x010 */ struct KWAIT_BLOCK *NextWaitBlock;
    /* +0x014 */ unsigned short      WaitKey;
    /* +0x016 */ unsigned short      WaitType;
};

struct KTHREAD {
    /* +0x000 */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER Header;
    /* +0x010 */ struct LIST_ENTRY       MutantListHead;
    /* +0x018 */ void                    *InitialStack;
    /* +0x01c */ void                    *StackLimit;
    /* +0x020 */ void                    *Teb;
    /* +0x024 */ void                    *TlsArray;
    /* +0x028 */ void                    *KernelStack;
    /* +0x02c */ unsigned char           DebugActive;
    /* +0x02d */ unsigned char           State;
    /* +0x02e */ unsigned char           Alerted[2];
    /* +0x030 */ unsigned char           Iopl;
    /* +0x031 */ unsigned char           NpxState;
    /* +0x032 */ char                    Saturation;
    /* +0x033 */ char                    Priority;
    /* +0x034 */ struct KAPC_STATE        ApcState;
    /* +0x04c */ unsigned long            ContextSwitches;
    /* +0x050 */ unsigned char            IdleSwapBlock;
    /* +0x051 */ unsigned char            Spare0[3];
    /* +0x054 */ long                     WaitStatus;
    /* +0x058 */ unsigned char            WaitIrql;
    /* +0x059 */ char                     WaitMode;
    /* +0x05a */ unsigned char            WaitNext;
    /* +0x05b */ unsigned char            WaitReason;
    /* +0x05c */ struct KWAIT_BLOCK       *WaitBlockList;
    /* +0x060 */ struct LIST_ENTRY        WaitListEntry;
    /* +0x068 */ unsigned long            WaitTime;
    /* +0x06c */ char                     BasePriority;
    /* +0x06d */ unsigned char            DecrementCount;
    /* +0x06e */ char                     PriorityDecrement;
    /* +0x06f */ char                     Quantum;
    /* +0x070 */ struct KWAIT_BLOCK       WaitBlock[4];
    /* +0x0d0 */ void                    *LegoData;
    /* +0x0d4 */ unsigned long            KernelApcDisable;
    /* +0x0d8 */ unsigned long            UserAffinity;
    /* +0x0dc */ unsigned char            SystemAffinityActive;
    /* +0x0dd */ unsigned char            PowerState;
    /* +0x0de */ unsigned char            NpxIrql;
    /* +0x0df */ unsigned char            InitialNode;
    /* +0x0e0 */ void                    *ServiceTable;
};

```

```

/* +0x0e4 */ struct KQUEUE
/* +0x0e8 */ unsigned long
/* +0x0f0 */ struct KTIMER
/* +0x118 */ struct LIST_ENTRY
/* +0x120 */ unsigned long
/* +0x124 */ unsigned long
/* +0x128 */ unsigned char
/* +0x129 */ unsigned char
/* +0x12a */ unsigned char
/* +0x12b */ unsigned char
/* +0x12c */ void
/* +0x130 */ void
/* +0x134 */ void
/* +0x138 */ struct KAPC_STATE
/* +0x140 */ char
/* +0x141 */ unsigned char
/* +0x142 */ unsigned char
/* +0x143 */ unsigned char
/* +0x144 */ unsigned long
/* +0x148 */ unsigned long
/* +0x14c */ struct KAPC_STATE
/* +0x164 */ unsigned char
/* +0x165 */ unsigned char
/* +0x166 */ unsigned char
/* +0x167 */ unsigned char
/* +0x168 */ void
/* +0x16c */ struct KAPC
/* +0x19c */ struct KSEMAPHORE
/* +0x1b0 */ struct LIST_ENTRY
/* +0x1b8 */ char
/* +0x1b9 */ char
/* +0x1ba */ unsigned char
/* +0x1bb */ unsigned char
/* +0x1bc */ long long
};

struct ETHREAD {
/* +0x000 */ struct KTHREAD
/* +0x1c0 */ long long
/* +0x1c8 */ long long
/* +0x1d0 */ long
/* +0x1d4 */ struct LIST_ENTRY
/* +0x1dc */ void
/* +0x1e0 */ unsigned long
/* +0x1e4 */ struct LIST_ENTRY
/* +0x1ec */ struct CLIENT_ID
/* +0x1f4 */ struct KSEMAPHORE
/* +0x208 */ void
/* +0x20c */ void
/* +0x210 */ struct LIST_ENTRY
/* +0x218 */ unsigned long
/* +0x21c */ void
/* +0x220 */ struct EPROCESS
/* +0x224 */ void
/* +0x228 */ void
/* +0x22c */ struct LIST_ENTRY
/* +0x234 */ unsigned long

*Queue;
*Queue;
ApcQueueLock;
Timer;
QueueListEntry;
SoftAffinity;
Affinity;
Preempted;
ProcessReadyQueue;
KernelStackResident;
NextProcessor;
*CallbackStack;
*Win32Thread;
*TrapFrame; /*points to KTRAP_FRAME*/
*ApcStatePointer[2];
PreviousMode;
EnableStackSwap;
LargeStack;
ResourceIndex;
KernelTime;
UserTime;
SavedApcState;
Alertable;
ApcStateIndex;
ApcQueueable;
AutoAlignment;
*StackBase;
SuspendApc;
SuspendSemaphore;
ThreadListEntry;
FreezeCount;
SuspendCount;
IdealProcessor;
DisableBoost;
Trailer;

Tcb;
CreateTime;
ExitTime;
ExitStatus;
PostBlockList;
*TerminationPort;
ActiveTimerListLock;
ActiveTimerListHead;
Cid;
LpcReplySemaphore;
*LpcReplyMessage;
*ImpersonationInfo;
IrpList;
TopLevelIrp;
*DeviceToVerify;
*ThreadsProcess;
*StartAddress;
*Win32StartAddress;
ThreadListEntry;
RundownProtect;

```

```

/* +0x238 */ unsigned long      ThreadLock;
/* +0x23c */ unsigned long      LpcReplyMessageId;
/* +0x240 */ unsigned long      ReadClusterSize;
/* +0x244 */ unsigned long      GrantedAccess;
/* +0x248 */ unsigned long      CrossThreadFlags;
/* +0x24c */ unsigned long      SameThreadPassiveFlags;
/* +0x250 */ unsigned long      SameThreadApcFlags;
/* +0x254 */ unsigned char      ForwardClusterOnly;
/* +0x255 */ unsigned char      DisablePageFaultClustering;
};

__END_DECLS

#endif

```

APPENDIX C. WPMOA.C

```

/*****
Name: Windows Physical Memory Offline Analyzer
File: wpmoa.c
Version: 1.0
Author: John Schultz

Description: Contains main as well as functions for running the user
interactive menus. Contains conversion functions for various data
reported by the dissector program.
*****/

#include "wpmoa.h"

/*****
Main opens the required i/o files and controls the main menu commands.
When the program is quit, main closes all opened i/o files and returns
0.
*****/
int main( int argc, char **argv ) {
    FILE * restrict imgFile = NULL;
    char command[64];
    char *action;
    char argstr[32];
    long address = 0;
    int argint = 0;
    int argint2 = 0;
    int numofProcs = 0;
    char outfile[32] = "STDOUT";
    const char welcomescreen[] =
        "Windows Physical Memory Offline Analyzer\n"
        "Use the help command for information\n";
    const char helpmenu[] =
        "Commands are caseinsensitive\n"
        "HELP - prints this menu\n"
        "PRINT ALL|1-999 - prints information about a process\n"
        "QUIT - exits program\n"
        "TRANSLATE - translate a virtual address to physical address\n";
    const char usage[] =
        "Usage: wpmoa [-f file] image\n";

    /*Open the image file, specified by last argument desired to be
analyzed*/
    FILE * restrict output = stdout; /*file handle for output, default
to stdout*/

    if( argc < 2 ) {
        puts(usage);
        exit(-1);
    }

    imgFile = fopen(argv[argc-1], "r");
    if( imgFile == NULL )

```

```

    fprintf(stderr,"Error: Could not open %s!\nTry
another?\n",argstr);

    for( int n=1;n<argc-1;n++ ) {
        if( strcmp(argv[n],"-f") == 0 ) {
            if( strlen(argv[n+1]) > 32 ) {
                fprintf(stderr,"Error: File name too long. Cannot exceed 32
chars. Exiting...\n");
                return -1;
            }
            strncpy(outfile,argv[n+1],sizeof(outfile));
            output = fopen(outfile, "w");
            if( output == NULL ) {
                fprintf(stderr,"Error: Could not open \'%s\'!
Exiting...\n",outfile );
                return -1;
            }
        }
    }

    /*Print the welcome screen*/
    system("clear");
    puts(welcomescreen);

    /*search the input file containing RAM image for EPROCESS blocks
and report how many were found*/
    numofProcs = process_count(imgFile);
    printf("%i processes found in %s\n\n",numofProcs,argv[argc-1]);
    struct EPROCESS *procSet[numofProcs];
    enumerate_processes(imgFile,procSet);

    /*user interaction loop - print command line prompt for the user to
enter commands*/
    while( 1 ) {
        for( int k=0;k<numofProcs;k++ ) {
            printf("[%i] %-16s ",k+1,procSet[k]->ImageFileName);
            if( (k+1)%4 == 0 )
                puts("");
        }
        puts("\n");

        printf("> ");

        fgets(command,sizeof(command),stdin);
        action = strtok(command," \n");

        if( action == NULL )
            continue;
        else if( strncasecmp(action,"quit",1) == 0 ) {
            system("clear");
            break;
        }
        else if( strncasecmp(action,"help",1) == 0 )
            puts(helpmenu);
        else if( strncasecmp(action,"print",1) == 0 ) {
            action = strtok(NULL," \n");
            if( action == NULL )

```



```

        continue;
    strncpy(argstr,action,sizeof(argstr));
    if( strcmp(argstr,"all") == 0 ) {
        for( int k=0;k<numofProcs;k++ )
            print_report(procSet,k,output);
        printf("All processes added to %s\n\n",outfile);
        continue;
    }
    argint = atoi(argstr);
    if( argint <= numofProcs && argint > 0 ) {
        print_report(procSet,argint-1,output);
        printf("%s process added to %s\n\n",procSet[argint-1]-
>ImageFileName,outfile);
        if( enumerate_workingsetlist(imgFile,procSet[argint-1]) < 0 ) {
            puts("Working Set Files could not be created.");
        }
        else
            puts("Working Set File created successfully.");
    }
    }
    else if( strncasecmp(action,"translate",1) == 0 ) {
        printf("Virtual Address? (in hex) ");
        scanf("%x",&argint);
        printf("Page Directory? (in hex) ");
        scanf("%x",&argint2);
        address = virtual_to_physical(argint,argint2,imgFile);
        if( address != -1 )
            printf("Virtual address %#1.8x maps to physical address
%#1.8lx\n\n",argint,address);
        else
            printf("Virtual address %#1.8x does not map to a valid physical
address\n\n",argint);
        }
        sleep(3);
        system("clear");
        puts(welcomescreen);
    }

    /*clean up dynamic memory*/
    for(int y=0;y<numofProcs;y++) {
        free(procSet[y]);
    }

    fclose(output);
    fclose(imgFile);
    return 0;
}

```

```

/*****
Prints a report of information found in the physical memory image which
would be useful for forensic analysis
*****/

```

```

void print_report(struct EPROCESS *eprocess[], int i, FILE * restrict
out) {

```

```

    const char * restrict format =
        "\nVirtual Address:      0x%1.8x      Image name: %21s\n"
        "ID: %8lu      Parent ID: %8lu      Created: %24s\n"

```

```

        "Virtual Size:           %8lu MB      Exited: %25s\n"
        "Peak Virtual Size:      %8lu MB      Page Directory:
%#1.8lx\n"
        "Handle count: %20s      Number of threads:      %8lu\n"
        "Open Handles:\nType      Name(if one exists)\n"
        "%s\n";
    unsigned long eprocessAddress;
    char handleCount[16];
    char created[32];
    char exited[32];
    char notfoundmsg[] = "None Found";
    char *handles = NULL;

    /*if the current eprocess block is the first in the list, then there
    is no other process in the array that points to this, so it must be
    explicitly set*/
    if( strcmp(eprocess[i]->ImageFileName,"System",6) == 0 )
        eprocessAddress = PS_ACTIVE_PROCESS_HEAD;
    else
        eprocessAddress = (long)eprocess[i-1]->ActiveProcessLinks.Flink-
0x88;

    /*if the object table was not resident in physical memory, then this
    fact is relayed to the user by printing Does Not Exist as the number of
    handles opened by the process*/
    if( eprocess[i]->ObjectTable == NULL ) {
        strcpy(handleCount,"Nonexistent",sizeof(handleCount));
    }
    else {
        sprintf(handleCount,sizeof(handleCount),
            "%lu",eprocess[i]->ObjectTable->HandleCount);
    }

    /*convert the times the the process was created and exited*/
    win_time(eprocess[i]->CreateTime,created);
    win_time(eprocess[i]->ExitTime,exited);

    /*format the handle list for printing*/
    if( eprocess[i]->ObjectTable == NULL )
        handles = notfoundmsg;
    else
        handles = eprocess[i]->ObjectTable->DebugInfo;

    /*print out the physical memory information to output user
    specified*/
    fprintf(out,format,
        eprocessAddress,
        eprocess[i]->ImageFileName,
        eprocess[i]->UniqueProcessId,
        eprocess[i]->InheritedFromUniqueProcessId,
        created,
        eprocess[i]->VirtualSize/1048576,
        exited,
        eprocess[i]->PeakVirtualSize/1048576,
        eprocess[i]->Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0],
        handleCount,
        eprocess[i]->ActiveThreads,

```

```

        handles);

    fflush(NULL);

    return;
}

/*****
Translates virtual address to a valid physical address, if the virtual
address is mapped to a physical address.
*****/
long virtual_to_physical(long ptr32, long pageDirBase, FILE * restrict
in) {

    if( (ptr32 & 0xf0000000) == 0x80000000 )
        return ptr32 - KERNEL_OFFSET;

    unsigned long pageDirectoryIndex = ptr32 & 0xffc00000;
    pageDirectoryIndex = pageDirectoryIndex >> 22;
    unsigned long pageTableIndex = ptr32 & 0x003ff000;
    pageTableIndex = pageTableIndex >> 12;
    unsigned long byteIndex = ptr32 & 0x00000fff;

    ptr32 = pageDirBase + pageDirectoryIndex * 4;

    fseek(in,ptr32,0);
    fread(&ptr32,4,1,in);

    if( (ptr32 & 0x00000001) != 1 ) {
        return -1;
    }

    ptr32 = (ptr32 & 0xfffff000) + pageTableIndex * 4;

    fseek(in,ptr32,0);
    fread(&ptr32,4,1,in);

    if( (ptr32 & 0x00000001) != 1 ) {
        return -1;
    }

    ptr32 = (ptr32 & 0xfffff000) + byteIndex;

    return ptr32;
}

/*****
Convert the Windows time format to Unix format and convert the Unix
time to GMT with the existing Linux Time library functions.

    Unix    epoch is 1970-01-01 00:00:00 resolution is seconds
    Windows epoch is 1601-01-01 00:00:00 resolution is 100ns
*****/
void win_time(long long winTime, char date[]) {
    long unixTime = 0;

```

```

    /*convert by subtracting the difference in time between Windows and
    Unix epochs*/
    unixTime = (winTime/1e7) - 11644473600;
    /*if the time is zero or negative (as a result of the conversion for
    example) then make the time zero and make it so the printout displays
    that the time is "No time reported" This applies to both the create
    time of System and the exit times of processes that have not exited
    yet*/
    if( unixTime <= 0 ) {
        unixTime = 0;
        strncpy(date,"No time reported",32);
    }
    /*format the time and copy it into the date buffer for later
    printing*/
    else
        strftime(date,32,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S %Z",gmtime(&unixTime));

    return;
}

/*****
convert unicode string to ascii string and put it in tempString
*****/
void unicode_to_ascii(char *string, unsigned short length) {
    if( length <= 0 )
        return;

    char *tempString = malloc(length/2);

    for(int m=0;m<length;m+=2) {
        memcpy(tempString+m/2,string+m,1);
    }
    memset(string,0,length);
    memcpy(string,tempString,length/2);

    free(tempString);
    return;
}

/*****
Compares 2 4-byte numbers for greater than, less than, or equal to
condition
*****/
int longcmp( const void *n1, const void *n2 ) {
    unsigned long a = *(unsigned long *)n1;
    unsigned long b = *(unsigned long *)n2;

    return (a < b) ? -1 : ((a == b) ? 0 : 1);
}

```

APPENDIX D. DISSECTOR.C

```
/******  
Name: Windows Physical Memory Offline Analyzer  
File: dissector.c  
Version: 1.0  
Author: John Schultz
```

```
Description: Houses all the functions that dissect the Windows physical  
memory layout and structures. Interprets the raw data into human  
readable information.
```

```
*****/
```

```
#include "wpmoa.h"
```

```
#define TOTAL_TYPES 32
```

```
/*Cache the type names to avoid unnecessary file seeks and reads*/
```

```
typedef struct {  
    long address;  
    char name[16];  
} typename;
```

```
typename typenameset[TOTAL_TYPES];  
int typeCount = 0;
```

```
/******
```

```
Follows the active process list pointers through memory, keeping a  
count of how many processes exist
```

```
*****/
```

```
int process_count(FILE * restrict in) {  
    struct EPROCESS *dummyProcList;  
    int count = 0;
```

```
    /*A dummy process list is used to traverse the active process list,  
    counting the total number of processes that will be enumerated*/  
    dummyProcList = malloc(sizeof(struct EPROCESS));
```

```
    fseek(in, PS_ACTIVE_PROCESS_HEAD-KERNEL_OFFSET, SEEK_SET);  
    fread(dummyProcList, sizeof(struct EPROCESS), 1, in);
```

```
    /*The active process list is traversed, meanwhile keeping count of  
    how many processes will be enumerated*/
```

```
    while( 1 ) {  
        if( count != 0 ) {  
            fseek(in, (long)(dummyProcList->ActiveProcessLinks.Flink-  
KERNEL_OFFSET-0x88), SEEK_SET);  
            fread(dummyProcList, sizeof(struct EPROCESS), 1, in);  
            if( (unsigned long)(dummyProcList->ActiveProcessLinks.Flink-0x88)  
==  
                PS_ACTIVE_PROCESS_HEAD )  
                break;  
        }  
        count++;
```

```

    }

    /*clean up the dummy list*/
    free(dummyProcList);

    return count;
}

/*****
Given the pointer to the first process in the active process list, this
function follows the list of active processes, reading and storing each
executive process block into memory (the heap).
*****/
int enumerate_processes(FILE * restrict in, struct EPROCESS
**processList) {
    /*create a new array of pointers to EPROCESS blocks that will exactly
    provide enough space for the processes to be enumerated in the
    following while loop*/
    processList[0] = malloc(sizeof(struct EPROCESS));

    /*read the System process block into the array*/
    fseek(in, PS_ACTIVE_PROCESS_HEAD-KERNEL_OFFSET, SEEK_SET);
    fread(processList[0], sizeof(struct EPROCESS), 1, in);

    /*read and store all the executive process blocks from the RAM image
    file into
    memory*/
    int n = 0;
    while( 1 ) {
        if( n != 0 ) {
            fseek(in, (long)(processList[n-1]->ActiveProcessLinks.Flink-
            KERNEL_OFFSET-0x88), SEEK_SET);
            fread(processList[n], sizeof(struct EPROCESS), 1, in);
            if( (unsigned long)(processList[n]->ActiveProcessLinks.Flink-
            0x88) ==
                PS_ACTIVE_PROCESS_HEAD )
                break;
        }

        /* enumerate the process block's handle table */
        processList[n]->ObjectTable =
        enumerate_handle_table(in, processList[n]);

        n++;
        processList[n] = malloc(sizeof(struct EPROCESS));
    }

    free(processList[n]);

    /*return number of processes found*/
    return 0;
}
/*****
Enumerate the Object Table containing a process block's opened file
handle info
Returns the pointer to dynamic memory containing the HANDLE_TABLE
structure or

```

```

NULL is the handle table is not mapped to physical memory
*****/
void *enumerate_handle_table(FILE * restrict in, struct EPROCESS
*eprocess) {
    long marker = 0;
    long subhandles[1024];
    long *subhandlePtr = subhandles;
    long currentObject = 0;
    long midhandles = 0;
    long pageDir = eprocess->Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0];
    int numofHandles = 0;
    int typeID = 0;
    unsigned short length = 0;
    char *objNames = NULL;
    char readbuffer[PAGESIZE];
    char volName[32];
    struct OBJECT_HEADER *objectHdr = NULL;
    struct OBJECT_TYPE *objectType = NULL;
    struct FILE_OBJECT *fileObj = NULL;
    struct DEVICE_OBJECT *deviceObj = NULL;
    struct DRIVER_OBJECT *driverObj = NULL;
    struct VPB *vpbObj = NULL;
    struct ETHREAD *ethread = NULL;

    /*set marker variable to the physical address of the process Object
    Table*/
    marker = virtual_to_physical((long)eprocess->ObjectTable, pageDir, in);

    /*if the object table is not resident in physical memory, set it to
    point to NULL if it is resident, follow the link to the handle tables.
    Despite the name of the HandleTable field, it does not point to the
    actual table of handles. The TableCode field does. If the TableCode
    field ends in 0x0, then that address is the virtual address of the
    subhandle table for that process. If the field ends in 0x1, then that
    address points to a mid-level handle table. The mid-level handle table
    contains addresses of subhandle tables (up to a page of unique entries,
    equates to 1024 entries with typical page size of 4096 bytes)*/
    if( marker > 0 ) {
        fseek(in, marker, SEEK_SET);
        eprocess->ObjectTable = malloc(sizeof(struct HANDLE_TABLE));
        fread(eprocess->ObjectTable, sizeof(struct HANDLE_TABLE), 1, in);

        marker = eprocess->ObjectTable->TableCode;

        if( (marker & 0x03) == 0 ) {
            subhandles[0] = virtual_to_physical((marker &
            0xffffffff8), pageDir, in);
        }
        /*when the TableCode field indicates that there are more than one
        subhandle table, store the subhandle table addresses in the array
        called subhandles*/
        else if( (marker & 0x03) == 1 ) {
            midhandles = virtual_to_physical((marker &
            0xffffffff8), pageDir, in);
            marker = midhandles;
            int r = 0;
            while( r < 511 ) {

```

```

        fseek(in,marker,SEEK_SET);
        fread(subhandlePtr,4,1,in);
        if( subhandles[r] == 0 )
            break;
        subhandles[r] = virtual_to_physical((subhandles[r] &
0xffffffff8),pageDir,in);
        marker+=4;
        r++;
        subhandlePtr = &subhandles[r];
    }
}

/*allocate memory for a name for each open file handle of the
process*/
numofHandles = eprocess->ObjectTable->HandleCount;
objNames = calloc(numofHandles,128);

/*traverse a subhandle table, then move to the next subhandle table
in the mid-level handle table until all open handles/objects have been
discovered*/
int table = 0; int count = 0; int handle = 0;
while( count < numofHandles && subhandles != 0 ) {

    while( count < numofHandles && handle < 511 ) {

        /*clear the file read buffer before each use*/
        memset(readbuffer,0,sizeof(readbuffer));

        /*set the marker to the address of the object to be examined*/
        fseek(in,subhandles[table]+handle*8+8,SEEK_SET);
        fread(&marker,4,1,in);

        /*if the object's address is null (meaning this spot is a free
handle), do not count this handle and move on to the next position in
the subhandle table*/
        if( marker == 0 ) {
            handle++;
            continue;
        }

        /*translate the address from virtual to physical*/
        marker = virtual_to_physical((marker & 0xffffffff8),pageDir,in);

        /*if the physical address is not mapped then count the object and
move on to the next handle in the subhandle table*/
        if( marker == -1 ) {
            count++;
            handle++;
            continue;
        }

        /*the file location of the object pointed to by the current
subhandle position is saved for use later in determining the object's
name*/
        currentObject = marker;

```



```

    /*allocate and read data into memory for the object header. use
the object header to determine the address of the information about the
object's type*/
    objectHdr = malloc(sizeof(struct OBJECT_HEADER));
    fseek(in,marker,SEEK_SET);
    fread(objectHdr,sizeof(struct OBJECT_HEADER),1,in);
    marker = (long)objectHdr->Type;

    /*check the object type address cache for the read type address*/
    for( typeID=0;typeID<TOTAL_TYPES;typeID++ ) {
        if( marker == typenameset[typeID].address && marker != 0 ) {
            strncpy(readbuffer,typenameset[typeID].name,16);
            objNames = strncat(objNames,readbuffer,16);
            break;
        }
    }

    /*if the type was not already in the cache, then add it*/
    if( typeID == TOTAL_TYPES ) {
        /*first add the address of the object type structure*/
        typenameset[typeCount].address = marker;
        /*convert the virtual address to physical*/
        marker = virtual_to_physical(marker,pageDir,in);
        /*if virtual address not mapped, then ignore the object type*/
        if( marker == -1 ) {
            free(objectHdr);
            count++;
            handle++;
            continue;
        }
        /*copy the object type into dynamic memory*/
        objectType = malloc(sizeof(struct OBJECT_TYPE));
        fseek(in,marker,SEEK_SET);
        fread(objectType,(sizeof(struct OBJECT_TYPE)),1,in);
        /*fetch the unicode name by its address*/
        marker = (long)objectType->Name.Buffer;
        marker = virtual_to_physical(marker,pageDir,in);

        if( marker == -1 ) {
            count++;
            handle++;
            free(objectHdr);
            free(objectType);
            continue;
        }
        /*read length of unicode name*/
        length = objectType->Name.Length;
        /*if name has a length greater than 64, then it is deemed
invalid and ignored*/
        if( length > 64 || length <= 0 ) {
            handle++;
            count++;
            free(objectHdr);
            free(objectType);
            continue;
        }
    }

```

```

    fseek(in,marker,SEEK_SET);
    fread(readbuffer,1,length,in);
    /*convert unicode to ascii and copy it into the cache*/
    unicode_to_ascii(readbuffer,length);

    strncpy(typonameset[typeCount].name,readbuffer,16);
    typeCount++;

    objNames = strncat(objNames,readbuffer,length/2);

    free(objectType);
}
/*copy the object type name into the list of opened objects of
the current process*/
objNames = strncat(objNames,"\t",1);
/*If the object type is a process, then fetch the process name
from the object body and add it to the list of opened objects*/
if( strcmp( readbuffer,"Process",7 ) == 0 ) {
    fseek(in,currentObject+0x18c,SEEK_SET);
    fread(readbuffer,16,1,in);
    readbuffer[16] = '\0';
    objNames = strncat(objNames,"\t",1);
    objNames = strncat(objNames,readbuffer,16);
    objNames = strncat(objNames,"(",1);
    fseek(in,currentObject+0x9c,SEEK_SET);
    fread(&marker,1,4,in);
    sprintf(readbuffer,"%lu",marker);
    objNames = strncat(objNames,readbuffer,5);
    objNames = strncat(objNames,")",1);
}
/*If the object type is thread, then fetch the thread's process
name and ID as well as the thread's unique ID number and add it all to
the list of opened objects*/
else if( strcmp( readbuffer,"Thread",6 ) == 0 ) {
    ethread = malloc(sizeof(struct ETHREAD));
    fseek(in,currentObject+0x18,SEEK_SET);
    fread(ethread,sizeof(struct ETHREAD),1,in);
    marker = (long)ethread->ThreadsProcess;
    marker = virtual_to_physical(marker,pageDir,in);
    fseek(in,marker+0x174,SEEK_SET);
    fread(readbuffer,16,1,in);
    readbuffer[16] = '\0';
    objNames = strncat(objNames,"\t",1);
    objNames = strncat(objNames,readbuffer,16);
    objNames = strncat(objNames,"(",1);
    sprintf(readbuffer,5,"%li",(long)ethread->Cid.UniqueProcess);
    objNames = strncat(objNames,readbuffer,5);
    objNames = strncat(objNames,"):",2);
    sprintf(readbuffer,5,"%li",(long)ethread->Cid.UniqueThread);
    objNames = strncat(objNames,readbuffer,5);
    free(ethread);
}
/*If the object type is File, then fetch the name, if one exists,
from the object body and add it to the list of opened objects*/
else if( strcmp( readbuffer,"File",4 ) == 0 ) {
    fileObj = malloc(sizeof(struct FILE_OBJECT));
    fseek(in,currentObject+0x18,SEEK_SET);

```

```

fread(fileObj, sizeof(struct FILE_OBJECT), 1, in);
length = fileObj->FileName.Length;
if( length <= 2 ) {
    marker = (long)fileObj->DeviceObject;
    marker = virtual_to_physical(marker, pageDir, in);
    if( marker != -1 ) {
        deviceObj = malloc(sizeof(struct DEVICE_OBJECT));
        fseek(in, marker, SEEK_SET);
        fread(deviceObj, sizeof(struct DEVICE_OBJECT), 1, in);
        marker = (long)deviceObj->DriverObject;
        marker = virtual_to_physical(marker, pageDir, in);
        if( marker != -1 ) {
            driverObj = malloc(sizeof(struct DRIVER_OBJECT));
            fseek(in, marker, SEEK_SET);
            fread(driverObj, sizeof(struct DRIVER_OBJECT), 1, in);
            length = driverObj->DriverName.Length;
            marker = (long)driverObj->DriverName.Buffer;
            marker = virtual_to_physical(marker, pageDir, in);
            fseek(in, marker, SEEK_SET);
            fread(readbuffer, 1, length, in);
            unicode_to_ascii(readbuffer, length);
            objNames = strncat(objNames, "\t", 1);
            objNames = strncat(objNames, readbuffer, length/2);
            free(deviceObj);
            free(driverObj);
        }
    }
}
/*if the name length of the file is less than 512, then it is
deemed valid and will be added to the list of opened objects*/
else if( length < 512 ) {
    marker = (long)fileObj->Vpb;
    marker = virtual_to_physical(marker, pageDir, in);
    if( marker != -1 ) {
        vpbObj = malloc(sizeof(struct VPB));
        fseek(in, marker, SEEK_SET);
        fread(vpbObj, sizeof(struct VPB), 1, in);
        memcpy(volName, vpbObj->VolumeLabel, 32);
        free(vpbObj);
        unicode_to_ascii(volName, 32);
        objNames = strncat(objNames, "\t", 1);
        objNames = strncat(objNames, volName, 16);

        marker = (long)fileObj->FileName.Buffer;
        marker = virtual_to_physical(marker, pageDir, in);
        fseek(in, marker, SEEK_SET);
        fread(readbuffer, 1, length, in);
        unicode_to_ascii(readbuffer, length);
        objNames = strncat(objNames, readbuffer, length/2);
    }
}
free(fileObj);
}
/*If the object type is anything other than the ones previously
mentioned then use the default method to fetch the object name
from the object name structure and add it to the list of open
objects*/

```

```

    else {
        if( strlen( readbuffer ) < 8 )
            objNames = strncat(objNames, "\t", 1);
        fseek(in, currentObject-0xc, SEEK_SET);
        fread(&length, 2, 1, in);
        fseek(in, currentObject-0x8, SEEK_SET);
        fread(&marker, 4, 1, in);
        marker = virtual_to_physical(marker, pageDir, in);
        if( marker != -1 && length > 0 && length < 2048 ) {
            memset(readbuffer, 0, sizeof(readbuffer));
            fseek(in, marker, SEEK_SET);
            fread(readbuffer, 1, length, in);
            unicode_to_ascii(readbuffer, length);
            objNames = strncat(objNames, readbuffer, length/2);
        }
    }
    objNames = strncat(objNames, "\n", 1);

    free(objectHdr);
    handle++;
    count++;
}
table++;
handle = 0;
}
eprocess->ObjectTable->DebugInfo = objNames;
}
else
    eprocess->ObjectTable = NULL;

return eprocess->ObjectTable;
}

/*****
Function enumerates a process' working set and creates files with the
contents of the working set pages in memory.
*****/
int enumerate_workingsetlist(FILE * restrict in, struct EPROCESS
*eprocess) {
    char pname[24];
    char processID[8];
    char vaddress[24];
    char fname[56];
    char fname2[64];
    char directory[24] = "mkdir ";
    char deldir[24] = "rm -rf ";
    int i = 0;
    long marker = 0;
    long pageDir = 0;
    long pid = 0;
    unsigned int n = 0;
    unsigned int wsIndex = 0;
    unsigned int wsSize = 0;
    unsigned int wsCount = 0;
    unsigned long wsEnd = 0;
    unsigned long buffer[1024];
    unsigned long *wsList = NULL;

```

```

unsigned long start = 0;
FILE *fd = NULL;
struct MMWSL *wsl = NULL;

pageDir = eprocess->Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0];
wsSize = eprocess->Vm.WorkingSetSize;
wsList = malloc(wsSize*4);

/*find address of the workingsetlist structure*/
marker = (long)eprocess->Vm.VmWorkingSetList;
marker = virtual_to_physical(marker,pageDir,in);
if( marker < 0 )
    return -1;

/*read the contents of the workingsetlist structure into dynamic
memory*/
wsl = malloc(sizeof(struct MMWSL));
fseek(in,marker,SEEK_SET);
fread(wsl,1,sizeof(struct MMWSL),in);

wsEnd = wsl->LastInitializedWsle;

marker = (long)wsl->Wsle;
marker = virtual_to_physical(marker,pageDir,in);
if( marker < 0 ) {
    free(wsl);
    return -1;
}

fseek(in,marker,SEEK_SET);

memset(wsList,0,sizeof(wsList));

wsCount = 0;
while( wsCount < wsSize && wsIndex < wsEnd ) {
    i = -1;
    fread(buffer,4,sizeof(buffer)/4,in);
    while( wsCount < wsSize && i < 1024 ) {
        i++; wsIndex++;

        if( virtual_to_physical(buffer[i],pageDir,in) < 0 )
            continue;

        wsList[wsCount] = (buffer[i] & 0xfffff000);
        wsCount++;
    }
    fseek(in,4096,SEEK_CUR);
}

/*sort the list of virtual addresses in the working set from low to
high order*/
qsort(wsList,wsCount,4,longcmp);

/*Pool together consecutive memory locations and create files from
the data in those areas */
pid = (long)eprocess->UniqueProcessId;
snprintf(processID,sizeof(processID),"\x5f%lu",pid);

```

```

strncpy(pname, eprocess->ImageFileName, sizeof(pname));
strncat(pname, processID, sizeof(pname));
strncat(directory, pname, sizeof(directory)-strlen(directory));
if( fopen(pname, "r") != NULL ) {
    strncat(deldir, pname, sizeof(deldir)-strlen(deldir));
    system(deldir);
}
system(directory);

n = 1;

puts("Creating Working Set Files, Please Wait");

while( n < wsCount ) {

    if( wsList[n] - wsList[n-1] == 0x1000 ) {
        if( start == 0 )
            start = wsList[n-1];
        snprintf(vaddress, 11, "/%1.8lxh", start);
        strncpy(fname, pname, sizeof(fname));
        strncat(fname, vaddress, sizeof(fname)-strlen(fname));
        fd = fopen(fname, "w");
        memcpy(buffer, "\x41\x42\x43\x44", 4);
        if( fd == NULL )
            return -1;
        while( ( wsList[n] & 0xffff00000) == (start & 0xffff00000) ) {
            marker = virtual_to_physical(wsList[n-1], pageDir, in);
            fseek(in, marker, SEEK_SET);
            fread(buffer, 1, sizeof(buffer), in);
            fwrite(buffer, 1, sizeof(buffer), fd);
            n++;
        }
        strncpy(fname2, fname, sizeof(fname2));
        strncat(fname2, "-", 1);
        snprintf(vaddress, 10, "%1.8lxh", wsList[n-1]+4096);
        strncat(fname2, vaddress, sizeof(fname2)-strlen(fname2));
        rename(fname, fname2);
        fclose(fd);
        start = 0;
        if( memcmp(buffer, "\x41\x42\x43\x44", 4) == 0 )
            n++;
    }
    else
        n++;
}

free(wsl);
return 0;
}

```

APPENDIX E. MALWARE.C

```
// MALWARE.cpp : Defines the entry point for the console application.
//

#include "stdafx.h"

int _tmain(int argc, _TCHAR* argv[])
{
    char string[32];

    while( 1 ) {
        scanf_s("%s",string);
        printf("%s\n",string);
        if( strcmp(string,"quit") == 0 )
            break;
    }

    puts("Hello World!");

    return 0;
}
```

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