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THESIS

**IMPROVING COUNTERINSURGENCY: AN AUXILIARY
TRAINING PROGRAM FOR SPECIAL FORCES**

by

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June 2006

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13. ABSTRACT The US military has proven its strengths many times over through its ability to dominate opponents on the conventional battlefield. However, when it comes to irregular wars and insurgent conflicts, which are defined by enemies who conduct war from the shadows and refuse to meet on the open field, finding success has been far more difficult. The nature and dynamics of these unconventional wars are dramatically different from the conventional warfare realm, and require innovative approaches and rethinking of many long held conceptions of waging war. Conducting unconventional warfare has been the core mission of US Army Special Forces (USSF) since they were founded in 1952. Throughout a relatively short history, USSF have shown a broad utility in conducting operations with indigenous military, paramilitary, and civilian personnel in "irregular wars" and low intensity conflicts (LICs), and thus Special Forces have been widely regarded as the preeminent experts in this particular field of warfare. Now more than ever, the capabilities of Special Forces are invaluable in supporting US national security strategy, continuing the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and supporting efforts to transform military capabilities for irregular warfare and unconventional conflicts. USSF are now faced with a difficult challenge: high demand and operations tempo require that USSF must find new ways to more effectively and efficiently employ their skills in unconventional environments. In order to enhance the capabilities of USSF in conducting unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency, this thesis proposes that USSF develop a training program that allows recruitment and selection of both indigenous personnel and US foreign-born as auxiliaries and surrogates to USSF operations. Training would take place in the US and would be for the explicit purpose of creating indigenous cadres for assisting Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (SFODAs) in developing operational/security forces and intelligence networks at the local level in order to create long-term stability in unconventional conflict areas.				
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**IMPROVING COUNTERINSURGENCY: AN AUXILIARY TRAINING
PROGRAM FOR SPECIAL FORCES**

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ABSTRACT

The US military has proven its strengths many times over through its ability to dominate opponents on the conventional battlefield. However, when it comes to irregular wars and insurgent conflicts, which are defined by enemies who conduct war from the shadows and refuse to meet on the open field, achieving success has been far more difficult. The nature and dynamics of these unconventional wars are dramatically different from the conventional warfare realm, and require innovative approaches and rethinking of many long held conceptions of waging war.

Conducting unconventional warfare has been the core mission of US Army Special Forces (USSF) since they were founded in 1952. Throughout a relatively short history, USSF have shown a broad utility in conducting operations with indigenous military, paramilitary, and civilian personnel in “irregular wars” and low intensity conflicts (LICs), and thus Special Forces have been widely regarded as the preeminent experts in this particular field of warfare. Now more than ever, the capabilities of Special Forces are invaluable in supporting US national security strategy, continuing the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and supporting efforts to transform military capabilities for irregular warfare and unconventional conflicts. USSF are now faced with a difficult challenge: high demand and operations tempo require that USSF must find new ways to more effectively and efficiently employ their skills in unconventional environments.

In order to enhance the capabilities of USSF in conducting unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency, this thesis proposes that USSF develop a training program that allows recruitment and selection of both indigenous personnel and US foreign-born as auxiliaries and surrogates to USSF operations. Training would take place in the US and would be for the explicit purpose of creating indigenous cadres for assisting Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (SFODAs) in developing operational/security forces and intelligence networks at the local level in order to create long-term stability in unconventional conflict areas.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Thesis Statement and Methodology: The purpose of this thesis is to examine the practicality and feasibility of a program that allows USSF teams to recruit indigenous personnel and US foreign-born for training in the US as auxiliary forces in order to assist USSF teams in forming security and intelligence networks at the local level in unconventional conflict areas. *More specifically, this thesis argues that an Auxiliary Training Program for Special Forces will dramatically improve the capabilities and effectiveness of Special Forces in establishing and maintaining local control in UW environments, thereby improving security and intelligence, reducing the ability of insurgent forces to conduct operations, and reducing the need for a large US military footprint.*

Counterinsurgency: A Different Kind of War: Low Intensity Conflicts (LICs) and unconventional wars have surpassed large-scale conventional conflicts as the biggest threat to peace and global stability. The US military has been organized, trained and equipped to deal with threats from other state military forces, so a gap in capabilities exists between the force we have and the force we need to defeat enemies that fight from the shadows and use the basic precepts of guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Because unconventional/insurgent wars operate on wholly different principles than conventional wars, new approaches must be taken to transform US military capabilities. Measures that focus purely on the destruction of the enemy no longer suffice—unconventional wars require our forces to have the ability to change the environment at the grass roots level so that the insurgents become ineffectual. Using auxiliary forces is one such method to establish control at the local level and Special Forces are well suited for the task of training and utilizing auxiliaries in counter-insurgency operations.

Auxiliary Training Program for Special Forces: This chapter presents the proposal for the Auxiliary Training Program. This proposal is a framework for recruiting, training and employing auxiliaries in counter-insurgency operations. The program consists of two distinct groups needed for maximum effectiveness: an asset force comprised of US foreign-born citizens with language and local expertise; and the

indigenous auxiliaries who are recruited directly out of the local population in the target country. Using the advantages of “distance training” in the US and “combined formations” with Special Forces teams, these auxiliaries will greatly enhance US counter-insurgency capabilities.

Supporting Discussion: This chapter discusses other advantages of the Auxiliary Training Program. The program utilizes distance training and combined formations; helps enhance language capabilities; and capitalizes on using pre-existing social networks to gain intelligence and influence the local population. Shortfalls and problems like security issues, vetting personnel, and trying to transform corrupt systems and organizations are also candidly discussed. Also discussed are the roles of Special Forces and conventional units in counterinsurgency, and recommendations for additional roles that they may need to perform to increase the effectiveness of COIN operations.

Case Studies: SOF Missions with Auxiliary and Indigenous Forces: By using inductive methodology case studies, this portion of the thesis argues that SOF and other specialized units can be highly effective when their abilities are combined with the local knowledge and cultural expertise of indigenous auxiliary forces. By using studies of the Jedburgh teams of Southern France in WWII, the SAS and the Omani irregulars in the Dhofar War, and Executive Outcomes and irregular forces in Angola, this chapter will illustrate how elite units working with auxiliary forces have been able to successfully defeat their numerically superior opponents in protracted, strategic conflicts.

Conclusion: Finally, the thesis concludes by recognizing that counterinsurgency is a complex problem that requires more than an “off the shelf” conventional military solution. Although the Auxiliary Training Program would not be a panacea for defeating insurgents, it is a sound method for gaining control and establishing long-term stability at the local level and could help define US counterinsurgency strategy for the future. Areas of further research and follow-on work are also recommended.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ANA – Afghanistan National Army

ANP – Afghanistan National Police

AO – Area of Operations

BAH – Basic Allowance for Housing

BEQ – Bachelor Enlisted Quarters

BMLC – Basic Military Language Course

COIN – Counter-insurgency

DA – Direct Action

DLI – Defense Language Institute

DOD – Department of Defense

EO – Executive Outcomes

FAA – Armed Forces of Angola

FID – Foreign Internal Defense

FFI – Forces Francaises de L’Interieur

FTP – Communist French resistance group

GAO –US Government Accountability Office

GOA – Government of Afghanistan

GWOT – Global War on Terrorism

JCET – Joint Combined Exercise for Training

ING – Iraqi National Guard

LIC – Low Intensity Conflict

LLSO – Low Level Source Operations

LOCs – Lines of Communication

MPLA – Angolan Government

MSRs – Main Supply Routes

MTC – Movement to Contact

OSS – Office of Strategic Services

PSYOPS – Psychological Operations

QDR– Quadrennial Defense Review

QRF – Quick Reaction Force

SADF – South African Defense Force

SAF – Sultan’s Armed Forces (Oman)

SAS – Special Air Service *also* BATT

SASO – Support and Stability Operations

SF – Special Forces *also* USSF

SFODA – Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha, *also* SF team

SOF – Special Operation Forces

SOP – Standard Operating Procedures

UNITA – Angolan Rebels

USSF – United States Army Special Forces

USSR – The Soviet Union

UW – Unconventional Warfare

I. COUNTERINSURGENCY: A DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR

The most common type of threat today comes not from standing armies of enemy states but from groups that wage war from the shadows, wearing no uniforms and claiming no state but able to wreak havoc by using the basic precepts of guerrilla warfare.¹

- Linda Robinson, *Masters of Chaos*

A. BACKGROUND

Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the biggest threat to peace and global stability has shifted from major wars waged by state sponsored militaries, to one of shadow conflicts conducted by sub-state groups and transnational terrorist networks conducting unconventional warfare (UW) campaigns around the globe. For generations, the US military has been organized, trained and equipped for threats from the former. Thus, a significant gap in capabilities—between the force we have and force we need—now exists that is perhaps best illustrated by current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, where US troops (the bulk of which are conventional US Army) are having great difficulty in establishing long-term security and stability against insurgent forces—enemies which rely predominantly on guerrilla and terrorist tactics.

While these irregular wars or low-intensity conflicts (LICs) have historically been the “Achilles heel” of conventional military forces, they continue to be the “predominant form of contemporary war.”² These wars are protracted campaigns, stretched out by their perpetrators in ways that significantly challenge both political and military efforts. The preferred means by which the enemy chooses to fight in such conflicts often undermines the advantages of the biggest and most advanced regular military forces. In these unconventional wars, conventional military forces are frequently rendered impractical at best; at worst, such forces become liabilities and impediments to success. Also, because

¹ Linda Robinson, *Masters of Chaos* (NY: PublicAffairs, 2004), xvi.

² Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (NY: The Free Press, 1991) According to van Creveld “since 1945 there have been perhaps 160 armed conflicts around the world...of those, perhaps three quarters have been of the so-called ‘low-intensity’ variety.” He also states that LIC is “by far the most important form of armed conflict in our time.” p. 20-22.

many of the places US military forces must now operate are increasingly hostile to US/Western policies and ideals, a large presence of US forces is more likely to be seen as a foreign occupation and can be counterproductive toward achieving our strategic goals. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states:

Today, efforts large and small on five continents demonstrate the importance of being able to work with and through partners, to operate clandestinely and to sustain a persistent but low-visibility presence. Such efforts represent an application of the indirect approach to the long war.³

Forces that can conduct protracted, complex and sensitive operations with indigenous personnel in UW environments with a reduced US footprint will be increasingly in demand.

Since the attacks of 9/11, US Army Special Forces (USSF) have played a vital role in the Global War on Terror. In Afghanistan, small numbers of USSF showed great utility in conducting operations in concert with Northern Alliance forces to depose the Taliban and displace Al Qaeda from their safe havens. In Iraq, two battalions of USSF along with Kurdish “Peshmerga” fighters were able to seize the northern cities of Mosul and Kirkuk, thereby providing a vital economy of force to conventional mechanized units by allowing them to focus their efforts elsewhere. While USSF played a primary role in the initial major combat operations in both Afghanistan and Northern Iraq, the tables have turned and they are now in a supporting role to the main effort of conventional forces in both theaters. It is possible to question the wisdom of this reversal of roles and it may well be that USSF should be the dominant force in establishing security and control at the local level in these types of conflicts. Yet this would require cost-effective force multipliers who, in addition, would also provide the means to reach down into the local community.

³ 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Department of Defense, 6 February 2006); available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report>, 11. Internet; cited 3 March 2006.

1. Purpose/Thesis Statement

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the practicality and feasibility of a program that allows USSF teams to recruit indigenous personnel and US foreign-born citizens for training in the US as auxiliary forces in order to assist USSF teams in forming security and intelligence networks at the local level in unconventional conflict areas. More specifically, this thesis argues that an **Auxiliary Training Program for Special Forces** will dramatically improve the capabilities and effectiveness of Special Forces in establishing and maintaining local control in UW environments, thereby improving security and intelligence, reducing the ability of insurgent forces to conduct operations, and reducing the need for a large US military footprint.

Although a program of this nature would have broad uses in guerrilla warfare, peacekeeping, nation-building and other unconventional missions, this study will be limited to discussing its applications in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. This is the area with the highest potential payoff, and the one most critical today with operations bogging down in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

This program is not intended to be a panacea for defeating insurgents, and should be implemented as part of a strategy that focuses on the indirect approach to counterinsurgency (along the lines of Dr. Gordon McCormick's "Diamond Model" and Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, Jr.'s "Oil Spot" method), rather than current attempts being made to apply conventional warfare measures to an unconventional problem. The aim here is to focus and enhance successful traditional COIN practices of working "by, with and through" the local population to establish local security, provided primarily by local irregulars, police or paramilitary forces. Similarly, a US trained auxiliary force will sharpen traditional COIN practices of relying on "grass roots" intelligence, implementing civic action programs, gaining unity of effort with locals, and will help bridge the cultural gaps that exist between US forces and native populations.

2. Methodology

The following methodology will be employed in this thesis: Chapter I includes the thesis' background, purpose, methodology, and outline. This chapter will go on to discuss the current problems the US military faces in conducting counterinsurgency campaigns

and will present a deductive framework which will enable the reader to understand the conceptual problems of insurgent conflicts and how they differ from conventional wars. This chapter will also describe the US Army's ongoing struggle to define its niche in insurgent wars, the need to move current capabilities towards the unconventional warfare realm, and why a program to train auxiliaries would enhance capabilities on many different levels. Chapter II will present the auxiliary training concept in detail. This chapter will address specifics of how to organize and implement an Auxiliary Training Program, and will highlight aspects necessary to run a program including recruiting, cost estimates, logistics and other requirements. Chapter III will discuss potential benefits and limitations of the Auxiliary Training Program, and will recommend roles for USSF and conventional forces in COIN operations. Chapter IV includes inductive methodology-case studies. The case studies will focus on three examples of small units in insurgent conflicts and how they utilized locals and irregular forces to achieve success. Chapter V will summarize and conclude the thesis, as well as recommend further areas of research.

B. DEFINING THE PROBLEM

In order to understand the value of the role auxiliary forces would play and their potential power in unconventional conflicts, it is important to step outside the conventional frame of reference for warfare. Also, a critical analysis of how the US military organizes, prepares, and wages war must be made and contrasted to the reality of our current threats. In short, the means we have devised for waging wars is not meeting our needs to defeat enemies who refuse to submit to the force we continue to create. Our current enemies refuse to play by a set of rules that we have long taken for granted and assumed that everyone else will follow.

1. The Two Faces of Unconventional Warfare

Unconventional Warfare is defined (and all too vaguely) by the Department of Defense as "the broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, predominantly conducted through, with or by indigenous or surrogate forces organized, trained,

equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source.”⁴ Absent in this definition is the recognition of the distinctive roles of the two competing sides in this type of conflict: a side playing the role of offense and a side on defense. Both sides are competing for legitimacy in a zero-sum game— “a contest of control over a fixed political space.”⁵ This “contest” is for the support of the population, which is the center of gravity in these types of conflicts (in contrast to conventional conflicts where the enemy’s military force is the center of gravity). Essentially, UW is a strategy whereby either side is attempting to use the population as an indirect way to achieve its goals. Thus, the term “UW” can describe both sides of the same coin—measures taken by the offense and defense.

On offense, there is a counter-state movement (also known as the resistance or insurgency), that is trying to overthrow or destabilize an existing government or authority by non-violent or violent means. Violent resistance by the counter-state includes subversive acts like sabotage, terrorism or guerrilla warfare.

On defense, the government (or other form of authority) is trying to maintain power and legitimacy, and must employ measures (usually through an existing state security apparatus) in order to protect itself from lawlessness, subversion and insurgency. These measures, commonly called counterinsurgency (COIN), have taken many forms, and have often proved to be very manpower and resource intensive. Efforts to conduct COIN can come at a high price, particularly for outside powers operating on foreign soil. When states try to apply conventional military measures toward solving an unconventional problem like insurgencies, they do so at their own peril.

⁴ *Department of the Army, FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), 2-1.

⁵ Gordon McCormick, *Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare* class notes (Naval Postgraduate School, Spring 2005).

2. The Curse of Counter-Insurgency

Ha, ha! You fool! You fell victim to one of the classic blunders! The most famous is never get involved in a land war in Asia...!

-Vizzini, *The Princess Bride*

Since the end of World War II and the advent of the nuclear age, the record of success for great powers conducting counter-insurgency abroad is abysmal. In spite of ruthless measures, tremendous economic resources, sophisticated military technology and a myriad of other advantages, the “counter-insurgency” forces failed in virtually every case.⁶ While the bulk of these failures can be attributed to the third world colonial ventures of Western European powers, none have seen failure conducted on a grander scale than “superpower” nations.

The US and the Soviet Union have fallen into the same trap as their smaller European counterparts, only they “super-sized” it. The US was dealt its first true military defeat in Vietnam against what was perceived to be a peasant, backwater enemy force from a fourth rate country. The USSR suffered a similar defeat in Afghanistan when it was forced to withdraw at the hands of seemingly poorly trained and equipped “mujahideen” rebel fighters. The US military was also forced out of Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983 after the attack on the Marine Barracks, and then left Somalia in 1994 after efforts to bring security and stability failed, which culminated in the infamous “Black Hawk Down” incident in Mogadishu.

Today, the US is fighting insurgencies on two fronts—Afghanistan and Iraq—while Russia still struggles with a brutal Islamic insurgency in Chechnya. Why have materially and technologically superior forces that seemed to hold all the cards, such as the US Army, struggled against militarily and numerically inferior insurgent forces?

⁶ Van Crevelde, 22-24. Highlighted examples of counterinsurgency failures: The British lost in India, Palestine, Kenya, Cyprus and Aden; the French lost in Indochina and Algeria; The Belgians surrendered the Congo; the Dutch lost Indonesia; the Spaniards yielded the Sahara; the Portuguese capitulated in Angola and Mozambique; the South Africans withdrew from Namibia; US failed in Vietnam and withdrew forces from Beirut; the USSR left in defeat in Afghanistan; and the Israelis were forced to withdraw from Lebanon. The most notable and often-quoted exception is the British counterinsurgency mission in Malaya, which successfully defeated a communist insurgency.

3. US Problems with Counterinsurgency

The cold, brutal fact is that much present-day military power is simply irrelevant as an instrument for extending or defending political interests over most of the globe; by this criterion indeed, it scarcely amounts to ‘military power’ at all.⁷

-Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*

US Army doctrine, “the officially sanctioned theory of victory outlining the conduct of war on all levels,” is essentially a blueprint for how the Army goes to war.⁸ Doctrine is a product of the Army’s experiences, the creation of which has been in many respects an exercise in “highly selective historical interpretation.”⁹ The Army’s great victories in the major wars of the last century—WWI, WWII, and the 1991 Persian Gulf War, as well as generations spent preparing for large scale-warfare against the Soviet Union during the Cold War—shaped and defined the Army’s current doctrine.

Victory in these major wars was generally achieved through a strategy of massed combat that relied on big units in fixed battles, advanced technology, overwhelming firepower, and other measures that maximized the destruction of the enemy’s forces on the battlefield (also referred to as “attrition warfare”). This type of doctrine is well and good for fighting a mirror-image enemy that chooses to fight on these same terms, but is inefficient and largely irrelevant when it comes to defeating opponents who fight from the shadows and refuse to meet on the open field. According to Dr. Steven Metz, professor of national security affairs at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, “Insurgents and terrorists avoid battle spaces where they are weakest—often the conventional military sphere—and focus on those where they can operate on more equal footing, particularly the psychological and the political.”¹⁰ Unlike conventional wars, victory in LICs and unconventional conflicts is obtained by “altering the political variable to the point where the enemy becomes ineffectual, and not by actually defeating enemies

⁷ Van Creveld, 27.

⁸ Larry E. Cable, *Conflict of Myths* (NY: NYU Press, 1986), 3.

⁹ Ibid, 113.

¹⁰ Steven Metz, “Small Wars: From Low Intensity Conflict to Irregular Challenges,” in *Rethinking the Principles of War*, ed. Anthony D. McIvor (Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 2005), 288.

in battle.”¹¹ More importantly, current Army doctrine presents a diversion from the real tasks demanded of COIN operations.

The Army is quite comfortable when it comes to application of heavy firepower (kinetic effects), conducting large-scale offensive operations (clear and sweep operations, cordons and searches), and performing Direct Action (DA) missions to kill or capture targeted personnel (“man-hunting” operations). However, it is far less adept at the difficult and often mundane tasks that are critical in COIN campaigns (i.e., implementing population control measures, training local security forces, gaining intimate local knowledge, and maintaining a persistent presence). It is little wonder that a mass and technologically driven force like the US Army is at odds when placed in a situation where a low tech, human-centered form of warfare is the order of the day.

C. DETERMINING THE SOLUTION

1. Lessons Ignored in Counterinsurgency

It is ironic, then, that the Army and US military establishment is not without experience, or success for that matter, in unconventional wars. After being created out of an insurgency against British rule in 1776, the US military proved quite adept at “another, less celebrated tradition in US military history” of fighting “small wars” against irregular and guerrilla forces during the 1800s and early 1900s.¹² Unfortunately, when it comes to learning lesson from these wars, our hindsight is not always 20/20, and experiences in these wars have often been poorly integrated into military doctrine. Many of these small wars—like the Indian Wars fought by the US Army on the western plains in the post Civil War period, and the Banana Wars fought by the US Marines in the Caribbean (Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua) from 1915-1934—were ultimately successful for reasons that were largely misunderstood, forgotten, ignored, or deemed irrelevant in fighting “real” wars where “vital” national interests were at stake.

¹¹ Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” in *National Security Management: Dimensions of Military Strategy*, ed. George E. Thibault (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1987), 340.

¹² Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace* (NY: Basic Books, 2002), xiv.

Success in defeating guerrilla and insurgent forces in these small wars was generally achieved through protracted campaigns that depended on creating and employing security forces at the local level. Also, operations were conducted by units that, for mostly budgetary and political reasons, were restricted in numbers and resources. While constraints on force size were likely looked upon with displeasure by military planners and leaders, they came with several fortuitous side-effects. Although public and political scrutiny during these periods was not an issue to the extent that this has become post-Vietnam, circumstances forced these units to conduct operations with a relatively small footprint, which allowed them to avoid the normal scrutiny of the public eye (remaining “under the radar”) and thus were able to maintain a persistent presence. These situations also compelled US forces to interact with and rely heavily on indigenous personnel to help achieve their goals.

US Marines in the Banana Wars were comfortable with engaging the local population and were able to work through the locals to develop constabularies (a local body of security forces) which focused on internal defense.¹³ By co-opting locals for the tasks of security, they were able to separate the guerrillas from their popular support bases and gain intelligence that was vital to quelling the insurgents and establishing and maintaining local security and order.

Because of Congressional economizing, Army Cavalry units in the Indian Wars were able to recruit Indians into their force as scouts in their efforts to police the region (an area roughly half the size of the continental US) and promote peace between the tribes. These Indian auxiliaries became so indispensable to the Army that “in every case of actual or potential conflict between Indians and whites, Indians were called on to help to defeat the hostiles or to prevent hostilities from breaking out.”¹⁴

Measures used in these small wars came with the added benefit of forcing the men to become intimately acquainted with the locals and gain a cultural understanding that was vital to acquiring the good intelligence that is a “prerequisite for effective

¹³ Cable, 107 and Boot, 288.

¹⁴ Thomas W. Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 68.

counterinsurgency operations.”¹⁵ Local knowledge, even as limited as it was in some cases, allowed these units to be able to tap into the great resources of human capital that were available as a result. By using the people to defeat an enemy derived from the people, these soldiers and marines happened upon the most practical way to defeat insurgents. Their success was not achieved as a result of a well conceived master plan or grand strategy, but arose out of simple pragmatism.

Over the years, the Army has developed a general distaste for irregular wars and as Edward Luttwak notes, “the Defense Establishment as a whole still operates under the implicit assumption that ‘low-intensity’ warfare is merely a lesser included case of ‘real’ war.”¹⁶ It is because of this that irregular and unconventional conflicts are seen as a distraction from “real” war, and have been considered the exception and not the norm when it comes to warfare. Developing capabilities for these types of conflicts has taken a backseat to preparing for large-scale conventional operations (where the stakes were considered much higher), and lessons taken from these wars emphasized aspects that appealed to the Army’s long held concept of massed warfare. It is largely for these reasons that an effective counterinsurgency doctrine has eluded the US Army and the US military establishment in general.

2. Local Control: The Heart and Soul of Counterinsurgency

Efforts at winning the hearts of the people will come to naught, however, if the insurgent is able to control the population by “winning their minds” through terror, assassination, and reprisals for pro-government activities. In short, physical security is the sine qua non in any strategy aimed at defeating an insurgent movement.¹⁷

-Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.

The most effective way to beat insurgents is to adopt a strategy that places the highest priority on gaining control of the local population (establishing security and the rule of law), and less emphasis on targeting and hunting down insurgents (as is the case

¹⁵ Boot, 127.

¹⁶ Luttwak, 335.

¹⁷ Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 216.

with US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan). While being proficient at capturing insurgents is a necessary and important task, it cannot be the campaign strategy around which everything else revolves. Direct Action (DA) missions that are driven by reliable intelligence are intrinsic to COIN, but operations that serve as “fishing expeditions” in order to gain intelligence or to “flush out” insurgents should be avoided because they are less productive and often backfire by antagonizing the population.

Claiming that an insurgency cannot be defeated merely by killing or neutralizing insurgents may seem counterintuitive, but this is one of many paradoxes of insurgent warfare that is difficult to grasp for a military that has been raised on a diet of mass warfare. To explain: the insurgents and their terror activities are the product of a system that requires money, food, training, recruits, materials, weapons, safe-havens, information and, most important, the support of a few and the absolute indifference of everyone else. As T.E. Lawrence said:

Rebellion...must have a population sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by two percent active in a striking force, and 98 percent passively sympathetic...¹⁸

In other words, the essence of the problem is that it is the attitude of the population that permits a rebellion to exist.¹⁹ If the government cannot provide basic needs and security to the people and neglects its citizens’ demands for social change (prompted by corruption, injustices, abuses within the system, etc.), motive and opportunity for insurgency and rebellion will be created. It is out of this “disequilibrium” that insurgents find ways to exploit social grievances, inequities and government weakness to their advantage and set the stage for revolution.²⁰

The local population is the “Petri-dish” that breeds and supports the insurgents, therefore gaining and maintaining local control is the essential element of any counterinsurgency strategy, without which there is simply nothing to build upon. For an

¹⁸ T.E. Lawrence, *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 1950, Vol. X, 953.

¹⁹ Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts*, (Chicago: The Rand Corporation, 1970), Ch 2, p. 6-27

²⁰ Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1982), Ch 4.

occupying force, no amount of focus or success in any other tasks—such as holding elections, solving infrastructure problems with civil projects, or capturing high value targets like Saddam or al Qaeda’s top leadership—can compensate for a shortfall in the area of local control. Local control is defined as “being able to see everything that occurs and being able to influence what is occurring.”²¹ Achieving local control should be viewed as the “decisive point,” if indeed there can be a decisive point in a counterinsurgency campaign.

Only by maintaining a 24/7 presence that uses population control measures like curfews, entry/exit checkpoints to population centers, monitoring techniques like biometric ID cards, and other tactics and measures that are more akin to policing and nation-building than offensive military operations, can we hope to establish local control and gain legitimacy in insurgent conflict areas.

The mastery of these techniques by communist regimes is largely the reason that they have been notoriously difficult to topple using unconventional warfare measures. Communist government control over people runs so deeply and effectively at the lowest levels that it leaves no contested space in which insurgents/counter-state forces can operate, even if the government is abusive and overwhelmingly unpopular among the people. Conversely, a similar systematic “bottom-up” approach to mobilizing populations for what Mao Zedong referred to as “people’s war” is why communism was able to spread steadily in many weakly governed third world countries during the Cold War years. This is not to suggest that the US military should adopt communist-like practices in conducting counterinsurgency, but there may be certain security measures that can be adopted and improved upon that do not compromise our democratic values.

Of course, an outside military force operating on foreign land faces a “Catch-22” situation in which the very presence of the large numbers of troops necessary to implement effective security can likewise fuel anti-government sentiment and insurgent activity. This is particularly so when the outside force is not meeting the expectations of the locals when it comes to providing security and other basic needs and services. In

²¹ Gordon McCormick, *Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare* class notes (Naval Postgraduate School, Spring 2005).

reference to the British efforts in Malaya and other successful COIN efforts during the last century, Dr. James S. Corum states:

Even if foreign forces had to carry the main burden for a time, the preference of the defending government has been to employ foreign security forces only as long as absolutely necessary, with the ideal being the creation of local forces capable of defeating insurgents with minimal support from foreign forces. Simply put, enabling an indigenous government to fight its own war is a key element of a sound counterinsurgent strategy.²²

Therefore, efforts to create an environment that makes insurgent activity difficult and fosters cooperation with locals to the point where they can be placed in charge of their own security must be swift and deliberate.

Instead of concentrating the bulk of our efforts on building centralized state forces in the image of our own military (like the Iraqi National Guard and the Afghan National Army), a solution that is more appropriate to the nature of the problem of insurgencies is to begin establishing security forces and intelligence/informant networks made up of the local populace in every village and town where insurgents operate. This is a much more effective and practical means of providing on-the-ground intelligence and exerting influence over the rest of the population than the temporary presence of a centralized state military force, which may drive out insurgents for a short term, but will leave a population vulnerable to insurgent influence when these state forces must inevitably withdraw.

Mao Zedong made the allusion that guerrillas exist among the population like “fish in the sea.” Much like draining a fish tank, if you can separate the insurgents from the population, the insurgency has no chance of sustaining itself. This indirect approach targets the problem (the lack of physical security and local control), rather than the *symptoms* of the problem (the insurgents and their activities).

This is the most efficient means of accomplishing the overall goal of eliminating the insurgency because it helps you attain all your other goals along the way. Because

²² James S. Corum, *Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2006), 1.

you must work *by, with and through* the locals, this helps you gain the trust, credibility, and legitimacy you need for them to start turning in their insurgent neighbors, and at the same time you are helping to build the infrastructure that you need in order to eventually implement an exit strategy. Co-opting locals for these tasks also reduces the amount of time and resources you must spend conducting intrusive sweeps, searches and offensive operations, which are counterproductive in the sense that they often have the unwanted side-effect of antagonizing and alienating the very people you are there to protect.

3. A Call for Change

Military conflict has changed and we have been reluctant to recognize it. Defeating nation-state forces in conventional battle is not the task for the 21st century. Odd missions to defeat transnational threats or rebuild nations are the order of the day, but we haven't yet adapted.²³

-GEN Anthony Zinni, USMC, Retired

According to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Department of Defense (DOD) is calling for sweeping changes within the military. The QDR states, "In the post-September 11 world, irregular warfare has emerged as the dominant form of warfare confronting the United States, its allies and partners."²⁴ As the Pentagon moves to overhaul strategy by beginning to reverse decades of focus on conventional conflicts, it will look toward strengthening military capabilities in conducting counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and stabilization and reconstruction operations.

The QDR acknowledges that irregular wars will demand very different skills from our troops, like being able to "understand foreign cultures and societies and possess the ability to train, mentor and advise foreign security forces."²⁵ Measures to improve performance in these campaigns must be realistic, visibly effective and come at a low cost. A program that meets these criteria and improves efficiency for US forces in establishing short-term security at the local level in UW conflicts, while at the same time

²³ Tom Clancy, with GEN Anthony Zinni, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, and Tony Koltz, *Battle Ready* (New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 2004), 424.

²⁴ 2006 QDR, 36.

²⁵ Ibid, 42.

laying the groundwork for the development of long-term stability, could help define US counterinsurgency strategy for the future. Establishing a program that capitalizes on the capabilities of auxiliary and surrogates would assist in filling many of these needs for the future.

4. Auxiliaries and Surrogates in COIN: the Elegant Solution

As always, people, not technology, will make the difference...in short, we have to invest in the human capital that is the real key to future warfare.²⁶

-Thomas X. Hammes

One of the most profound side-effects of the US military's pursuit and heavy reliance on conventional war-fighting capabilities is that we have been precluded from needing a deep understanding of our enemies in order to beat them. According to Dr. Anna Simons, "To succeed in the past, we didn't have to have the sort of small-unit cultural awareness that is being trumpeted today."²⁷ Even the most ardent conventional warriors would admit that *finding* the enemy, not *fighting* him, is one of the biggest problems the military is facing in Iraq and Afghanistan. Retired Maj. General Robert H. Scales states:

This war [Iraq] will be won by fostering personal relationships, leveraging non-military advantages, reading intentions, building trust, converting opinions and changing perceptions, all tasks that demand an exceptional ability to understand people, their culture, and their motivations.²⁸

The military establishment is now beginning to acknowledge the importance of developing grassroots cultural awareness and the need for understanding how to leverage this knowledge to our advantage. While acknowledging the problem is a good first step, finding a viable solution could prove to be a difficult task. Of course, continuing to push language skills and "cultural awareness training" is important, but comes with limitations

²⁶ Thomas X. Hammes, "Rethinking the Principles of War: The Future of Warfare," in *Rethinking the Principles of War*, ed. Anthony D. McIvor (Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 2005), 277.

²⁷ Anna Simons, "Seeing the Enemy (or Not)," in *Rethinking the Principles of War*, ed. Anthony D. McIvor (Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 2005), 323.

²⁸ Robert H. Scales, "Human Intel vs. Technology: Cultural Knowledge important in Iraq," *Washington Times*, 3 February 2005, 21.

and is far from a quick-fix solution. Deep cultural understanding takes time (sometimes a lifelong commitment) and patience to develop—two commodities which are generally in short supply when a democracy goes to war.

At certain points in our nation's past, we have looked to indigenous people to act as auxiliaries and surrogate forces to help meet these needs in times of conflict. The Army's use of Indian auxiliaries during the Plains Wars wasn't just for economic reasons; Indians proved indispensable to the Army's efforts to police the western frontier, promote peace between the different tribes, and pave the way for western expansion. Indian auxiliaries provided skills as scouts, interpreters and intermediaries—skills that could not have been realistically cultivated by their white counterparts. The services of Indian auxiliaries proved to be so valuable to operations that “a school of thought had developed within the army, of indeterminate numbers but including experienced frontier officers, favoring some sort of permanent, systematic organization of Indian auxiliaries and scouts.”²⁹

The US Marines in the Banana Wars were able to complement their virtues of discipline and combat skills with the local knowledge and terrain familiarity of the irregular forces. The Marines used an “institutionalized cross-cultural combat cooperation” of mixed formations which, according to Larry E. Cable, “had the best effect on civilian morale, as they were a highly visible sign of what would later be termed ‘U.S. commitment.’ ”³⁰

Another illustrative example that highlights the concept of incorporating auxiliaries from target areas (perhaps more in theory than in practice) occurred during the Cold War with the passing of the Lodge Act of 1951. The Lodge Act was initially designed to assist the US military in creating a “foreign legion” of Eastern Block expatriates to be used against a Red Army invasion of Europe. While this idea never came to pass, the law was used by US Army Special Forces to fill its ranks with former Eastern Europeans for the purpose of creating teams to be dropped behind the Iron

²⁹ Dunlay, 23-24.

³⁰ Cable, 107.

Curtain to train and lead partisan resistance movements.³¹ Although one can only speculate as to what degree this would have been successful had this mission been executed, the fact remains that a few individuals had the vision to plan for such a contingency, and to do so recognized they needed to rely heavily on the incorporation of native personnel. A program of a similar nature could prove even more useful in today's conflicts.

Utilizing people in military operations that are from a target area and have a lifetime's worth of knowledge about the inner workings of society at the micro-level has obvious benefits. Aside from language and cultural skills, natives have an "insider status" that can assist in gaining a unity of effort with the local population that we as outsiders might never achieve. This is particularly important in "non-Western" areas where we are conducting ongoing operations where our status as "outsiders" is even more evident. The next chapter will discuss a plan to recruit, train and incorporate auxiliary forces from target countries into UW/COIN operations by coalescing them into Special Forces teams for the purpose of redressing many of the aforementioned problems.

³¹ The Lodge Act of 1951 (also known as Public Law No. 597, 81st Congress) named after its sponsor, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. See http://www.coldwar.org/articles/50s/lodge_act.asp; Internet; cited 10 February 2006.

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II. AUXILIARY TRAINING PROGRAM FOR SPECIAL FORCES

A. AUXILIARY TRAINING PROGRAM OVERVIEW

Maintaining a long-term, low visibility presence in many areas of the world where US forces do not traditionally operate will be required. Building and leveraging partner capacity will also be an absolutely essential part of this approach, and the employment of surrogates will be a necessary method for achieving many goals.³²

-2006 Quadrennial Defense Review

1. Definitions

This portion of the study will use terms that Special Forces are familiar with in conducting guerrilla warfare campaigns and supporting resistance movements, only here they will be applied to COIN operations. The terms “auxiliary” and “asset” will be borrowed from UW doctrine to define elements that will perform important roles in supporting COIN operations and keeping an existing government in power.

Special Forces doctrine defines an “auxiliary” as the “the internal support element of the resistance movement whose organization and operation are both covert and clandestine in nature and whose members do not openly indicate their sympathy or involvement with the resistance movement.”³³ For purposes of this study, the definition will apply to an organization of similar or mirrored purpose in counterinsurgency operations. The term “auxiliary” may also be used interchangeably with the terms “irregular” and “surrogate.” It is worth noting that circumstances of counterinsurgency operations would not necessarily require an auxiliary force to operate covertly or clandestinely, but the tasks of assisting in logistics, security, intelligence, recruiting, and helping to mobilize the population can make similar demands. Local indigenous people must be relied on to assume these roles when the existing host nation government infrastructure cannot, or in cases where a government’s influence does not extend everywhere within its own borders (i.e., the new Government of Afghanistan). In extreme

³² 2006 QDR, 36.

³³ Special Forces Detachment Officer Qualification Course Summary Sheets, US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, June 1998, 103.

cases, USSF must be prepared to create and foster these capabilities out of the local populace from scratch.

The term “asset” is commonly used to describe a member of a resistance movement or “insider” who can provide USSF valuable intelligence and insight for mission planning and operations. It is generally understood that an asset has tactical information, local knowledge and influence that is useful when it comes to conducting UW. In a guerrilla warfare campaign, an asset might accompany an SF team during infiltration and link-up with the resistance movement. In COIN, the function of assets would be similar in this capacity, only instead of linking up with a resistance movement, they would accompany SF teams and assist in establishing relations with local government and/or key leaders in a specific area. For this study, assets are construed to be an essential part of an auxiliary force, but their status will be different from indigenous auxiliaries because they will be recruited out of the US population, they will be a more permanent fixture on SF teams, and they will be acting as “facilitators” between USSF and the host nation because they have backgrounds and experience in two different cultures.

2. Purpose

The idea behind the Auxiliary Training Program is to develop a permanent, institutionalized system by which USSF can create professional cadres of auxiliaries for use in operations, particularly COIN operations, where long-term success depends predominantly on creating and improving local indigenous security forces. While current efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan are aimed at creating large quantities of state military and police forces trained in predominantly conventional military measures to hunt and root out insurgents (a top-down approach), this plan focuses on the development of basic security infrastructure at the village and town level in order to indirectly defeat insurgents by separating them from their popular support base (a bottom-up approach). The ideas presented here are by no means the only way of conducting such a program, and should be considered as a general framework for implementation.

This program is *not* an attempt to create more Special Forces, raise a “foreign legion,” or to rehash a “Bay of Pigs” style operation where groups of refugees are trained as a fighting force by the US and sent unilaterally to defeat a mutual enemy.³⁴ Rather, the Auxiliary Training Program is intended as a “long haul” method to help defeat insurgent forces at the grass roots level by *partnering* indigenous regional experts with SF teams to create a continuous training “pipeline” for building a security infrastructure from the ground-up within a conflict area. This training pipeline will produce the personnel core that the indigenous security force will be built around. This program is a relatively inexpensive and alternative means of fostering an effective security apparatus in a target country, a way of cultivating broader and deeper knowledge of specific areas of operation, and of demonstrating long-term US commitment to our allies and partners in helping to rebuild conflict areas.

3. Method

Once a country has been identified as a potential target for US military intervention (or perhaps at its request for US assistance), the basic concept of the plan is to immediately begin recruiting people within the US who have local knowledge of the target country (preferably foreign-born expatriates with pre-existing language skills, cultural knowledge, social ties with people in their native country, etc.) and assign them to Special Forces Operations Detachment Alphas (SFODAs) as “assets” to assist with mission planning, training and operations. This process can begin well in advance of an anticipated US military strike or invasion.

Once the SFODAs and their assets are inside the target country (before, during or after US military action, depending on the situation), the assets would assist in building rapport and gaining legitimacy with local leaders and key personnel, and would help recruit and train locals as security forces. The best and brightest of these local recruits would be identified, and volunteers from this group would accompany their respective

³⁴ “The Bay of Pigs” was a failed attempt to overthrow the government of Fidel Castro in 1961 by using a group of CIA trained Cuban exiles in a clandestine amphibious invasion. The operation was intended to cause a chain reaction and inspire insurrection among the population, but ended in disaster.

SFODAs back to the US for more lengthy and in-depth training in security and COIN operations as “auxiliaries.”

An initial group of these indigenous auxiliary recruits would be sent back immediately to train with the SF unit that has been identified as the follow-on force for the current SF unit in theater (follow-on forces are typically identified several months in advance). When the current SFODA in theater redeploy, it will take another group of recruits with it to train during its recovery cycle, while the incoming SF unit takes over and already has a working relationship with a group of auxiliaries that is trained and prepared to continue the mission. On the ground, the auxiliaries assist the SF teams in training and employing locals for security measures and collecting intelligence. The security measures and intelligence networks must be continuously expanded and improved upon until there is no “contested space” left for the insurgents to operate in. This cycle would repeat with every operational rotation until the mission is complete and a US military presence in the target country is no longer deemed necessary.

4. Endstate

In short, the training of indigenous forces would simultaneously take place in the host country and in the US, and SF teams would never be out of contact with the local forces for lengthy periods as they currently tend to be when they redeploy and are on their “down cycles” between operational deployments. SF teams would be committed to the same areas of operation over repeated rotations, instead of being shuffled from area to area to react to the demands of the immediate security situation on the ground.

The net effect of this program is that, over time, it will help establish local control and create an environment inhospitable to insurgent activity. The program will foster a professional security apparatus within the target country, it will improve the language skills and cultural understanding of both the US forces and their counterparts, and it will build deeper, more personal ties and a sense of commitment to the target country—all of which are necessary in the long approach to success in COIN operations. The following will focus on the creation of the two basic and interrelated components of the Auxiliary Training Program—the *US assets* and the *indigenous auxiliary forces*—as well as the function of the stateside training portion of the program.

B. RECRUITING

1. Special Forces Assets: Recruiting Auxiliaries in the US

That is where we are lucky. No other country has such a fund of men who speak the languages of the lands we must invade, who understand the ways and have tasted the wine of the land on the palate of their memories. This is a lucky thing for America.³⁵

-John Hershey, *A Bell for Adano*, 1944

Because circumstances may preclude USSF from initially being able to recruit individuals from the target country prior to an invasion or other military action, an auxiliary “asset” force should be organized within the US prior to any offensive action if the situation permits. Although this asset force would be comprised primarily of US citizens who are foreign-born, it may also include foreign-born who are non-US citizens (refugees/displaced persons, etc.), or those in various stages of working towards US citizenship. This distinguishes “assets” from “indigenous auxiliaries” who are citizens of the host nation and are currently residing in the host nation.

The goal of developing this asset force is to augment every SFODA with at least one person (preferably more) who is familiar with the culture, language and social structure of the target country. While many of the duties of assets would resemble those of interpreters, far more would be demanded of assets. Assets would assist USSF teams in making the transition from initial combat operations to “Phase IV,” Support and Stability Operations (SASO), and COIN in the event that an insurgency arises in the post-conflict environment. As area experts and advisors, assets would assist USSF in being able to quickly establish initial contact with local leaders and people of influence in their areas of operation, as well as assist in recruiting and training indigenous personnel for creating local security forces.

Fortunately, the ideal place to look for recruiting potential candidates for the asset force is in the US. Since the US is an immigrant nation, we have an extraordinary reservoir of foreign expertise found within our own population. Using the populations of Iraqis and Afghans that live in the US as an illustrative example (see Tables 1 and 2),

³⁵ John Hershey, *A Bell for Adano* (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1944), 2.

there are a substantial number of individuals from these countries who could potentially be recruited into service as assets.

Table 1. US Foreign Born in Afghanistan³⁶

Statistics from the US Census Bureau, Year 2000	
US Population of People Born in Afghanistan	
Population 18 years and over.....	40,910
Male.....	20,985
Female.....	19,925

Table 2. US Foreign Born in Iraq³⁷

Statistics from the US Census Bureau, Year 2000	
US Population of People Born in Iraq	
Population 18 years and over.....	79,760
Male.....	44,465
Female.....	35,295

When looking to plan contingencies for potential opponents like Iran or China, the numbers of US foreign born are even greater (see Tables 3 and 4).

Table 3. US Foreign Born in Iran³⁸

Statistics from the US Census Bureau, Year 2000	
US Population of People Born in Iran	
Population 18 Years and over.....	269,625
Male.....	145,630
Female.....	123,995

Table 4. US Foreign Born in China³⁹

Statistics from the US Census Bureau, Year 2000	
US Population of People Born in China (including Taiwan)	
Population 18 Years and over.....	1,404,010
Male.....	659,305
Female.....	744,705

While small numbers of US foreign-born are serving in our efforts abroad as interpreters, translators, and in other capacities, efforts to recruit foreign-born citizens with backgrounds from present conflict areas into military service have been weak or non-existent. According to the Migration Policy Institute, of the approximately 69,300 foreign-born serving the US Armed Forces, only 800 are from south-central Asian

³⁶ Profile of Selected Demographic and Social Characteristics, Year 2000, US Census Bureau, Table FBP-1. [Web site]; available from <http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/stp-159/STP-159-afghanistan.pdf>; Internet; cited 10 January 2006.

³⁷ Ibid, <http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/stp-159/STP-159-iraq.pdf>. Internet; cited 10 January 2006.

³⁸ Ibid, <http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/stp-159/STP-159-iran.pdf>. Internet; cited 10 January 2006.

³⁹ Ibid, [http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/stp-159/STP-159-china\(inclTaiwan\).pdf](http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/stp-159/STP-159-china(inclTaiwan).pdf). Internet; cited 10 January 2006.

countries, and 325 are from western Asian (Middle East) countries.⁴⁰ This should be reason for concern considering these regions include Iraq and Afghanistan, which constitute the central focus of the Global War on Terror, and US forces have now had a presence there for several years. These numbers reveal either a lack of emphasis, or a lack of effectiveness on behalf of the US military in recruiting people with backgrounds and non-combat skills from these critical regions.

USSF has its own recruiting apparatus, which is primarily used to draw in SF candidates from the ranks of the Army. However, the duties of SF recruiters could be expanded to recruit for the Auxiliary Training Program and to reach out to specific foreign-born communities within the US. Recruiting could also be conducted through the assistance of dissident and exile groups as well as informal leaders and other organizations within these ethnic communities in the US.

The US has relied on its foreign-born population and non-citizens in the past for assistance in military endeavors; this a resource that should not be ignored as a potential source for providing help to US operations in present and future conflict areas.

2. Indigenous Auxiliaries: Recruiting in the Target Country

The incorporation of assets on SF teams should facilitate recruiting indigenous auxiliaries, however, should SF teams have to recruit without the assistance of assets, this is one of the areas where Special Forces soldiers excel—interacting and developing rapport with indigenous people. It is one of the core strengths of Special Forces, which has generations of institutional knowledge and experience in working with and mobilizing groups of indigenous people that dates back to the days of the OSS and the Jedburgh teams of Europe and Detachment 101 in Burma.

It is typical of insurgencies that only a small percentage of a population is in “hard core” support of the insurgents (this is the “2%” that T.E. Lawrence refers to). The rest of the population is capable of being persuaded to side with the authorities given the

⁴⁰ Jennifer Yau, “The Foreign Born in the Armed Services,” Migration Policy Institute, 1 May 2005. [Web site]; available from <http://www.migrationinformation.org/USFocus/print.cfm?ID=304>; Internet; accessed 6 March 2006. Report states there were 69,299 foreign-born individuals on active duty in the armed forces of the United States as of December 2004.

proper incentives. Recruiting for government forces is facilitated even more when an insurgency is not popular with the people. During the Dhofar War in Oman, the British Special Air Service (SAS) was able to recruit irregulars in order to fight against the communist insurgents (see Case Study “Operation Storm”). In Angola, a small group of former South African Special Forces was able to create groups of irregulars out of the local population to fight a powerful anti-government rebel movement (see Case Study “Executive Outcomes in Angola”).

Even in Iraq and Afghanistan, where anti-US sentiment and insurgent movements are strong, efforts to recruit for the Iraqi National Guard (ING), the Afghan National Army (ANA) and other security forces have been remarkably successful. According to a recent White House Fact Sheet, there are over 120 Iraqi army and police combat battalions in the fight – each comprised of between 350 to 800 Iraqi forces.⁴¹ Likewise in Afghanistan, the US and Government of Afghanistan (GOA) are achieving similar successes in recruiting. The projected number of Afghan combat troops by the end of 2005 is 43,000, and US training of these troops has frequently outpaced efforts to equip and sustain them.⁴² As of January 2005, Germany and the US have trained over 35,000 national, highway and border police, and expect to reach the overall goal of training 62,000 by Dec 2005.⁴³

While the reasons for joining the ranks of these forces likely range from practical (getting a steady paycheck and putting food on the table) to personal (patriotism, wanting to do their part to help rebuild their country, etc.), these statistics support the proposition that even in the midst of some of the least ideal circumstances it is still possible to recruit and gain a certain level of cooperation from the local populace. Offering people training, work, and decent wages can be a strong motivator that can sway even those with a preference for the insurgents’ cause.

⁴¹ The White House Fact Sheet: Training Iraqi Security Forces, 30 November 2005. [Web site]; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051130.html>; Internet; accessed 16 January 2006.

⁴² United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) report “Afghan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined,” GAO-05-575, June 2005, p.11.

⁴³ Ibid, 19.

Many more might be willing to join the ranks of the security forces if they are permitted to serve in their home towns and villages, where they have a vested interest in protecting people they already know and have lived among their whole lives. The best incentive, however, is to offer a better deal than the insurgents. This means going beyond offering better wages or gainful employment and working to solve the inequities, discontent and injustices that fuel insurgency and rebellion and cause people to turn against their government.

While getting locals to join the ranks of the security forces is the first step, getting volunteers to leave their country for several weeks or months to receive training in the US might prove to be the more difficult task. If the insurgents have a strong presence in their area, individuals may be hesitant to leave their families for a lengthy period for fear of reprisals. Providing an adequate cover story for their status and extra police/military protection for their families would be necessary in many circumstances. Security for trainees is a legitimate concern, as is potential insurgent infiltration into security forces. Both issues will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter III.

C. TRAINING AUXILIARIES

Training indigenous security forces is also one of the most complex tasks in developing an effective counterinsurgency strategy. Building new forces from scratch is difficult enough. It is even more difficult to take indigenous police and military forces with a tradition of incompetence and corruption and transform them into effective forces that can find and defeat insurgents without undermining the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the people.⁴⁴

-James S. Corum

1. Training Security Forces for COIN

While there are different approaches that can be taken to successfully recruit for the ranks of security forces and for training abroad, it is the training itself which is most important and can impact the success or failure of a COIN campaign. While the numbers of military and police forces trained in Iraq and Afghanistan may seem

⁴⁴ Corum, v.

impressive, these forces continue to struggle to establish security and stability and have been largely ineffective at quelling insurgent activity. To wit, the insurgencies have only become *more* violent and influential in both these countries. In Iraq, insurgents launched 34,131 attacks in 2005, up 29% from 26,494 in 2004.⁴⁵ In Afghanistan, 2005 was the deadliest year for US troops since the war began in late 2001.⁴⁶ The manner in which the US struggles with turning over security to indigenous forces in both countries illustrates the need for more refined approaches by our military forces.

The most successful counterinsurgency missions within the last century have relied on strategies that focused on employing indigenous police and paramilitary forces as the principle forces of the government, often attaining a higher priority than training the indigenous military.⁴⁷ While the need for indigenous security forces in COIN is generally accepted, there is less of a consensus on what makes an effective security force for dealing with insurgents. The question of how to organize, train and employ such forces for this unique problem is not widely agreed upon or understood.

Typical activities of insurgents range from simple criminal acts to small-scale military-style operations. Thus, it is often difficult to differentiate between the roles of police and military forces in counterinsurgency. Police and local security forces are the people's first line of defense, but they must have the skills to survive and operate in what may still be a "battlefield environment." Indigenous security forces must be able to provide security for the population, but also must be able to conduct offensive operations against insurgents in order to expel them from their strongholds or deny them safe-havens. The Auxiliary Training Program will ensure that local security forces are given the tools they need to operate between both extremes. The following sections will discuss an alternative approach to current methods being used to organize, train and employ security forces by US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

⁴⁵ Rick Jervis, "Attacks in Iraq Jumped in 2005," USA Today, 22 January 2006. [Web site]; available from www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-01-22-iraq-statistics_x.htm; Internet, accessed 5 March 2006.

⁴⁶ Bryan Bender, "US Endures deadliest Year in Afghanistan," The Boston Globe, 3 July 2005. [Web site]; available from http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2005/07/03/us_endures_deadliest_year_in_afghani; Internet, accessed 5 March 2006.

⁴⁷ Corum, 2.

2. Training Americans and US Foreign-Born as “Assets”

Since assets would bypass the levels of training required by US military enlistees and officers, the burden of training them in basic skills would fall heavily on their assigned SFODAs. Besides basic skills (like marksmanship, weapons training, first aid, survival, and small unit tactics), assets must be trained in team standard operating procedures (SOPs) for situations that they may encounter while operating in an unconventional environment (immediate action drills, react to enemy contact, convoy operations, etc.). For the stateside training, the assets would be the conduits between the SF teams and their auxiliary partners. Assets would be relied upon to translate and help teach these skills and tradecraft to the indigenous auxiliaries on their respective SFODAs. To the extent possible, it is important that assets are integrated as part of the team and are not treated as outsiders, as this impression could come across negatively to the locals. It is also important that their efforts are in unity with the SF teams and that they working towards achieving the same goals.

While the role of assets is to assist their respective SF teams in various capacities (such as being teacher/trainers, interpreters, negotiators, advisors, collecting and assessing intelligence, understanding basic military and policing measures and terminology, etc.), assets would not be expected to perform as “operators” at the level of SF soldiers. While assets will be required to perform an array of tasks, they would merely need to be familiar with these tasks, not “subject matter experts” at them.

The most significant contributions the assets would make to the teams would be in the realm of language and regional expertise. The degree to which the assets will be valuable and effective for their respective SFODAs will depend largely on how much effort the SF team members make toward building a good working relationship, integrating them into the team’s operational strategy and most important: making the SF mission understandable to them so that they can import this to the indigenous auxiliaries and the local population.

3. Training Indigenous Auxiliary Forces

SFODAs are well prepared to train auxiliaries in many tasks, ranging from basic military skills to more complex and advanced measures required of COIN. Basics skills

such as weapons training, small unit tactics, reacting to enemy contact, survival, first aid, and communications would be taught first before the more complex tasks of urban combat training, surveillance, and intelligence collection and management.

However, since many of the tasks required of local security forces for conducting COIN are more related to policing than typical military skills, certain training would have to be outsourced to private security companies, police instructors and/or other US federal agencies that fall under the realm of the Department of Justice. Training a force of “beat cops” that can patrol neighborhoods and deal with everything from simple crime and gathering intelligence, to taking the lead in joint operations with state military forces to quell insurgent and terrorist activity is an ideal means to an end. Many of these tasks require teaching policing skills such as manning vehicle and personnel checkpoints, crowd control, conducting foot patrols, teaching basic detective skills, apprehending and handling suspects and other control measures designed to provide local security and law enforcement.

4. Intelligence Training: Collection and Management

Effective counterinsurgency operations depend more on accurate intelligence than any other factor.⁴⁸

-James S. Corum

In an unconventional warfare environment, insurgents are generally in a position of information advantage, but have a firepower disadvantage when compared to the state. In contrast, the state has the firepower and resource advantage but lacks the intelligence and situational awareness necessary to capitalize on its strengths.⁴⁹ To compensate for this “asymmetry,” the state often relies on “low leverage” and high cost means to defeat insurgents, i.e., using brute force, overwhelming firepower and mass warfare techniques to root out insurgents. In order for the state to create the “high leverage” means necessary

⁴⁸ Corum, 10.

⁴⁹ Gordon McCormick, *Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare* class notes (Naval Postgraduate School, Spring 2005).

to gain the information advantage requires that auxiliaries and security forces be trained in the tradecraft of intelligence collection and management.

Local police and security forces typically come across valuable information concerning insurgent activities during the course of their daily routines (making their rounds, walking their beats, manning control points, etc.). Efforts to train and cultivate these skills when building an auxiliary force are critical when it comes to improving the situational awareness of government and counterinsurgent forces.

Intelligence collection can come from a variety of means. Auxiliaries and security forces would be taught how to conduct surveillance operations (particularly urban surveillance) where their ability to blend into the local population will be an enormous advantage. This includes plain-clothes operations to trail suspected insurgents without being detected, and how to discern when one is being followed and what actions to take.

While conducting surveillance is an important task, local security forces will collect the majority of their information from informants. Informants can be either witting or unwitting, and can be employed on an informal (incidental informants) or formal basis (recruited agents). Incidental informants typically provide information on a one-time basis. Recruited agents are selected and trained for continuous service in collecting information. Utilizing informant networks and establishing less formalized programs like neighborhood watches, “home guards” and block monitors are critical to gaining situational awareness and achieving the level of local control that security forces need to “see everything that occurs” in their areas of operation.

While intelligence collection is vital, without good intelligence management information will not get down to whom it matters the most. According to Larry E. Cable, “...no intelligence product, regardless of substantial merit, has any utility unless it can be exploited quickly, vigorously, appropriately and without interorganization jurisdictional disputes.”⁵⁰ Intelligence management means being able to foster cooperation among intelligence agencies and to share information between security organizations. Also auxiliary forces must be able to properly analyze information in order to produce useful intelligence products for their operations. Special Forces are trained in Low Level Source

⁵⁰ Cable, 84.

Operations (LLSO) and have the capacity to teach this tradecraft to auxiliaries and indigenous security forces. Ultimately, it is reliable information that allows for effective operations and for security forces to tighten the noose around the insurgents and their support networks.

5. Utilizing Auxiliary Forces “On the Ground”

There is nothing more difficult to carry out, or more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle than to institute a new order of things.

-Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 1513

Once the US asset force has been recruited and trained, the SF teams will deploy with their assets to the host nation to begin conducting operations. The assets will assist the SF teams in establishing rapport with the local leaders and will act as “liaisons” between the locals and the US forces. With the assistance of the assets, the SF teams will begin organizing a security force out of the local population. From this developing security force, the SF teams will carefully select individuals who are “emerging leaders” and show potential as long-term investments for the security force. These individuals will be the “indigenous auxiliaries” that will accompany the SF teams back to the US for distance training.

After several weeks or months of training together in the US, the SF teams and their assets and indigenous auxiliary counterparts will begin to establish mutual trust, close ties and professional working relationships. After the auxiliaries have completed their stateside training, they will accompany their respective SF teams back to the host nation. Since the SF teams now have a small cadre of trained auxiliaries, they can more effectively divide their efforts between expanding and professionalizing the local security force and taking measures to ensure the physical security of the local population.

In order to expand the local security force, the auxiliaries would use their local connections and influence to recruit more members into the force. Unlike the distance training the auxiliaries received back in the US, much of the security force training in country would be “on the job.” Less experienced recruits would be placed in static

security positions at critical local infrastructure and potential targets (water and power supplies, industry and economic sources, etc.), as this does not require much interaction with other locals or in-depth training. If US forces are currently securing these sites, then local forces must be phased-in to take over this responsibility as soon as possible.

More experienced personnel would conduct more complex tasks like monitoring control points to population centers, conducting active patrols, and conducting surveillance operations throughout the AO. The role of the auxiliaries is to teach and oversee these activities and be the “eyes and ears” of the SF teams, since the teams cannot possibly be everywhere at once. The auxiliaries would also use their local connections and pre-existing social ties to create intelligence networks to gather information on the insurgents and their support structure. This includes organizing less formal programs like neighborhood watches or “home guards” to report on insurgent activities.

In cases where the host government is incapable of providing state military forces to assist the locals, SF teams, along with the help of the auxiliaries, must also create a strike force (or Quick Reaction Force (QRF)) that is capable of responding to emergencies and insurgent activities that overwhelm the security forces on the ground. This strike force would also be used for targeting operations against insurgents when actionable intelligence is acquired. The QRF would perform functions similar to a police force “SWAT team” that can capture or kill targeted personnel.

SF teams would initially lead the indigenous forces in these COIN tasks, and then begin steadily transferring responsibility of these tasks over to the auxiliaries. As the auxiliaries and the local security forces gain confidence and experience in conducting these activities, the SF teams would assume advisor roles until the locals are ultimately ready to operate on their own. This process would not happen overnight, and could take months (or years) to begin producing visible results. It is for this reason the indirect method of warfare is referred to as “the long approach.”

D. LOGISTICS AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

1. Legal Precedents and Incentives for US Assets

There are legal precedents that could be looked to for establishing a US asset force. The first is the Act of 1866, which fixed the force strength of the Military Peace Establishment of the United States. This act contained a clause authorizing the president to enlist a force of Indians to “act as scouts” and receive the pay and allowances of cavalry soldiers.⁵¹ Similarly, the Lodge Act of 1951, which was employed to recruit foreign born Americans from Eastern European countries during the Cold War, could be employed today to create asset forces for current operations, particularly in the Middle East.

Although recruiting assets directly into the ranks of Special Forces could be an option, much like the purpose of the Lodge Act of 1951, there could be more efficient alternatives. Hiring assets as private government contractors, similar to the process of how government and military interpreters and members of contracted private security companies are hired, might prove to be advantageous. Potential recruits who might not prefer the long-term commitment required by enlisting in the Armed Forces might be more apt to sign up in the short-term as government contractors. This would also open up service to older individuals who would not meet the minimum age requirements of the military (recently changed to 39 years as the age cap for enlistment), but who would nevertheless provide valuable expertise. This would also allow assets to bypass lengthy and unnecessary training that is required of regular enlistees (basic training, advanced individual training, airborne school and the Special Forces Qualification Course) and go directly to Special Forces units. Time saved by this process would be critical in situations where assets are needed for unforeseen and hard to predict conflicts which Special Forces must frequently respond to. Hiring assets as contractors would also allow recruiters to entice potential recruits with higher wages (commensurate with officer or interpreter pay) and would make it easier to get rid of “undesirables.”

In the event that the assets are not already US citizens, another option for recruiting would be to cover the assets under the 3 July 2002 Executive Order that allows for the “expedited naturalization for aliens and non-citizen nationals serving in an active-

⁵¹ Dunlay, 44.

duty status in the Armed Forces of the United States during the period of war against terrorists of global reach.”⁵² Offering US citizenship in exchange for a commitment as an asset could be a very strong and sincere motivator for recruitment.

Lastly, efforts must be made to appeal to foreigners’ sense of pride in their homeland. Their heritage and connection to their place of birth and the opportunity to return to their native soil and bring freedom and stability could help leverage supporters, many of whom may have immediate or extended family living under oppressive conditions in the target country.

2. Wages for Auxiliary Forces

In order to recruit the best candidates, indigenous security forces should receive pay commensurate with what military forces in the target country are paid. Any disparity in pay between police and military will likely contribute to difficulties in recruiting numbers and adversely impact the quality of applicants. Auxiliary forces should be offered additional pay and bonuses for training in the US, and should receive higher pay (placed in a higher pay bracket) once they complete the training and return to their native country. This would encourage others to want to join the training and perhaps foster positive competitiveness within the security organization. Pay should be relative to the economic situation in a particular region, and would vary from country to country.

Pay for assets should at least equal that of interpreters and other civilian contractors. Wages earned in the target country would have to be substantially more than wages earned while back in the US conducting distance training. This would help in recruiting those who may be wary of entering a conflict area. Additional pay or bonuses should be considered for assets who can speak multiple languages or dialects in the target country, and for special skills such as prior military or law enforcement experience.

⁵² White House Press Release, Expedited Naturalization Executive Order, 3 July 2002. [Web site]; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/print/20020703-24.html>; Internet; accessed 7 March 2006. This order waives the traditional five-year waiting period to apply for citizenship for non-US citizens serving in the Armed Forces.

3. Numbers and Duration of Training

When it comes to producing trained auxiliary forces, the goal is quality, not quantity, so keeping the numbers at a manageable level is important. “Assembly line” production of auxiliaries would not produce as effective a force as training smaller numbers on a more personalized and individual basis. The pace and scale of the Auxiliary Training Program is not intended to produce large quantities of security forces, but rather to create a loyal and highly trained core of personnel that US forces can rely on back in the target country.

SFODAs would accommodate between 4-6 auxiliaries for training in the US between operational rotations, particularly in the early stages of the program. These numbers would not overwhelm SF teams and are manageable enough to equip and provide individualized training, and necessary logistics. Based on training five auxiliaries per SFODA, (there are 18 SFODAs per SF battalion), each battalion would train approximately 90 auxiliaries (not including assets) per operational cycle. An ideal operational cycle would consist of a 6 month deployment followed by a 6 month recovery and training cycle. Keeping the numbers of auxiliaries small also prevents having to take too many people out of the fight, which is particularly important when every last person is critical. Over time, and once the insurgency begins to weaken, the numbers of trainees could be increased after the training has been refined.

The duration of the training would depend largely on the stage of the operation and how well it is progressing. In the initial portion of the operation, distance training should be kept short (limited to 4-8 weeks) to keep the maximum number of security forces in the fight and to make necessary adjustments and changes for training the next cycle of recruits. Ultimately, barring time for leave and recovery operations for the SFODAs, the goal would be to keep the auxiliaries in training during all or most of the teams’ down cycle.

4. Housing for Auxiliaries in the US

In the short-term, if the rotations of SF battalions are managed accordingly, auxiliaries in training could be housed with little to no additional cost. All SF Groups

have facilities to house enlisted soldiers (Bachelor Enlisted Quarters or BEQs). During a rotational deployment, soldiers living in the BEQ could have their belongings placed in storage for the duration of their deployment to make rooms available for the auxiliary trainees. In the event that there are not enough rooms available, single SF and support soldiers could be authorized to receive basic allowance for housing (BAH) to live on the economy so that their rooms could be used for the auxiliaries.

This housing plan would presume that an SF Group would maintain the mission for the duration of the operation and would manage the rotation of its battalions in and out of country on a predictable schedule. In the long-term, if the Auxiliary Training Program is deemed successful and made a permanent program, plans should be made to build barracks to accommodate future auxiliary trainees.

5. Program Cost Estimates and Comparisons

This section will look at the financial costs of the Auxiliary Training Program and compare them to costs of ongoing operations in the GWOT. In order to estimate the operating costs for the Auxiliary Training Program, the follow assumptions will be made:

-The costs will be for one Special Forces battalion for one year.

-One Special Forces battalion consists of 18 SFODAs.

-A one year deployment cycle will consist of the SF battalion spending 6 months in the target country conducting operations and 6 months in the US conducting recovery and training.

-Each SFODA will have one US asset and five indigenous auxiliaries (18 assets and 90 indigenous auxiliaries per battalion).

-US assets will be paid an average of \$75,000 per year, or \$6250 per month with no additional pay or allowances.

-Indigenous auxiliaries will be paid \$200 per month while in-country (average pay for indigenous police and military in Iraq and Afghanistan).

- Indigenous auxiliaries will receive \$1,178.10 per month (the equivalent of an E1 with less than 4 months on the US military pay scale) for time spent training in the US, with no bonuses or additional allowances.

-The SF battalion will be allotted an operational fund of \$1,000,000 per year to cover additional costs like providing transportation in and out of the host nation, hiring additional trainers, providing individual equipment, ammunition and other training necessities, and unforeseen expenses and overhead costs.

Based on these assumptions, the following is the raw, estimated cost for the Auxiliary Training Program:

Table 5. Estimated Cost for the Auxiliary Training Program

• 90 Indigenous Auxiliaries	
– 6 months pay in country (\$200 per month)	\$108,000
– 6 months pay in the US (\$1,178.10 per month)	\$636,174
• 18 US assets	
– \$75,000 salary per year	\$1,350,000
• Operational Fund	\$1,000,000
• Estimated Total Cost (per SF battalion, per year)	\$3,094,174

According to a recent Congressional Research Service report, if the FY2006 supplemental request is approved, the total war-related cost to date for Iraq will be \$320 billion, and \$89 billion for Afghanistan (\$409 billion total for both operations).⁵³ Taking into account that funding to train security forces was shifted from the Department of State to the Department of Defense in FY2005, the funding dedicated to train security forces is

⁵³ Amy Belasco, "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11" (RL 33110, CRS Report for Congress, 24 April 2006), 8.

\$10.7 billion to date for Iraq with another \$3.7 billion requested for FY2006 (for a total of \$14.4 billion).⁵⁴ In Afghanistan, the funding to train and equip their military and police totals \$4.1 billion, with an additional \$2.2 billion requested in the FY2006 supplemental (which would bring the total to \$6.3 billion).⁵⁵ The total funding provided for training security forces for both countries is \$20.7 billion.

As these statistics show, only a fraction of the money being spend for both operations is dedicated to improving security forces (\$20.7 billion out of \$409 billion, or about 5%). For less than the price of one M1A2 Abrams tank (\$3.5 million), we could fund the Auxiliary Training Program for an entire SF battalion for one year.

⁵⁴ Amy Belasco, "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11" (RL 33110, CRS Report for Congress, 24 April 2006), 13.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

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III. SUPPORTING DISCUSSION

A. OTHER BENEFITS OF THE AUXILIARY TRAINING PROGRAM

1. “Distance Training” and “Combined Formations”

Distance/remote training for indigenous security forces is not a new idea. In spite of the difficulties of dealing with an active armed communist insurgency, the British trained Malayan police and military personnel at schools and academies in England during the Malayan Emergency in the 1950's.⁵⁶ The US military trained El Salvadoran forces (as well as many other military personnel from Central and South America) in the US and Panama at the School of the Americas and during their struggle against leftist guerrillas in the 1980s. The US has been training other foreign military officers and NCOs at US military institutions for decades. More recently, the US government (along with 15 other nations) has provided instructors to conduct training for Iraqi security forces at the Jordan International Police Training Center outside Amman, Jordan.⁵⁷

There are many advantages to distance training. First, it provides a better training environment by getting trainees away from the distractions of being in a combat zone. Second, it is less costly in terms of money and resources that have to be spent concerning physical security and logistics to support a training site amidst an ongoing insurgency. Third, it helps avoid the public criticism, political liabilities and other difficulties that come with sending large numbers of troops and professional trainers into a conflict area to conduct training.

However, in spite of all the benefits of distance training, there are some disadvantages to consider. The most notable is that in nearly all cases when distance training is conducted, there is little continuous oversight for the employment or development of foreign personnel after their training is complete. The “trainees” from these programs often disperse back to their home countries and very little is known about what direct impact or effectiveness was achieved by their schooling. Also, it is common

⁵⁶ Corum, 16-18.

⁵⁷ Jim Garamone, “Jordan Aids in Iraqi Police Training,” American Forces Information Service, 18 March 2006. [Web site]; available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/20050318_236.html; Internet; accessed on 15 April 2006.

that the trainers for these programs are not directly involved in the conflict, and therefore do not share the same fate as their recruits once the training is complete. This invites problems when there is little risk for trainers to push unqualified and poorly trained recruits through to meet quotas or please higher-ups. Referring to the Iraqi recruits produced by the Jordan International Police Training Center, Army Captain Paula Broadwell notes:

There are three main reasons why these forces will never be ready to defend their country: The wary, uncommitted recruits are immature and lackadaisical about the mission; the parsimonious training is inadequate; and accountability once recruits return to Iraq is inconsistent at best and lacks the return on investment one would expect.⁵⁸

The Auxiliary Training Program proposed here capitalizes on the advantages of distance training in the US, but also incorporates the institutionalized “combined formations” that the Marines in the Banana Wars found so advantageous for producing the best individual training, as well as fostering local cooperation. According to Larry E. Cable:

Marine officers and NCOs were able to overcome cultural and linguistic barriers as well as racial prejudice to cooperate effectively with and lead local troops in prolonged, stressful patrols...The marines also found that mixed patrols had the best effect on civilian morale, as they were a highly visible sign of what would later be termed “U.S. commitment.”⁵⁹

Another example of “combined formations” that worked exceptionally well occurred during WWII with the “Jedburgh” operations (see Case Study “The OSS in Southern France”). The Jedburghs were three-man teams assembled to infiltrate into German occupied Southern France to organize resistance movements. These teams were composed of one British or American officer, one French officer, and an enlisted communicator of any nationality. Jedburgh members trained for many months together in England before being inserted into France to conduct UW operations against the Germans. These mixed teams were able to capitalize on each other’s strengths—the

⁵⁸ Paula Broadwell, “Iraq’s Doomed Police Training,” The Boston Globe, 30 August 2005. [Web site]; available from http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/08/30/iraqis_doomed_police_training/; Internet, accessed 20 April 2006.

⁵⁹ Cable, 107.

guerrilla warfare skills of the Brits and Americans, and the local expertise and influence of the French members—and were highly successful at tying up the German forces to prepare for the Allied invasions of Normandy and Southern France (note: for more examples of combined formations, see Case Studies on “Operation Storm” and “Executive Outcomes in Angola” in section).

In a similar fashion, the combination of distance training and long-term partnerships of native personnel with SF teams would render the Auxiliary Training Program dramatically different from ongoing efforts to create indigenous COIN forces since the SFODAs would work hand in glove every day with the very people they have trained.

2. Language Skills

Some of the immediate benefits of having US foreign born as auxiliaries are the language skills and cultural knowledge that are essential in conducting COIN—skills that cannot easily be replicated in language schools. For US military personnel, foreign language skills take months or years to acquire, often resulting in soldiers having only a rudimentary level of proficiency—far below what is necessary in order to conduct effective COIN and other missions abroad without the use of professional interpreters.

Teaching foreign languages comes at great expense to the force in terms of money and time required to send soldiers away from their operational units. At the SOF Foreign Language Program at Ft. Bragg, NC, a Basic Military Language Course (BMLC) runs between 4-6 months. At the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, CA, (the primary source of language training for the Department of Defense) language courses typically run from 12-18 months. While foreign language skills for Special Operations Forces (SOF) and other US military personnel are no doubt important, achieving a level of foreign language proficiency equal to that of native speakers is extremely difficult and would be the exception, not the rule. Training cultural skills is an even greater challenge given time constraints and predominantly classroom environments. Local knowledge is something that can only be gained by living in the target country for an extended time—and this kind of “immersion training” is often hard to come by. The “Catch-22” is that a

permissive environment is needed for this training. SOF also has other challenges when it comes to language capabilities to support its missions. For example,

1) It is common for SOF personnel to have received language training in more than three languages during their career; 2) SOF units often operate in geographic regions where there are numerous languages; 3) high operational demands and force structure limitations often require SOF personnel to operate in areas where their specific foreign language(s) are not spoken, and 4) it is difficult to determine the right languages and personnel mix to address a wide variety of unknown and hard-to-forecast small-scale conflicts.⁶⁰

Utilizing US foreign born individuals and their pre-existing language skills would be an efficient means to attain these much needed abilities in present and future conflict areas.

3. Social Network Dynamics

The Auxiliary Training Program relies on the employment of local indigenous security forces in order to create an environment inhospitable to insurgent activity. Locals make highly effective COIN forces because they have pre-existing social networks which are critical in fostering social movements and collective action. According to Anna Simons, “extended families, lineages, clans, religious brotherhoods, and other indigenous associations represent latent networks, ideally suited for covert use by criminals, terrorists, and insurgents.”⁶¹ These same relationships and networks are also exploitable by counter-insurgent forces if conducted the right way.

In *Social Movements and Networks*, Doug McAdams explains three dynamics of why people join insurgencies and other social movements. First, “recruits to a movement tend to know others who are already involved...prior social ties encourage entrance into a movement.”⁶² Second, “most social movements develop within established local

⁶⁰ GAO Report to Congressional Committees, “Military Training: Strategic Planning and Distributive Learning Could Benefit the Special Operations Forces Foreign Language Program,” September 2003. [Online article]; available from <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031026.pdf>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2006.

⁶¹ Simons, 334.

⁶² Doug McAdams, “Beyond Structural Analysis: Toward A More Dynamic Understanding of Social Movements,” in *Social Movements and Networks* (Oxford University Press, 2003), 285.

settings...e.g. recognized leaders, communication channels, networks of trust.”⁶³ Third, “emerging movements tend to spread along established lines of interaction.”⁶⁴

According to McAdams’ theory, in conducting COIN operations it would be more effective to rely on locals who have access to these pre-existing social networks than it would be to rely on outside or centralized state forces that have no ties to the area. This also supports why the current strategy of using state military and police forces in Afghanistan and Iraq is encountering difficulties in establishing security and stability.

When it comes to the challenge of tapping into these human networks, Anna Simons states, “...it is not so much access that is denied as that we’ve never committed the resources.”⁶⁵ Working through auxiliaries will enhance our capabilities in gaining influence with the local population and will improve our ability to reach down into the community to gain reliable intelligence on the insurgents.

4. Persistent Presence and Building Trust

There is a cliché that the US Army didn’t fight the Vietnam War for nine years, but fought it one year, nine times over. This implies that while the presence of US military forces in Vietnam spanned nearly a decade, there was no consideration for long-term continuity as individuals were rotated after one year tours—most of whom never returned and those who did either came back working in a different capacity or in a different AO. In Iraq and Afghanistan today, many US service members have completed multiple tours of duty in either country (or both), but very few units or individuals return to operate in the same areas on a repeated basis.

In general, for the US military to conduct missions abroad, it is very difficult politically to sustain a protracted presence in a hostile area, much less the kind of persistent presence that is required to achieve long-term success. Unfortunately, this often comes at the expense of being able to create an image of US commitment to locals in these operations. From the point of view of the locals, it would be justifiably frustrating

⁶³ Doug McAdams, “Beyond Structural Analysis: Toward A More Dynamic Understanding of Social Movements,” in *Social Movements and Networks* (Oxford University Press, 2003), 285.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Simons, 335.

to deal with different US personnel every few months, as they are essentially having to start from scratch in building rapport, relationships and trust with each new US unit that rotates through.

There are different reasons for the US military's inability to maintain a true persistent presence in conflict areas. First, there is a lack of understanding or lack of importance placed on the value of persistent presence. In reality, persistent presence is seen in the broad sense as a continuous presence of troops in an area, not in the more meaningful sense of keeping the same people dedicated to the same areas for protracted periods and/or multiple iterations. The difference may seem subtle, but is quite revealing in how the US military approaches unconventional wars and about how we perceive building trust in foreign cultures.

According to Anna Simons, "because non-western means are typically person-to-person and are built on relations of *proven* trust, we can neither easily insinuate ourselves nor readily penetrate these networks on the ground."⁶⁶ A true "committed presence" by US forces must be able to attain a deep embedded status with the locals, which would pay large dividends towards developing the kind of intimate local knowledge and access to vital social networks that are critical in COIN operations.

Another factor in our inability to maintain a persistent presence is the bureaucratic nature of the US military itself. US military culture and bureaucracy treats service members as interchangeable pieces, keeping personnel constantly on the go by moving them to different duties stations or to different jobs within units. This makes it nearly impossible to keep people in one place (particularly in a conflict area) for long enough to gain intimate local knowledge. However, not every deployed service member would have to return to the same area time after time. As long as at least some individuals are able to develop these ties with the locals on a repeated basis, this may be enough for the locals to perceive an image of US commitment. To this end, a true persistent presence of *key individuals* returning repeatedly to the same AOs is possible.

If a USSF strategy for a COIN campaign is designed around the Auxiliary Training Program, this would essentially commit SFODAs to the same AOs by default.

⁶⁶ Simons, 335.

Commanders would be compelled to send their SFODAs back to the same areas for multiple iterations because there would be too much “friction” involved with the teams’ assets and indigenous auxiliaries in changing them to a different operational area. The Auxiliary Training Program would essentially build in a resistance to what is a natural tendency by commanders to move teams and units around inside a conflict area. The result is that the SFODAs will be able to reap the benefits of a true persistent presence: gaining intimate local knowledge, gaining access to indigenous social networks, and building trust and credibility with the locals.

B. PROBLEMS AND LIMITATIONS

1. Security and Vetting

Potential insurgent infiltration of security forces is a major concern in COIN operations. This is an ongoing problem in Iraq, where insurgents have penetrated the ranks of the police and military at various levels. The SFODAs would need to carefully hand-pick the auxiliary members, so they would be responsible for most of the vetting process. A detailed personnel record system may not be available in the host nation and, in many cases, the only means available to check the background of recruits is by consulting with other locals and trusted contacts who know the history of the personnel in question. The SFODAs can use their assets to assist in this process and get a feel for who is loyal and has a credible reputation within the community and who does not.

New recruits would undergo a probationary period similar to what the French Resistance used in WWII (see Case Study “OSS in Southern France). Under this probationary period, new recruits would be monitored and given duties that would not expose them to any sensitive information before background checks and vetting can be conducted. Before being allowed to enter the US for training, auxiliaries would go through the same process, as well as more detailed screening through available host nation and US databases and “wanted lists” to ensure they are not working for or have ties to insurgents or extremist/anti-government groups.

In addition to insurgent infiltration, reprisals against security force personnel and their families also must be addressed. It is difficult to keep the identities of security force

personnel a secret from the population because their roles require them to maintain an active, visible presence within the community in order to be effective. Consequently, measures must be taken to ensure that their families are not threatened or intimidated by insurgents. This may require frequent or additional patrols of the homes of security force personnel to ensure the safety of their families and to give the security force members peace of mind while they are out performing their duties.

In extreme cases, where an insurgency is very strong, the families of security force members may have to be temporarily relocated (or sent to live with other relatives) until the insurgency is brought under control. To the extent possible, the stateside training portion of the Auxiliary Training Program must be kept secret from all locals except close family members and key personnel. Because auxiliaries would have to leave their country for several weeks or months at a time, their unprotected families would pose as “targets of opportunity” for the insurgents. The indigenous auxiliaries must have an adequate cover story for their whereabouts while they are conducting their distance training in the US.

2. “Too Hot” for Operations?

The Auxiliary Training Program requires that the environment and situation on the ground be permissive enough for USSF to operate effectively. SFODAs are very agile and lethal when engaged in short duration combat. However, they are only lightly armed and operate in small numbers. Thus, SFODAs are not designed to be decisively engaged, or intended to conduct protracted “high-intensity” offensive operations.

It would be difficult and dangerous to implement this plan in areas that are “non-permissive” or overrun with insurgents. If the security situation is such that SF teams are only able to concentrate on force protection and their own self-preservation, they will not be able to dedicate sufficient time and resources to perform any other tasks required of the program (i.e., recruiting, training, conducting meetings and building rapport with locals, etc.).

Situations where the environment is too hostile for USSF to operate would require conventional forces to conduct “clear and sweep” operations to eliminate the presence of

large numbers of armed insurgent forces before USSF could move into the area and begin conducting operations. This is particularly so when insurgents have strongholds, “free zones” or “liberated areas” where government forces are unable to enter or operate. A case in point is the operation conducted by conventional US military forces to eliminate insurgents in the Iraqi city of Fallujah in 2004. Support and stability operations were only able to resume there because the strong insurgent presence was removed by substantial force. This is in keeping with the concept of starting the Auxiliary Training Program in “softer” areas first before working into more difficult areas over time.

3. Professionalizing the Force

While the Auxiliary Training Program would facilitate teaching basic and practical skills to newly established local security forces, more advanced training would be required for their long-term success. Advanced training would include how to conduct and incorporate public campaigns like rewards and amnesty programs, weapons buy-back programs and other innovative measures. Also, indigenous security and local law enforcement personnel must be taught how to use non-military resources for civic action programs (i.e., improving water and electrical services, roads, schools and other infrastructure improvements) to relieve social and economic grievances and to leverage support from the population and away from the insurgents. Other aspects that must be incorporated into their training include classes in democracy, human rights, the Law of Land Warfare, legal interrogation practices, dealing with detainees, and learning to work with and through other government agencies. All are necessary for professionalizing a security force.

In cases where it is necessary to rebuild an institution like a police force that has had a long history of corruption and incompetence, auxiliaries would be given classes in anti-corruption practices and how to avoid infiltration by insurgents. In certain cases it may be necessary to improve the public’s confidence in its police organization, which would require campaigns to fix the public’s image of the police, as well as concerted efforts to change the mindset of the police— that they exist to serve the people, not the other way around.

The Auxiliary Training Program is merely one measure that can be taken to help create government security infrastructure, and it has its limitations when it comes to producing a professional police/security force. In order to continue to professionalize a security force, there must be a progressive plan to educate and train members in more advanced skills, many of which are beyond the capabilities of USSF.

In order to teach these skills, training may have to be outsourced to other organizations or agencies that have more experience in building professional police and law enforcement institutions. In the mid-term, this may require key personnel and leaders to attend advanced schooling abroad. In the long-term, the US must help the host nation develop its own schools and training academies that would allow the host nation government to become self-sustaining. During the Malayan Emergency, selected Malayan police inspectors and officers who had been promoted from the NCO ranks were sent to England for a year to attend the UK police college course in Ryton and Hendon.⁶⁷ Many other courses were created across the country to train thousands of individual police. However, even with a massive concerted effort, it still took years to reform and professionalize the police forces in Malaya.

Although many of these tasks lie outside of the purview of USSF and the Auxiliary Training Program, they must be taken into consideration for the long-term stability and success of the host nation.

C. ROLES OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND USSF IN COIN

1. Conventional Forces in COIN

Command relationships and “territorial disputes” between USSF and conventional forces operating in COIN environments are often difficult to overcome but are beyond the scope of this study. Arguably, the roles of USSF and conventional forces would be reversed in COIN: USSF would undertake the main effort in establishing local control and conventional forces would play the supporting role. Without question, there are roles that conventional forces would be exceptionally well-suited for in supporting the efforts of USSF that would require a high degree of cooperation and coordination with the local

⁶⁷ Corum, 17.

SFODAs. These roles include providing local security and quick-strike capabilities while local security forces are in their developmental stages.

Conventional forces have the numbers, firepower, communications capability and mobility to move in quickly and secure newly occupied or liberated areas, but should only do so for as long as is necessary to phase in and replace them with indigenous local security forces. Insurgents do not typically operate in large formations, so rarely would conventional military forces need to organize for operations at the battalion level or higher. Rather, conventional military units should be organized to support police and local security forces in tactical operations and day to day security. Conventional forces can also be the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to react to any insurgent activities that overwhelm local forces. A QRF is an on-call force that can bring lethal firepower and other capabilities to bear on insurgents and assist in situations where additional force is needed in a hurry.

Another vital role for conventional forces is to employ Movement to Contact (MTC) teams that can patrol main supply routes (MSRs), borders, and the outer perimeters of towns and villages to keep insurgents at bay and until local control is established. This is an “economy of force” measure that allows indigenous security forces to concentrate their efforts on securing urban/built-up areas. These are all critical functions that must be performed until indigenous forces are able to take over the responsibility for these tasks themselves. These tasks would require little additional training or reorganization on the part of conventional forces, but would require redefining relationships and improving coordination between SOF and conventional forces in COIN and other unconventional operations.

2. Special Forces and Training Foreign Forces

One of the core missions of USSF is to conduct “military and paramilitary operations, predominantly conducted through, with or by indigenous or surrogate forces.”⁶⁸ This is a role that was inherited from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in WWII, which was regarded by USSF’s founder Col. Aaron Bank as the “operational

⁶⁸ Department of the Army, FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), 2-1.

predecessors of Special Forces.”⁶⁹ For years, US Special Forces have been called on to provide training for military and security forces of friendly foreign nations. Therefore, USSF are a logical choice for taking the lead in an Auxiliary Training Program. USSF are organizationally a “good fit” for such a program on many levels.

First, SFODAs are designed to conduct “decentralized” operations. The teams are comprised of senior NCOs, a warrant officer and a commissioned officer, who are trained in specialties of communications, engineering, weapons, medical skills and staff planning procedures. Teams are also regionally oriented and members are trained in foreign language skills and survival to help them operate independently and far away from the logistical trains that are required by conventional forces. SF members are also trained extensively in intelligence gathering and Low Level Source Operations (LLSO) that allow them to collect HUMINT and create local networks of informants.

USSF have generations of experience in working with indigenous forces. SFODAs frequently conduct Joint Combined Exchange for Training (JCETs) and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions to help friendly foreign nations improve their military capabilities and security infrastructure. The purpose of these missions is to train, assist, advise (and sometimes lead) foreign military and paramilitary units in tasks that help protect a foreign government from lawlessness, subversion and insurgency. While many of these missions are short in duration and limited in nature, some notable exceptions are the missions in El Salvador in the 1980s, and ongoing missions in the Philippines and Colombia. This Auxiliary Training Program, however, diverges from these typical USSF missions in several ways.

First, JCET and FID missions typically train forces that are part of an established, centralized state security apparatus. The intent of this proposal is to enable USSF teams to be able to form units from scratch at the local level, where an existing security apparatus does not exist, has not been formalized, or has been disbanded for the purpose of being replaced with one which meets with US policy goals (e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan). Another difference is that training would not take place only in the target

⁶⁹ Aaron Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets* (NY: Pocket Books, 1986), 222.

county, but would occur in the US with the auxiliaries training directly with their respective SFODAs.

While USSF is the best choice for conducting the Auxiliary Training Program, they cannot accomplish this mission alone. USSF needs the support of conventional forces for matters of force protection, security and playing the role of “big brother” when insurgent forces become overly ambitious. USSF needs SOF assets like PSYOPS and Civil Affairs Teams to help with building infrastructure and other soft power measures that are critical to winning the support of the population and driving out insurgents.

The next chapter will look at three case studies of specialized forces (similar to the composition and function of USSF) that conducted unconventional warfare operations in concert with indigenous forces. In all three cases, the ability to work with locals and build grassroots support at the local level was critical to the strategic success of operations.

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IV. CASE STUDIES: SOF MISSIONS WITH INDIGENOUS & AUXILIARY FORCES


A. CASE STUDIES INTRODUCTION

Special Operations Forces (SOF) and other specialized units have frequently relied on the assistance of the indigenous people in conflict areas in order to accomplish their missions. The use and support of these indigenous groups (also referred to as auxiliaries, surrogates or irregulars) can range in size and scope depending on the mission and the objective. Certain circumstances compel outside forces to rely on the local population, which can provide a spectrum of assistance ranging from materiel support, information and providing a safe haven, to actually conducting offensive military operations.

This section will look at three illustrative examples: the OSS in Southern France, the SAS in Oman, and a private military company called Executive Outcomes in Angola. These examples were chosen because they represent operations conducted by highly specialized units in protracted strategic campaigns that relied on indigenous forces. Also, they were all conducted in unique circumstances and environments, under varying political conditions, and were all ultimately successful. The OSS in Southern France was essentially an unconventional force that fought against a conventional adversary (the Jedburghs and the French Resistance vs. the Nazis and German regulars). The SAS in Oman were an unconventional force fighting an unconventional force (the SAS and Omani irregulars against the Communist insurgents). Lastly, the conflict in Angola from 1993-1995 is an example of an elite force (Executive Outcomes and the Angolan army) which used a mixed strategy of unconventional and conventional tactics against the Angolan rebels (UNITA).

These examples will demonstrate the broad utility and importance of using indigenous forces in a spectrum of circumstances, and will help us draw conclusions about when these forces should be utilized, and under what conditions these forces can prove critical to mission success.

B. JEDBURGHES: THE OSS IN SOUTHERN FRANCE (1944)



Map of French operations, adapted from a 1944 OSS pamphlet entitled *Operational Group Command*.

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1. Background

Southern France in WWII was under German occupation, and allied forces needed a plan to support the Maquis (French guerrilla groups) and the Forces Francaises de l'Interieur (FFI) in order to successfully support Operation Overlord (the invasion of Normandy) in June 1944, as well as Operation Dragoon (the invasion of Southern France) in August 1944.

The U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) developed units called “Jedburghs” that were tasked to organize, train, supply and direct the French Resistance (the Maquis). The plan was for each section to organize and train the Maquis for the purpose of

⁷⁰ Office of Strategic Services Operational Group, (n.d.). [Web site]; available from http://www.ossog.org/pics_pages/map_france_01.html; Internet; accessed 10 December 2005.

delaying the movement of enemy reserves to the invasion lodgment area in Normandy; to harass enemy lines of communication in their area of operations in Southern France; and to conduct such sabotage operations as were directed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, in support of Operation Overlord.⁷¹ (Note: Jedburgh operations were also simultaneously conducted in Belgium and Holland for the same purposes.)

2. The “Jeds” in Action

The individual Jedburgh teams were broken down into 3-man sections: one British or American as the commander, a French officer to coordinate with the French Resistance, and an enlisted communicator who could be of any nationality. De Gaulle insisted that each team deploying to France have a French officer to act as the liaison (an “asset”) between the team and the French resistance.

All of these personnel were highly trained individually. The team members also had strong input into the composition of their teams. The OSS command allowed the trainees to pick and choose their team members, and many teams dispersed and reassembled during training. This technique ultimately proved successful as the individuals on the teams developed the best “feel” for who they could rely on.

Before Operation Overlord and Operation Dragoon, the French Resistance was already conducting intelligence and sabotage operations. The mission of the Jedburgh teams was to improve the organization of the resistance and more properly align resistance activities with the needs of the allied conventional forces invading France. Little formal training was conducted in how to organize and train guerrillas, but the innovative and aggressive nature of the Jedburgh team members allowed them to figure out how to solve these problems on their own. The Jedburghs organized the French Resistance into small, more mobile and less detectable groups, and separated the intelligence and sabotage activities. Many Jedburgh teams also organized reserve Maquis cells called *Le gaux*.⁷² These reserve cells would be activated at a time and place when the invasion was imminent.

⁷¹ Aaron Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets* (NY: Pocket Books, 1986), 8.

⁷² *Ibid*, 52.

The Jedburgh teams were purposely limited in terms of their range of their guerrilla warfare activities in Southern France.⁷³ These restrictions were put in place by Allied Forces Command so the Jedburghs would not “tip their hand” to the pending allied invasion of Southern France. At the same time, the Jedburghs were in constant competition with the FTP (a Communist French resistance group) to keep up guerrilla operations for recruitment purposes. The Jedburghs had to keep the size of the resistance movement down to a manageable level for reasons of operational security. A large force attracted a lot of attention and would therefore force the Germans to take aggressive action; without a pending invasion to distract them, the resistance would have also made a vulnerable target for the Germans should they have decided to conduct full scale counter-guerrilla operations. There was a constant effort to keep the resistance movement “underground” and hidden from view.

Infiltration by French spies who were loyal to the Germans was also an issue for the French Resistance and the Jedburghs and, therefore, recruiting new members became “one of the most dangerous of guerrilla activities.”⁷⁴ Before new recruits were allowed to join the Maquis, they were given a probationary period, they were placed under surveillance while they were being vetted, and they were not allowed to meet the other members until their background checks were completed.⁷⁵

The Jedburghs’ big task was to get the French Resistance to conduct short and furious hit and run style ambushes against the enemy security forces, and not get decisively engaged. As the Germans began to suspect and prepare for a Mediterranean invasion, the resistance had to keep the enemy concerned over its routes of communication, so that it would have to commit more of its forces to securing its rear area instead of reinforcing its coastal defense forces.

3. Conclusion

The Jedburgh teams and the French Resistance proved to be highly effective in tying up the German forces and allowing the allied invasions to proceed, eventually

⁷³ Bank, 53.

⁷⁴ Will Irwin, *The Jedburghs* (NY: Public Affairs, 2005), 20.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

liberating France. This capacity for waging “unconventional war” was considered by Col. Aaron Bank to be “as integral a component of modern warfare as infantry, armor, and artillery.”⁷⁶ These small but highly potent forces combined the military skills of US and British soldiers and the cultural skills and local expertise of the French Resistance. Working together, they helped prove the value of the support of the natives as “auxiliaries” in a conflict area, and the importance of highly trained and specialized units that were capable of leading resistance movements and handling complex tasks deep in enemy held territory. The Jedburghs and the Maquis could not have been as successful had they operated independently of each other. By combining their efforts, they were able to maximize each other’s strengths and capabilities in order to accomplish their goals.

C. OPERATION STORM: THE SAS IN OMAN (1970-1976)⁷⁷



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1. Background

The Dhofar War began in the mid 1960s and ended in 1976, and was a classic counter-insurgency campaign fought by the British SAS (also referred to as “BATT”).⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Linda Robinson, *Masters of Chaos* (NY: PublicAffairs, 2004), xiii.

⁷⁷ The British Special Air Service (SAS) is commonly referred to by its own members as BATT, short for “battalion.”

⁷⁸ WorldAtlas.Com, (n.d.): <http://worldatlas.com/webimage/country/asia/om.htm>; Internet, accessed 10 November 2005.

As fortune would have it, the war was fought at a time when the Labor Government was trying to disengage from Britain's colonial commitments and wanted to keep the operation out of the press. In addition, the newly installed ruler of Oman, HM Sultan Qaboos, had continued his father's policy of not allowing any press into his country (a policy that he would later reverse). These two factors created an ideal state of affairs for both the SAS and the British Government to conduct a military campaign quietly, without interference and public scrutiny.

The Dhofar War was unique because it was only the third campaign after Greece in the 1940s and Malaya in the 1950s and early 1960s to be won against a Communist armed insurrection.⁸⁰ The soldiers of the 22 SAS were critical to this operation because they operated with the *firqats*, which were bands of Dhofari ex-guerrillas raised to fight for the Sultan and "without whom the war could not have been won."⁸¹

2. Making a Counter-Revolution in the Desert

In the initial stages (before the SAS entered the conflict) the war was going very badly. The war against the Communist insurgents (the "adoo") was being fought by the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF), which were essentially regular forces (predominantly Arab), conventionally trained and conventionally employed against an unconventional enemy. The general *modus operandi* of the SAF operations was to:

...move by night in up to a battalion's strength, on to the high ground, build *sangars* and wait for the enemy to attack. A long range battle would ensue during the day, usually with few casualties on either side, and the SAF would withdraw at last light with honor satisfied.⁸²

The *adoo* were masterful at conducting "hit and run" style attacks against the SAF and offered no tangible targets against which the SAF could bring weaponry and strengths to bear. They were also adept at mining roads and lines of communication

⁷⁹ Dhofar is the southern province of Oman, inhabited by people who more resemble Ethiopians or Somalis than the true Arabs who inhabit the northern part of the country.

⁸⁰ Tony Jeapes, *SAS Secret War* (Oxford, UK: HarperCollins Publishers, 1996), 11.

⁸¹ *Ibid*, 12.

⁸² *Ibid*, 24.

(LOCs), sniping at SAF patrols, and using other terrorist tactics, and could move about the region virtually uncontested. They received money, training and arms from the Communist Chinese and Soviet consulates in Aden, Yemen.⁸³ Before the British stepped in, the adoo were also gathering more support and were able to recruit locals for their cause by using coercive and punitive operations to intimidate the civilian population into joining their movement.

When the SAS joined the effort in 1970, their short term goal was to provide immediate relief to the people in areas where the Omani Government could not. Then, in the medium term they were to train Omanis to take over these tasks. The long term goal, however, lay in the hands of the Omani Government: to improve the lives of the Dhofari people by investing in resources and civil development to modernize the state. Military operations were simply a means to that end.⁸⁴

Rather than simply destroy the enemy, one of the goals of the SAS operations was to persuade the fighters to leave the adoo and the Communist revolution and join the government's side. According to SAS Major General Tony Jeapes:

Persuading a man to join you is far cheaper than killing him. Words are far, far less expensive than bullets, let alone shells and bombs. Then, too, by killing him you merely deprive the enemy of one soldier. If he is persuaded to join the Government forces the enemy again becomes one less, but the Government forces become one more, a gain of plus two.⁸⁵

This was not just a humane method of conducting a war, but a cost effective one as well. The basic strategy of the SAS was to begin in the "softer" areas, and gradually work their way into the more difficult areas. They did this by working by, with, and through the locals to develop small groups of irregular forces called "firqats" made up of locals in each village. The SAS had three phases of firqat development:⁸⁶

⁸³ Jeapes, 26.

⁸⁴ Ibid, 33.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 39.

⁸⁶ Ibid, 167.

1. Raising and training them, sorting out their tribal problems and establishing a leader.
2. The main operational phase: getting a company or battalion of SAF and as many BATTs (SAS battalions) as they could, and establishing them in their tribal area and helping them to clear it.
3. Getting the civil action going: a well drilled, a clinic, school and shop built, and so on.

After these three phases were complete, the SAS would withdraw and hand over the areas to firqat forces, freeing up men to start again with another firqat.⁸⁷ Careful orchestration on the part of the SAS was needed in order to balance offensive/kinetic operations against the adoo with psychological operations (PSYOPS) campaigns to encourage defection, intelligence gathering, and civil development. The SAS also had to find innovative solutions to problems such as determining the ideal firqat strength, handling their pay, and settling complex tribal disputes that could hamper progress.

The strategy slowly started to work as the SAS expanded their influence and raised more firqats. As more and more defectors came from the adoo, intelligence on enemy positions and activity began to produce more effective offensive military operations. The adoo front began to alienate the population, despite amnesty programs, payment to martyrs' widows, and the announcement that Islam would now be tolerated. The adoo could not keep pace with the success of the civil development programs and information services that were "driving a wedge between Islam and Communism."⁸⁸

Although the firqats and the SAF did participate together in certain major offensives, these were left largely to the SAF. The firqats came to complement their conventional brethren by working hand in glove in defeating the adoo. The firqats were able to maintain a long-term presence with their communities and had an understanding of the local situation that the SAF could not have effectively achieved, but when it came to the conventional military tactics of a disciplined force, they needed the SAF. Neither force could have won the war alone.

⁸⁷ Jeapes, 167.

⁸⁸ Ibid, 133.

3. Conclusion

By the middle of 1975, the adoo in most of the country had been split into small bands that were on the run. They were still dangerous, but no longer had any chance of winning a revolution. In September 1976, the last SAS squadron left Dhofar for good after an uninterrupted presence of six years. By training and using the firqats to establish security and control at the local level, the SAS displayed a great conceptual understanding of how to defeat an insurgency. The SAS understood that the answer to the problem had to be found by the Omanis themselves. Tony Jeapes notes, “Vietnam had shown that there is no future for a foreign army of intervention in a national revolutionary war.”⁸⁹ To sum up the power of using Special Operations in concert with irregular indigenous forces, SAS Brigadier John Akehurst concluded, “Put a BATT with a firqat and you triple your output.”⁹⁰

D. EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES IN ANGOLA (1993-1995)⁹¹



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⁸⁹ Jeapes, 30.

⁹⁰ Ibid, 233.

⁹¹ Jim Hooper, *Bloodsong!* (London: HarperCollins, 2002).

1. Background

Executive Outcomes (EO), the most successful private army in recent history, was founded as a “military advisory company,” whose ranks consisted of experienced South African Defense Force (SADF) soldiers, most having fought side-by-side with the UNITA rebels in Angola, who were struggling for democracy against the communist-backed (Cuban and Soviet) forces of the Marxist Angolan government (MPLA). The men of EO have a unique and unusual perspective of fighting on both sides of a bloody insurgency. Most of EO’s founding personnel supported the Angolan rebels (UNITA) while serving in the ranks of the South African Defense Force, then came to switch sides and, as a private army, began helping their former adversaries (the Angolan government) defeat their long time allies.

2. Defeating UNITA: Fighting Fire with Fire

As a private military company, EO was contracted by the Angolan government in 1993 to regain control of a valuable petroleum complex taken over by the rebel UNITA forces. After a decisive victory over UNITA forces and the return of the petroleum complex to the Angolan government, EO’s actions quickly became legendary and controversial because EO’s numbers were so small and because EO was an “outsourced” or mercenary army (EO members were quickly labeled by the media and some of their South African counterparts as traitors). Nevertheless, EO was given an exclusive contract to train and advise a brigade-sized element of the Armed Forces of Angola (FAA) to conduct counter-insurgency operations against the UNITA forces. When developing the training concept for the FAA, EO’s founder Eeben Barlow said:

...to train the whole army, we’ll have to start from the grass roots-level with basic training, because there is no way we are going to change the mindset of the Angolan soldier until he wants it changed. If we could train a green brigade, as in green, raw brigade, and they could achieve success,

⁹² WorldAtlas.Com, (n.d.): <http://worldatlas.com/webimage/country/africa/ao.htm>; Internet; accessed 10 November 2005.

the other troops would want to have the same—and that was the idea we approached the Angolan army with: to set up a team for them and train a brigade.⁹³

EO essentially had to start from scratch, building a counter-insurgent force from the ground up. They also had to conduct damage control on the public perception of the FAA who, in the eyes of the international media, were being compared to Charles Taylor's regime in Liberia for sending young children (13 to 15 years old) into battle. EO insisted on a minimum age of 16 for their recruits, a stance that the top FAA reluctantly accepted.⁹⁴

EO had to worry about perception problems with the locals as well. In order to gain rapport with the frightened and distrustful local recruits, EO used engineers to purify water for the locals, and set up a clinic to treat them for malaria, intestinal parasites, malnutrition, do dental work, and address other medical problems they had. Because EO recognized that they had to win over the locals first before they could make other progress, new and interesting doors began opening. More FAA generals started lending support to their effort by providing weapons and supplies, and better quality recruits began arriving.⁹⁵

EO began producing trained soldiers, but because of the intensity of the conflict and due to the lack of competent soldiers in the FAA, each newly trained class was sent directly to the front lines. "UNITA grudgingly admitted that the South African-trained troops they encountered were far better than the run-of-the-mill government soldiers they normally faced."⁹⁶ Although the quality of the troops was better, the desperateness of the situation at the front kept EO initially from being able to follow through on their original concept of amalgamating the FAA with EO elements and continuing their training on the job.

EO found they had their work cut out for them in trying to reverse the rigid doctrine of the conventionally minded FAA, who had been taught by the Soviets with

⁹³ Hooper, 62.

⁹⁴ Ibid, 67.

⁹⁵ Ibid, 68.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 68.

their unbending “Fulda Gap” mentality of using overwhelming numbers to defeat the enemy. The FAA were also constantly reacting to the “hit and run” guerrilla tactics of UNITA instead of seizing and holding ground.

EO began conducting combined operations with elements of its specially trained 16th Brigade, using conventional attacks to overtake UNITA fortifications and logistics that were susceptible to smaller unit tactics. They also employed guerrilla “hit and run” style attacks on more fortified bases with mortars and small arms, and conducted ambushes against high level UNITA leadership and their convoys. EO also began to teach the FAA how to effectively employ air power, artillery and armor into their operations, as well as how to conduct air and ground reconnaissance missions in order to paint a picture of the enemy situation.

EO’s hegemony over operations slowly began to bear fruit. Angolan government troops methodically began to take back contested and UNITA-occupied areas. EO’s insistence on using less heavy-handed and more humane tactics was critical in helping to smooth over the relationship with the locals, who cautiously began siding with the government. In contrast, UNITA’s actions began to become more desperate and brutal, to include sometimes executing and burning locals and committing other atrocities as they withdrew from the towns and villages.

After a grueling final offensive to take back the heavily defended town of Cacolo in 1995, EO and the FAA delivered such a crushing blow that they sent UNITA into retreat. “The next month UNITA agreed to talks on ending the war and United Nations monitors began arriving.”⁹⁷

3. Conclusion

EO’s stunning success in beating and driving back the rebels forced UNITA to the negotiating table and brought a temporary end to the conflict. EO’s successes, however, did not come without failures and losses, and many EO personnel were missing or killed in the conflict. Ultimately, EO was forced to leave the country as a part of the

⁹⁷ Hooper, 225.

negotiations (perhaps a tribute to their effectiveness) and UNITA resumed hostilities once the United Nations troops were brought in and EO had departed.

There were various reasons for EO's success in Angola. "It was in the right place—southern Africa—at the right time, when a desperate Angolan government (and, ironically enough, former enemy) needed help. More practically, its staff of professional warriors had learned their trade in the South African Defense Force and shared a corporate philosophy of aggressive, unconventional warfare against numerically and materially superior opponents."⁹⁸

A group of less than 300 highly trained men—who understood their environment, unconventional warfare, economy of force, and the value of earning rapport with the local populace and incorporating them into their efforts—had an extraordinary impact on the insurgency in Angola. By training, leading and participating in operations with their Angolan counterparts, they were able to increase their effectiveness in defeating the UNITA rebels. EO's ability to recruit and professionalize a group of local "irregulars" and change the mindset of a military bent on using conventional measures demonstrated a highly effective implementation of COIN at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.

E. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

In all three cases depicted above, these highly specialized units relied on locals for their success in protracted strategic campaigns against numerically and materially superior forces. Perfect (or near perfect) human intelligence was critical to day-to-day operations—intelligence which could not have been provided without the assistance and employment of auxiliaries, irregulars, and locals.

All missions were limited in their application of personnel and resources because the missions either required a level of secrecy that kept forces to a minimum, or they were forced to limit their size (economy of force) due to the necessity of allocating resources for ongoing efforts elsewhere (like the Allied invasion of France). In all three cases this happened to work to these units' advantage by forcing them to economize and maximize their efficiency over larger forces.

⁹⁸ Hooper, 8.

The most important skill displayed by these specialized units was their understanding of the importance of building rapport with the locals and integrating them into the struggle with the effect that they had a clear stake in the outcome of the conflict. It also required a level of wisdom in realizing that these forces also had their limitations, particularly when they were overextended and overworked in a conventional capacity.

Working with indigenous people required a special mindset and could not have been accomplished by just any soldiers. The average conventional soldier finds dealing with irregulars “a frustrating experience because they are anathema to all his military upbringing.”⁹⁹ It takes a great deal of patience, tolerance and understanding to deal with irregulars. Unlike most regular professional soldiers—who pride themselves on virtues of honor, discipline and selflessness—irregulars are often dishonest, unruly and selfish.

Although auxiliaries and indigenous groups present certain limitations and come with their own unique set of challenges, it seems to be in the best interest of our military to capitalize on their abilities and incorporate them as best we can into future operations.

⁹⁹ Jeapes, 236.

V. CONCLUSION

The long war against terrorist networks extends far beyond the borders of Iraq and Afghanistan and includes many operations characterized by irregular warfare—operations in which the enemy is not a regular military force of a nation-state.¹⁰⁰

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This thesis has argued that the nature of warfare has changed and Low Intensity Conflicts (LICs) and unconventional wars have surpassed large-scale conventional conflicts as the biggest threat to peace and global stability.

There is ample literature that now argues that the US military has been organized, trained and equipped to deal with threats from other state military forces, and is largely unprepared to conduct COIN and UW missions. Because unconventional/insurgent wars operate on wholly different principles than conventional wars, new approaches must be taken to transform US military capabilities. Measures that focus purely on the destruction of the enemy no longer suffice—unconventional wars require our forces to have the ability to change the environment at the grass roots level to render the insurgents ineffectual.

In order to change the environment, security and control must be attained locally, and more effective and innovative measures are needed in order to achieve this. Experiences drawn from the US Marines in the Banana Wars and the US Cavalry during the Plains Indian Wars show that using auxiliary forces is a highly effective method for establishing control at the local level. As demonstrated by their history and recent actions abroad, Special Forces are well suited for the task of training and utilizing auxiliaries in counter-insurgency operations.

This thesis presents an argument for the creation of an Auxiliary Training Program whose components would be: an asset force comprised of foreign-born US citizens with language and local expertise; indigenous auxiliaries which are recruited directly out of the local population in the target country; and stateside training which uses

¹⁰⁰ 2006 QDR, 11.

the advantages of “distance training” in the US and “combined formations” with Special Forces teams to greatly enhance US counter-insurgency capabilities.

Recommendations for recruiting, training and employing auxiliaries in counter-insurgency operations have also been considered, along with cost estimates to show that the Auxiliary Training Program can be conducted for a fraction of what is being spent to rebuild and train security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

While the Auxiliary Training Program offers clear advantages for using distance training and combined formations to increase effectiveness, enhance language capabilities, build and then rely on pre-existing social networks to maintain a persistent presence and build trust. Abroad, we’d be remiss not to acknowledge the potential disadvantages and limitations. These include problems with security and vetting (insurgent infiltration); needing the right kind of environment to be effective (a semi-permissive environment at a minimum) and issues and limitations when it comes to the long-term professionalizing of a host nation security force.

Also worth considering are the roles conventional units and Special Forces in counterinsurgency, and their advantages and limitations in long-term COIN operations. USSF is well suited for the mission of working with locals, but cannot be successful alone. Conventional forces would need to play a supporting role by providing security, force protection and the capability to react to insurgent forces that become too much to handle for USSF and local security forces. There must be cooperation and close coordination with conventional units and other SOF assets like PSYOPS, Civil Affairs, and other soft-power capabilities.

History indicates that SOF and other specialized units can be highly effective when their abilities are combined with the local knowledge and cultural expertise of indigenous auxiliary forces. We see this in such disparate examples as the Jedburgh teams of Southern France in WWII, the SAS and the Omani irregulars in the Dhofar War (1970-1976), and Executive Outcomes and irregular forces in Angola in the mid 1990s. As these three cases make clear, elite units working with auxiliary forces can successfully defeat their numerically superior opponents in protracted, strategic conflicts.

Insurgent wars and Low Intensity Conflicts are difficult, complex, and require far more than an “off the shelf” solution that the US military likes to apply to operations. The US military is slowly recognizing the need to be able to more efficiently conduct unconventional wars in order to project US power and national strategy around the globe. The Auxiliary Training Program is merely one step towards improving our capabilities in COIN operations and in Low Intensity Conflicts. The Auxiliary Training Program combines measures that have proven effective in a variety of environments, particularly in COIN, irregular wars and other sub-state conflicts, where winning the population, not defeating the enemy force, is the objective.

More than 2400 years ago, the Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu said, “What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy.”¹⁰¹ Current measures being used by our military forces abroad are encountering great difficulty and we have not yet achieved resounding success against insurgent forces. The vast majority of our efforts and resources in Iraq and Afghanistan have been oriented towards finding and defeating the enemy—measures that we have relied on to bring us success in the biggest wars of the last century, but are largely irrelevant in fighting “people’s wars.” One reason why we struggle in these wars today is that our strategy has been to attack the enemy, not to attack his strategy. While we scramble desperately to hunt for the ever elusive insurgent, he is patiently and methodically using the population as a conduit to help him achieve his vision of social change and revolution. Only by adopting measures that first focus on securing the local population will we be able to dry up insurgent resources and support bases and bring stability and security to unstable regions of the world. By capitalizing on these principles, the Auxiliary Training Program would play a significant role in changing the way we fight and win future wars.

Recommendations for further study include: more detailed research into the long-term effects of distance training and how to avoid consequences such as creating a “privileged” or “elite” class of people; examining the challenges of “Westernizing” the “non-West” areas of the world; and how to import American ideals abroad through key individuals.

¹⁰¹ Sun Tzu, *The Art War*, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (NY: Oxford University Press, 1964), 77.

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