International Security Negotiations: Lessons Learned from Negotiating with the Russians on Nuclear Arms
Abstract
This paper examines arms control and non-proliferation negotiations during and after the Cold War. To make the analysis of this vast topic manageable, the discussion concentrates on negotiating with the Russians (recognizing that the USSR was more the Russia) and, primarily, on negotiations to eliminate or control nuclear arms. American Cold War policy was focused largely through the lens of how to contain and deter Russian expansion and aggression. The intense military competition was at the heart of this struggle, and the nuclear balance was at the heart of the military strategies on both sides. Why did the United States enter into nuclear arms control negotiations? What did the US government expect to achieve? How did the negotiations evolve over time? How were they related? What made for a successful negotiation and, indeed, what were the criteria of success? Were they shared by the executive and legislative branches and did the criteria shift with whomever was in the White House? What variables played the most significant roles in successful negotiations? Style and tactics? Strategy and substance? Mood? Setting and negotiating venue? Knowledge of the opponent and his objectives? Interagency discipline? Public diplomacy? Factors external to the negotiations? Most importantly, what lessons are relevant to today's security environment?
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 01, 2006
- Accession Number
- ADA460350
Entities
People
- Michael O. Wheeler
Organizations
- United States Air Force Academy