An Analysis of Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Mosul, Ramadi, and Samarra from 2003-2005
Abstract
After defeating the Iraqi military, Coalition Forces spread out across Iraq to stabilize and transition control of the country back to Iraqis. This historical analysis of Mosul, Ramadi, and Samarra studies military operations intended to stabilize these three cities from April 2003 to September 2005. Prior to and after the reestablishment of Iraqi sovereignty, Coalition Forces worked with Iraqi citizens at the local level to reestablish control of the population. In order to achieve this, the counterinsurgent force must understand that when consensus for non-violent political opposition does not exist within the governed populace, coercive measures must be taken to enforce local security. This analysis evaluates the effects of military operations over time and through frequent unit transitions with varying numbers of U.S. and Iraqi security forces. The conclusions gleaned from this analysis are summarized as unit approaches that either achieved control or failed to achieve control at the local level. This study suggests that a distributed light-to- medium equipped ground force operating within urban centers and in continuous close proximity to the population is best able to establish local control and partner with local police and military forces. This force should be enabled with language and cultural skills. Necessary combat multipliers include human intelligence collectors and social network analysts.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 2006
- Accession Number
- ADA460435
Entities
People
- Jarett D. Broemmel
- Shannon E. Nielsen
- Terry L. Clark
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School