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THESIS

"Hacer o no hacer"
[To do or not to do]
**MEXICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND UN PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS IN THE 21st CENTURY**

by

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December 2006

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OPERATIONS IN THE 21st CENTURY**

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ABSTRACT

On December 1, 2000 a new administration took over the presidency of México. This event was especially anticipated because the new president, Vicente Fox, was coming from a different party than the PRI, the old official party.

The arrival of President Fox brought important changes in the way of governing; with the moral obligation to be different, since the beginning of his administration one of the main goals was incline to pursue a more dynamic participation by Mexico in the political issues of the world. This was to be accomplished by taking up several measures that included enhancing economic trade with the United States and other nations, world summits in Mexico, improvement of human rights and others. Among those plans one attracted special attention when Mexico asked for a seat as a non-permanent member in the UN Security Council for the period 2002-2003 the third time in Mexican history. There were divided opinions on the subject because Mexico would be directly involved in UN decisions concerning internal situations of other countries, something that goes against the foreign policy principles of México. Eventually this discussion opened doors for other topics; one of them was the possibility of Mexico participating actively in peacekeeping operations by sending troops overseas; this initiated a bitter debate in the political sphere.

This study analyzes Mexican Foreign Policy and the historical perspective of the foreign principles stated in the Mexican Constitution's article 89, followed by a discussion of their influence and interpretation in the political-military environment before and during the administration of President Fox. The study includes the analysis includes the new social and political scenario that México is facing in order to determine the odds and obstacles when dealing with military participation overseas. As México takes its place in the community of nations, the country's leadership needs to search for possible options and test whether the new Mexican political apparatus has the flexibility to address current threats and requirements for international security. An analysis on the capabilities of the

Mexican Armed Forces is also necessary in order to determine their capacity to execute multinational operations. Finally bring out the real benefits and/or risks from getting Mexico involved in these kinds of operations are identified.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This work analyzes the history of Mexican Foreign Policy and the Mexican Constitution in order to understand México's contemporary position on international affairs. The study looks particularly at the changes in foreign policy since 2000 and the new attitude of the Mexican government towards international affairs, especially the question of the participation by Mexican Armed Forces in UN peacekeeping operations. This study demonstrates that the Mexican Armed Forces are eminently capable of overseas operations, particularly those involving disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.

The study also demonstrates that México has historically adopted a defensive and anti-interventionist posture, a consequence of number foreign interventions against Mexico in the past; it argues that this posture is no longer applicable in the contemporary context. Since 2000, the Mexican government has considered participating In UN peacekeeping operations.

The main arguments against participation of Mexican military in UN peacekeeping operations are grounded in Article 89 of the Mexican Constitution, particularly the principle of non-intervention; however, the same article specifies that México showed support for “the struggle for peace and international security.” In light of this fact the Mexican Armed Forces are clearly constitutionally authorized to participate in UN peacekeeping operations.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE NEW VISION

On July 2, 2000 México held presidential elections with an outcome that would have a powerful impact on the country's future; it was not only the election itself which made a difference, but the political membership of the new elected President Vicente Fox; he was from the *Partido Accion Nacional* (PAN).¹ It was the first time that an opposition party had reached the presidency, leaving behind 71 years of single party rule by the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI).² The political system remained basically the same, but the newly elected administration had a "different view" about how the country should be run, and how to manage México's international relations.

At home many believed that the time had come for México to finally become a democratic country. Quoting Mexican journalist Carlos Luken:

The 2000 presidential election was México's first truly democratic national contest in a century, and the victory of Vicente Fox... put an end to 71 years of oligarchic rule by the PRI.³

The new administration was fully aware that the results of the elections would have a huge impact on the country, and on the way the world looks at México. Such a situation needed to be exploited to realize the projects that President Fox had in mind.

An outward strategy brought numerous chiefs of state of the world to Mexican soil. It was one way to show the world that México had peacefully transited to democracy. These meetings were a perfect opportunity to secure a closer relationship with México's allies and partners, particularly the United States. Among the first actions taken by the government was the emphasis given to México's foreign policy, an issue of particular importance for this thesis. The plan to handle international relations for the next six years was stated in the

¹ National Action Party.

² Institutional Revolutionary Party.

³ Carlos Luken. México's democratic challenge—to develop a civil service. Mexidata.info. June 27, 2005.

*National Development Plan 2001-2006.*⁴ One of the five strategies included in this document planned to “intensify the participation and influence of México in multinational forums, performing a more active role in the design of the new international architecture.” With this, President Fox wanted to enhance México’s place in the international arena, as was further demonstrated by the decision to seek a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council (UNSC).

This decision divided opinion in Mexico, but nevertheless it was considered a victory for the new administration. México served as a non-permanent member for the period 2002-2003. Although this was not the first time that México occupied a seat in the UN Security Council it was the first time that México’s government had asked for a place; before 2002, México was part of the Security Council twice. The first time was in the early stages of the UN in 1946, possibly because México had collaborated very closely with the United States during the war, especially concerning economics, and there were fewer options at the time (51 members initially with 19 Latin American countries). The second time was in 1980 because the UN General Assembly couldn’t agree on the two (then) candidates, Cuba and Colombia, setting an all-time record of 154 rounds of voting; after three months, Mexico was put forward and was elected in the 155th round. Nonetheless, some Mexican scholars and foreign policy experts were concerned about the involvement of México in the internal affairs of other countries, something contrary to the pillar principles of México’s foreign policy. Outside the country, the perception was that México was finally taking a long earned place in international forums.

Without any doubt, President Fox was inclined towards a more active participation in international affairs, as it was emphasized at the 2001 annual meeting with Mexican ambassadors. Here the President stated:

⁴ The National Development Plan represents México's main planning instrument and contains not only the government's policies and principles but also its main objectives and strategies for each administration.

I believe that with the maturity that we reached today, we can emerge as an active player in the world, and participate in what is happening, whether we like it or not, whether it is favorable or not. We must play a clear role in the world.⁵

At the beginning of the Fox administration, Jorge Castañeda took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was the architect of the new “active” strategy, and working closely with Mexico’s Ambassador to the UN, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, they were the tip of the arrow of Mexico’s new international policy, including more active participation in the UN affairs. Through what Castañeda called “foreign policy activism” he pressed for the non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, which eventually opened other doors for opportunities to get involved in international affairs. México sent civilian observers to the electoral processes in El Salvador (2005), Haiti (2004-2005), and Ecuador (2001) as well as electoral trainers and advisors to Morocco and Algeria, both in 2005.

Castañeda also ignited Mexican foreign policy with his controversial proposal to involve México directly in UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKO), including the possibility of military participation. Unfortunately, Castañeda resigned in 2002, but his successor, Luis Ernesto Derbez, continued to pursue the idea. The world changed after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and cooperation to maintain international security became a necessity, not a choice. The Fox administration was taking big and fast steps, too fast, perhaps, for Mexican public opinion, which had no accurate information about peacekeeping operations and eventually responded to these changes with a general feeling of rejection.

The common understanding before President Fox was that México was constitutionally impeded from direct involvement in other nation’s affairs. This is not quite precise, as explained later. At this point, it is worth noting that after the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)⁶ in 1994, México started to change rapidly. A more open border set the scene for important

⁵ *Diario del Pueblo [on line]*. Internet; accessed August 3, 2006; retrieved from http://spanish.peopledaily.com.cn/spanish/200101/08/sp20010108_44933.html. Author’s translation.

⁶ North American Free Trade Agreement. Signed between the United States, México and Canada and officially launched in January 1994.

economic growth, and an unavoidable increase in the level of integration with the United States and Canada. The Fox administration considered felt that the integration process should not be restricted to the economy; it should also include politics, and most importantly, international security, an area where states can show commitment. UN peacekeeping operations were considered a good vehicle for this purpose: by this means México could show its commitment to world affairs.

Nevertheless, one of the first challenges for President Fox in this regard was the political opposition. México was now a much different country. The once “almighty” power exerted by the presidency before 2000 was severely diminished. The new president was not in charge anymore of “all” the political decisions; now it was the time for other political players to exercise influence. The Fox administration faced one of the most, if not the most, divided congresses in Mexican history.

B. PERSPECTIVES AND OPINIONS

The debate on the peacekeeping issue attracted diverse opinions in México: politicians, military officers, academics, and ordinary citizens. However, it was not an easy task to find people that truly knew what peacekeeping operations were, even in the congress.

At first public opinion was against the idea of sending troops abroad; the view was that Mexican soldiers and sailors would go to fight a war that was not ours. This was due mainly to a generalized misperception of what peacekeeping operations really are. Also, many politicians and academics based their criticisms on Article 89 of the Constitution, regarding the foreign policy principles of non-intervention, self-determination, and peaceful solutions. However, these principles were a “non-written rule” until 1986 when they were included in the constitution by President de la Madrid; and as we shall see, this article has been shown to be ambiguous in some parts and some times misunderstood after its inclusion in the constitution. Interpretations of the constitution have varied from one administration to another according to the mindset of the president concerned.

Nonetheless, interest in the topic spread among Mexican politicians who started to express concern about the issue. For instance, due to the fact that UN peacekeeping operations involved military personnel, it was thought that the most influential opinions should come from the military. On the one hand, General Ricardo Clemente Vega, Secretary of Defense, was reluctant to consider peacekeeping operations as a task for the Mexican Army or the Air Force⁷ as the topic is not even mentioned in the National Development Plan. On the other hand, the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Marco Antonio Peyrot, restructured the navy creating two naval forces capable of participating in multinational peacekeeping operations.⁸ The contrasting opinions of the two most important military officers in the country were evident to all.

Such a difference in opinions was due to the difficulty of interpretation. Was it the result of misinterpretations of President Fox's policy? Perhaps it was a sign of resistance by the Secretary of Defense to adapt "old traditional doctrines" to the new reality. In México political traditions have always played a singular role in the mindset of government decision makers. In this particular case the rationale to oppose PKO was unveiled by the question, "Why send troops to peacekeeping operations now if we did not do it before?" The counterargument pointed to limitations imposed by the foreign policy principles as they were currently outlined. However, in spite of these principles, México is, and has been for a long time, an active financial contributor to the peacekeeping operations fund.

⁷ The Mexican armed forces are organized in two different cabinet departments, or secretariats instead of the usual three found in most countries. The Secretariat of National Defense (*Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional*) is the largest and best funded. It includes the Army and the Air Force, the latter one as a subordinate entity. The second is the Secretariat of the Navy (*Secretaria de Marina*) which is smaller and includes surface, air and marine components. The heads of both departments hold cabinet positions and are full-rank officers - a four star general in the Army and a fleet Admiral in the Navy. The two components do not come under a single unified commander at any level below the President. That is to say, there is no Minister of Defense as the term is usually understood. Each minister serves in a dual capacity: as a full cabinet member reporting to the President, and as the operational commander of his force. *Military of México*. Internet; accessed September 1, 2006; retrieved from Answers.com.

⁸ Plan Institucional de Desarrollo 2001-2006. Navy's Institutional Development Plan 2001-2006.

When these circumstances are put to closer examination, more questions arise. For instance, does México need to participate in PKO? What would be the costs and benefits of such an endeavor? Are the Mexican armed forces prepared to get involved in PKO? Perhaps the old idea that the Mexican Armed Forces are a “defensive” and not an “offensive” force will prevail to counter the call for more involvement in international security. Or perhaps the reluctance of government decision-makers is based on a fear of a loss of sovereignty with Mexican military involvement in international conflicts.

This fear has been an important intangible restraint on the Mexican Armed Forces, which have been limited to internal matters focusing on fighting drug trafficking and conducting social labor and disaster relief. Hence any attempt to get involved in multinational exercises or joint operations overseas was a forbidden subject, until President Fox came to power in 2000. The topic is no longer a prohibited issue, and despite the reluctance and divisions among different actors, the subject remains on the table for debate. As the Fox administration is approaching its end, it is expected that México will follow a similar path in international affairs. The newly-elected president Felipe Calderon has stated that: “we will continue with the construction... and the presence of México as a Latin American leader, leaving behind ideological loads.”⁹

C. METHODOLOGY AND SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS

Although the independence of México was gained in 1810 we Mexicans consider ourselves to be a nation that has existed for centuries, heirs of old and rich cultures. Regardless of the roots of Mexican nationalism, the roots of Mexican foreign policy principles are less debatable and can readily be traced to the second half of nineteenth century after the war with the United States (1846-1848) and the French Empire (1861-1867).

However, the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) is particularly important because it was out of the revolution that the modern nation-state of México emerged. The contemporary Mexican Constitution was written in 1917 against

⁹ El Universal newspaper [on line]. Internet; accessed September 8, 2006; retrieved from <http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/noticias.html>.

the backdrop of the revolution. As stated before the foreign policy principles were a *non-written doctrine* that was not included in the constitution's Article 89 until 1986.

Article 89: the powers and obligations of the president are the following: (Amended by decree published in the Federation Official Newspaper on October 25, 1993)

Subtitle X: Direct foreign policy and conclude international treaties, and submit them to the approval of the Senate: In the conducting of this policy, the head of the Executive Power will observe the following standard principles: self-determination of peoples, non-intervention, peaceful resolution of disputes, juridical equality of states, international cooperation for development, and the struggle for international peace and security. (Amended by decree published in the Federation Official Newspaper on May 11, 1988.¹⁰)

In 1929 the PRI was born and for the following 71 years the country remained under its political control: the basis of its foreign policy was strengthened in 1930 by the so-called Estrada Doctrine,¹¹ and this remained the guiding foreign policy doctrine down to the twenty-first century.

The present work will be divided into three main parts. This chapter, Chapter I, has provided an introduction to the overall study. This is followed by a second chapter on the historical background to México's foreign policy. The first part of Chapter II examines the evolution of the Mexican Constitution and the weight of history on domestic policy and foreign policy. The guiding model will be Joel Migdal's¹² concepts. An overview of the historical background will help explain some of the main decisions taken to maintain a distant attitude in relation to the world's conflicts driving the country to a state of conformity regarding most international matters. This chapter also explains how the PRI's influence as a hegemonic party managed to preserve the core principles during its permanency in power. Such an analysis will shed light on the reasons behind México's decision not to commit troops for UN peacekeeping operations.

¹⁰ Mexican Constitution as of 2002, translated by Ron Pamachena. Internet; accessed September 2, 2006; retrieved from <http://www.historicaltextarchive.com/sections.php?op=viewarticle&artid=93>.

¹¹ This doctrine was established in 1930 by Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs Genaro Estrada.

¹² Joel Migdal. *Strong Societies and Weak States*.

Chapter III explores the new political environment in México. This includes an overview of the new approaches of México's foreign policy and a forecast for the coming years. A close view of the main domestic challenges (political opposition, legal constraints, adverse public opinion, etc.) for a military contribution to UN peacekeeping will provide a better picture of the real possibilities of México to become an active player in international security. In addition, an analysis of the evolution of the Mexican Constitution since independence is included to provide a historical perspective on the interpretations given to the core principles of Mexican foreign policy during the last decades. The present political context is summarized at the end of this chapter. This will help to understand how new democratic practices, such as transparency, human rights, gender equality, and accountability are transforming the decision-making process. Some of these democratic practices also provide support for the peacekeeping argument because they translate into the need for professionalism on the part of the Mexican military, and peacekeeping contingents must have high levels of professionalism.

Chapter IV is dedicated to identifying capabilities, organizations, current situations, and roles of the Mexican Armed Forces pointing out that throughout history México has favored economic development over militarization and thus maintaining a low-cost military system. Different from most Latin American counterparts, the Mexican military has been loyal to civilian power, focusing on internal security, social labor and disaster relief. The Mexican Army, for example, is one of the few armies in the world that has developed strong capabilities in the war against drug traffic and disaster relief, and the Navy is the first responder in natural disasters on the coast line with excellent results in search and rescue operations. This situation explains why México has maintained, and still does, one of the lowest military budgets in Latin America. The chapter is aimed at foreseeing the direction Mexican armed forces are heading.

Finally, Chapter V provides the conclusion to this work. This chapter compares the costs and benefits of the eventual involvement of México in UN peacekeeping in contrast to different options that would also contribute to international security, such as peacebuilding, peacemaking, and humanitarian assistance.

México changed with the advent of democracy. Today the newly-elected President Felipe Calderon represents the continuity of Fox's approach. The congress will also be renewed. It is important to examine whether the new political apparatus will have the flexibility and if it is able to reach consensus to effectively face the present threats to México's national security, which is an extension of international security. In a highly interdependent world, isolationism is not an option for México anymore.

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II. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE MEXICAN CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN POLICY

Today's Mexican constitution is a document that has been modified, misused and ignored by national leaders. Nonetheless, México has been able to maintain a strong document to bond the country, and has gained respect from the rest of the world defending its policy on the right of nations to be independent and has disagreed with the use of force to impose another's will on sovereign nations. Such an attitude caused México to establish a moderate and sometimes passive foreign policy trying to stay out of international problems. The reasons that México arrived at this stance towards international affairs can be found in the history of the country, where the bases of Mexican foreign policy were set in the formation of the Constitution.

The purpose of this chapter is to study the evolution of the Mexican constitution in relation to the country's foreign policy, and analyze the historical background of México that influenced policymakers, whose diplomacy was grounded in three main principles: non-intervention, self-determination and peaceful solution of conflicts. The nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries were very significant for México. The early nineteenth century was lived in a permanent state of fear after independence, surviving a war with the United States, the loss of half of Mexican territory, innumerable internal revolts, and a French imperial occupation. These incidents combined to place very specific constraints on the Mexican government's view of international relations, particularly concerning the United States.

Whether either side likes it or not, geography has made the relationship between the United States and México the most important one for México and one of the most important, if not the most significant, for the United States.¹³

Each one of the three foreign policy principles was a result of the country's historical experience. They were solidified in the context of situations that directly

¹³ S. A. Weintraub. *Marriage of Convenience: Relations Between Mexico and the United States*. Oxford University Press; New York. 1990. p. 3.

threatened Mexican sovereignty, and later implemented as part of the foundation of the long period of one-party rule in México. The principles became the guiding dogma in international affairs and were strictly followed, most of the time, by the government. However, we shall see that the use and misuse of the foreign policy principles has been a privilege only granted to the president resulting in inconsistencies and endangering the foreign relations of México. Although the principles were not officially stated in the constitution until 1988, they reflected the long-standing defensive posture of the country, being highly influential in every administration in México.

A. THE STARTING POINT

The roots of the Mexican constitution were established during the War for Independence (1810-1821). In particular they are to be found in two documents: *Los Sentimientos de la Nación* (The Nation's Feelings), written by José María Morelos y Pavón¹⁴ (1813); and the *Decreto Constitucional para la Libertad de la América Mexicana* (Constitutional Decree for the Freedom of the Mexican America), also known as the Constitution of Apatzingán (1814). Written by the Congress of Apatzingán this latter document sought to establish the basis for the end of foreign dominance:

The supreme Mexican congress, eager to fill the heroic sights of the nation, elevated nothing less than to the sublime objective to evade forever the foreign domination, and to replace the despotism of the Spanish monarchy...¹⁵

The constitution of 1814 also enhanced the right to be sovereign and invoked the non-intervention principle:

¹⁴ José María Morelos y Pavón (30 September 1765-22 December 1815) was one of the main leaders of Mexico's struggle for independence.

¹⁵ *Decreto Constitucional para la Libertad de la América Mexicana*. As cited by the Instituto de Investigaciones Legislativas del Senado de la República (PILSEN). *Principios Históricos de la Política Exterior Mexicana*. Internet; accessed September 12, 2006; retrieved from <http://www.senado.gob.mx/iilsen/docs/investigaciones1.html>.

No nation has right to impede to another the free use of its sovereignty [non-intervention]. The conquest title cannot legitimize the acts of force: the people [nation] that tries it must be forced by the arms to respect the conventional right of the nations.¹⁶

This text was the starting point to build up a republic based on liberal political institutions and respect for individual rights, but due to the struggle and instability of the late Spanish period never became an official document. However, those two sources had an important impact on the next constitution (1824) when the new congress wrote the *Acta Constitutiva de la Federación Mexicana* (Constituent Act of the Mexican Federation), the first official Federal Constitution of the United Mexican States, which established a federal system. The text included concepts from the United States constitution and was modeled around a central government with a division of powers into the legislative, executive and judicial branches. The text also gave power to the President and the Congress in foreign policy, giving the latter, as a whole, the final decision to approve any treaty or agreement:

The president has the right to...

Name the diplomatic envoys and consuls with approval from the Senate, and meanwhile this one settles down, from the present congress; and...

To direct diplomatic negotiations, to celebrate treaties of peace, friendship, alliance, federation, truce, armed neutrality, commerce and others; but to lend or to deny its ratification to anyone of them, it will have to precede the approval of the General Congress.¹⁷

The 1824 Constitution was abolished by President Antonio López de Santa Anna in 1833 establishing his personal charter known as *Las Siete Leyes* (The Seven Laws). The Seven Laws maintained basically the same arguments on foreign affairs but gave the president much more power in the final decision. The document was fully centralist regardless of the existence of a congress, which at the same time was powerless against the decisions of the executive.

¹⁶ *Decreto Constitucional para la Libertad de la América Mexicana*.

¹⁷ *Acta Constitutiva de la Federación*, decree of January 31, 1824. As cited by the Instituto de Investigaciones Legislativas del Senado de la República (IILSEN).

During this period Mexican foreign policy primarily responded to external intimidation and reflected the lack of internal stability and a diminished capacity to negotiate at the international level.

B. THE ERA OF BENITO JUAREZ

In 1855 Santa Anna went into exile, but before doing so México lost half of its territory to the United States during the Mexican-American War (1846-1848). This terrible experience is still remembered as an abusive act of power by the United States against a weak, defenseless and struggling México, and it would have an enormous affect upon the mindset of future decision-makers by encouraging an ongoing mistrust of the United States. After Santa Anna a new generation of liberals, most of them civilians arrived. At that time the congress elected President Ignacio Comonfort, and appointed Benito Juárez¹⁸ as president of the Supreme Court, who also acted as vice-president. Between 1855 and 1857 Juárez worked with other legislators including Ignacio Ramírez, Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, Melchor Ocampo, José María Iglesias, and Francisco Zarco to write *Las Leyes de Reforma* (The Laws of Reform), preparing a new constitution issued on February 5, 1857. The new constitution and the inclusion of *Leyes de Reforma* had an enormous impact on the emerging new political order in Mexico for several reasons. As its first articles stated:

The State and the Church are independent between them. The Congress can not dictate laws establishing or prohibiting any religion. Marriage is a civil contract; this and other acts concerning the civil status of people are of exclusive competence of the State. No religious institution can acquire real estates or taxes imposed upon them.¹⁹

The text also reaffirmed the independent and federal character of the Republic suppressing any trace of the former centralist system. The new set of laws was the beginning of a new socio-political era for México. The document

¹⁸ Benito Pablo Juárez García (March 21, 1806-July 18, 1872) was a Zapotec Indian who served two terms as President of México. For his resistance to French occupation and his efforts to modernize the country, Juárez is often regarded as México's greatest and most beloved leader. He is the only full-blooded Indian to serve as president of México.

¹⁹ RedEscolar.ilce.edu.mx. "*Las Leyes de Reforma*." Internet; accessed September 10, 2006; retrieved from <http://redescolar.ilce.edu.mx/redescolar/efemerides/septiembre2001/conme25.htm>.

was more detailed with regards to foreign policy, giving specific duties to each one of the chambers such as the Senate's exclusive attribution to approve, or disapprove any diplomatic treaties or agreements with other countries; and to ratify, or not, the naming of ministers, diplomatic agents, consuls.²⁰ The 1857 constitution was reminiscent of the 1824 charter but was noteworthy for its introduction of major reform laws restricting military and clerical *fueros* (privileges) and clerical property rights. The new constitution also introduced a bill of rights, abolished slavery, and reestablished a strong national congress as a unicameral body.²¹ The restriction of clerical property rights made the Catholic Church react against the paper, finding support in some conservatives and initiating a three-year armed conflict known as *La Guerra de Reforma* (The War of Reform). Benito Juárez was put in jail along with other congressmen and the states of the union were divided between those in support of the constitutional order and those against it. The war ended in 1861 and Benito Juárez became president continuing to strengthen the Laws of Reform. However, one year later the French Empire invaded México proclaiming a Catholic Empire causing President Juárez and his forces to retreat to the north, while the Austrian archduke Maximilian von Habsburg was declared Emperor of México.

With the American Civil War over the United States moved to help President Juárez and his forces. The American congress demanded the French withdraw from México and set up a naval blockade. The pressures and problems in Europe made Emperor Napoleon III withdraw in 1866; Maximilian was captured and executed in 1867 after court martial, disregarding pleas made by prominent European figures to spare his life. The message sent by President Juárez was that México would not accept any foreign government intervention in its internal affairs. The 1857 Constitution had been ignored during Maximilian's rule and was reestablished after President Juárez returned to the nation's capital.

²⁰ *Constitución Política de la República Mexicana, 1857, art. 72.* as cited by Instituto de Investigaciones Legislativas del Senado de la República (IILSEN).

²¹ AllRefer.com –“México, *Prospects for the Future*” -Mexican Information Resource, Internet; accessed September 12, 2006; retrieved from <http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/mexico/mexico98.html>.

Benito Juárez was re-elected president for the last time in 1871 and died the next year; he is most remembered by his quote about respecting others' rights: "May the people and the government respect the rights of everyone. Among individuals, as among nations, respect for the rights of others is peace."²² After Juárez's death, Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada assumed the presidency. During this term an important step in the Mexican foreign policy was taken, introducing the principle of **self-determination** in a diplomatic note sent by Mexican Foreign Minister Jose Maria Lafragua to the U.S. Ambassador John W. Foster. Minister Lafragua argued that any foreign citizen or corporation involved in economic activities in México should follow Mexican laws, and that any complaints should be addressed to the country's tribunals. The argument was based on Argentinean jurist Carlos Calvo's²³ theory, known as The Calvo Doctrine of 1868, which specifies:

[The] States [nations] are sovereign and have the right to be free from any form of interference from other states, and that any foreigner should follow the general principle that they are equal to nationals and have no special privileges; therefore, they have the same rights as nationals, and in case of disputes or reclamations will have the right to follow all the legal procedures using the local tribunals without asking [for] diplomatic protection or intervention from their home country.²⁴

This argument became a constitutional pillar for many Latin American countries and one of the most important Mexican foreign policy principles, reinforcing non-intervention in the building of a diplomatic shield against foreign invasions.

When President Lerdo de Tejada announced he would run for re-election in 1876, José de la Cruz Porfirio Díaz, better known as Porfirio Díaz, took control of the country. Díaz had challenged Juárez at the polls in 1867 but did poorly

²² Wikipedia.org. Benito Juárez Biography. Internet; accessed September 10, 2006; retrieved from http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benito_Ju%C3%A1rez.

²³ Francesco Tamburini. *Historia y Destino de la "Doctrina Calvo" ¿Actualidad u obsolescencia del pensamiento de Carlos Calvo?* Rev. estud. hist.-juríd. [online]; 2002, No.24, pp. 81-101; Internet; accessed October 17, 2006; retrieved from http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0716-54552002002400005&lng=en&nrm=iso. ISSN 0716-5455.

²⁴ Ibid.

against a statesman who was at the height of his popularity, and tried again in 1871, claiming that he lost through electoral fraud. Díaz' ideological standard was, ironically, the principle of "no reelection" and claimed that Juárez was attempting to perpetuate himself in office, calling for a general uprising only to be routed by troops loyal to Juárez. Díaz not only lived to fight another day but this "advocate" against re-election would also live to impose a thirty-four year dictatorship on México.²⁵ The foreign policy of Diaz was focused in four main goals: attract foreign investment (from the United States and Europe); diversify foreign relations reestablishing diplomatic relations with Italy (1869), Spain (1871), France (1880) and England (1884); influence U.S. public opinion and promote foreign immigration. Diaz was cautious, maintaining a flexible relationship with the United States and Europe. During the nineteenth century México accumulated twenty two years of wars including one with the United States, a French intervention, and multiple internal fights. The violent overthrow of governments and the perpetuation in office of powerful presidents were problems that plagued México throughout the nineteenth century and into the revolutionary period.

C. THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1917, AND THE CARRANZA DOCTRINE

"Madero has unleashed a tiger. Now let's see if he can control it."²⁶ Between 1910 and 1921 México would be involved in its most terrible internal war, the Mexican Revolution. The episode marked the country significantly providing the bases for modern México. The Revolution was not only the consequence of the thirty-four years dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz. But also the preferences given to the aristocratic class and the mistreatment of the lower class; nevertheless, there was an imperative to change the regime and reclaim the democratic principles that were set out at the beginning of the independence period. In the words of James F. Engel:

²⁵ Throughout the thirty-four years the dictator maintained the sham of democracy. Elections were held periodically at the local, state and national levels, but they were invariably manipulated in favor of those candidates who held official favor. As cited by Meyer, 435.

²⁶ Famous quote made by Porfirio Diaz in 1911 on his way to Veracruz and ultimate exile.

The Mexican Revolution... was a genuine revolution, accomplishing deep and lasting changes in the social and political structure of the country. Latin America has a history of revolutions, but that in México is unique in its thorough effect on the totality of Mexican society.²⁷

Throughout the Revolution there were several important events that influenced the foreign policy of México and directly involved the United States. The first occurred on February 12, 1913 when General Victoriano Huerta met with Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. Huerta received full support to impose a new regime overthrowing President Francisco I. Madero.²⁸ During the meeting Wilson promised not to recognize the government of Madero, allowing Huerta to assume power. The resulting agreement came to be known as The Embassy Pact. After Madero was captured and forced to resign, Huerta asked Ambassador Wilson what he should do with Madero. Wilson replied that Huerta “ought to do what is best for the country,” which Huerta saw as a U.S. endorsement of his disposing of Madero as he wished. Wilson’s attitude was a classic manifestation of U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of México. Madero was subsequently killed by order of Huerta. Another intervention took place in 1914; in the middle of México’s internal struggle the United States invaded México. The invasion of the country brought back memories of the 1846 Mexican-American War, as described by Jorge Salaverry:

President Woodrow Wilson dispatched a squadron to support the opponents of General Victoriano Huerta, who [with U.S. support illegally] seized the presidency in 1913. Wilson’s aim was to interdict a shipment of German weapons for the Huerta government. Wilson underestimated Mexican nationalism. Not only Huerta, but his opponent Venustiano Carranza, condemned the U.S. occupation as an intervention in México’s internal affairs...

²⁷ James F. Engel. *The Revolution and Mexican Foreign Policy*. JSTOR. Oct. 1969 [article online]; Vol. 11, No. 4; p. 520, Internet; accessed 26 September, 2006; retrieved from <http://links.jstor.org>.

²⁸ Francisco I. Madero (October 30, 1873-February 22, 1913) ran against Díaz during the election of 1910 who had promised a true democratic election. Madero won the elections as served as president from 1911 to 1913. However, once Díaz was deposed, the Mexican Revolution quickly spun out Madero’s control. Madero became the first democratic elected president after Díaz.

[This event] also gave Mexicans a new reason to resent the U.S....The Revolution signaled the beginning of popular participation in government – a signal that Mexicans rather than foreigners must control the national destiny.²⁹

In 1916 U.S. President Wilson ordered the famous “Pershing Punitive Expedition” under the command of General John J. Pershing to capture Francisco “Pancho” Villa in response for the attack by Villistas on the small town of Columbus, New Mexico. “Little if any help could be expected from the rural Mexicans, and as the Americans entered small *pueblos* they were often greeted with shouts of ¡Viva México, Viva Villa!”³⁰ Pancho Villa was never captured and the failure of the expedition, which was recalled to the US in January 1917, gave even more prestige to Villa. At the same time the writing of the 1917 Constitution, which has survived down today, was taking place in an attempt to legitimize the Revolution, Venustiano Carranza agreed to convoke a congress to meet in Querétaro for the purpose of drawing up a new constitution.³¹ The congress approved the new Constitution on February 5, 1917 with Venustiano Carranza as the first president.

President Carranza made a statement in 1918 about the foreign policy principles of México declaring that the principles of Mexican foreign policy

are few, clear and simple... All countries are equal, owing mutual and scrupulous respect to their institutions, their laws, and their sovereignty; that no country should intervene in any form or for any motive in the internal affairs of another. All should strictly maintain, and without exception, the universal principle of non-intervention... Nationals and foreigners should be equal before the sovereignty of the country in which they live... Neither should it serve to exert

²⁹ Jorge Salaverry. “*Evolution of Mexican Foreign Policy.*” *The Heritage Foundation's Report*. March 11, 1988 [journal online]; Internet; accessed September 22, 2006; retrieved from <http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/bg638.cfm>.

³⁰ Michael C. Meyer. Sherman William L. and Deeds Susan M. *The Course of Mexican History*. Oxford University Press; New York Oxford. Seventh Edition. 2003. p. 517.

³¹ Meyer, 520.

pressure on the governments of weak countries, in order to obtain modification of laws which do not suit the citizens of powerful countries.³²

This statement is known as the “Carranza Doctrine” and clearly reflected the historical experience of México. It also revealed an obvious allusion to U.S. behavior and the importance of the principle of non-intervention. The 1917 Constitution differed from its predecessor in several areas, chiefly taking care of national resources that attracted foreign interests by reducing external influence over the nation’s economy. The biggest threat to foreign investors was article 27, which stated that only the government had full rights over the nation’s natural resources, clearly restricting oil and mining exploitation. The Mexican leadership was well aware that the country was powerless, especially against the United States; and in order to make up for this weakness México needed to look for a better option than war. This reality led the country to the only choices available: international diplomacy and moral persuasion. From now on México would wield diplomacy and rational argument as its only tools in international relations.

D. THE POST-REVOLUTION RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

In 1920 Carranza was assassinated, and the end of the Revolution was drawing near. Mexico initiated a slow process of reconstruction and pacification headed by a select caste of prestigious Revolutionary generals. Adolfo de la Huerta was the first provisional president of Mexico after the conflict; Alvaro Obregón who followed de la Huerta was re-elected in 1928 but was killed before taking office; and finally, Plutarco Elias Calles was elected president in 1924. Calles had the political vision that would allow the “revolutionary class” to stay in power permanently as Nora Hamilton says: “The [Mexican] revolution of 1910 destroyed the pre-existing state apparatus and enabled the revolutionary leadership to form a new state.”³³

³² As cited by Engel, James. pp. 523-524. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. Dirección General de Prensa y Publicidad. *Algunos aspectos de la política internacional de la Revolución*. México, 1960.

³³ N. Hamilton, *The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary México*. Princeton University Press; Princeton, New Jersey. 1982. p. 3.

Although the country was still wracked by political instability the base of power in the republic had shifted into new hands, and the country was finally on the threshold of better times.³⁴

1. The Initial Stages Implementing the Constitution

President Alvaro Obregón was very cautious in his implementation of the Constitution of 1917. He was particularly concerned about the effects it would have on the ownership of property by foreigners; article 27 hung like a sword over the agricultural and oil properties of foreigners because it opened up the possibilities of their being expropriated or nationalized.³⁵ In addition to the difficulties inherent in nationalization there was a need to make sure that there would be no more interference from the United States or any other nation in México. However, since the beginning of Obregón's administration, American businessmen had been urging the United States to become more active in the defense of their Mexican interests. Obregón's administration and his policies were always overshadowed by the specter of U.S. intervention to protect the interest of its citizens who owned properties in México.³⁶ A key element of U.S. pressure on the Mexican government in the post-revolutionary decade was the threat of non-recognition.³⁷ In 1923 Obregón's administration signed the Bucareli Agreements, allowing American oil companies to continue the exploitation. In exchange President Harding would extend diplomatic recognition.

Between 1924 and 1934 México was effectively under the control of General Plutarco Elías Calles, *Jefe Máximo* (the Supreme Chief) and successor to Obregón. Calles was well known as both a liberal and a strong man, with radical tendencies.³⁸ Relations with the United States were still centered on oil and in 1924 the relationship reached a difficult point, thanks to U.S. Ambassador James Sheffield who, regardless of the Bucareli Agreements, required from

³⁴ Meyer, 542.

³⁵ Aguilar Camín Hector and Meyer Lorenzo. *In the Shadow of the Mexican Revolution: Contemporary Mexican History, 1910-1989*. University of Texas Press; Austin, Texas. 1993. p. 81.

³⁶ Meyer, 554.

³⁷ Hamilton, 70.

³⁸ Meyer, 560.

President Calles further assurances that foreign property interests would be protected. Calles refused to go beyond the promises made in the Bucareli Agreements, and Sheffield started to bombard the U.S. State Department with 'red scare dispatches'. Then in 1925 US Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg clarified the U.S. position in a statement to the press promising support to the Mexican government "only so long as it protects American lives and American rights and complies with its international obligations. The Government of México is now on trial before the world."³⁹ This kind of attitude was more than Calles could stand. He immediately expressed his strong displeasure with the statement, for it appeared that the United States was once again harboring aggressive designs, and he would never allow any nation to establish a privileged position for its nationals, rejecting outright the inherent threat to México's sovereignty in the secretary's pronouncement. Calles reinforced his statement, making the legislature enact a new petroleum law in December 1925 which required all oil companies to apply to the government for a confirmation of their concessions to determine whether or not to grant the confirmations. As Calles began to enforce the new petroleum law, relations between México City and Washington reached the breaking point.⁴⁰

U.S.-Mexican relations were mired in an atmosphere of distrust, and in 1927 Sheffield was replaced by Dwight Morrow. The new designation didn't make any difference to Mexican government, which was convinced that the U.S. had sent another Wall Street representative to push for the oil companies, but the new ambassador turned out to be a pleasant surprise. Morrow's political and personal behavior was very different than "standard Americans," demonstrating a real interest in México, going shopping with his family in the open marketplaces, and he even began to study Spanish - not common for U.S. ambassadors in the 1920s. President Calles and the ambassador began having breakfast together. The relaxed atmosphere enhanced their ability to discuss diplomatic problems

³⁹ Meyer, 563.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

between their two countries.⁴¹ Morrow did not warn that México was on trial before the world; rather he told Calles that he believed the oil companies' concerns should be settled in the Mexican courts, and indicated that he expected no special consideration for U.S. citizens. Calles was impressed and possibly used his influence to see that the courts rendered a compromise decision.⁴² The significance of this shift was clearly manifested in U.S. State Department's official comment that: "the petroleum controversy had been resolved by the Mexican government without any interposition from the United States". For the first time Washington had formally recognized México's full legal sovereignty.⁴³ At the same time México started to participate in international forums and conventions; these forums would provide México with a voice regarding international policy and non-intervention.

In 1928 the shadow of US interventionism reappeared, during the Sixth Pan American Conference in Havana, when U.S. delegate for the Conference Charles Evans Hughes stated that he: "refused to accept the projected Treaty of States, because of the article prohibiting any state from interfering in the internal affairs of any other state."⁴⁴ México didn't accept the policy of intervention and the conference was a failure. Meanwhile, in México the Constitution of 1917 had recently been amended to provide a six-year presidential term and the possibility of re-election, if it were not immediate.⁴⁵

E. THE INFLUENCE OF THE ESTRADA DOCTRINE (1930)

In September 1930 the Mexican Foreign Minister, Genaro Estrada, proclaimed the *Doctrina Estrada*⁴⁶ (Estrada Doctrine). It played an important role in Mexican foreign policy by dealing directly with the recognition policy. This was the first important statement made by the government stating that México would maintain a respectful attitude toward the nations of the world, particularly in Latin

⁴¹ Meyer, 564.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Samuel F. Bemis. *The Latin American Policy of the United States*. 1940.

⁴⁵ Meyer, 566.

⁴⁶ See Appendix A for full text.

America; in return México expected that kind of attitude from the rest of the world. México had been setting the pace for support of the principle of non-intervention, encouraging the rest of Latin America to follow. The Estrada Doctrine specifically stated that México would no longer release any kind of statement regarding this issue, recognition, limiting its position to maintaining or withdrawing its diplomatic representation. As James Engel explains:

The Estrada Doctrine, therefore, allowed México to avoid the problem of passing judgment on the government of another country and, by that step, interfering in its internal affairs. This doctrine and the principle of non-intervention that it implies, has been espoused by México since its proclamation as Mexican policy.⁴⁷

Nevertheless, the real message contained in the Estrada Doctrine was that México would no longer be frightened by the withdrawal of recognition by any country as had happened during Carranza and Obregón's time, when diplomatic recognition became an instrument of pressure used by the United States and European countries. Under this premise and via the flag of non-intervention México would continue working with the rest of Latin America to persuade the rest of the world of the significance of the principle.

F. THE ERA OF LÁZARO CÁRDENAS AND THE OIL PROBLEM

In 1934, many Mexicans were delighted with the election of General Lázaro Cárdenas to the presidency. Cárdenas was a nationalist-left wing leader who respected the revolutionary principles of land distribution, freedom, and no re-election, and was fully committed to fulfill twenty years of promises. Once in office Cárdenas determined that he was going to be free of Calles' domination.⁴⁸ In 1936 he ordered Calles arrest and sent him into exile with the order that he should never return. By the mid-1930s, México had developed a cadre of professional bureaucrats in the foreign relations and treasury ministries who were committed to national economic development rather than to any single chief

⁴⁷ Engel, 529.

⁴⁸ Meyer, 574.

executive.⁴⁹ Cárdenas came to the presidency at a time when a new, young generation of revolutionaries was beginning to displace the old veterans of the days of violence.

1. The Petroleum Expropriation of 1938 and the Relations with the United States

The Cárdenas administration faced the peak of the chronic oil problem with the United States in the year of 1938. The period was marked by several international events that were influential in Mexican foreign policy. The conditions prior to 1938 paved the way for Cárdenas in many forms with three main ingredients in play: the newly declared “good neighbor” policy on the part of the U.S., the relationship with the Mexican working class, and the international scene. Cárdenas was able to combine those elements in a series of high-level decisions to successfully accomplish the petroleum expropriation. The proclamation of the Good Neighbor Policy by U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1933-1945) in relation to Latin America was focused on hemispheric solidarity against external threats. In his first inaugural address on assuming the presidency (March 4, 1933), Roosevelt declared:

In the field of world policy I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor -the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because, because he does so, respects the rights of others-the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors.⁵⁰

In accordance with Roosevelt’s policy the United States accepted the “Protocol of Non-Intervention on December, 1936 during the Inter American Conference on Maintenance of Peace, held in Buenos Aires, Argentina. This protocol declared that the American republics were against intervention in any form, be it direct or indirect, [and] was approved.”⁵¹ It was an outstanding

⁴⁹ Helen Delpar. *Review Essays*. Inter-American Relations and Encounters: Recent Directions in the Literature. Review of *México Between Hitler and Roosevelt: Mexican Foreign Relations in the Age of Lázaro Cárdenas*. JSTOR. Latin American Research Review, Vol. 35, No. 3; 2000 pp.157-172; Internet; accessed October 1, 2006; retrieved from <http://jstor.org>.

⁵⁰ Wikipedia.org. *Good Neighbor Policy*. Internet; accessed September 16, 2006; retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Good_Neighbor_Policy.

⁵¹ Engel, 525.

achievement for Mexican foreign policy. For the first time the United States recognized non-intervention as a universal principle. Two years later on March 18, 1938 Cárdenas declared the expropriation of all the foreign oil companies operating in México.

The decision shocked nationals and foreigners. The biggest problem was that it endangered relations with the United States and Great Britain; and indeed, London broke off diplomatic relations with México. The wave of protests provoked an immediate economic and diplomatic problem for México. In the U.S., President Roosevelt was highly criticized, arguing that his “good neighbor” policy had encouraged México to adopt an independent attitude that could not be tolerated. The most important signal of success for Cárdenas was given when U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull recognized that the Mexican government had the right to expropriate foreign property in Mexico.

President Cárdenas had not rolled the dice to decide what to do; he balanced the situation by taking into account all the facts. He knew that the United States would eventually support Great Britain in most any situation; he also knew that the expropriation was sanctioned by international law because it involved prompt and fair payment.⁵² However, he was confident that President Roosevelt would support his decision on the oil matter and that Roosevelt’s good neighbor policy would ensure that there would be no armed retaliation by the United States.

G. THE PRI-GOVERNMENT CONSOLIDATION AND THE MEXICAN FOREIGN POLICY

After the Mexican Revolution the revolutionary class intuitively understood that the use of a political party was the best option to legitimize the revolutionary principles, ensuring that they would remain intact and could be defended. In 1929 the *Partido Nacional Revolucionario*⁵³ (PNR) was created, led by General Plutarco Elias Calles. The PNR would become the most important instrument in

⁵² Clint E. Smith. *Inevitable Partnership: understanding México-U.S. Relations*. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Boulder, London; Great Britain. 2000. p. 51.

⁵³ The *Partido Nacional Revolucionario* was the first official party formed after the Revolution. Their strong roots were based in the veterans of the conflict and eventually evolved in the PRI as it is known today in Mexico.

maintaining a controlled country. In 1938, Calles' PNR disappeared to give way to a new party —the PRM, *Partido de la Revolución Mexicana*, renamed by Lázaro Cárdenas after sending Calles into exile; since 1946 it has been known as *Partido Revolucionario Institucional*, the PRI. The initial PNR brought political stability to the country in the early years after the Revolution. The so-called party of the government, whatever the name used, was capable of capturing the Revolutionary principles and exploiting them to rebuild a patriotic atmosphere around it. How was the PRI so successful in retaining the power for so many years? According to Joel Migdal⁵⁴ the government's behavior can be explained as follows: there are three types of state policies that underlay the rapid and widespread weakening of old social and political arrangements:

The first one was instituting new models of transportation: this model was used by Porfirio Díaz, giving preference to the construction of roads and rail networks. During Díaz' administration the rail network grew 800 percent between 1876 and 1884, and by 1910 the railroad grid laced the entire country. The second type was adopting new forms and procedures of taxation, which didn't change much during the process of the reconstruction. The third and final option is effecting important changes in land tenure patterns, which was the main philosophy of the revolutionaries prior to, during, and after the Revolution, and was eventually adopted by the PRI government. Cárdenas was one of the most fervent followers of this policy, although subsequent presidents in México have used land reform to bolster the PRI's power. The slogan gave the party and the government the chance of reviving President Juárez' precepts and use them as a symbol of Mexican history. In México, as in almost every other area where land tenure changes were introduced, the state rulers offered new regulations as a step against the *mortmain*, that anachronism of feudalism which preserved the inalienable right of communal organizations to hold land in perpetuity.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Joel S. Migdal. *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and the State Capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton, New Jersey. 1988. Princeton University Press. p. 56.

⁵⁵ Migdal, 59.

For many years the words PRI and government were synonyms in México. The PRI became the state organization and the focal point for hopes of achieving broad goals of human dignity, prosperity, and equity; it was to be the chisel in the hands of the new sculptors.

The capabilities of states to achieve these kinds of changes in society that their leaders have sought through state planning, policies and actions... include the capabilities to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways. Strong states are those with high capacities to complete these tasks.⁵⁶

The Revolution gave the PRI those capabilities and it became master of controlling the masses. Its domestic policy was focused on enhancing the economic development of the country, and establishing strong state institutions from health clinics to markets. The president in turn was in permanent touring mode, traveling around the country to convey the appearance of a constant presence among the population.

The government through the PRI realized the need to strengthen its presence in all areas of the country. Every six years, the government continued to fulfill the revolutionary goals in land distribution, visiting the rural areas, and promising to resolve all problems. The reconfiguration of the official party and the new intuitionalized system for the Mexican government would guarantee peace and stability for the next decades. The question of how the PRI was able to stay in power finds an answer in a combination of strict party policy, and pacts with union leaders. Under the guidance of the president, the PRI made a direct impact on Mexican society by embracing the three major sectors of the Mexican population: the labor sector (incorporating the major labor confederations and industrial unions in the Regional Confederation of Mexican Labor, the CROM, which supposedly represented the largest group of organized workers of México with the CTM⁵⁷), the peasants or *campesinos* (dominated by the National Peasant Confederation, the CNC), and the so-called popular sector (consisting of

⁵⁶ Migdal, 4.

⁵⁷ *Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos*. (Confederation of Mexican Workers).

organizations of small landowners, teachers, state employees, etc., loosely joined in the National Confederation of Popular Organizations, CNOP).⁵⁸ The good relationship with the country's most powerful unions was a guarantee of "votes" in any election. From this point on the PRI would totally dominate the political landscape of México and the president would be the six-year almighty leader whose decisions were not to be questioned in any way and should be fully supported by the party.

At the outset of World War II México held back until the day after Pearl Harbor when President Avila Camacho, the last general to be president, broke relations with the Axis countries in support of the United States. México got directly involved in the war after two Mexican oil tankers were torpedoed by U-boats, officially declaring war on the Axis powers. The country increased in vast quantities exportation of strategic metals and minerals to the United States but its most significant contribution was the dispatching of some 300,000 Mexican workers to the U.S. to replace American farm and industrial workers who had joined the military services.⁵⁹ Relations with the United States were better than ever.

1. Mexican Foreign Policy after World War II

At the end of World War II the U.S. chose to frame its relations with Latin America, including México, in an international security context. There was no counterpart to the Marshall Plan in the developing countries of Latin America though the Mexican economy continued to grow robustly under the new President Miguel Alemán Valdés, the first civilian in decades to be elected president of México.

México got a seat in the newly formed UN Security Council in 1946 for one year. México continued to improve the relations with the U.S. and in March 1947 received the first visit by an American president to México City in the person of Harry Truman.⁶⁰ The situation changed in 1954, when relations were marred by

⁵⁸ Hamilton, 35.

⁵⁹ Smith, 53.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 54.

the U.S. intervention in Guatemala to overthrow President Arbenz in a CIA-supported coup. The CIA's support was widely denounced in México as being all too typical of *yanqui* interventions of the past.⁶¹ The Cuban Revolution was another issue where despite the urging of the United States and other Latin American neighbors, México refused to vote in favor of several measures taken by the Organization of American States (OAS) condemning Cuba and effectively expelling it from this important regional body. Within a short time, México found itself the only Latin American country maintaining diplomatic relations or even regular air links with Cuba. However, the Mexican approach to the Cuban situation did not prove to be a serious problem in the U.S.-México relationship.⁶²

Presidents López Mateos (1958-1964) and Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970) continued good relations with the United States which was heavily focused on the Vietnam War. In 1968 México City was getting ready for the inauguration of the XIX Olympic Games (October 12, 1968). The lead up to this event involved a tense atmosphere sparked by several violent engagements between students from the National University and the Polytechnic Institute against the police. On the evening of October 2, violence reached its climax in the *Tlatelolco Plaza* (México City) where approximately 8,000 students staged a peaceful protest against the authoritarian actions of the Díaz Ordaz regime and the PRI. The Mexican army surrounded the plaza in an attempt to dissipate the meeting. However, shooting started and by the end of the day more than 400 students were killed or wounded, 2,000 more were incarcerated, and many others disappeared forever. What went wrong? Until today there are still doubts about what really happened. President Díaz Ordaz publicly accepted full responsibility for the actions and since that day the shadow of the massacre of October 1968 has loomed over the PRI.

2. The Inconsistencies of Mexican Foreign Policy: Echeverría and López Portillo

In the early 1970s Mexican foreign policy became very proactive but incorrectly managed. Leftwing President Luis Echeverría (1970-1976) took office

⁶¹ Smith, 54.

⁶² Ibid., 55.

under the cloud of the 1968 student massacre of *Tlatelolco*, during which he had been the Secretary of the Interior. After decades of diplomatic passivity, México charged into the international spotlight. The leftist causes championed by Echeverría included close ties with Cuba, support for the socialist government of Chile's Salvador Allende, and the denouncing of the imperialism of the industrialized nations. Echeverría got so involved in the Chilean situation that after the international financial community had stopped lending to Chile, he traveled to that country to offer a line of credit. He even risked a wave of domestic criticism by sending oil and wheat to Chile at a time when México itself was not self-sufficient in either product. In addition to these presidential decisions, Echeverría also refused to recognize the new Chilean government after Allende was overthrown in 1973 by General Pinochet. This non-recognition of the new Chilean government, of course, was totally inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention and the old Estrada Doctrine.⁶³ Echeverría established diplomatic relations with 62 more nations. Critics of Echeverría in Mexico pointed out that, in doing so, he was trying to gain the favor of as many countries as possible to fulfill his aspirations of obtaining the Nobel Peace Prize and of becoming secretary-general of the United Nations. If that is so, he failed on both counts.⁶⁴

Echeverría's successor, José López Portillo⁶⁵ (1976-1982), went even further. He totally ignored the foreign policy principles of an earlier era and intervened in El Salvador and Nicaragua by allowing guerrillas fighting against the two regimes to use Mexican territory and also supplying them with large quantities of ammunition.⁶⁶ He also broke off formal diplomatic relations with the Somoza government in Nicaragua. López Portillo, in one of the greatest inconsistencies of any Mexican administration, still contended that his foreign policy was non-interventionist. And while supporting communist guerrillas in El

⁶³ Salaverry, 4.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 7.

⁶⁵ A character whose *sexenio* instead of being remembered as one of the most economical benefited due to the enormous oil increment it is remembered as the most corrupted and disastrous *sexenio* of modern era in México that virtually sent the country into bankruptcy.

⁶⁶ Salaverry, 1.

Salvador, López Portillo did refuse to support the communist guerrillas in Guatemala. Somewhat hypocritically he said: "México will take no sides in the [Guatemala] conflict... it is an internal problem and we view internal affairs in the context of non-intervention."⁶⁷

López Portillo exercised what he perceived as a new position of power on the international stage using President Carter's state visit to México to needle him about America's "past deceits" and to warn him against such actions in the future.⁶⁸ Much of López Portillo's policy was in flagrant violation of Mexican foreign policy principles; it was clearer than ever that the foreign policy principles could be managed or ignored at the will of the president when convenient.

3. The Institutionalization of the Foreign Policy Principles and President Miguel De la Madrid

When President De la Madrid (1982-1988) took office the country was experiencing serious problems; he had to deal with a terrible economy, internal political problems and international inconsistencies, all part of the legacy of Echeverría and López Portillo. De la Madrid had to attack all the problems at the same time; he started renegotiating the foreign debt, an immediate priority, which required lowering the volume of Mexico's Third World rhetoric, which had been typical of his two predecessors⁶⁹ in an effort to regain the confidence of the US. In a dramatic opening of the Mexican economy De la Madrid eschewed the protectionist, closed policies of the past and brought México into the GATT.⁷⁰ México also adopted a much more open policy regarding foreign ownership of Mexican enterprises and began to encourage foreign investments.⁷¹

In relations with the U.S. De la Madrid met six times with President Reagan, improving relations in each visit. Reagan and De la Madrid eventually started giving less weight to Central American matters, and finally ignored them

⁶⁷ Salaverry, 10.

⁶⁸ Smith, 61.

⁶⁹ Salaverry, 8.

⁷⁰ General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

⁷¹ Smith, 64.

for an emphasis on the bilateral issues of trade and foreign debt.⁷² De la Madrid did manage to bring stability to the Mexican economy and to set the stage for the real growth that was to come with his successor. Besides a strong improvement in the relationship with the United States, De la Madrid's most important contribution to Mexican foreign policy was that during his administration foreign policy principles were finally elevated to constitutional rank. His foreign minister Bernardo Sepúlveda was tasked to articulate foreign policy and in 1988 seven foreign policy principles were included in Article 89 as follows:

Article 89: the powers and obligations of the president are the following: (Amended by decree published in the Federation Official Newspaper on October 25, 1993)

Subtitle X: Direct foreign policy and conclude international treaties, and submit them to the approval of the Senate: In the conducting of this policy, the head of the Executive Power will observe the following standard principles: self-determination of peoples, non-intervention, peaceful resolution of disputes, juridical equality of states, international cooperation for development, and the struggle for international peace and security. (Amended by decree published in the Federation Official Newspaper on May 11, 1988.⁷³

This presupposed that from now on Mexican foreign principles would no longer be used at the sole discretion of the president but rather would be sanctioned by the Congress.

Mexican foreign policy can be considered as pragmatic in many ways and easily predictable. The Mexican government has assumed a foreign policy that has agreed more, in a conjunctural way, to its interests; although this means to move away of the foreign principles as seen during Echeverría and López Portillo. Nonetheless, the Mexican foreign policy principles evolved in parallel with the constitution. The interpretations and misuses given to the principles by

⁷² Salaverry, 9.

⁷³ Mexican Constitution as of 2002, translated by Ron Pamachena. Internet; accessed September 2, 2006; retrieved from <http://www.historicaltextarchive.com/sections.php?op=viewarticle&artid=93>.

each administration are, in theory, no longer possible since their inclusion in the Constitution and since the Congress has assumed a more steady compromise with the international issues of the country.

Nevertheless, since their achievement, the principles were established based on the historical experience and have reflected, to this day, the peace vocation that México always has had. There is no intention to change this vocation, but it is essential to understand that the current situation in the international environment have changed and México is part of that environment; it is impossible to hold an isolationist position with respect to the outside especially when thinking about the considerations and present exigencies of international security.

This attitude towards the international affairs appears to have changed since the arrival of President Vicente Fox who has define a new strategy for the Mexican foreign policy in search of a greater participation in order to cooperate with the international community, particularly with the United States.

III. THE END OF THE REVOLUTIONARIES' ERA AND THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW ORDER

After being one of the most successful economies, with a six percent GDP during the sixties, and the most stable government of Latin America, México entered the 1970s with very little confidence in the government's capacity to manage the country. The moral and political catastrophe of the 1968 *Tlateolco* massacre began the long and painful decline of the PRI as México's ruling party. This political descent was accompanied by a downturn of the economy⁷⁴ during the Echeverría and López Portillo administrations, while President de la Madrid could barely stabilize the country, not improving the conditions enough to convince the people that the PRI deserved their support. The Mexicans saw with displeasure the terrible consequences of letting the PRI-Government act freely and its lack of respect for the electoral process, as Sidney Weintraub observes:

The political unease that México was experiencing was based on systematic frustration that was bound to manifest itself under the proper circumstances, circumstances that presented themselves over three successive administrations, starting with that of Echeverría in 1970.⁷⁵

This chapter analyzes the challenges faced by the PRI during its last stages as ruling party and to see why, after being so successful, it lost control of the political environment, surrendering the power to the PAN. This chapter will also examine the new approaches of México's foreign policy and the main domestic challenges faced by the Fox administration regarding peacekeeping, as well as a quick look comparing Mexican foreign principles and the Charter of the UN to forecast the odds for the next administration on this issue.

A. THE PRI-GOVERNMENT DEBACLE

The scale of repression during the administrations of President Díaz Ordaz and Echeverría generated a new wave of opposition movements, prepared for outright confrontation with the state. A full-scale guerilla movement developed in

⁷⁴ Brian R. Hamnett. *A Concise History of México*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, New York. Second Edition. 2006. p. 262.

⁷⁵ Weintraub, 39.

the state of Guerrero by 1971, involving five army battalions and 10,000 police. Although the movement was broken up the politics in Guerrero remained turbulent. William Glade attributes the PRI's durability to "its extensive information network, its appropriation of cherished political symbols (the Revolution in particular), and its ability to renew itself constantly."⁷⁶ Forced circulation of elites has occurred after every six-year presidential administration, rather than during the period of any single administration. This practice effectively ensured that state agencies have not developed deep internal ties over time.⁷⁷ When de la Madrid took office, the country was submerged in a terrible economic crisis. The PRI felt the sensation of having arrived at a dangerous limit with regards to the stability and viability of their political system and this feeling was extended in the political and social mood of the country at the end of 1982. In January 1983, high-level government officials were estimating that if it was possible to get to the September 1 date for the first annual presidential report without a social explosion taking place, the new government could consolidate itself and advance its own agenda. The iron-clad presidential control of the party in power —the PRI— and its extreme dependence on governmental resources were such that it was not really a political party but rather part of the structure of the federal government.⁷⁸

The gathering of so many political errors influenced the PRI's popularity, which started to feel its real decline in 1983 by losing several municipalities to the *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN). These elections were understood by the government as an indicator that the crisis had effectively arrived at the voting booths, and presaged the severe decline of the PRI.⁷⁹ In 1987 at the peak of the political struggle, a fissure in the governing party happened; a handful of PRI activists created a political offshoot within the party called the Democratic Current. This movement was finally marginalized within the party and later abandoned the PRI to establish an independent center-left political force that

⁷⁶ Weintraub, 39.

⁷⁷ Migdal, 216.

⁷⁸ Aguilar. 239.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 226.

eventually evolved into today's *Partido de la Revolución Democrática*, (PRD).⁸⁰ It was the beginning of the end for the PRI. Between 1982 and 1997 the political domination of the PRI went down from an average of 91% to 54%.⁸¹ The Salinas's administration entered office in 1988 under a gigantic shadow of electoral fraud, which encouraged the opposition to press harder on the government. Nonetheless, the political education of Salinas de Gortari was grounded in a new vocabulary and buttressed with new concepts. The world had changed with the end of the Cold War; the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia fell apart just as West and East Germany came together. With changes this remarkable occurring elsewhere in the world, president Salinas decided that it was time for México, too, to begin marching to a new cadence. He placed México on the cusp of becoming *post-revolutionary*.⁸²

Salinas's most remarkable success was NAFTA⁸³ in 1994; but it was eclipsed by a wave of violent events such as the Zapatista Revolt in Chiapas (January 1994); the assassinations of PRI candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio in March, 1994 (The most charismatic candidate in decades), and PRI's national leader and ex-brother in law of Salinas, Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu (September 1994). This was all crowned by an economic crisis at the end of Salinas' period in office.

The accumulation of so many irregularities in the Salinas government worked against the PRI in many ways; however, the death of Luis Donaldo Colosio indirectly helped the PRI and its new candidate Ernesto Zedillo by influencing the presidential elections of 1994. Zedillo used many of Colosio's phrases during his speeches, making him a martyr. His assassination still remains as an unresolved problem. The new President Ernesto Zedillo instantly

⁸⁰ Aguilar, 241.

⁸¹ Base de Datos Políticos de las Américas. (1999) Mapa de Distribución de los Puestos de Elección Popular/1982-1997. 26 de octubre 2000. Georgetown University y Organización de Estados Americanos. Internet; accessed June 1, 2006; retrieved from <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Mexico/Dist82-97.html>.

⁸² Meyer, 670.

⁸³ North American Free Trade Agreement, which includes México, the United States and Canada in an open market.

started to make changes regarding the political relationship between the presidency and the party. Clint Smith defines Zedillo's new attitude as follows:

President Zedillo from the very beginning of his administration sought openly to reduce the awesome power of the presidency... Zedillo announced early in his administration that he wanted to keep a *sana distancia* - a safe distance - from the PRI leadership and called for a more democratic selection process to choose PRI candidates for elective national and state offices.⁸⁴

By the spring of 1998 Zedillo appeared to have abandoned the practice of presidential selection of the official PRI candidate for the forthcoming presidential elections. The political scenario was perfectly set up for a more radical change in the Mexican political system, and the presidential election of 2000 would be a decisive moment in Mexican history; the result would decide the fate of the PRI. It was true that México was a constitutional state, but no opposition party had ever taken office as a result of victory in a national election. Brian Hamnett notes:

The presidential succession was a remarkable transition, which took many Mexicans by surprise, the victory of Vicente Fox, from the PAN, meant that for the first time in living memory a political party other than the PRI (or its predecessors) would be governing the country.⁸⁵

The PRI's loss of the presidency elevated President Zedillo to the status of *el democratizador de México*, defending whatever the results of the elections totaled; the newly elected president Vicente Fox and the PAN represented the end of the PRI-Government and the beginning of a new era in México.

B. THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA

The new or post-revolutionary era, actually started with President Salinas de Gortari who left little doubt of his position concerning the old concepts of the Mexican Revolution. Regardless of the many problems faced by his administration, he was the key author of the new post-revolutionary concept known as *neo-liberalism*, an anti-socialist doctrine championing the free market by placing stringent limits on all government regulation of economic forces; this

⁸⁴ Smith, 104.

⁸⁵ Hamnett, 291.

would also be the name on the headstone of the revolution's tomb, putting it in such a deep grave that exhumation would be impossible.⁸⁶ President Zedillo followed the same model in his economic and foreign policy enhancing both an eye to the United States. One aspect of México's foreign policy activity has undergone substantial change in the 1990s. Under Salinas and Zedillo México was more willing to promote its interests by engaging in higher-profile activities in Washington, D.C.⁸⁷

Despite the dramatic changes that begun under Salinas and Zedillo at the level of politics, México's first presidential election in the new millennium was quite unlike anything in national memory. It was the fulcrum of México's post-revolutionary experience. Attention was focused on the flamboyant Vicente Fox, the candidate of the conservative PAN. Fox, a prosperous rancher, former chief executive of Coca-Cola de México, and popular governor of the state of Guanajuato, ran an outstanding campaign and won the elections. Michael Meyer had said that

If Salinas and Zedillo had buried the Mexican Revolution by abandoning its most revered principles, Vicente Fox's landmark victory put the final nails in the Revolutionary coffin.⁸⁸

The new administration brought a breath of fresh air to the country; President Fox knew that he had to start doing things not only different from past administrations, but also be credible in his actions. As Meyer describes it:

Fox announced a major offensive against corruption. México's Customs Department was so dishonest that Fox's newly appointed director found [it] necessary to fire almost all of the customs supervisors. In 2001 twenty-two notorious drug traffickers were arrested. White-collar crime was exposed when five bank executives charged with laundering drug money were convicted. Former governor of Quintana Roo, Mario Villanueva, was arrested... and President Fox agreed to extradite him to the U.S.

⁸⁶ Meyer, 670.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 163.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 683.

where he could be tried for cocaine trafficking. In the total scheme of things the successes were only a drop in the bucket, but a good start had been made on an endemic problem.⁸⁹

1. A New Foreign Policy for a New Democracy

In foreign policy Fox was even more drastic, drafting a totally new scheme for the country against many old system concepts. Fox appointed Jorge Castañeda Gutman to be his Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the architect of the new foreign vision, and whose father held the same office during López Portillo. Castañeda defied and broke with the old Estrada Doctrine considered ambiguous and obsolete. Castañeda was confident that one main priority of the new government was to move away from the old regime practices and mark a new position in the international order. He promoted openness and an acceptance of criticism from the international community, which was also supported by President Fox, and incrementally increased Mexican involvement in foreign affairs. Castañeda was the promoter of the non permanent seat in the UN Security Council for México. In his enthusiastic sponsorship to make México more participative, Castañeda ignited a fire under Mexican foreign policy when asked about México's future involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, showing support for the possibility of military participation. This was new for nearly everyone particularly for many congressmen in México, who were only accustomed to military deployments in disaster relief and humanitarian assistance inside and outside the country.

The idea of Mexican involvement in peacekeeping was reinforced by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan during his visit to México City and address to Mexican Congress on March 19, 2002. Talking about peacekeeping Annan said:

⁸⁹ Meyer, 686.

Mexican police participated in ONUSAL, the operation that helped the peace process bear fruit in El Salvador. I would like to thank you for those contributions, and to **express the hope that in the future Mexico will join in more such operations, and be an even bigger part of our efforts** to stem the tide of conflict.⁹⁰

Unfortunately, the events of September 11, 2001 influenced México's foreign agenda and Castañeda himself. He became increasingly frustrated about failures to achieve his goals⁹¹ and had growing difficulties in his interaction with some cabinet members even with President Fox. As a consequence Castañeda resigned in January 2003. Nevertheless, peacekeeping was on the table and his successor, Luis Ernesto Derbez, continued to push it. Derbez was also part of that new generation of politicians that believed the revolutionary times had hit the ground and that México was facing a new time.

With Derbez, the peacekeeping issue became more responsive, and knowing that the topic was sensitive he started to manage it with diplomacy, making careful statements and referring to Mexican contributions to the UN. Derbez has since ruled out the involvement of Mexican military personnel in peacekeeping forces but said he would support the use of Mexican medical personnel, observers, and police officers in peacekeeping operations. He said the Fox administration has conveyed this possibility to Kofi Annan. "[President Fox] has clearly stated that we would like to participate in humanitarian efforts," Derbez said during a radio interview. "Our conversations with the secretary-general are related to how we can provide support services."⁹² However, there were some problems. During a visit to Spain in May 2004, Derbez openly said

⁹⁰ Department of Public Information -News and Media Services Division- New York. *International Conference on Financing for Development*. Monterrey, NL, México. March 18-22. Internet; accessed September 12, 2006; retrieved from <http://www.un.org/ffd/pressrel/19b.htm>.

⁹¹ Among others the constant critics about foreign policy changes, the attempt to have a U.S.-Mexican immigration agreement, the peacekeeping issue and his statement that the new government should move away from the old regime and mark a new position in the international order.

⁹² The Herald-Mexico City. *UN Secretary General gets mostly negative response to request that México contribute troops to peacekeeping forces*. September 22, 2004. Internet; accessed September 12, 2006; retrieved from <http://retanet.unm.edu/LADB-articles/25768.html>.

that México was considering military participation in peacekeeping and that such participation would always be subject to the support of Mexican society; **the next day** while visiting Switzerland President Fox denied what Derbez said:

...it is not the intention of this government to militarily participate whatsoever, even if the UN or any other organization or country asked. México is not going to participate militarily in any of these cases, and I'm saying this as President of the Republic.⁹³

It appeared that Fox and Derbez were thinking differently; to make things worse UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked the Mexican Senate and President Vicente Fox's administration to consider contributing peacekeeping troops to international missions in a request that created strong controversy in Mexico. Annan made the request during a visit to Mexico City in early September 2004 to meet with Mexican government officials and intellectuals and to take part in a seminar on democracy in Latin America. Derbez continued pushing on the subject, maintaining a clear position about military participation in peacekeeping. One year later during an interview on June 30, 2005 he stated:

...in order to have a bigger possibility and flexibility ...[there is] the need that México take its responsibility as a country that represents the tenth [largest] economy of the world... At this moment it's economically contributing to all these peace missions. Well then, that [México] also can take an active role and this doesn't mean send troops to combat... This debate has to be done in our country, people needs to understand what we are talking [about] here, that this is a Mexican presence with no interventionist activity because it could only happen under the approval of the United Nations and with a specific request from the corresponding country.⁹⁴

Among other things, Derbez justified the need to get more involved in peacekeeping not only in the yearly contribution made by México to the UN (around 13 million US dollars) but also in Mexican former participations during the early years of the UN, and the responsibility of México in the world context.

⁹³ Presidencia de la Republica. *Conferencia de Prensa Conjunta que ofrecieron los Presidentes Joseph Deiss y Vicente Fox Quesada*. May 21, 2004. Internet; accessed September 1, 2006; retrieved from <http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/actividades/visitaoficial/?contenido=8110>.

⁹⁴ Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. *Versión estenográfica de la entrevista concedida por el Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Luis Ernesto Derbez*. June 30, 2005. Internet; accessed September 1, 2006; retrieved from http://www.sre.gob.mx/comunicados/entrevistas/2005/entre_45.htm. Author's translation.

The day before Derbez's interview, his deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Patricia Olamendi, participated in a debate promoted by the Chamber of Deputies Foreign Relations Commission; during her inaugural speech Olamendi explained that "the intention of the seminar is that legislators know the benefits as much as the role that México would play participating in UN peacekeeping operations."⁹⁵ She also mentioned that México was signatory of several international treaties including the non proliferation treaty as well as others and said:

...therefore we [México] had the authority to participate in this kind of [peacekeeping] operations... [T]he challenge is to be part of the international context in a more active and constant manner, from different scenarios and tasks, and above all, end the **taboo and misunderstanding** with regards to this activity."⁹⁶

Olamendi's statements stirred the waters again, with the result that the president's spokesman refuted her based on the statement made by President Fox during his visit to Switzerland in 2004. After the announcement Olamendi left a meeting held with representatives of 30 countries and immediately renounced his post that same day saying: "I deeply regret the expressions of Ruben Aguilar [president's spokesman]; I deeply regret that he has ignorance in these topics. It is not possible to work like this."⁹⁷ None of this altered Derbez's attitude. In July 2005 he had a meeting with federal deputies and members of the Foreign Affairs Commission, where both sides agreed that:

México ought to participate in peace missions under the command of the UN, but in a circumscribed way: humanitarian assistance, electoral counseling and reconstruction tasks in nations that have required and requested it. The incursion of the country's Armed Forces in combat operations or wars, as well as the establishment

⁹⁵ H. Congreso de la Unión. Comisión de Relaciones Exteriores de la Cámara de Diputados. *Analizan en la Cámara de diputados el que México participe en operaciones de paz en la ONU*. Bulletin No. 2176. June 29, 2005. Internet; accessed September 12, 2006; retrieved from <http://comunicacion.diputados.gob.mx/notas2005/290605.htm>. Author's translation.

⁹⁶ H. Congreso de la Unión. Comisión de Relaciones Exteriores de la Cámara de Diputados. Author's translation.

⁹⁷ Cronica.com. *Renuncia Olamendi como subsecretaria por segundo mentís del vocero presidencial*. July 30, 2005. Internet; accessed September 12, 2006. retrieved from http://www.cronica.com.mx/nota.php?id_nota=189739. Author's translation.

of conditioners for their authorization, is a subject that must be first discussed by the society as a whole, based on the changes of world-wide dynamics.⁹⁸

During this same meeting Derbez pointed out that if México eventually sends troops to peacekeeping operations, this undoubtedly should be with full respect of Mexican foreign principles, particularly non-intervention, indicating that the international community has already defined some basic criteria that are congruent with Mexican foreign policy, like the non-use of force (unless in self defense), and impartiality in relation to the parties in the conflict. Under these circumstances there is no interventionism as traditionally conceived.

The last time the issue was touched on was during the appearance of the Secretary of Defense, General Clemente Vega at the Senate National Defense Commission (September 2005) during which Senator Dulce María Sauri (PRI) asked five long questions (see Appendix B) regarding peacekeeping, to which General Vega answered poorly the following:

...In relation to the blue helmets, I considered that it's a polarized issue. Most staff officers had said that first we have to arrange our house and then go to other parts. I can't deny that we have sent people to Canada, England, United States and Argentina for training on behalf of the blue helmets... it's worth it to clarify that is very important not to confuse humanitarian tasks with those of the blue helmets.⁹⁹

Since then the topic has been frozen; nonetheless, the most important observation is that the issue is still open for debate.

2. To Do or Not to Do Peacekeeping

The issue of peacekeeping is not unfamiliar to México, which has been part of the UN Peacekeeping Operations Committee since 1956. In 1947 México also sent four military observers overseas for the first time during the UN Special Commission to the Balkans, which is considered as the first peacekeeping

⁹⁸ Centro de Información de las Naciones Unidas. Internet; accessed September 12, 2006. Retrieved from <http://www.cinu.org.mx>. Author's translation.

⁹⁹ Senado de la República. *Glosa V Informe de Gobierno. Comparecencia del Secretario de la Defensa Nacional, General Clemente R. Vega García*. Boletín de Prensa 2005/1040. September 27, 2005. Internet; accessed September 12, 2006, retrieved from <http://www.senado.gob.mx/comunicacion/content/conferencias/2005/glosaV/defen.php>. Author's translation.

operation.¹⁰⁰ In 1949 India and Pakistan signed the Karachi Agreement followed by a cease fire supervised by the UN; México contributed with six military observers. More recently México sent a police force (1991) to be part of the UN Observers Mission to El Salvador and in 1994 the Mexican Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) signed a Technical Assistance Agreement with the UN, participating in 35 assistance missions in 22 countries including East Timor, and more recently providing electoral training to Iraqi officials in México City. This information provides sufficient evidence that peacekeeping operations and México's collaboration with the UN are anything but new.

Since the start of the peacekeeping debate in México a number of uncertainties have continued to hang over the whole issue. First: whether the Mexican people would support sending troops to these operations. Second: the implications of the principles on foreign intervention in the Mexican constitution. Third: the opinion of top military leaders. The absence of accurate information has been an important factor in the whole issue. In the end, the voice of the Congress would have the last word acting as representatives of the people and as interpreters of the constitution; the military will obey. To have an idea of how Mexicans see foreign policy, a comparative study made by Global Views 2004 discovered that Mexicans are actively aware of the foreign policy of the country:

Against all expectations, Mexicans are not inwardly focused. They are interested in and knowledgeable about what happens beyond their borders. [The] Mexican public is quite worried about the state of the world and the direction it is taking. However, leaders (political, business, and cultural leaders with an interest in world affairs and Mexico's foreign policy) have a less pessimistic view. Both leaders and the public reject a reactive engagement in international affairs and favor an assertive, proactive foreign policy, but they limit Mexico's activism to those issues that directly affect Mexico. Leaders disagree with the government's foreign policy performance, yet the general public supports the government's handling of foreign affairs.¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰ Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional. *Compendio de Operaciones de Mantenimiento de la Paz DN C 4200*. p. 170. Comisión Especial de las Naciones Unidas sobre los Balcanes (UNSCOB) 1947-1951.

¹⁰¹ Global Views 2004. *Mexican Public Opinión and Foreign Policy*. p. 8. Internet; accessed July 2, 2006; retrieved from www.ccf.org/globalviews2004/index.htm.

The document also revealed that 64% of the population favored Mexican to participation in UN peacekeeping operations, and only 27% opposed them.¹⁰² In this matter it is important to remember that congressmen should represent the people's desires and not those of their party. Most politicians opposed to peacekeeping belong to the PRI and the PRD. For instance, in January 2005 Deputy Jorge Martínez Ramos (PRD) proposed and got approval in the chamber "to exhort the Federal Executive to abstain himself to carry on any action related to sending Mexican troops in the so-called peace missions."¹⁰³ In July of that same year, the PRD reiterated that they would reject any request from the federal government to allow México to send troops overseas in peacekeeping operations. These radical attitudes caused more damage around this sensitive topic instead of helping open a debate and find a solution. Both parties defended revolutionary principles and the Estrada Doctrine, trying to return to the old system where if you don't mess with other people's problems nobody will mess with yours. However, it is not only the preservation of the old doctrine; rather as Laura Zamudio has noted, there is more behind the scenes:

...[T]he fact that the country was dominated for more than 70 years by one single party that held the fallacy of democracy through apparent elections..., the concept of sovereignty became an important shield to stop possible interventions from the U.S. over the national politics to protect the damaged prestige that the authoritarian regime of the PRI suffered in the international arena... [S]overeignty and self determination helped to avoid that the Mexican government suffered interventions from international organisms like the UN.¹⁰⁴

Zamudio also favors México's participation in peacekeeping, saying that it would give the country a "more visible role in international affairs without losing

¹⁰² Global Views 2004. p. 23.

¹⁰³ Camara de Diputados. LIX Legislatura. Secretaría General. January 3, 2005. Internet, accessed August 3, 2006; retrieved from http://archivos.diputados.gob.mx/servicios/datorele/LIX_LEG/1R_2A/Ene_05/6.htm. Author's translation.

¹⁰⁴ Laura Zamudio. Universidad Iberoamericana. *México y las Operaciones de Mantenimiento de la Paz: Hacia una verdadera política exterior*. Internet, accessed August 3, 2006; retrieved from http://www.uia.mx/departamentos/dpt_estudinterna/dialogo/politicas/mexico%20y%20las%20operaciones.html. Author's translation.

its traditional posture of peaceful solution to conflicts;" taking into account that peacekeeping is directed to prevent the continuation of conflicts and México, now looking for a more active foreign participation, has been a strong advocate of peaceful solutions. For many years México has faced a safe, stable, and benign regional environment with no immediate security threats, largely because of the implicit U.S. security shield it enjoys. This has allowed México to disengage from world affairs and to choose when and how to involve itself in them. The Fox administration has tried to conciliate this pragmatism and the principles of foreign policy, particularly since the September 11 events. Now México has to work more closely with the U.S. to ensure a viable security environment that benefits both countries, because if México was blessed by the cover of the U.S. before, now it is also sleeping under the same insecure blanket.

3. Navy versus Army versus New Foreign Policy

Journalist Jorge Carrasco pointed out that the Secretary of National Defense, [General] "Clemente Vega, has manifested his opposition to this kind of collaboration [peacekeeping] and above all against the eventuality that Mexican troops stay under command of an American general."¹⁰⁵ Is General Vega's main concern that Mexican soldiers would be under the command of a U.S. general rather than the real political and social implications of the problem? According to his statement and assuming that Mexican troops participated in peacekeeping, they could be under the command of any foreigner designated by the UN, but not an American.

Regardless of Gen. Vega García's opinion there are other Mexican military leaders that see the benefits of allocating troops to peacekeeping forces. Retired Army Gen. Luis Gárfias Magaña said Mexican soldiers would gain from the experience of serving under an international command. "This would allow them to strengthen their military training," Gárfias told the Mexico City daily newspaper La

¹⁰⁵ Proceso. *El Ejército Exportable*. Participación de fuerzas armadas en misiones internacionales de paz. On line magazine. March 18, 2005. Internet; accessed June 1, 2006; retrieved from <http://www.consejomexicano.org/download.php?id=17041,329,1>. Author's translation.

Jornada¹⁰⁶. Gárfias also said that Annan's proposal for including Mexican troops in peacekeeping forces merits further discussion. "This is a matter that should be addressed not only by legislators but by members of the military."¹⁰⁷ The Mexican Navy has made clear its support to México's participation in peacekeeping as Admiral Marco Antonio Peyrot, Secretary of the Navy, restructured the Navy in 2000, creating two naval forces capable of participating in multinational peacekeeping operations;¹⁰⁸ he also said that "the Navy would do whatever the president or Congress ordered, even if it required additional equipment or preparation."¹⁰⁹ For the Navy it's important to exert control of the sea and project naval supremacy, which demands an oceanic profile; also "the possibility of participating in peacekeeping operations imposes the necessity to have capacity to project naval supremacy to great distances."¹¹⁰

Furthermore, in August 2004 the *Centro de Estudios Superiores Navales*¹¹¹ (CESNAV) organized a seminar in peacekeeping operations in coordination with the Foreign Affairs Ministry with the participation of Congressmen, Army and Navy officers. However, it was during the 2005 seminar on peacekeeping organized by the Chamber of Deputies Foreign Relations Commission, where the Army and the Navy found the perfect forum to articulate their positions about peacekeeping. In her inaugural speech Deputy Secretary Olamendi stated that "the simple economic contribution [of México] doesn't

¹⁰⁶ La Jornada on line. Newspaper. Accessed September 1, 2006; retrieved from <http://www.jornada.unam.mx:8080/ultimas>.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Mexican Navy's Institutional Development Plan 2001-2006.

¹⁰⁹ Gram. H. Turbiville. *México's Evolving Security Posture*. Article on line. Internet; accessed August 3, 2006; retrieved from http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/documents/mexico_evolve/mexico_evolve.htm.

¹¹⁰ Marcos Moloeznik. *La Naturaleza de un instrumento militar atípico: las fuerzas armadas mexicanas*. Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad. Año 19, N° 1, 2005. pp. 169-212; Internet; accessed July 3, 2006; retrieved from http://www.fasoc.cl/php/fasoc.php?seccion=articulo&id_articulo=521. Author's translation.

¹¹¹ The CESNAV is the Mexican equivalent of the U.S. Naval War College.

count, because it looks like México won't make any [real] commitment to peace, not participating in PKO."¹¹² In support the Navy representative said that

México couldn't subtract from the process of globalization and that other Latin-American countries have seen our country in the past as a leader in opinion, action, and foreign policy, they have now grown and México has been left behind, stagnant in an old posture.¹¹³

On the other hand, the Army (Secretariat of Defense) position was reinforced by General Carlos Gaytán Ochoa, Operations Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, maintaining a different perspective indicating that

The consequence of a possible participation [of México] would be to the contrary, meaning the loss of the international prestige of México by modifying its traditional posture defending the principle of non-intervention.¹¹⁴

While Olamendi and the Navy representative agreed in several things -- peacekeeping would give the opportunity for special training to the military component, the economic benefits for the participants, and the acquisition of new equipment); the Army representative argued:

There are developed countries whose armed forces have the mission of expand the dominion of such state, on the other hand, Mexican Armed Forces have the fundamental mission of defending the country from foreign aggressions and that to participate in PKO will mean modified military doctrine, in addition, it would have to modify the military doctrine, which establishes that our country can't participate in another country's war.¹¹⁵

This comment was answered by a Mexican foreign affairs delegate stating that nobody was proposing any changes to military doctrine, and that México's participation would be under the UN sponsorship and not under unilateral or

¹¹² Mauricio Dardón Velázquez. *Conceptos, datos y hechos para el debate en torno a las Operaciones de Mantenimiento de la Paz (OMPS) y la posible participación de México en ellas*. p. 14. Internet; accessed September 1, 2006; retrieved from http://prdleg.diputados.gob.mx/debate_parlamentario/marzo_2006/pdf/MAURICIOODPMARZOPDF%5B1%5D.pdf. Author's translation.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 14. Author's translation.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 15. Author's translation.

multinational operations against other nations, like the case of Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army representative had also said:

...another aspect would be the reciprocity, that is to say, that [another country] could insert foreign troops into [our] national territory. It also will imply extraordinary expenses of money for the annual budget that would affect the internal priorities...¹¹⁶

He was, again, replied to by another foreign affairs official, denying it and stating that reciprocity is no longer in effect and that current peacekeeping operations were deployed under specific internal circumstances. The symposium was a platform that really showed both Secretariats' positions. The Secretariat of the Navy clearly favors peacekeeping and has what is most important in this matter, the will to take the risk in these operations, understanding that it will be a slow process but also that it can be no longer postponed. The Navy arguments are more focused on the operations itself, lessons to learn, the procedures, military and political implications, possible benefits, etc. This attitude is the result of more frequent contact with other nations' armed forces and the experience gained from participating in multinational exercises as observers; those exercises have demonstrated that the exchange of information, experience and training is an invaluable tool for the better performance of the Navy during the execution of operations in México.

The position of the Secretariat of Defense is equally clear in its opposition to participation in peacekeeping operations. The disagreements of the Army are concentrated in the historic foreign policy principles and the Estrada Doctrine, particularly in non-intervention, showing a consistent inclination that reminds us of the early post revolutionary years. Another bias exposed as lack of support is the one about participating in other countries' wars, showing a misperception or misunderstanding of peacekeeping purposes and missions. The argument that México will suffer severe consequences in foreign policy if it gets involved in these operations is out of context; México is already suffering the consequences

¹¹⁶ H. Congreso de la Unión. Cámara de Diputados. *Debe debatirse la participación de México en las Operaciones para el Mantenimiento de la Paz mundial*. Bulletin No. 1992. June 29, 2005. Internet; accessed September 12, 2006; retrieved from <http://www.diputados.gob.mx/camara/content/view/full/9470>. Author's translation.

of maintaining an isolationist policy. In essence there is only one fact; the Army doesn't want to get involved in peacekeeping and the Navy does want it.

4. Mexican Foreign Principles and the UN Charter

The main argument of those opposed to Mexican involvement in peacekeeping is that it is against the foreign principles of the Mexican constitution and that this would have severe consequences for the country; in this matter it is imperative to see not only the contradictions of the Mexican constitution itself but also the similarities that it has with the UN Charter:

The principles stated in the Mexican Constitution, Article 89 are six and are fairly clear:

Article 89 sub incise X. ...In the conducting of this [foreign] policy, the head of the Executive Power will observe the following standard principles: self-determination of peoples, non-intervention, peaceful resolution of disputes, juridical equality of states, international cooperation for development, and the struggle for international peace and security.¹¹⁷

The **self-determination** principle is a concept developed before 1859 and it was an ethical and political statement against European colonialism and the right of nations to have an equal right to sovereignty which is included in the **juridical equality of states** principle; the UN Charter equivalents are:

Article 1. No. 2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace. And...

Article 2. No. 1. The Organization is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its Members."¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ Mexican Constitution as of 2002. Article 89. fraction X. Translated by Ron Pamachena. Internet; accessed June 1, 2006; retrieved from <http://historicaltextarchive.com/sections.php?op=viewarticle&artid=93>.

¹¹⁸ Charter of the United Nations. Article 2. Internet, accessed September 2, 2006; retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>.

Non-intervention, as it has been seen, means that it is out of the question for México to get involved directly in another country's problems, unless the country itself has asked outside involvement. In this same tone the UN Charter says:

Article 2. No. 7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.

The **peaceful solution of disputes and the struggle for international peace and security** are also included in the UN Charter in

Article 2. No. 3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

The **international cooperation for development** is included in

Article 1. No. 3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character...

Among all the similarities, which are obvious, one in particular calls for attention in the Mexican Constitution, the last part of Article 89 stating **the struggle for international peace and security**. If this is the case, then **México's Constitution is effectively already committed to help maintain international peace**, and in light of this fact, peacekeeping operations are one of the main tools used by the United Nations to preserve international peace; therefore México is, according to its own constitution, **capable and authorized to participate actively in peacekeeping operations**.

IV. THE MEXICAN ARMED FORCES AND THE FUTURE

Since the end of the Mexican Revolution the Mexican military has been focused on internal security; with the exception of the participation of the Air Force 201 Squadron in WWII the army, navy and air force are currently playing a significant role in counter narcotic activities, including interdiction and the deployment of some 20,000 troops at any one time including disaster relief whenever needed. Since the end of the Revolution and even more after WWII the Mexican military was characterized by its loyalty to Mexican governments, without questioning or getting involved in politics, while other Latin American countries were struggling with internal conflicts and military coups. The Navy was separated from the Army in 1939 creating the Secretariat of National Defense and the Secretariat of the Navy. Since then both entities have assumed similar missions: “I. Defend the integrity, independence and sovereignty of the nation” and “II. Guarantee internal security”¹¹⁹ for the Secretariat of Defense and “...to use the naval power of the federation in the external defense and to contribute in the internal security of the country”¹²⁰ for the Navy. As Wesley Fryer explains:

An analysis of the ways American nations perceive security threats begins with the fundamental *raison d'être* of every nation's military: the protection of territorial integrity. Many Latin American militaries share a common preoccupation with historic border conflicts.¹²¹

Making their primary role the defense of national territory against possible aggression of neighbors, México's military is a leading example of this mindset; focusing on defending the country against foreign incursions has provided the basis of their legitimacy as institutions for decades. Nonetheless, it has been some years since México's sovereignty was threatened by its northern neighbor, and it is currently hard to believe that it could happen again. This absence of

¹¹⁹ Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional. Ley Orgánica, artículo 1. Internet; accessed September 1, 2006; retrieved from <http://www.sedena.gob.mx>.

¹²⁰ Secretaria de Marina-Armada de México. Ley Orgánica, artículo 1. Internet; accessed September 1, 2006; retrieved from <http://www.semar.gob.mx>.

¹²¹ Fryer Wesley. *Prospects for Collective Security in the Western Hemisphere*. Internet; accessed September 1, 2006; retrieved from <http://www.wesfryer.com/collectivesecurity.html>.

neighboring threats or enemies made the Mexican military look for secondary roles where it could be employed in order to justify its presence and the allocation of budget; for instance, internal defense, civic action, and counter narcotics operations have become part of their regular duties. The Mexican Armed Forces, particularly the Army, never considered to be deployed overseas in peacekeeping or other operations; now is the time to consider those deployments. This chapter analyzes the current situation and capabilities of the Mexican Armed Forces as a whole, as well as considers some aspects separately. The purpose of this analysis is to discover whether the Mexican Armed Forces have the capabilities shown by other Latin American countries that have committed their military to UN peacekeeping missions. This analysis will demonstrate that the Mexican Armed Forces are eminently capable of performing, and will discuss the important advantages that would flow from Mexican participation in UN peacekeeping.

A. ORGANIZATION

As mentioned before, the Mexican Army (at least 144,000 personnel) and Air Force (at least 12,000 personnel) are embedded in the same body known as the Secretariat of National Defense; the Navy (at least 44,000 personnel), which includes Marines and Naval Aviation, are under a different command known as the Secretariat of the Navy.

Although in the Secretariat of National Defense's structure the Mexican Air Force (FAM¹²²) has its own Commandant (see figure 1 under the name *Comandancia FAM*) the official voice is the Secretary of National Defense, an active duty four stars General, who is also acting as Army Commandant. This means that the Air Force actually has no independence from the Army; the structure is similar to the one the United States had during WWII. The structure doesn't contemplate a Joint Staff either; therefore, the Navy is a separate autonomous entity.

¹²² Fuerza Aerea Mexicana.




Figure 1. Organizational Chart of the Secretariat of National Defense

The Secretariat of the Navy is not dissimilar; although it has a Marine component, there is no Marine Commandant; instead, all Marine units are included in two Naval Forces (Gulf of México and Pacific) in a brigade level *Fuerza de Reacción Anfibia de Infantería de Marina* (Marine Amphibious Reaction Force). Naval aviation is subordinated to Regional Commanders but works closely with both Naval Forces.




Figure 2. Organizational Chart of the Secretariat of the Navy

In comparison with some Latin American countries México's GDP is fourth in Latin America and first measured in GDI¹²³ and it's the only Latin American country that has been accepted in the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development; however, the Mexican Armed Forces are one of the smallest in budget. In 1999, México's military budget had swelled to 1% of GDP, and recently the budget has been expanded to accommodate counter drug operations. The inward orientation of the armed forces has contributed to placing them as a third or fourth order secretariat in the Mexican government, being relegated to a lower status by other priorities such as education, social development, and security.

The development of the armed forces defense policy and its doctrine is the result of a long term historical cluster; from this point, missions and tasks are perfectly identified and prioritized in order to decide which kind of organization is needed to meet the government assigned priorities. However, this doesn't mean that the armed forces have not reacted appropriately to changing circumstances. Since the Chiapas uprising (1994), and in light of the continual increase in drug trafficking, the armed forces have done as much as possible to contend with new requirements and missions. Most of these inputs have been done without any major adjustments in structure and equipment. Although both Secretariats are autonomous from each other, (a long term issue barely discussed but definitely a subject matter that requires more study), it is important to emphasize that both organizational structures have been effective in their own fields regardless of the tasks assigned and the government requirements.

B. EQUIPMENT, TRAINING AND PROFESSIONALIZATION

The 1994 Zapatista uprising was a wakeup call not only for the Mexican Armed Forces but also for the government, as Díez explains:

...it provided sound justification for additional funding for modernization. This was quickly recognized and taken advantage of by the military hierarchy. In addition to significant equipment purchases, the institution embarked upon a thorough review of its professional development of the officer corps, as well as of its

¹²³ Grows Domestic Income.

training and organization. Over the period of 10 years, massive improvements to barracks and training facilities have been made throughout the country, and new courses for Special Forces and the Army in low intensity warfare developed.¹²⁴

Nonetheless, both secretariats have managed to develop in strength and training. For instance, beginning in 1986, the *Fuerza de Intervención Rápida* (Rapid Intervention Force) was created by the Army to provide security during the Soccer World Cup in México City. They were trained by the French GIGN (*Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale*) in counter-terrorism tactics and special weapons; in 1990 this force became the *Grupo Aeromóvil de Fuerzas Especiales* (Special Forces Airmobile Group, GAFE) and since then the Army have created three Special Forces Brigades with nine highly trained battalions. Later the GANFE, Special Forces Amphibious Group was formed; Jordi Díez' describes it:

Most notably, forming, training, equipping and deploying airmobile and amphibious Special Forces units/groups (GAFES/GANFES) in the war on drugs have been emphasized. These are serious soldiers who do well in their internal mission, and compare favorably to foreign counterparts.¹²⁵

Up to the present the Army Special Forces continue fighting the war against drug cartels. They have successfully captured drug leaders such as Benjamin Arellano Felix and Osiel Cardenas of the *Cartel del Golfo*. In this regard the Navy also did its part in 2000, creating two Special Operations Forces company level units called *Fuerzas Especiales* (FES); their specialties are unconventional warfare, assault, counter-terrorism, kidnapping recovery, and special reconnaissance operations. There are also two other Special Forces units battalion level called *Batallón de Comandos Anfíbios* (Amphibious Commando Battalion), these units carry out special tasks for the Marine Amphibious Reaction Forces; they are trained in underwater demolition,

¹²⁴ Jordi Díez and Ian Nicholls. *Mexican Armed Forces in Transition*. Strategic Studies Institute. January 2006. p. 25.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 23.

parachuting, irregular warfare, and urban combat. All these units are assigned to the Naval Forces. Each secretariat has its own training process for Special Forces and for the regular forces.

While both secretariats have been dealing with budget restrictions for many years they have made some remarkable achievements; for example, without any specially assigned funds the Army brought out a new rifle in 2005, the FX-05,¹²⁶ which will replace the old HK G-3, including the capability to build all its parts. The Navy instead purchased the M-16 in all its variants for Marine units as a basic weapon, and had to stretch its budget to continue buying helicopters and building new ships, mainly rapid patrol boats and oceanic patrols, as well as the acquisition of bigger ships including two LST USS Newport Class and three USS Knox Class Frigates.

Although the Mexican and U.S. Armies have very little affection for each other, at least not as much as the Mexican Navy with its U.S. counterpart and the U.S. Coast Guard, the United States influence on the Mexican Armed Forces has been unavoidable. Mexican military organization is based on the U.S. model and most military training programs incorporated U.S. army/marines field manuals and navy procedures. The U.S. IMET program (International Military Education and Training) has allowed hundreds of Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force officers and NCOs to receive training at different levels in American military schools every year. However,

The most significant changes have been in the field of professional development for officers. [In México] Schools and courses were developed for all rank levels, with successful completion being a prerequisite for advancement.¹²⁷

¹²⁶ Fusil Xiuhcoatl (Fire Serpent in nahuatl language), the 05 refers to the year developed. Internet; accessed September 2, 2006 retrieved from <http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=82106>.

¹²⁷ Jordi Díez and Ian Nicholls. p. 23.

In an effort to improve the professional level of personnel, the Mexican Armed Forces have made a most noteworthy advancement in human rights training and Rules of Engagement (ROE) formulation. This was a directive from President Fox, highly preoccupied by the respect for human rights which both secretariats had taken very seriously as Díez points out:

Virtually every course, whether for privates or generals, includes a human rights component. For example, many training areas include mock-ups of villages where situational exercises assist young soldiers in learning what is acceptable conduct and what is not. Discussions with human rights organizations show that the number of accusations of violations by the military has plummeted, and very few of those are found to have substance. ROEs for a variety of situations have been established, and it is believed that they have resulted in remarkable restraint being shown by young officers and soldiers in some very provocative situations, often with media cameras rolling, hoping the military will overreact. These developments show a high degree of maturation and professionalization.¹²⁸

These changes are particularly important. The new democratic practices that México is experiencing, such as transparency, human rights, gender equality, and accountability, are transforming the decision-making process. Some of these practices are also supporting points for the peacekeeping argument because they translate into professionalism for the force, and peacekeeping contingents must have high levels of professionalism. The Mexican soldier is no longer the ignorant peasant that joined the Army because he had no other work options; now the armed forces have grown, representing not only a work source but also a means to achieve preparation and qualification. The advances made by the Mexican Armed Forces in the preparation and training of their personnel must be counted as real achievements. This professionalized level has changed the image of the armed forces in the country, particularly for the Army, which has been living with the stigma of 1968 for almost forty years.

C. MEXICAN MILITARY VS. THE REST OF LATIN AMERICA

The Mexican Armed Forces have been in a peace-time mode since the end of WWII; this situation has made them face new challenges, adapting their

¹²⁸ Jordi Díez and Ian Nicholls. p. 26.

tasks to new threats, such as drug trafficking, as mentioned previously. Most Latin American countries are facing the same situation; there are no real neighboring threats in terms of traditional inter-state warfare. This doesn't mean that the need for armed forces is disappearing as Antonio Pala stated, "The armed forces are an integral institution within a state, and the absence of a [clear and] present enemy [or external threat] does not invalidate their existence."¹²⁹ The Mexican administration of 2000 changed the view of México towards international issues, deciding to assume a more active role; if México is moving in the right direction with regards to economic relations and social development with the international community what would be the role of the Mexican military? Could UN peacekeeping missions provide a viable role for the Mexican Armed Forces in the international context? Antonio Pala provides a possible answer.

In light of the current international environment, several Latin American armed forces have incorporated United Nations (UN) peace operations as a secondary role within their defense doctrine. The Argentine army highlights the support of peace operations as a secondary role, along with providing logistical support to combat narcotrafficking, providing community support in emergency situations, and helping to protect the ecological system.¹³⁰

The participation of Latin American countries has increased significantly and has been recognized --especially Argentina, which has become an exemplar model of modern peacekeeping force, as Sir Brian Urquhart, former UN undersecretary, stated during an interview. "Argentina has provided hospitals, troops, engineers, police, and electoral observers. I wish that all countries would participate at this level and diversity."¹³¹ Argentine Army General Carlos Maria Zabala, former UN Sector Commander in Croatia, cited many of the advantages of peacekeeping for his army:

¹²⁹ Antonio L. Pala (USAF) Maj "The Increased Role of Latin American Armed Forces in UN Peacekeeping: *Opportunities and Challenges*." [article online] Internet; accessed June 1, 2006; retrieved from <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/pala.html>.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ As cited by Pala Antonio.

On a professional level, it is an occasion to operate in a complex operational environment. You have the opportunity to work with other armies and appreciate their capabilities as well as your own. It provides first hand knowledge of the effects of war, allowing our troops to appreciate the importance of the UN and its peace operations. On a personal level, it lends opportunity for travel to foreign locations and exposure to other cultures and customs. Additionally, it allows the troops to feel as representatives of their country in an important mission abroad.¹³²

Argentina is only one case; currently there are eleven Latin American countries involved in peacekeeping --Brazil leading the one in Haiti, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Ecuador, Paraguay, etc. with troops and observers deployed all around the world. Some of these countries are smaller in size than México, in area and population as well as in their economic proficiency. The comparison made is not limited to Latin American countries; there are many more countries around the world that are helping the UN sending peacekeeping troops with fewer resources than México, which means that there are other factors involved in deciding whether or not send troops for peacekeeping; other than those already mentioned. Throughout the twentieth century many Latin American countries faced military coups, including Argentina, developing an environment of mistrust in many of those societies. This was not the case for the Mexican Armed Forces; despite the crude events where particularly the army has been involved most Mexicans consider their military as an honorable institution. Participation in UN peacekeeping is an opportunity not only to improve the image and prestige of the military domestically and internationally, but also to increase the level of training and professionalization, as Deborah Norden observes:

The military's participation in peacekeeping allowed the armed forces to become a valuable player in the government's foreign policy, bringing praise and recognition, where they had previously found disdain.¹³³

¹³² General de Division Carlos Maria Zabala. "*Una Oportunidad Histórica*" Revista del Suboficial No. 611 (March-April 1994) pp. 24-25.

¹³³ As cited by Pala Antonio L. "The Increased Role of Latin American Armed Forces in UN Peacekeeping: *Opportunities and Challenges*."

Peacekeeping is a Military Operation Other Than War; it involves a much more humanitarian level of conduct, as Antonio Pala states:

The protection of innocent civilians in Croatia, the clearing of minefields in Cambodia, and the operation of a hospital in Mozambique can only enhance their profile at the national and international levels. These new roles cannot erase past mistakes but can offer the prospect for a better partnership with civilian authorities and society.¹³⁴

This is the kind of role that the Mexican government and its military establishment must look for, which also concurs with the line of **international cooperation for development, and the struggle for international peace and security** stated in the constitution. Despite the particular exigencies that any UN peacekeeping operation may have concerning equipment, logistic support or else, the Mexican Armed Forces have sufficient proficiency to perform in this environment; the basic and most important element of any operation is the human factor. Time is still running against México while politics and military leadership are thinking how to manage the issue; it is time that both parts moved faster and decide on the issue; apart from the roles that Mexican Armed Forces already have inside the country, peacekeeping is best not only for them but also for México. All this must and can be accomplished without changing their primary mission because, as Gabriel Marcella put it, “Defense of the nation from external enemies is the irreducible sine qua non legitimating function of the armed forces,”¹³⁵ and this mission is undisputable.

D. A POLITICAL AND/OR MILITARY DECISION

The posture of the two main Mexican military bodies has been clearly described in this chapter. It is also a fact that the final decision of whether México will or will not commit its military in peacekeeping operations will be political rather than military. Nonetheless, the Mexican Armed Forces have to shift their mindset to a broader scenario than only internal commitment. The arguments sets out in this paper favor the active participation in peacekeeping operations.

¹³⁴ As cited by Pala Antonio.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

From the military perspective, the primary motivation for UN participation should be institutional survival or the avoidance of budget reductions. However, there are other unintended beneficial consequences that will be promoted, such as democratic consolidation, increased professionalism, and international recognition.

Mexico lives today within a scheme of increasing interdependence, and its policies are oriented to consolidate that reality. In this sense, one of the leftovers that needs to be resolved is to update and to relocate concepts such as non-intervention because, regardless of the Mexican historical experience and the traditional foreign policy adopted by the revolutionaries, the new world environment is sweeping the country in a new context. The obvious changes made as a consequence of the September 11 events have modified the conditions for global security and regional stability, and México has not only a geographical obligation, due to its closeness with the U.S., but also an international commitment with global security. This is the right time for a change in foreign policy.

México suffered another, perhaps more radical, change in its political apparatus; while the new regime peacefully took office, the last six years have been lived in a new democratic experience for Mexicans, watching how the president is no longer the *patron* and the many difficulties of having a split congress. The Fox administration ended on December 1 this year, and is expected that the new President Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) from the PAN will seek for a continuation in foreign policy, as stated during an interview

[Mexican] foreign policy has to be a responsible and active policy, a policy that sends México into the world. I commit myself to resume the leadership of México in the world, in multilateral forums and also in the different regions of the world, starting with Latin America.¹³⁶

President Calderon also stated in his proposals for his administration to

¹³⁶ Interview of Felipe Calderon Hinojosa made by Leonardo Curzio in the radio program Enfoque on June 7, 2006. Internet; accessed September 2, 2006; retrieved from http://200.57.135.210/felipeCalderon/Sala+de+Prensa/Entrevistas/2006/Junio/ent_07b_06_06.htm.

...complement actions with the Millennium Objectives proposed by the United Nations and incrementing our political participation in international organisms, as well as multilateral forums promoting the respect for human rights and sustained human development.¹³⁷

During a conference to students of the *Universidad de las Americas* in Puebla, Arturo Sarukhán, (Calderon's Coordinator for International Affairs during his campaign) was even more explicit:

México must play a leadership role in the international system, must have weight in the construction of a new set of international rules because if we don't participate, other nations will do it and we probably won't like the result because they certainly are not going to take in to account our agenda, nor our interests nor our position in the international system.¹³⁸

These thoughts are showing that Calderon will continue enhancing Mexican foreign policy. The surrounding changes and the continuity of the same foreign policy are critical to provide the opportunity in reviewing the peacekeeping subject again, and Mexican leadership have to look for an open door in the social-political-military environment aimed at procuring active participation of the Mexican Armed Forces in international affairs, specifically in peacekeeping operations.

México is still shaping its future under the command of this new generation of leaders, and active participation with UN missions will yield domestic, regional, and international benefits for México. UN peacekeeping is the most feasible option for the Mexican Armed Forces considering that military participation in UN peacekeeping serves both political and military objectives. México is already behind in the world ranking regarding international security and UN peacekeeping missions, which essentially will provide the Mexican Armed Forces with an operational environment to exercise a military role, and therefore, be an active collaborator, among other things, with international security.

¹³⁷ Policia Exterior de Felipe Calderon; Internet; accessed May 7, 2006, retrieved from <http://www.ruv.itesm.mx/portales/maletin/propuestas/pe.htm>. Author's translation.

¹³⁸ Universidad de las Americas. Puebla. Conference by Mr. Arturo Sarukhán. Internet; accessed June 1, 2006; retrieved from <http://www.udlap.mx/noticias/boletines/2006/abril/27/01.aspx>. Author's translation.

V. CONCLUSIONS

A. A FINAL ANALYSIS

México changed in 2000 with the advent of President Vicente Fox. His promotion for the respect of human rights and the opening of México to international observers, breaking with the old Estrada Doctrine, has giving him the recognition of the international community. This new foreign policy view has also proved that the avoidance of getting involved in international issues is no longer the best option for México in a global environment and that México can not stay aside of the international issues and conflicts. Mexican foreign policy principles were very effective in the past setting an exemplary model; however, the times have changed and now they are questioned and seen as a restriction for the new world order; the principles are not obsoletes however, since they still valid and are also included in the UN Charter. Among the six principles stated in the Constitution the last part of Article 89: **“international cooperation for development and the struggle for international peace and security;”** is not an authorization for México to be involved in international affairs; rather is an order to do it, it is a constitutional obligation.

The analysis of the historical background of México has shown that México assumed its foreign policy for defensive purposes and to avoid interventionism, this posture also reflected the country's peaceful vocation. Needless is to say that there is no intention to change this peaceful vocation, but one thing is certain, México and the world are now facing a different situation since the fall of the Berlin wall, such situation became an international crisis since the 9/11 terrorist attacks of New York. México's long standing foreign policy must be reviewed; its non-intervention principle has been misinterpreted and misused; it is imperative to understand that is almost impossible to hold an isolationist position when thinking about present international security exigencies.

The options for México have been reduced not only to an unavoidable need to take part in international matters, especially in security, but also because it is nonsense to argue that such a need is unnecessary; México can't avoid that

compromise. México's geographic situation is now, more than ever, directly involved in this subject; the need to cooperate with the international community, especially with the United States, has become almost mandatory.

The new perspective of Mexican foreign policy can not be restricted only to economic or social development; rather it has to include military participation with the UN as a good beginning. Why go to peacekeeping? Peacekeeping is an excellent tool to show commitment with international security and not get directly involved in war. Regardless of the differences in the military perspective, Army and Navy, they will have to face the final decision in the hands of the Congress. During the Fox administration the Secretary of Defense never said that Mexican troops were not prepared for this challenge, instead he argued other problems; nonetheless, any argument made about whether Mexican military is well prepared to participate in peacekeeping is nonsense. The improvements made in training and personnel professionalization are guarantee that Mexican military can and will perform correctly in such environment; both, Army and Navy have been successful performing in disaster relief operations inside and outside the country and they permanently carry out routine security operations. The Secretary of the Navy has clearly stated that Mexican sailors and Marines are ready to face these operations and has tried to impel the participation of the Navy proving to be a successful example after sending ships and Marines to help in Indonesia and the U.S.; both operations brought pride and recognition to the Mexican Navy and the country.

B. PEACEKEEPING AS THE BEST ANSWER

Mexican policymakers are looking for a more credible position in the international scenario with the will of being more involved in the issues regarding international security; peacekeeping is a very strong tool to enhance México's ranking in this matter. The benefits of participating in peacekeeping exposed in this work are clear and tangibles, regardless of the risk of having Mexican casualties overseas, which is implicit in the military carrier and Mexican military is aware of this risk dealing with it on the daily basis; the possible negative impact that this might have on the society can be mitigated by the introduction of new

criteria that comply with the national and international interests. The new posture of the soldier will be more protective than destructive, as Gustav Däniker says

...the soldier's mission in the twenty-first century will be increasingly oriented towards the task of securing a life worth living not just for his or her own country but for all nations... Thus the new peacekeepers [are expected to] represent, in person, the new citizens of the emerging global community rather than the particularistic interests of the nation-state or their co-nationals. These are the humanitarian warriors or the cosmopolitan patriots.¹³⁹

The traditional roles for military employment in México don't need to be changed; rather they need to be enhanced and adjusted with others that include UN peacekeeping. This can only be done by having the political willingness to impel these operations; the strategies used by former Mexican governments were fundamental in the defense of national interests, but today those positions are a restraint in attaining other benefits for the country and in the development of the Mexican Armed Forces. Peacekeeping is not an armed imposition nor an invasion, rather it is an operation that involves much more humanitarian consciousness to ensure a peaceful negotiation process; therefore there is no violation of the self-determination or non-intervention principles; the main obstacle for México to participate in peacekeeping is an obsolete political mindset. However, the participation of México in peacekeeping is unavoidable, in fact, México has let pass too much time in making this decision, and even though it might be a difficult process it is important to understand that México's present has become the world's past. Peacekeeping will help to achieve the important role that México is looking for in the international arena. The next years will be critical for the new administration of President Felipe Calderon in this regard; México is running out of time, the political and military sectors have much to do to make this happen.

¹³⁹ Gustav Däniker. *The guardian soldier: On the nature and the use of armed forces*, Research Paper No. 36 (New York and Geneva: UN Institute for Disarmament Research, 1995), p. 75. As cited by Lorraine Elliot and Graeme Cheeseman in *Cosmopolitan theory, militaries and the deployment of force*, p. 59. November 2002.

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APPENDIX A. STATEMENT OF THE ESTRADA DOCTRINE (1930)

“In connection with the changes of government that have taken place in certain South American countries, the Mexican Government has, once more, found it necessary to decide on application by it of the theory known as “recognition” of governments.

As is well known, México suffered, as few other countries have, a few years ago, from the consequences of this doctrine, which leaves to foreign governments final adjudgement on the legitimacy of other governments, thus bringing about situations in which the legal capacity or the rise to power of governments or authorities seems to be subordinated to alien opinions.

The doctrine of so-called recognition has, since the Great War, been applied more particularly to the nations of this continent, while in the case of well known changes of regime in European countries, the governments of the nations have not expressly granted such recognition, and due to this the practice has become a sort of specialty for Latin American Republics.

After carefully study of the subject, the Mexican Government has sent instructions to its ministers or Charges d’Affaires in countries affected by recent political crises, to the effect that México does not make any announcement as to granting recognition, because she holds this is an offensive practice which, besides wounding the sovereignty of other nations, lays them open to have their domestic affairs judged in one sense or another by other government, which assume a de facto critical attitude when they decide, whether favorable or unfavorable, on the legal status of alien regimes. Consequently, the Mexican Government confines itself to keeping or withdrawing, whenever it shall deem advisable, its Diplomatic Agents, and to continue to accept, also when it shall deem it advisable, similar diplomatic agents accredited by such countries to México, without judging, either hurriedly or a posteriori, the right of any foreign nations to accept, preserve or change their governments or authorities.”

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APPENDIX B. QUESTIONS MADE BY SENATOR DULCE MARIA SAURI (PRI) TO THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE REGARDING PEACEKEEPING PARTICIPATION OF THE MEXICAN ARMED FORCES¹⁴⁰

There has been recently much talking that México must review its role about participation in peace missions promoted by the United Nations. It has been said that it is an indispensable condition in order to make our country to participate as regional power in the world. It is necessary to define the concept of peace mission as the United Nations understands it, and in second term, analyze the structure of our juridical scheme to valuate the legal possibility of participation for the Mexican Armed Forces in peace operations.

I have four concise questions:

How can be defined the concept and security doctrine inside and outside, and what is the relation of this concept according to fraction X of the constitutional article [89] regarding the struggle for peace and international security?

How can these concepts be adjusted over the possibility that our country could participate in peace missions promoted by the United Nations?

In which kinds of peacekeeping missions, military observers, reconstruction, consolidation or humanitarian assistance, do you consider that military personnel could participate and under what bases?

Can it be admissible that Mexican Armed Forces stay under the command of other countries in the United Nations' scheme?

Do you consider that is necessary to fulfill legal holes around this topic by incorporating in the constitution the definition of the concept of national security and its doctrine, a reform to the Army's Organic Law, the Air Force or the creation of a new law that can regulate Mexican cooperation for peace in the international arena?

¹⁴⁰ Author's translation.

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