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THESIS

**THE RESILIENCY OF TERRORIST HAVENS: A SOCIAL
MOBILIZATION THEORY APPROACH**

by

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December 2006

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**THE RESILIENCY OF TERRORIST HAVENS: A SOCIAL MOBILIZATION
THEORY APPROACH**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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Terrorist havens are an important policy problem today. The policy and academic literature has generally concluded that failed states are more likely to be terrorist havens, but some have begun to question this conventional wisdom. While the link between state failure and terrorist havens is fairly clear, it does not tell the entire story. This thesis borrows from an aspect of social mobilization theory to try to explain why some havens are more resilient to outside pressure than others. It argues that a shared collective identity between the group providing haven and the havened terrorist group makes the havening group less likely to buckle under outside pressure. To test this theory, the thesis compares the frames that define al Qaeda's collective identity with those of the Sudanese National Islamic Front and the Afghan Taliban to see if observed variations in haven resiliency can be explained by the levels of shared collective identities in each case. The findings suggest that the theory can account for the variation in resiliency, while raising new questions for future research.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A relatively large number of countries have provided haven to transnational terrorist groups in recent years. However, some of these havens have been better than others, providing a greater level and range of support, and demonstrating greater resistance to international efforts to dislodge those who have been provided haven. The purpose of this thesis is to better understand such variations among terrorist havens. The number of potential and actual havens is too large for the United States to respond militarily or engage in focused diplomacy in every case. Understanding the factors that contribute to making particular states more likely to act as "good" terrorist havens will allow the United States to focus its efforts more appropriately in the Global War on Terrorism.

The literature on terrorist havens has grown, but the discourse has not progressed very far beyond the conventional wisdom that failed states are most likely to act as havens. This conventional wisdom was spawned by the American experience with al Qaeda in Sudan and Afghanistan, and has been supported by studies of failed states since the 1990s. The CIA commissioned "Failed States Project" finds that countries that experience "adverse regime change, including but not limited to a state collapse" are more likely to be havens and that failing states constitute an "important resource" for international terrorists.¹ Advancing a more geographically framed version of the failed state argument, the 9/11 Commission concludes that wide open spaces with little government or population and rugged terrain provide the best opportunity to plan and prepare for a terrorist attack.² Scholarly research has also asserted a clear link between weak and/or collapsed states and terrorist havens.³

¹ Robert H. Bates et al., *Political Instability Task Force Report: Phase IV Findings*. (Arlington, VA: George Mason University, 2003), 191.

² Stewart Patrick, "Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?," *The Washington Quarterly*, 29:2 (2006), 27.

³ John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan, "Toward Postconflict Reconstruction," *The Washington Quarterly*, 25:4 (2002), 85; Robert Rotberg, "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure," *The Washington Quarterly*, 25:3 (2001), 85, 90, 96.

Other scholars maintain that the theorized relationship between state capacity and terrorist havens has not been systematically tested against all of the available evidence.⁴ Patrick and Menkhaus each argue that *weak* states are more likely to provide attractive terrorist havens than those with no capacity at all, and that strong states are significantly vulnerable to terrorist activities undertaken by disaffected Islamic minorities.⁵ While these criticisms are well taken, it nevertheless seems fairly clear that failed and failing states are significantly more likely to experience terrorist activity than their more capable counterparts. A simple comparison of the Failed States Index and the State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism shows that terrorist organizations are active in 53% of the least capable states, but only 23% of the most capable states.⁶ State failure increases the likelihood that a country will experience terrorism, but it does not tell the whole story.

A few scholars have begun to probe other factors that might facilitate terrorist havening, either independently or in combination with state failure. Menkhaus, for example, suggests that individuals, businesses, and Islamic charities might provide such haven in the collapsed state of Somalia.⁷ Similarly, Michael Innes argues that sub-state actors in Bosnia provided haven to terrorists.⁸ However, neither of these analyses provides clear insights into why or how such non-state actors link up with transnational terrorists, nor why, once established, such links prove to be more resilient in some cases than in others. This thesis is therefore devoted to exploring the nature and resiliency of links between sub-state actors and transnational terrorists in very weak states. I define

⁴ Patrick, "Weak States and Global Threats," 28.

⁵ Patrick, "Weak States and Global Threats," 34-35; Ken Menkhaus, "Somalia, Global Security and the War on Terrorism." *Adelphi Paper* 364 (2004), 49-75.

⁶ *Failed States Index 2006*, <http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex.php> (Washington, DC: The Fund For Peace, 2006), accessed 19 July 2006; Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2005*. <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/> (Washington, DC: State Department, 2006), accessed 19 July 2006.

⁷ Ken Menkhaus, "Quasi-States, Nation Building, and Terrorist Safe Havens," *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, 23:2 (2003), 12-13.

⁸ Michael A. Innes, "Terrorist Sanctuaries and Bosnia-Herzegovina: Challenging Conventional Assumptions." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 28 (2005) 295-302.

haven as a service provided by an actor with the capacity to make decisions. Neither “open space” nor “ungoverned territory” are actors with free will, and thus neither condition can “provide haven.”

A. A NEW FRAMEWORK?

Innes and Menkhaus direct our attention to the important part played by sub-state actors in providing haven to transnational terrorists. Such linkages between sub-state and transnational actors have received significant attention in the literature on violent protest and rebellion. Since terrorism is fundamentally a method of warfare (a tactic) designed to change the behavior of the state one would expect terrorism to have much in common with violent protest and rebellion. Therefore, my theoretical framework borrows extensively from social mobilization theory, which lies at the heart of this literature.

All transnational movements are rooted in domestic movements, which shift in scale (or spread) from one area to another either horizontally (e.g., from one province to another) or vertically (e.g., from the level of a province to the state). This scale shift can occur through three different processes, which Tarrow and McAdam call non-relational diffusion, relational diffusion, and brokerage between groups. Non-relational diffusion occurs when one group emulates another group’s ideas without the two groups interacting. Relational diffusion occurs when a group’s ideas spread to people with a shared identity more or less spontaneously through the social networks of members of the group. Brokerage occurs when ideas are deliberately spread from one group to another through an emissary.⁹ “Rooted cosmopolitans,” or people with roots in many different localities and social networks, are one of the most efficient routes for both relational diffusion and brokerage.¹⁰ In the context of protest movements, Tarrow and McAdam argue that brokerage is a more difficult connection to accomplish and fails more often than relational diffusion, because brokerage can reveal differences between unrelated

⁹ Sidney Tarrow and Doug McAdam, “Scale Shift in Transnational Contention,” in Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow (eds), *Transnational Protest and Global Activism*, (NY: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 127, 130.

¹⁰ Anne Marie Baylouny, “14 March class notes.” *NS4300: Social Mobilization and Conflict in the Middle East*. Lecture given 14 March 06.

groups as well as affirm similarities and build ties between groups.¹¹ When ties are established through brokerage, they are also likely to be weaker because groups joined by brokered interaction tend to share fewer interests than groups joined by relational diffusion.¹² Finally, groups joined by brokered ties tend to not share deeper interests and to be based on an exchange of favors. Overall, then, relational ties are stronger than brokered ties because groups joined by relational diffusion have a common underlying identity.¹³ Brokerage ties are theorized to be stronger than those established through non-relational diffusion because the personal connection established by brokerage (and relational diffusion) is absent when a group merely emulates another.¹⁴

This logic provides a useful framework to begin exploring ties between substate actors and transnational terrorist organizations. If the *strength* of the ties formed between groups is determined by *what kind* of ties was formed (with relational diffusion being the strongest, followed by brokerage, with non-relational diffusion creating the weakest ties), then the resilience of terrorist havens should be higher when the link between the substate actor and the transnational organization is established through relational diffusion and lower when the link is established through brokered ties. Non-relational diffusion, or emulation, is logically impossible in the context of terrorist havening, since havening requires direct cooperation between the substate actor and the transnational organization

B. IDENTITY

A key differentiating point between brokerage and relational diffusion is shared identity; therefore we need to establish what constitutes a shared identity and what does not. Each person has a conception of themselves that consists of many identities, such as gender, race, religion, family, ethnicity, and/or nation. People are born with certain ascribed identities and acquire others as a result of choices and actions.¹⁵ These multiple

¹¹ Tarrow and McAdam, "Scale Shift in Transnational Contention," 130.

¹² *Ibid.*, 130-131.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 130-131.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 130-131. This is why non relational diffusion is also known as emulation in the literature.

¹⁵ Louis Kriesberg, "Identity Issues," *Beyond Intractability*, Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: July 2003 http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/identity_issues/, accessed 04 August 2006.

identities nest together, and the relative importance of each varies depending on place, time, and circumstance.¹⁶ Some of these identities are *collective* in that they are shared by and with others.¹⁷ “People who share the same collective identity think of themselves as having a common interest and a common fate.”¹⁸ Such collective identification involves an individual’s internalization of the “norms and characteristics” of a group and the individual’s belief that his or her characteristics and attributes are “consistent with that group identification.”¹⁹ Collective identity is *not* simply commitment to a common ideology nor is it the sum of the personal identities of the individuals that make up a group. Individuals can be members of an organization, but not share a collective identity with other organization members.²⁰ Collective identities make collective action out of solidarity with the group a rational individual act because of the individual’s stake in the group’s fate.²¹ Collective ties bind one to help other members of the group in return for past kindnesses and consideration for future ones, as well as concern for one’s reputation and maintenance of status in the group. These factors are powerful motivators for group solidarity and maintenance of a collective identity.²² Some of the collective identities felt by an individual are more strongly felt than others.²³ Collective identities that clearly distinguish between the group and an enemy, in which group members feel the differences between them and the enemy strongly and that have a strong “sense of moral virtue” about the distinctions “should be a more potent collective identity than one in which either the emotional or moral dimensions are weakly developed.”²⁴ Some of the ties based in collective identities are also strong enough to motivate people to fight and

¹⁶ Louis Kriesberg, "Identity Issues"

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Marilynn B. Brewer and Wendi Gardner, "Who is this "we"? Levels of collective identity and self representations," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 71 (1996), 84.

²⁰ Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 27 (2001), 298.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 289.

²² *Ibid.*, 289-290.

²³ Louis Kriesberg, "Identity Issues."

²⁴ David Snow, *Collective Identity and Expressive Forms*, (Irvine, California: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2001), 11.

die “to preserve their identity group(s).”²⁵ According to social movement theory, “identities play a critical role in mobilizing and sustaining participation” in a social movement and failure of the collective identity of the people to line up with the goals of the movement (as an organization) can explain why movements lose their members – because the movement stops representing the people who comprise its membership.²⁶

Ascribed collective identities are relatively straightforward. Acquired collective identities are often socially constructed when one of an individual’s personal identities are amplified, blended with another identity, extended to cover a new situation, or transformed in such a way as to override other identities. This is most likely to occur when an individual is forced to deal with a contentious or changing situation, or when they interact with others with similar but not identical collective identities.²⁷ Social movements constantly attempt to manage the collective identity of the movement and its members, adjusting its frames as necessary to maintain a committed membership and to distinguish between the group’s members, innocent bystanders, and opponents.²⁸

C. FRAMES AS EXPRESSIONS OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

A frame is a bumper sticker version of a movement’s message at any given moment. While ideology can be thought of as being durable, frames tend to be more transient uses of ideology, culture, and identity that are constructed by actors to show injustice and/or promote the need for action to affect an interest of a group. Frames are contested by factions within the group and change over time depending on which factions win different arguments. There are several types of thematic frames. A diagnostic or injustice frame helps create the shared perception of an injustice committed against the social group – it defines what is wrong. An agency or motivational frame is a frame that shows the members of a social group that participation in the movement is both in the

²⁵ Kriesberg, “Identity Issues.”

²⁶ Polletta and Jasper, “Collective Identity and Social Movements,” 292.

²⁷ David Snow and Doug McAdam, “Identity Work Processes in the Context of Social Movements: Clarifying the Identity/Movement Nexus,” in Sheldon Stryker, Timothy J. Owens, and Robert W. White (eds.), *Self, Identity, and Social Movements*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 41-67. cited in David Snow, *Collective Identity and Expressive Forms*, (Irvine, California: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2001), 10.

²⁸ Polletta and Jasper, “Collective Identity and Social Movements,” 292.

individual interest of members and that participation is also the social duty of members. A prognostic frame articulates the right solution to the problem identified in the injustice frame. Different organizations and factions within a movement compete with each other to have their preferred frames adopted as those of the movement as a whole. The collective identities of movements can be built on frames, a preexisting collective identity from earlier contentious activism, other ascriptive identities, or any combination of the above.²⁹ Mobilization does not “require preexisting collective identities,” and the power of the invention and or creation of identities does not lie solely in the hands of organizers, but is equally held by the movement members.³⁰ One of the ways to tell if members of two groups share the same collective identities is to determine if they are members of the same social groups and if they espouse similar frames. Therefore one of the ways to determine if the ties al Qaeda formed with another group were based on relational diffusion or on brokerage is to determine whether members of the two groups shared ascribed and/or acquired collective identities, expressed in similar frames.

D. METHODOLOGY

The hypothesis that relational ties lead to more resilient havens and that brokered ties lead to less resilient havens will be tested by a comparative case study of Sudan and Afghanistan. Both are weak states that provided haven to Al Qaeda before September 11, 2001, under similar international constraints.³¹ The Afghan haven demonstrated a much greater degree of resilience than did the Sudanese haven. The Sudanese government expelled al Qaeda in response to of international criticism and cuts in foreign assistance. In Afghanistan, the Taliban government withstood much greater pressure and was ultimately deposed by force without ever expelling al Qaeda. If my theory is correct, the haven in Sudan should be expect to have been established on the basis of brokered ties, while the one in Afghanistan should be based on relational ties.

²⁹ Polletta and Jasper, “Collective Identity and Social Movements,” 288, 291; Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26 (2000), 613-617, 626, 628-629, 631.

³⁰ Polletta and Jasper, “Collective Identity and Social Movements,” 291.

³¹ Both cases occur before September 11, 2001, when the expectation that a non-neighboring state would invade and topple the government of a state for providing haven to a terrorist group was generally low in the international system. The same cannot be said about the expectation in the international system over the last five years.

Because collective identities are partly revealed by the frames groups espouse, this thesis will compare the frames espoused by al Qaeda and the sub-state actors that provided it haven: the National Islamic Front (NIF) of Sudan and the Taliban of Afghanistan. The next chapter provides an overview of al Qaeda and its frames as a point of reference. Chapters three and four compare the NIF and the Taliban frames with those of al Qaeda to establish whether either havening actor shared a collective identity with al Qaeda, and thus whether the ties that bound each to it were brokered or relational. These chapters will also assess the level of resilience of the two havens in greater detail. The conclusion assesses the validity of my theoretical framework and suggests avenues for future research.

II. AL QAEDA: IDENTITY, BACKGROUND, AND FRAMES

Al Qaeda is part of the jihadi faction of the Salafi movement, and it uses several frames to advance its agenda and mobilize its followers. Al Qaeda has a collective identity based in the shared faith of its members as Salafi Muslims, and this identity motivates diagnostic, prognostic, and agency frames that support the movement and its jihad against the United States.

A. THE SALAFI MOVEMENT

The most basic division within Islam is between Sunnis (the mainstream) and Shia (who broke away from the Sunnis soon after the Prophet's death over succession issues). Sunni Islam is then divided into Sufi, Salafi, Wahhabi, and several other sects. Salafism is a loose Islamic fundamentalist movement whose practitioners (Salafis) believe that the proper form of Islam and Islamic way of life was demonstrated by the Prophet Mohammed and his companions, and should be closely emulated by Muslims today. Salafism asserts that deviation from the norms set by the Prophet in the centuries since the founding of the faith has distorted God's message and that the way to salvation is to return to the practices of Mohammed and his companions.³² Thus, Salafism is defined in opposition to Sufism, which permits a relatively flexible practice of Islam, and often includes cultural practices that predate Islamic conversion. Sufi Muslims are generally divided into various orders founded by particular charismatic leaders, which permit varying degrees of saint worship, idolatry, and other practices that allow the worshiper to have a personal connection with God. Salafists focus instead on the application of orthodox Islam as a comprehensive system of law, government, religion, and societal organization.³³

Wahhabism appeared on the Arabian Peninsula in the eighteenth century in reaction to the spread of Sufi practices. Today Wahhabism is the official state sect of Saudi Arabia. Jumping ahead slightly, the Salafi movement and the Wahhabi movements

³² Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Framing Jihad: Intra-Movement Framing Contests and al-Qaeda's Struggle for Sacred Authority," *International Review of Social History* 49 (December 2004), 1-2.

³³ John L. Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, 3rd ed, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 100-103, 126-130.

effectively merged during the 1980s under the pressure of the Afghan jihad and the influence of Saudi oil money. Wahhabism thus should be thought of as the Saudi form of Salafism.³⁴ The non-Saudi Salafi movement originated in the late nineteenth century, with the call to reform Islam by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida, among others.³⁵ This broader Salafi movement was a response to Western colonial domination of the Islamic world. Early Salafi leaders opposed the growth of secularism in Muslim lands during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as well as the Sufi sects, which they claimed were failing to respond adequately to the encroachment of secularism because of their deviations from proper Islamic practice.³⁶ Led by Rashid Rida, Salafists increasingly oriented themselves towards the Wahabbist focus on emulating the Prophet and his followers, and away from earlier references to the practices of the “early Islamic centuries.”³⁷ Following the end of the colonial period, Rida continued to advocate the reform of Islam as a defense against “the dangers of the west,” specifically Western secular liberalism.³⁸ Salafists sought to modernize their societies within an Islamic framework, and increasingly defined themselves as anti-Western and as well as in opposition to the secular nationalist governments that dominated the Middle East in the 1950s and 1960s.

Sayyid Qutb, an influential Salafist intellectual, argued that offensive jihad to remove secular, and thus infidel, governments was permissible, if not mandated, by the Islamic Law.³⁹ Qutb maintained that the entire world was ignorant of Islam, including the Muslim countries, in which he said “[t]he Muslim community has long ago vanished

³⁴ Christopher M. Blanchard, *CRS Report for Congress: The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya*, (Washington: Congressional Research Service), RS21695, 1-3.

³⁵ Esposito, *Islam*, 126-134.

³⁶ The Rightly Guided caliphs were the first four successors to the Prophet Mohammed before the establishment of the Ummayed dynasty in the 7th century A.D.

³⁷ Esposito, *Islam*, 132-133.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 126-130, 134.

³⁹ Peter Bergen, *Holy War, Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden*, (NY: The Free Press 2001), 48, 200.

from existence.”⁴⁰ Therefore, Qutb contended that Islamic society had to be purified by a bloody jihad to rid it of Western influences.⁴¹ Qutb’s prison writings are bounded by the context of resistance to the Egyptian regime specifically, but they influenced many of the later Salafi jihadists, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, who expanded the focus to target all corrupt regimes in the Middle East, and added a call for direct resistance to the United States’ influence in the Middle East.⁴²

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 there was general agreement amongst Salafis that “violence in the defense of an occupied Muslim country” was justified and support for that effort, be it verbal, monetary, or through service in combat, was an obligation of “all able Muslims.”⁴³ There was the outpouring of support from the broader Muslim world to the Afghans’ efforts to expel the Soviets from their territory. This effort became known as the Afghan jihad. The Salafi principle that support of other occupied Muslims was a personal obligation was then applied to the Bosnian and Palestinian struggles during the 1990s. Following the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan in 1989, those who had traveled to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets, the so called “Arab Afghans,” returned to their home countries and began to advocate jihad against their own governments.

This advocacy for jihad against *Muslim* rulers split the Salafi movement. The new jihadi faction continued to support the prosecution of violent jihad against corrupt rulers, and the reformist faction continued to assert that the jihad should be one of “individual spiritual transformation, propagation, and advice to the rulers and ... Muslim community” as to the correct way to live their lives.⁴⁴ Jihadi movements led by returning ‘Afghan Arabs’ in Egypt and Algeria were successfully repressed. The Egyptian and Algerian jihadis then either traveled to Afghanistan to join al Qaeda, which had been

⁴⁰ Lawrence Wright, “The Man Behind Bin Laden: How an Egyptian doctor became a master of terror,” *The New Yorker*, 16 September 2002, http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/020916fa_fact2a?020916fa_fact2a, accessed 23 October 2006.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.*, 199.

⁴³ Wiktorowicz, 2.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

established by bin Laden toward the end of the Afghan jihad, or put their remaining “networks, resources, and personnel” at al Qaeda’s disposal.⁴⁵ Al Qaeda’s assertion that the struggles in Egypt, Algeria and elsewhere failed because of U.S. support to the secular governments in the region provided a broad diagnostic frame with which the gathering jihadis could all identify.

The reformist and jihadi factions of the Salafi movement agree on this basic diagnostic frame, or problem: “the U.S. is waging a war of aggression against Islam and is responsible for many of the problems in the Muslim world.”⁴⁶ The preferred response to this threat differs, however, with the jihadis promoting violent resistance and the reformists advocating internal reform. Each of the factions is supported by some religious scholars.⁴⁷ Because religious authority in the Sunni Muslim community is decentralized, and the authority of scholars is based in “informal acknowledgement” of their expertise and reputation, Sunni Muslims rely on the reputation of scholars to determine the legitimacy of their religious rulings, or *fatwas*.⁴⁸ Both jihadi and reformist Salifis recognize the importance and role of religious scholars as interpreters of the sacred texts of the faith.⁴⁹ Jihadi Salafi religious scholars generally have lesser educational credentials than their reformist competitors, and thus rely on vilifying reformists for their connections with Middle Eastern governments, asserting their own righteous character and sincerity, and portraying reformists’ arguments as emotional and illogical, to boost the credibility of the jihadist message.⁵⁰

B. AL QAEDA

Osama bin Laden grew up in Saudi Arabia a rich man’s son. His family was well connected to the Saudi royal family through their successful construction firm, which did a lot of work for the Saudi kingdom.⁵¹ Osama bin Laden attended King Abdul Aziz

⁴⁵ Wiktorowicz, 2-3; Bergen, 59-60; Coll, 204.

⁴⁶ Wiktorowicz, 4.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 1, 4-5.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 10-11.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 13-20.

⁵¹ Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars*, (NY: Penguin Books, 2004), 85.

University in Jeddah where he studied under Islamic radicals such as Abdullah Azzam, the spiritual founder of Hamas, and Mohammad Qutb, the brother of Sayyid Qutb.⁵² Between 1979 (when he was a sophomore at Aziz University) and 1981, bin Laden began to funnel some of his personal fortune to the jihad in Afghanistan and to humanitarian assistance to the Afghan population.⁵³ Later, bin Laden would claim that he went to Afghanistan “within weeks” of the Soviet invasion, but he may not have actually visited the area until 1981, following graduation from university.⁵⁴ During the mid-1980s, bin Laden executed various projects for the Saudi General Intelligence Department (GID) in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including construction contracts to improve logistics and liaison work.⁵⁵ As the war progressed, he turned his attention to building the infrastructure that allowed Arab volunteers to support the jihad.⁵⁶

Arab and Muslim aid organizations⁵⁷ joined the United Nations and Western aid groups in supplying aid, relief supplies, and medical facilities to support the Afghan refugees within Pakistan. The Arab and Muslim groups were supported by the same networks that provided funding for the armed struggle within Afghanistan.⁵⁸ In 1984, Abdullah Azzam, bin Laden’s former professor, moved to Peshawar to help coordinate the Islamic charities aiding the Afghan refugees. Beyond his contacts with the Saudi government, Bin Laden also worked with Azzam to support the Afghan jihad in the 1980s, and Azzam encouraged bin Laden to financially support the fighters traveling to Afghanistan.⁵⁹ Azzam was a firm believer in jihad as the best method of restoring the caliphate, and he viewed jihad as an individual obligation for every Muslim until the Muslim lands were restored to them.⁶⁰ Azzam’s Office of Services was focused on

⁵² Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 85; Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.*, 47-48.

⁵³ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 85-86.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 86.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 87-88.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 145-146.

⁵⁷ Such as the Saudi and Kuwaiti Red Crescent, the World Muslim League, and the International Islamic Relief Organization, and the Muslim Brotherhood.

⁵⁸ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 154.

⁵⁹ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.*, 51.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 52-53.

supporting the Afghans, and bin Laden joined him in this pursuit by providing funding and then joining the decision making process. Through the Office of Services, bin Laden and Azzam recruited fighters for the jihad from the Arab world and elsewhere and paid their expenses.⁶¹ While bin Laden was not actively anti-American at this point, Azzam was and “preached stridently against the United States.”⁶² Bin Laden moved his family to Peshawar, Pakistan in 1986, and continued his growing involvement in supporting the jihad across the border in Afghanistan and in discussions amongst the Islamists in Peshawar about politics, religion, and theology.⁶³

As time passed the Islamists supporting the jihad from Peshawar debated about the nature of the war and the future. Bin Laden began to chafe at his supporting role in the jihad, and to question who the enemy really was.⁶⁴ As part of his growth away from his mentor, bin Laden began to establish training camps apart from the Pakistani Intelligence facilities to train the Arab volunteers in Pakistani and Afghanistan, including a compound at Jaji.⁶⁵ In April 1987, he and fifty Arab volunteers were attacked by the Soviets at Jaji and forced to withdraw after a week of fighting in which bin Laden was wounded.⁶⁶ The battle at Jaji became the centerpiece of bin Laden’s media campaign to popularize the jihad in Afghanistan and his self-proclaimed role as a leader of it. Jaji also provided the platform from which bin Laden began advocating a wider jihad against the “secular governments of the Middle East, the United States, and Israel.”⁶⁷ After hearing one of these lectures, Ayman al-Zawahiri advised bin Laden to upgrade his security, “because you are hitting the snake on the head.”⁶⁸

Following the expulsion of the Soviets in February 1989 the Afghan resistance split. Azzam supported Ahmed Shah Massoud’s faction, while bin Laden backed

⁶¹ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 155.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 155.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 153.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 156.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 157. 163-164.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 162-163.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 163.

⁶⁸ Ayman al-Zawahiri, *Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner*, cited in Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 163.

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb e-Islami.⁶⁹ Both Afghan leaders were also followers of Qutb's theories about *takfir* and believed that they could declare other Muslims to be infidels. The intellectual debates in Peshawar sharpened, and various jihadi groups declared different Muslim rulers *kaffir*, or infidels.⁷⁰ While bin Laden endorsed such actions, and wanted "a wider war against impious rulers," Azzam did not and worried about his protégé's connections with the more radical groups in Peshawar.⁷¹ Azzam and bin Laden were breaking apart over bin Laden's vision of "an all-Arab legion... to wage jihad in Saudi Arabia and Egypt," when Azzam was assassinated in 1989.⁷²

Bin Laden established al Qaeda in 1988 after the battle of Jaji with three purposes: first, to provide security against the various Middle Eastern security services that were targeting the Arab Afghans; second, to follow up on missing Arab volunteers; and third, to continue the jihad beyond Afghanistan.⁷³ After Azzam's death, bin Laden rolled the Office of Services into al Qaeda, and departed Afghanistan for home. During 1990, he organized a jihad against the Marxist government of South Yemen from his family's home in Jedda, with the Saudi government's support.⁷⁴ Then the Iraqis invaded Kuwait, and the Saudi kingdom called on its American ally to defend Saudi Arabia against further Iraqi aggression. Bin Laden objected to the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, and offered to defend the kingdom with the Muslim veterans from the Afghan war instead. His offer was refused, and he continued to object, asserting that the Americans were the true masters of the Saudi Arabian government.⁷⁵ His open dissent against the Saudi government deepened as part of a broader movement against the easing of Islamic restrictions and the presence of U.S. forces in the kingdom, and he left Saudi

⁶⁹ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 202-203.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 203.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 203-204.

⁷² Wright, "The Man Behind Bin Laden"; Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.*, 61-62.

⁷³ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.*, 59-60; Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 204.

⁷⁴ Coll, 204, 221-22; Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, (NY: Columbia University Press, 2002), 27.

⁷⁵ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 222-223; Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, 28.

Arabia for Pakistan.⁷⁶ Bin Laden continued to speak out against the kingdom from Pakistan, now openly advocating its overthrow.⁷⁷ When Hasan al-Turabi, leader of the ruling National Islamic Liberation Front (NIF) in Sudan, sent a delegation to Pakistan to invite bin Laden to come to Sudan to help train the NIF, and bin Laden accepted out of concern for his security.⁷⁸

C. FRAMES OF AL QAEDA

Al Qaeda's diagnostic frame asserts that Muslims everywhere are under attack from the West, led by the United States. This attack is facilitated by corrupt un-Islamic governments in the Middle East, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which ally themselves with the U.S. to ensure their own survival. If U.S. support were withdrawn, the frame suggests, these corrupt regimes could then be removed by the jihadis. Al Qaeda's prognostic frame thus calls for a jihad against the United States to undermine its power and remove its support from corrupt local regimes, and from Israel. After the U.S.'s influence is removed, these regimes should be overthrown, Israel destroyed, and a caliphate established in their place. The agency frame proclaims that jihad is the individual duty of every Muslim, particularly when repelling an invasion or occupation of Muslim lands.⁷⁹

The diagnostic frame alludes to the West's occupation of Islam's holiest places: Israeli control of Jerusalem, and the presence of United States and British forces in Saudi Arabia. These "occupying forces" are characterized the "Zionist-Crusader alliance."⁸⁰ This frame had broad appeal, as U.S. forces operating from Saudi Arabia to monitor Iraqi compliance with UN sanctions following the Gulf War were seen as occupiers by many

⁷⁶ The circumstances are reported differently by different sources.

⁷⁷ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 221-224, 228-232; Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.*, 61-62; Gunaratna, 28; Jason Burke, *Al Qaeda*, (NY: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 142.

⁷⁸ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, 29-30

⁷⁹ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.*, 25-26; Frank Gardner, "The cult of Bin Laden", *BBC*, September 24, 2001 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1560482.stm, accessed 25 November 2005; Osama bin Laden, Fatwa published in August 1996 in *Al Quds Al Arabi*, republished and published online by PBS at: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html, accessed 01 November 2006; Osama bin Laden, Fatwa published on 23 February 1998, published online by PBS at: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1998.html, accessed 01 November 2006.

⁸⁰ Osama bin Laden, 1996 Fatwa, *Al Quds Al Arabi*.

Arabs, particularly Saudis. This frame gained even greater traction among Saudis following the September 11 attacks.⁸¹ Al Qaeda also asserted that United Nations sanctions against Iraq following its expulsion from Kuwait, and efforts by the U.S. and its allies to enforce them, constituted further attacks by the West on Muslims. In bin Laden's 1996 fatwa, Al Qaeda blames the United States and Israel for the massacre of Muslims worldwide, and claims that these massacres show that Muslims are "the main target for the aggression of the Zionist-Crusader alliance." Many Saudis identify with bin Laden's desire to have the Americans and British (whom they also see as colonialists) leave Saudi Arabia, and the claim that the West is "persecuting Muslims" gained broader acceptance in reference to the situations in Palestine and Iraq. Broad identification with this frame is one of the reasons that al Qaeda does not lack for recruits.⁸²

Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's confidant from the Afghan jihad, was one of those who had returned to Egypt following the Afghan jihad and tried and failed to overthrow the government there through his organization Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), which would later ally itself with al Qaeda.⁸³ While EIJ's opposition to the Egyptian regime is evident in its actions, bin Laden's opposition to the Saudi regime is evident in his public pronouncements. In the 1996 fatwa, bin Laden attacked "the Saudi regime for its corruption and anti-Islamic policies,"⁸⁴ and outlined the Saudi Arabia kingdom's faults:

illegitimate behaviour and measures of the ruling regime: Ignoring the divine Shari'ah law; depriving people of their legitimate rights; allowing the American to occupy the land of the two Holy Places; imprisonment, unjustly, of the sincere scholars.⁸⁵

Bin Laden further accused the regime of impotence and illegitimacy because of its need to call in the Americans, despite the "[e]xpensive" arms deals the kingdom had let out. Al Qaeda's grievances against the Saudi kingdom were amplified by the poor

⁸¹ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc*, 97-98; Gardner, "The cult of Bin Laden."

⁸² Bergen, *Holy War, Inc*, 19, 22, 95-96, 222; Gardner, "The cult of Bin Laden."

⁸³ Wright. "The Man Behind Bin Laden."

⁸⁴ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc*, 93-94.

⁸⁵ Osama bin Laden, 1996 Fatwa, *Al Quds Al Arabi*.

economic situation in the 1990s due to low oil prices, and al Qaeda accused the regime of restricting oil sales to better suit American rather than Saudi needs.⁸⁶ Al Qaeda also felt that the kingdom's taxes, permission of usury, and oppression of dissident clerics were also un-Islamic.⁸⁷ These accusations tap directly into the basic doctrinaire Salafi frames for an Islamic society in which an Islamic government rules through Sharia law and presides over an Islamic economy. Because al Qaeda was largely led by Egyptians and its foot soldiers were mostly Saudis and Yemenis, al Qaeda's frames focused on local issues in Egypt and Saudi Arabia for recruitment and to maintain the participation of its members. At the same time, broader Arab issues, like the occupation of Jerusalem by the Israelis, were also utilized to broaden the base and maintain involvement. All of these issues had long been central to the Salafi movement as a whole.

Al Qaeda's prognostic frames identify a two phased response to Western aggression and corrupt local regimes: jihad against the United States, and the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate. When the West and its local collaborators are defeated by jihad, Al Qaeda envisions a return to a form of government consistent with what that practiced during the time of the Prophet Mohammed and his four Rightly Guided successors, or caliphs.⁸⁸ As an organization Al Qaeda practices this form of governance. Decisions are made through consultative shuras and committees, under the direction of bin Laden, much as Salafis perceive the decision making process to have been under the Rightly Guided Caliphs.⁸⁹ In 1999, bin Laden explicitly added the restoration of a Caliphate including the entire Muslim world to al Qaeda's prognostic frame. Like the diagnostic frame, the prognostic frame has a great deal of pull on al Qaeda members and followers.⁹⁰ The restoration of the Caliphate is an intrinsically Salafi frame, almost by definition, because the Salafis desire to imitate the period of the

⁸⁶ Osama bin Laden, 1996 Fatwa, *Al Quds Al Arabi*.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ This period is also known as the Rashadun.

⁸⁹ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc*, 30-31.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 19-20.

Rightly Guided Caliphs as the last point in Islamic history where they were favored by God because they were governing according to His word.

Al Qaeda mobilizes followers to support the jihad against the United States by framing it as an individual's Islamic duty.⁹¹ Al Qaeda, like other contemporary and historical extremist groups, views jihad as the sixth pillar of Islam.⁹² In his 1996 fatwa, bin Laden placed jihad to expel the Americans from the "holy land" above all other Islamic duties "except belief" and claimed that Muslims had a duty to set aside all other differences to expel the Americans, even if it means using "non righteous military personnel and commanders."⁹³ Al Qaeda frames the jihad as a defensive war against an occupying power rather than as an offensive war, which is generally frowned upon in Islam.⁹⁴

D. CONCLUSION

The chapters that follow will compare al Qaeda's frames with the frames of the national movements in Sudan and Afghanistan to determine how well they correspond in order to test the hypothesis that al Qaeda had brokered ties to the National Islamic Front in Sudan, resulting in observed low level of haven resilience, and relational ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan, resulting in the observed high level of haven resilience.

⁹¹ The five pillars of the Islamic faith are: (1) Profession of Faith that "There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of God," (2) Praying five times a day and attending communal prayers on Friday, (3) Giving 2.5% of one's income to the poor. (4) Fasting during the holy month of Ramadan, and (5) Making a pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a believer's life, if possible.

⁹² Esposito, *Islam*, 88-93.

⁹³ Osama bin Laden, 1996 Fatwa, *Al Quds Al Arabi*.

⁹⁴ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc*, 52-53.

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III. SUDAN: THE NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT

The National Islamic Front (NIF) is the most radical of Sudan's three main political parties, all of which are Islamist. It emerged out of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood after the removal of the military regime of President Nimeri in 1985.⁹⁵ The Muslim Brotherhood was formed in Egypt in 1928 and is a "militant organization with a fundamentalist Islamic theology."⁹⁶ Dr. Hasan al-Turabi, a lecturer at the University in Khartoum, has been a leader of the Islamist movement in Sudan since 1964, when he led the Muslim Brotherhood, and he has acted in a formal or informal leadership role since that time despite his period falls from favor, including his most recent ouster by President Umar al-Bashir in 2000.⁹⁷ The Muslim Brotherhood started as a student movement in opposition to the Communist student movement.⁹⁸ Under Turabi, the Muslim Brothers in Sudan worked against the politically and religiously dominant Sufi orders, whose deviations from proper Islamic practice it blamed for the discord in the Sudanese society.⁹⁹ Turabi and other members of the NIF elite are Western educated, comfortable with city life, and disconnected from Sudanese local culture.¹⁰⁰ While the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt favored a more evolutionary approach to the Islamization of society through education and reform of the law to comply with Sharia, the Muslim Brothers of Sudan took a more radical tack, seizing control of the state and imposing an Islamic order on society through the state's power.¹⁰¹ This approach is very similar to

⁹⁵ Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban and Richard Lobban, "The Sudan Since 1989: National Islamic Front Rule," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Spring, 2001.

⁹⁶ Holt and Daly, *The History of the Sudan*, 176.

⁹⁷ Fluehr-Lobban and Lobban, "The Sudan Since 1989"

⁹⁸ Holt and Daly, *The History of the Sudan*, 175-176.

⁹⁹ Abdullahi A. Gallab, "The Insecure Rendezvous Between Islam and Totalitarianism: The Failure of the Islamist State In The Sudan." *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Spring, 2001.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

what Zawahiri's EIJ, and other organizations founded by Afghan Arabs were advocating in the 1990s. Seizure of the state was the *sin qua non* for achieving Turabi's and his follower's vision.¹⁰²

Sudan, like many African countries, is an accident of colonial history that resulted in a populace divided on the basis of religion, cultural identity, tribal affiliation, and economic system. Religiously, the population is divided between Muslims (70%) and non-Muslims. The non-Muslims are both Christian (5%) and Animist (25%), and live primarily in the south. The ethnic divide is also a geographic division between the Center North, whose people have been converted to Arab culture, and the South, whose peoples have not. The Eastern region is populated both by peoples identifying themselves as Arab, and as African. There are tribal divisions throughout the country and mainly effect the non-Arab south and east, though Darfur and other Islamized areas are also affected. Economics also divides the country between those groups that have become sedentary and those who are still pastoralists; this division crosscuts the North especially. All of these divisions (religious, cultural, tribal, and economic) intermingle.¹⁰³ The result is a country that has been in "near constant conflict since it became independent 1956," most intensely between the 'Muslim' north and the 'Christian and Animist' south. In addition to open civil war between 1956 and 1972 and again between 1983 and 2005, Sudan has experienced a revolving series of coups, military dictatorships, partial democracy, repression, and (according to some) genocide.¹⁰⁴

Arabized Muslim northerners, comprising about 40% of the population, have dominated Sudanese politics since before independence in 1956. The non-Muslim southern third of the country was separated from the Muslim North by the British during the colonial era, and efforts by the Arabized Muslim elite to spread their culture and

¹⁰² Abdullahi A. Gallab, "The Insecure Rendezvous."

¹⁰³ "Conflict History: Sudan," *International Crisis Group*, January 2006 http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=101 accessed 08 September 2006; Ann Mosely Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities*, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998), 15-19; See also Gabriel Warburg's *Islam, Sectarianism, and Politics in Sudan Since the Mahdiyya*. (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003). I had to read the balance of the book to truly appreciate how commingled and interdependent these divisions are.

¹⁰⁴ "Conflict History: Sudan," *International Crisis Group*; Edgar O'Balance, *Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 1956-99*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, LCC, 2000), viii.

religion amongst the southerners, halted by British colonialism, were resumed following independence.¹⁰⁵ Sudan's two oldest political parties, the Democratic Unionist Party backed by the Khatmiyya Sufi sect and the Umma Party backed by the Mahdist Sufi sect, were dominant throughout most of the early 20th century. They were joined by the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s.¹⁰⁶ The National Islamic Front, a Turabi-led derivative of the Muslim Brothers, would emerge as a party in 1985.¹⁰⁷ All three parties have consistently expressed support for the establishment of an Islamic State, governed under Sharia law, in Sudan. However, all three have faced the same fundamental obstacle to achieving that end: non-Muslim Southerners would rather fight that be governed under Sharia law. Thus, the establishment of an Islamic state and the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Sudan, the two essential goals of all three parties, have always been fundamentally at odds with one another.¹⁰⁸

As a member of an earlier incarnation of the NIF, the Islamic Charter Front (ICF), al-Turabi first participated in government during the military regime of Ja'far Nimieri, after Nimieri suddenly shifted the ideology of his regime from socialism to Islamism in the late 1970s.¹⁰⁹ When Nimieri accused the Islamists of undermining his regime in 1985 and attempted to distance himself from the Islamist agenda, the Muslim Brotherhood led the popular uprising that overthrew him.¹¹⁰ After the uprising the army oversaw a transition to democracy and handed power to an elected government in 1986.¹¹¹ The two historically dominant Islamists parties, the Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist Party finished first and second in the 1986 elections, with the NIF finishing a surprisingly strong third. Having failed to secure a majority in parliament, the Umma Party formed a

¹⁰⁵ "Conflict History: Sudan," *International Crisis Group*; O'Balance, *Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism*, 1-7.

¹⁰⁶ Holt and Daly, *The History of the Sudan*, 176, 182, 184, 186.

¹⁰⁷ Fluehr-Lobban and Lobban, "The Sudan Since 1989."

¹⁰⁸ Lesch, *The Sudan*, 113; O'Balance, *Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism*, 203.

¹⁰⁹ O'Balance, *Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism*, 112-113.

¹¹⁰ Mohamed Mahmoud, "Islam and Islamization in Sudan: The Islamic National Front," *U.S. Institute for Peace Conference Paper*, United States Institute for Peace, 16-17 September 1997, <http://www.usip.org/religionpeace/rehr/sudanconf/Mahmoud.html>, accessed 23 October 2006.

¹¹¹ "Conflict History: Sudan," *International Crisis Group*; O'Balance, *Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism*, 140-144.

coalition government with the DUP from 1986 through 1988, under the leadership of Prime Minister Saddiq al Mahdi. Due to differences in opinion, al Mahdi dropped the DUP from the governing coalition in favor of the NIF and moved toward Islamization and away from accommodating the south.¹¹² Although all three parties were committed to the proper implementation of Shariah law (Umma and DUP opposed Nimieri's application of Sharia as corrupt and un-Islamic), Umma and DUP backed off the Islamist agenda in an effort to end the civil war, which had restarted in 1983 partly in response to Nimieri's Islamization agenda. The democratic government of Saddiq al Mahdi, after much vacillating, agreed to end Sharia law in the South, which was a key demand of the Southern rebels. In response to this policy, the NIF withdrew from the government and supported a military coup against it. Street demonstrations by the NIF rank and file commenced in the spring of 1989, and General Umar al-Bashir overthrew the democratic regime in June 1989.¹¹³ The NIF would back the military government and provide the ideology that supported it over the coming eleven years.

A. FRAMES OF THE NIF

After coming to power in 1989, Turabi and his adherents expected that with the global collapse of communism as an ideology, political Islam would spread virally and wipe out competing secular ideologies and states in the Muslim world.¹¹⁴ Turabi also expected that the Islamic revival following the Cold War would enhance the exclusivity of the Islamic identity and culture.¹¹⁵ Turabi was the brains behind the brawn in Sudan during the 1990s, and was the real leader of the government from behind the scenes.¹¹⁶ Although Turabi was briefly arrested with the other political party leaders immediately following the coup, he is widely believed to have been behind the coup from the planning

¹¹² Lesch, *The Sudan*, 70-83.

¹¹³ O'Balance, *Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism*, 152-154, 161-162; "Party History," *Sudan Umma Party Website*, <http://www.umma.org/02e.html>, accessed 14 September 2006; "Conflict History: Sudan," *International Crisis Group*; Fluehr-Lobban and Lobban, "The Sudan Since 1989"; Lesch, *The Sudan*, 84-85.

¹¹⁴ Abdullahi A. Gallab, "The Insecure Rendezvous."

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ Abdullahi A. Gallab, "The Insecure Rendezvous"; Shaul Shay, *The Red Sea Terror Triangle*, (London: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 28.

stages.¹¹⁷ In any case, the NIF's seizure of power following the 1989 coup dissolved the movement into the state and committed the party to holding power by force, since the 1986 election have revealed that its popular support was far from sufficient for it to hold power democratically.¹¹⁸

The NIF had announced its political program two years prior to the coup in the January 1987 document "Sudan Charter: National Unity and Diversity." In that document, the NIF declared the Sudanese to be "one nation" with common values that transcended the many religious and cultural traditions in the country.¹¹⁹ The NIF asserted that the Sudanese were "bound by one common allegiance to nation and land," but African - Arab divisions within Sudan should be respected in domestic as well as in foreign relations.¹²⁰ It went on to declare that Sharia should be the predominant source of law in Sudan, since Muslims composed the majority of the Sudanese population. The program described would allow the other faith and cultural groups to be governed in their own local areas by their own local laws, but Sharia was to be the predominant source for the law of the land despite the allowances for personal religious freedom that the NIF built into its political treatise. The remainder of the document advocated a vigorous peace process similar to what the international community has prescribed as a way out of the civil wars in Sudan.¹²¹

The NIF had three frames, two of which were widely shared by supporters of all three Islamist parties. The first frame was inherently Sudanese: the commitment to a unitary, Arab, Sudanese state.¹²² The second frames was the establishment and maintenance of Sharia Law, which was in a position of tension with the first, given the

¹¹⁷ Warburg, *Islam, Sectarianism, and Politics in Sudan*, 205-206.

¹¹⁸ Mahmoud, "Islam and Islamization in Sudan."

¹¹⁹ National Islamic Front, "Sudan Charter: National Unity and Diversity," Originally published in January 1987, Republished as Annex 3 of the Proceedings of the Bergen Forum on *Management of the Crisis in the Sudan*, 23-24 February 1989, <http://www.fou.uib.no/fd/1996/f/712001/annex3.htm>, accessed 12 November 2006.

¹²⁰ National Islamic Front, "Sudan Charter."

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² "Seminar with Colonel John Garang," *Federal News Service*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1989).

longstanding resistance of the non-Muslim southern population to the imposition of Sharia. The third frame, espoused by the NIF alone, advocated support for the jihad against corrupt Muslim rulers everywhere, and active cooperation among Islamist groups seeking to remove them.

1. An Arab Identity

An Arab Sudanese identity was a mainstay of the NIF's cultural framework and a core part of its identity. While the NIF was prepared to tolerate deviance from their Arab and Islamic norm, the Arab Muslims were by far the largest population group in Sudan (40%), and the NIF felt that they had the right to create a national identity with themselves at the core. As such, the maintenance of Arabic as the national language was part of the NIF's political platform. Once in power, the NIF pursued the Arabization of the south and west of the country, despite pledging tolerance for ethnic groups as part of their pre-coup charter.¹²³ This drove demands for secession from the south, which the NIF rejected out of hand on the basis of its commitment to a unitary state. Under the leadership of John Garang, the rebel Southern Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) shared the NIF (and Umma and DUP) frame of a single Sudanese nation and a unitary state: it disagreed forcefully, however, about the definition of the Sudanese national identity. Garang and others outside the North/central Arabcore, favored a broader, more inclusive construction of Sudanese identity.¹²⁴

The NIF generally construed being Muslim with being Arab.¹²⁵ Members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the military government that governed Sudan following the coup, that were not NIF members or Arabs were sidelined from the decision making process.¹²⁶ NIF leaders from outside the Arab clique defected to the

¹²³ Lesch, *The Sudan*, 22-24, 33, 38-43, 67, 117-118.; National Islamic Front, "Sudan Charter: National Unity and Diversity."

¹²⁴ "Seminar with Colonel John Garang," *Federal News Service*; Lesch, *The Sudan*, 3.

¹²⁵ Alex de Waal and A. H. Abdel Salam, "Islamism, State Power and Jihad in Sudan," Ed. Alex de Waal, *Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004), 98-99.

¹²⁶ The NIF sidelined the three members of the RCC that were Dinka, Nuba, or Dar Fur Islamists within the RCC, and the remaining member (Muhammad al-Amin Khalifa Yunis from Dar Fur went to the TNA rather than to the Council of Ministers following the dissolution of the RCC, though many Council members were also sidelined for dissident viewpoints. Lesch, *The Sudan*, 115-119, 226-227.

marginalized DUP or the SPLA (the southern rebel group), feeling themselves discriminated against as non-Arabs.¹²⁷ Arab racism and Islam were intimately connected in the minds of many of the Sudanese people, leading to an escalation of conflicts between outlying communities and the Arabized center during the NIF reign.¹²⁸

2. Islamic Law and Government

The application of Islamic law, extending into all aspects of life, was a critical central theme for the NIF regime. It underpinned all of the NIF's programs and was a central part of the NIF's framing strategy and its identity. Turabi, like the Salafist thinkers Hassan al-Banna and Abdul A'la al-Mawdudui, believes that Islam must permeate every aspect of private and public affairs, and thus Muslims must live within an Islamic state.¹²⁹ Turabi emphasizes the Unity of God (*tahwid*) in all aspects of life, that "all [of] life is just one program of worship, whether it's economics, politics, sex, private, public or whatever."¹³⁰ Unitarianism, for Turabi, "explains almost every aspect of doctrinal or practical Islam."¹³¹ As part of the unity of God's rule, the NIF emphasized the centrality of Sharia in governing all aspects of society. Beyond merely the law, "[t]he economy, educational system, and social programs" had to be part of the Islamic system and based in its principles.¹³² Islam had to govern in order for the people to be good Muslims.¹³³ Turabi and members of his movement took advantage of the various regimes prior to the 1989 coup to gradually further the Islamist agenda from within. They helped establish Islamic banking and economics, a key part of Mawdudi's doctrine, during the Nimeiri regime long before Sharia law was implemented.¹³⁴

¹²⁷ de Waal and Salam, "Islamism, State Power and Jihad in Sudan," 98-99.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 99.

¹²⁹ Hassan al-Turabi, *Islam as a Pan-National Movement and Nation-States: An Islamic Doctrine of Human Association* (London: The Sudan Foundation, 1992) cited in Abdullahi A. Gallab, "The Insecure Rendezvous Between Islam and Totalitarianism: The Failure of the Islamist State In The Sudan." *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Spring, 2001.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² Lesch, *The Sudan*, 67-68.

¹³³ Vali Nasr, Class Discussion NS4320: *Islamic Fundamentalism*.

¹³⁴ Mahmoud, "Islam and Islamization in Sudan."

Islamic Law was central to the rationale behind the NIF's street demonstrations leading up to the 1989 coup and remained an important part of the government's legitimating ideology after the NIF seized power. Maintenance of Sharia was the issue that put NIF loyalists into the streets between April and June 1989. The NIF leadership claimed that people were in the streets "because the government had lost its legitimacy by freezing *haudud*...."¹³⁵ The NIF Secretary General, Yasin Umar al-Imam, stated that the goal of the NIF's demonstrations was to either compel the government to switch back to Sharia or cause the government to fall.¹³⁶ The suspension of Sharia in exchange for southern participation in constitutional discussions "triggered the NIF's coup."¹³⁷ After the 1989 coup, the Turabi regime reinstated Sharia law, with all of the *haudud* punishments (such as amputations), in March 1991.¹³⁸ In Khartoum, the courts began applying *haudud* punishments locally in 1989 to all citizens, including non-Muslims.¹³⁹ Implementation of Sharia throughout Sudan, even in the non-Muslim areas, was a non-negotiable goal for the NIF, and the NIF followed through on its promises when it got into power.¹⁴⁰

The military members who led the 1989 coup established a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) to govern following the coup. The powers of the non-Islamist RCC members were bounded by the NIF, and the entire RCC was guided by a NIF led Council of Forty that oversaw the political program as a consultative body (*shura*). The RCC increasingly purged dissident members through its four year reign, after which it was replaced by an appointed Council of Ministers dominated by the NIF. Bashir was appointed President by the RCC, technically limiting his power. The NIF tried to broaden participation from the Sudanese people by establishing an appointed Transitional National Assembly (TNA) in 1992, but the NIF dominated 80% of the TNA, effectively broadening participation in the government within the NIF. Elections under the NIF

¹³⁵ Lesch, *The Sudan*, 85.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 85.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 129.

¹³⁸ "Omar al-Bashir-Sudan leader"

¹³⁹ Lesch, *The Sudan*, 131.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 65-67.

government were neither free nor fair. When the NIF lost elections, they merely voided the results and fixed the outcome on the next round. Turabi assumed a central role as speaker of the national assembly, and Islam continued as the guiding principle for government.¹⁴¹ The Sudanese government between 1989 and 1996 was broadly inclusive of the people who counted – the Islamists of the NIF.

The 1993 civilian government made Islam the central guidance for all citizens, and enforced Islamic law on all citizens with only very limited exceptions. Those Muslims who disagreed were, according to a fatawa from the Kordofan Ulama, “...apostates, and non-Muslims [were] heathens” and, accordingly, it was “the duty of Islam to fight and kill both categories.”¹⁴² The government declared that the war against the southern rebels was a jihad, waged by mujahidin who, when martyred, ascended directly to heaven. The police and army swore oaths of fealty (bayat) to Bashir, and the booty they gathered during their operations in the South had to be divided in accordance with Islamic Law.¹⁴³

The application of Islamic law as a means of governing was a non-negotiable facet of the NIF’s rule. The NIF interpreted Islamic law and its attendant social restrictions strictly, which is consistent with a Salafist approach to Islam. This approach, that required traditional oaths of fealty for underlings, executed or maimed violators of the law, and prosecuted jihad against the enemies of the states is entirely consistent with al Qaeda’s Salafist identity. The NIF’s form of government rejected Western liberal democracy in favor of a one party state that included the NIF and sidelined other parties. Islam was the guiding principle for law and government under the NIF’s authoritarian rule, but it never attempted to emulate a caliphate or other historically Muslim governance structure. While military commanders and tribal leaders assumed Islamic titles with Bashir’s consent, these titles did not extend to the highest levels of government.¹⁴⁴ Neither Turabi nor Bashir were the ‘Commander of the Faithful,’ the

¹⁴¹ Lesch, *The Sudan*, 114-125.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 130.

¹⁴³ Lesch, *The Sudan*, 130; Mahmoud, “Islam and Islamization in Sudan”

¹⁴⁴ Lesch, *The Sudan*, 130.

‘Emir’ or the ‘Caliph’. Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir was a Lieutenant General who became the chair of the Revolutionary Command Council in 1989, the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, the Minister of Culture and Information between 1991 and 1992, and the President of Sudan beginning in 1993.¹⁴⁵ Hasan al-Turabi did not assume an official position in the government until 1996, when he was “elected” to parliament and selected as the Speaker of the National Assembly.¹⁴⁶ Note that this was a “National Assembly,” not a shura. The Sudanese state was run as a western one party state under the NIF. Islam provided the guiding principles of the Sudanese government (in theory), but Islam was not the Sudanese government.

For all the consistency on application of Sharia law between the Salafists and the NIF, the NIF was not Salafist. It did not idolize any particular period of Muslim history, and it disagreed with the practices of Sufism for different reasons than the Salafists do. The Salafists reject the legitimacy of the traditional Islamic Sufi ulema because of their deviations in practice from the Rashadun. The NIF rejected the legitimacy of the ulema because they arrogated themselves above the people as the proper interpreters of Islam and separated religion from the state.¹⁴⁷ Therefore, while al Qaeda and the NIF might very well agree on what Sharia said, they disagree on the governmental model through which it should be implemented. For Turabi, an Islamic state was a state governed by good Muslims embracing an Islamic modernity, rather than a state governed by a set of Islamic principles embedded in ancient historical patterns.¹⁴⁸

3. Support for Revolutionaries

Turabi set the internationalist agenda for the Sudan. In his writings, he sees a future where Islam will transcend international borders and make them obsolete as more people submit to Islam, resulting in a return to Islamic empire. Turabi sought to lead

¹⁴⁵ Lesch, *The Sudan*, 226.

¹⁴⁶ Lesch, *The Sudan*, 124-125; Timothy Carney, “The Sudan: Political Islam and Terrorism,” Ed. Robert I. Rotberg, *Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2005), 126.

¹⁴⁷ Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim, “A Theology of Modernity: Hasan al-Turabi and Islamic Renewal in Sudan,” *Africa Today* 46 (1999), 195-222.

¹⁴⁸ de Waal and Salam, “Islamism, State Power and Jihad in Sudan,” 89.

radical Islam in pursuit of wider power.¹⁴⁹ To support that agenda, he supported Islamic Fundamentalists wherever they were.¹⁵⁰ The NIF adopted Turabi's vision of spreading Islam throughout Africa, as demonstrated by the slogan on its banner: "We will only stop when the forces of Islam have raised the Islamic flag over [Cape Town] and the whole continent of Africa has been Islamized."¹⁵¹ Sudan supported Islamic terrorist groups from the neighboring countries of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.¹⁵² The NIF also sought to build bridges to Islamist movements in the Arab world. It established governmental ties with Iran, and used Iranian aid to further its agenda in the South in exchange for furthering Iran's agenda of spreading Iranian revolution and the Islamist message, and in supporting the war in Palestine and Lebanon. Turabi established the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC) to unite Islamist and Arab movements in their struggles against the corrupt regions in the region. Iran materially supported this effort.¹⁵³ In his writings, Turabi admits that the NIF supported Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Front in Algeria, and Islamists in Tunisia in their efforts to overthrow governments.¹⁵⁴ Press reports claim that he also permitted the training of " Hamas activists" on Sudanese soil between 1992 and 1993.¹⁵⁵ Turabi hosted and mediated a strategic meeting between Hamas and the Palestine Liberation Organization between the 2nd and 4th of January 1993 in Khartoum.¹⁵⁶ The NIF also spread its support further afield, supporting the jihad in Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, the Philippines, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Yemen by providing a safe place to train, plan, and organize, by providing travel documents, and a by providing venue through which to

¹⁴⁹ de Waal and Salam, "Islamism, State Power and Jihad in Sudan," 82.

¹⁵⁰ Shay, *The Red Sea Terror Triangle*, 31-33; Hassan al-Turabi, *The Islamic Movement in Sudan*, (Cairo: The Arab Reader Publications, 1991), 252-256, cited in Shaul Shay, *The Red Sea Terror Triangle*, 38-39; Gallab, "The Insecure Rendezvous Between Islam and Totalitarianism"

¹⁵¹ *Sudan Democratic Gazette* 45, February, 1994, cited in Lesch, *The Sudan*, 213.

¹⁵² Carney, "The Sudan: Political Islam and Terrorism," 123-124.

¹⁵³ Shay, *The Red Sea Terror Triangle*, 35-38; Carney, "The Sudan: Political Islam and Terrorism," 125.

¹⁵⁴ Hassan al-Turabi, *The Islamic Movement in Sudan*, (Cairo: The Arab Reader Publications, 1991), 252-256, cited in Shaul Shay, *The Red Sea Terror Triangle*, 39.

¹⁵⁵ Ehud Ya'ari, "The Metamorphosis of Hamas," *The Jerusalem Report*, 14 January 1993.

¹⁵⁶ Isabel Kershner, "The Khartoum Protocols," *The Jerusalem Report*, 25 March 1993.

smuggle arms and launder money.¹⁵⁷ Turabi's efforts not only transcended ethnic divisions and the Sunni/Shia divide, they crossed religious boundaries as well. Secular Arab nationalist movements, like the PLO, were included in Turabi's meetings. Turabi also reached out to Christians in a series of meetings in 1993 and 1994, seeking to unite pious Christians and Muslims against the heathens.¹⁵⁸

Turabi was an Arab Islamic revolutionary, tolerant of ethnic and religious divisions, with designs on the broader Muslim world. What the religious tenets of such an empire would have been under Turabi's influence are less than clear, he was unquestionably more interested in creating an Islamic modernity than returning to an Islamist past. However he, and perforce the NIF, were committed to supporting Islamic revolution, in various forms, in league with Shia Iran, Salafi Afghan Arabs, and even secular nationalist Palestinian groups.

B. CREATION AND RESILIENCY OF AL QAEDA'S SUDANESE HAVEN

After the end of the Afghan jihad the Afghan Arabs considered using Sudan as a base of operations.¹⁵⁹ Turabi welcomed bin Laden to Sudan in April 1991.¹⁶⁰ Peter Bergen, working from Jamal al-Fadl's testimony in the United States' case against bin Laden, described the relationship between bin Laden and Turabi as a "symbiotic" one. In return for bin Laden making economic investments in Sudan, trying to convince other Arab businessmen to do the same, and the supply of small arms and communications gear to the NIF al Qaeda was granted sanctuary in Sudan and two hundred passports to facilitate the travel of al Qaeda members.¹⁶¹ Bin Laden invested millions into Sudan's farming, construction, trucking, manufacturing, and banking sectors. The companies he founded provided cover for al Qaeda's other activities.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁷ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc*, 86; Carney, "The Sudan: Political Islam and Terrorism," 123-124.

¹⁵⁸ Carney, "The Sudan: Political Islam and Terrorism," 126.

¹⁵⁹ Ehud Ya'ari, "The Afghans are Coming," *The Jerusalem Report*, 2 July 1992.

¹⁶⁰ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc*, 78-79.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 79-80.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 79-81.

Al Qaeda used Sudan as a base to support the spread of Islamic government in the Middle East and to attrite the power of the United States in the region. It smuggled weapons and equipment across the ungarded Sudanese/Egyptian border through “ancient caravan trails.”¹⁶³ Al Qaeda also received operational training from Hezbollah and arms from Iran while in Sudan.¹⁶⁴ Turabi’s Pan Islamic People’s Conferences in 1991, 1993, and 1995 allowed al Qaeda to make contacts with other Salafist groups from Pakistan, Algeria, Tunisia, and Palestine.¹⁶⁵

Nineteen ninety three was a busy year for terrorism supported from Sudan. Al Qaeda claimed that it conducted operations against American targets in Somalia, in the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, and in Yemen.¹⁶⁶ Sudan supported the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center by Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG) leader Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman through staff at its UN mission in New York City.¹⁶⁷ The Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and EIG tried and failed to assassinate the Egyptian interior minister in August 1993. The attack killed and maimed bystanders, including the Speaker of Parliament.¹⁶⁸ The August 1993 attack undermined EIJ’s popular base in Egypt, forcing EIJ to seek external support – essentially driving EIJ and al Qaeda together.¹⁶⁹ In response to EIG’s operation against the World Trade Center in New York and because of Sudan’s alledged support for that operation the United States put Sudan on the State Department’s list of State sponsors of terrorism in 1993 and increased economic pressure on Sudan.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶³ Lawrence Wright, “The Man Behind Bin Laden: How and Egyptian doctor became a master of terror,” *The New Yorker*, 16 September 2002, http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/020916fa_fact2a?020916fa_fact2a, accessed 01 November 2006.

¹⁶⁴ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc*, 85; Wright, “The Man Behind Bin Laden.”

¹⁶⁵ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc*, 85; Carney, “The Sudan: Political Islam and Terrorism,” 125.

¹⁶⁶ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc*, 81-84; Lawrence Wright. “The Man Behind Bin Laden.”

¹⁶⁷ Fluehr-Lobban and Lobban, “The Sudan Since 1989: National Islamic Front Rule”

¹⁶⁸ Wright. “The Man Behind Bin Laden.”

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid*.

¹⁷⁰ Shaul Shay, *The Red Sea Terror Triangle*, 39.

In April 1995 EIG and EIJ, the two largest Egyptian jihadi organizations tried and failed to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.¹⁷¹ Al Qaeda and the Sudanese government materially supported the assassination attempt.¹⁷² The Mubarak assassination attempt led to reprisals against acquaintances and fellow villagers of EIJ members by the Egyptian government.¹⁷³ Three of the assassins fled to Sudan, and the UN imposed sanctions on Sudan after it refused to extradite the assassins. The UN imposed sanctions on Sudan via UNSCR 1054 and 1070.¹⁷⁴ UNSCR 1054 directed UN member states to reduce their diplomatic personnel in Sudan, restrict the travel of Sudanese governmental officials, and requested that “international and regional organizations [not hold] any conference in Sudan” as of 10 May 2006.¹⁷⁵ UNSCR 1070 banned Sudanese air traffic.¹⁷⁶

In early 1996, the U.S. withdrew its U.S. staff because of (now discredited) intelligence indicating that the Sudanese government was going to try to assassinate then U.S. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake.¹⁷⁷ Before the U.S. staff withdrew to a neighboring country, U.S. Ambassador to Sudan Timothy Carney and his State Department superior David Shinn had a candid conversation with the Sudanese Foreign Minister, Ali Osman Taha about Sudan’s support for terrorism. This conversation led to a two track diplomatic effort between Sudanese Intelligence and the CIA and the Ambassador and the Sudanese Foreign Minister.¹⁷⁸ The result of these talks was that by March/April 1996, Sudan expelled “some Middle Eastern groups” and allowed the U.S. to examine the camps they had occupied.¹⁷⁹ The discussion on bin Laden and al Qaeda revealed that the United States did not have enough to indict him, but he was causing

¹⁷¹ Wright. “The Man Behind Bin Laden.”

¹⁷² Fluehr-Lobban and Lobban, “The Sudan Since 1989: National Islamic Front Rule”; Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.*, 90-91, 227.

¹⁷³ Wright. “The Man Behind Bin Laden.”

¹⁷⁴ Shaul Shay, *The Red Sea Terror Triangle*, 39.

¹⁷⁵ *UNSC Resolution 1054*, (NY: United Nations Security Council, 1996).

¹⁷⁶ *UNSC Resolution 1070*, (NY: United Nations Security Council, 1996).

¹⁷⁷ Carney, “The Sudan: Political Islam and Terrorism,” 127.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 128-129.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 130.

problems for the Saudi royal family and the U.S. at least wanted bin Laden expelled from Sudan.¹⁸⁰ The Sudanese offered to expel bin Laden to Saudi Arabia, but the Saudis, who had stripped bin Laden of his citizenship in 1994, would not take him unless he apologized for his position against the Saudi regime.¹⁸¹ Nevertheless the Sudanese government expelled him on 20 May 1996, just three months after the U.S. had begun the negotiations.¹⁸² Turabi, by most accounts, personally told bin Laden to leave.¹⁸³ Bin Laden flew to Jalalabad, Afghanistan to regroup.¹⁸⁴

C. AL QAEDA'S AND THE NIF'S FRAMES COMPARED

The ascribed Arab identity shared by both the NIF and al Qaeda should have facilitated relational diffusion according to our theory. However, while the NIF framed their movement as an Arab movement, al Qaeda tended to look beyond the ascriptive Arab identity shared by many of its members and to focus more on a pan Islamic identity. As such, the sharing of this ascriptive tie should be expected to be less important than other the other frames expressed by the NIF and al Qaeda.

The NIF's fundamentally nationalist approach to Islamic revolution clearly distinguished its frames from al Qaeda's frame of establishing a broader caliphate. The NIF supported Islamist revolutionaries from around the globe, and sought to increase cooperation between them as a means of increasing their effectiveness. But it never defined the Islamic revolution other than in national terms. This difference in framing between al Qaeda and the NIF expressed itself in the NIF's choice of regime type, which was a modern one party state rather than a historically Arab or Islamic emirate or caliphate.

Nevertheless, the NIF and al Qaeda did share a strict Islamic reform doctrine with roots in the eighteenth century Salafist movement. But again the differences are more striking than the similarities. The NIF was not Salafist, and did not seek to emulate the

¹⁸⁰ Carney, "The Sudan: Political Islam and Terrorism," 130.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid*, 130, 138. See note 26.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 130-131.

¹⁸³ Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*, (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 235-236; Wright, "The Man Behind Bin Laden."

¹⁸⁴ Wright, "The Man Behind Bin Laden"; Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 324-327.

past; rather the NIF was strictly modernist, and seeking to define an Islamic modernity.¹⁸⁵ This aspect of the NIF's ideology was not consistent throughout its membership – there were factions within the NIF that looked towards the past rather than to the future – but the NIF under Turabi's leadership was focused on achieving a modern state.¹⁸⁶ And this dominant frame was never adjusted to accommodate al Qaeda's frames.

Similarly, while the NIF and al Qaeda agreed that corrupt regimes were the appropriate target for their revolutions, but the NIF did not have, and never adopted, al Qaeda's (and the Salafi movement's) most important diagnostic frame -- that America and the West was attacking Islam – or its corollary prognostic frame -- that jihad against the United States was therefore necessary. A common enemy is a powerful indicator of collective identity, but with the exception of possible support for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the NIF's support for international jihad was focused on the Middle East, at the national level.¹⁸⁷ The NIF dealt with the United States at a governmental level, and the CIA and State department had a relationship with their Sudanese counterparts throughout the NIF's tenure.¹⁸⁸

In a brokered relationship, the relationship is about the exchange of services between the parties. It is about fulfilling tangible obligations and meeting the interests of the parties in the expectation that doing so will allow the relationship to continue. In a relationship based on relational diffusion, the parties involved in the relationship do things for one another because of the relationship, even if it is contrary to their immediate or long term interests. They expect payback later, to be sure, but there is give in the relationship in which one member can take a lot from the other member(s), and the other members will continue to give because of the relationship. It is why family members will drop each other off at work despite great inconveniences or lie to the police to protect one of their own. The NIF - al Qaeda relationship seems to have been purely based on

¹⁸⁵ Ibrahim, "A Theology of Modernity," 195-222.

¹⁸⁶ de Waal and Salam, "Islamism, State Power and Jihad in Sudan," 71-75, 91-93.

¹⁸⁷ Fluehr-Lobban and Lobban, "The Sudan Since 1989: National Islamic Front Rule"; Wright, "The Man Behind Bin Laden"; David Snow, *Collective Identity and Expressive Forms*, 11.

¹⁸⁸ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 322-323.

brokered exchange of services. The NIF received economic investments and some communications gear in exchange for providing al Qaeda a place to live and train. The relationship never developed any deeper than a business deal because the two groups did not share common identities and enemies to draw them closer together. When the NIF had to choose between getting along with the United States and other states or supporting al Qaeda or Carlos the Jackal, it gave them up because the relationship to either al Qaeda or the Jackal was far less important than Sudan's interests in the international community.

D. CONCLUSION

Consistent with the hypothesis, al Qaeda and the NIF did not have strong shared collective identities, and thus the relationship between them as brokered rather than relational. Al Qaeda helped the NIF by investing economically in Sudan and by providing weapons and equipment to arm the NIF's cadres in their war against the southerners. The NIF provided al Qaeda sanctuary and passports. This exchange of services was the apparent foundation of their relationship. The NIF and al Qaeda were both Islamist movements, and the discontinuities in doctrine and practice between the two groups were not an impediment to cooperation. However, when the U.S. began to apply pressure, these differences in doctrine facilitated the NIF's abandonment of al Qaeda and other groups. The difference in the identification of the enemy was a deal breaker for the haven. Because the relationship between the NIF and al Qaeda was only about goods and services and not about their shared ties, the Sudanese negotiated with the United States and expelled bin Laden in exchange for the more valuable favors the U.S. was in a position to offer instead of supporting al Qaeda against the United States,

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IV. AFGHANISTAN: THE TALIBAN

The Taliban rose out of the chaos following the Soviet withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989. The Soviet installed leader of the Afghan government was Mohammad Najibullah, who lost the civil war with the mujahedin in 1992. Najibullah would survive until the Taliban seized control of Kabul in 1996 and executed him.¹⁸⁹ After Najibullah's fall in 1992 it did not take long for the competing mujahedin factions to begin fighting amongst themselves as the power sharing agreements established to govern Afghanistan following the fall of Najibullah's communist regime fell apart. By 1993, a full scale civil war was on and the various (mostly ethnically determined) factions fought and changed sides regularly.¹⁹⁰ Pakistan backed a Pashtun faction led by Gulbadin Hekmatyar, whom they had favored during the war against the Soviets, to further their interests in the country. Hekmatyar was unable to defeat a similarly armed Tajik faction led by Ahmad Shah Massoud and the selected President of Afghanistan, Burhanuddin Rabbani.¹⁹¹ Another Pashtun faction on the Pakistani border, a Shia faction on the Iranian border, and an Uzbek faction under General Dostum in the north complicated the war as factions shifted and aligned to support local interests.¹⁹²

All of the men who formed the initial Taliban cadre in Kandahar were former students of the Haqqannia madrassa east of Peshawar, Durrani Pashtuns, and veterans of the anti-Soviet jihad.¹⁹³ The shared framework of education at Haqqannia ensured that all of the initial Taliban subscribed to the Deobandi school of Islam, which was anti-modern, focused on living like the followers of the Prophet Mohammad during the Prophet's lifetime and during the rule of his four successors, the rightly guided caliphs. Deobandism is also very much like the Wahabbi school of Islam in that they disdained

¹⁸⁹ Hafizullah Emadi, *Culture and Customs of Afghanistan*. (London: Greenwood Press, 2005), xxv-xxvi, 46.

¹⁹⁰ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 262-263.

¹⁹¹ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 283-285; Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 21.

¹⁹² Rashid, *Taliban*, 21.

¹⁹³ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 283-285.

images and music. Being rural Pashtuns, they all tended to believe, in accordance with both tribal custom and their faith, in the seclusion of women – though in practice in normal rural life, this rule was not strictly kept among relatives.¹⁹⁴ As Durrani Pashtuns, they had strong tribal ties, and a tribal history that asserted that the Durrani Pashtuns should be in charge of Afghanistan – despite the lack of social status that they possessed in the tribe. As veterans of the anti-Soviet jihad, they were less bound by tribal customs, and they had learned from their experience, like Mao had learned, that political power comes out of the barrel of a gun. The various mujaheddin veterans who had returned to their madrassa studies following the war came to the conclusion that the chaotic situation was unacceptable, and that something needed to be done about it – despite the fact that none of the old leaders from the jihad seemed to have a plan to end the war.¹⁹⁵

The Haqqania madrassa and other madrassas on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border would provide the manpower that fueled the Taliban movement.¹⁹⁶ The typical Taliban recruit was a male Pashtun between 14 and 24 years of age, a former refugee of the war who had grown up in the camps on the Pakistani side of the Afghan border in the North West Frontier Province or Baluchistan, and had received their education in the Koran and Islamic law from the mostly uneducated and “barely literate” teachers who taught in the madrassas in those areas. They were disconnected from normal Pashtun village life, Pashtun history, and their tribes by the war. Many were orphans, and had lived in the all male madrassas while growing up. As such, they had no societal context beyond that which was provided by the madrassas or the camps, where men and women were segregated to a greater degree than normal because of the crowded conditions. When their leaders told them that women should be segregated off from the rest of society, this was easily accepted as it was consistent with their own personal experience.¹⁹⁷

This mix of people made the Taliban rigid because of their lack of either a broad education or exposure to a society that was not confined to a refugee camp. They simply

¹⁹⁴ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 284.

¹⁹⁵ Rashid, *Taliban*, 22, 89-91.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 89-91.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 32-33.

did not have the background or experience to hold knowledgeable debates about their practices with other Muslims, and in some observer's opinions this disparity in knowledge made the Taliban cling to those practices more tightly.¹⁹⁸ The origins of the Taliban meant that their identities as Pashtuns and as Muslims were both central to their collective identity, and indeed these were the only identities many had, particularly among the rank and file. It meant that a socially conservative, segregated, lifestyle governed by the teachings of the Koran was the norm for the rank and file Taliban foot soldier as well as the leadership.

A. FRAMES OF THE TALIBAN

The following sections of the paper will discuss the frames the Taliban used to mobilize support, identify itself as an organization, and connect to al Qaeda. The Taliban is defined fundamentally by its subethnic collective identity as Durrani Pashtuns, and then by its Islamic fundamentalist frame. These frames are used as diagnostic frames to identify what is wrong with Society, as prognostic frames to identify how to fix society, and as agency frames to explain why Muslim Pashtuns should help fix the problems identified in the manner specified. The Taliban adds an anti-western diagnostic frame to these more intrinsic frames more instrumentally in response to later western pressure and bin Laden's financial incentives.

1. A Pashtun Identity

One of the ascriptive identities of the Taliban was that they were all ethnic Pashtuns drawn from the Pashtun tribal areas along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. The Taliban was not the only ethnic Pashtun militia group, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar led another one, but the Taliban ended up assimilating or driving out all of the other Pashtun militia groups. The Taliban movement began in Khandahar, which was Durrani Pashtun tribal territory. Historically the Durrani Pashtuns had ruled Afghanistan, but the tribe had been marginalized during the Soviet occupation and subsequent civil war. None of the major mujhadden groups were led by the Durrani, and the Taliban used promises of a return to power for the Durrani Pashtuns to mobilize their base while taking over the Pashtun

¹⁹⁸ Rashid, *Taliban*, 93-94.

areas, particularly around Khandahar.¹⁹⁹ Later, during the March 1996 Shura, the Khandahari faction of Durrani Pashtuns sidelined the Jalalabad faction and legitimized the rule of Mullah Omar in a piece of public theater designed to play to the Pashtuns as a whole, but the Durrani base in particular. At the end of the Shura, Mullah Omar, in the presence of the tomb of Ahmed Shah Durrani, the first king of Afghanistan, climbed to the roof of the Mosque of the Cloak of the Holy Prophet in Khandahar with the Cloak of the Prophet Mohammed in hand. He wrapped himself in the cloak to the roaring approval of the crowd, who declared Mullah Omar to be the “Commander of the Faithful”, declared the area under Taliban control to be “The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” and “called for jihad against Massoud.”²⁰⁰

The movement would continue to be dominated by the Khandahar shura, even after the government moved to Kabul. The Khandahari shura, much to the consternation of outsiders dealing with the Taliban government in Kabul, would frequently overturn decisions made by the Kabul government. The Khandahar shura did not expand its composition beyond its Durrani Pashtun membership as the movement took over the country, which made the ultimate decision makers increasingly disconnected from the people they ruled. The Kabul shura was also dominated by a Durrani Pashtun majority, though other ethnic groups were included. In conquered areas, the senior bureaucratic posts (mayor, governor, police chief, etc) would be controlled by Durrani Pashtuns almost exclusively. Cities conquered by the Taliban were ruled by Pashtun Shuras dominated by Durrani Pashtuns. This created the aura of an occupied area and disenfranchised local elites. When the Taliban did bend and allow non-Durrani Pashtuns to assume the position of governor in the various provinces, they emasculated the post and restricted their power by frequently rotating the posting of governors and restricting their funds. After conquering Kabul, the other ethnic groups were purged from the ministerial bureaucracy and replaced by Pashtuns who were largely unqualified. While governing, the Taliban consistently sidelined other ethnic groups and non-Durrani

¹⁹⁹ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 283-285.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 328.

Pashtun tribes, like the Ghilzais, from positions of power and authority. Non Durrani Pashtuns, regardless of their postings, did not have the pull to accomplish their jobs.²⁰¹

Having an ethnic Pashtun identity had foreign policy implications for the Taliban, and they helped cement their client relationship with the Pakistani government. Pakistan at least partly backed the Taliban because of their ethnic identity, believing that as Pashtuns the Taliban would be amenable to helping Pakistan in its continuing rivalry with India, and because having good relations with Afghanistan helped combat Pashtun irredentism into the Pashtun areas of Pakistan. In part, this is also why India backed the Northern alliance in the civil war that continued through the 1990s.²⁰² Pakistan had favored Hekmatyar through the Afghan jihad, partly to squeeze out the Durrani royal family and solidify Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan, but switched their support to the Taliban in the 1990s after Hekmatyar failed to win the Afghan civil war and the Taliban cleared up the truck mafia's transportation problem through Khandahar to Herat.²⁰³ In this case, battlefield success and ethnic connections played hand in hand.

2. Islamic Law and Government

The establishment and maintenance of Islamic Law and Government was one of the most prevalent and durable frames of the Taliban. Mullah Wakil, one of Mullah Omar's aides, said "We want to live a life like the Prophet lived 1,400 years ago and jihad is our right. We want to recreate the time of the Prophet..."²⁰⁴ Because the Taliban tried to be good Muslims, they set about establishing order by establishing what they thought an Islamic Society should look like. Part of establishing an Islamic Society was establishing an Islamic government that ruled through the establishment and enforcement of Islamic law (Sharia). Part of how the Taliban gained initial credibility with the Khandaharis was by not asking for compensation for their help in settling disputes and enforcing law. When all the Taliban asked for in return was support for the Taliban's establishment of a "just Islamic system," the Khandaharis believed that the

²⁰¹ Rashid, *Taliban*, 50-51, 98-101.

²⁰² Emadi, *Culture and Customs of Afghanistan*, 38-40.

²⁰³ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 28-29, 282-285, 290-293; Rashid, *Taliban*, 26-29.

²⁰⁴ Rashid, *Taliban*, 42-43.

Taliban was not out for itself, but out for the good of the Afghan people.²⁰⁵ The establishment of law and order covered over the anti-modernity aspects of the Taliban's Islamic Law and Government frame. The Taliban were on a quest to return life to the time of the Prophet, and controlling modernity and its impacts on the faith of the population was part of accomplishing their goals.²⁰⁶ To not follow Taliban laws and edicts was to not be living as God commanded through Muhammad, and was contrary to the Taliban's vision of what society should look like.

The institution and enforcement of Islamic Law was a major frame for the Taliban, and one that they were committed to over the long term, and their interpretation of the law affected their ability to continue to attract fighters to their cause from the madrassas on the Pakistan border.²⁰⁷ The Taliban, which was an ethnic Pashtun movement, used the frame of Islamic law to justify their rule. The population, who were also Muslim, received security and stability in exchange for empowering the Taliban. However, the Taliban were quite serious about the Islamic and socially conservative nature of the Law and Order they provided because of the beliefs held by their base of support.²⁰⁸ The application of Islamic punishments, such as the stoning of adulterers and the amputation of thieves' hands is an example of getting back to God's laws as revealed to Muhammad.²⁰⁹ Taliban's use of *haudud* punishments reduced crime in Kabul, and establishing order was a big deal for much of the population after more than two decades of warfare. Reestablishment of law and order was one of the reasons that the Taliban's takeover was celebrated in many areas.²¹⁰ The Taliban banned Western dress, forced the women to wear Burqas to adequately seclude them from the world, and forced men to

²⁰⁵ Rashid, *Taliban*, 25.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 29-30.

²⁰⁷ The phrase "long term" is used somewhat loosely here. The Taliban only ruled in Afghanistan for about six years. Compared to the NIF and its Muslim Brotherhood antecedents in Sudan this time period is only a tenth of the period in which to compare the durability and longevity of a frame. Who knows, in twenty years, how much the Taliban will have compromised, or would have had to compromise if they had ruled Afghanistan for that period?

²⁰⁸ Peter Marsden, *The Taliban: War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press), 44-45.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 62-63.

²¹⁰ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.*, 15.

wear Afghan style clothing and beards to better emulate Muhammad. The Taliban also banned human or animal images, music, TV, most sports and games, and imposed mandatory collective prayer on the male population. The Taliban banned paper bags because they might contain “recycled pages of the Koran.”²¹¹ These measures were especially enforced in the cities, which the Taliban considered to be decadent. In 1998, the Taliban shut down all girls schools in Kabul, forced all women off the streets, and insisted that the windows of all houses be blackened to prevent women from being seen.²¹² They also banned women from using the general hospitals, and declared that all female Muslim UN employees also had to travel with a male blood relative while in Afghanistan.²¹³ All of these measures had a common goal: to bring about the Taliban’s vision of what an Islamic society should look like, which is a society that follows God’s law as set down by the Prophet in the Sharia and the Hadith.²¹⁴ In the later 1990s, some of the Pashtun areas that had initially acquiesced to Taliban rule began to resist the Taliban’s rule because of its severity and because of the ongoing war.²¹⁵ However, because of the composition of the rank and file, the Taliban leadership could not compromise on their socially conservative and Islamic interpretation of the law without alienating their base of Pashtun Sunni fighters.²¹⁶

How the leadership of the Taliban sought to govern and portray its decisions is also illustrative of their Islamic Law and Government frame. At first, the movement was fairly open in its decision making, allowing wide input in the Islamic tradition of consultation. In March of 1996, a little over a year after the Taliban exploded out of Kandahar, Mullah Omar summoned all of the Pashtun mullahs in the south to Kandahar for a Shura²¹⁷ to discuss the future and legitimize Mullah Omar’s rule. Militia commanders, traditional tribal and clan leaders, political leaders from the war, and non-

²¹¹ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc*, 9.

²¹² Rashid, *Taliban*, 70.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, 71.

²¹⁴ Marsden, *The Taliban*, 63-65; Rashid, *Taliban*, 29-30.

²¹⁵ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 283-285; Rashid, *Taliban*, 34-35.

²¹⁶ Marsden, *The Taliban*, 44-45.

²¹⁷ Literally, a consultation. In this case, with the knowledgeable people, who would be the mullahs.

Pashtuns and other foreigners were not invited.²¹⁸ After the event, the Taliban insisted that their Shura had met the Koranic requirement of a meeting of “those empowered to take legitimate decisions on the behalf of the Islamic community.”²¹⁹ As the movement moved out of the Durrani Pashtun dominated provinces in the south, the frame that they were ruling by God’s law remained, but the movement became increasingly insular, and refused to broaden inclusion in the decision making process to many members beyond its Durrani Pashtun base, to include the Ghilzai Pashtuns, whom the Taliban increasingly needed as fighters to replace their losses.²²⁰ The needs imposed by the ethnic identity of the Taliban overcame the requirements imposed by being an Islamic Government to consult broadly with society. After 1996, decision making was also increasingly concentrated into the hands of Mullah Omar, who consulted outside groups less and less. The Taliban insisted that this change in procedure was in line with Islamic law, because Mullah Omar had been declared Commander of the Faithful during the 1996 Shura.²²¹

During the 1996 Shura, Mullah Omar had accepted the baiat, or oaths of fealty, from the assembled mullahs after being declared Commander of the Faithful. Acceptance of baiat was the procedure for succession set down in the period of the rightly guided caliphs. The acceptance of baiat both helped construct a frame of Islamic governance and helped to legitimize the Taliban’s rule among outsiders.²²² Mullah Omar’s donning of Mohammad’s cloak during the Shura was also a powerful means to bolster the Taliban’s Islamist credentials because it cloaked the Taliban’s rule in the legitimacy of the Prophet himself.²²³ The Taliban rejected suggestions of implementing democracy or western political structures (President, Prime Minister) because they were not in concordance with Islamic practice as set forth by Muhammad.²²⁴

²¹⁸ Pakistani ISI officers were, however, in attendance at the Shura. In the author’s estimation, they were probably Islamist Pashtuns, which would have made them not foreigners in the Taliban’s eyes. Rashid, *Taliban*, 95, 41-42.

²¹⁹ Rashid, *Taliban*, 42.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, 95-98.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, 102.

²²² Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 328.

²²³ Rashid, *Taliban*, 42.

²²⁴ Marsden, *The Taliban*, 65-66.

The decision making in the central governing body of the Taliban was justified on an Islamic governmental model and the provinces and cities were also governed according to what the Taliban insisted was an Islamic model. When the Taliban occupied Kabul, they installed a six man Pashtun (mostly Durrani) Shura of mullahs to govern the city. In doing so, the Taliban installed religious leaders to run what was essentially an ethnically exclusive theocracy. They governed in a similar fashion throughout the rest of the country, because this was how they believed Muhammad would have governed.²²⁵ Islamic government, in its many forms, was an important frame for the Taliban because they legitimized themselves based on their Islamic credentials. However, the Taliban did not broaden participation in governance as their movement progressed out of the Durrani Pashtun areas, essentially limiting the people “empowered to take legitimate decisions on the behalf of the Islamic community” to the Durrani Pashtun tribal group, rather than broadening the Islamic community to include other ethnic groups.²²⁶ Thus the frame of Islamic government remained, but the context of participation in it changed with the situation.

The Islamic Law and Government frame affected Taliban dealings with the United Nations humanitarian mission and other Non Governmental Organization (NGO) efforts in Afghanistan. The Taliban were suspicious of the United Nations’ motives in Afghanistan. They thought that the UN was against Islam and the “imposition of Sharia law” in Afghanistan, and that the UN (influenced by surrounding states) was a key stumbling block to the Taliban’s recognition as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.²²⁷ Being as one of the key demands of the UN in regards to Afghanistan was a peaceful solution to the conflict resulting in a democratically chosen, broad based, multi-ethnic government the Taliban was not entirely wrong about their conclusion.²²⁸ As donor countries became decreasingly willing to provide humanitarian aid to

²²⁵ Rashid, *Taliban*, 50-51.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 42.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, 64.

²²⁸ *UNSC Resolution 1076*, (NY: United Nations Security Council, 1996); *UNSC Resolution 1193*, (NY: United Nations Security Council, 1998); *UNSC Resolution 1214*, (NY: United Nations Security Council, 1998); *UNSC Resolution 1333*, (NY: United Nations Security Council, 2000).

Afghanistan because of the Taliban's policies towards women, the Taliban increasingly resisted the UN's efforts to provide aid because of the fear that the UN was promoting secularism, which was antiethical to the establishment of an Islamic state.²²⁹ Despite the international pressure that the Taliban's policies engendered, the Taliban and their allies in the Pakistani ulema community could have cared less.²³⁰ The UN pulled out of Kandahar in 1998 "after senior Taliban leaders beat up UN staff and threatened them."²³¹ Soon thereafter, the Taliban drove the 30 foreign NGOs that were working in Kabul out of the country.²³² The Taliban, much as it craved recognition as the legitimate government over Afghanistan, were unwilling to comply with UN or NGO actions aimed to help the people that they governed if such actions were or promoted what they thought were un-Islamic practices.

For the Taliban, the establishment and maintenance of Islamic law and government was part of the core of their identity as Muslims. The Taliban's Islamism was, however, bounded by their Pashtun ethnic identity. This frame was vitally important to the Taliban and not subject to compromise, regardless if the people they ruled or the international community liked it or not.

3. Anti-Western/Anti-American Frame

The Taliban did not start out as an anti-Western organization, but they increasingly adopted that frame as the United States and the United Nations sanctioned, used force, and threatened the use of force against them both over human rights violations and in the pursuit of Osama bin Laden. Relations with the United States started off well, as the order created by Taliban rule created the possibility of running an oil pipeline across the country. United States government supported UNOCAL's bid to build that pipeline across Afghanistan.²³³ Ahmed Rashid asserts that the change in the Taliban's thinking on the United States and the West, and increased rhetoric against

²²⁹ Rashid, *Taliban*, 64-65.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 65-66.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, 70-71.

²³² *Ibid.*, 71-72.

²³³ *Ibid.*, 153-167.

apostate regimes, is related to the bombing of Afghanistan by the United States in response to the 1998 bombings by al Qaeda of the two American Embassies in Africa. Ahmed Rashid and Steven Coll, two reporters who have worked extensively in Afghanistan and reporting there, both assert that bin Laden converted the Taliban to his anti-American point of view.²³⁴

The Taliban rejects modernity and liberal values on human rights because of a combination of how their Muslim and Pashtun identities are expressed. The West was essentially unwilling to not comment on the Taliban's human rights abuses, and the United Nations pressured the Taliban to ease up on its female population. However, the conflict between the West, represented by the United States and the United Nations, and the Taliban over human rights remained in the diplomatic sphere. The United States "Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called Taliban policies towards women "despicable"...[d]uring a ...1997 visit to Pakistan."²³⁵ The UNSC passed two resolutions, numbers 1193 and 1214, in 1998 urging the Taliban to treat women better, and the U.S. Senate passed a resolution in 1999 "calling on the President not to recognize any Afghan government that discriminates against women."²³⁶ These resolutions directly played against the Taliban's frame of the enforcement of Islamic Law; the Taliban's interpretation of the Law drove their policy towards women.

Meanwhile, Bin Laden effectively bought his way into Taliban circles, building Mullah Omar a house, giving other senior leaders money, and contributing troops to feed the Taliban advance to the north. Bin Laden also convinced them of the rightness of his anti-American cause, and Taliban rhetoric towards the United States reflected this change as recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan was not forthcoming.²³⁷

²³⁴ Rashid, *Taliban*, 139-140; Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 335, 341-343.

²³⁵ Kenneth Katzman, *CRS Report for Congress: Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 6 April 2006), 5.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.

²³⁷ Rashid, *Taliban*, 139-140.

During the period that these exchanges about human rights were going on, the Taliban was also kinetically attacked by the United States when the United States responded to the East Africa Embassy bombings by launching cruise missiles at al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan. Prior to 1998, most of the rhetoric directed against the United States was mild by any standard, despite the degree of force (in the form of sanctions) applied to the Taliban to give up bin Laden and to do better on human rights issues. At the 1997 summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Islamabad, Mullah Omar remarked that the United States' aid to the Afghan jihad was "remembered "with gratitude"... and that [he] hoped the United States would adopt a "correct policy" on the issue of continued deployments of its troops to Saudi Arabia."²³⁸ The 1998 missile attacks changed the Taliban's perception of the situation.

The Taliban protested the 1998 U.S. missile attacks in the streets. Mobs attacked UN offices and Mullah Omar called the United States a terrorist for attacking Afghanistan.²³⁹ In 1999, the Taliban's rhetoric hardened further. In response to false reports that the United States was preparing military action against Osama bin Laden in August 1999, Mullah Omar called "on Muslims behind the world to stand by their brothers in Afghanistan."²⁴⁰ As UN sanctions loomed over Afghanistan on 03 November 1999, the Taliban foreign minister, Maulvi Wakil Ahmed Mutawakil, protested that the Taliban wanted good relations with the United States, but that the Taliban could not meet the U.S. demand to extradite bin Laden for trial.²⁴¹ By the 12th, "Taliban leader Mullah Omar warned of unspecified retribution against U.S. citizens because of the planned sanctions."²⁴² A year later, in response to more proposed sanctions, Mullah Omar told the Afghans "that the United States and Russia have a plan to isolate Muslims worldwide

²³⁸ Mullah Omar, cited in "Taliban supreme asks Osama bin Laden not to harry Saudi interests," *Agence France Presse*, 26 March 1997.

²³⁹ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 408-411; Rashid, *Taliban*, 75.

²⁴⁰ "Taliban seeks Muslim aid," *The Australian*, 11 August 1999.

²⁴¹ "Taliban wants good ties with US: official," *Xinhua News Agency*, 03 November 1999.

²⁴² Barry Schweid, "U.S. warns of U.N. move if Taliban doesn't help with bin Laden," *The Associated Press*, 12 November 1999.

beginning with Afghanistan... [and] accused America of using the presence of... bin Laden” as an excuse to “thwart the rule of the Taliban.”²⁴³

The Taliban’s anti-American response to western pressure was softened by attempts to accommodate western demands without compromising on bin Laden’s extradition. Khandahari Afghans interviewed after the USS COLE attacks in October 2000 were worried that the U.S. might strike Khandahar, but claimed to like the United States. However, they warned the reporter that further U.S. attacks on their country would make “many enemies.”²⁴⁴ Mullah Omar restrained protests against further sanctions against Afghanistan in early 2001 that put members of the Pakistani religious party Jamiat ulema-e-Islam into the streets.²⁴⁵ The Taliban also hardened its rhetoric on bin Laden to give the United States something. In a June 2001 interview, Mullah Omar discredited bin Laden’s fatwas because bin Laden had not completed the required religious education to issue one, and offered to try bin Laden in either Afghanistan or a third Islamic country in an Islamic court, an offer that the United States dismissed.²⁴⁶ The Taliban convened trial for bin Laden’s accused support for the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in East Africa, but closed the trial because no evidence was produced by the UN.²⁴⁷ The Taliban’s anti American rhetoric hardened still further following the September 11th attacks. In a speech passed to the wider world via the Afghan Islamic Press news agency, Mullah Omar claimed that the United States was holding Islam hostage, and that the United States “want[ed] the end of the Islamic order” in Afghanistan “to create disorder ...[and]...a pro-American government.”²⁴⁸

In summation, the Taliban’s anti-Americanism is a diagnostic frame in response to outside pressure from the United States and the United Nations for the Taliban’s

²⁴³ Salah Nasrawi, “AP Photos CAI101-105,” *Associated Press*, 27 December 2000.

²⁴⁴ John Donnelly, “Afghans on Edge, Fearing a Strike by US,” *The Boston Globe*, 18 November 2000.

²⁴⁵ Vladimir Shreter, “Fundamentalists Protest Against UN Sanctions,” *Ria Novosti*, 20 January 2001.

²⁴⁶ Arnaud de Borchgrave, “Taliban invalidates bin Laden’s orders to kill Americans; Leader says terrorist has no authority to issue ‘fatwas’,” *The Washington Times*, 18 June 2001.

²⁴⁷ Arnaud de Borchgrave, “Taliban invalidates bin Laden’s orders to kill Americans.”

²⁴⁸ Mullah Omar, “Text of Taleban leader’s speech,” *BBC News*, republished from *Afghan Islamic Press*, 24 September 2001.

support for bin Laden and human rights practices that the West finds abhorrent. The Taliban sought good relations with the United States, but found that goal difficult in the face of increasing diplomatic, economic, and military pressure from the United States and the United Nations. The Taliban adopted an anti-American frame in response to anti-Taliban frames from the Americans.

B. CREATION AND RESILIENCE AL QAEDA'S AFGHAN HAVEN

In 1996, Sudan expelled bin Laden, family, and his follower from Sudan, and they travelled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan to get out of Sudan and away from U.S. pressure. Jalalabad was controlled by “a regional shura of eastern Pashtun tribal leaders and guerrilla commanders, including Younis Khalis, Mullah Omar’s former guerrilla leader whom bin Laden also knew from the war.”²⁴⁹ The Jalalabad Shura and the Khandahar Shura did not always see eye to eye, and there was a degree of tension between them. According to some sources, the Taliban welcomed bin Laden to Afghanistan. Mullah Omar “sent a delegation after his arrival [in Jalalabad] to assure bin Laden that the Taliban would be honored to protect him because of his role in the jihad against the Soviets.”²⁵⁰ After the fall of Kabul to the Taliban 1996, the Taliban responded to American inquiries about bin Laden’s whereabouts by saying they did not know where he was. Meanwhile, the Taliban knew exactly where bin Laden was, and offered to deliver bin Laden to the Saudis because of bin Laden’s anti-Saudi rhetoric.²⁵¹ The Saudis, who had earlier indicated that they did not care if the Taliban offered bin Laden refuge, refused to take bin Laden because they did not want to face the domestic consequences of trying and convicting bin Laden.²⁵² As U.S. efforts to extradite bin Laden failed, the U.S. banned arms sales to Afghanistan on 14 June 1996 for not cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism efforts.²⁵³ The United States continued to pursue bin Laden, and the

²⁴⁹ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 325-328.

²⁵⁰ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc*, 93.

²⁵¹ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 335, 341.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, 341-342.

²⁵³ Katzman, *CRS Report for Congress: Afghanistan*, 49-51.

U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Bill Richardson, asked the Taliban to turn over bin Laden in April 1998. His request was denied.²⁵⁴

On 07 August 1998, following the release of bin Laden's now famous fatwa against the United States and Israel, two al Qaeda teams struck the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.²⁵⁵ The bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania changed the nature of the international pressure on the Taliban. The United States launched cruise missiles at targets in both Afghanistan and Sudan believed to be connected to al Qaeda on 20 August 1998.²⁵⁶ Saudi Arabia, a close ally of the Taliban since 1995, pulled its diplomats out of Kabul and stopped providing governmental funding to the Taliban in the fall of 1998 over the Taliban's support of Bin Laden.²⁵⁷ A year later, on 4 July 1999, the United States banned all trade and financial transactions with the Taliban by U.S. persons or companies, less humanitarian aid, and froze the Taliban's assets in the United States under Executive Order 13129.²⁵⁸ This ban froze half a million dollars worth of Ariana Afghan Airlines assets in the United States and banned U.S. citizens from flying on the airline.²⁵⁹

Rather than detaching bin Laden from Afghanistan or killing him, the 1998 counterattacks on bin Laden's organization strengthened bin Laden's reputation.²⁶⁰ Within Afghanistan, the relationship between bin Laden/al Qaeda and Mullah Omar/the Taliban had developed into a strong one prior to the attacks. Bin Laden spoke in the mosques of Kandahar, and Mullah Omar called him out at one sermon "as one of Islam's most important spiritual leaders."²⁶¹ Osama bin Laden moved freely through Kandahar

²⁵⁴ Katzman, *CRS Report for Congress: Afghanistan*, 5.

²⁵⁵ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 402-404; Rashid, *Taliban*, 75.

²⁵⁶ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 408-411; Rashid, *Taliban*, 75.

²⁵⁷ Rashid, *Taliban*, 77.

²⁵⁸ *What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions against the Taliban (in Afghanistan)*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control, 19 January 2001), republished by the Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/t11tali.pdf>, accessed 20 November 2006.

²⁵⁹ Katzman, *CRS Report for Congress: Afghanistan*, 50-51.

²⁶⁰ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 412.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 342.

and financed the building of mosques within the city, further ingratiating himself with the Taliban. Supporters from outside visited freely.²⁶² The Taliban government allowed bin Laden and his entourage to occupy the apartments near the Kandahar airport and Tarnak farms outside of the city.²⁶³ As an indication of just how good their relationship was, Bin Laden had open access to Mullah Omar, who was a recluse.²⁶⁴

In response to the 1998 cruise missile attacks, the Taliban “organized demonstrations” to protest the attacks, and mobs attacked UN offices.²⁶⁵ Mullah Omar criticized the attacks as a means to distract the United States public and the world from U.S. President Clinton’s affair with Monica Lewinsky, and declared that the United States was the “biggest terrorist.”²⁶⁶ Mullah Omar also “insisted that Bin Laden was a guest, not just of the Taliban but of the people of Afghanistan and that the Taliban would never hand him over to the U.S..”²⁶⁷ He told his own people and bin Laden’s organization that “I will not hand over a Muslim to an infidel.”²⁶⁸ Mullah Omar also characterized the attack as being not against bin Laden, but a sign of “enmity for the Afghan people.”²⁶⁹ The rejection of the power of the United States’ attacks to change Taliban policy on bin Laden was more than clear, as was the use of the Taliban’s Muslim identity as a reason for protecting bin Laden.

Beginning with UNSC Resolution 1267 on 15 October 1999, the UN joined the effort to have bin Laden extradited to a country that would prosecute him (i.e., the United States). UNSC Resolution 1267 banned commercial air flights into and out of Afghanistan and froze Taliban financial assets held abroad.²⁷⁰ The United Arab

²⁶² Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 342.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, 343.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 344.

²⁶⁵ Rashid, *Taliban*, 75.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 75.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 75.

²⁶⁸ *Asharq al-Awsat*, 6 July 2005, cited in Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*, (NY: Cambridge University Press 2005), 196.

²⁶⁹ Mullah Omar, quoted by Julian Borger, “US missile raids: Sudan prepares to make complaint to the UN; REACTION/ Middle East rages against US motives,” *The Guardian*, 21 August 1998.

²⁷⁰ Rashid, *Taliban*, 78-79.

Emirates, the only country other than Pakistan that continued to recognize the Taliban government, endorsed the sanctions on 20 October 1999, further isolating the Taliban.²⁷¹ The Taliban offered to either restrict bin Laden's movements in Afghanistan or to try him either in Afghanistan or a third country in an Islamic court.²⁷² Bin Laden suggested that he was willing depart Afghanistan if safe passage could be arranged, but the U.S. was adamant about extradition.²⁷³ UNSCR 1333 of 19 December 2000 placed a further restriction on the providence of arms, military equipment, or advisors to the Taliban because of lack of compliance with Resolution 1267.²⁷⁴ The United States and the United Nations continued to ratchet up the pressure into 2001. UNSCR 1363 of 30 July 2001 "provided for monitors in Pakistan to ensure that no weapons or military advice was provided to the Taliban" in an attempt to further isolate the Taliban from their Pakistani sponsors.²⁷⁵

During this period, the United States continued to indicate a willingness to negotiate with the Taliban to give up bin Laden in exchange for U.S. recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. The United States also made it clear that the United States would believe that the Taliban was "complicit" in al Qaeda sponsored attacks.²⁷⁶ The Taliban and the United States deadlocked over bin Laden's extradition to the United States for trial. The Taliban refused to extradite bin Laden to the United States for trial, and the United States refused to accept any other compromise position after the 1998 Embassy bombings.²⁷⁷ In March 2001, Mullah Omar said "Half of my country has been destroyed by two decades of war. If the remaining half is also

²⁷¹ Ajith Abeysinghe, "US intrigues and the imposition of United Nations sanctions on Afghanistan," World Socialist Web Site Published by the International Committee of the Fourth International, 22 November 1999, Posted: <http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/nov1999/afgh-n22.shtml>, accessed 20 November 2006.

²⁷² Kathy Gamon, "Taliban leader tells bin Laden no pressure to leave Afghanistan," *Associated Press*, 31 October 1999.

²⁷³ Ajith Abeysinghe, "US intrigues and the imposition of United Nations sanctions on Afghanistan"

²⁷⁴ *UNSC Resolution 1333*, (NY: United Nations Security Council, 2000).

²⁷⁵ Katzman, *CRS Report for Congress: Afghanistan*, 51.

²⁷⁶ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 431.

²⁷⁷ Rory McCarthy, "Afghan leader refuses to give up Bin Laden to US," *The Guardian*, 28 July 2000.

destroyed in trying to protect Mr Bin Laden, I'm willing for this sacrifice."²⁷⁸ By this point, the option of trying bin Laden in a third country under Islamic law was no longer a real option.²⁷⁹ The U.S. would maintain diplomatic pressure until the September 11th attacks, but with no effect.²⁸⁰

After the September 11th attacks the United States began discussions with regional states, including Pakistan, securing their support by 15 September 2001.²⁸¹ The United States also stepped up pressure on Afghanistan to give up Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda for trial. Between the On 20 September 2001, the United States issued a non-negotiable demand that the Taliban extradite Osama bin Laden, protect foreign citizens in Afghanistan, close all the terrorist training camps and allow inspections to ensure that the camps were shut down.²⁸² The Taliban again refused to extradite bin Laden to the United States, but offered to hold talks on the issue.²⁸³ On 24 September the United States issued an Executive Order freezing bin Laden's, al Qaeda's, and al Qaeda affiliated group's funds and prohibiting transactions between the U.S. and those persons or groups.²⁸⁴ Also on the 24th of September, Mullah Omar issued a statement demanding that, "If America wants to root out terrorism and intimidation, then it should withdraw its forces from the Gulf and demonstrate neutrality over the issue of Palestine."²⁸⁵ The following day, Mullah Omar issued another statement saying that the September 11th attacks were the result of the U.S. government's policies in the region that resulted in "atrocities in Muslim countries" and denied that bin Laden was capable of carrying out

²⁷⁸ Mullah Omar, quoted in Luke Harding, "Taliban will not hand over Bin Laden," *The Guardian*, 31 March 2001.

²⁷⁹ Luke Harding, "Taliban will not hand over Bin Laden," *The Guardian*, 31 March 2001.

²⁸⁰ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 474-478.

²⁸¹ George W. Bush, Colin Powell, John Ashcroft. Joint Remarks, *President Urges Readiness and Patience*, 15 September 2001, Thurmont, Maryland; Ari Fleishcher. *Press Briefing*, 14 September 2001, Washington, D.C.

²⁸² George W. Bush, President of the United States. *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People*, 20 September 2001, Washington, D.C.

²⁸³ "Taleban demand proof on Bin Laden," *BBC News*, 19 September 2001 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1551913.stm, accessed 29 November 2006.

²⁸⁴ George W. Bush, *Executive Order on Terrorist Financing*, 23 September 2001.

²⁸⁵ "Text of the Taleban leader's speech," *BBC News*, 24 September 2001 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1561090.stm, accessed 29 November 2006.

the attacks.²⁸⁶ The United States dismissed reports that the Taliban had lost track of bin Laden.²⁸⁷ By the first of October, Mullah Omar's statements all but dared the United States to invade Afghanistan and meet its own destruction.²⁸⁸ Throughout this period, the United States continued to emphasize that the United States was the leading provider of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, and that the United States would prefer to avoid hurting its longtime friends. On October 4, President Bush offered additional humanitarian aid, but decried the Taliban's unwillingness to distribute what had already been offered.²⁸⁹ The U.S. President and Congress decided to execute a military overthrow of the Taliban in order to prevent further attacks, combat operations began on 7 October 2001, and Kabul fell on 13 November 2001.²⁹⁰

The level of pressure applied to the Taliban to withdraw its al Qaeda haven was very intense, and ultimately ineffective. The haven was extremely resilient to outside pressure. The Taliban probably did not anticipate the strength of the military response after the 11 September attacks, but they nevertheless demonstrated a will to resist constant and increasing pressure without weakening the haven they provided Al Qaeda.

C. AL QAEDA'S AND THE TALIBAN'S FRAMES COMPARED

Al Qaeda and the Taliban did not share an ethnic identity. The Taliban was a Pashtun movement, and its power structure was narrowly focused on a clique of the Durrani Pashtun tribe from Khandahar. Al Qaeda's members were largely from Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula. However, the Muslim identity shared by Al Qaeda and the Taliban had deep roots for both. Both groups try to emulate the Rashadun. The Taliban expressed their Muslim identity by pursuing the implementation of Islamic law and the

²⁸⁶ "Taleban say attacks avenged US 'cruelty'," *BBC News*, 24 September 2001 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1563639.stm, accessed 29 November 2006.

²⁸⁷ "US to produce Bin Laden evidence," *BBC News*, 24 September 2001 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1560099.stm> accessed 29 November 2006.

²⁸⁸ "Taleban chief warns against attack," *BBC News*, 24 September 2001 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1573206.stm, accessed 29 November 2006.

²⁸⁹ *U.S. Assistance to the Afghan People Fact Sheet*. (Washington D.C.: White House, 2001).

²⁹⁰ *Senate Joint Resolution 23 – Authorization for Use of Military Force*, (Washington, D.C.: Senate, 18 September 2001); *Background Note: Afghanistan*, US State Department Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, May 2006. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm>, accessed 20 November 2006; George W. Bush, *Presidential Address to the Nation*, 07 October 2001, Washington D.C.

foundation of an Islamic state. Al Qaeda expressed its Muslim identity by railing against corrupt Muslim rulers and calling for the return of the caliphate by violent jihad. Al Qaeda governed itself along principles similar to those by which the Taliban governed Afghanistan.²⁹¹ The shared faith in, and institutional practice of, a particular interpretation of Islam bound the Taliban and al Qaeda closely together.²⁹²

The final ingredient was perhaps the most potent. By the late 1990s, the Taliban and al Qaeda had acquired a common enemy, and increasingly shared an anti-American frame. While the Taliban said that they wanted friendly relations with the United States, it was very hard to pursue good relations when the United States was not being particularly friendly in return. The crux of the animosity that the United States expressed towards the Taliban was over harboring bin Laden, but human rights concerns also drove the United States to, both unilaterally and through the UN, to sanction and militarily attack the Taliban. As discussed in the section on the Taliban's anti-American frames, the Taliban increasingly adopted an anti-American and anti-Western frame in the face of this pressure. This frame matched perfectly with al Qaeda's diagnostic frame that the West was attacking Islam. By September 11, 2001, after two years of UN sanctions and a bombing attack, the Taliban probably believed that bin Laden was right – the United States was out to get them. And bin Laden could point to the UN sanctions, the 1998 bombing attack, and U.S. sanctions and diplomatic pressure and say – you're right, the U.S. is out to get you. Furthermore, this was a fairly easy frame for the Taliban to adopt. Western ideas, dress, and cultural mores were already defined by the Taliban as bad. It was not hard, and certainly not contradictory, for the Taliban to then define the purveyor of those values and ideas as the enemy as well without compromising the Taliban leadership's connection with their base of support.

²⁹¹ Mark Nicholson and Farhan Bokhari, "Islamic student militia takes Kabul, Communist-era president executed," *Financial Times*, 28 September 1996; Rashid, *Taliban*, 43-44.

²⁹² Owais Tohid, "Taliban vows to protect but restrain bin Laden," *Agence France Presse*, 16 October 1998; "Taliban wants good ties with US: official," *Xinhua News Agency*, 03 November 1999; Rory McCarthy, "Afghan leader refuses to give up Bin Laden to US," *The Guardian*, 28 July 2000; B. Muralidhar Reddy, "Osama unhappy with Taliban Curbs," *The Hindu*, 4 April 2001.

The Taliban and al Qaeda exchange services. The Taliban allowed bin Laden to run training camps, to promote the revolution from Afghanistan with varying degrees of freedom, to move freely throughout the country, and refused to extradite him to a foreign country to face criminal charges. Al Qaeda supported one the Taliban's vital interests of winning the civil war by fielding the 400 man 055 Brigade in 1997 to support the Taliban in their fight against the Northern Alliance.²⁹³ They also performed construction projects to support the regime. But the relationship was deeper than merely an exchange of services. Mullah Omar refused to give up bin Laden because the relational bond between the two organizations made doing so unacceptable to Omar and other Taliban members. The common American enemy seems to have driven the Taliban and al Qaeda together in the face of pressure rather than splitting them apart.

D. CONCLUSION

The relationship between the Taliban and al Qaeda was a relational one. While al Qaeda and the Taliban had ethnic differences, they shared a common faith and a common enemy. Both the Taliban and al Qaeda interpreted Islam strictly, and saw Islam as the basis for law and government. While the corrupt rulers that each group wanted to overthrow were different, the reason that those rulers were corrupt, primarily because they were not Islamic enough, was the same. Both groups tried to emulate the Rashadun when making decisions about government, society, and law and the forms for those systems. The al Qaeda prognostic frame of establishing a broader caliphate across the Middle East was a little too broad for the Taliban, and something that they never seemed to latch onto. But until such a caliphate existed, al Qaeda's desire to establish one did not conflict with the Taliban's frame of establishing Islamic law and government within the state boundaries of Afghanistan. Both groups increasingly shared an anti-American frame because of U.S. pressure on them. As pressure from the West increased on the Taliban for their human rights record, it became easier to believe that the United States and its allies were out to get the Muslims and to buy into al Qaeda's frame. The shared sense of a common enemy helped drive the Taliban and al Qaeda together, and helps to

²⁹³ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc*, 162-163.

show that these groups shared a collective identity. That the relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban was relational diffusion is consistent with my hypothesis.

V. CONCLUSION

The problem of terrorist havens is a policy problem of growing relevance. As the number of havens that in the international community has grown and shrunk over the past forty years, one can make the observation that some havens protect those they haven better and provide a greater range of services and support to the havened than other havens have in the past or do currently. This thesis focused on the question of what makes some havens more resilient to outside pressure than others. Because the conventional wisdom that state failure is causative for terrorist havens does not completely answer the question this thesis borrows from the concept in social mobilization theory expressed by Sidney Tarrow and Doug McAdam that transnational groups that share collective identity ties with substate groups will have stronger ties than similar groups that do not share collective identity ties.²⁹⁴ The way to tell if the groups share collective identity ties is to compare the frames used by the groups and the ascribed collective identities of the groups. Direct ties between groups can be described in two categories, either a brokered or a relational tie. Groups that do not share collective identity ties have brokered ties and groups that share collective identity ties have relational ties. Theoretically, the stronger haven would be provided by the substate group that had the greatest degree of congruence in collective identities with the transnational group.

Accordingly, this theoretical framework was tested by a comparative case study of two terrorist havens provided by the National Islamic Front (NIF) of Sudan and the Taliban of Afghanistan, respectively, to al Qaeda. The NIF provided haven to al Qaeda between 1991 and 1996, and the Taliban provided haven to al Qaeda from 1996 until the present day. Because of the reputed ease by which al Qaeda was ejected from Sudan compared to the relative difficulty in weeding al Qaeda out of Afghanistan, the hypothesis predicted that al Qaeda's ties to the NIF would be brokered ties and that al Qaeda's ties to the Taliban would be relational ones, as defined by Tarrow and

²⁹⁴ Tarrow and McAdam, "Scale Shift in Transnational Contention," 127, 130-131.

McAdam's paper. The frames and ascribed identities of the havening groups were compared to al Qaeda's frames and ascribed identities in the preceding chapters. Also, the level of pressure exerted on each haven by the United States and the international community on each haven was also assessed. The results of these analyses are reviewed below.

Al Qaeda is a jihadi Salafist organization born out of the Afghan jihad during the 1980s. As a Salafist organization, al Qaeda governed itself with consultative shuras. Al Qaeda's membership was composed primarily of ethnic Arabs. Al Qaeda's diagnostic frame is that the West, led by the United States, is attacking Muslims everywhere aided by the corrupt regimes it supports, namely, but not limited to, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Al Qaeda identifies the big enemy as the United States and the lesser enemies as the corrupt regimes and Israel, who are occupying Islam's holiest places. Al Qaeda's proposed solution to this problem is a jihad against the United States to undermine the corrupt regimes and Israel, allowing their overthrow and the establishment of a Caliphate in their place. Al Qaeda sells this frame to their fellow Muslims by framing their jihad as a jihad against an occupying power, participation in which is mandatory for all Muslims.

The Sudanese National Islamic Front was an Arab party and their Arab identity was congruent with al Qaeda's. The NIF also professed to desire the establishment of an Islamic State governed by Islamic Law, though the state they advocated was patterned after a modern vice a traditional model. The NIF did not idolize the Rashadun, and this showed in their choice of governmental model. This was a point of difference between Salafist al Qaeda and the NIF. The NIF actively supported revolutionaries across the broader Muslim world, undermining Israel, Egypt, and other corrupt governments, but they did not identify the United States as an enemy during the 1991–1996 period that they provided haven to al Qaeda. The relationship between al Qaeda and the NIF appeared to be based more in an exchange of services than as part of their core values. This is the essence of a brokered tie, and this paper assesses that al Qaeda and the NIF had a brokered relationship.

The Taliban, on the other hand, was ethnically different from al Qaeda. The Taliban, like the NIF, also professed an Islamic law and government frame, but the

Taliban established an emirate governed by consultative shuras vice a modern state. The Taliban, unlike the NIF and like al Qaeda, looked to the Rashadun for their governmental model. The Taliban's Pashtun national state may have provided a point of difference with al Qaeda in the future, if al Qaeda succeeded in establishing the Caliphate, but it did not matter during the period studied. Under western pressure over human rights and for their havening of al Qaeda, the Taliban increasingly adopted an anti-American and anti-Western frame. The use of force or perceived threat of use of force by the U.S. magnified this frame for the Taliban. Backed into their corner of the world by U.S. and international pressure, al Qaeda's enemies increasingly looked like the Taliban's enemies. The Taliban, thus, increasingly matched up with al Qaeda's primary diagnostic frame. This paper assesses that the Taliban's and al Qaeda's ties were relational ones because of the great congruence in the two group's Islamist and Anti-American frames.

To double check the starting assumption that the level of pressure required to eject al Qaeda from Afghanistan was less than what was required to eject al Qaeda from Sudan, the level of pressure exerted by the United States and the international community on the respective countries was researched and catalogued in the supporting chapters. Sudan was listed as a State Sponsor of terror by the United States, received U.S. economic sanctions, and faced the withdraw of the U.S. embassy from its soil due to threat concerns. For its refusal, or inability, to extradite the al Qaeda affiliated assassins that tried and failed to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 1995 the UN, through a series of UNSC resolutions, asked member states to reduce diplomatic contact, restrict the travel of Sudanese officials, and to not hold conferences on Sudanese soil. Sudan, absent any criminal charges against bin Laden, expelled bin Laden in 1996 at U.S. request in order to improve Sudanese-U.S. relations.

The Taliban, on the other hand, refused on multiple occasions to extradite bin Laden to the U.S. after the U.S. indicted him for acts of terrorism. In 1996, the U.S. banned arms sales to Afghanistan for refusing to cooperate on this issue. The 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings upped the ante, and the U.S. launched missile strikes on Afghanistan in response. In 1999 the U.S. also banned all U.S. trade and financial transactions with the Taliban, less humanitarian aid, and froze the Taliban's U.S. held

assets. These measures joined UNSC resolutions that demanded bin Laden's extradition, banned commercial air traffic into or out of Afghanistan and grounded its national airline, froze the Taliban's overseas assets, and banned the sale of arms or provision of military advisors to the Taliban. After 1999, the only country with diplomatic relations was Pakistan. The only discernable effect of these measures was to harden the Taliban's resolve to harbor bin Laden. In the end, despite the international pressure and inducements of foreign aid, the Taliban continued to resist U.S. efforts to extradite bin Laden even after the September 11th attacks. The Afghan haven was significantly more resistant to outside pressure, confirming the assumption that underpinned the hypothesis.

This thesis supports the hypothesis that that relational ties lead to more resilient havens and that brokered ties lead to less resilient havens. Collective identity ties, as measured by the frames of the involved groups, appear to be an important factor in increasing the resiliency of terrorist havens. If ascriptive ties were not expressed by both groups as a frame, they appeared to not impact haven resilience. Thus the Pashtun Taliban are more supportive of Arab al Qaeda than was the Arab NIF. Ascriptive ties that were framed the same way did increase haven resilience. Because the Taliban and al Qaeda both idolized the past and because of the great deal of similarity between Deobandism and Salafism the frames supporting each groups Islamic identity supported al Qaeda and the Taliban's relationship. However, the NIF was quite adamant about being modernist, and this Islamic modernist frame conflicted with al Qaeda's frames that emphasized the Rashadun. The NIF's inflexibility on the anti-American frame was probably the deal breaker for Sudan's continued haven of al Qaeda. The Americans were not the NIF's enemy, and while they could not extradite bin Laden to the United States because no charges were yet made public, they were willing to discommode al Qaeda by making it find another place to live at the United States' request. By contrast, the Taliban adopted al Qaeda's anti-American frame. Doing so was arguably easier for the Taliban than it was for the NIF because the United States and the West are arguably the current world standard for modernity and the Taliban was anti-modern while the NIF was pursuing modernity with an Islamic face. Because the NIF's frames did not line up with

al Qaeda's frames and the Taliban's did, the NIF did not support al Qaeda nearly as well as the Taliban did in the face of outside pressure.

The number of potential and actual havens is too large for the United States to handle militarily or engage in focused diplomacy to mitigate their effects. Understanding the factors that contribute to making particular states more likely to act as "good" terrorist havens will allow the United States to focus its efforts more appropriately in the Global War on Terrorism. Accordingly, this thesis shows that shared collective identities and shared identification of the enemy by the havening organization and the havened group will likely increase the level of resistance to pressure from the outside for the havener to have the stop providing haven. Other than overthrowing the regime in question, perhaps a better policy option is to reduce barriers to compliance rather than increasing the level of pain applied.

The 9-11 Commission has left policy makers thinking that they understand the problem of terrorist havens, but only the surface of the issue has been scratched. Social mobilization theory offers a theoretical framework that can be used to push the boundaries and deepen our understanding of terrorist havens. It might not seem like it, but the call put out by Stewart Patrick in early 2006 to push the boundaries of what the academic community and policy makers think they know about terrorist havens is still wide open. This study looks at just one transnational terrorist group and the relationship between it, the groups that provided it haven, and the international community through the lens of social mobilization theory. There are many future studies that need to be done.

There are several ways to test the validity of these results and see how well this theory will continue to hold up. One of the ways to test the validity of the results of this project is to broaden the study to look at other transnational terrorist groups and where they havened using the social mobilization theory framework. Does the same result hold for other transnational terrorist organizations?

Another way to test the validity of these results is to look at these cases through the perspective of interests and actors rather than through the social mobilization theory

framework. Did al Qaeda merely serve the Taliban's needs better than they served the NIF's needs? If another theory is just as explanatory as this one, how valid are these results? The interests and actors paradigm is a hypothesis that needs tested to further validate these results.

There are also other avenues of research to pursue. One of the aspects of terrorist havens that this study does not consider is haven formation. Does Social Mobilization Theory have anything to say about where havens form, as well as their resiliency? Large N studies of terrorist havens and their relationship to state failure are also possible. This work mentions such a possibility in its Introduction, but a deeper study is needed. Our presumed understanding of terrorist havens as a purely failed state phenomenon is an illusion, and we need to systematically test other hypotheses in order to broaden our understanding of them.

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