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THESIS

**ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES:
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALOGIES FOR
COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY**

by

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December 2006

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**ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALOGIES FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY**

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ABSTRACT

As modern warfare moves towards the lower end of the intensity spectrum, conventional forces are placed in unconventional roles outside their traditional high intensity military specialty. By showing that there are analogies between organized crime and insurgencies, further studies can be conducted on the applicability of modern law enforcement tactics to military operations.

This thesis shows that there are organizational and conceptual analogies between organized crime families and insurgencies. They both organize themselves as secret societies with similar hierarchical command structures for both survival and operational needs. Both organized crime families and insurgencies must remain hidden from authorities, whether from law enforcement agencies such as the FBI or the military.

The similarity between organized crime and insurgent organizations provides a broad basis for further study in other areas. The FBI and other law enforcement agencies have been combating organized crime families for decades and have used proven techniques of infiltration, informants, wiretaps and electronic eavesdropping to expose organized crime's largely invisible network. Based on the similarities between organized crime families and insurgent organizations, law enforcement tactics and their applicability to modern counterinsurgency doctrine are an area for further study.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to show that there are valid analogies between La Cosa Nostra crime families in America and insurgencies. This study will specifically focus on the similarities in organizational structure and secrecy of the La Cosa Nostra crime families of New York and the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in the Casbah during the Battle of Algiers in 1957. By showing that there are valid analogies between both organized crime in America and insurgency organizations, further studies can be conducted as to the applicability of modern law enforcement tactics to military operations and their feasibility in the Army's emerging counterinsurgency doctrine. By showing the types of organizational similarities that exist between organized crime in America and insurgencies, the possibility exists to expand the current counterinsurgency doctrine to include anti-organized crime techniques that are relevant to the tactical situation.

Today, the Army doctrinally identifies the analogies between organized crime and insurgencies in its new counterinsurgency (COIN) manual FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, which states, “[e]xperience countering organized crime is especially relevant to COIN, as most insurgent groups are more similar to organized crime in their organizational structure and relations with the population than they are to military units.”¹ This thesis will focus on the organizational command structure and the secrecy of these organizations. The hierarchical command structure of La Cosa Nostra crime families in New York in 1983 and 1987 is analogous to that of the ALN in the Casbah from 1956 to 1957. In addition, there is a dependent relationship between both organizations and their populations for secrecy and survival.

Although terrorist organizations and insurgencies have dramatic differences in ideology and backgrounds, there are some similarities in the basic networked structure between the two. Based on the outward appearances of both organized crime and insurgencies, one would assume that there are direct relationships between the two and a

¹ United States Army, *Field Manual (FM) 3-24: Counterinsurgency*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2006, 6-19.

direct applicability of anti-organized crime techniques to counter terrorism strategies. This, however, is not entirely valid and is another area for possible study.

B. BACKGROUND

As modern warfare moves towards the lower end of the intensity spectrum, conventional forces such as Infantry, Armor, and Artillery units are placed in unconventional roles outside their traditional high intensity military specialty. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review demonstrates this shift in military operations in the preface as it outlines the Defense Department's change in military emphasis, "[f]rom major conventional combat operations – to multiple irregular, asymmetric operations."² The QDR further demonstrates the change in military capabilities as it outlines the Defense Department's operational strategy in the statement, "[m]ultipurpose forces to train, equip, and advise indigenous forces; deploy and engage with partner nations; conduct irregular warfare; and support security, stability, transition, and reconstruction operations."³ The Department of Defense acknowledges the need for troops with a broader perspective and capabilities in the war ahead.

Combat troops in Iraq and Afghanistan are facing a changing and adaptive enemy without complete knowledge of how to break down the insurgency's organizational structure and eliminate the enemy's invisibility within the indigenous population. As Colonel William Peers, of the OSS Detachment 101 in World War II stated in the book *Behind the Burma Road* "[t]he guerrilla's first job is to remain anonymous, to live among the enemy."⁴ Combat experience and Company Commanders in Iraq have noticed the similarities between the Iraqi insurgency and organized crime, although largely as a result of popularized films and television that most troops enjoy while deployed. Despite the problems that exist with the popularized version of organized crime, there are some valid analogies between the two types of organizations. Although many commanders are

² Department of Defense, *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review*, February 6, 2006, vii, available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf>; Internet; accessed October 20, 2006.

³ *Ibid.*, 23.

⁴ William Peers and Dean Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), 12.

figuring out how to fight the insurgency within their sectors, units as a whole are never truly able to penetrate the network's hierarchy and get inside the enemy's decision making cycle.

Only recently has the Army developed a counterinsurgency academy in Iraq and drafted a new counterinsurgency doctrine in the field manual FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*. With a new counterinsurgency doctrine developing, conventional forces are attempting the challenge of extending their conventional mindset to irregular warfare techniques. Counterinsurgency doctrine is a recent and emerging skill set within the conventional Army forces and is being developed through historical study and combat experience in the field. Due to this emerging need for information and counterinsurgency doctrine, this thesis will focus on organizational analogies between organized crime in America and a historical insurgency in order to provide a better basis for analysis and comparison.

By analyzing historical data from La Cosa Nostra crime families of New York and comparing them to the ALN in the Casbah from 1956 to 1957, this thesis shows that there are organizational and conceptual analogies between the two. Both insurgencies and organized crime families organize themselves as secret societies with similar hierarchical command structures. This is done both for survival within a population and for operational needs based on the environment, such as a particular ethnically homogeneous neighborhood in either New York or in the Casbah of Algiers. For survival, both organized crime families and insurgencies must remain hidden from authorities, whether from law enforcement agencies such as the FBI or the military. They must also maintain anonymity within the civilian population in order to conduct their business.

Organized crime in America and its study provides evidence and useful insights into counterinsurgency strategy. The FBI and other law enforcement agencies have been combating organized crime families for decades, however, the study and understanding of organized crime academically was not fully realized until the late 1960's and early 1970's. The FBI has used proven techniques of infiltration, informants, wiretaps and

electronic eavesdropping and other operations within the laws and regulations of the United States, to expose the criminal organization's largely invisible network and provide evidence for criminal prosecution.

The FBI's *2004 to 2009 Strategic Plan* shows the agency's recent focus on organized crime as one of its strategic goals in the statement, "La Cosa Nostra (LCN) and Italian organized crime enterprises still pose a significant threat and will continue to influence the political and economic structure of the United States. . ."⁵ The FBI's website further provides evidence of the organization's commitment to fighting organized crime in the statement, "[o]ur ultimate goal is the elimination of the LCN [La Cosa Nostra] as the most dominant organized criminal enterprise in the United States."⁶ The FBI's website also shows the agency's strategic objective in its fight against organized crime in the statement,

The FBI's fight against organized crime is unlike other criminal programs. Instead of focusing on these crimes as individual events, the FBI's Organized Crime Program targets the entire organization responsible for a variety of criminal activities. The FBI has found that even if key individuals in an organization are removed, the depth and financial strength of the organization often allows the enterprise to continue.⁷

The FBI's strategic objective also demonstrates the importance of focusing on the entire organization rather than individual members whose removal could still allow the organization to continue to operate despite losses at the top or bottom of its structure.

Although organized crime families can be viewed as largely parasitic within a given society, without a stated ideology, and with different societal goals than insurgent organizations, their primary means of survival is the relative invisibility to law enforcement within a population. As Joseph Pistone, a former special agent in the FBI, better known as Donnie Brasco, testified before the Committee on Governmental Affairs in April 1988, "[t]he neighborhood where the wiseguys [sic] regularly hang out is always

⁵ Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Strategic Plan 2004 to 2009*, 51. available from <http://www.fbi.gov/publications/strategicplan/strategicplanfull.pdf>; Internet; accessed October 12, 2006.

⁶ "La Cosa Nostra/Italian Organized Crime/Labor Racketeering Unit," *Federal Bureau of Investigation Website* [Website]; available from <http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/lcnindex.htm>; Internet; accessed October 12, 2006.

⁷ "About Organized Crime," *Federal Bureau of Investigation Website* [Website]; available from <http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/aboutocs.htm> ; Internet; accessed October 12, 2006.

aware of their presence and their positions in the Mafia. Whether from fear or respect, the neighbors protect the wiseguys from police surveillance. The wiseguys in return will help out the neighborhood by ensuring that no disorganized or street crime operates in the area.”⁸ Joseph Pistone worked as an undercover FBI agent and infiltrated the Bonanno family in New York.⁹ He provided law enforcement with much needed evidence and information on the inner workings of organized crime activities in that city. His insights into the organizational structure of organized crime families and their relationship to the population have credibility unlike that of a normal informant. He did not use his information in order to gain favor with authority figures in return for leniency. This gives his testimony impartiality as well as a uniqueness given his position within organized crime and as a law enforcement officer. Joseph Pistone’s testimony demonstrates that by protecting organized crime from law enforcement, the local population receives protection from other criminal activities in return; in other words, organized crime provides the local population a measure of security.

Insurgent organizations use the same techniques in order to maintain secrecy and gain legitimacy among local populations. As Andrew Krepinevich states in his book *The Army and Vietnam*, “the support of the people is a measure of the insurgents’ ability to control the people, whether through their willing cooperation or as the result of threats, acts of terrorism, or the physical occupation of their community.”¹⁰ He continues by stating, “[t]he bottom line for a successful guerrilla warfare operation, then, is a primary support system anchored on the population.”¹¹ Krepinevich’s description of Vietnamese insurgents provides evidence for the importance of local population support to insurgencies. Both organized crime and insurgencies rely on the population for support and secrecy in order to survive and conduct their day to day operations.

This study will purposely focus on organized crime families in America and exclude gangs and other transnational criminal organizations. It will draw on previous

⁸ Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate, *Organized Crime: 25 Years After Valachi*, One Hundredth Congress, Second sess., 1988, 205.

⁹ Ibid., 202.

¹⁰ Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 9.

¹¹ Ibid.

and ongoing research in these fields to compare organized crime families with insurgent organizations. The analogy of organized crime families and terrorist organizations is another area for possible further research.

C. METHODOLOGY

This thesis will focus on the La Cosa Nostra crime families in New York and the ALN in the Casbah due to the amount of data on each organization's structure. This thesis will use both primary and secondary sources to show the valid analogies between organized crime in America and insurgent organizations. The data for the La Cosa Nostra crime families in New York was primarily found in the 1967 Presidential Task Force on Organized Crime Report, the 1983 hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, the 1988 hearing before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and in the books and journal articles published by leading academics in the field. The data for the Senate committees was compiled by the FBI, the New York State Police, and local law enforcement agencies. It provides the basis for the command structures of organized crime families. The transcripts of the hearings provide a unique first-hand account of organized crime activities from informants, former organized crime members, and undercover FBI agents. This data, along with hierarchy charts provided before Congress, is used to show the hierarchical command structure of La Cosa Nostra crime families in New York.

The data on the ALN was collected primarily from Alistair Horne's book *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*, Roger Trinquier's book *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, and General Jacques Massu's book *La Vraie Bataille D'Alger*. General Massu's book provides a unique perspective on the Battle of Algiers from his position as the French commander and is generally defensive of the French tactics and techniques used against the FLN during the battle. The data listed in each of these books provides the basis for the command structure and hierarchy of the ALN in 1956 and 1957.

The data used in this study was collected from the government's perspective and not from either organized crime families or the ALN. The secrecy and clandestine nature of these organizations logically limits the amount of data available from within the

organizations. From this perspective, the data can be considered one-sided, however, this thesis has used terms and structures that are generally accepted in the field of study to filter the possible bias.

Chapter II will give a brief background of organized crime and its accepted terms and definitions, and describes the leading methods of analysis. Chapter III will focus on the five La Cosa Nostra crime Families of New York and their command structure. Chapter IV will focus on a brief history of the Battle of Algiers and the command structure of the ALN. Chapter V will show the valid analogies in organizational command structure and secrecy between the organized crime families and the ALN, and suggest areas for possible further study.

D. CONCLUSION

The study of organized crime and the ways to outline and understand its structure are directly related to the perspective and skills needed by combat commanders in the fight against insurgent organizations. U.S. troops on the ground can use the command structure of organized crime families to outline the structure of insurgent organizations. With this knowledge, commanders can get inside the insurgency's decision making cycle and disrupt its operations based on their knowledge of the organization's structure and the relationship that exists between its members.

The current systems in place to outline insurgency networks within the conventional Army lie largely within the military intelligence community and are outside the daily knowledge of ground commanders and troops in the field. Unfortunately, the "I have a secret" system within the Army remains largely in effect and information is stove-piped between organizations and not shared with people in the right places to use it. By demonstrating the analogies to organized crime, U.S. troops can not only gather intelligence during day to day operations within the neighborhoods of the populace, but outline insurgent networks at the lowest level by using techniques freely available from libraries and the internet.

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II. ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA

A. BACKGROUND

La Cosa Nostra, the Mafia, and organized crime have historically meant different things during different parts of history, however, today they are almost used synonymously outside the academic and law enforcement world. Popularized television and movies helps promote this lack of knowledge and understanding among the general population. Joseph Albini, one of the founding fathers of the study of organized crime, describes the lack of understanding of the term mafia in his book *The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend*, “[d]espite constant exposure to the term, there are few who can give a logically consistent, reasonably lucid definition or interpretation of what the term stands for.”¹² The 1967 Presidential Task Force on Organized Crime also pointed out the lack of knowledge among the American public regarding organized crime and its effects in the statement, “[o]rganized crime affects the lives of millions of Americans, but because it desperately preserves its invisibility many, perhaps most, Americans are not aware how they are affected, or even that they affected at all.”¹³ This lack of knowledge is still true today, aggravated by the expansion of criminal networks over multiple criminal enterprises and ethnicities, and the expansion of international criminal and terrorist networks in the information age.

This study will focus on La Cosa Nostra as the basis for a national criminal syndicate of organized crime families and specifically the traditional crime families of New York. The reason for selecting La Cosa Nostra is the American nature of this organization and the amount of academic, governmental, and law enforcement data available on its structure. Before analyzing the families in New York and their similarities to insurgent organizations, it is useful to review the brief history of all three terms and their origin in American culture and academe.

¹² Joseph Albini, *The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend* (New York: Meredith Corporation, 1971), 83.

¹³ United States Task Force on Organized Crime. *Task Force Report: Organized Crime*. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967, 1.

It is also important to note that although the word “family” is often, used it does not necessarily mean that all members are of a particular genealogical lineage. The term “family” refers to the organization as a whole. Although direct genealogical relations are important, they are not the defining basis for membership within the organization. This study will use the term in an organizational manner in order to minimize the confusion and accurately portray particular organized crime organizations.

B. “MAFIA”

The term “Mafia” is generally accepted by academics as a Sicilian or Italian term and distinctively separate from the term “La Cosa Nostra.” The precise origin of the term “Mafia” has been debated among academics for decades and still remains controversial as Francis Ianni, a social anthropologist and leading academic in the study of social relationships in organized crime, states that, “[t]he origins of the word *mafia* are lost in history. Some of the theories of its origin are patently absurd.”¹⁴ Ianni does, however, provide two useful meanings of the term in his book *A Family Business*. He provides a detailed study of an organized crime family through several generations in the United States as well as its historical origins in southern Italy and Sicily,

Mafia is a word which has at least two distinct meanings to the Sicilians. When the word is used as an adjective, it describes a state of mind, a sense of pride, a philosophy of life, and a style of behavior which Sicilians recognize immediately. . . It bespeaks the man who is known and respected because of his ability to get things done. . . the word *Mafia* when used as a noun, clearly denotes such an organization as well as such a state of mind.¹⁵

Ianni shows the difficulty of finding the origins of the word “Mafia.” He also demonstrates that there is a distinctive local meaning to the term and that this dual meaning presents problems for making accurate studies without a clear understanding of the term and its usage in different contexts.

Despite the debate over the origins and meaning of the term “Mafia,” most academics will agree that such an organization historically existed and possibly still exists in southern Italy and Sicily today. The immigration of Italians and Sicilians to America

¹⁴ Francis Ianni, *A Family Business* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972), 25.

¹⁵ Ibid., 24-25.

in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century most likely brought the term and possibly the structure of the organization with them. Ianni concedes this point in the statement, “[i]t is possible that southern Italian immigrants in America resurrected the *Mafia* model, under the stress of ghetto poverty and lawlessness, to organize their movement out of the slum and into crime.”¹⁶ The Mafia as it existed or still exists in these countries provides another avenue of study for analogies to insurgent organizations due to the different role the Mafia played within these societies. The organization replaced and opposed governmental control and is separate from that of organized crime families in the United States and in New York, as Ianni describes, “[a]s a kin-centered social system, the *Mafia* is Sicilian society in microcosm.”¹⁷

Ianni’s book and his studies of the Mafia organization prior to 1972 attempted to prove that a link between the organization in Sicily and Italy and the United States was unlikely, “[e]very government committee investigating organized crime in America has pointed to some organizational link between Italian-American crime syndicates and the Sicilian *Mafia*. But anyone searching for the link finds problems on both sides of the Atlantic. In the first place, by no means all of the reputed members of *Cosa Nostra* are Sicilians.”¹⁸ Currently, however, the FBI recognizes the existence of a Sicilian Mafia in the United States. It confirms this on its official public website,

Since their appearance in the 1800s, the Italian criminal societies known as the Mafia have infiltrated the social and economic fabric of Italy, and now impact the world. They are some of the most notorious and widespread of all criminal societies. Those currently active in the United States are the Sicilian Mafia, Camorra or Neapolitan Mafia, Ndrangheta or Calabrian Mafia, and Sacra Corona Unita or United Sacred Crown. The FBI refers to them as ‘Italian Organized Crime’ (IOC).¹⁹

Despite the debate concerning the international link of the Mafia and its place in America, the FBI does recognize that the terms “Mafia” and “La Cosa Nostra” are

¹⁶ Francis Ianni, *A Family Business* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972), 11.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 41.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹⁹ “Italian Organized Crime,” *Federal Bureau of Investigation Website* [Website]; available from <http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/lcn/ioc.htm>; Internet; accessed October 25, 2006.

different, “[a]lthough the La Cosa Nostra has its roots in Italian Organized Crime (IOC), it has been a separate organization for many years.”²⁰

The Mafia, whether a transnational organization or distinctively Sicilian, as described by Ianni, is undoubtedly different from La Cosa Nostra and provides a different perspective for analysis based on its social and political setting. As Joseph Albini stated in 1988 when describing the Kefauver Hearings of 1951, “[w]hat no one realized, however, at the time of these hearings, was the Kefauver had planted the seed-‘the slippery label’-*Mafia* into the minds of the American public. There is one characteristic that all ‘slippery labels’ have in common; they can be applied to different concepts, different organizations, different time periods, and a variety of other entities and be made to take on a semblance of truthfulness and authenticity.”²¹ Because of Albini’s “slippery label” definition, the differences demonstrated in Ianni’s study, and the FBI’s current website definition, this thesis will not use the term “Mafia” except when making use of governmental documents of the late 1960’s and 1970’s.²²

C. “LA COSA NOSTRA”

The term “La Cosa Nostra,” which literally means “this thing of ours” as the FBI defines it on their website, is generally accepted as separate from the term “Mafia.”²³ As with the term “Mafia,” the origins and true meaning of the term “La Cosa Nostra” are also debated, however, the generally accepted first public use of the term is attributed to Joseph Valachi and his testimony before the Senate McClellan Committee in 1963. As stated on the FBI’s website,

²⁰ “La Cosa Nostra/Italian Organized Crime/Labor Racketeering Unit,” *Federal Bureau of Investigation Website* [Website]; available from <http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/lcnindex.htm>; Internet; accessed October 12, 2006.

²¹ Joseph Albini, “Donald Cressey’s Contributions to the Study of Organized Crime: An Evaluation,” *Crime & Delinquency* 34, no. 3 (July, 1988): 345 [journal online]; available from www.csa.com; Internet; accessed September 13, 2006.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ “La Cosa Nostra/Italian Organized Crime/Labor Racketeering Unit,” *Federal Bureau of Investigation Website* [Website]; available from <http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/lcnindex.htm>; Internet; accessed October 12, 2006.

In 1963, Joseph Valachi became the first La Cosa Nostra member to provide a detailed look at the inside of the organization. . . Valachi exposed the name, structure, power bases, codes, swearing-in ceremony, and members of this organization.²⁴

The literal translation of the term “La Cosa Nostra” also denotes a distinctly different connotation from that of “Mafia” and its accepted Italian/Sicilian origins. Some academics, such as Ianni, claim that “this thing of ours” denotes an organization that is purposely different from that of the old Mafia in Italy and Sicily and is, “homegrown and is not the product of an imported, alien conspiracy.”²⁵ Whether the term fits its literal translation or not is also debatable. It does, however, demonstrate that this organization is distinctively different from that of the Mafia, and further shows the level of distinction needed for accurate analysis.

Donald Cressey, as a part of the 1967 Presidential Task Force on Organized Crime and in his book *Theft of the Nation*, describes La Cosa Nostra as a fraternity of Italian-American organized crime families in the United States.²⁶ The 1967 Task Force on Organized Crime also describes the FBI’s transition in its use of terms, “[t]o date, only the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been able to document fully the national scope of these groups [organized crime families], and FBI intelligence indicates that the organization as a whole has changed its name from the Mafia to La Cosa Nostra.”²⁷ Despite the term’s debatable origins and historical use in academic literature, Congressional hearings, or as law enforcement terminology, today La Cosa Nostra is generally accepted as an American group of loosely consolidated organized crime families of Italian or Sicilian origin. This group, however, is not exclusively dominated by either ethnic Italians or Sicilians. The 1967 Presidential Task Force on Organized Crime confirms this in the statement, “[t]he phrase [La Cosa Nostra] incorrectly implies

²⁴ “La Cosa Nostra/Italian Organized Crime/Labor Racketeering Unit,” *Federal Bureau of Investigation Website* [Website]; available from <http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/lcnindex.htm>; Internet; accessed October 12, 2006

²⁵ Frank Hagan, "The Organized Crime Continuum: A further Specification of a New Conceptual Model," *Criminal Justice Review* 8, no. 2 (September, 1983): 52 [journal online]; available from www.csa.com; Internet; accessed September 8, 2006.

²⁶ Donald Cressey, *Theft of the Nation* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 10.

²⁷ United States Task Force on Organized Crime. Task Force Report: Organized Crime. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967, 6.

that all members of the conspiracy are Italian or Sicilian and, further, the term is unknown outside New York.”²⁸ The findings of the 1967 Presidential Task Force also provide background for the study of organized crime families in New York under the term “La Cosa Nostra.”

This study will use the term as it is generally accepted today to refer to a group of organized crime families in America and, as the FBI currently defines, it as, “a nationwide alliance of criminals, linked through both familial and conspiratorial ties that is [sic] dedicated to pursuing crime and protecting its members.”²⁹ Using the term in this way allows for a comparative level of analysis to insurgent organizations distinctively different from the Mafia.

D. “ORGANIZED CRIME”

As with the terms “Mafia” and “La Cosa Nostra,” the definition of “organized crime” is also debated among leading academics in the fields of criminology, sociology and social anthropology. It has been used to describe a type of crime or criminal activity; a type of criminal organization; or an entire enterprise encompassing the Mafia, La Cosa Nostra, international criminal organizations such as the Russian mafia and Cuban mafia, and others such as the Klu Klux Klan and neighborhood gangs. As Frank Hagan described in 1983, “[a]nalysis of criminology literature indicates that a large number of works including textbooks, fail to offer a clear definition. Organized crime has often been described and discussed but rarely defined.”³⁰ The 1967 Presidential Task Force on Organized Crime Report offers this definition, “[o]rganized crime is a society that seeks to operate outside the control of the American people and their governments.”³¹ Howard Abadinsky offers another definition in his book *Organized Crime*, “[o]rganized crime is a nonideological enterprise involving a number of persons in close social interaction,

²⁸ United States Task Force on Organized Crime. Task Force Report: Organized Crime. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967, 27.

²⁹ “La Cosa Nostra/Italian Organized Crime/Labor Racketeering Unit,” *Federal Bureau of Investigation Website* [Website]; available from <http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/lcnindex.htm>; Internet; accessed October 12, 2006

³⁰ Frank Hagan, “The Organized Crime Continuum: A further Specification of a New Conceptual Model,” *Criminal Justice Review* 8, no. 2 (September, 1983): 52 [journal online]; available from www.csa.com; Internet; accessed September 8, 2006.

³¹ United States Task Force on Organized Crime. Task Force Report: Organized Crime. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967, 1.

organized on a hierarchical basis, with at least three levels/ranks, for the purpose of securing profit and power by engaging in illegal and legal activities.”³² Joseph Albin offers yet another definition, “(1) the use of force, intimidation, or threats of such, (2) the structuring of a group or organization whose purpose is that of providing illicit goods and services, and (3) providing legal and political forms of protection that assure its operation.”³³

For the purposes of analysis, this thesis will use a combination of both Abadinsky’s definition and Albin’s. Organized crime will be referred to as an organization, having a formal structure with means of coercive force in order to ensure its operations and survival, which conducts legal and illegal activities. By defining organized crime in this manner, this limits the argument that organized crime is merely a type of criminal behavior outside the socially accepted norms of a given society.

E. FAMILY STRUCTURE

In order to make a valid comparison between organized crime in America and insurgency organizations, it is necessary to describe the accepted terms within organized crime families and the traditional command hierarchy of these organizations. Joseph Albin describes the generally accepted methods to study organized crime in the following statement, “there are two schools or models that seek to describe and explain the structure and function of this form of criminal endeavor; one is commonly referred to as the governmental, law enforcement, President’s Task Force, evolutionary-centralization, or traditional view while the other is generally conceptualized under such categories as a patron-client social system, informal structural-functional system, network system, or developmental association model.”³⁴ Howard Abadinsky also describes the two leading models in the statement, “[t]he attributes of organized crime that we have examined can fit two contrasting organizational models: the *bureaucratic/corporate* [hierarchical] and the *patrimonial/patron-client network*.”³⁵ Both models provide a valid basis for the

³² Howard Abadinsky, *Organized Crime*, 3rd ed., (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1990), 5.

³³ Joseph Albin, *The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend* (New York: Meredith Corporation, 1971), 126.

³⁴ Joseph Albin, "Donald Cressey's Contributions to the Study of Organized Crime: An Evaluation," *Crime & Delinquency* 34, no. 3 (July, 1988): 338 [journal online]; available from www.csa.com; Internet; accessed September 13, 2006.

³⁵ Howard Abadinsky, *Organized Crime*, 3rd ed., (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1990), 8.

comparison of organized crime families and insurgent organizations.³⁶ This thesis will focus on the hierarchical command nature of organized crime families to demonstrate their similarity to insurgent organizations

1. Command Positions

To understand the hierarchal command structure of organized crime and the authoritative relationship each member of the family has with others, some accepted positions within organized crime families need to be defined first. This thesis will use these positions as a basis for comparison to insurgent organizations. As with the terms “Mafia” and “La Cosa Nostra,” the origins and exact nature of each position, and the total number of positions and jobs within organized crime families, is debatable among academics and law enforcement agencies. However, the basis for each position and its place within the family are generally agreed upon as a result of Joseph Valechi’s testimony before the Senate McClellan Committee in 1963, the 1967 Presidential Task Force on Organized Crime’s Report, Donald Cressey’s book *Theft of the Nation*, the testimony of undercover FBI agent Joseph Pistone and his position within the Bonanno family, and historical wire tapping and eavesdropping evidence collected by the FBI.

The 1967 Presidential Task Force on Organized Crime’s report provides the terms that most academic and law enforcement studies use today. The positions within organized crime families are: the boss, the underboss, the counselor, the lieutenants or captains, and the soldiers or “made-men.”

The 1967 report describes the position of the boss in the following manner, “[e]ach family is headed by one man, the ‘boss,’ whose primary functions are maintaining order and maximizing profits.”³⁷ Howard Abadinsky also describes the boss in the statement, “[a]t the center of an Italian-American crime groups is the boss who in the past was usually a senior citizen-he needed many years to gain the respect of

³⁶ For more information on the Patron-Client model see Howard Abadinsky, *Organized Crime*, 3rd ed., (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1990)25, or Joseph Albini, "Donald Cressey's Contributions to the Study of Organized Crime: An Evaluation," *Crime & Delinquency* 34, no. 3 (July, 1988): 338 [journal online]; available from www.csa.com, or Francis Ianni, *A Family Business* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972).

³⁷ United States Task Force on Organized Crime. Task Force Report: Organized Crime. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967, 7.

members and the knowledge and connections need by the group.”³⁸ This position is generally accepted as the head of a particular family and is also referred to as “capo,” although this term is also applied to lower levels of the organization as an abbreviated form of the word “coporegime.”³⁹ The boss is the leader of the organization and controls the family similar to the leader of a legitimate business organization or military command.

The 1967 report goes on to describe the positions of underboss and counselor. These positions have also been generally accepted among the academic and law enforcement communities as valid positions within organized crime families,

Beneath each boss is an ‘underboss,’ the vice president or deputy director of the family. He collects information for the boss; he relays messages to him and passes his instruction down to his own underlings. In the absence of the boss, the underboss acts for him. On the same level as the underboss, but operating in a staff capacity, is the *consigliere*, who is a counselor, or adviser. Often an elder member of the family who has partially retired from a career in crime, he gives advice to family members, including the boss and underboss, and thereby enjoys considerable influence and power.⁴⁰

The 1967 report describes positions similar to a legal or professional business organization. These are defined roles with a professional connotation and an accepted command hierarchy that its members adhere to. The underboss is the second in command and ensures that the boss’s instructions are passed down within the organization. This position is similar to an operations officer within a military organization or the vice president of a legitimate business. Joseph Valachi is quoted in Donald Cressey’s book *Theft of the Nation* as stating, “[e]verybody today is professional.”⁴¹ The counselor as described by the 1967 report serves in an advisor capacity to that of the boss and is similar to an executive officer within a traditional

³⁸ Howard Abadinsky, *Organized Crime*, 3rd ed., (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1990), 30.

³⁹ Ibid., 29.

⁴⁰ United States Task Force on Organized Crime. Task Force Report: Organized Crime. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967, 7.

⁴¹ Donald Cressey, *Theft of the Nation* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 221.

military hierarchy. This is important to note because this thesis will use each term in that particular command context for the purpose of concise comparison to command positions within insurgent organizations.

Within the structure of the family, the next position level below the underboss and counselor is that of the lieutenant or captain or “caporegime.”⁴² The exact name of the position, whether lieutenant or captain, is debatable, however, the position within the command hierarchy is generally accepted despite which term is used and therefore each is interchangeable for the purposes of analysis. The 1967 report describes the lieutenant or captain position in the following manner,

. . . *caporegime* serve as chiefs of operating units. The number of men supervised in each unit varies with the size and activities of particular families. Often the *caporegime* [the position of *caporegime*] has one or two associates who work closely with him, carrying orders, information, and money to the men who belong to his unit. From business standpoint, the *caporegime* is analogous to plant supervisor or sales manager.⁴³

As with the underboss and counselor positions, the 1967 report describes this position as being similar to that found in legitimate professional business organizations. This position is the lowest managerial and command position within the organization. It is comparable to the position of company commander within military organizations.

The lowest level within the family is that of the soldier, where grass roots level operations occur. The 1967 report describes this position and its role in the statement,

The lowest level “members” of a family are the *soldati*, the soldiers or “button” men who report to the *caporegime*. A soldier may operate a particular illicit enterprise, e.g., a loan-sharking operation, a dice game, a lottery, a bookmaking operation, a smuggling operation, on a commission basis, or he may “own” the enterprise and pay a portion of its profit to the organization, in return for the right to operate.⁴⁴

Similar to soldiers in the military sense, these men operate at the lowest level of the organization and provide the muscle for the organization to operate. This is where most

⁴² United States Task Force on Organized Crime. Task Force Report: Organized Crime. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967, 7.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁴⁴ United States Task Force on Organized Crime. Task Force Report: Organized Crime. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967, 7.

of the direct illegal activities take place and where the organization has its greatest visibility among the surrounding population and to law enforcement. Soldiers and their crews are similar to platoon leaders and their platoons within a military organization

2. Traditional Hierarchy

The traditional hierarchy chart follows a traditional line and block chart where the leader is at the top of the organization and the lowest level workers are at the bottom. The organization's executive officer is below the leader and his lower level leaders are below him. The soldiers are depicted at the bottom of the chart with their associates and crews below them. Soldiers are not responsible to every lieutenant as the chart might indicate; rather, they are individually grouped under particular lieutenants similar to platoons assigned under company commanders

According to Joseph Albini, the traditional hierarchy is given different names: "the governmental, law enforcement, President's Task Force, evolutionary-centralization, or traditional view."⁴⁵ Albini also describes this as "the Cressey model" due to the contributions of Donald Cressey to the 1967 Presidential Task Force on Organized Crime and his subsequent book *Theft of the Nation*.⁴⁶ Howard Abadinsky also provides another name for this structure: "Bureaucratic/Corporate Model."⁴⁷ He continues and describes the model in the following manner,

The corporation, the police, and the military are examples of bureaucracies, that mode of organization essential for efficiently carrying out large-scale tasks. All bureaucracies share a number of attributes; they are rationally organized with a complicated hierarchy, an extensive division of labor, positions assigned on the basis of skill, responsibilities carried out in an impersonal manner, extensive rules and regulations, communication from the top of the hierarchy to persons on the bottom, usually in written (memo) form⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Joseph Albini, "Donald Cressey's Contributions to the Study of Organized Crime: An Evaluation," *Crime & Delinquency* 34, no. 3 (July, 1988): 338 [journal online]; available from www.csa.com; Internet; accessed September 13, 2006.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Howard Abadinsky, *Organized Crime*, 3rd ed., (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1990), 20.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

Despite the numerous different names given to this type of structure, this thesis will refer to it as the traditional command hierarchy in order to avoid confusion and provide a clear level of analysis.

The hierarchy as it is laid out in Figure 1 demonstrates the relationship of each position within the organized crime family hierarchy and is taken directly from the 1967 Presidential Task Force on Organized Crime's Report.⁴⁹ The position of the boss or leader is located at the top of the hierarchy, with the counselor in a subordinate role outside the direct chain of command. The positions of the underboss and the lieutenants in the chart show their positions of authority and responsibility within the organization based on a clear delineation of command and responsibility from the top. The position of the soldiers at the bottom shows their role at the lowest levels of the organization and their jobs and responsibilities. The bottom of the chart also shows the types of legal and illegal activities run by the organization and the lowest level of responsibility or accountability for the activities.

The chart does not show the grouping of soldiers under each lieutenant as described by the 1967 Presidential Task Force on Organized Crime Report, where there may be a number of soldiers and their crews directly responsible to a particular lieutenant. The chart also fails to show the possible division of labor among criminal activities between each lieutenant and his soldiers. In addition, the possible social and genealogical relationships that might exist within a particular organized crime family are not shown. For example, men within higher positions in the hierarchy could be fathers or grandfathers of men in lower positions.

⁴⁹ United States Task Force on Organized Crime. Task Force Report: Organized Crime. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967, 9.




Figure 1. Organized Crime Family Hierarchy Chart. (From: 1967 Task Force)

3. Patron-Client Model

The second type of generally accepted method of study of organized crime families is the patron-client model described in Figure 2. As with the hierarchical chart, this model demonstrates the hierarchy of organized crime families. Abadnisky describes

the relationships within this model as patron-client, the patron being closer to the center of the model and the client being further out.⁵⁰ He further demonstrates this relationship in the statement, “[t]he patron. . . acts as a power broker between the client and the wider society, both legitimate and illegitimate.”⁵¹ This model provides similar structural relationships to the hierarchical chart.

Similar to the hierarchical model, the boss is the center of the organization with his underboss and counselor located directly with him. The lieutenants and their soldiers fan out from the center to show the different levels within the organization. Despite differences in approach, the positions within organized crime families as stated earlier in this chapter remain the same, such as the boss, underboss, counselor, lieutenants and soldiers. For the purposes of analysis, this study will use the hierarchal chart to show the similarities between organized crime and insurgent organizations.

⁵⁰ Howard Abadinsky, *Organized Crime*, 3rd ed., (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1990), 26.

⁵¹ Ibid.




Figure 2. Patron-Client Model. (From: Abadinsky)

F. CONCLUSION

The history, context and usage of the different terms such as the "Mafia," "La Cosa Nostra," "organized crime," and the different types of relationships within the family hierarchy are grounds for further study within the subject of criminology,

sociology and social anthropology. By understanding the manner in which organized crime is studied, one can make the correct linkages between organized crime families and insurgent organizations and increase the possibility of using law enforcement anti-organized crime techniques correctly and in the right context given the military's emerging counterinsurgency doctrine.

III. NEW YORK CRIME FAMILIES

A. INTRODUCTION

There are five generally accepted La Cosa Nostra crime families in New York. They are the Bonanno Family, the Luchese Family, the Colombo Family, the Genovese Family, and the Gambino family. Diarmuid Jeffreys, in his book *The Bureau: Inside the Modern FBI*, confirms this in the statement, “Gambino, Lucchese[sic], Colombo, Genovese, Bonanno- these names have become synonymous with Cosa Nostra activity in New York, where the five families have dominated organized crime for as long as most people can remember.”⁵² This study focuses on these families so as to be able to draw from the vast amount of academic, governmental, and law enforcement data on them. Both the 1983 Committee on the Judiciary hearing and the 1988 Committee on Governmental Affairs hearings have an enormous amount of data on the disposition of each family, some of their criminal undertakings, and their locations within the New York and New Jersey area. This study will not focus on their criminality, but use this data to show the command relationships.

The command hierarchy chart of each family focuses on the authoritative structure of these organizations both in 1983 and 1987 to demonstrate the evolving nature of these families and the membership movement within these organizations. Members change positions based on death, retirement and incarceration. However, not all incarcerations affect the structure, as some bosses continue to run their organizations while in jail.

Within each chart, the membership listed represents the data presented before Congress in 1983 and 1988 and may not totally encompass the entire organization. It focuses on the top level positions and those members that met the criteria for public notification by law enforcement agencies at the time.⁵³ All of the family members listed in each of the following figures had open case files or criminal records recorded by the

⁵² Diarmuid Jeffreys, *The Bureau: Inside the Modern FBI* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1995), 83.

⁵³ Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate, *Organized Crime: 25 Years After Valachi*, One Hundredth Congress, Second sess., 1988, 4.

FBI, the state of New York, or both at the time of each of the Congressional hearing. The data for these names was collected by the FBI, New York State Police, and local law enforcement agencies in order to provide an accurate picture of these organizations at the time.⁵⁴ Although law enforcement agencies had open files on each of the members of these families, their names do not denote criminal guilt and for the purposes of this study are used in order to demonstrate the command positions that each held within the hierarchy of these organizations, such as the boss, underboss, counselor, or lieutenant. The study of the criminality of each family and the genealogical relationships that exist within some of the families is an area for possible further study.

The data shown for each family was collected by the New York City Police Department for the 1983 Committee on the Judiciary.⁵⁵ The data for the 1987 families was collected for the 1988 Committee on Governmental Affairs.⁵⁶

B. BONANNO FAMILY

Figures 3 and 4 show the command relationships within the Bonanno Family in 1983 and 1987. The charts also show the evolving nature of the family between the four years and the differences that could possibly exist within a short period. Both Figure 3 and Figure 4 show Philip Rastelli as boss of the Bonanno Family, with Salvatore Farruggia as acting boss in Figure 3. The reasons for having an acting boss are not clear; however, the 1988 Committee on Governmental Affairs data shows that Philip Rastelli was in failing health, thereby offering a possible explanation.⁵⁷ Neither the 1983 nor 1988 report clearly state the reasons for this position, nor does the 1967 Presidential Task Force Report on Organized Crime. The title does, however, indicate that this position is temporary in nature. Figure 4 supports this conclusion because the position is not listed and the 1988 Committee on Governmental Affairs data shows Philip Rastelli as head of

⁵⁴ Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate, *Organized Crime: 25 Years After Valachi*, One Hundredth Congress, Second sess., 1988, 4.

⁵⁵ Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, *Organized Crime in America: Part 2*, Ninety-eighth Congress, First sess., 1983, 240.

⁵⁶ Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate, *Organized Crime: 25 Years After Valachi*, One Hundredth Congress, Second sess., 1988, 4, 747.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 915.

this family and running the organization despite his imprisonment.⁵⁸ The 1988 data also supports the conclusion that others within the family act on the behalf of members that are imprisoned and in their capacity within the organization.⁵⁹

Jospeh Massino in Figure 4 moves from lieutenant to underboss demonstrating that a hierarchical move or promotion within this organization is similar to a promotion within a legitimate business structure or military organization. The reason for the decrease in the number of lieutenants from Figure 3 to Figure 4 is also not clear. The change in lieutenants is not done on a one for one basis.




Figure 3. 1983 Bonanno Family Hierarchy. (After: April 1983 Committee)

⁵⁸ Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate, *Organized Crime: 25 Years After Valachi*, One Hundredth Congress, Second sess., 1988, 4, 915.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 922.




Figure 4. 1987 Bonanno Family Hierarchy. (After: April 1988 Committee)

Joseph Pistone's testimony on the Bonanno Family provides insight regarding the lower level of this organization,

There is a surprising similarity which marks the innerworkings [sic] of the Mafia and contemporary terrorist organizations. The families are broken down into small, separate cells, commonly called crews. You work with that crew and rarely ever deal with any other crews. In all likelihood, a member of one crew may not even know who are the members of another crew in his own family.⁶⁰

The lower level of this organization gives the family structure a level of security and secrecy similar to other cell type organizations.

⁶⁰ Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate, *Organized Crime: 25 Years After Valachi*, One Hundredth Congress, Second sess., 1988, 204.

C. LUCCHESE FAMILY

Figures 5 and 6 show the command relationships of members of the Luchese Family in 1983 and 1987 respectively. Figure 5 shows Antonio Corallo as the boss of the Luchese Family in 1983 and Figure 6 shows Vittorio Amuso in this position in 1987. The only upward movement within this hierarchy during this time was Anthony Casso, who moved from lieutenant in Figure 5 to counselor in Figure 6. This promotion could be due to a number of factors such as the incarceration, death, or retirement of Christopher Furnari.




Figure 5. 1983 Luchese Family Hierarchy. (After: April 1983 Committee)




Figure 6. 1987 Luchese Family Hierarchy. (After: April 1988 Committee)

The complete change within the command hierarchy between 1983 and 1987 also supports the conclusion that targeting the head of the family does not necessarily result in the destruction of the entire organization. The organization merely replaces the individual with another who assumes command in that position or someone acts on his behalf and in his capacity.

D. COLOMBO FAMILY

Figures 7 and 8 show the command relationships of the Colombo Family in 1983 and 1987 respectively. The movement of Alphonse Persico from 1983 to 1987 shows the upward mobility within the command hierarchy and the possibility for promotion within the organization. The charts also demonstrate the resilient nature of this family and the general lack of turnover despite the efforts of law enforcement agencies.

Figures 7 and 8 show Carmine Persico, Jr. as the head of the Colombo Family with Thomas Anthony Dibella as the counselor. Figure 7 shows Alphonse Persico moving from the position of lieutenant in 1983 to that of counselor in 1987. As with the Bonanno Family boss, Philip Rastelli, the Colombo Family boss Carmine Persico, Jr. led the family in 1983 and 1987 while in prison, further demonstrating that incarcerating the head of the family does not necessarily hinder its operations or destroy its organization.⁶¹ As with other families, the lieutenants within the family changed between 1983 and 1987. Within this family, however, four of the thirteen lieutenants remained the same between the four years. The 1983 New York City Police Department Report to the Committee on the Judiciary states that, “[a]lthough this Network’s upper echelon has been hard hit by arrests, convictions and returns to prison for parole violations, their activities have continued unaffected.”⁶² The lieutenant data listed in both Figure 6 and 7 also supports this assessment and provides further evidence for targeting the entire organization.

⁶¹ Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate, *Organized Crime: 25 Years After Valachi*, One Hundredth Congress, Second sess., 1988, 4, 919.

⁶² Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, *Organized Crime in America: Part 2*, Ninety-eighth Congress, First sess., 1983, 224.




Figure 7. 1983 Colombo Family Hierarchy. (After: April 1983 Committee)




Figure 8. 1987 Colombo Family Hierarchy. (After: April 1988 Committee)

E. GENOVESE FAMILY

Figures 9 and 10 show the command structure of the Genovese Family as it existed in 1983 and 1987 respectively. Figure 9 shows Philip Lombardo as the head of the Genovese Family with Anthony Solerno as the underboss and Gerardo Catena as the counselor. In Figure 10, the 1987 New York City Police Department Report to the Committee on Governmental Affairs shows the promotion of Vincent Gigante from lieutenant in 1983 to head of the family in 1987 based on the arrest and imprisonment of Anthony Salerno.⁶³ As with other families, the lieutenants within the family changed between 1983 and 1987. The 1983 New York City Police Department Report to the Committee on the Judiciary confirms this in the statement, “Genovese members have a reputation for aggressively expanding operations through the use of ‘legitimate’ frontmen [sic] who have successfully assumed control of many business ventures connected with

⁶³ Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate, *Organized Crime: 25 Years After Valachi*, One Hundredth Congress, Second sess., 1988, 4, 934.

the local entertainment industry.”⁶⁴ The use of legitimate business at the bottom of the organization provides the family hierarchy with a measure of security and secrecy.




Figure 9. 1983 Genovese Family Hierarchy. (After: April 1983 Committee)

⁶⁴ Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, *Organized Crime in America: Part 2*, Ninety-eighth Congress, First sess., 1983, 209.




Figure 10. 1987 Genovese Family Hierarchy. (After: April 1988 Committee)

F. GAMBINO FAMILY

The Gambino Family, as stated in the 1983 New York City Report to the Committee on the Judiciary, “is considered to be the largest, most influential criminal organization in New York City.”⁶⁵ Figures 11 and 12 show the command structure as it existed in 1983 and 1987 respectively. Figure 11 shows Paul Castellano as boss of the Gambino Family with Aniello Dellacroce as underboss and Joseph Gallo as counselor. Figure 12 shows the promotions of John Gotti from lieutenant to boss and Joseph Armone from lieutenant to underboss. In addition, Salvatore Gravano became counselor. According to the 1987 New York City Police Department Report to the Committee on Governmental Affairs, Gotti and Armone were promoted after Paul Castellano and Frank DeCicco were killed while serving in the positions of boss and underboss, respectively, in

⁶⁵ Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, *Organized Crime in America: Part 2*, Ninety-eighth Congress, First sess., 1983, 195.

1985.⁶⁶ The promotions suggest that the positions within the organization are more important than the individuals who fill them. Despite the death of the boss, the family replaced the leader from within its ranks and continued to operate. As with other families, many lieutenants within the family changed between 1983 and 1987.




Figure 11. 1983 Gambino Family Hierarchy. (After: April 1983 Committee)

⁶⁶ Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate, *Organized Crime: 25 Years After Valachi*, One Hundredth Congress, Second sess., 1988, 926-927.




Figure 12. 1987 Gambino Family Hierarchy. (After: April 1988 Committee)

G. CONCLUSION

The hierarchical charts of each of the five New York La Cosa Nostra families demonstrate the importance of each position within the family structure. Despite the changeover within the ranks of the lieutenants, which most families did in significant numbers from 1983 to 1987, the positions of boss, underboss and counselor were always maintained by either a new member from within the existing ranks or the former boss with a stand-in member. This data demonstrates that the command positions within the organization are more important than the individuals who maintain them. This is not to discount individual leadership or charisma and the importance that each plays in commanding the organization. Rather, it points out that by eliminating one member, even if the head of the organization, the organization will continue to exist by filling that

member's position with another member. This conclusion is essential to comparing this organization to insurgencies because of the importance the command structure plays. The capturing or killing of the head of the organization may not eliminate it; rather the organization will reorganize itself in order to fill the command position. This data provides evidence for the strategy of targeting the organization as a whole, rather than individual members either at the top of the organization or at the bottom.

The involvement outside the organization and the separation of its exterior members from the center supports the organization's survival. The hierarchal command structure and business-like nature of the organization supports the upward mobility that clearly exists with higher membership turnover.

IV. ALN IN THE CASBAH FROM 1956 TO 1957

A. BACKGROUND

The Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) was an insurgent organization that fought against France for Algerian independence from 1954 to 1962. As an insurgent organization, the FLN was extremely organized and complex at both the national and local levels. The FLN used anti-colonial sentiment as the basis for gaining popular support both within the urban and rural areas of the country. The organization was similar to most insurgent groups in that it started with a select educated few at the top of the organization and then evolved and recruited membership down to the lowest levels of Algerian society. Unlike most insurgent groups, however, the FLN lacked a clearly stated and defined ideology as the basis for revolt and post revolution government. Martha Hutchinson describes the FLN's ideology in the statement, "[t]he FLN did not possess a highly structured or comprehensive ideology; the revolution was simply guided by nationalism."⁶⁷ Despite the lack of a clear ideology for post-independence government, the organization was highly organized with a well defined command structure. The FLN was broken down geographically into six *wilayas* across the country in which it conducted operations.⁶⁸

Within the city of Algiers, the FLN was broken down into three autonomous zones, Algiers One, Two, and Three.⁶⁹ The FLN acted as the political arm of the insurgent organization, and the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) acted as the military or operational branch of the organization. Similar to the Soviet model where each level of the military was accountable to a political officer, the ALN was directly accountable to the FLN at each national level *wilaya*. Below the national level divisions, the ALN alignment with the FLN was less clear, however, the political organization still controlled the military operations of the insurgency as illustrated in Figure 14.

⁶⁷ Martha Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 12.

⁶⁸ Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, trans. Daniel Lee (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1964), 12.

⁶⁹ Jacques Massu, *La Vraie Bataille D'Alger* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1971), 382.

Within the city of Algiers, the breakdown of the ALN below the city level was also unclear. General Jacques Massu, commander of the 10th French Paratrooper Division in Algiers, acknowledges this in his book *La Vraie Bataille D'Alger* (The True Battle of Algiers), in which he states, “Nos découvertes concernant l’ALN dans Alger sont moins nettes qu’en ce qui concerne l’organisation politico-administrative. [Our discoveries concerning the ALN in Algiers were less clear than those concerning the political-administrative organization].”⁷⁰ Despite the breakdown of the FLN below the city level, the ALN operated almost exclusively out of the Muslim quarter of the city known as the Casbah. The Casbah provided the organization a headquarters and safe haven within the Arab population of the city and the ALN’s organization here is the focus of this study.

The Battle of Algiers in 1957 became the focal point of the FLN operations in Algeria during its struggle for independence and is most closely associated with the FLN’s overall operations within Algeria during this time. The exact beginning of the battle and who started the fighting is unclear; however, most academics agree it began with the killing of nine *pied noir* (non-Arabs) in June 1957 by Yacef Saadi’s ALN and the subsequent retaliatory bombing of the Casbah by *pied noir* extremists.⁷¹ The ALN retaliated by bombing three targets within the European sectors of Algiers, escalating the revolutionary conflict within the city.⁷² Widespread violence between Arabs and the *pied noir* resulted.⁷³ The breakdown of law and order within the city became known as the Battle of Algiers and on January 7, 1957, General Jacques Massu and his 10th Paratrooper Division were called in to stop the violence and regain order.⁷⁴

During the Battle of Algiers as well as at other times in the revolt, the ALN used terrorism as a tactic in its military operations against the French. The brutality of their attacks in Algiers and the ensuing brutal retaliation by both the French Paratroopers and the *pied noir* caused the organization to gradually lose support both within the upper

⁷⁰ Jacques Massu, *La Vraie Bataille D'Alger* (Paris: Libratrie Plon, 1971), 383.

⁷¹ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*. Revised ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 184.

⁷² Ibid., 185-187.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 188.

leadership of the FLN and the population of the Casbah. The ALN in Algiers was eventually defeated in 1957 when most of the upper leadership was either killed or captured by French Paratroopers. The brutality of the French interrogation methods and the political fallout from their use eventually led to the loss of international support for the French. Algeria was granted independence under the FLN in 1962.⁷⁵

This study will not focus on the exact details of the Battle of Algiers, the use of terrorism by the ALN, or the use of torture by the French to break down the ALN hierarchy. The brief background of the Battle of Algiers has been given to demonstrate the ALN's military presence within this conflict and its role as the military arm of the FLN. The national level structure of the FLN, its complexity, and its precise hierarchical breakdown is another area for possible further study. This thesis will focus on the internal command structure of the ALN in Algiers and the command relationship of its members as it existed in the Casbah from 1956 to 1957.

B. ALN COMMAND STRUCTURE

Figure 13 outlines the ALN command structure in 1956 and 1957. The data for Figure 13 is taken from Roger Trinquier's book *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*. Trinquier was a Lieutenant Colonel on General Jacques Massu's staff during the Battle of Algiers. He successfully instituted a program of clandestine informants inside the Casbah which provided vital information of the exact command structure of the ALN. Trinquier describes the ALN's command structure in the following manner, "[t]he district commander and his deputy were at the head of three armed groups, each headed by a leader and deputy and composed of three cells of three men each."⁷⁶ Jacques Massu confirms the declination of the organization into sets of three in the statement, "*Il semble que le système soit ternaire.*[It appears the system was ternary.]"⁷⁷ Trinquier further describes the structure of the ALN in the statement, "[a] clandestine organization of such size and complexity requires for its creation both time and a precise

⁷⁵ For more information on the Battle of Algiers and the French use of torture and its affects see Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*. Revised ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), and Douglas Porch, *The French Foreign Legion* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), as well as the movie "The Battle of Algiers" directed by Gilla Pontecorne, 1966.

⁷⁶ Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, trans. Daniel Lee (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1964), 11.

⁷⁷ Jacques Massu, *La Vraie Bataille D'Alger* (Paris: Libratrie Plon, 1971), 383.

technique.”⁷⁸ Trinquier’s description of the ALN command structure provides evidence for the complexity and precision of the organization’s hierarchy as well as its secrecy.




Figure 13. ALN Command Structure in Algiers. (After: Trinquier)

The ALN command hierarchy closely resembled that of a traditional military command structure with a commander at the head of the organization and an executive officer below him. The commander of the organization provided guidance and mission instructions to his subordinates within his command structure based upon his mission, similar to a traditional military commander. The executive officer served as his chief of staff and second in command of the organization. Each lower level within the command also had a commander and an executive officer with cells of three being the lowest level of operation within the structure. This structure resembled a traditional military battalion level structure with a battalion commander at the top of the organization, company commanders below him, and platoon leaders below the company commanders.

The cells of this organization resembled the platoons of traditional military hierarchies and represented the lowest level of the organization. This is the primary level

⁷⁸ Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, trans. Daniel Lee (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1964), 13-14.

of military operations conducted against the French Paratroopers and *pied noir* during the Battle of Algiers. Due to their network structure, the cells provided a measure of operational security to the hierarchy of the organization. Cell members lacked knowledge of the organization above their immediate superiors and about other cells at the same level within the organization.

Although not shown in Figure 13, the ALN also had a “shock group” located at the top of the organization which operated separately from the lower levels and reported directly to the commander.⁷⁹ This group served as a special staff to the commander and consisted of bomb making, internal police, “shock group,” and logistics.⁸⁰ This group conducted operations under the direct orders and supervision of the commander and as Trinquier describes, was “[c]arefully kept apart from other elements of the organization.”⁸¹ The precise nature of the command hierarchy and delineation into groups of three shows the highly organized and structured nature of the ALN command hierarchy.

The command structure of the ALN allowed for effective operations against the French during the Battle of Algiers. However, the detail of the organization and the clear breakdown into groups of three allowed for effective intelligence collection against the organization despite the cell structure at the lowest level. Once the lowest level of the ALN was penetrated, the ability to know which positions were still operating was possible. It was also possible to confirm the positions of individual members within the organization. Professor Douglas Porch describes a consequence of the ALN’s detailed organizational structure in the statement, “[o]ne of the most flagrant security breaches was created by the FLN’s tendency, curiously bureaucratic for a clandestine organization, to generate tremendous amounts of paper- reports on meetings or of operations in which the names of those who had performed especially well were cited for special recognition.”⁸² The precision and detailed command hierarchy of the ALN allowed for

⁷⁹ Martha Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 10.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 11.

⁸¹ Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, trans. Daniel Lee (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1964), 13.

⁸² Douglas Porch, *The French Foreign Legion* (New York: Harper Collins Publisher, 1991), 584.

effective operations against the French, however, it was the same precision and organization that eventually led to the ALN's destruction.

Figure 14 shows the actual command structure of the ALN in the Casbah from 1956 to 1957 as described by Jacques Massu in his book *La Vraie Bataille d'Alger*.⁸³ Figure 14 shows Ben M'hidi at the top of the organization. Ben M'hidi was the FLN political leader of the city of Algiers and gave instructions to his ALN commander Yacef Saadi for military operations.⁸⁴ The placement of Ben M'hidi at the top of the organization demonstrates the importance of the political arm of the FLN in relation to its military operations. The position of the military commander below the political leader also demonstrates the use of military operations to support the FLN's political goals during the conflict and the importance of political operations over military ones. Ben M'hidi was eventually captured by the French Paratroopers on February 25, 1957 and died while in captivity on March 6, 1957 under suspicious circumstances.⁸⁵ Ben M'hidi's death, however, did not break down the command structure of the organization. Yacef Saadi assumed complete command of ALN operations in Algiers and continued its operations until his own capture later that same year. Yacef Saadi's complete control of the organization after Ben M'hidi's death demonstrates the vertical movement typical of hierarchical organizations with a defined command structure.

Alistair Horne describes the detail and precision of Yacef Saadi's military organization in his book *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* as, "a meticulously organized hierarchy."⁸⁶ The hierarchical command structure of the organization shown in Figure 14 shows the clear lines of authority from the top of the organization to the operating cells at the bottom. Figure 14 also shows Amara Ali, known as Ali la Pointe, in the deputy position to that of Yacef Saadi. Alistair Horne described him as, "Yacef's most loyal and valuable lieutenant," however his exact position and title within the

⁸³ Jacques Massu, *La Vraie Bataille D'Alger* (Paris: Libratrie Plon, 1971), 383.

⁸⁴ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*, Revised ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 184.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 194-195.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 184.

organization is unclear.⁸⁷ His description as being Yacef Saadi's lieutenant denotes a lower position within the command hierarchy, but his importance within the organization and his loyalty to Yacef Saadi placed him above that of the armed group commanders. Jacques Massu's book also places Amara Ali at the top of the organization and in a deputy role to that of Yacef Saadi.⁸⁸

Amara Ali was also described as being head of Yacef Saadi's "shock group."⁸⁹ Despite the ambiguity as to his exact command position within the hierarchy, his position at the upper level of the organization is clear and is shown in Figure 14 below that of Yacef Saadi, but above the armed group leaders. His importance at the top of the organization is also evident with the destruction of the ALN and the accepted end of the Battle of Algiers upon his death. Alistair Horne confirms this in the statement, "[w]ith the death of Ali la Pointe in the autumn of 1957 the grim Battle of Algiers was truly ended."⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*, Revised ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 187.

⁸⁸ Jacques Massu, *La Vraie Bataille D'Alger* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1971), 383.

⁸⁹ Martha Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 10.

⁹⁰ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*, Revised ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 218.




Figure 14. Casbah ALN Command Structure. (After: Massu)

C. ANALYSIS

The precision and highly organized command structure of the ALN allowed it to effectively and efficiently operate during the Battle of Algiers, however, these same characteristics also allowed the French to effectively break down the organization's hierarchy and capture or kill most of its members including the capture of Yacef Saadi; and the killing of Amari Ali. The demise of the ALN following the capture and death of the ALN's upper leadership could lead to the conclusion that the individuals within this command hierarchy were more important than the command positions they occupied. This, however, is not entirely true. The geographically isolated position of the Casbah and the dwindling support of the upper leadership of the FLN of Saadi's terrorism methods put Saadi's capture and Ali's death into a different context. The ALN was unable to reorganize because the French Paratroopers isolated the Casbah from the rest of

the city and the rest of the country. Movement in and out of the Casbah was controlled by military checkpoints and the Paratroopers routinely conducted mass roundups of the population in order to conduct interrogations. The FLN was unable to reorganize the command structure of the ALN due to the almost complete control of the Casbah by the French. From this perspective, the French targeted the organization as a whole and denied it the ability to reorganize.

The French specifically targeted the organization as a whole and by effectively cordoning off the entire Casbah, they were able to break down the organization from the lowest level up. Trinquier demonstrates the French strategy of targeting the entire organization in the statement, “[t]o win, we have to destroy this entire organization.”⁹¹ Alistair Horne also describes the French Paratrooper’s actions against the organization as a whole in the statement,

threads of intelligence gathered in the course of rounding up the bombers were leading back closer and closer to the really big fish. To Godard, ‘the man who places the bomb is but an arm that tomorrow will be replaced by another arm.’ It was essential to get at the brain behind the arm.⁹²

Horne’s description of the Paratrooper’s actions provides evidence for the strategy of attacking the entire command structure of the organization as well as the ALN’s capacity to regenerate itself at lower levels.

During the Battle of Algiers, the ALN continually tried to rebuild its organization as members were either captured or killed; however, the organization’s ability to completely reorganize at the upper levels was extremely limited due to its isolation. Horne provides evidence for the ALN’s lower level reorganization in the statement, “Yacef being Yacef, he refused to accept defeat, and in a remarkable fashion began to pick up the pieces, reconstitute his organization and prepare for a fresh offensive.”⁹³ However, despite Yacef’s efforts to rebuild his organization, the geographical isolation

⁹¹ Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, trans. Daniel Lee (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1964), 67.

⁹² Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*, Revised ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 194.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 208.

and loss of support from the upper leadership of the FLN eventually allowed the French to completely destroy Saadi's military structure within the city of Algiers.

D. CONCLUSION

The detailed organization and hierarchical nature of the ALN is evident in both the command structure of the ALN and its organization within the Casbah. The movement of Yacef Saadi to head of the organization upon Ben M'hidi's death shows the upward movement within this command hierarchy as well as the organization's initial ability to continue operations. The geographical isolation of the ALN in the Casbah and the destruction of the organization from the ground up prevented the ALN from completely reorganizing and continuing operations.

Despite the French success, Yacef Saadi did try and rebuild the ALN hierarchy. However, his own capture and his isolation from the rest of the FLN prevented the organization from completely rebuilding. The success of the French during the Battle of Algiers demonstrates the importance of targeting the entire organization and not just members at either the top or bottom of the hierarchy.

V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

There are fundamental differences between organized crime families and insurgent organizations that need to be addressed in order to analyze the validity of the analogy between the groups and place it in the correct contexts. By acknowledging the clear differences between organized crime and insurgent groups, one can then accurately compare their similarities and make the correct deductions.

Organized crime families are criminal organizations that are largely parasitic within society, focusing on illicit enterprises in order to make a profit. They lack a stated political ideology outside the enterprise of making money for the organization. They work outside the laws of society and use the gaps in governmental control to make money for their members. They do not seek to overthrow the government, but merely use members of the existing structure to protect their illegal activities. They would rather bribe and control governmental officials than implement a government structure of their own. By bribing officials, organized crime nullifies the existing system in order to conduct business. Hugh Barlow confirms this in the statement, “[b]ecause it pays off in security, organized crime will continue to pursue the nullification of government.”⁹⁴ Organized crime families depend on the laws of society in order to make money from their illicit enterprises. They do not seek to replace the existing structure with a government of their own. The laws of society also provide the basis for their illegal activities. If there were no laws against their activities, they would not be able to make a profit from conducting them. They need an existing governmental structure to conduct their operations.

Organized crime does not seek membership for the purposes of popular support within a given population. It recruits mainly for expansion of its own enterprises. A member of society can not simply want to join the organization and sign up. Membership is sought by the organization itself for its own advantages and purposes, such as protection or the advancement of profit.

⁹⁴ Hugh Barlow, *Introduction to Criminology*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1981), 275.

Insurgent organizations, however, usually have a clearly defined ideology for the purposes of replacing the existing governmental structure. They seek to replace the existing structure of government and its laws with a government and laws of their own. Andrew Krepinevich expresses this in the statement, “[a]n insurgency is a *protracted struggle* conducted methodically, step by step, in order to obtain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order.”⁹⁵ Insurgent groups seek membership as a basis of popular support for their cause and use the population in order to overthrow the existing governmental structure. Krepinevich writes, “[t]he bottom line for a successful guerilla warfare operation, then, is a primary support system anchored on the population.”⁹⁶ The population becomes the basis of insurgent operations rather than using the population for the organization’s profit. Insurgent organizations also draw upon a societal need or perceived societal need rather than the goal of making a monetary profit from the existing gaps in the governmental structure. Insurgent groups do not seek to work within the laws of a given society; rather, they seek to replace them.

With some of the basic conceptual differences between organized crime and insurgencies identified, there are some similarities between both organizations that merit comparative analysis. The organizational command structure of the La Cosa Nostra crime families of New York and the command structure of the ALN in the Casbah during the Battle of Algiers are very similar and provide a basis for command structure analysis. Both the individual crime families in New York and the ALN in the Casbah have a clearly defined hierarchy and command structure. The command positions within both organizations are also very similar and play a similar role within each organization.

The secrecy of both organizations is also very similar as well as their mechanisms for maintaining it. Structurally both groups organize at the lowest level in order to protect their upper level leadership. The existence of both organizations is also highly dependent on secrecy within the population. By analyzing the similarities between

⁹⁵ Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 7.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 9.

organized crime and insurgent groups and in the correct context, one is in a better position to apply correct law enforcement strategies effectively to counterinsurgency operations and doctrine.

B. VALID ANALOGIES IN COMMAND STRUCTURE

The command structure of individual crime families in New York and the ALN in the Casbah are very similar and provide a valid basis for the command structure analogy. Each group organized itself in a clear hierarchy with a defined chain of command from the top down. Figures 1 and 12 show the similarity between these organizations based on their structure alone. The individual crime family charts listed in Chapter III as well as the ALN command chart listed in Chapter IV provide supporting evidence for this conclusion

The position of the boss as the leader of an organized crime family is similar to the district commander position within the ALN. The 1967 Task Force on Organized Crime Report states that, “[e]ach family is headed by one man, the “boss,” whose primary functions are maintaining order and maximizing profits.”⁹⁷ Within the context of organized crime families, the boss provided guidance to the family and issued commands based on the family’s primary mission of making money. The district commander of the ALN maintained a similar role within its command structure. He provided instructions to his subordinates based on the ALN’s mission of providing military operations in support of the FLN’s political objectives. Within their contexts both positions are similar to that of a military commander, where in the leader guides the direction of the organization according to its mission- for organized crime, making money, and for the ALN, supporting the political goals of the insurgency. Yacef Saadi’s position as commander of the ALN is analogous to John Gotti’s position as boss of the Gambino Family or Philip Rastilli’s as boss of the Bonanno Family. Saadi, Gotti, and Rastilli clearly led their organizations and their position at the top of the command hierarchy confirms this conclusion.

The underboss in an organized crime family is similar to the deputy commander of the ALN in both his command relationship to the leader and his role within the

⁹⁷ United States Task Force on Organized Crime. Task Force Report: Organized Crime. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967, 7.

organization. The underboss is described as, “the vice president or deputy director of the family. He collects information for the boss; he relays messages to him and passes his instruction down to his own underlings. In the absence of the boss, the underboss acts for him.”⁹⁸ The deputy commander of the ALN maintained a similar role within that command hierarchy. He acted as the executive officer of the organization and second in command to the district commander.

The position of lieutenant within organized crime families is similar to the armed group leader of the ALN. The 1967 Task Force on Organized Crime described the role of lieutenants in the following statement,

. . . *caporegime* serve as chiefs of operating units. The number of men supervised in each unit varies with the size and activities of particular families. Often the *caporegima* [the position of *caporegime*] has one or two associates who work closely with him, carrying orders, information, and money to the men who belong to his unit.⁹⁹

The armed group leaders of the ALN maintained a similar role within their organization. Trinquier described the armed group leaders in the following manner, “three armed groups, each headed by a leader and deputy and composed of three cells of three men each.”¹⁰⁰ The position of the armed group leader and his deputy is similar to that of the lieutenants and their associates both in terms of their command roles and their positions as leaders of the operating level of their organizations. This is similar to the company commander over his platoon leaders and platoons within a traditional military organization.

The position of soldiers and their cell structure as described in Chapter III is similar to the operating cells at the bottom of the ALN command structure. This level of the organization is similar to the platoons within a military structure. The organized crime families and ALN both used cell networks at the lowest level to provide security to the upper echelons of the command structure and conduct day to day operations. The

⁹⁸ United States Task Force on Organized Crime. Task Force Report: Organized Crime. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967, 7.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 8.

¹⁰⁰ Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, trans. Daniel Lee (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1964), 11.

lowest level of both structures also conducted the majority of each organization's operations and was most visible to authorities.

The command structure within both the organized crime families of New York and the ALN is clearly visible in the detailed hierarchy of both organizations. The command structures of both organizations are analogous; however, they still need to be viewed within their correct contexts. The importance of the commander within the organizations could lead to the conclusion that targeting the upper leadership would break down both organizations. The data for organized crime families clearly shows this not to be the case. The death and capture of the ALN in Algiers could also provide evidence for targeting the leadership of the organization. The context of the ALN, however, is slightly different from that of the organized crime families of New York and demonstrates the importance of detailed analysis before making complete assumptions. The ALN was unable to reorganize and rebuild due to the specific and unique tactical situation within Algiers and not necessarily due to the importance of the individual leaders. The ALN clearly tried to reorganize its lower leadership under Yacef Saadi, however, the tactical situation limited its efforts and prevented the organization from completely rebuilding.

Based on the data collected on both the organized crime families in New York and the ALN, each organization has a clear commander, with a deputy who acts either on his behalf or relays instructions down to subordinate members. The commander guides the organization according to its mission and leads the command hierarchy of the organization. The clear delineation at the top of the organization also allows for unity of command within the organization, which is often critical to mission success. The middle leadership within each organization was also in charge of the bottom of the organization, where day to day operations occur. The bottom of both organizations also provide a level of security and secrecy between the lowest level and the upper command.

Within the context of either the crime families of New York or the ALN, the strategy of targeting the organization as a whole can be effective. Both Trinquier and Horne acknowledged that the French targeted the ALN as a whole instead of individual members, causing the eventual collapse of the ALN in the Casbah. As Trinquier stated, “[v]ictory therefore can be attained only through the complete destruction of the entire

organization.”¹⁰¹ The FBI website and its stated strategy as outlined in Chapter I provide evidence for the law enforcement strategy of targeting organized crime families as wholes instead of going after individual members. The similarity of command structure between organized crime families and insurgencies provides a valid analogy for this strategy and is an important lesson in developing counterinsurgency strategy for future operations.

The similarities in command structure also provide a basis for collecting intelligence on insurgent organizations. If a target of collection is at the bottom of the hierarchy, he may not know who is above his immediate superior. Asking him the exact structure of the organization will likely provide little to no actionable intelligence. However, by knowing that there is a defined command structure, it may be possible to learn about the structure of the insurgency through well-placed intelligence assets.

C. VALID ANALOGIES IN SECRECY

Both organized crime families and insurgent organizations rely on secrecy within a given population for survival. Professor Gordon McCormick describes secrecy as the insurgent’s only advantage over conventional military forces.¹⁰² Secrecy allows both organized crime families and insurgent organizations to operate within a given population.

Both Trinquier and Horne continually refer to the ALN as a clandestine organization, providing evidence for the secrecy of this organization. Trinquier confirms the secrecy of the ALN in the statement, “Yassef Saadi. . . was able to install himself within 200 yards of the office of the army commandant of the Algiers sector and remain there without being found for several months before his arrest.”¹⁰³ The secrecy of the organization is also evident in its cell structure at its lowest level. This prevented members at the lowest level from knowing other individuals within the organization or having a good picture of the group as a whole.

¹⁰¹ Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, trans. Daniel Lee (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1964), 11.

¹⁰² Professor Gordon McCormick, Department of Defense Analysis, class notes from SO3802.

¹⁰³ Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, trans. Daniel Lee (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1964), 15.

Organized crime families rely on secrecy for the same reasons as insurgent organizations: security. Edward Allen describes this in the book *Merchants of Menace: The Mafia* in which he states, “[i]ts success depends upon its anonymity, upon its ability to remain undiscovered.”¹⁰⁴ He continues by stating that, “it may be said with accuracy that the Mafia is a secret society.”¹⁰⁵ Joseph Pistone’s testimony before the 1988 Committee on Governmental Affairs also provides evidence for this conclusion. Donald Cressey also confirms the secrecy of organized crime in the statement, “[t]he ongoing activities of organized criminals simply are not accessible to observation by the ordinary citizen or the ordinary social scientist.”¹⁰⁶ Abadnisky also provides evidence for the secrecy within organized crime in the statement, “[d]ecentralization in a criminal organization is advantageous for both business and security reasons.”¹⁰⁷ The secrecy of organized crime is dependent upon the population and the rules under which the organization operates. Without secrecy, law enforcement would be able to completely target organized crime families, gather sufficient evidence and eliminate their organizations. Organized crime must maintain secrecy in order to operate and continue its existence.

D. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY

There are several other analogies that can be made between organized crime and insurgencies that are not covered in this thesis, but could provide further areas for study. Cohesive and bonding mechanisms are one area of possible study that could provide useful insights for applying law enforcement social control methods to counterinsurgency operations. Ethnicity and unit cohesion within organized crime families and insurgencies, either through family or ethnic linkages or through societal ones such as prison time, are another. Phil Williams, an expert on transnational criminal networks, describes this type of cohesion in the statement,

¹⁰⁴ Edward Allen, *Merchants of Menace: The Mafia* (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C Thomas Publisher, 1962), 5.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Donald Cressey, "Methodological Problems in the Study of Organized Crime as a Social Problem." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 374, no. Combating Crime (Nov., 1967): 102. [journal online]; available from www.jstor.org; Internet; accessed September 13, 2006.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

bonding will be directly related to family or kinship. . . Other bonding mechanisms include ethnicity and common experience in which participants develop a strong sense of trust and mutual reliance. Membership in youth gangs or time spent together in prison can also provide critical bonding mechanisms.¹⁰⁸

Prison, ethnic similarities and family ties are also strong cohesive mechanisms within insurgency groups.¹⁰⁹ The ALN developed along similar lines, recruiting from within prisons and Arab ethnicities in the Casbah.¹¹⁰

The analogy that organized crime is similar to a system of government with its own leaders, rules, and enforcement mechanisms similar to insurgency groups and their position as the “anti-state” is another area for possible further study.¹¹¹ As Donald Cressey in *Theft of the Nation* describes the position of criminal family leaders, “[t]he bosses succeed in part because they are controllers of a large business enterprise, as well as the rulers of an illicit government.”¹¹² Hugh Barlow, a sociology professor at Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, also demonstrates the similarity between organized crime and government in the statement, “[o]rganized crime has been likened to government in this sense; not only do syndicates create their own rules, but like states, have their own machinery for enforcing them and their own methods of doing it.”¹¹³ Both organized crime families and insurgencies have their own forms of government, either for their own day to day operations as with organized crime or as a means to replace the existing form of government as with an insurgency.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁸ Phil Williams, “Transnational Criminal Networks,” in *Networks and Netwars*, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 72.

¹⁰⁹ For more information on bonding mechanisms within organized crime families see Francis Ianni. “New Mafia: Black, Hispanic and Italian Styles.” *Society* 35, no. 2 (Jan/Feb, 1998): 115. Journal online; available from www.proquest.com; Internet.

¹¹⁰ For more information on the recruitment and initiation of the ALN members see Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, (New York: Penguin Books, 1987).

¹¹¹ Professor Gordon McCormick, Department of Defense Analysis, class notes from SO3802.

¹¹² Donald Cressey, *Theft of the Nation* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 221.

¹¹³ Hugh Barlow, *Introduction to Criminology*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1981), 273.

¹¹⁴ Joseph Pistone’s testimony before the Committee on Governmental Affairs in April 1988 provides insight to the comparison of the state inside a state analysis in organized crime families. It can be found in Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate, *Organized Crime: 25 Years After Valachi*, One Hundredth Congress, Second sess., 1988, 205-208.

The use of violence as an enforcement mechanism is another area where we see analogies between organized crime and insurgencies. Both organizations use violence either for their own enforcement of rules or to control the local population and maintain their positions of power and control within the community. The use of violence and its effect as a social control mechanism is another area for further research and possible applicable analogies.

The strategy of targeting an entire organization rather than the leader is an area that merits further study. The French in Algeria used this strategy to effectively destroy the ALN during the Battle of Algiers, and the FBI strategy against organized crime follows a similar methodology. Although the context of both organizations is different, their similarities merit further study as to the general applicability of this strategy.

Another area for further study is the use of informants and undercover agents against both organized crime families and insurgent groups. The French effectively used a secret network of informants under Roger Trinquier to outline the structure of the FLN. Joseph Pistone's position within the Bonanno Family in New York and his testimony demonstrates the applicability of undercover operatives to organized crime families. Although the tactical situation may not allow this type of operation, the importance that insiders play in determining the complete structure of either organized crime families or insurgent organizations merits further analysis and comparison.

In collecting data on both organized crime families and the ALN, data was found supporting the use of social control mechanisms by both organizations. The ALN used both violence and other non-coercive mechanisms in order to gain control of the population of the Casbah during the Battle of Algiers. Joseph Pistone's testimony describes the effects of organized crime's social control mechanism within the neighborhoods of New York (see Chapter I). The similarities between both organizations merit further study in order to provide a complete and valid analogy between both organized crime and insurgent groups.

This thesis analyzed one insurgent organization and the crime families of New York and found comparisons between the two. Further studies on other insurgent organizations and other organized crime families are needed to completely confirm the results found in this thesis.

E. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis was to show that there were valid organizational analogies between organized crime families and insurgencies. This study specifically focused on the similarities in command structure and the secrecy of the La Cosa Nostra crime families in New York and the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in the Casbah. By showing that there are valid analogies between both organized crime and insurgency organizations, further studies can be conducted on the complete applicability of modern law enforcement tactics to military operations and their feasibility in the Army's emerging counterinsurgency doctrine.

There are organizational similarities between both organized crime in America and insurgencies. By understanding these similarities and the context in which they exist, it may be possible to expand the current counterinsurgency doctrine to include anti-organized crime techniques that are relevant to the tactical situation. The study of organized crime also provides commanders in the field the ability to make the correct linkages between organized crime families and insurgent organizations and to refine their intelligence collection based on a structural knowledge of these organizations.

By analyzing historical data from La Cosa Nostra crime families of New York and comparing them to the ALN in the Casbah from 1956 to 1957, this thesis has shown that there are organizational and conceptual analogies between the two. Both insurgencies and organized crime families organize themselves as secret societies with similar hierarchical command structures. This is done both for survival within a population and for operational needs based on the environment, such as a particular ethnically homogeneous neighborhood in either New York or in the Casbah of Algiers. For survival, both organized crime families and insurgencies must remain hidden from authorities, whether from law enforcement agencies such as the FBI or the military. Both must also maintain anonymity within the civilian population in order to conduct their business.

This thesis has shown the importance of knowing the organization's command structure within organized crime families and insurgencies. Knowing the social context of either organized crime families or insurgencies may not be enough to break down their organizations. By knowing the command structure as well as the social conditions, commanders can then target the correct individuals within these organizations and attack the organization as a whole.

The strategy of targeting the entire organization is applicable to both insurgent organizations and organized crime families. By targeting the entire network and not just the individual members, military commanders can focus their efforts against insurgent organizations and apply the appropriate law enforcement and military tactics, techniques and procedures. The analogies between organized crime in America and insurgent organization provide the basis for this strategy of targeting the organization as a whole.

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