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THESIS

THE MILITARY COOPERATION GROUP

by

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December 2006

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THE MILITARY COOPERATION GROUP

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ABSTRACT

The United States has experienced a significant amount of difficulty of late with two factors: a) the question of how to fight against a networked enemy, and b) the need for more cultural intelligence. This thesis will describe a structure to assist with both those needs. The premise is that an expanded and improved network of US Military Groups is the weapon of choice for the war on terror, and beyond. The purpose of this thesis is to propose a policy that will consolidate the functions of Defense Attachés, Security Assistance Officers, and a proposed corps of ethnographic information officers into a network of embassy annexes that will cover every nation in which the United States has a country team. The intertwined questions of how to fight a network and how to gather cultural intelligence present the United States with a strategic challenge, and require the examination of the type of information the Department of Defense captures, and what is to be done with that information. This thesis proposes a means to collect ethnographic information and a structure for using it to make effective decisions in a variety of traditional security roles as well as in the fight against transnational terror networks.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United States has experienced a significant amount of difficulty of late with two factors: a) the question of how to fight against a networked enemy, and b) the need for more cultural intelligence. This thesis will describe a structure to assist with both those needs. The premise is that an expanded and improved network of US Military Groups is the weapon of choice for the war on terror, and beyond. The purpose of this thesis is to propose a policy that will consolidate the functions of Defense Attachés, Security Assistance Officers, and a proposed corps of ethnographic information officers into a network of embassy annexes that will cover every nation in which the United States has a country team. The intertwined questions of how to fight a network and how to gather cultural intelligence present the United States with a strategic challenge, and require the examination of the type of information the Department of Defense captures, and what is to be done with that information. This thesis proposes a means to collect ethnographic information and a structure for using it to make effective decisions in a variety of traditional security roles as well as in the fight against transnational terror networks.

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I. THE PROBLEM: DOUBLE TROUBLE

A. INTRODUCTION: DOUBLE TROUBLE

The United States has experienced a significant amount of difficulty of late with two factors: a) the question of how to fight against a networked enemy, and b) the need for more cultural intelligence (Renzi, 2006, pp. 16-22). This thesis will describe a structure to assist with both those needs. The premise is that an expanded and improved network of US Military Groups is the weapon of choice for the war on terror, and beyond. The purpose of this thesis is to propose a policy that will consolidate the functions of Defense Attachés, Security Assistance Officers, and a proposed corps of ethnographic information officers into a network of embassy annexes that will cover every nation in which the United States has a country team. The intertwined questions of how to fight a network and how to gather cultural intelligence present the United States with a strategic challenge, and require the examination of the type of information the Department of Defense captures, and what is to be done with that information. This thesis proposes a means to collect ethnographic information and a structure for using it to make effective decisions in a variety of traditional security roles as well as in the fight against transnational terror networks.

B. FIGHTING THE NETWORK: A NEW WAR

President Bush himself emphasized that the US is in a new kind of war in his speech of September 21st, 2001:

We will direct every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war—to the destruction and to the defeat of the *global terror network*. Now, this war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion.... Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a *lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever seen*. (Bush, 2001)

After the strategic shock of September 11th, 2001, much has been made of the idea that the most dangerous current threat is transnational terrorism, perpetrated by the ‘new’ form of warfare—the technologically empowered network, as embodied by Al Qaeda and

its associates. Such groups are sometimes called “dark networks” since their purposes are nefarious (Milward and Raab, 2002). Among networks, Al Qaeda is of course the most infamous and most current, but there are several other examples from the recent past and present, such as blood diamond and drug cartels, leading to the conclusion that such networks remain a challenge in the foreseeable future. The access of these networks to modern communications, transportation, and potentially to weapons of mass destruction makes them far more formidable adversaries than ever before in our history. The danger of such dark networks and the lack of government control over them were actually foreseen in the pre-September 11th findings of the Hart-Rudman Commission (Phase III) on the security environment of the 21st century:

In the Internet age, for example, information technologies may be used to empower communities and advance freedoms, but they can also empower political movements led by charismatic leaders with irrational premises. Such men and women in the 21st century will be less bound than those of the 20th by the limits of the state, and less obliged to gain large industrial capabilities in order to wreck havoc. For example, a few people with as little as a \$50,000 investment may manage to produce and spread a genetically-altered pathogen with the potential to kill millions of people in a matter of months. Clearly, the threshold for small groups or even individuals to inflict massive damage on those they take to be their enemies is falling dramatically. As for political life, it is clear that the rapidity of change is already overwhelming many states in what used to be called the Third World.... One result is that many national armies do not respond to government control. Another is that mercenaries, criminals, terrorists, and drug cartel operators roam widely and freely. (Hart-Rudman, 2001, p. 3-4).

The result has been a great deal of intellectual turmoil among both civilians and military personnel. Out of this turmoil has emerged the cry for more special operations forces, better language training, increased human intelligence, better cultural intelligence, enhanced man-hunting techniques, and so on. Significantly, there is a great deal of writing on restructuring US forces, championing the idea that “it takes networks to fight networks” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1996, p. 81).

C. THE LACK OF CULTURAL AWARENESS

When it came to Vietnam, we found ourselves setting policy for a region that was *terra incognita*. (McNamara, 1995, p. 32)

At the same time, the United States is wrestling with a lack of intimate familiarity with other cultures, which has led to bloody surprises in current conflicts. Regrettably, the traditional structure of United States military intelligence is not designed to be efficient at countering this threat. Retired Army Major General Robert Scales highlighted the mismatch in what US intelligence captures now, and what needs to be captured:

I asked a returning commander from the Third Infantry Division how well situational awareness (read aerial and ground intelligence technology) worked during the march to Baghdad. ‘I knew where every enemy tank was dug in on the outskirts of Tallil,’ he replied. ‘Only problem was, my soldiers had to fight fanatics charging on foot or in pickups and firing AK-47s and [rocket propelled grenades]. I had perfect situational awareness. What I lacked was *cultural awareness* [italics added]. Great technical intelligence...wrong enemy.’ (Scales, 2004).

In this thesis, the term ‘cultural awareness’ will be more accurately defined as ‘ethnographic information,’ and it is the key to setting policy for *terra incognita*. Although sometimes described as cultural or ethnographic ‘intelligence,’ the term ‘information’ is more suitable because this knowledge is unclassified and usually outside the realm of traditional intelligence data. The classification of ethnographic information into ‘intelligence’ would only limit its accessibility, which would be counterproductive. The *terra* in this case is the human terrain, and the information about it is too frequently unknown to those who wield the instruments of national power. It is this type of information that the United States needs in order to combat networks, anticipate alternative tactics such as those described by General Scales, and conduct counterinsurgency on a global scale.

1. The Definition of Ethnographic Information

According to Dr. Anna Simons of the United States Naval Postgraduate School:

What we mean by ethnographic intelligence is information about indigenous forms of association, local means of organization, and traditional methods of mobilization. Clans, tribes, secret societies, the *hawala* system, religious brotherhoods, all represent indigenous or latent

forms of social organization available to our adversaries throughout the non-Western, and increasingly the Western, world. These create networks that are invisible to us unless we are specifically looking for them; they come in forms with which we are not culturally familiar; and they are impossible to ‘see’ or monitor, let alone map, without consistent attention and the right training. (Simons & Tucker, 2004, p. 5)

Such ethnographic information is the only way to truly know a society, and is thus the best tool to divine the intentions of its members. The ‘indigenous forms of association and local means of organization’ are hardly alien concepts to us. Our own culture has developed what we call “social network analysis” (Krebs, 2006) in order to map these associations and forms of organization. It is the connections between people, and the unwritten rules of a society, that form key elements of information that, according to General Scales’ article, combat commanders are now demanding. These connections and rules form ‘traditional methods of mobilization’ that help people either support or oppose US goals, and therefore demand constant attention from the government and forces of the United States. Simply put, with ethnographic information we can make sense of personal interactions, trace the connections between people, determine what is important to people, and anticipate how they might react to certain events. As the United States no longer has the luxury of a relatively monolithic enemy, we must be much more aware of what is transpiring in what amounts to a confusing cauldron of different locales and societies. Each has its own ‘latent forms of social organization’ that create networks we cannot currently see or map, and to which we may very well fall victim unless we aggressively pursue this knowledge.

D. WHAT IS STILL UNADDRESSED

While General Scales illustrates the need for ethnographic information, and the Hart-Rudman Commission’s observations on networks led it to conclude that “the emerging security environment in the next quarter century will require different US military and other national capabilities (2001, p.3),” the specific nature of these capabilities remains unaddressed. What none of these calls for better information address is the base issue— how to gather ethnographic information, and how to decide what to do with it. Deciding what to do implies preparing and conducting operations at the time, place and manner of American, not foreign, choosing. The Hart-Rudman paragraph above clearly identifies ungoverned or under-governed spaces of the world: those places

that even if under nominal sovereign government control, are beyond the ability of the government to coerce. This political wilderness is not truly ungoverned; it is just not controlled by the recognized state government. Someone is in control, of that the observer may be sure. But the United States frequently cannot identify who is in control, and by which traditional associations that control is enforced. Drug cartels, terrorist organizations, tribal leaders, and so on, all have methods of enforcement that must be known if America is to make good decisions about intervention, assistance, or the use of force. A prime example is the US relief effort for the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. Upon arrival, the operations officer for the Combined Disaster Assistance Center - Pakistan (CDAK-PAK) noted the lack of current information on the country, even maps. He later commented on a specific province: "Having only one US military guy in the last 6 years go up to the Kashmir province didn't do us any favors" (Lt. Col. Aaron "Spud" Aldridge, interview, July 13, 2006, aboard the USS Coronado, San Diego, CA).

This thesis will describe a mode of organization that can address both the issues of fighting dark networks and gathering ethnographic information. This thesis draws on the experiences of others captured in their own written accounts, and through over 40 extensive first-person interviews across Services and agencies, as well as the author's own experience. I also include 2 historical and 2 current case studies. In the following text, Chapter II describes the proposed organizational solution, which is titled the Military Cooperation Group, as a means to gain ethnographic information and a weapon to fight networks. Chapters III through VI describe the benefits of creating this structure, in terms of ethnographic information, command and control, information sharing, and war plans. Chapter VII examines 4 brief case studies to show the feasibility and challenges of this proposal. Chapter VIII makes recommendations and lists issues for further study. Annex A is designed to show the existing global coverage and gaps in the US diplomatic-military structure, which represents 'raw material' for the proposed solution. The remaining annexes support the case studies.

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II. THE SOLUTION: THE MCG IS THE WEAPON TO FIGHT NETWORKS

A. CONSOLIDATION OF DOD ACTIONS AT EMBASSIES

As the Department of Defense addresses how to gain the cultural or ethnographic information required to make good decisions, it is first of all imperative to recognize that current discussions of force structure transformation do not go deep enough. The United States must re-tailor its methods to cope with new post-Cold War kinds of disorder, especially the ambiguous area between peace and war. The primary method should be the consolidation of DoD activities at embassies, and expansion of the charter for DoD operations conducted from embassies. For the purposes of this thesis, I've dubbed this new center of gravity in embassies the Military Cooperation Group (MCG), which could also be described as an improved Military Group (MILGP), with the merger of the Defense Attaché Office, and some other key enablers. The key ingredient still missing is a corps of experts for ethnographic information. Such a corps of personnel has already been proposed, and its natural fit would be with the MCG.

B. WHAT THE MCG SHOULD LOOK LIKE

My purpose was to establish a modest network of US intelligence, operations, and planning capabilities in each capital and at the theater-operational level, using that regional network to try to pull together and to coordinate the efforts that we were undertaking in each country. (General Wallace H. Nutting, Commander, US Southern Command, 1979 to 1983, quoted in Manwaring & Prisk, 1988, p. 100).

The Military Cooperation Group should be the building block for an overt counter-network, which is defined here as an official US method of organization, combining elements of both a network and a hierarchy, in order to combat dark networks. While normally the term “network” should suffice, I have chosen to use the term “counter-network” to emphasize a proposal for the US effort to combat sinister networks such as Al Qaeda and the like. Such a counter-network could be an expanded version of what the former commander of US Southern Command proposed. A generic task organization for the Military Cooperation Group could be as follows:




Figure 1: The Military Cooperation Group Structure

The exact composition of a Military Cooperation Group should be flexible and tailored to the host nation. Should any neighboring countries represent denied space, the tools necessary to penetrate that space should factor into the composition of the MCG. The commander could be a Major or Lieutenant Colonel for small groups, or even a General Officer for groups with large and extensive missions. In more robust MCGs, for example those having US advisors with host nation forces, the structure may expand to include additional command and control assets, such as J-3 Operations, J-4 Logistics sections, and perhaps even a subordinate element to command the advisor teams. In general, the group should include the functions of the Defense Attaché Office, the Security Cooperation Office, the proposed ethnographic information collectors, psychological operations or the Military Information Support Team (MIST), and any other appropriate functions, such as civil affairs or special operations personnel. The MCG does not have to be completely active duty personnel, but should utilize the most locally appropriate mixture of US government civilians, local civilians, American military retirees, expatriates, third-country nationals, and so on.

The underlying assumption is that sovereign nations with tighter control can usually police most of their own populations, and can be persuaded to share police-style intelligence. For example, a Military Cooperation Group (MCG) in Paris is not going to

take unilateral action to address recruitment of angry Muslim youth in the slums of France, but would prefer to leave that negotiation to civilian US government agencies. However, even among treaty allies that are developed countries, it is important to note that there are zones—usually ethnic enclaves—where the host nation authorities have little control or knowledge. In these cases, it could be useful to have eyes and ears collecting ethnographic information, and identifying threats such as the Al Qaeda Hamburg cell before they reach the United States. As a rule of thumb, this thesis assumes that the poorer the nation, or the less internal control it has, the more extensive the US Military Cooperation Group (MCG) and its activities may be. Depending on the posture of the MCG, the attitude of the host nation, and the strength of the US interagency partners, the Military Cooperation Group could become a very powerful part of the counter-network in that country. In keeping with current DAO/SAO posture, this counter-network should remain overt. Military personnel are accustomed to executing their duties in the open, and the nature of the vast majority of the tasks discussed here, especially the gathering of ethnographic information, is overt work. The CIA should retain responsibility for its core competency in covert operations. The covert network developed by the CIA should be complemented by the overt network of the MCG, coordinated at the embassy level between the MCG commander and the chief of station.

In staffing overt tasks, it would be best to draw from all the Services in order to bring the right types of expertise to the MCG. For example, the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard should provide experts in littoral security issues, while the Army has a strong tradition of working with land forces. Likewise, a host nation could benefit from the Air Force's expertise in reconnaissance, transport, close air support, and so on. The MCG should be a Joint organization in order to capitalize on the *different* capabilities of the Services, and not be Joint simply for the sake of appearances.

It is significant to consider that many of the personnel who would staff a consolidated Military Cooperation Group already exist, and are active in the business. Annex A describes the countries where current Defense Attaché and Security Cooperation efforts are present or absent. When considering the idea that the requirement is a mere handful of military personnel per embassy, many of whom are already in the field, the magnitude of the proposed expansion could be fairly easily

supported. LTG Kohler, the current Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, noted that when stationed at USPACOM, he recommended a team of four military personnel per each embassy, and emphasized the importance of a team that understands operations, intelligence and security cooperation (interview, 25 July 2006, Washington, DC). Further, both LTG Kohler and a senior official in the Defense Intelligence Agency noted that it is clear that the Secretary of Defense wants such a consolidated effort for military activities in embassies (interviews 25 July and 3 October 2006, Washington, DC).

When discussing consolidation, some bureaucratic arrangements merit consideration. A large point is ‘unity of command’ in-country between the Defense Attaché and Security Assistance personnel. The commander of the MCG should probably have a dual role as the Defense Attaché in order to meet accreditation purposes. This unity of effort might be enhanced by seriously reconsidering the definitions of intelligence and security cooperation for a new century, possibly making the merger of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency an advantageous move. However, such a merger is beyond the scope of this thesis, which is concerned mainly with the MCG at the embassy level. An additional bureaucratic consideration for unity of command may be conflicting marching orders between the Departments of State and Defense. For this reason, it is important to establish a clear military chain of command from the Geographic Combatant Commander to the MCG commander. Due courtesy and effective coordination must be offered to the Ambassador, as he is the President’s personal representative, and in peacetime is held responsible for official American actions in that country. However, the military team on the ground is there to execute military tasks, and those priorities come from the Combatant Commander.

1. Why the Alternative Won’t Work

Inherent in the current debate about force transformation and culture-centric warfare is the idea that US ground units should become more expert in foreign cultures. Basic cultural familiarity at the individual and unit level is necessary and should be pursued, but will not solve US shortfalls in the ethnographic domain. It simply will take too much time and money to train every nineteen-year-old rifleman to be truly culturally

proficient, and the US will not expend the resources. Such focused ethnographic training would also require area specialization by each unit. The nation doesn't have a force that large. The truly in-depth knowledge of foreign societies required would imply units targeted to specific sub-regions, since one language and culture does not fit all areas of a combatant commander's responsibility. The southern Philippines is not Thailand, and Morocco has relatively little in common with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Likewise it is dangerous to assume that knowing a single language fits a unit to a sub-region. For example, Kenya alone has 61 languages, ranging from 400 people speaking Dahalo to over 5 million speaking Gikuyu (Ethnologue, 2006). The level of force structure to become truly immersed in each potential conflict area is not feasible. This sort of regional focus happens now to a very superficial extent, such as the 25th Infantry Division's participation in various USPACOM exercises every year. However, when DOD must add units to either training or combat rotations, they must come from another combatant commander's forces, who would then be working out of their cultural specialty. Those transplanted units are then unequipped, in spite of huge expense in their cultural and language training. A telling example is that of 3rd and 7th Special Forces Groups, oriented to Africa and Latin America respectively, who were required to shoulder some of the burden in Afghanistan. Since the nation is engaged in a "long war," (White & Tyson, 2006, p. A.8) one cannot rely on only the units that are trained for that region. The Department must spread out the rotations, or it will not touch the majority of forces. This thesis does not propose canceling initiatives to broaden cultural and language training among the Services – quite the opposite. However, the argument here is to avoid relying solely on basic language training for the average trooper. The Services should continue their plans for basic language training, in combination with an expanded inventory of "heritage speakers" in the Reserve Component (Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, 2005). These measures will provide a much needed capability at the basic and intermediate level, but do not address the need for deep understanding of foreign societies. A low-cost and more practical 'main effort' is to instead use a network of a few long-term people to set conditions through cultural reconnaissance, personal contacts, working relationships, and the construction of culturally attuned war plans.

This use of a few US personnel, formed into a specialized network, avoids the enormous, effort of trying to change an entire institution.

C. THE MISSING LINK: WHAT A CORPS OF ETHNOGRAPHIC INFORMATION PERSONNEL SHOULD LOOK LIKE

The MCG could offer a clever, effective, and economical alternative—a network of a few people immersed in the ethnography of local mores and associations. With this improved structure, the United States could use ethnographic information to see trends before they become shocks, fight networks, and accomplish several other tasks, which will be described later. What yet needs to be developed as part of this solution is a corps of personnel dedicated to gathering ethnographic information. Two key points in the development of an ethnographic corps are that these personnel must be devoted exclusively to the task without distraction, and that they must be allowed and rewarded for spending extended time in-country (Simons & Tucker, 2004). This type of work could be labeled a form of strategic reconnaissance, and in reconnaissance matters there is simply no substitute for being physically present on the ground in question. Since the ethnographic ground in question is actually the population, not necessarily the terrain, a constant and near-total immersion in the local population represents the means to turn the “*terra incognita*” that McNamara described into familiarity with “indigenous forms of association, local means of organization, and traditional methods of mobilization” (Simons & Tucker, 2004, p. 5).

While the Defense Attaché system is charged with the overt collection of political-military information, and the assessment of the military situation in particular countries, a comprehensive effort to collect and process ethnographic information is quite different. In essence, this is work for a cultural anthropologist. Regrettably, the anthropological community in academia has tremendous reservations about working with the military. At the same time, the Security Assistance officers attached to US country teams often obtain a fine appreciation of the cultural aspects of their host nation, but are not charged with the responsibility to collect ethnographic information, and may not always have a smooth relationship with the Defense Attaché, if one is even assigned (Marisa, 2003, p. 6-11). For all of these reasons, a specialized group of ethnographers is urgently needed. The solution is for the Department of Defense to grow its own cultural

experts—hybrids between soldiers and anthropologists, who may not have to be uniformed, but do have to look at cultural matters from a security standpoint.

D. ENORMOUS BENEFITS FROM THE MCG

Consolidating the different DoD functions into an MCG, with the addition of an ethnographic corps, could produce a number of additional benefits. An investment in round the clock presence could have several benefits, included in four broad categories. The first is the deep knowledge of cultures, personalities, networks, opportunities and dangers, and personal relationships built over time. The second is more streamlined command and control for operations including limited counterterrorism, limited counterinsurgency, security cooperation, civil-military efforts, and psychological operations. The third benefit is the direct sharing of information gained about terrorists in both a vertical and lateral fashion. Lastly, a good ethnographic familiarity with an area will provide a much better grounding for contingency plans, and the in-country personnel dedicated to the task will be a ready-made asset should a Joint Task Force be required for intervention. The following chapters will discuss these benefits.

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III. ETHNOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

A. CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE IDENTIFIES TRENDS BEFORE THEY BECOME SHOCKS

As previously stated, the gathering of ethnographic information can be crucial, because this deep knowledge of the local culture will automatically lead to identifying key personalities, networks, opportunities, and potential dangers. The point here is to maintain relationships and identify trends before they become shocks. Arguably this was the original intent behind the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program, although with more of a view toward military-to-military contacts, and more emphasis on the assessment of military equipment and capabilities. A predominantly military focus is where the current FAO program falls short, mainly for reasons of organizational culture and sparse numbers. Foreign Area Officers, primarily assigned to either Defense Attaché Offices (DAO), or Security Assistance Offices (SAO) already do good ethnographic reconnaissance as it relates to the host country military, but this type of information is not prioritized, stored, shared or used well. Additionally, the problem with the current system of Defense Attaché and Security Cooperation personnel is rotations are too short.

B. HOST NATION RELATIONSHIPS

In addition to American officers in foreign lands, host nation officers are frequently sent to US military schools under traditional security cooperation programs. Security assistance officers are instructed to track these international students and maintain contact when they return home. But the press of other duties and limited time in-country makes long term relationships difficult to nurture. The Military Cooperation Group (MCG) should become a base of friendship for the host nation officers who have attended school in the US. Allied nations generally send their most promising and best connected personnel to US schools. When the allied officer becomes a key decision-maker, he could have experienced a long, beneficial, and ongoing history with members of the US (MCG) in his country. A permanent Military Cooperation Group (MCG) with a certain percentage of long term staff could assist in tracking these allied personnel, maintain close friendships, and even ask host government permission for them to participate should a Combined Joint Task Force become necessary in the region.

Unfortunately, the US Servicemembers Protection Act of 2002 has sidetracked funding for IMET, the International Military Exchange Training program, which is the key avenue to provide American schooling to foreign officers. While some nations are free to pay for their personnel to attend schooling in the United States, many of the most vulnerable in the War on Terror cannot afford this. For example, the entire 2004 defense budget for Cameroon amounted to about \$132 million, or half the price of an F-22 fighter jet (Lubold, 2006). The literal cost of cultivating good relationships with individuals in countries that are most susceptible to the evils of transnational terrorism and its attendant dark networks is significant for other governments, yet a relative pittance for America. At the same time, if the United States does not cultivate these relationships, then surely someone else with opposing goals will do so. In addition to doing a much better job of tracking host nation officers who have been to the US, American officers should continue to nurture relationships with counterparts.

An interesting example of how this can benefit us is the case of US Army Colonel Jeff Donald (telephonic interview, 30 September 2006). For about half of his career, COL Donald maintained a good working relationship with his Belgian counterparts. As a junior officer, he was an exchange officer in 1st Belgian Corps for two years. After that, in a US assignment in Germany supervising the Belgian reciprocal exchange officer, then-Major Donald attended the war plan staff coordination meetings. Later, he became the Army Attaché in Brussels for three years, and then the Defense Attaché for 4 years. By the time Jeff Donald was the DATT, he maintained eleven years of contact with the same generation of officers. He essentially grew up in service with the host nation officers, and personally knew the Belgian Army Chief of Staff. He developed relationships, and when, as the DATT, he asked for help, he got it. Sometimes this assistance was overt and sometimes it was quiet help with sensitive issues. Colonel Donald's experience provides an interesting counterpoint to the "security assistance" mentality which often emphasizes that US officers need to have something tangible to trade for information. On the contrary, sometimes a long-lasting personal relationship is the best thing to have, although it is probably best combined with the "two-way street," or the ability to offer security assistance training, education, and equipment. In either case, a long term presence is absolutely critical.

Developing his understanding of the host nation from 1985 to 2000, Colonel Donald understood intimately the security needs of a NATO ally, and gained the trust of most of its general officer corps, notably LTG Willy Hanset, the Commander of the Land Forces Operational Command. This relationship proved extremely effective when the United States asked Belgium to provide constant year-round rotational units to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), and the shorter duration Albania Force (AFOR). Likewise there are sometimes classified favors¹ that the United States asks of its friends, and after official meetings break up for the day that type of cooperation can only really be gained by an American officer who has earned the personal trust of host nation decision makers. Donald described the difference in his relationship with the Belgian senior leadership, which was intimate, as opposed to his relations on a later tour as DATT in Ireland. A US officer can make friends in a two year stint, but the relationship is rather “superficial” in Donald’s words.

In addition to adequate time in-country, another nuance to the relationship between the US officer and his host counterparts is his role as a Security Assistance Officer, Defense Attaché, or both. Colonel Donald was involved in selling US helicopters to the Irish army, in his double role as both Defense Attaché and Security Assistance Officer, which raises the issue of unity of command. Colonel Donald, a seasoned Foreign Area Officer, liked wearing both hats. Indeed, when asked, he favored a Military Group-style entity under the direction of the Defense Attaché (telephonic interview, 30 September 2006), because of the unity of effort that synergy like this would guarantee. Regrettably, there are all too many counter-examples to Colonel Jeff Donald, of individuals not being allowed to stay in one culture over extended times. A colleague of his, who was even promoted to Brigadier General, is more typical. In this officer’s FAO career, he went from an exchange position in Belgium, to various attaché jobs in Macedonia and Korea, then to the Army G2 staff, and different positions in Belgium and NATO headquarters (COL(R) Jeff Donald, telephonic interview, 30 September 2006). Unfortunately, so many PCS moves obviated building the sorts of ties Jeff Donald developed.

¹ Sometimes the United States asks its allies to perform certain services quietly, such as the exchange of intelligence or the perhaps the surveillance of suspected terrorists, etc.

A similar example of personal relationships that were of direct benefit in counterinsurgency operations is the story of LTC Gabe Acosta, former military intelligence officer in El Salvador. During his first tour in 1983-84 he established a set of friendships and relationships that were very helpful. While these working friendships were beneficial during his first tour, the real pay off came on his second tour in 1990-91. Between tours in El Salvador, as part of his stateside professional military education, Acosta attended the School of the Americas, where he made the acquaintance of thirteen more Salvadoran officers. As a result, those officers were completely comfortable in sharing information with him during his second tour in country (interview, 25 July 2006, Pentagon). The Gabe Acostas of the US are the best examples of how personal contacts can be very useful to begin with, and can be reinforced by personnel assignment cycles.

C. DENIED SPACE

In addition to building relationships with individuals in government and military capacities, it is equally important to develop similar relationships with members of local groups, non-governmental organizations, and other indigenous networks in friendly nations especially when it comes to gaining information about denied adjacent territory. The primary means of penetrating hostile space should be a ring of American MCGs surrounding nations in which US personnel cannot operate freely. Such information can then be slowly and carefully crafted into influence. A secondary means of penetrating denied space is to use the counter-network of MCGs to project influence via indigenous networks or cyberspace. The case of ethnic Chinese networks (Williams, 1998, p. 157) proves instructive, because the concept of *guanxi*, or reciprocal obligation, extends beyond nations that are physically adjacent to China. This concept of extended reciprocity takes the return of favors or services across both time, such as generations, and distance, such as continents. It therefore represents an incredibly powerful tool in the hands of a network with evil intent, yet a tool unexploited in US efforts.

Since the power of both dark networks and their more benign counterparts is the ability to endure over time and transcend geography, US personnel can glean valuable insight into denied space by building on contacts beyond host nation individuals in adjacent countries. A complementary method to such vicarious penetration of denied space is the approach taken by Ruth Benedict. Her ethnography, *The Chrysanthemum*

and the Sword, written in 1944 to support the United States war effort, is a sterling example of the use of expatriates, refugees, exiles, businessmen, and anyone else who'd spent time in Japan. Benedict used immigrant, missionary, and diplomatic communities, as well as open source media such as film, radio and literature, to produce an understanding of culture in the denied space of Imperial Japan (Simons, 2006). Ruth Benedict is a pathfinder for those who are concerned with gaining insight into peoples who live beyond hard, impermeable borders, and there is much to be gained by connecting a network of military in-country teams to future Ruth Benedicts in both the United States and other countries.

When considering the countries that are actually denied to US personnel, it is useful to remember that while a certain amount of territory around the globe is physically difficult to get into, the number of governments that actually deny entry to US personnel is quite small. Several nations have tense relationships with the United States, but still host American embassies, and thus the potential for gathering information. Many nations have little or no American presence due to a lack of US interest. See Annex A for an analysis of US presence and denied space.

Although a certain amount of denied space is very real, when taken together, the three complementary approaches described here could serve the United States well by identifying trends, opportunities, and potential dangers before they become shocks to American vital interests.

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IV. PROVIDE LIMITED COMMAND AND CONTROL

A. A PERMANENT HEADQUARTERS: 4 TYPES OF OPERATIONS

This form of strategic cultural reconnaissance is crucial because its purpose should be to enable well-informed action. In the realm of low-key, fairly steady state operations, four main categories stand out: limited counterterrorism or counterinsurgency; traditional security cooperation; civil-military operations; and psychological operations. A properly tailored Military Cooperation Group in-country could provide the command and control of these operations, while a permanently stationed cadre would guarantee continuity. At the moment, the US tends to station either no one at all in a country; a handful of attachés or security cooperation personnel; or a full Joint Task Force (JTF). For either amassing knowledge of the social environment or controlling any operations, the first two are insufficient.

In providing command and control for US forces, the JTF is sufficient, but overly burdensome in the provision of manpower for the headquarters (JTF HQ). The main problem with filling the JTF HQ is the Joint Manning Document approach. Staffing the headquarters with a large number of Individual Augmentees (IA) drawn through the Services' personnel offices places an extraordinary drain on the Services, creates JTF headquarters that are at best inefficient, and risks breaking formations still at home by stripping out leadership that may or may not be available for their home unit's rotation overseas. Part of the difficulty in command and control that the US military faces is the huge inefficiency of manning the JTF HQ by individual augmentees, currently numbering in the thousands, with about 5597 in the whole of the US CENTCOM AOR alone. The bulk of several staffs are now comprised of individuals, not unit core headquarters. For instance, the Combined Forces Command Afghanistan has approximately 319 individuals out of 347 in the headquarters. Some of these staffs are almost 100% individuals, like the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan which has 215 out of 215 billets filled with IAs, all of whom have different arrival and departure dates. There is huge turnover with no one typically there for more than a year. Even HQ CENTCOM Forward has 914 of 947 slots filled by augmentees. The Horn of Africa JTF consists of about 302 individual augmentees of a 459 strong headquarters, only 89 of that total 459

are uniformed active duty personnel, and the remainder either reservists or contractors (Mr. Chris Bilello, USJFCOM J35, personal communication, October 8, 2006).

This condition stems from the lack of MCGs established, the relatively small number of major unit headquarters available for rotation as the nucleus of a JTF HQ, and the tendency for DoD planners to opt for the JTF as the weapon of first, not last, resort. The proposal of an extensive network of MCGs could reverse this draining condition by putting a small number of personnel on Permanent Change of Station into the host countries, thereby providing an alternative between a handful of DAO/SAO officers and a full JTF, with the attendant issues of which major command is to provide the nucleus and how many uncommitted units to ‘break’ in providing extended rotations of augmentees. In most cases, the MCG providing command and control to activities in-country will have to recognize the “triangular relationship” between the MCG commander, the Ambassador, and the Geographic Combatant Commander (Dr. Kalev Sepp, LTC(R), interview, 19 April, 2006, Monterey CA).

It is important to note that the military personnel in the MCG should be under the command of the Geographic Combatant Commander in order to safeguard the chain of command to the Secretary of Defense without interjecting command authority from the Department of State. However, it is also a reality that short of major combat operations, the Ambassador is the President’s personal representative to that country and is responsible for all American official activities there. The triangular relationship is not quite as streamlined as the average military officer would prefer and, some would caution about the danger of mixing military operations with such a triangle. Therefore, in the event of irreconcilable conflict, the authority of Geographic Combatant Commander should override that of the Ambassador. However in the ambiguous area between peace and war, for most day to day operations the MCG commander in reality must answer to two bosses. The Geographic Combatant Commander must respect the sensitivities of the Ambassadors in the region, and foster among them as supporting a climate as possible for MCG activities. This interaction should also drive more integration within embassies.

While this study proposes that the Geographic Combatant Commander should be the higher headquarters, there is a disagreement over which community should provide

the oversight, training, education, Washington-based command and control, consolidation of information from the field, and provision of policy and operational guidance out to the field. Should embassy-based operations fall under the primacy of the intelligence community or the ‘operations’ (security cooperation) community? In other words, should the training, education, information processing, and directions to the field be controlled more from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)? Certainly, both agencies utilize Foreign Area Officers, but DIA controls the Defense Attachés, and DSCA controls the Security Assistance (Cooperation) Officers.

There are three readily identifiable options for reconciling this control issue: the aforementioned two in either DIA or DSCA; and a third, which would entail a merge of the two agencies and a complete conceptual overhaul in the fundamental definitions of military-diplomatic intelligence and its interconnection with military cooperation in the twenty-first century. The idea of completely intertwining military intelligence with security cooperation is attractive from the point of view that working together with the host nation forces will naturally generate information, and that a certain amount of equipment, assistance or training enables the quid pro quo of ‘buying’ information. This would imply a truly ‘transformational’ step in the Department of Defense, and because this study entertains no illusions about the difficulty of breaking and redefining current paradigms in intelligence or security cooperation, or about the difficulty involved in merging large, complex agencies, the practical solution seems to be a decision to award primary responsibility for oversight and guidance to either DIA or DSCA. While some in both communities would argue that they possess the more operational mindset, the reality is that once the Secretary of Defense orders either agency to execute primary responsibility, the men and women of the department will, over time, make it work.

Making ‘it’ work at the embassy level means consolidating the current systems, and undertaking an expanded role. The case of unity of effort thus begets the case for unity of command when it comes to the country team. The MCG must have a commander “who understands intelligence, operations, and security cooperation,” in order to properly integrate all these actions (Lt. Gen. Kohler, interview, 25 July 2006, Washington, DC). This commander must be capable of directing the appropriate, tailored

level of operations in counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, security cooperation, civil-military relations, and psychological operations.

B. LIMITED COUNTERTERROR OR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

The MCG could be useful for a limited scale of command and control in counterterrorism or counterinsurgency. The limits in this vision are defined as the collection of ethnographic information in peaceful environments, and control of US combat advisors up through the scale of violence to a point just short of full warfare. Smaller and low-key operations can be controlled from a leaner MCG, while more extensive operations, such as advising and supporting host nation forces to conduct their own operations, will require a more robust headquarters. In significant and sustained operations that become more and more “hot,” the MCG may grow to resemble a traditional J-staff, and arguably, as the MCG expands to resemble a JTF headquarters, there should come a threshold where a JTF is established. In general terms, such a threshold could be the commitment of US combat units. Major combat operations, requiring the commitment of large US units, will usually require a full JTF headquarters as currently deployed, which is addressed in chapter VI. In the ambiguous conditions between peace and war, leaner MCGs should focus their limited missions to acquire the ethnographic information that can illuminate terrorist or insurgent connections.

A small number of Americans, usually military Foreign Area Officers, are already in tune with the type of ethnographic work necessary for counterterrorism or counterinsurgency, and some have achieved a high level of excellence. The problem is that they are too few in number, and they lack a truly comprehensive focus regarding the ethnographic aspects of networks. A sterling example of the capacity that the United States could build can be found in an officer named “David:”

Last summer, two dozen US Army Rangers headed for the Iraq-Syria border to figure out how foreign fighters were slipping through western Iraq's barren deserts. As they had done in the past, the Rangers took positions around each village and Bedouin encampment. At one village, an officer named David, accompanied by a small security team, strode into the center looking for someone who would talk. Unlike the clean-shaven, camouflage-clad Rangers, David wore a thick goatee and civilian clothes. The Rangers carried long, black M-4 carbine rifles. David walked with a small 9mm pistol strapped to his leg. The Rangers spoke English. He

spoke Arabic tinged with a Yemeni accent. As he recounts the day, David met a woman with facial tattoos that marked her as her husband's property. As they chatted, the pale-skinned, sandy-haired North Carolina native imitated her dry, throaty way of speaking. "You are Bedu, too," she exclaimed with delight, he recalls. From her and the other Bedouins, the 37-year-old officer learned that most of the cross-border smuggling was carried out by Shamar tribesmen who peddle cigarettes, sheep and gasoline. Radical Islamists were using the same routes to move people, guns and money. Many of the paths were marked with small piles of bleached rocks that were identical to those David had seen a year earlier while serving in Yemen. (Jaffe, 2005, p. 1)

This is a prime example of gaining access and operational information via ethnographic information. The deeper that personnel like David dig into local society, the more they can assess which threats are pertinent to the United States, and which are matters best left alone. While a popular perception is that the CIA performs this role, this is only partially correct. Civilian intelligence agencies tend to focus on key personnel in official positions, and trends at the grass roots level are frequently unexplored. If the Department of Defense could build a robust corps of people like David, based out of each US embassy in the world, then our nation could appreciate the military implications of "networks that are invisible to us unless we are specifically looking for them; [and] come in forms with which we are not culturally familiar" (Simons & Tucker, 2004, p. 5). Sadly, the number of Davids in the Services is not nearly sufficient. There are about 1,000 Foreign Area Officers in the Army, with the largest number concentrated in Europe; and the fourth largest group—a mere 145—focused on the Middle East (Jaffe, 2005, p. 1). Their numbers can also be deceptive, since the duties of a FAO include many things that are important, but do not necessarily include ethnographic information, such as protocol for visits and administrative duties. Certainly, a solution to the growing threats from networks is to produce more Davids and reward them for extensive time on the ground exclusively focused on the development of ethnographic information.

In countries with much smaller-scale US troop commitments than Iraq, Military Cooperation Group commanders could direct and coordinate counterterrorism or counterinsurgency operations, such as those conducted by David and a few companions. But let there be no mistake: this study does not propose that counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are the same thing. They are not. However, the two approaches do

share some aspects in common, relevant to the focus of this thesis. Those aspects in common are the need for ethnographic information, the need for long term presence in order to be effective, and the principle that the vast majority of the action is best done “by, with, and through” the host nation. All three of those factors argue that the MCG is the best command and control tool in these types of long term fights. The majority of the ‘by, with, and through’ fight should be conducted by the host nation forces, and this frequently requires American advisors.

While advisors’ work is in the field, wherever that takes them, the natural home base for these US personnel is in the MCG—the logical successor to the current Military Group (MILGP) or Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG). The MILGP in El Salvador during that extended conflict provides an example of patient advisors assisting the host nation to deal with a security problem that was a threat to both the host nation and American interests. One example is the work of the US advisors at the brigade level, who assisted in the rapid expansion of the Salvadoran army, and its counterinsurgency training (Waghelstein, 1985). A second is the parallel work of advisors at the Salvadoran headquarters level, who helped the equivalents of the G-2 (Intelligence) and G-3 (Operations) staff. Often it is sufficient to assist with the basics, such as professional education and training for junior officers and NCOs. In 1982, the guerrillas were being supplied by ships from Nicaragua, and then transferred material to small boats that traversed the “maze of swamps” on the coast. The Salvadoran Navy had some patrol boats, but lacked leadership, coordination and training until the USMILGP arranged for US Navy advisors. Within the year, the host nation was disrupting the guerrilla re-supply routes, and taking pride in doing so (Waghelstein, 1985, pp. 47-48). There is a certain amount of controversy over the efficacy of the MILGP in comparison to the 7th Special Forces Group, who provided most of the field advisors. This controversy underscores the need to properly structure, rely upon, and hold accountable, the in-country military headquarters, and not depend on a unit in the United States or elsewhere to maintain continuity. This will be further discussed in chapter VII.

While El Salvador represents a counterinsurgency, roughly similar scenarios could exist for counterterrorism efforts. The same principles could apply where a Military Cooperation Group works “by, with and through” the host nation to combat

transnational terrorism. Such a purpose is certainly relevant to the current security environment, where assisting local security efforts overseas defends the United States from terrorist threats. An example from El Salvador points to the blur between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism:

Another method that was particularly effective was a series of MILGP briefings on the guerrillas' attacks on the economic infrastructure. It wasn't a question of the ESAF [El Salvador Armed Forces] not being aware of these attacks, but rather a need to focus their attention on the cumulative effects and the regional emphasis of those attacks....When graphically portrayed, it became evident that these attacks were focused primarily on the San Vicente and Usulután Departments. These revelations were then coupled with other graphic portrayals of guerrilla activities—road mining, bridge destruction, electric power line sabotage, and attacks on trucks and buses and crop duster aircraft....The economic potential of the San Vicenter-Usulután area was analyzed as well as the crop losses due directly to guerrilla attacks and indirectly to abandoned cooperative farms. Schools and public health facilities were also considered.... By the end of 1982, the ESAF had begun to think seriously about the nonmilitary aspects of the war such as popular support in the area and the deteriorating economic picture. (Waghelstein, 1985, pp. 51-52)

Today's transnational terrorists have also used attacks for calculated purpose, such as the bombings of US embassies in East Africa and trains in Madrid, as well as violence in the Philippines. It is easy to imagine an MCG having a similar discussion with a host nation to focus on the pattern of terrorist actions and cooperative ways to combat those actions, as well as non-military solutions to address their root causes. Enabling host nation security could represent the thin end of the wedge between America's friends and enemies. A current case worthy of study is the Philippines.

While the current efforts of the JSOTF in the Philippines are not under the command and control of an MCG, there is serious merit in this arrangement, especially given that such a group would provide unity of command among advisors and other security cooperation personnel, which is not currently the case (LTC Greg Wilson, interview, 22 May 2006, Monterey, CA). For example, the JSOTF and the current MAAG work hand in glove, but are not required to do so, and may not, if personalities get in the way. The MAAG actually reports from the embassy to CDRUSPACOM through USPACOM's J4. A logistician is actually in charge of security cooperation. The

JSOTF reports to Commander SOCPAC, the USPACOM special operations component (LTC Greg Wilson, interview, 22 May 2006, Monterey, CA). These parallel chains of command should be resolved by establishing a single chain of command in-country under a Military Cooperation Group commander. This commander could then direct a holistic effort, and report a consistent picture to both the Ambassador and the Geographic Combatant Commander. This is not to say that every MCG should have a JSOTF working for it. Some “general purpose” MCGs could exercise operational or tactical control over a group of combat advisors, but the small number of potential JSOTF headquarters—meaning Special Forces battalions and groups—could be reserved for especially sensitive regions that require unique focus. The persistent presence in the “general purpose” MCG could alleviate some of the current strain on over-tasked SOF elements. The typical MCG emphasis must be on the ‘by, with and through’ the locals, so trust is important, and getting the locals to do the primary action is in the long run more effective.

For example, in the 1950s, the legendary Edward Lansdale insisted that the Philippine government take action against its Huk insurgents rather than try to cajole scarce resources from the US government, or impose a US style solution. Lansdale and Ramon Magsaysay together recognized the need to provide a positive alternative for Huk insurgents who might be tempted to lay down their arms, and brainstormed the resettlement villages. However, both men realized that the effort had to be Philippine, not American, for two reasons. In the first place, the United States was at war in Korea, which demanded priority of personnel, equipment and funds. In the second place—and even more importantly—both men realized that an imposed Yankee solution had absolutely no hope of appealing to Philippine Huk fighters. The incentive to lay down arms had to come from the Philippine government to Filipino people (Lansdale, 1972, pp. 1-85).

Enabling local personnel to undertake the task reflects three things: support for the ‘ideology’ of respect for sovereignty; recognition of the reality that the host nation’s pride will only allow a certain level of US action in the host nation territory; and recognition of the reality that America has neither the resources nor desire to be the policeman of the world. While the primary effort should always be from host nation

forces, another reality must be acknowledged. With the expertise of a few US advisors, and the restraint from doing the task for the locals, host nation personnel can accomplish tremendous feats.

However, sometimes a sprinkling of advisors is not quite enough and American units must serve in-country. The preferred method should be that of units who deploy for short amounts of time to accomplish a specific and measurable goal, such as the New Horizons effort in US Southern Command (Kozary, 2001). Rather than an open-ended commitment for nebulous purposes, such as ‘provide security,’ it is often more effective to have US units deploy for a purpose, such as National Guard engineers who use their annual training time to build a specific road in Honduras, or a training team to introduce a certain capability. The purpose of building a particular road at a certain place and time is to serve an overall goal that the MCG defines, in order to support the Combatant Commander’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan. Likewise, de-mining is another eminently useful activity. Clearly, with long term presence by the MCG, such seemingly isolated events can create a consistent effort toward an eventual objective. The definition of such projects and training efforts will no doubt continue to require negotiation between the MCG and the host nation authorities. But with the permanent commitment of MCG personnel, they can help maintain continuity in the US efforts, and recognize the potential temptations of host nation officials to divert such efforts to personal advantage. Likewise, with the ethnographic information gained by immersion in the local culture, the MCG commander can avoid creating inadvertent advantage or displaying favoritism. Such gaffes are easy for the newcomer to make, for example, when US and host nation personnel dig a well that happens to be on land under the control of a particular ethnic group. Sometimes it is also necessary to distinguish between what the community needs, such as a clinic, and what the leader needs to enhance his standing in the community, such as a bigger town hall. Americans, as the outsiders, can often be fooled, though at times helping local leaders can also be quite important. Here too, continuity for US personnel also becomes important, since it would allow the US to figure out whose careers in the host nation to try to enhance, granting the United States more consistency in training and education. Such ‘follow-on’ relationships become ‘follow-through’ for US priorities.

C. TRADITIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE

So far, the discussion of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency acknowledges that sometimes US advisors will be involved. This study informally defines traditional security assistance as efforts that remain short of the presence of actual combat advisors. A more compelling definition is actually security cooperation. Formerly, security assistance was designed to aid the host nation in countering its threats, typically against communist influence, which was also to US advantage. After the September 11th attacks, Rumsfeld changed the emphasis to security cooperation, more focused on the set-up of the opening phases of US war plans (DSCA, 2006). The proposed MCG does not detract from the war plan opening phase focus, but proposes that the meaning of the term ‘security cooperation’ change even more. Instead of a cooperative effort against communism, the meaning of cooperation shifts to mutual effort against forces of instability—at the moment represented by transnational terrorism such as Al Qaeda, but flexible enough to include new types of threats as they emerge.

In the Cold War, there was an element of ‘pull’ from the receiving country, frequently for conventional hardware and training against the Communist threat. This thesis proposes a bit less consideration of the host nation’s desire for hardware like fighter jets, and a bit more offering of training, education, and some lower-profile equipment for the establishment of internal control. The presumption here is that American policy emphasizes the responsibilities of sovereignty among other nations. Those responsibilities include the maintenance of order against terrorist or insurgent movements that have or could develop the capacity to threaten US interests. Especially for those many states which are basically willing, but incapable of maintaining such control, the MCG is the ideal vehicle by which to offer security assistance in the form of education, training and equipment. This is not a new concept, and an example of training and education is the School of the Americas, now the “Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation” which has reinforced the Military Groups of US Southern Command since 1946. In states that are both willing and capable, more traditional yet limited forms of security assistance, such as fielding F-16 fighter jets in Turkey, would still be well managed by a Military Cooperation Group that need not look much different

from current entities like the Offices of Military Cooperation, or Offices of Defense Cooperation, depending on the sensitivities of the host nation.

D. CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

Civil-military operations (CMO) provide an incredibly useful tool for the reinforcement of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, or traditional security assistance goals. In practice, all these activities blend so closely together that maintaining bureaucratic separations in the DoD offices of an embassy becomes counterproductive. Civil-military operations especially represent the nexus between American hard power and soft power, and can provide benefit far beyond their minimal costs. CMO can range broadly from the very small to the very large and everything in between. For example, a squad on either combat or training maneuvers with a single medic attached could provide rudimentary care to local villagers. At the opposite extreme, the United States could invest in extensive reconstruction. In between, an MCG could sponsor a particular road construction project, or a small JTF could maintain periodic veterinary visits, as in the JTF Horn of Africa.

However, there is a missing piece to how such operations are currently conducted. They tend not to be closely coordinated, often lack focus in the original conception of the mission, and exhibit too little continuity in the execution of what become disparate activities over space and time. Without focus and continuity, civil-military efforts, even if well executed, risk becoming isolated feel-good projects or photo opportunities without lasting impact. The guarantor of focus and continuity should be the Military Cooperation Group. The MCG is ideally situated to control civil-military operations, because both function at the convergence of the military and diplomatic realms. At this nexus, civil-military work is an ideal complement to the gathering of ethnographic information. CMO provide an ideal reason for the collection of such data, and the information helps ensure that the work and projects are targeted in a manner that avoids unintended offense.

Civil-military operations can further American goals in several ways. They can help deny safe haven to America's enemies, enable us to seize opportunities via disaster relief, set long term conditions, or take advantage of unforeseen opportunities. These interactions should be targeted to develop relations with local people, but for eventual US advantage, not just as uniformed NGO relief organizations. In the best scenario, US

forces should conduct such civil-military assistance indirectly, through the host nation forces. This was the genius of Colonel Lansdale's approach during the Huk rebellion in the Philippines. He recognized that the only truly effective CMO was when the Filipino military conducted the activities, especially out of genuine desire to ameliorate the situation, not merely to appease an American advisor. Lansdale described civic action as "brotherly behavior" between soldiers and their citizens. That Lansdale was able to convince his friend, Defense Minister Ramon Magsaysay who, in turn, was able to instill this spirit in the Philippine armed forces, was a major breakthrough in the successful conclusion of the Huk insurrection (Lansdale, 1972, p. 70).

One of the better examples of civil-military operations designed to deny safe haven to terrorists is the Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (JTF HOA). This Joint Task Force manages rotational units as they conduct civil-military activities in the region. The primary purpose of such activities is to maintain an American presence in the area for some deterrent effect, gain some goodwill among the local population, conduct subtle yet overt reconnaissance, and assist indigenous people to develop the economic means to resist monetary temptations from terrorists seeking shelter. In the words of one JTF HOA commander, a simple veterinary tour of the region to inoculate cattle is like putting money into the owner's bank account, because that is what the livestock represents (Helland, 2005). By extension, the improved economic stability of the farmer gives some physical basis for the campaign of persuasion to resist terrorist financial incentives. In short, civil-military operations like these provide the tools to ameliorate the conditions that can contribute to terrorism or insurgency. It is through activities like these that the distinction between civil-military operations and security cooperation is blurred, given that the local farmer with healthy cattle can then afford to refuse terrorist payoffs. Later, further assistance could enable local populations to resist terrorist coercion. Such operations are very much complementary to counterterrorism or counterinsurgency, not necessarily for the somewhat wishful thinking of 'winning hearts and minds,' but for the population's physical ability to resist the coercion of America's adversaries. Such actions are better managed by a Military Cooperation Group attached to one of the region's embassies than a Joint Task Force. A JTF Joint Manning Document (JMD) is

not only difficult to sustain, but more importantly, provides far less continuity than a headquarters element that is on Permanent Change of Station to the area.

A permanent but small presence, like a Military Cooperation Group, would not only be useful to continuous, low key activities such as in the Horn of Africa, but would provide an invaluable foothold for being able to react to opportunity by way of disaster relief in countries where we maintain even lower levels of activity. Another country's disaster is the United States' opportunity, and Americans have proven very adept and willing to provide acute trauma care for short durations in the wake of natural disasters, such as the 2004 Tsunami relief in Indonesia (LTC John Maraia, personal communication, 1 October 2006) and the 2005 earthquake relief in Pakistan. These relief efforts represent civil-military operations on a huge scale, and can 'win hearts and minds' for a brief moment that can provide entry into a region heretofore leery of any American presence. The military is not necessarily good at long-term care for widespread chronic problems such as man-made famine. However, the US military is very good at the massive logistics and quick response time for disasters like the tsunami in Indonesia and the earthquake in Pakistan. The MCG could be an ideal way to capitalize on these strengths. Much like the scout in quiet overwatch on an objective, a handful of military people attached to an embassy could prepare both the physical and ethnographic reconnaissance necessary to enable rapid relief operations. Such relief may never be needed, or may suddenly present the opportunity of the century.

Recurring, periodic civil-military work in combination with the host nation would set the conditions for doors to open, especially when it comes to things like basing rights for crucial operations or eventual collaboration in other activities. With an established relationship between the two nations, the United States could create a faster reaction to unforeseen events. A good example would be the pre-September 11th groundwork in Uzbekistan that paid off when an airbase from which to invade Afghanistan was suddenly

needed.² In general, fostering stable relationships with other countries is in America's long-term interests.

E. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

One of the best ways to talk to people overseas is via a non-doctrinal structure pioneered and used by US Army Psychological Operations forces for years: the Military Information Support Team (MIST). A small team or even a pair of information warriors attached to a US embassy can be powerful, and, logically, these teams should fall under the command and control of a Military Cooperation Group. Like the MCG, the MIST works 'by, with and through' the host nation—in this case, local media. Working through official local media such as the Ministry of Information can help avoid alienating political decision-makers in friendly or relatively neutral countries. The purpose of the MIST is to disseminate messages that support US interests, packaged in appropriate local context.

While Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations are not the same thing, they must work hand in glove so that the words match the deeds. Lenin called terrorism the 'propaganda of the deed.' The reader may find it ironic to quote such a notorious revolutionary, and the United States certainly does not endorse terrorism, but Lenin's point is well taken—actions speak louder than words. The problem American forces encounter is when US actions don't have any accompanying words to explain them, and the enemy fills in the void. Likewise, there can be huge issues when ill-advised US operations tell a story different from the rhetoric, which is discussed in chapter VI. Much has been made lately of foreign media outlets like Al Jazeera, which gain enormous attention among foreign audiences, resonate well with messages framed in culturally authentic terms, and are frequently at odds with American objectives. In order to combat opposition media, American words must match US deeds, especially when a Military Cooperation Group conducts low key, persistent civil-military operations. Media support can counter opposition attempts to twist American objectives, such as convincing local

² In the late 1990s, the United States made diplomatic efforts to foster a relationship with Uzbekistan, and win it away from Russian influence. US interest in the oil and gas resources of the region, as well as the prospect of counterbalancing Russian and Chinese influence have been compared to the 'Great Game' of Anglo-Russian competition in the region during the 19th century. Since then, America's relationship with Uzbekistan has been severely strained over human rights abuses, leading to the 2005 eviction of US forces from Karshi-Khanabad Airbase ("K2"). In some cases the persistent presence of an MCG may help influence host nations to use restraint in their treatment of dissidents.

people that American-assisted well drilling is not truly designed for local well-being, but is a precursor to a fictitious invasion.

The prerequisite for culturally savvy media operations is ethnographic information, which enables the US to know what we're doing to help, not harm, local people, and convey that to them. While the term 'battle of the story' is currently in vogue, it requires caution. To envision US military media efforts as an advertising contest with our enemies is to invite the fallacy that more glitz will convince uncommitted audiences to support American goals—a close cousin to the fallacy that building an isolated clinic and then leaving will 'win hearts and minds.' Let Americans make no mistake—the nation is in fact currently in an information war with Islamic extremists. The United States will also engage in the struggle of ideas with future enemies, just as it did previously in the Cold War. However, a superficial campaign of glitz will fail. The key to the information war is soft power, as the United States quietly and steadily presents the message of 'who and what we are', along with 'what we're doing and why.' The United States can present a true picture of itself only if Americans understand indigenous social relationships and values, and if US personnel based out of the MCG can leverage host nation entities to disseminate the message.

Even in countries where not much appears to be going on, the quiet, persistent message is important, because ideas build over years. American military leaders make the mistake of thinking that a Joint Task Force can hit an area and begin convincing people that America and its ideals are there to save the day. This is a dangerous self-delusion. Strategic PSYOP or 'Strategic Communication' takes years and is best done quietly and subtly; the long quiet effort is what makes it 'strategic'. The short burst of high visibility activity, such as the effort to convince the Serbs to abandon their positions in the Kosovo war, represents the blur between operational and tactical levels at best. The operational-tactical level approach can be effective for relatively straightforward battlefield objectives, such as surrender appeals or splitting factions within the enemy military. This is something that US Army PSYOP Soldiers and units are trained and structured to do, but could do more effectively if MISTs could prepare the battlespace from a surrounding network of MCGs. The strategic mode of operation has been done on an ad hoc basis, with a non-doctrinal method (MIST) for years. Now is the time to

institutionalize it, and firmly link it to ethnographic information and the execution of operations from US embassies, especially if this is truly to be a “long war.”

Also, by recruiting local personnel and earning the cooperation of local Ministry of Information-type agencies, the US message can be produced and disseminated by, with, and through the host nation media, and therefore put into a culturally meaningful package. A key example of how critical it is to use the appropriate people comes from the British counterinsurgency experience in Malaya, where the propaganda team was mostly ethnic Chinese ex-terrorists (Nagl, 2002, p. 93). Similarly, Lansdale helped establish the Philippines’ psychological warfare program, and its civil affairs program in three dimensions. First, he persuaded the host nation to take action, and not await American largesse. Second, he recognized the nexus between civil-military relations and psychological warfare, in order to split the population from the insurgents. Third, and probably the most subtle, Lansdale used the combination of CMO and PSYOP to let democratic values quietly permeate both military and civilian society. This represents a very effective nexus between PSYOP and CMO, and Lansdale capitalized on it. He was, in fact, the ultimate democrat; he believed in the inherent goodness of democracy, and wanted to let it seep in slowly and spread by good example, not by imposition (Lansdale, 1972). While this may not work universally, it is worthy of consideration as a potential tool for countries in which US civilian leadership wishes to foster democracy. As a policy, this usually appeals domestically to even the most imperialist US constituents, as well as those more inclined to encourage self-determination.

Overseas, this version of Joseph Nye’s “Soft Power” (2004) helps to provide an ideological alternative to other peoples’ extremist ideas. A similar technique has been used in Colombia against the narco-terrorist organizations, with the use of a MIST, host nation official personnel and, notably, individuals from the opposition who have been turned (Valentzas, 2006). The best type of influence is quiet and persistent, and does not always have to address a combat environment.

A similar effort with more of a counterinsurgency mission is the MIST in the Philippines, which supports the Joint Special Operations Task Force working with the Philippine forces against Islamic extremists (Briscoe, 2004). Other peacetime examples

include the rotational MISTs maintained for years in Latin America, both for counter-drug efforts and de-mining public awareness campaigns.

Over the years, the media support to US activities overseas has been called political warfare, Psychological Operations, Psychological Warfare, Information Operations, Information Warfare, Strategic Communications, and Military Support to Public Diplomacy. While words do matter, and therefore the title of such operations is a matter of significant import, the purpose of this thesis is not to debate these titles, but rather to emphasize the need for media support. Portraying the true story of ‘who and what Americans are’ was important during the Cold War, and such information operations have become only more important in the post-Cold War disorder. Regrettably, the United States Information Agency is dead, and its State Department incarnation in the bureau of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs has received limited resources or emphasis in spite of a great deal of lip service. What this means is that without the US Information Agency operating overseas at its previous levels, the Department of Defense has little choice but to invest in buying media support for its military objectives. Both the Pentagon’s Information Operations Roadmap and Strategic Communications Roadmap have addressed the gulf in such matters and called for more robust DoD efforts to compensate. If the State Department’s Public Diplomacy apparatus grows, then perhaps the proposed increase in military psychological operations could be curtailed. In the meantime, the best way for DoD to enact such media support is for a small number of US personnel, expert in local culture, to build a team of local people. Only the locals will have the cultural familiarity with themes, symbols, imagery, idioms, and so on, while an American Soldier will never be proficient enough. To think otherwise is, again, dangerously self-deluding and US military personnel will, in spite of hard work and good intentions, disseminate culturally or linguistically flawed products. At the same time, the local people needed can only be recruited, vetted, and carefully monitored by long term presence and expert attention housed in the MIST, under the command of an MCG. In this way, the right words *can* be matched to America’s deeds, which is the key to the war of ideas.

F. THE GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE

As the United States enacts its Global Defense Posture, the MCG becomes all the more important for command and control. The Global Defense Posture describes the re-basing of forces into a hub-and-spoke system (National Defense Strategy, 2005, p. 16). The overall idea is to reduce the currently ill-positioned stance of many units from Cold War leftover bases, especially in Western Europe, to a stateside basing with unit rotation for training terms overseas. The concept is for the Army's brigade combat teams to act more like the Navy's carrier battle groups and the Marine Corps' Marine Expeditionary Units who go on 'float' to various regions for a certain number of months. The Global Defense Posture would, for example, maintain a hub-and-spoke structure of logistics bases and outlying austere airfields, such as a main base at Ramstein, Germany, and a satellite airfield, hypothetically in Tunisia. A network of Military Cooperation Groups could directly enhance this security posture by providing quiet oversight to the air and seaports in the hub-and-spoke infrastructure. In addition to developing the appropriate ethnographic information on the local people, the MCG commander could subtly ascertain that the Tunisians are maintaining the promised austere airfield. Some of the purposes listed above can be achieved or enhanced by units that rotate into the host country, frequently under the status of "deployed for training (DFT)." The MCG commander is the ideal point of contact to coordinate the combined exercises between the US rotational units and the Tunisian military. Before arrival in country, US units could take advantage of the ethnographic information prepared by the MCG. In similar fashion, US Special Operations Command units have been conducting Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCETS) with their foreign contacts for years. Here again, the MCG commander is the ideal agent to coordinate these exercises, offer ethnographic information, and provide in-country command and control for limited, small-scale training.

V. WHAT HAPPENS WITH ETHNOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

A. Laterally within the Embassy

While the MCG is going about many of the duties described above, especially its study of local ethnographic relationships, its members will overtly and naturally discover nuggets of information that can be pieced together for use in our ongoing counterterrorism fight. Such information could easily be shared laterally with other government agencies in the embassy. Counterterrorism is now recognized as more than just a law-enforcement or military problem. Counterinsurgency, as well, has long been recognized as more than just a military problem, even though US efforts beyond military means have not been extensive. Once the MCG finds overt information that leads to potential use for counterterrorism, the MCG commander, in coordination with his interagency counterparts, the Ambassador, and the Geographic Combatant Commander, can decide whether to continue observation, disrupt the terrorists, or take some other action. It seems that such a group is the best way to provide eyes on target, stir up activity that will gain information, and then act or pass the information on to the appropriate actor. If this is the aim, as it should be, then all the more reason that it be coordinated and integrated, with the full roster of American agencies on the same page.

B. Laterally with other MCGs

The MCG could also become a powerful part of a counter-network in its region. But to do so, it must share information laterally with other MCGs. This sharing could help create a more consistent regional approach, which is a current weakness. Indeed, a telling example of lack of regional consistency is the Combatant Commander's security conferences in 2003 and 2004 at US Southern Command, since the few times that Ambassadors got together were at the invitation of the military commander (MAJ Chris Muller, interview, 21 March 2006, Monterey, CA). Likewise, the trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) is a follow-up to the Pan-Sahel Security Initiative, expanded to include nearly all of northern and northwest Africa: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad. This program of cooperation is specifically designed to help host nation governments gain control of large

expanses of remote terrain, and prevent the migration of asymmetric threats (USEUCOM, 2006). Given the porosity of borders, presence of nomads, and the vast expanses of under-governed territory, this effort has been rightly approached as a regional task. Since these are governments that have historically exercised little internal control, and represent societies where personal and clan relationships are emphasized to a far greater extent than in the West, it would seem that the persistent presence of an MCG would be tailor-made for the situation. Indeed, the porosity of borders makes lateral communications *between* embassy teams absolutely crucial. Currently, this is a weakness among embassies. The type of information necessary for a counter-network to act expeditiously is frequently quite perishable, and therefore timely lateral sharing is essential.

Another issue is that Department of State regions don't line up geographically with DoD geographic areas of responsibility. The Department of Defense will not change Department of State procedures anytime soon, but DoD can use the MCG as a "work-around" for these problems. The network of MCGs could ensure that any information stirred up in one country is transferred in real time to affected countries even outside the region. For example, an MCG in Sierra Leone could find that money from conflict diamonds passed through an ethnic network appears to be only a local problem that would not affect US interests but, in fact, such diamonds are laundered through a contact in Antwerp to fund Al Qaeda cells in the US, Pakistan, and Mali. The MCG commander could notify his counterparts in Belgium, Pakistan, and Mali. The MCG commanders in Belgium and Pakistan would almost certainly inform host nation authorities and ask them to take action. The US embassy in Sierra Leone would inform Washington, and let the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice handle cells on American soil. The MCG in Mali would receive the information and, depending on the capabilities and willingness of the host nation, may ask the Malian authorities to act, conduct a combined action with them, or seek assent for a US unilateral action. Since networks are an issue of growing concern, then every place that a dark network touches must be involved, or at least made cognizant of its presence.

C. VERTICALLY TO THE COMBATANT COMMANDER AND WASHINGTON

The MCG commanders should communicate and take action in lateral fashion with each other as described above, which is the strength of a network. However, it is not sufficient to fight a terrorist network with another decentralized network. The argument that “it takes a network to fight a network” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1996, p. 81) breaks down when one side must command its subordinates to act at a certain time, rather than just trusting their willingness for informal cooperation. The American counter-network must include a hierarchy, with a chain of command that can task people and require them to act. The crucial element of vertical control must supplement lateral coordination. That vertical control must come from the Geographic Combatant Commander. Decentralized networks, such as the current Al Qaeda configuration, imply that action depends on the consent of the members. To fight such decentralization, a counter-network is required, which must include enough hierarchy to command and control synchronized action.

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VI. PROVIDE A BETTER INTELLIGENCE BASE TO WAR PLANS

A. ETHNOGRAPHIC FACTORS INTO OPLANS AND CONPLANS

In addition to low key and small scale activities, as well as counter-network style operations, the ability to prepare for large scale intervention is also critical. Simply put, American forces at this time do not incorporate ethnographic information into Operations Plans (OPLANS), Contingency Plans (CONPLANS) or Functional Plans (FUNCPLANS). A huge contribution in overcoming this deficiency could be made by a permanent network of Military Cooperation Groups—who fuse the expertise of their attachés and security cooperation personnel—in concert with their respective Geographic Combatant Commanders. A system of MCGs could ensure that the base assumptions in war plans are accurate. MCGs should participate intensively in the review cycle for these plans, and rotate well-informed staff officers into the combatant commands. They would be extremely well-positioned to provide personnel with in-country experience if a Joint Task Force were to become necessary.

B. INSURE THAT BASE ASSUMPTIONS ARE WELL GROUNDED

The most glaring gap when it comes to ‘Operational Preparation of the Battlespace’ or “shaping the battlefield” (Meyer, 2003), is the lack of cultural knowledge. The current parlance in Washington is the term “cultural intelligence” or “cultural awareness” (Scales, 2004), but this study prefers the more accurate term “ethnographic information.” Regrettably, in many current plans such detailed ethnographic information is not included in Annex B (Intelligence), or the psychological operations or civil affairs annexes. United States forces, for all their talent, simply do not collect and document this type of information well, and certainly not very well in the average war plan. Just as disturbing is the lack of such ethnographic information in the base assumptions of the typical contingency plan. All too often, the new planner reports to the J-5 section of the Combatant Commander, picks up an OPLAN or CONPLAN, and finds no more insightful base assumptions than that the target country or its neighbor will give the US forces overflight, seaport or basing rights. While ethnographic information may not always be crucial, such information is always worth developing because it might offer the

commander an option for a significantly different course of action. Imagine how much more useful it could be to find in either the assumptions or intelligence annex the suggestion that a particular tribe of pastoral nomads who pass through the target area of operations could be enticed to conduct certain forms of reconnaissance for US forces across a border or into outlying areas. It would also be enlightening to know that such nomads may provide information about a particular rival group, but would never betray their kinsmen in a region of US interest. Such knowledge could generate radical alternatives in the combatant commander's list of courses of action. Sadly, this illustrates the most disturbing point of all. Such ethnographic information is not usually considered in course of action development during the Commander's Estimate Process or the remainder of the Military Decision-making Process (Wilson & Young, 2001), and thus the ethnographic conditions of the target area become either opportunities never realized, or hidden pitfalls discovered only after seemingly logical, yet disastrous, actions taken by US forces. Such culturally ill-advised US operations become liabilities in the battle of the story when American actions don't match their rhetoric.

An encouraging sign is the recent publication of DoD Directive 3000.05, which directs the Geographic Combatant Commanders to develop intelligence campaign plans for stability operations, which must include as a minimum: "Information on key ethnic, cultural, religious, tribal, economic and political relationships..." (2005, p. 9, paragraphs 5.9.2 to 5.9.2.1). The only way to gather such information to fulfill this requirement, however, is to spend a long time in-country, which is again recognized by Deputy Secretary of Defense England, in the same directive, in which he tasks USD (Personnel and Readiness) to "Develop opportunities for DoD personnel to contribute or develop stability operations skills by...learning languages and studying foreign cultures, including long-term immersion in foreign societies" (DoD 3000.05, 2005, p. 6, paragraphs 5.3.4 to 5.3.4.3). A very effective way to study foreign cultures and to translate that information into useable material for US military plans is to emplace Military Cooperation Groups into each country where the United States has an embassy. While it remains to be seen whether a structural change will create an attitude shift within DoD, such a structural initiative could be the most helpful "work-around" for current deficiencies generating from US organizational culture.

Ethnographic information should also be considered critical to the contingency plans maintained by US combatant commanders. For example, there has been much discussion of late about how American forces did not really understand the tribal networks of Iraq, and how this has been a partial factor in the serious difficulties in the current insurgency. With consistent attention and the right training, knowledge like this could be built into war plans that rest on the shelf, and could be updated in the regular two-year plan review cycle, to insure currency. Ethnographic information could have allowed US forces in Iraq to use tribal networks to advantage from the outset, and not have to figure it out by trial and error, based on the personality and initiative of singular commanders. One such commander is Lieutenant Colonel Tim Ryan who, during his tour in Iraq, figured out how to use the local sheiks to control their population, and ease the burden on American troops:

The key is a "truce" brokered by the National League of Sheiks and Tribal Leaders and US Army Lt. Col. Tim Ryan, the 1st Cavalry Division officer responsible for Abu Ghraib -- a Sunni Triangle town west of Baghdad and a hotbed of the insurgency. Under the agreement, Ryan now meets regularly with tribal leaders and provides them with lists of residents suspected of taking part in attacks. The sheiks and their subordinate local clan leaders then promise to keep their kinsmen in line. Newly released Abu Ghraib prisoners are similarly turned over with a tribal assurance of good behavior. "We tell them that these guys are your responsibility now," Ryan said. "They do have a lot of influence. To ignore that is to ignore 6,000 years of the way business has been done here." In return, Ryan has drastically reduced the amount of anti-insurgent raids and house searches—essentially trusting the sheiks to police their own. "If there's any kind of information about somebody, the Americans have to come to the local leader. He'll go personally to the suspect and say, 'Stop -- this is your last chance,' " said Sheik Mohammed Khamis Saadi, national head of the Saadi tribe and vice president of the league of sheiks. "We have the same blood. I'm responsible for them. It's my duty to give them another chance." ... After the invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein's government, Saadi said, the Americans made a fundamental mistake by interpreting Iraq's societal dynamics along purely religious and ethnic lines. "They came and saw the society as Kurds, Sunnis, Turks, Shiites and Christians," he said. "They didn't understand the tribal culture." (Khalil, 2004, p. A8)

With MCGs laying the groundwork for exactly this kind of an approach, there would be less time spent in on-the-job learning.

C. PARTICIPATE INTENSIVELY IN THE REVIEW CYCLE FOR PLANS

Once the MCG is emplaced, has developed a store of ethnographic information, and applied that knowledge to the theater commander's contingency plans, the task is still not complete. Operational plans are supposed to be reviewed on a two year cycle (Joint Forces Staff College Publication 1) and, given the potential for changes in local power structures, it is imperative that the MCGs assist in updating the plans on time. Relationships between two tribes can change due to feuds, marriages between leading families, and alliances of convenience or economic gain. Social changes usually take place over time, and are difficult to identify or quantify at first, so a two year review cycle on contingency plans is probably still appropriate and would generally carry no greater risk than currently exists. Naturally, a dramatic shift noted by an MCG could prompt an out-of-cycle review for a plan, between the Combatant Commander's J-5 office, presumably with his J-2 and J-3 participating, and the one or more MCGs concerned.

D. ROTATE WELL-INFORMED STAFF MEMBERS TO THE RELEVANT COMBATANT COMMAND

The Military Cooperation Groups on the ground should work closely with the Combatant Commander's staff for more than just contingency plan review in the J-5 office. The MCG must be in close contact with the GCC's J-2 Intelligence, J-3 Operations, J-4 Logistics directorates at a bare minimum, and any other relevant staff sections as well. The logical destination for the ethnographic information and any coincidental intelligence items would be the J-2 directorate. Any actions or exercises that the MCG anticipates or proposes should be coordinated with the J-3 shop, as well as with the J-5 shop regarding their impact on future operations plans or contingency plans. Frequently, transportation, infrastructure, and security assistance material will require coordination with the GCC J-4, as well as the J-3. It makes sense, therefore, that when the time comes for the eventual rotation of long-term Military Cooperation Group personnel, many of them should find places in the corresponding Combatant Command headquarters.

Today, Defense Attaché and Security Cooperation personnel sometimes rotate to the Combatant Command, usually to the J-5 plans and policy directorate, but not consistently enough. Certainly it is logical that some American Foreign Area Officers

rotate back to Washington for tours in the headquarters of both the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Personnel from the expanded future Military Cooperation Groups should probably continue to do so. However, US personnel should remain longer in-country in the MCG, and rotate into more Combatant Command directorates than just the J-5. The Combatant Commander's staff should be better saturated with veterans of the MCGs, which would take advantage of their experience and relationships with host nation personnel. Simply put, the GCC staff would greatly benefit from a broad population of true regional experts, rather than the current population of staff officers who may or may not have any experience in the theater.

Additionally, the Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) should be greatly expanded, as it is an ideal partner to the MCG and GCC staff. Officers who are exchanged or seconded to another nation's military have a unique opportunity to develop cultural expertise. The personal ties that US officers make can last a full career, as in the case of Colonel Jeff Donald. This simple and low cost program has been in place for years, but remains an undiscovered gem. Regrettably, the 2002 American Servicemembers Protection Act nearly shut down the exchange program, creating a "chilling effect on some military training that US forces once conducted abroad, and limited some weapons sales" (Lubold, 2006, p. 32).

E. PROVIDE PERSONNEL WITH IN-COUNTRY EXPERIENCE IF A JTF BECOMES NEEDED

In addition to quiet, persistent presence and expertise to the theater commander, a network of Military Cooperation Groups could directly benefit field operations by making key personnel available to the commander of a Joint Task Force, should one be needed. A significant purpose of the MCG network would be to identify and address problems before they become large enough to require a JTF. A significant benefit, previously described, could be to take the Joint Task Force from its current default position close to the planner's list of first resorts and, through the use of Military Cooperation Groups, move the JTF to the weapon of last resort. Joint Task Forces are difficult to stand up, but even more painful to sustain over time in routine operations, as previously mentioned. That said, there will undoubtedly be times when a robust task

force proves necessary. As a rule of thumb, a small MCG could handle relatively peaceful pursuits. An expanded MCG could control training, advising and equipping host nation forces to conduct their own operations with US support. However, when US forces conduct combat operations, even with host nation forces in a secondary role, a US JTF will probably be required. Such a task force will usually be ‘joint,’ and frequently ‘combined’ in national composition. At this point, it is imperative to offer the CJTF Commander as much regional expertise as possible. A very practical way to do this is to offer the JTF Commander the option to incorporate the relevant MCGs into his JTF headquarters. There may be times when it is politically smarter to keep the two elements separate, since the JTF should leave after a relatively short time, preferably with an exit that has been enabled by the preparatory work of the MCGs, while the MCGs must stay in their respective countries and continue to face their host nation contacts daily. For host nation relations, it may be more expedient to co-locate, but not merge the two elements. Conversely, if the situation warrants, it may be far more streamlined for command and control to have the JTF incorporate the MCG into its headquarters.

Two examples of what might have been are again the tsunami relief in Indonesia and the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. In the absence of an MCG on the ground in Indonesia, a Marine headquarters in Okinawa was tasked as the JTF lead. One expert, then-Major John Maraia, a Special Forces officer oriented toward that region, had been a US student at the Indonesian staff college for a full year. However, Major Maraia was stationed at US Joint Forces Command in Virginia, and had to volunteer for temporary duty in the tsunami relief effort; no one knew how to access his knowledge or include him (author’s experience and personal correspondence). Likewise, in Pakistan, the newly arrived director of the Office of the Defense Representative (ODRP), BG Sandy Davidson had few military experts to fall in on when the earthquake hit. The US embassy in Pakistan could muster so little military continuity that the Commander of US Central Command chose to bring a Navy headquarters off its command ship, seven hundred miles inland in order to have a cohesive, practiced command element to coordinate relief efforts (RDML Michael Lefever, presentation and interview, May 30, 2006, Monterey, CA). Neither of these JTF commanders had any real element on the ground to prepare the ‘battlespace’ or ‘environment’ for them. Those task forces, which

in spite of thin ground preparation performed admirably, could have been even more effective if a handful of experts had been permanently stationed in the MCG in-country. Perhaps similar but smaller contingencies could be handled by the MCG alone, but in large scale crises, when the ability of the MCG to command relatively small operations becomes overwhelmed and it becomes apparent that a more robust JTF is required, the JTF commander could have the option to incorporate the MCG personnel into the JTF staff, or keep the MCG as a subordinate element for advice and expertise.

Certainly disaster relief efforts are not the only case where such expertise is needed, and combat operations can benefit equally from cultural preparation of the battlespace. One of the best examples is Somalia, where Special Forces personnel from a year-long deployment on an infantry Technical Assistance Field Team were never consulted or brought into the planning for the subsequently disastrous 1992 large US intervention (John Jordan, interview, 23 September 2006, Monterey CA).

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VII. EXISTING PIECES AND PARTS: 4 CASE STUDIES

A. PIECES AVAILABLE, BUT NOT UNIFIED

There are pieces of this MCG idea available today, but they're not truly unified into a single system. While one size does not fit all countries, the point is that the United States needs to consolidate its defense activities in embassies into a strategic counter-network. When it comes to the consolidation of a new system, such as the proposed Military Cooperation Groups, the looming question is whether it will work. Since no one can predict the future, the closest comparison we can make is to entities in the past. The Military Cooperation Group described in this thesis has never existed per se, but historic antecedents can be found.

B. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS: MILGPS AND RELATED EFFORTS

Indeed, American military advisory groups in foreign lands have been around for quite some time. A little celebrated but very successful World War II effort involved the US Navy, in combined effort with the Chinese government, training Chinese guerrillas against the Japanese (Miles, 1967). Shortly thereafter, the US established a group for the support of the White Tiger partisans behind the lines in North Korea (Malcom, 1996). While the aim here is not to glorify the roots of special operations forces or the tradition of behind-the-lines actions, the point is that Americans have conducted very successful cooperative efforts with local nationals on both sides of the guerrilla/counter-guerrilla fight. Americans have established these groups and gained the cooperation of host nation personnel during world wars, as well as in a number of environments that span the confusing, messy continuum between peace and total war.

Many of the military advisory efforts came as a response to the spread of communist influence in the Cold War. Notable and successful historical examples include the Joint US Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) in the Greek Civil War (Cable, 1986, p. 14), and the Joint US Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) that Edward Lansdale built around Philippine President Magsaysay to counter the Huk rebellion (Lansdale, 1972, p. 17). Arguably the most famous, the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam, grew to enormous scale. While its advisory efforts at the village level seemed to be on the right track (Donovan, 1985), perhaps a significant factor

leading to its unhappy conclusion was its drift away from the ‘by, with, and through the locals’ theme so crucial to the success of an advisory, cooperative mission (Krepinevich, 1986). Other groups, usually with the title US Military Group (MILGP) or US Military Advisory and Assistance Group (USMAAG), have worked out of embassies in Asia and Latin America for years. While all of these efforts developed from specific needs, without an MCG-like organization in place, it would seem more advantageous to have persistent presence in all countries, tailored to the current need for strategic cultural reconnaissance and low-key action. Two cases worth examining in somewhat greater detail are El Salvador and Haiti.

1. El Salvador

El Salvador probably represents the most successful recent effort at counterinsurgency, and was done by a small group of advisors, working ‘by, with, and through’ host nation forces. In fact, this thesis proposes that the very success of the mission is what made it so easy to forget, and thus it is not considered in much of the public counterinsurgency discussion today. (See Annex B for a snapshot of the MILGP structure.)

In the early 1980s, the MILGP contained some personnel on a one-year permanent assignment in the headquarters section, which included some administrative personnel for internal function, and staff advisors to the Salvadoran headquarters in the Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, and Logistics bureaus. In temporary duty deployments were mobile training teams of anywhere from two to six personnel for the Navy, Air Force, strategic site survey, logistics, maintenance, Internal Defense and Development, and intelligence training. Likewise, the Operations and Training Teams (OPATT) were five to eight man teams assigned to Salvadoran brigades, certain battalions, or particular geographic departments. The exact numbers, locations, and functions were shifted according to mission requirements and conditions from the early 1980s through the early 1990s. The actual number of US advisors in El Salvador was capped by Congress at 55, which was sufficient for the initial assessment, but not truly adequate for expanded operations (Waghelstein, 1985, p. F-1 to F-2). In later years, normal assignments of 3 accompanied years or 2 unaccompanied years were in place in the headquarters. Eventually, senior OPATTs in the geographic departments were on a

PCS status, and some officers and senior NCOs spent one to two years in their zone. Most others were on six-month temporary duty assignments.

Ultimately successful, the host nation and its American advisors withstood the Communist insurgency and enacted reforms sufficient to gain the support of the population. One key issue that plagued the mission at the time and that still exists is the lack of consolidation of activities in-country. The Military Group, working for the Geographic Combatant Commander, facilitated the combination of combat advisors and Security Assistance material. The Defense Attaché Office, supervised by the Defense Intelligence Agency, was not part of the MILGP. The Defense Attaché was therefore not forced to coordinate with the MILGP, although common sense prompted most of the attachés to assist their fellow Americans. However, there were a few examples of interpersonal conflict that inhibited good cooperation, and even among countrymen of the same Service one or the other could throw the trump card of working for separate chains of command: DIA and the CDRUSSOUTHCOM (LTC Gabe Acosta, interview, 25 July 2006, Pentagon).

There is a certain amount of controversy over the efficacy of the MILGP in controlling field advisors. While most veterans of the conflict interviewed for this thesis generally approved of the MILGP's ability to provide command and control, others disagreed and noted that the continuity in rotations of appropriate, culturally attuned personnel came from the 7th Special Forces Group, especially its forward battalion in Panama. This view posits that success in the counterinsurgency came more from the 7th SFG cadre's ability to return time and again to work with "old friends" in-country, than any support from the MILGP headquarters (Hy Rothstein, interview, 4 December 2006, Monterey, California). The existence of this controversy underscores the need to properly structure, rely upon, and hold accountable the in-country military headquarters, and not depend on a unit in the United States or elsewhere to maintain continuity. The purpose of the improved Military Cooperation Group should be to provide in-country continuity, cultural expertise, and local friendships, thus freeing limited SOF headquarters for more selective missions.

2. Haiti

A related example, although in a less hostile environment, is 1997 Haiti. The former US Support Group Haiti was a close cousin to a MILGP for post-conflict stabilization. The previous intervention by the US JTF was of corps size, and enforced a good degree of stability. However, someone had to keep the situation stable as the Joint Task Force exited the country. In order to do this, the US Support Group Haiti was organized. It consisted of about 600 military personnel, and was commanded by a colonel who worked for the Combatant Commander. (See Annex C for structure.)

A critic might point to the lack of progress in Haiti after Operation Uphold Democracy to refute the level of effort expended, but that would be erroneous. The purpose of the support group was not to build a nation, but to control any backlash from the departure of a US JTF. Judged in this light, the Support Group Haiti was quite successful. The colonel in command recognized the triangular relationship of the Combatant Commander, the Ambassador, and himself. Units that were deployed for training executed the Group's tasks. Seabees and Marines completed a road and bridge, while Army well drillers hunted for fresh water. An Army Civil Affairs staff element focused on putting the projects in the right places, while an Army PSYOP MIST team supported the Group's objectives with information. Counter-intelligence detachments concentrated on force protection information. In a sense, the US Support Group Haiti represents the post-hostilities phase of an MCG.

As a precursor to the idea that the MCG could be a base for forces conducting operations, the USSPTGP Haiti provided a base for a company from 3rd Special Forces Group to conduct an area assessment. Unfortunately there was no concerted effort to share any ethnographic information with the Support Group, whose commander had little authority to compel such cooperation.

Another example of the interplay between unity of command and the gathering of ethnographic information had to do with the US Coast Guard attaché, who was present with four to six personnel. The Coast Guard's purpose was to teach the Haitian National Police force how to establish a professional harbor security unit. At the time, this may have sounded trivial. But, post-9/11, it is a critical topic, since in countries with water

access, smuggling will always be present, frequently lethal, and potentially a conduit of weapons of mass destruction. The USCG attaché, while cooperative with the Support Group, was not under its command, which again made interpersonal relations the only potential key to success.

C. CURRENT EFFORTS: MILGPS AND RELATED EFFORTS

While so far, this study has proposed a system, and presented some historical examples to support the MCG, some examination of what exists today is in order. It is important to note that the proposed MCG counter-network, which could be useful for a variety of functions, does not have to be built from scratch. A full range of personnel and efforts already exist, and can be combined to good effect. The most robust structure in the field is, by its nature, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. In Security Cooperation efforts, one name does not fit all. Some missions have the title Military Group (MILGP), while others are called Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG). The missions actually carrying the name Military Group in 2006 are in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Venezuela. MAAGs exist in the Dominican Republic, Peru, Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. The rest have various names like the Office of Military Cooperation (OMC), Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), US Liaison Office (USLO), Military Liaison Office (MLO), and so on. Sometimes, security cooperation programs are executed by Defense Attaché personnel or, occasionally, civilian embassy personnel (Congressional Budget Justification, 2007, p. 599-601 or p. 15 of pdf file).

The key point here is that there is little standardization among these activities, and they are certainly not organized as a counter-network to collect or act on ethnographic information. From this perspective, the MCG would certainly offer a more powerful tool. Two case studies that illustrate current assets available, but that lack the proposed unity of an MCG, are the Philippines and Colombia.

1. The Philippines

Operation Enduring Freedom in the Philippines is an interesting current example of counterinsurgency. It is not conducted by a MILGP per se, which could be a weakness. There is no unity of command between unit advisors, the Security Assistance staff, and the Defense Attaché. (See Annex D for the structures of US efforts in the

Philippines.) Although the MILGP in El Salvador was clearly the main effort for counterinsurgency advisor operations as well as security assistance matters such as materiel and training, the advisor role in the Philippines is not overseen by a Military Group, but by the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), which has been conducting “aggressive Foreign Internal Defense” (MAJ Joe McGraw, interview, 7 September 2006, Monterey, CA). This does not constitute an MCG as described in this thesis. The JSOTF reports to Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC), and does not enjoy control over security assistance decisions and materiel. The Joint US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG)-Philippines reports to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (J4) at USPACOM, and provides the security cooperation aspects of the effort, such as education and equipment. The JSOTF and JUSMAG may cooperate, but are not truly required to do so (LTC Greg Wilson, interview, 22 May 2006, Monterey, CA). Likewise, the huge amount of ethnographic information that is being gleaned by both elements may be informally collected by 1st Special Forces Group, but is not processed, archived and distributed in an established, unified system for that country. It would seem that the permanent presence of an ethnographic team could add continuity, and the whole effort represents a case for greater unity of command. In addition, having an MCG element control advisors in the field could enable the JSOTF HQ to redeploy to a more sensitive mission, if appropriate. While the Philippines effort looks reasonably successful at present, the jury is still out and it would make more sense to put US efforts under the same commander in order to present the Filipinos with a coherent front. At present, the separation in US forces may place a burden on the host nation to coordinate American effects. Arguably, while it is the Filipinos’ country and their counterinsurgency campaign, the principles of unity of command and unity of effort argue that the United States should present help in a coordinated fashion and not place yet one more synchronization effort on the shoulders of a host nation that already has enough internal coordination challenges.

2. Colombia

Another current example is MILGP Colombia, which is actively engaged in helping the host nation to combat the hemisphere’s bloodiest narco-terrorist ‘insurgency.’ While originally designed as a counter-drug program, both the United States and

Colombia have recognized, especially after September 11th, that the drug problem is only one aspect of the deadly brew of crime, terror, and insurgency. The MILGP is structured with a headquarters and advisor teams called Planning Assistance Training Teams (PATTs), modeled after the successful effort in El Salvador. (See Annex E for the MILGP Colombia structure.) As the MILGP designation implies, it is a security assistance organization, with ties to the Security Assistance Training Management Organization (SATMO). The ‘by, with, and through’ aspect comes with US support to Plan Patriota, which is the Columbians’ plan to beat their own insurgency, not a Yankee imposed solution (LTC Erik Valentzas, interview, 31 May 2006, Monterey, CA).

The disconnect, similar to the Philippines and reflective of typical current US postures worldwide, is that the Security Assistance elements, any supporting SOF elements, and Defense Attaché personnel do not come under unified command, and any ethnographic information that they gather is processed in sporadic, compartmented fashion, if at all. Any special operations elements, for example 7th Special Forces Group teams that deploy for temporary training missions, report under the operational control of the TSOC, not the MILGP commander. The MILGP commander is the supported commander, and SOF is supporting, but direct control is not exercised. This command arrangement is actually a step backwards from the El Salvador case, where all advisory personnel came under the command of the MILGP. Similarly, any intelligence cooperation with the Defense Attaché Office, even for overt ethnographic information, is dependent on personality, not command structure and prioritized collection.

Like El Salvador, there is a certain controversy about the efficacy of the MILGP, and a view by some that “what makes Colombia viable is the long-term commitment of 7th Special Forces Group and a cadre that returns to the country and interacts with old friends from the host nation” (Hy Rothstein, interview, 4 December 2006, Monterey, California). Again, the existence of such controversy provides all the more emphasis to improve upon the MILGP and create a better-structured Military Cooperation Group, which can insure continuity of personnel and the requisite longevity in-country.

While the MILGP facilitates training and advising by the PATT teams, as well as provision of Security Assistance material, according to the description offered by the

current chief for the PATT advisors, LTC Erik Valentzas, the entire effort needs structure, and a new doctrine for security cooperation activities including both an SAO and DAO element. From the operators on the ground, then, the notion of a Military Cooperation Group, with an attendant ethnographic team, finds considerable support.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

A. RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to create an effective “counter”-network, consolidating the benefits described in this thesis, DoD should:

1. Make the MCG the First Line of Defense for the United States

- a. Establish an MCG wherever the US does not currently have a similar function. (See Annex A for current levels and types of US DoD presence in embassies.)
- b. Build up existing Security Cooperation and Defense Attaché functions into more robust MCGs.
- c. Create an ethnographic information gathering corps.
- d. Charge the MCG with the counter-network mission and give it the necessary authorities and resources. Since the authorities required are an administrative issue, they are nearly cost-free. The resources required are miniscule in comparison to what would be required to develop sufficient cultural expertise in US combat units. Likewise, the savings can be huge when the costs of US forces conducting operations unilaterally are compared to the potential economy of force gained if an MCG can facilitate action by host nation forces. Since many of the elements described in this thesis such as FAOs, Defense Attachés, and Security Cooperation personnel already exist, the cost of permanently embedding a relative handful of people in each country is a pittance compared to current operations.
- e. Put an agency in charge: either DIA or DSCA, but make a decision and empower it.

B. FOR FURTHER STUDY

Should the Secretary of Defense fuse together the three elements of the DAO, SAO and ethnographic corps, certain elements warrant further study.

1. Career Paths

First of all, the career paths and development of a corps of ethnographic experts is a huge issue. In order to fill this missing capability, the recruitment, education, training,

assignment, management, and rewarding of such specialists is crucial. Poor investment in people would break the program before it could ever start. It is probably redundant to create a corps in addition to the current FAO community, but a “re-tooled” FAO program has some appeal. This could be the option for part of the FAO corps to be the hybrid ethnographer described in section II.C. It is important to recognize that the ethnographic information specialist must be devoted to this task exclusively because of the requirement for immersion in potentially obscure places. Personnel policies must support such a radically different career path. Again, the relative cost is quite low, as some of the administration, training and education infrastructure for FAOs could be used. Second, a review of legislation would certainly be in order.

2. Legislation

While the Director of DSCA has emphatically noted the cumbersome nature of current Security Cooperation laws (Lt Gen Kohler, interview, 25 July 2006, Washington, DC), it would seem that a full review of how these laws interact with intelligence oversight legislation would be beneficial. More responsive legislation could ensure the necessary resources, rewards, and task definitions to make the embassy military teams effective, and not merely a good idea. Perhaps to be effective in the 21st century it will be necessary to break the bureaucratic difference between DIA and DSCA, re-defining military aid and military intelligence. In this combined structure, attachés would no longer be considered ‘legal spies,’ and emphasis could be placed on the quid pro quo of cooperation for mutual security objectives. Perhaps the definitions of cooperation and intelligence need to be re-thought.

This thesis entertains no illusions about the difficulty of legislative review or bureaucratic mergers, but leaves such enormous undertakings for future study.

C. CONCLUSION

The security environment has obviously changed since the end of the Cold War. Unfortunately, the United States has not adapted quickly enough to two challenges: the empowered network as a threat, and the lack of ethnographic information needed to counter this threat and identify trends before they become shocks to American interests. To address this mismatch, the United States needs a ‘workaround.’ That workaround is the counter-network of enhanced Military Cooperation Groups (MCG). America has

most of the raw material, but needs to consolidate current functions, reinforce them with an ethnographic capability, and form it all into a counter-network. This is a low cost, and relatively easy solution that doesn't tilt at windmills to change the nature of US general purpose forces. Such a counter-network can provide benefit far beyond the investment, if organized properly. It is important to recognize that this need and general method were outlined by the Hart-Rudman Commission even before September 11th brought dramatic attention to it.

We believe that homeland security can best be assured through a strategy of *layered defense* that focuses first on prevention, second on protection, and third on response....[After the first instrument of diplomacy,] *The second instrument of homeland security consists of the US diplomatic, intelligence, and military presence overseas.* Knowing the who, where, and how of a potential physical or cyber attack is the key to stopping a strike before it can be delivered. Diplomatic, intelligence, and military agencies overseas, as well as law enforcement agencies working abroad, are America's primary eyes and ears on the ground. (p. 12)

The Military Cooperation Groups (MCG) proposed in this thesis, in concert with the rest of the agencies at the embassies of the United States, represent this instrument. A network of such groups would seem the best way to provide eyes on target, identify trends before they become shocks, stir up activity that will gain intelligence, and then act or pass the intelligence on to the appropriate actor. This counter-network could provide in-depth ethnographic information on societies, which is the missing basis for fighting empowered networks, and a crucial enabler to react to the unknown.

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APPENDIX A: LOCATIONS AND COVERAGE

A. SECURITY ASSISTANCE: PRESENCE AND POTENTIAL ACCESS

While the term “Military Groups” implies USSOUTHCOM’s approach in Latin America, it is important to note that security assistance activities have several titles, and are controlled by the GCC, who executes the security cooperation plan authorized by Congress and administered by DSCA. For further illustration, see the Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, 2007 “Supporting Information” p. 599 (<http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/>), or p. 15 of pdf file.

Countries **not** covered by some kind of security assistance office are:

Asia: China, Iran, North Korea, Bhutan, Laos, Burma, Tibet.

Middle East: Cyprus, Syria.

Latin America: French Guiana.

Africa: Sudan, Libya, Somalia, Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Gambia, , Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Togo, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa), Angola, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Swaziland, Lesotho, Mauritius, Sao Tome & Principe, and the Western Sahara (occupied by Morocco).

In other words, a large swathe of Africa has no security cooperation arrangement permanently in place. Some are temporary arrangements with visiting US trainers.

Europe: Belarus, Finland, Ireland, San Marino, Monaco, the Vatican, Malta, Luxembourg (covered by Belgium ODC), Liechtenstein, Switzerland.

B. DEFENSE ATTACHÉS: PRESENCE AND POTENTIAL ACCESS

The exact roster is classified, but in general terms there are about 136 DAO slots filled, although 182 countries have accredited the US with a DATT position. In about 35, the DATT runs Security Cooperation. The SAO is represented in some fashion in about 115 countries. Between the two functions the United States is represented in about 160 countries. In about 10 countries there is a DAO, but not an SAO. In another 10 countries, there is an SAO, but not a DAO. The numbers look confusing because of a certain amount of overlap and underlap, as well as personnel shifts from time to time.

Of the countries with no SAO permanent presence, many have embassies. The countries without embassies, which present varying degrees of difficulty when it comes to access are:

Asia:

North Korea

Bhutan (covered by the US consulate in New Delhi)

Tibet

Note: Laos has a US embassy. The Laotians don't host a US DAO because they cannot afford to send one of theirs to the US, and would lose face if the US sent one and they couldn't reciprocate.

Middle East: Iran

Latin America: all capitals have US embassies

Africa:

Guinea-Bissau (covered by US Embassy in Senegal)

Republic of Congo (Brazzaville, covered by US Embassy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa))

Sao Tome & Principe (covered by US Embassy in Gabon)

Western Sahara (occupied by Morocco)

Somalia

NOTE: The only place in Africa without some kind of access is Somalia, (and even that is the responsibility of the US Embassy Kenya).

Europe: fully covered

C. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN?

There are very few places in the world that are truly denied space to the United States. Those that cause the most concern are, of course, North Korea and Iran. The remaining countries without US embassies are: Tibet, Bhutan, Western Sahara, and Somalia. In many other places, such as Syria, Burma, and China, access for US personnel is difficult, but possible. The establishment of Military Cooperation Groups in many countries would take time and care, but is feasible. For a great number of countries, especially in Africa, where terrorists can find safe havens, the establishment of MCGs would probably not encounter serious host nation government resistance.

APPENDIX B: EL SALVADOR

The MILGP in El Salvador changed according to the need for advisory teams to work in different locations and address different requirements. In general, the MILGP consisted of a mixture of functional and Service components:

Permanent Party (One year assignment)

- MILGP Commander
- Training Officer
- Air Force Section Chief
- Administrative Officer and NCO
- Navy Section Chief
- Advisors to Salvadoran HQ
 - o Personnel Advisor
 - o Intelligence Advisor
 - o Operations Advisor
 - o Logistics Advisor

Temporary Duty Personnel (Mobile Training Teams-MTT)

- Navy MTT 6
- Air Force Maintenance and Instructor Pilot MTT 4
- Strategic Site Survey MTT 2
- Logistics Maintenance MTT 2
- Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) MTT 2
- Intelligence Training MTT 4
- Operations and Training Team (OPAT) advisors to units
 - o San Vicente 5
 - o Usulután 5
 - o Airborne Battalion 8
 - o Battalion Upgrade 7

(Source Waghelstein, 1985, p. F-1 to F-2)

In later years, this structure was expanded to include OPAT teams in every brigade and zone headquarters. A senior OPAT was added to manage all the OPAT personnel.

The integration of advisors with the Security Assistance structure was efficient. However, the intelligence structure was not streamlined. Note that the MILGP Commander had US intelligence advisors to the Salvadoran headquarters under his control. He did not have US Defense Attaché or other DIA personnel under his command. The cooperation or lack thereof in the intelligence domain was purely the result of personalities, not authority. There was no provision for gathering ethnographic information.

The 55 man limit was imposed by Congress and became a matter of controversy. While the advisors on the ground always wanted to do more, and therefore wanted more US personnel, such an increase was too politically volatile. In retrospect, some Americans proposed that the limit forced US advisors to require the host nation to develop its own solutions (Steele, as quoted in Manwaring & Prisk, 1988, p. 407 - 408).

APPENDIX C: HAITI

The composition of the units in the US Support Group Haiti (USSPTGP) in 1997 changed according to operational rotations. For example, the deployable Navy hospital was replaced by an Air Force hospital. Individual augmentees for the headquarters and “deployed for training” units usually stayed for 6-month tours. The overall strength of the group was consistently about 600. In general, the USSPTGP consisted of functional components:

Headquarters

- Commander (one year tour)
- Deputy Commander
- J-1 Personnel
- J-2 Intelligence
- J-3 Operations
- J-4 Logistics and Engineering
- J-5 Civil Affairs
- J-6 Communications
- Special staff: Chaplain, Postal, etc

Deployed for training units (DFT)

- Military Information Support Team (MIST): psychological operations
- Force Protection team: counter-intelligence
- Deployable Hospital: medical civil assistance
- Army engineer platoon: fresh-water well drilling
- Seabee section: road construction
- Marine engineer company: bridge construction

- Security company: guard duty
- Crash-Fire rescue section: airfield safety

Other units, not under Support Group command:

- USCG Attaché
- USCG training team: advisors to Haitian National Police harbor unit
- US Defense Attaché
- US Special Forces company: temporary duty for area assessment

Note that the SPTGP Commander had an intelligence staff and a force protection (counter-intelligence) section under his control. He did not have US Defense Attaché or other DIA personnel under his command. The cooperation or lack thereof in the intelligence domain was purely the result of personalities, not authority.

There was no provision for gathering ethnographic information in a systematic way. The MIST, Civil Affairs, and Force Protection (CI) personnel became familiar with some of this knowledge in the course of their duties, but no system was ever devised to consolidate, process and catalogue it. The Special Forces company, conducting a brief area assessment (similar to Operational Preparation of the Environment), did not share such information well with the Support Group, and the SPTGP Commander had little authority to compel cooperation. Likewise, there was little sharing of ethnographic or law-enforcement information from the US Coast Guard training detachment, not because of an adversarial working relationship, but more because this was not an identified priority and there was no established system.

(Source: author's personal experience.)

APPENDIX D: THE PHILIPPINES

The Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P) was established in January 2002, as JTF 510. JTF 510's mission ended in July 2002, and transitioned to the present JSOTF-P. Its mission is humanitarian civic action and support to upcoming Security Assistance Modules for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), mostly on the island of Basilan and in Zamboanga City, Mindanao (Military: JSOTF-P, from www.globalsecurity.org, 14 November 2006). The task force strength is anywhere from 50 to 300 personnel, depending on the tempo of operations (Wilson, 2006, p. 21). The JSOTF is organized along Service components:

- Commander (coordinates with AFP GHQ Manila)
- Commander, Forward (coordinates with AFP SOUTHCOM Zamboanga)
- Army SOF
 - o CIVIL AFFAIRS
 - o MIST
 - o LCE: Liaison Coordination Elements consist of 4-12 SOF personnel and are embedded with select AFP units at Div, BDE, BN level
- Navy SOF LCE
- Air Force SOF LCE

The purpose of the LCE teams is to assist certain AFP units in planning and fusing various sources of intelligence in support of counterterrorist operations.

The JSOTF-P is not part of the JUSMAGPHIL. The former commander of the forward task force (Wilson, p. 21) notes success in linking LCE teams with AFP units that have been provided equipment under the Security Assistance program. However, in contrast to El Salvador, the advisors are under separate command than the train-and-equip program, and the LCEs are currently prohibited from training or operating with the units in which they are embedded.

The Joint US Military Assistance Group Philippines (JUSMAGPHIL) is responsible for equipment and training such as joint exercises and the International

Military Education and Training program (source: <http://manila.usembassy.gov>). It coordinates large exercises with the Armed Forces of the Philippines, but does not include a combat advisor role. The JUSMAG is organized along Service components:

Operations Division

- Permanent
 - Army/Air Force Officer 1
 - Navy/Marine Officer 1
 - Operations NCOs 2
- Rotational basis (varying numbers according to the mission)
 - Civil Affairs
 - Reserve Component
 - Counter-terrorism Liaison Officers
- Joint Security Unit staffed by AFP

Security Assistance Office

- Army Mission 1
- Navy Mission 1
- Air Force Mission 1
- Security Assistance NCO 1
- Augmented by 5 Foreign Service Nationals, 13 Philippine Civilians, 5 AFP

The integration of advisors with Security Assistance is not accomplished by structural design, but by coordination between two independent commands, the JSOTF-P and the JUSMAGPHIL. This represents a step backwards from the efficiency of El Salvador and Colombia. Again, the intelligence structure is not streamlined. Note that the JSOTF-P Commander has US SOF advisors to AFP units, who are trying to help fuse all source intelligence. The US Defense Attaché and his personnel are completely separate from either the JUSMAGPHIL or the JSOTF-P. The cooperation or lack thereof in the intelligence realm remains purely the result of personalities, not authority. While personnel from all three entities no doubt develop some ethnographic information, there is no provision for gathering, storing, sharing or using this type of information.

APPENDIX E: COLOMBIA

The Military Group (MILGP) Colombia in 2006 has the mission to integrate, synchronize and coordinate Security Cooperation efforts in order to build Colombian military (COLMIL) warfighting capabilities. It faces a blend of narco-terrorism and insurgency. The strength of the MILGP varies according to the number of advisors deployed and usually totals about 296. At this time, 118 personnel are permanent party on a 2-3 year tour, and the remaining 178 are on temporary duty tours of 3-12 months. The MILGP structure is a combination of Service and functional components:

- Commander
- Executive Officer
- Security Assistance teams: equipment and training
 - Army Mission
 - Air Force Mission
 - Navy Mission
 - Logistics Mission
- Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE): Airspace and air transport coordination
- Planning Assistance Training Team (PATT): advisor teams with Colombian Army units
- Force Protection Detachment (FPD): counter-intelligence
- Intelligence Integration Teams (IIT): liaisons with Colombian units
- Embassy Intelligence Fusion Center (EIFC) (including Technical Assistance Team-Bogotá): coordination with all US government agencies

There is some controversy as to whether the command and control for Special Operations Forces belongs to the MILGP or the Theater SOC:

- Special Operations Command Forward C² (SOCC² Fwd): planning assistance and training to Colombian Army headquarters
 - SOF Operational Detachment B (ODB): Company headquarters
 - Usually 3 ODA: Special Forces “A” teams training Colombian Army units
- (Source: Major Chris Muller, Command Brief MILGP Colombia, 13 November 2006)

Note that there is no formal effort to gather ethnographic information. This type of knowledge is collected to an extent, as intelligence personnel study narco-terrorist organizations, which is an encouraging sign. However, as usual, the Defense attaché office is not under the command of the MILGP, and cooperation is still dependent on personalities.

Likewise, the SOF trainers in the SOC Forward headquarters and the ODB/A are a matter of contention and there have been clashes among personalities. While they are said to be under the tactical control (TACON) of the MILGP, there is a constant question of whether SOF personnel are controlled by the MILGP Commander or the Theater SOC (TSOC) Commander.

On a positive note, Security Assistance functions are integrated with the advisor functions under the MILGP, as in El Salvador. This represents a more streamlined approach than in the Philippines.

While the intelligence fusion efforts of the embassy are laudable, it would seem to be more effective to have dedicated ethnographic personnel and unity of command under an MCG structure.

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