Applying the Dependability Paradigm to Computer Security
Abstract
Dependability is that property of a computer system such that reliance can justifiably be place on the service it delivers [Lap94]. In this paper we contrast the way different ways faults are handled in the dependability paradigm with the way they are handled in the current paradigms for secure system design. We show how the current security paradigm is generally restricted to a subset of the types of approaches used in dependability, largely concentrating on fault prevention and removal while neglecting fault tolerance and forecast, and argue that this paradigm is fast becoming obsolete. We discuss the implications of extending the security paradigm to cover the full range of options covered by dependability. In particular, we develop a rough outline of a fault model for security and show how it could be applied to better our understanding of the place of both fault tolerance and fault forecast in computer security.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1995
- Accession Number
- ADA462692
Entities
People
- Catherine Meadows
Organizations
- United States Naval Research Laboratory