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**CONSTRUCTING A REGIONAL ORDER: NORTHEAST
ASIA AND THE SYSTEMIC CONSTRAINTS ON KOREAN
UNIFICATION**

by

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SYSTEMIC CONSTRAINTS ON KOREAN UNIFICATION**

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ABSTRACT

Nowhere has the mid-20th century polarization of Northeast Asia been more evident than on the Korean Peninsula. Over the past six decades, efforts toward Korean unification have spanned the range of total warfare, covert attacks, propagandist affronts, and formal diplomacy to no avail. Amidst the talk of unification however, it seems a better understanding about the evolving nature of Korea's division is needed. Using a truly unique International Relations approach, this thesis explores the utility of Alexander Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics to address the evolving structure of Northeast Asia and its implications for Korean unification. The results of this analysis contrast with those of predominant IR theories such as Neorealism and suggest that unification is becoming less likely under current structural trends. Additionally, the constructivist methodology employed here shows that while the United States will continue to play an important role in regional security, it must begin to diverge from its anachronistic Cold War defense posture to ensure future stability. By providing a deeper understanding about the macro-level structure of Northeast Asia, this thesis will contribute to the development of policies which will both enhance regional stability and aid in the eventual unification of the two Koreas.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. IMPORTANCE

Northeast Asia has emerged as one of the primary power centers in the modern international system. Its salience is anchored economically by the affluence of Japan, the newly industrialized economies of South Korea and Taiwan, and most recently through the market-oriented People's Republic of China (PRC). Corresponding with its impressive economic stature, the region also hosts an aggregate military force of nearly 5 million troops and is a nexus of nuclear weaponry. Geographically, it interlocks two proven nuclear states (the PRC and Russia), one developing nuclear state (North Korea), and arguably three other members with the potential for rapid nuclear weapons acquisition (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan).¹ While some Asian scholars now consider the region to be "ripe for rivalry,"² others have stated that, "at no time has the challenge of redefining national identities seemed more urgent and open-ended than in recent post-Cold War years, particularly in the Northeast Asian region."³

Also embedded in Northeast Asia is the United States—itsself an advanced nuclear state, the possessor of an overwhelming conventional military force, and historically the most integrated external economic actor in the region. While Northeast Asia as a whole experienced periodic conflict from 1894-1953, it has remained relatively stable since then, either due to or coincidental with America's robust presence. American bilateral defense alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan emerged early in the 1950s to buttress efforts at containing the spread of communism, subsequently entrenching a polarized security paradigm which still persists today.

Nowhere has the mid-20th century polarization of Northeast Asia been more evident than on the Korean Peninsula. Six decades have passed since the

¹ Samuel S. Kim, ed., *The International Relations of Northeast Asia* (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 5-9.

² Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," *International Security* 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993-1994): 5-33.

³ Kim, 42.

United States and the Soviet Union arbitrarily divided responsibilities for disarming Japan's colonial regime in Korea along the 38th parallel. The emergent, antagonistic halves became not only bitter civil war enemies with distinct ideas about how to govern their newly-decolonized society, but they also became sentries for their respective superpower patrons in a global battle between "good" and "evil." The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was a symbolic end to this global battle. It contributed not only to the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it also sparked the reunification process between East and West Germany. However, whether that shocking event ended all aspects of the Cold War is debatable as one looks out across Korea's four kilometer-wide demilitarized zone—the peninsular problem remains unresolved.

Efforts toward the unification of Korea have spanned the range of total warfare, covert attacks, propagandist affronts, and formal diplomacy to no avail.⁴ Yet despite these failures, Korean unification remains a desirable goal and plausible to many. Talk in the Western world about Korean unification rarely proceeds beyond key contemporary issues though—North Korean ballistic missile proliferation and nuclear weapons development, the U.S. military presence in South Korea, the 1953 armistice agreement, or the Kim Jong-il cult of personality. These issues are indeed significant to the process of Korean unification, but awareness of them has done little toward bringing the two Koreas closer. As such, unification continues to elude the Korean people—and Korea's division continues to fuel anachronistic fires in the region, ultimately threatening the tenuous stability which has pervaded for so long.

After years of fruitless efforts to unify the Korean Peninsula (an expressed intent of both the North and South to varying degrees, along with a stated desire of the U.S. State Department), it seems what is needed is a better understanding

⁴ The "unification" of Korea will be referred to throughout this discussion instead of "reunification," as the effect on the overall argument is considered nil. Whether Korea will be unified or reunified is semantically debatable, although the term reunification is perhaps more sensitive toward the modern Korean perspective. The Choson dynasty encompassed the territory of both Koreas from 1392-1910, but full sovereignty and the Western recognition of Asian nations was hardly established during that timeframe. Additionally, there has never been a single Korean seat in the United Nations; there have been two since 1991 when both North and South Korea were admitted.

about the evolving nature of Korea's division and how the region of Northeast Asia affects it. That is, *what factors are currently working to keep the two Koreas apart?* Are the two Koreas complicit in their own sustained division? Or, has the surrounding political environment of Northeast Asia been the primary constraint on Korean unification? Additionally, is that environment becoming more or less conducive to Korean unification over time? Furthermore, what impact does U.S. foreign policy have on this political environment? Do current American policies promote regional stability while inhibiting the prospects of Korean unification or vice versa? Do they do both or neither simultaneously?

Utilizing a systemic International Relations (IR) approach based on social constructivist theory, this discussion offers a new perspective on the problems confronting Korean unification and suggests that unification is becoming less likely over time as a consequence of evolving structural conditions in Northeast Asia. This does not mean that Korean unification has become impossible, but that the prospects for it are diminishing under current trends. Furthermore, it will be suggested that the United States remains a critical actor in the Northeast Asian security picture, although there is mounting pressure to alter its anachronistic policy approach to the region. Existing U.S. policies neither meet the needs of future regional stability nor the unification of North and South Korea.

In 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell and Germany was reunified, the world and all of its Cold War analysts were caught by surprise. Fortunately, these events favored much of the European continent and the regional system that America helped to build. A continued misunderstanding about the division of the two Koreas, however, could produce consequences which are much less desirable for the United States in Northeast Asia today.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

If the unification of Korea is truly considered a salient factor in the sustained peace of Northeast Asia, it is imperative to begin analyzing its two halves with an IR approach that is both cogent in the present and sustainable in the future. One of these approaches utilizes the perspective of international relations that there are inescapable forces at play between states that affect their

behavior among one another. Proponents of this systemic approach have further become enmeshed in an ontological debate about which specific forces drive state behavior in the international system. One side of this structural debate originates from a materialist and individualist perception of the world whereby states pursue their self-interests amongst one another within a system of anarchy, which is ungoverned by an ultimate arbitrator or Leviathan.⁵ States in this type of system are considered rational actors because they have clearly defined interests that they pursue, while weighing the costs and benefits of their actions vis-à-vis others. Additionally, these rational states desire their own continued survival.

Neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz posit that in the absence of a legitimate arbitrator or international government, each state takes on a functionally similar role to all other states in the system—each contains some form of government that presides over a given citizenry and occupies a given territory—but each state varies in its respective distribution of power (resources, population, etc.) compared to other states. Therefore, the outcomes of systemic competition, according to Waltz, reflect each individual state's natural and acquired capabilities to stay alive.⁶ Accordingly, this self-help hypothesis

⁵ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil* [1651], ed. Michael Oakeshott (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), is one of the classic texts used in the study of international relations. Hobbes makes several statements regarding the state of nature as he sees it, proclaiming that "...during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man." The common power he refers to is the "Leviathan" or commonwealth, which men abdicate their rights of self government to.

⁶ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979) is an excellent, but highly criticized attempt to theorize the interaction of states at a systemic level. Its criticism is levied by various pedigrees of political and social scientists, yet it remains critical to modern studies of international relations. This author's primary disagreements with Waltz's theory are that (1) it assumes too much similarity about individual states (intentional by Waltz) and (2) it was framed during a period of history when the world appeared to operate on Realist terms (see also Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia, 1986), 211-214. It remains inadequate to predict systemic changes such as the end of the Cold War where the Soviet Union's material power changed dramatically as a result of domestic politics, altering system polarity rapidly. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 could also be viewed as a rapid change in relative power among Asian nations, yet system polarity was largely unaffected and widespread attempts to balance or rebalance the system were not undertaken.

replicates the outcomes from the microeconomic model (states are like “firms” in the international system or “market”) Waltz uses to describe the international system as a whole.

While Neorealism is capable of describing the behavior between states such as North and South Korea throughout the Cold War period, its assumptions about states cause distinct problems in assessing Korea’s future. First, it assumes the *de facto* existence of states within the international system while taking their interests (security and power) as given. Neorealism does not account for the creation of new states, such as the new republics which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, even though it hints at the possibility of state elimination.⁷ The best we can infer about state creation from Neorealism is that “each state duplicates the activities of other states” because “the ends they aspire to are similar.”⁸

From this, Neorealism suggests that the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan should have all had interests resembling Russia’s after 1991. However, this was proven otherwise in one of many instances when the three former republics gave up their nuclear weapons capabilities and the latter maintained them.⁹ Giving away this “acquired” nuclear security counters the fundamental tenets of Neorealism, and in the time since the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan gained their respective independence from the Soviet Union, their existence as nations has not been externally threatened.

Second, Neorealists claim that the most powerful states in the international system “set the scene” for all others and propagate power-balancing competitions which result in structural arrangements with various degrees of polarity.¹⁰ While this is perhaps a quintessential aspect behind the division and sustained separation of Korea throughout the Cold War, it nevertheless suggests starkly conflicting consequences should Korea become unified. On one hand,

⁷ Waltz, 95.

⁸ Ibid., 96.

⁹ Federation of American Scientists. <http://www.fas.org> (accessed 22 May 06).

¹⁰ Waltz, 94.

the balance of the current international system may be altered little by a newly-unified Korean “shrimp” subject to competing “whales” (*kyeongjeon hasa*) such as China, Japan, Russia, or the United States. On the other hand, a unified Korea could immediately lead to an imbalance in the modern international system due to its relative and absolute increases in material power (territory, resources, population, etc.). While either of these could prove to be true over time, the potential disparity between the opposing structural consequences is far too great to ignore and Neorealism does little to predict which of these circumstances is more probable.

Third, the causality of a material-driven international structure on individual state behavior suggests that a unified Korea, in a dog-eat-dog (*ijeon tugu*) world, would be destined to compete with its already polarized neighbors since it would immediately represent a more capable actor than it did while divided. Conversely, Korea’s neighbors may attempt to prevent the unification process in the first place for the sake of conserving their own relative power in the region.¹¹ In Thucydidean terms, Korea would then be compelled to balance against the “systemic tyrants” who aim to suppress it, seeking alignment with states outside of the region for protection. It is certainly conceivable that the PRC, Russia, and Japan may have concerns about a new power emerging in Northeast Asia, but Neorealism offers little insight toward the possibilities of cooperation with Korea under these circumstances. Once again, Germany’s reunification did not lead to direct conflicts with its neighbors or collusion against it. Neorealism therefore, provides only a pessimistic view of the potential unification of Korea and leads to worst-case policy scenarios for the United States.

Critics of Neorealism, however, present an expanded pallet of variables in their analyses of systemic structure, promoting the salience of both sub-unit (domestic) and supra-unit (international) processes in the alteration of state

¹¹ Waltz, 70.

behaviors over time.¹² Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little distinguish Structural Realism from Waltz's Neorealism by eliminating the microeconomic foundation, disaggregating the all-encompassing concept of relative state power into distinct state capabilities, and by acknowledging that "[t]here is not one logic of anarchy, but many."¹³ Admittedly, this is an attempt by Buzan, Jones, and Little to make an "archipelago" out of the various "islands" of international relations theory. However, providing additional pieces to the puzzle of international relations, even in a more orderly fashion, does not necessarily improve Structural Realism's theoretical potential. It lacks the coherence and simplistic appeal of Neorealism, which is a much more defined land mass in systemic terms.¹⁴ But Structural Realism also does little to show that material egoism is not a given condition of states in an anarchical system, even if the potential "logics" of anarchy which they describe are many.

From the Liberal Institutional (Neoliberal) perspective, establishing rules and norms for state behavior at the international level can regulate cooperation among otherwise self-regarding states under anarchic conditions, thereby diminishing the inevitability of conflict connoted by Neorealism.¹⁵ Understanding the impacts that international regimes have on transmitting rules and norms provides a much better avenue of exploration for the future of a unified Korea; such rules and norms can be considered systemic constraints or expectations which all states should live up to.

¹² For prominent critiques of Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*, Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little offer a Structural Realist view in *The Logic of Anarchy* (New York: Columbia, 1993); a Liberal Institutional perspective is presented in Robert Keohane, ed. *Neorealism and its Critics*; and John Gerard Ruggie critiques and compares Neorealism and Neoliberalism *contra* Social Constructivism in *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalism* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

¹³ Buzan, Jones and Little, 244.

¹⁴ Ibid. See especially Chapter 2 and Chapter 13.

¹⁵ Pertinent examples on the tenets of Neoliberalism are Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," *World Politics* 38, No. 1 (October 1985): 226-254; Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, "The Rational Design of International Institutions," *International Organization* 55, No. 4 (Autumn 2001): 761-799; and Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," *International Security* 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995): 39-51.

Due to the convergence of two vastly different political systems, world views, and the historical North-South dependence on opposing larger powers, a nascent, unitary Korea may well be compelled to cooperate with its neighbors over mutual interests because of the separation and suffering it has endured (so as to avoid it again). Furthermore, Neoliberals such as Robert Keohane posit that international cooperation is most feasible among those nations with advanced market economies and similar political systems which become increasingly interdependent on each other.¹⁶ Presumably, South Korea's current economic ties among its Asian neighbors and the rest of the world, along with its maturing democracy would benefit a unified Korea, bolstering the Neoliberal approach (it will not be suggested here that Korean unification would occur under the socialist/isolationist banner of North Korea).

Unfortunately, the promise of a Neoliberal approach is susceptible to the same pitfalls of Neorealism; it accepts the preexistence of states within the international system, it maintains a limited concept of international anarchy,¹⁷ and uses “power” and “wealth” to determine the relative order of states among each other—all drawbacks from pursuing the structural implications on a potentially unified Korean state.¹⁸ Thus, while the Neorealist-Neoliberal debate varies through its level of analysis,¹⁹ it ultimately revolves around the material concerns of rational-egoist states, and either side unnecessarily predisposes a unified Korea to a self-regarding collision course with its larger neighbors.²⁰

¹⁶ Robert Keohane's *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) establishes much of the Neoliberal canon, and in it he questions the ability of nations to cooperate in the absence of a hegemonic power. For lack of better explanations at the time it was written, Keohane accepts many of Waltz's systemic assumptions about the world, including the rational-egoist nature of states. Ultimately with regard to Waltz though, he believes that “no systemic analysis can be complete” and that state behavior also rests on domestic institutions and leadership.

¹⁷ Ibid., 7.

¹⁸ Ibid., 21.

¹⁹ David Singer addressed this issue long before the controversy existed between Neorealists and Neoliberals in “The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations,” *World Politics* (October 1961), 77-92.

²⁰ Keohane (1984), 27.

A fundamentally different way to study the structure of international relations and the future of Korea is to view state interaction sociologically instead of materially—based on the “distribution of ideas” rather than the distribution of power.²¹ Some constructivists argue that a system of states structured along differing social cultures and analyzed in terms of enmity, rivalry, and amity is distinctly different than one modeled on market economics where all states are analogized as firms trying to maximize their profits. Such an approach, offered by Alexander Wendt’s *Social Theory of International Politics* (hereafter *STIP*), not only acknowledges state cognition of “self” vis-à-vis “others” across the range of state interactions, but also suggests that state behaviors may result from the repeated patterns of social behavior among other states.²²

Wendt’s idealist and holist approach is promising when addressing the complexities of the modern Northeast Asian region and also when considering the potential of Korean unification into a preexisting system of anarchy. It enables a regional analysis under the current conditions of Korean division and accommodates the creation of a unified Korean identity in the future, unhindered by material properties alone. Furthermore, the ontological differentiation between materialism and idealism on the one hand, and individualism and holism

²¹ A systemic theory of international relations derived from constructivism is presented by Alexander Wendt in *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), which was published after his well-known article “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992): 391-425. A “distribution of ideas” is used by Wendt to describe various political cultures in the international system. Many of his terms are used specifically throughout this discussion unless otherwise stated.

²² There are different “strands” of constructivism and correspondingly different names for each according to various scholars. Alexander Wendt speaks of “building a bridge” between “modern” and “postmodern” constructivists in “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics”; John Gerard Ruggie provides descriptions of “neo-classical,” “post-modernist,” and “naturalistic” constructivists in “What Makes the World Hang Together: Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge,” *International Organization* 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998): 855-885; Ted Hopf distinguishes between “conventional” and “critical” constructivists in “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” *International Security* 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998): 171-200.

on the other, provides a philosophical and theoretical foundation for *STIP* which does not presuppose conflict within a system of anarchy, even though its possibilities are not removed.²³

Although there is an increasing body of empirical studies pertaining to constructivist approaches to international relations, both proponents and critics have cited the need for additional research to support its utility.²⁴ Ted Hopf has proposed a constructivist research agenda, highlighting common IR concerns such as “the balance of threat, security dilemmas, neoliberal institutionalist accounts of cooperation under anarchy, and the liberal theory of democratic peace” as areas for the alternate approach of constructivism.²⁵

As one of the variants within this alternate approach, using *STIP* allows the issues raised by Hopf to be addressed indirectly by assessing just how “distributed” certain ideas are within Northeast Asia. Pertaining to *STIP* particularly, Kathleen McNamara has criticized Wendt’s text by asserting that “researchers looking for a historically grounded assessment of the cultures of anarchy or a template for doing empirical constructivist work will have to look elsewhere.”²⁶ Ultimately, this discussion is an effort to contribute to the

²³ David Dessler challenges Wendt’s “materialist” perception of Neorealism in his book review of *Social Theory of International Politics*. See *American Political Science Review* 94, No. 4, (December 2000): 1002-1003.

²⁴ Thomas Berger addresses state identity and interests in “Power and Purpose in Pacific East Asia: A Constructivist Interpretation,” in *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, eds. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 387-419, although he resorts primarily to economic factors which account for identity shifts in Northeast Asia after World War II, leaving room for Realist and Neoliberal arguments; J.J. Suh presents an exceptionally strong constructivist explanation of state identities in, “Bound to Last? The U.S.-Korea Alliance and Analytical Eclecticism,” in *Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency*, eds. J.J. Suh, Peter Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 131-171; Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu addresses foreign policy as a measure of national identity in *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach* (New York: Routledge, 2003); and Maja Zehfuss critiques the utility of constructivism in explaining Germany’s post-reunification identity in *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

²⁵ Hopf, 186.

²⁶ Kathleen McNamara. Book review of *Social Theory of International Politics* by Alexander Wendt, *The Journal of Politics* 63, No. 3 (August 2001): 997-999.

“elsewhere” that McNamara mentions by empirically addressing Korea’s division and its relationship to the modern history of Northeast Asia, utilizing the cultures of systemic anarchy defined by Wendt in *STIP*.

The division of nations such as Korea is not an uncommon phenomenon since inception of the Westphalian state system in Europe in 1648.²⁷ Civil wars, territorial conflicts, colonization, and outright conquest have caused or perpetuated various degrees of separation among otherwise unified political entities from Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. But the unification of states within the international system is a much less frequent occurrence. The potential of Korean unification, therefore, distinctly relates it to a small family of cases which were salient throughout the Cold War as “fault lines” and have become important in the modern international system since that time.²⁸

As proxies (albeit with their own domestic interests), the divided polities of Vietnam, Germany, China, and Korea became enveloped in an ideologically-driven competition with systemic impacts, and were utilized to varying degrees as pawns in a four decade-long struggle of superpower identity.²⁹ Two of these cases, Vietnam and Germany, have resulted in the unification of previously separated political entities and the emergence of new states within different regions. Since domestic politics or unit-level phenomena alone were not enough to facilitate either instance of unification, the study of international structure on state unification remains a worthy pursuit.

²⁷ I label previously unified political entities within a defined territory as “nations” here only to differentiate them from modern “states” which are largely products of the post-World War II period. The definition of a state in Wendt’s *STIP* centers on the notion of sovereignty, which is constitutive of recognition by other “states” as being the legitimate authority over a defined territory and society, with a legal-institutional order and a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

²⁸ Weiqun Gu labels China, Germany, Korea, and Vietnam as the “fault lines” of the Cold War in *Conflicts of Divided Nations: The Cases of China and Korea* (Westport: Praeger, 1995), 4.

²⁹ I assert from an idealist perspective, that the Cold War was a conflict between the two primary winners of World War II based on their desires for a capitalist versus a socialist international economic order. These ideas were absolutely antithetical to each other, and as a result, the expansion of American and Soviet identities became necessary to guarantee their desired systems until much of the globe became an “us” against “them” arrangement. Wendt also discusses this phenomenon on p. 375 of *STIP*.

In regard to the unification of divided states, there remains relatively little IR scholarship dedicated to it as a unique phenomenon in its own right. One such study is *Conflicts of Divided Nations* (1995) by Weiqun Gu, who defines divided state relations as “transpolital,” representing a combination of domestic and international politics, and as *sui generis*, or one of a kind.³⁰ This is certainly an appropriate perspective, not denied by this study, but Gu’s synthesized comparative politics-IR methodology focuses primarily on various levels of conflict between the PRC and Taiwan and the two Koreas throughout the Cold War. It also utilizes an eclectic mix of variables which have already been shown ineffective in an *STIP* approach.

The first three variables in Gu’s study utilize Neorealist principles and have proven unsatisfactory at describing divided state outcomes since the time of Gu’s writing. The balance of power between “contestant” states and also between their “superpower backers” represent Gu’s first two variables, while the overall system polarity constitutes the third.³¹ From this Neorealist perspective, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dramatic shift in overall power between North and South Korea toward the latter’s favor should have generated North Korean attempts to rebalance the regional system or bandwagon with another state throughout the early 1990s. However, this was not the case—North Korea moved only further toward self-isolation—implying that there is more to the existing culture of anarchy in Northeast Asia than such variables can describe.

The final two variables in Gu’s study are taken from second- and first-image levels of analyses respectively. While supplementing the first three third-image variables from the inside-out, they depart from the Neorealist structural analysis. Here, changes in domestic political systems and changes in leadership are explored, but on their own, do not fully explain Korea’s sustained division, nor do they contribute toward an explanation of future unification.³²

³⁰ Gu, 5.

³¹ Ibid., 14.

³² Ibid., 14.

However ineffective these five key variables are in an *STIP* or other structural analysis, Gu does address two issues which are of significant interest. First is the notion that divided states struggle for international legitimacy,³³ which appeals specifically to the crucial concept of state sovereignty prescribed by *STIP*. Second, Gu directly cites a Hobbesian “state of nature” as the basic environment for divided states.³⁴ While this may or may not be true (a definition for the Hobbesian “state of nature” in international relations is not provided by Gu), this description registers among the potential logics of anarchy which will be examined later in this discussion.

A second effort at examining divided states as a unique phenomenon was made in a compilation of essays published shortly after the end of the Cold War. Although it places more emphasis on domestic politics in divided state conflict resolution, *Politics of Divided Nations: China, Korea, Germany and Vietnam—Unification, Conflict Resolution and Political Development*, edited by Quansheng Zhao and Robert Sutter, also highlights a favorable international environment as “crucial” in resolving divided state relationships.³⁵ This insight again hints at the importance of a structural analysis, but in this book, it is framed primarily in respect to the Cold War.

While the Cold War was a watershed event in the division of China, Korea, Germany, and Vietnam, it has proven not to be very significant in divided state resolution aside from the German case (which may in itself have been coincidental). From a Neorealist or Neoliberal point of view, dissolution of the Soviet Union may have represented a structural shift from a bipolar international system to a unipolar or multipolar system. However, from an *STIP* perspective, systemic polarity describes little about systemic structure.

³³ Gu, 15-16.

³⁴ Gu, 4.

³⁵ Zhao Quansheng and Robert Sutter, eds., *Politics of Divided Nations: China, Korea, Germany, Vietnam—Unification, Conflict Resolution and Political Development*, in *Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies* 5 (Baltimore: University of Maryland, 1991), 2.

Within the same volume, Ahn Byung-joon analyzes the international situation as one of three important elements affecting resolution between the two Koreas specifically.³⁶ The end of the Cold War, German unification, political shifts in Eastern Europe, and normalization of Soviet-South Korean relations are some of the key variables for Ahn's analysis of the international situation, but in the fifteen years since these events transpired, their direct impacts on the two Koreas are questionable, if even measurable.³⁷ Although concluding that the peoples and governments of the two Koreas should ultimately lead the peace and unification processes, Han Sung-joo emphasizes "détente between the United States and the Soviet Union" as "the most notable and important development" in international relations for the two Koreas,³⁸ and cites China, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan as important participants in resolving the North-South dispute.³⁹

The previous assessment of literature available to aid in the understanding of the Korean situation at a structural level provides results of only limited benefit. Neorealism, Structural Realism, and Neoliberalism all offer a predisposed IR approach, while eclectic efforts toward divided states as *sui generis* phenomena acknowledge the importance of the international environment, yet look primarily to the end of the Cold War for answers—answers which still have not come. The international environment in Northeast Asia is indeed a critical factor in Korea's future, but it must be assessed from a different perspective before a new way ahead can be established.

C. METHODOLOGY

To provide a new perspective on the Korean situation in Northeast Asia, the methodology for this study will attempt to follow through on the theoretical basis of *STIP*, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Such an approach

³⁶ Ahn Byung-joon, "Peace, Cooperation, and Reunification in Korea" in *Politics of Divided Nations: China, Korea, Germany, Vietnam—Unification, Conflict Resolution and Political Development*, eds. Zhao Quansheng and Robert Sutter, 90.

³⁷ Ahn, 90.

³⁸ Han Sung-joo, "Problems and Prospects for Peace and Unification in Korea" in *ibid.*, 109.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 106.

implies that patterns of social behavior between states emerge over time and can have normalizing effects on other states around them, regardless of material conditions. Utilizing theoretical concepts from *STIP*, state interactions across Northeast Asia will be empirically analyzed in terms of Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian cultural logics. Beginning with the post-World War II period and continuing through the conventional end of the Cold War, the aggregation of results from the state-to-state assessments will provide insight on the macro-level of social structure in Northeast Asia. The primary focus will be to construct the social history of the region by assessing the dyadic relations between each of the primary actors. The results will be aggregated across specific historic periods according to significant social patterns of the time. From these historic case studies, valuable data points (DPs) for mapping the overall trend in regional culture will emerge.

Performing this structural assessment of Northeast Asia and its impacts on Korea's division utilizes a synthesized approach drawn from a variety of literary sources. In addition to *Social Theory of International Politics* as the theoretical foundation, primary sources such as American and Chinese foreign policy documents and news media reports will provide the empirical foundation. Secondary materials will be used extensively for this study and consist of books, scholarly journals, and academic publications related to the specific topics being addressed.

D. REVIEW OF CHAPTERS

Although many scholars and students of IR are familiar with the academic works of Alexander Wendt (especially his concept that “anarchy is what states make of it”), the in-depth study of *Social Theory of International Politics* and empirical work associated with it is not yet pervasive. Therefore, Chapter 2 will provide an overview of the essential concepts from *STIP* that will be utilized throughout this discussion: the state as agent, including national identities and interests; the macro- and micro-levels of international structure; and the three of the potential logics of international anarchy. As Wendt himself has not provided a template for empiricizing *STIP*, this highly-condensed overview will be

presented with the author's best intent and understanding of Wendt's ideas. Chapter II is not essential for readers familiar with *STIP* or for understanding the rest of this work generally. It merely serves as a source for terminology used throughout the remaining sections and as a compass for readers with further interest on the use of constructivism in the study of political science.

In Chapter III, Northeast Asia will be analyzed at the macro-level from 1946-1992, to develop a basic understanding of the *STIP* concepts that pertain to Korea's divided-state relationship. Again, the primary focus of this chapter is to construct the social history of Northeast Asia by assessing the dyadic relations of each country involved and then by aggregating the results in to a broader framework. The historical periods will be broken down by significant social events, each of which will provide a data point in the evolution of the Northeast Asian macro-structure. The final section in Chapter III will synthesize the results about social relations in Northeast Asia from an *STIP* point of view and will serve to clarify some of the constraints on Korea's division at the international level.

Whereas Chapter III is an effort to capture an objective "outsider" perspective on regional social culture, Chapter IV will attempt to provide an "insider" perspective on the Korean micro-structure, as it relates to the regional relationships around it. It will address the national identities and interests of both North and South Korea and explore how these identities and interests contribute to the regional social culture. In Chapter V, the discussion will turn to issues of concern for U.S. policy-makers and scholars of the region. Considerations about the current U.S. policy status quo will be made in respect to the 1953 Armistice and ROK-U.S. Alliance, the new doctrine of Strategic Flexibility, the ongoing Six-Party talks, and other regional issues. Following this discussion will be suggestions from the preceding *STIP* study that will not only enhance stability in Northeast Asia, but will also promote Korean unification. Finally, Chapter VI will conclude with a commentary on the usefulness of *STIP* and its potential for further analyses in the study of international relations.

II. SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (STIP)

A. THE CONTEXT OF *STIP*

A *STIP* assessment of systemic behavior within the international system begins from what Wendt labels “two basic tenets” that have become “increasingly accepted” in the realm of constructivist thinking.⁴⁰ First, ideas are the *primary source* of explanation for the ongoing interactions between individuals, rather than material forces such as wealth or power. This is not to say that material concerns are irrelevant, but that they occupy a secondary position behind that of ideas. Second, *shared* ideas contribute in a fundamental sense to the identities and interests of individuals.⁴¹ Thus, the meanings of objects and others are constantly being defined for an individual while its own identity and interests are being reinforced, altered, or rejected throughout interactive processes. The first tenet, that the international system functions as a result of ideas, is important for understanding how persistent cultures may develop and impact the components of the system. The holist aspect of the second tenet in *STIP* is equally critical however, by relating individual identities to the ideas they share with others.

Utilizing individualist-holist and material-ideational dyads, Wendt places *STIP* in the context of four distinct sociologies of international politics.⁴² These sociologies are defined by the four separate quadrants of Figure 1 which represent materialist-individualist, materialist-holist, idealist-individualist, and idealist-holist combinations. From a theoretical perspective, materialism-individualism defines a social system where the actors pursue wealth or power due to their own nature (that is the actors themselves are naturally self-regarding and desire wealth or power). Materialism-holism suggests instead that actors are driven to pursue wealth and power as a result of structural conditions set by the interaction between all actors in the system. Idealism-individualism indicates the

⁴⁰ Wendt (1999), 1.

⁴¹ Ibid., 1. Wendt acknowledges that there are many forms of constructivism and that he is addressing only one form of it in *STIP*. He concedes that proponents of other forms may reject his work for “not going far enough” and for being a “thin” version of constructivism.

⁴² Ibid., 23.

possibility of actors creating their own identities and interests (which could be wealth or power, or anything else) without feeling the impacts of interactions among other actors. Finally, idealism-holism presents the opportunity for actors to create their own identities and interests, although the social system around them has significant effects on this process.




Figure 1. Four Sociologies of International Relations. (From Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 32)

As previously mentioned, *STIP* is clearly differentiated from the materialist-individualist approaches of Neorealism and Neoliberalism, but it is accompanied in the idealist-holist quadrant by other bodies of IR scholarship. These bodies, including postmodernism and the English School, will not be discussed in detail here. It suffices to say however, that *STIP* remains distinct from these bodies by endorsing “a scientific approach to social inquiry.”⁴³

B. THE STATE AS AGENT

Underlying the international structure that *STIP* addresses is the building block of modern international relations—the state. Although transnational forces and multilateral organizations are pervasive in today’s politics, Wendt, like Neorealists and Neoliberals, considers the state to be the essential element of analysis. The “system” described in *STIP* is built of states, and the interest of this discussion is how “structure” intervenes on state behavior. Therefore, it is important to mention the concept of state which will be used henceforth.

⁴³ Wendt (1999), 1. For elaboration on the differences between *STIP*, the English School, postmodern IR, feminist IR, and World Society theory, see pp. 29-40.

1. The Essential State

Borrowing from Max Weber and Karl Marx, *STIP* suggests that “the essential state has five properties: (1) an institutional-legal order, (2) an organization claiming a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence, (3) an organization with sovereignty, (4) a society, and (5) territory.”⁴⁴ This definition is appropriate; however, recognition of each of these properties by other states must be assumed to make the essential state an *objective state*—a point depending on whether state sovereignty is *de jure* or *de facto* or if proclaimed territorial borders are widely accepted. An autonomous government possessing its own military and a loyal civilian following would not be considered a state unless it also possessed a parcel of land recognized by others (i.e. Taiwan, Palestine).

The properties of essential states will not be elaborated on further here, but it should be considered that when states interact, they must account for other governments, militaries, civilian populations, and demarcated borders. Also included in Wendt’s concept of the essential state is the notion that states are intentional, corporate actors that possess self-consciousness and independent decision-making structures, suggesting that they can develop internal traits over time.⁴⁵ These internal traits are important because they contribute to particular self-understandings prior to interaction with other states. Once other states are interacted with, their subjective perceptions will then contribute to the establishment of an identity. Thus “[i]dentities are constituted by both internal and external structures,” or patterns of shared ideas.⁴⁶

2. National Identity

Building on a variety of identity paradigms, *STIP* consolidates its definition of identity around four distinct types: personal or corporate, type, role, and collective. Personal or corporate identities are constituted by internal beliefs or subjective ideas about the self, and may produce an element such as “the state”

⁴⁴ Wendt (1999), 202.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 218-222.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 224.

which is cognized solely by its members. Regardless of whether or not others recognize a personal or corporate identity, it can be sustained by its membership alone and is therefore not a constitutive identity type. A type identity is developed through association with particular behaviors, experiences, or characteristics which have social meaning or consequences.⁴⁷ States may be authoritarian or democratic, insular or land-locked, capitalist or socialist—these type identities are objective facts and do not require recognition by others to make them true. However, the reality of these different “types” does have meaning to other states in the system.

While personal or corporate and type identities do not depend necessarily on other states, the role identity exists “*only* in relation to Others” according to Wendt.⁴⁸ Thus roles become a constitutive relationship among states in the international system, whereby each state relies on the other to maintain an existing role identity. Being an “enemy” is not a personal or type identity, it requires the existence of an opposing state. Likewise, a state desiring to be a regional hegemon will not obtain that role unless other states in the region concede a certain degree of superiority and influence to it. The last identity type is that of collective identity. When various type and role identities between states begin to coincide, Wendt suggests that these states may begin to identify with each other over time, as several Western nations have. He states, “[i]dentification is a cognitive process in which the Self-Other distinction becomes blurred” and actors “define the welfare of the Other as part ...of the Self.”⁴⁹

3. National Interests

The four identity types presented by *STIP* are important factors for a constructivist interpretation of state behavior and the aggregate of these identities will largely determine the national identity of a state. Because states are intentional actors and value their own existence, they will attempt to reproduce the identities that they feel contribute most to their national identity.

⁴⁷ Wendt (1999), 225-226.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 227.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 229.

To sustain these identities though, they must acquire specific interests which compel them to act in certain ways. This is how ideas drive systemic interaction among states, rather than material forces.

STIP elaborates on two sets of interests for states; subjective and objective. “The concept of *subjective* interests refers to those beliefs that actors actually have about how to meet their identity needs” while “[o]bjective interests are needs...which must be fulfilled if an identity is to be reproduced.”⁵⁰ Among the objective interests, *STIP* highlights four specifically which it considers the essential interests of a nation.

First, *physical survival* is the preservation of the collective state identity such that it does not disappear simply after a regime change or a defeat in war. Second, *autonomy* is the independent control of state resources and government by the collective state itself. Puppet regimes or colonial powers would violate this notion of autonomy. Third, an interest in *economic well-being* connotes that the modes of production for a state are not dramatically altered and that its resources should provide state incomes, not rents for outsiders. Finally, the fourth national interest is *collective self-esteem*. If the self-image of a state is severely damaged by others, it may act in a way to redeem itself or bring others down to its level. This makes the recognition of sovereignty and expressions of equality by other states a vital factor in state interaction.⁵¹

C. TWO LEVELS OF INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE

While Neorealists conceptualize the international system as being composed of a single, material-driven structure isolated from the reductionist properties of states, Alexander Wendt argues that in fact, international structures exist on two separate levels.⁵² The first is at a micro-level based on state interaction and the second is at the macro-level of the states system itself.

⁵⁰ Wendt (1999), 231-232.

⁵¹ Ibid., 235-236.

⁵² Ibid., 149.

1. Micro-Level

The reductionist properties of states (i.e. government type, demographics, geography) are important factors in shaping state interests; however *STIP*, like Neorealism, suggests these properties do not in themselves explain the outcome of state-to-state interactions. These outcomes occur instead at a micro-level of structure which is defined by the constrained nature of state-to-state relations—a level overlooked in Neorealism due to the large explanatory role for material concerns. Without perfect knowledge of what others are thinking, according to Wendt, states must consistently “take each other into account” and strategically assess their options when pursuing their desires.⁵³ Rarely can states obtain the things they want without first contemplating the consequences of their behavior in regard to others.

Wendt concedes this micro-level of structure strongly resembles rational choice behavior, like that found in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.⁵⁴ This leaves a great deal of room for existing literature on strategic interaction to contribute to *STIP* analyses of the international system. However, once the myriad of these international micro-level structures are aggregated (all state-to-state relationships), the resultant becomes the macro-level of structure, which takes on very different characteristics than rational choice behavior would imply by itself.

2. Macro-Level

At the macro-level of structure, *STIP* focuses on the causality of social processes and patterns instead of the Darwinian causality central to materialist theories. Drawing from a multitude of micro-level interactions, states may develop various degrees of common and collective knowledge with other states in the system. Holding knowledge that is only private may impact domestic decision-making and micro-level outcomes, but it does not contribute to a broad social culture among states.⁵⁵ If one state covers its pacific tendencies by training a large army for national pride and another state masks its warlike

⁵³ Wendt (1999), 148.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 148.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 158.

tendencies while developing a clandestine army for revenge, then neither state could be said to be contributing to a “shared” perception of the social reality (in fact they would be contributing to a false perception of social reality that other states may hold to be true). Common knowledge among states, therefore, is different and does contribute to shared understandings in both subjective and intersubjective ways.⁵⁶ When two separate states believe in the norms of the Geneva Convention, and each state also believes that the other believes in the same norms, then it can be said that they have common knowledge.

Collective knowledge among states indicates a shared understanding that extends temporally beyond the members that currently perceive something as common knowledge. As Wendt states, “[s]tructures of collective knowledge depend on actors believing *something* that induces them to engage in practices that reproduce those structures.”⁵⁷ As a result of common and collective knowledge developing among all of the states in the international system, the macro-level may develop its own culture, which is not based on material concerns, but on broad patterns of shared ideas.

Relative to materialist IR approaches, idealism seems to connote certain flexibility among states to alter their micro-level behaviors, suggesting a propensity for change within the macro-level structure. While it can be convenient to assume this, Wendt suggests just the opposite. International material conditions may change very rapidly via industrialization, modernization, or globalization processes. However, due to the constitutive requirement for identities to be defined relative to others, state identities become very difficult to change.⁵⁸ They not only require the evolution of self-images, but the evolution of images held by significant others through interaction. Negative feedback (i.e. conflict or competition) anywhere in this process, even from one of many significant others, could alter self-image evolution or reinforce past perceptions of the other that constituted previous ideas of self in the first place. Consequently,

⁵⁶ Wendt (1999), 160.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 162.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 21.

since such interactions occur on a near-constant basis in the modern world, a degree of ideational path dependence among states is implied. Therefore, an ideational system of states may not change easily at the macro-level; shared ideas among states at the micro-level reflect attitudes and actions that are products of long, interactive histories.

D. THREE CULTURES OF ANARCHY

The previous discussion about shared ideas, constitutive identities, and systemic change leads to Wendt's expanded notion of international anarchy. Patterns of state behavior and the acceptance of various norms provide three distinct levels of social culture among states according to *STIP*: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. Although it is feasible that other social patterns could be defined, such as David Kang's "hierarchical system," only Wendt's three primary cultures will be analyzed in this discussion.⁵⁹ Expanding on the definitions of these three concepts, Wendt also provides "three degrees of internalization," which quantify the level of acceptance that a state might exhibit toward the norms of the various cultures of anarchy.⁶⁰

1. Hobbesian Culture

Having witnessed the European political *modus operandi* both prior to the Peace of Westphalia and after, Thomas Hobbes offered his perception of mankind in his classic philosophical work *Leviathan*:

So that in the first place, I put forth a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that

⁵⁹ David C. Kang, "Hierarchy and Stability in Asian International Relations," in *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, eds. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press), 165-168. Kang draws from the hierarchic past of East Asia, centered on China's tributary relations with the smaller nations around it, to discuss the potential reemergence of such an order as China's influence rises once again. He notes that realists have not fully explored hierarchic relations, which lie in between egalitarian (or alliance) systems and hegemonic systems. Hierarchy, according to Kang, connotes that a powerful state does not need to impose its will on weaker states through forceful means to achieve its overall goals. Additionally, weaker states respect the higher status of powerful states while also understanding that their sovereignty and territory are not threatened by the powerful state. Kang suggests "hierarchy" is not simply a Confucian model of state relations, but a "Confucian" order is perhaps the most appropriate label in respect to the Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian terms used by Wendt.

⁶⁰ Wendt (1999), 266.

ceaseth only in death...[H]e cannot be content with a moderate power...because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.⁶¹

This power-hungry perception of mankind provides the basis for Wendt's notion of an international Hobbesian culture, which is characterized by broad patterns of "enmity" between rival states. Under these patterns of enmity, "[e]nemies are constituted by representations of the Other as an actor who (1) does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore (2) will not willingly limit its violence toward the Self."⁶²

Much of the reasoning for the development of a Hobbesian culture lies in the fact that early states had limited encounters with one another and thus had little, if any, shared knowledge about intentions. Communications did not take place instantaneously nor did advanced market economies link them through daily trade in the same manner as modern times. Additionally, political, social, military, and legal institutions did not provide normative influences or mediate the misunderstandings between different states located on distant shores. Thus, first encounters often led to potentially life-threatening events and state security became essential.

In a Hobbesian culture, life or death of the state therefore, relies upon the independent abilities of self-defense and war-making. This fact generates four macro-level patterns to state behavior according to Wendt: "endemic and unlimited warfare" among states; the "elimination of 'unfit' actors" or weak states; balancing among states that are too powerful to be eliminated; and difficulty in maintaining neutrality.⁶³ Self-help patterns experienced by each state in the system eventually become shared understandings about the nature of international life. It is at this point Wendt suggests that, "actors start to think of

⁶¹ Hobbes, 64.

⁶² Wendt (1999), 260.

⁶³ Ibid., 265-266.

enmity as a property of the *system* rather than just of individual actors, and so feel compelled to represent all Others as enemies simply because they are parts of the system.”⁶⁴

A Hobbesian culture of international anarchy is largely used by Wendt to describe international relations prior to 1648 and the rise of the modern nation-state. It is epitomized by historical periods which were dominated by powerful dynasties and empires such as the Qin, Romans, or Ottomans. However, there is a pervasive Hobbesian culture (or multiple sub-cultures) evident throughout international relations from 1648 until the present. Many African and Asian nations in the 20th century alone fought for independence or to break free from their colonial masters while several established states in Asia and Europe struggled to prevent their own extermination from regional aggressors. Even in the course of the national divisions of China and Taiwan, West Germany and East Germany, North Vietnam and South Vietnam, and North Korea and South Korea has there persisted such evidence of localized Hobbesian social cultures where enemies are easily identified.

2. Lockean Culture

Whereas the Hobbesian culture is defined in terms of enmity between states which have limited social interaction and minimal shared knowledge, the Lockean culture is defined in terms of “rivalry” between states that have agreed to coexist.⁶⁵ Rivalry provides a fundamentally different logic for the manner in which states perceive one another, notably through reciprocal guarantees for continued survival. In *Two Treatises of Government*, John Locke wrote:

The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one, and...teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions...⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Wendt (1999), 264.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 279.

⁶⁶ John Locke, *The Works of John Locke*, Vol. 5, *Two Treatises of Government* [1689], prepared by Rod Hay for the McMaster University archive (London: n.p., 1823), <http://socserv2.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/government.pdf> (accessed 29 August 2006).

In a Lockean culture, the institution of sovereignty becomes a “right” and an “intrinsic property of the state” which is recognized by all other states.⁶⁷ Under these circumstances, overall self-defense and war-making capabilities matter less than they do in a Hobbesian culture, since some understanding among states exists that absolute survival will not be threatened. However, a Lockean order does not rule out conflict among states, especially if it is justified by one state inflicting “harm” on “another.” Wendt suggests that once the concept of sovereignty becomes shared knowledge among states, it becomes a normalized property of the system.

Aspects of a Lockean culture have appeared to increase throughout international relations since 1648 when the notion of independent, sovereign nation-states was solidified, although it is suggested here that a Lockean culture was just beginning at that time. State “rights” were largely limited to Western Europe and perhaps North America, as the competition for global colonization was just beginning in earnest. Nevertheless, Wendt identifies four primary tendencies that emerge within a Lockean culture as rivalry becomes a collective understanding.

First, war is limited to an activity of advancing state interests and does not result in the elimination or absorption of other states. Second, limited wars tend to preserve the membership of the international society, including the weak states which would naturally die off in a Hobbesian culture. Third, Wendt posits that states tend to balance among each other in a Lockean culture, although this occurs less out of fear for survival than it does from specific interests or features of commonality. Finally, since sovereignty is largely respected, neutrality is an acceptable status for states in a Lockean culture, as long as they can mitigate their differences with others in the system.⁶⁸ American conflicts against North Vietnam from 1965-1973 and against Iraq in 1991 are examples of limited

⁶⁷ Wendt (1999), 280.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 283-285.

warfare where state sovereignty was ultimately respected. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006 is also an example of limited warfare between states which did not jeopardize the absolute existence of an established state government.

3. Kantian Culture

The Hobbesian and Lockean cultures concede varying degrees of conflict occurring between states in the international system, with the primary difference being in the degree of respect for state survival, but both cultures are hindered by a limited amount of shared knowledge between members. The logic of a Kantian culture is much different; it is based on a near-complete awareness of intentions toward one another and a pact of non-violence which leads to “amity” among states. Immanuel Kant espoused such an international order in his 1795 essay on *Perpetual Peace* which called for a “federation of states,” each possessing a republican constitution and having disbanded their standing armies.⁶⁹ Wendt suggests that relations between states in a Kantian system will transcend those of temporally limited alliance partners which are found primarily in Lockean or Hobbesian cultures. Instead, states which perceive each other as “friends” will desire to settle their internal disputes without resorting to the use of force. They will however, fight as a group if their peaceful order is threatened by an outsider.⁷⁰

Whether or not a Kantian culture has developed in modern international relations is debatable. By no means have Kantian values developed on a global scale yet, but they may have begun evolving after World War II among the European Union, North America, Australia, and Japan. This so-called “Security Community” as highlighted by Robert Jervis⁷¹ coincides with the first of Wendt’s two primary tendencies of a Kantian order—that of pluralistic security. Pluralistic security develops from “shared knowledge of each other’s peaceful intentions and behavior” and decreases the necessity for an ultimate arbiter or Leviathan to

⁶⁹ Immanuel Kant, *Kant’s Principles of Politics, including his essay on Perpetual Peace. A Contribution to Political Science*, edited and translated by W. Hastie (Edinburgh: Clark, 1891), http://oll.libertyfund.org/Texts/Kant0142/PrinciplesOfPolitics/HTMLs/0056_Pt05_Peace.html (accessed 31 Aug 2006).

⁷⁰ Wendt (1999), 298-299.

⁷¹ Robert Jervis, *American Foreign Policy in a New Era* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 11.

settle disputes.⁷² As such, the United States may have trade or immigration issues with Canada or Australia, but each nation believes that resolving such issues peacefully is in their best interest. Furthermore, Wendt states that from shared knowledge, “the meaning of military power” is changed from its “meaning in rivalry.”⁷³ Thus, nuclear weapons in the hand of a friend do not represent the same threat as they do in the hands of an outsider.

The second tendency in a Kantian culture is an extension of the pluralistic security community. Collective security, as Wendt labels it, represents a major step away from self-help and individualist concerns. Once several states have identified each other as friends, a threat to any member of the group represents a threat to the entire group order. Protecting the peaceful order of the group is critical for each state; therefore they will willingly act in defense of any other threatened members.⁷⁴ In turn, they are confident that other members will act in their defense should they be the one that is threatened from outside. While the United States has negotiated a significant number of bilateral and multilateral alliances since the end of the Second World War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization may be the closest example to a collective security arrangement in existence. Although it was developed as an alliance in response to the Soviet Union, it comprises free nations which lack the motivation or desire to fight amongst themselves for relative power. Additionally, it continues to grow and provide normative regional behaviors even in the absence of the original threat.⁷⁵

4. Internalization

The previous descriptions of the potential logics of anarchy in the international system are by no means exhaustive, but it is clear that they each connote a certain set of norms that must be widely shared and affect the interaction among states. Without the widespread acceptance of certain norms at a given level, then a regional culture will not emerge or exist—the norms will

⁷² Wendt (1999), 299. Both Wendt and Jervis have attributed the “pluralistic security community” concept to Karl Deutsch *et al.*

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 300.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 301.

simply be confined to disparate states which hold their own beliefs. A Hobbesian culture represents a true self-help system, whereby states perceive that their security is not in the interests of others in the system. Therefore they must expend all efforts toward protection of territory, government, population, resources, and the like. States represent others as enemies as a condition of their beliefs about the nature of the system, leading to endemic warfare and the death of weak states. In a Lockean culture, states collectively respect the sovereignty of others, and thus will not threaten their absolute survival. Warfare still takes place, but generally occurs only to reconfigure territory, populations, governments, or resources. States represent each other as rivals and accept a degree of restraint while competing for relative gains. A Kantian culture includes the aspect of friendship and collective well-being. It is essentially differentiated by the level of knowledge shared by states regarding their pacific intentions. Once a Kantian group is established, all members of the group will work to protect it.

In addition to the three social cultures established in *STIP*, Wendt also elaborates on three different degrees of cultural internalization. These levels of internalization signify how thoroughly the norms of each culture are accepted by each state in the system. First degree internalization indicates that a state is aware of a cultural norm, but only complies with it due to threats from non-compliance. Wendt concedes that any internalization may be difficult in a Hobbesian culture, since knowledge is mostly private.⁷⁶ Conceivably though, a state with first degree internalization of Hobbesian norms could develop its independent war potential simply because it has to, but not because it wants to. If the threat from non-compliance (elimination) diminished, it would be inclined to stop producing the means to fight war and pursue other interests. However, in a Lockean culture, a state wishing to alter the sovereignty of another state (eliminate it) during the course of a successful border war might refrain from going too far out of fear of retaliation from other states. Wendt labels this Lockean-first degree paradigm as the essential ideational construct for Realism

⁷⁶ Wendt (1999), 266.

to exist within international relations.⁷⁷ In a Kantian culture, first degree internalization may prevent a state from attacking its neighbor at all, due to the possibility of unwanted economic sanctions.⁷⁸ Thus, the cultural outcomes in each instance remain the same, but only due to the ramifications of violating the norms.

Whereas first degree internalization requires coercive forces, the second degree of internalization represents an acceptance of cultural norms due to self-interests.⁷⁹ States operate according to the norms because there is a direct benefit for them involved, be it political, economical, or other. In a Hobbesian culture, a small state may produce advanced weapons for limited export to other states so that it maintains expertise in certain technologies and boosts its domestic economy, even though those exported weapons could potentially threaten it. Second degree internalization in a Lockean culture suggests that a medium-sized state might advocate for the respect of national sovereignty to ensure an equal status with larger states within international institutions. According to Wendt, this Lockean-second degree paradigm represents the ideational construct for the field of Neoliberalism in international relations.⁸⁰ The Kantian-second degree paradigm is a potentially strategic level of interaction among states, where friendship is portrayed, but perhaps not genuine. States may benefit in trade or security for a given time period by acting like friends with others and improving their own relative position.⁸¹

Finally, third degree internalization takes place when a state identifies with cultural norms and accepts them as being fully legitimate. This is represented by an exceptional level of socialization among states in a given culture of anarchy.⁸² In Hobbesian terms, this level of internalization may bring about an actual

⁷⁷ Wendt (1999), 286.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 303.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 270.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 287.

⁸¹ Ibid., 304-305.

⁸² Ibid., 288.

interest in enmity, whereby state identities become dependent on maintaining an adversary and perpetuating “us” versus “them” behaviors.⁸³ Having accounted for Realism and Neoliberalism in the first and second degrees of Lockean culture respectively, Wendt labels the Lockean-third degree paradigm as his constructivist hypothesis and the “basis for what we today take to be ‘common sense’ about international politics (Figure 2).”⁸⁴ Thus, for Wendt, today’s “common sense” is a system of rivals that have completely internalized the norms of state sovereignty. If this were true, one would expect the current international system to operate under a nearly predictive set of rules, although this is doubtful in reality. The last ideational construct is the Kantian-third degree paradigm, which represents complete identification among states as friends. Here, states legitimately believe that their interests are compatible and thus extend “cognitive boundaries of the Self...to include the Other.”⁸⁵

Degree of cultural internalization	3rd		STIP (modern int'l politics)	
	2nd		Neoliberalism	
	1st		Realism	
		Hobbesian	Lockean	Kantian
Degree of society (cooperation)				

Figure 2. The Multiple Realization of International Culture (From Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 254.)

The specific application of *STIP* in this study suggests that Wendt’s assumptions about modern international politics may not be completely accurate.

⁸³ Wendt (1999), 275.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 296.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 305.

While Wendt suggests the world is currently operating according to a Third Degree Lockean culture, results here will show that the modern international system actually spans each of the three *STIP* cultures, depending on which region is under assessment.⁸⁶

Determining the degrees of internalization based on empirical evidence is indeed even more challenging than determining which types of social culture exist between states. There are some regions (Western Europe and North America) where states have begun to exhibit deep identification with their neighbors and peace appears to be the emerging standard. However, there are clearly other regions which exhibit fragile Lockean norms (i.e. Eastern Europe, South America) and those which may not yet have escaped the norms of Hobbesian culture (parts of the Middle East and Africa). Due to this difficulty, the degrees of internalization for Northeast Asian culture will not be assessed here. However, they should remain under consideration.

⁸⁶ Wendt does not deny the possibility of multiple social cultures, however, he does not elaborate on how or where they might exist in the modern international system.

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III. THE EVOLVING STRUCTURE OF NORTHEAST ASIA

With a fundamental understanding of the *STIP* definitions of state, micro- and macro-level structure, and the three cultures of anarchy, it is possible to begin assessing the structural logic of Northeast Asia and its potential impacts on the two Koreas. The dyadic relations of the salient regional actors, including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea), the PRC (China), the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan), the Soviet Union (USSR or Russia), Japan, and the United States, will each be assessed vis-à-vis each other in four distinct time periods (case studies) to determine if any macro-level structural trends exist.

In Case Study 1, a macro-level baseline for regional culture will be established through the aggregation of micro-level relations which emerged in Northeast Asia from 1945-1947. This snapshot of micro-level relations will preface a discussion about the regional order which developed more completely over the 1948-1954 timeframe (Case Study 2). In Case Study 3, micro-level relations will be examined during the East-West Rapprochement period from 1971-1979. Although Case Study 3 nearly encompasses an entire decade, micro-level relations from 1979 will serve as the sole data point for the period (micro-level relations were relatively consistent across the entire period). In fact, the 1979 snapshot presents a clear picture of the social outcomes from micro-level events which began in 1971, and arguably before that. The fourth and final case study encompasses the rapid regional reorganization which took place from 1989-1992. It will be explored due to the significant micro-level changes which occurred, especially regarding the PRC and the Soviet Union. The year 1992 will thus serve as the final data point in this study, providing an opportunity to make conclusions about macro-level trends throughout the Cold War.

It should be noted that the four case studies chosen for this study do not represent the only salient periods of evolution in the regional structure of Northeast Asia, nor do they intentionally correspond to any conventional

periodization of Northeast Asian history. In fact, the entire history of micro-level interactions between states in Northeast Asia should be considered in an *STIP* study since the transmission of culture is an intertemporal phenomenon. Additional periods have not been included though (i.e. the Sino-Soviet Split from 1958-1969 and the Sunshine period in Korea from 2000-present) due to document constraints and an attempt to keep the discussion focused on the potential of *STIP* analyses. In short, only these four periods have been utilized because they are sufficient to convey the intended message.

While the four periods discussed here do not account for all of the micro-level activity worthy of consideration, they do however, account for some of the major events which impacted the region as a whole and which have also been researched and written about at length in conventional scholarship. This conventional scholarship, dominated by materialist theories, did not predict many of the significant turning points in regional relations which occurred as the Soviet Union collapsed.

By examining international relations phenomena such as regional polarization (Case Studies 1 and 2), East-West rapprochement (Case Study 3), and regional reorganization (Case Study 4) from a social perspective, a new understanding about the past relations in Northeast Asia may be attained. This understanding will be achieved by examining the constitutive effects of structure on states and also of states on the regional structure. As these effects contribute to a pattern of social culture, it will be possible to determine the likelihood or conditions for certain norms to be transmitted. In addition to recapturing the nature of Northeast Asian international relations throughout the Cold War, the study of the aforementioned periods enables an empirically-based discussion about Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian cultures at the macro-level of the international system to take place. This discussion will provide a basis for *STIP* applicability in other regions and at larger scales of international relations analysis.

Due to the complex nature of micro-level interactions among states, some degree of subjectivity is necessary to determine whether Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian relations exist between any two states at a given time in history. The lines of discernment can become blurred even further if the three degrees of internalization introduced by Wendt are incorporated into a broad, multi-state study (and will therefore be left out here). Are there definite “yes” and “no” questions to ask regarding whether states perceive others in a Hobbesian or Lockean manner? Where is the line between a long-term Lockean alliance and a low degree of Kantian internalization? These are difficult questions, and thus, much of what takes place between states must be interpreted by those who write about them. Interpretation is crucial in qualified determinations about international culture and micro-level state relations. Yet nonetheless, interpretations will always be open to scrutiny—two judges may interpret the same law in different ways. Therefore, the best that can be done is to maintain consistency throughout any single *STIP* study.

To maintain consistency throughout this study, criterion for determining the nature of micro- and macro-level relations have been established, along with justifications to support it. This will allow readers to first assess whether the author’s coding of the four case studies is accurate and fair. Furthermore, it will allow for the potential replication of this study or expansion of it to other cases or regions. Propagation of a standardized approach will determine whether operationalization of *STIP* is feasible. Additionally, critiques of the criterion given here will foster discussion about other factors or considerations not made by the author, providing new insights for further work based on *STIP*.

The first intricacy to consider in *STIP* is the “recognition” of states among each other. Recognition, after all, is the fundamental breaking point in respect to a Hobbesian versus a Lockean culture. What forms of recognition exist? How do states convey recognition? Which types of interaction are more important than others? In the modern international system, official diplomatic relations are demonstrated when two nations exchange ambassadors and allow embassies to operate as sovereign governmental institutions on each other’s territory. While

official diplomatic relations between states does demonstrate an open recognition of the “other,” they are not necessarily the only factor in assessing the difference between the Hobbesian and Lockean paradigms. They are however, an appropriate starting point.

The concept of recognition used here must go further than the mere presence of embassies to determine the broad cultural patterns of Northeast Asia. Life-threatening warfare and unresolved conflicts also provide indications about the degree of recognition between states. Whether or not these conflicts result in the complete loss of sovereignty and territory for one side or a long-term stalemate has important consequences for each of the actors involved. Additionally, inconclusive conflicts leave questions unanswered about the intentions one state has toward another, impacting the neighbors of the state in which the conflict took place. Widely accepted peace treaties therefore, provide conclusive evidence of recognition from a military perspective. Peace treaties require the representation of distinct governments which negotiate outcomes and direct the conditions to end hostilities between their opposing combat forces.

Beyond diplomatic and military indicators of state recognition, cooperation at various political, economic, and cultural levels also provides evidence of the intentions and perceptions between states. Policies directed at certain states which enhance their sovereignty, local economies, defensive capabilities, or societal progress can be construed as *de facto* recognition, although that state may not be widely recognized or treated similarly by others. On the other hand, policies which enforce the isolation of a state and inhibit its social or economic interactions with others contributes to the non-recognition of an entity which is deemed illegitimate.

The second intricacy of *STIP* that must be addressed is that of alliances. Whether states form alliances to balance against a preponderant power or the biggest perceived threat is not of concern here, nor is the reasons they might

choose to bandwagon instead.⁸⁷ It is apparent that alliances form under many circumstances, but when utilizing *STIP* it is more important to understand why alliances persist, especially if the circumstances which prompted the alliance have changed. The reason is that long-term alliances between nations may give the perception that a Kantian relationship has developed, whereby nations are identifying with each other in a different way than Lockean or Hobbesian relationships would suggest. It should be reemphasized that the existence of a long-term alliance does not necessarily demonstrate a Kantian relationship, since according to *STIP*, alliances may exist for the sake of specific state interests at any level of culture.

J.J. Suh proves this point in his “eclectic” analysis of the U.S.-Korea Alliance vis-à-vis collapse of the Soviet Union. He concludes that both the institutional forces of the U.S.-Korea alliance structure along with the convergence of American and South Korean identities may have contributed to long-term alliance persistence.⁸⁸ Alliances therefore, must be analyzed in the context of other interactions between states. Once again, additional political, economic, military, and cultural exchanges between allied states must be interpreted before concluding Kantian relationships exist.

A. CASE STUDY 1: A BASELINE FOR ANALYSIS, 1945-1947

To understand the cultural logic of modern international relations in Northeast Asia, it is imperative to first discuss the major forces which were at work from 1945-1947 and demonstrate how those forces established a broad pattern of enmity, rivalry, or amity. Foremost were the ideas at stake in this period, as espoused by the two major winners of World War II—ideas which were absolutely antithetical to each other. On one hand, the United States desired an international order based on its own liberal traditions and capitalist market economics. These desires were embodied by the creation of the United Nations

⁸⁷ Stephen Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” *International Security* 9, No. 4 (Spring 1985): 3-43. Walt provides an excellent survey of the conventional thinking on alliance formation, including balance of power and bandwagoning. He moves beyond these two concepts, suggesting instead that states form alliances to balance against the biggest perceived threat.

⁸⁸ Suh, Katzenstein, and Carlson, eds., 164-165.

in 1945 and further by implementation of the Bretton Woods international monetary system in 1946. On the other hand, the Soviet Union desired a world devoid of capitalist-imperialists, which from its perspective, had been the cause of both World Wars—a situation which had been foreseen by Lenin decades prior.⁸⁹ This conflict of ideas about how to arrive at a peaceful *modus operandi* and a new world order was evident in the words of prominent figures on both sides.

Amidst squabbling over reparations in Germany, Joseph Stalin criticized the West in February 1946, saying “the development of world capitalism in our times does not proceed smoothly and evenly, but through crises and catastrophic wars.”⁹⁰ Weeks later, George Kennan of the U.S. State Department noted in his “long telegram” that the Soviet Union is a “political force fanatically committed to the belief that with the U.S. there can be no *modus vivendi*...they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.”⁹¹

In March 1947, President Harry Truman publicized the international divide between “freedom” and “coercion” and correlated international peace with the long-term interests of the United States in the famous Truman Doctrine.⁹² Kennan followed up in July that year with his “X” article, summoning Americans to accept the “responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear.”⁹³ In September 1947, Soviet Politburo member Andrei Zhdanov highlighted a global division among “two major camps: the imperialist

⁸⁹ Joseph V. Stalin, “Speech Delivered by J.V. Stalin at a Meeting of Voters of the Stalin Electoral District, Moscow,” February 9, 1946, <http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/SS46.html> (accessed 9 Sep 06).

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ George Kennan, “The Charge in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State,” February 22, 1946, in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1946*, Vol. 6, (USGPO: 1969), 694-709.

⁹² Harry S. Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine,” March 12, 1947, in *Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman* (USGPO: 1963), 178.

⁹³ George Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct (the “X” article),” in *Foreign Affairs* 25, No. 4 (July 1947), <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19470701faessay25403-p0/x/the-sources-of-soviet-conduct.html> (accessed 5 Oct 2006).

and anti-democratic camp...and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp.” He noted, “[t]he principal driving force of the imperialist camp is the U.S.A.”⁹⁴ Thus, it was apparent by the end of 1947 that the United States and the Soviet Union viewed each other in similar light. Incompatible political and economic ideologies among the two superpowers fueled the competition to establish a world order which could only be based on one set of principles—communism or capitalism.

Aside from the developing enmity between the United States and Soviet Union based on the contradictions of communism and capitalism, many of the other relationships in Northeast Asia were defined by the regional upheaval from Japan’s expansion during the first half of the 20th century. Throughout its acquisition and colonization of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores from 1895-1945, its colonization of Korea from 1910-1945, and across much of China during the Greater East Asia War from 1937-1945, Japan subjected millions of people to enormous suffering.⁹⁵ For decades, it pursued militaristic policies which gradually brought more and more of Asia under its absolute control in a clearly Hobbesian manner. According to the Hobbesian definition in *STIP*, Japan demonstrated both aspects of enmity up until 1945 by not recognizing the right for others to exist and by not limiting its violence toward others.

While Japan exhibited Hobbesian characteristics toward its weaker neighbors up until September 1945, it eventually faced “prompt and utter destruction”⁹⁶ from American and Soviet forces if it did not unconditionally surrender to end the war in the Pacific.⁹⁷ In Hobbesian fashion, unrestrained levels of violence were exhibited by the United States through the use of two

⁹⁴ Andrei Zhdanov, “Report on the International Situation to the Cominform,” September 22, 1947, <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/04/documents/cominform.html> (accessed 9 Sep 06).

⁹⁵ James L. McClain, *Japan: A Modern History* (W.W. Norton & Company: New York, 2002), 441-522. See Chapters 13 and 14 for summaries on Japan’s “Pursuit of a New Order” in Asia and “The Greater East Asia War.”

⁹⁶ U.S. Department of State, “Proclamation Calling for the Surrender of Japan (Potsdam Declaration),” July 26, 1945, in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1945*, Vol. 2, Pt. 2, (USGPO, 1960), 1476.

⁹⁷ Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1991), 483.

atomic bombs (even if representing a show of force against to Soviets) and the severe fire-bombing of more than sixty Japanese urban centers.⁹⁸ These efforts were deemed necessary evils to end hostilities and reduce overall Allied casualties, yet nonetheless the entire fabric of Japanese society had been targeted for destruction. Accordingly, Major General Curtis LeMay became “totally dedicated” to “rain[ing] death and destruction upon ordinary Japanese” through the use of incendiaries “in order to break their morale and shatter their faith in their leaders.”⁹⁹

Also Hobbesian in nature, the notion of Japanese sovereignty was violated in dual-fashion during the 1945-1947 period. In February 1945, Soviet, American, and British leaders agreed to strip Japan’s territorial gains from the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War, including the Kuril and southern Sakhalin Islands and return them to the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁰ Months later, the Potsdam Declaration expressed the intent to support Japanese sovereignty although limited “to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku...”¹⁰¹ This intent was lost however, with the authority granted to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) by the eleven-nation Allied Far Eastern Commission (FEC) in Washington, D.C.

Through the SCAP, Japan was subjected to the post-surrender directives of General Douglas MacArthur’s occupational government, which rapidly implemented a new constitution and sweeping legal reforms over all of Japanese territory.¹⁰² The SCAP reforms were initially focused on the democratization, demilitarization, and decentralization of Japan, and thus positive from the perspective of Japan’s neighbors and former foes.¹⁰³ In this analysis however,

⁹⁸ McClain, 505-507.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 505.

¹⁰⁰ U.S. Department of State, “Agreement Regarding Entry of the Soviet Union in the War Against Japan (Yalta secret protocol),” February 11, 1945, in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1945*, Vol. 3, Pt. 2 (USGPO, 1955), 984.

¹⁰¹ U.S. Department of State, Potsdam Declaration, 1475.

¹⁰² McClain, 523-528.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 534.

the positive or negative nature of occupational reforms is not of concern. What is important according to *STIP* is whether or not sovereignty was lost—and to the people of Japan it would have certainly seemed so.

The loss of existing territories and SCAP's overall control of the government signified the real loss of Japanese sovereignty. When combined with the extensive levels of violence faced by the Japanese populace, a Hobbesian state of nature between the allied Powers and Japan is appropriately defined. Further contributing to the enmity toward Japan, the Allied Powers deferred the formal peace process. A peace treaty between some of the Allied Powers and Japan would eventually come several years later, as will be mentioned later in this discussion.

In the aftermath of the Japanese surrender, China's and Korea's futures remained uncertain as they each sought independence amidst the Hobbesian culture developing around them. In China, the two most powerful political and military factions had little time to rejoice in their newfound freedom from Japanese imperial forces. Full-scale fighting between Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang Party (KMT) and Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Party (CCP) commenced in July 1946 as the country plunged into economic collapse and a devastating civil war.¹⁰⁴ Although the United States and the Soviet Union had not rejected the CCP as a legitimate political party in China's united future as of 1947, Chiang Kai-shek had already established himself and his Nationalist government as the legitimate authority of China by the end of World War II. U.S. President Harry Truman summarized the status of relations with China on December 15, 1945:

The United States and the other United Nations have recognized the present National Government of the Republic of China as the only legal government in China...

The United States and the United Kingdom by the Cairo Declaration in 1943 and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by adhering to the Potsdam Declaration...and the Sino-Soviet Treaty

¹⁰⁴ Suzanne Pepper, "The KMT-CCP Conflict, 1945-1949," in *Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 13, eds. John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 758.

and Agreements of August 1945, are all committed to the liberation of China...These agreements were made with the National Government of the Republic of China.¹⁰⁵

In what might be considered an anomaly for Northeast Asia in the post-World War II era, the American and Soviet relations established with the KMT in late 1945 connote a Lockean paradigm *contra* the pervasive Hobbesian relations already discussed. A significant level of recognition was conferred by the two superpowers upon what they perceived as a “legitimate” Chinese government. This government however, was not yet legitimate within China itself, thus contradicting with the *STIP* notion of an *essential state*. By 1947, the KMT had clearly not established control over a given population or territory, and was in fact losing ground in this endeavor.¹⁰⁶ Without being able to accurately portray China as a “state” during the 1945-1947 period, it becomes problematic to assign Hobbesian or even Lockean characteristics to Chinese relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. Therefore, an exception must be made.

Where the United States and the Soviet Union recognized a KMT government which was not truly representative of all of China, Japan had in fact waged war against all of China—cementing an enemy status in the eyes of both the KMT and CCP. For the sake of this analysis in the 1945-1947 period, Sino-U.S. and Sino-Soviet relations will not be defined along Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian terms, although closely representing the second of the three options. A determination about these relationships will be made later in this analysis. The distinct nature of Sino-Japanese relations however, should be considered. The people of China, regardless of KMT or CCP rule, perceived Japan as an enemy, resulting in an overall Hobbesian characterization between them.

On the Korean Peninsula, the joint U.S.-Soviet agreement to disarm Japanese occupational forces on either side of the 38th parallel led to the development of two interim administrations by early 1946—one in the north led

¹⁰⁵ U.S. Department of State, “Statement by President Truman on United States Policy Toward China,” December 15, 1945, in *United States Relations with China* (U.S. Department of State, 1949), 608.

¹⁰⁶ Spence, 497-498.

by Kim Il-song and supported by the Soviet Union, and one in the south led by Syngman Rhee and backed by the United States. In March of that year, the Soviet-American Joint Commission reached an impasse on the implementation procedures for a new Korean government, setting the scene for the sustained national division which is central to this discussion.¹⁰⁷

In similar circumstances to those of China, there was no clearly defined government in Korea in 1947—neither in the eyes of other regional actors, or in the eyes of the Korean people themselves. Additionally, Korea's post-colonization fate had been ill-defined since the 1943 Cairo Declaration.¹⁰⁸ For the sake of this *STIP* analysis, U.S.-Korean and Soviet-Korean relations will also not be defined in Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian terms for the 1945-1947 period. In respect to Japanese-Korean relations though, almost the entire Korean population had suffered due to Japanese colonization and Korean sovereignty had been completely demolished. Therefore, the state of nature between the two sides should be considered Hobbesian.

The preceding assessment of Northeast Asia is not intended to reinterpret the history of the post-World War II period or promote the national perspective of one side over another. It is intended to objectively set a benchmark for the emerging culture of the time, according to the available *STIP* variables and definitions. It can be said that pervasive and endemic warfare was characteristic of the region generally, subjecting all actors to conflict, while the boundaries of national sovereignty were largely disregarded by powerful nations over the weaker nations.

From this complex web of dyadic relations in Northeast Asia, it is possible to construct a baseline for the macro-structure during the 1945-1947 period. There was clearly a preponderance of Hobbesian relationships and activities

¹⁰⁷ Steven Hugh Lee, *The Korean War* (New York: Longman, 2001), 24-25.

¹⁰⁸ U.S. Department of State, "Press Communiqué (Cairo Declaration)," December 1, 1943, in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1943: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran* (USGPO, 1961), 449. In the Declaration, it is stated by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill that "Korea shall become free and independent" in "due course." No other details about Korea are presented.

among states, enabling the determination of the relative cultural logic in found in Figure 3. As was mentioned, the United States and the Soviet Union established a Hobbesian relationship through an emerging conflict in their desired global political-economic system. Japan initially represented an “enemy” to all of the actors in the region from its expansive activities in the first half of the decade. China and Korea were not formally established or represented states from 1945-1947, but distinct factions had emerged and began gravitating toward the United States or Soviet Union, based on their needs for materiel support and legitimacy.

In Figure 3, “The Micro-Structures of Northeast Asia, 1947,” each state or emerging state has been cross-referenced with each of the others. For each dyad, if an apparently Hobbesian relationship developed from 1945-1947, an “H” has been placed in the corresponding box. While neither China nor Korea had been formally divided into the PRC-ROC and DPRK-ROK political entities which will be used in the rest of this study, their emerging representations have been indicated in Figure 3 as the CCP, KMT, North Korea, and South Korea. Once again, CCP-KMT and North-South Korean relations are considered collectively, while they are not considered in this fashion for relations with the United States and the Soviet Union.

	North Korea	South Korea	Japan	CCP	KMT	USSR	USA
North Korea	--						
South Korea	--	--					
Japan	H		--				
CCP	--	--	H	--			
KMT	--	--		--	--		
USSR	--	--	H	--	--	--	
USA	--	--	H	--	--	H	--

Figure 3. Micro-Structures of Northeast Asia, 1947.

Figure 3 is admittedly a basic quantitative measure of the specific *STIP* relationship types which are identifiable from 1945-1947. Accordingly, only five of the nineteen potential dyadic relations are labeled as being Hobbesian, while the rest are unable to be adequately defined at this time. With only a limited amount of data based on this period, it is apparent that a Hobbesian culture had emerged in the region, although it had not yet encompassed all actors. Additionally, with the paucity of legitimate state-to-state relations available for assessment, it indicates that the modern international system is still under development, even though it began in 1648.

Significant from Figure 3 however, is the fact that the Hobbesian relationships did include the three most-powerful states in the region—the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan—indicative of the Neorealist notion that the most powerful states “set the scene” for all others. From this it is fair to suggest that a Hobbesian regional order was emerging in Northeast Asia by the end of 1947. In the next time period, this Hobbesian order will develop more fully.

B. CASE STUDY 2: “US” VERSUS “THEM,” 1948-1954

The conflict of ideas that emerged between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1945-1947 not only drove the foreign relations of the two superpowers along Hobbesian norms, but also created a regional environment with limited options for the other states. As both superpowers began identifying each other on terms of “good” versus “evil,” these identities began expanding and eventually encompassed each of the three devastated nations in Northeast Asia. Events in Japan, Korea, and China from 1948-1954 therefore, contributed significantly to this expansion of superpower identities, accommodating their opposing ideologies in distinct ways. Events in these places also served to expand the regional culture of Northeast Asia beyond the nascent Hobbesian logic which emerged in the previous period.

By the end of 1947, Japan had been largely democratized, demilitarized and decentralized by American occupation forces in accordance with the original

goals of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC).¹⁰⁹ Since the Soviet Union possessed little ability to challenge America's unilateral position in Japan, its importance as a Far East economic hub in the United States' capitalist international order was pursued—in what has been labeled a “reverse course” in U.S. foreign policy.¹¹⁰ Implementation of National Security Council (NSC) report 13/2, beginning in October 1948, cemented Japan's transition from one of a defeated enemy to that of a critical partner, remade in America's image.¹¹¹ This new image was upheld even in the eyes of Soviet leadership, which began to perceive Japan as an extension of the United States, and pursued foreign policies which reflected this perception.¹¹²

By the end of 1948, Japan's previously Hobbesian relationship with the United States had been altered toward one of recognition and partnership, although the initial motives for this change appear to have been American self-interest in countering the spread of communism (the containment policy). For Japan, it was important to regain its sense of sovereignty so that the new government could justify its move toward the U.S. sphere of influence and pursue the harsh containment of communism within its own borders. The U.S.-Japan relationship was clearly no longer Hobbesian, and thus evolved along Lockean terms. These terms were punctuated with self-interest early in the Japanese-U.S. relationship, but progressed as other events transpired in the region.

¹⁰⁹ George Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925-1950* (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1983), 376 and State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, “SWNCC 150/2, United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan,” August 12, 1945, in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1945*, Vol. 6 (USGPO, 1969), 609-612.

¹¹⁰ Paul J. Bailey, *Postwar Japan: 1945 to the Present* (Edinburgh: Blackwell, 1996), 50-55. The change in U.S. position toward Japan is considered a “reverse course” since the American desire for Japanese weakness was rapidly changed to a desire for Japanese strength. George Kennan persuaded the SCAP, General MacArthur down this path. As the potential for conflict rose in Korea, Japan became a vital element in U.S. plans for a free world. Accordingly, Kennan convinced MacArthur that the SWNCC demilitarization and democratization goals had indeed been accomplished and that it was necessary as of 1948 to utilize Japan and its economic potential to thwart the spread of Soviet communism. See Kennan, *Memoirs*, 386-387.

¹¹¹ U.S. National Security Council, “NSC 13/2, Recommendations with Respect to United States Policy toward Japan,” October 7, 1948, in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1948*, Vol. 6 (USGPO, 1974), 858-862.

¹¹² Haruki Wada, “The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Definition of the Kurile Islands,” in *Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1949-1999*, ed. Gilbert Rozman (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 28.

Although the ideological position of Japan had been clearly demarcated vis-à-vis the Soviet Union by the end of 1948, nationalist struggles continued in both Korea and China. While Korea's division in 1945 was initially a collaborative effort between the United States and the Soviet Union to remove Japanese colonial forces, by 1948, the acrimonious U.S.-USSR relations were being played out directly amidst Korea's independence struggle. Having helplessly witnessed Japan's rapid transition toward U.S. partnership, the Soviet Union remained intransigent over the Korean national elections sponsored by the United Nations (UN) in its area of control.¹¹³ Nonetheless, the elections continued south of Korea's 38th parallel, and on August 15, 1948, Syngman Rhee was democratically elected as the first president of the Republic of Korea. In the eyes of the UN and the United States, Rhee's government then became the legitimate government of all of Korea.

Not to be outdone, the Soviet Union backed the establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, north of the 38th parallel, three weeks later. The DPRK was led by interim administrator, long-time communist, and guerilla fighter Kim Il-Sung, which also claimed the rights to all of Korea. With the two new regimes installed, each dependent on their superpower patron for official recognition and support, the Soviet Union finally withdrew its forces from Korea in December 1948. Six months later, in June 1949, the United States followed suit.

Korea's status as a nation was still undetermined at that time, but its emerging division held the seeds of two conflicts; one for the legitimate control of the Korean Peninsula and one fueled by the ideologies of the two superpowers.¹¹⁴ Selective recognition by the superpowers of one Korean regime over the other nurtured these seeds of conflict, but they also marked a significant turning point in the cultural logic of Northeast Asia. The recognition of two distinct Koreas represented a necessary shift toward Lockean norms for both the

¹¹³ Lee, 29.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 31.

United States and the Soviet Union. This turn toward Lockean norms would force each superpower to strongly consider their actions among the weaker states in the region, out of fear of “losing” those states to the other side.

Contrary to the situation in Korea where the United States and the Soviet Union clearly supported opposing regimes, Stalin and Truman both watched with one foot in each camp of the Chinese civil war from 1946-1949. Each leader was reluctant to end up supporting the loser between Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (KMT) and Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP).¹¹⁵ Since the Yalta agreements of 1945, Moscow and Washington had both been committed to Chiang’s KMT as the legitimate government of China. However, as Mao’s communist victory became inevitable, Truman passed on last-ditch diplomatic efforts with the CCP and prevented Ambassador John Leighton Stuart from meeting with CCP representatives in May 1949 (arguably to deflect Republican criticism of being soft on communists).¹¹⁶

Communication between the United States and China was officially severed the following month by Mao, who then proclaimed that China would “lean” to the side of socialism and the Soviet Union. On October 1, the PRC was officially established and recognized by the Soviet Union. Although America had transformed its Hobbesian relations with Japan and established Lockean relations with the ROK, there was a perception that China had been “lost” to the grasp of America’s communist enemy.

Throughout this period, American domestic politics also contributed to the evolving identities of the polarized regimes in Korea and China. In May 1949, speaking to the House of Representatives, Richard Nixon dismissed as fallacy the contention that Chinese communists were different from any other communists.¹¹⁷ In July, Stanley Hornbeck and George Taylor said on national

¹¹⁵ Spence, 478-490. The U.S. continued to probe Mao Zedong and the CCP throughout the civil war while also supplying Chiang Kai-shek’s forces with aid and military equipment. Attempts to establish a coalition government through the Dixie Mission and Marshall Visit did not succeed.

¹¹⁶ Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 34.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 26.

radio that “Communists are communists, no matter where you find them, or what nationality they are.”¹¹⁸ In August, Dean Acheson wrote that “the Communist regime serves not their [Chinese] interests but those of Soviet Russia”¹¹⁹ and President Truman followed suit, stating “the policy on China is the same...we have never been favorable to the Communists.”¹²⁰

Capturing this new monolithic world-view, NSC 48/2 was written in December 1949, demonstrating America’s perception of communism as being “evil” and synonymous with the Soviet Union, while anti-communists such as Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee were “good” and pro-American. The American position on Asia became to “prevent further encroachment by communism...[and] elimination of the preponderant power and influence of the USSR in Asia to such a degree that the Soviet Union will not be capable of threatening from that area the security of the United States.”¹²¹ The policy also addressed future American support for “non-communists” in 17 separate instances.¹²²

By the end of February 1950, the regional divide in Northeast Asia was nearly complete. Small-scale conflict had been a regular occurrence between Korea’s two sides since its division, and both sought national legitimacy over the entire country. Nearly simultaneous to signing the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance with Mao Zedong, Joseph Stalin gave Kim Il-sung a long-awaited approval for his invasion plans of the south. With the support of nearly 40,000 Chinese volunteers (who had also fought alongside many Koreans against the Japanese in Manchuria and with the CCP in

¹¹⁸ Chang, 24-25.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 36.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 38.

¹²¹ National Security Council, “NSC 48/2, The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia,” December 30, 1949, in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1949*, Vol. 7 (USGPO, 1976), 1215-1216.

¹²² Ibid., 1215-1220 .

the Chinese civil war), Kim Il-sung invaded the southern half of Korea on June 25, 1950, to the shock of the United States which had pulled its troops out only one year prior.¹²³

In immediate response, the United State pressed for a United Nations resolution to stop the conflict, and mobilized against the threat of communism in Northeast Asia. Uncertain about the potential for an expanded conflict involving the communist PRC and Chiang Kai-shek's forces on Taiwan, a U.S. fleet was dispatched to the Taiwan Strait to keep both sides at bay, establishing an anti-PRC precedent which would persist for decades. The Korean War, therefore, became the pivotal event in solidifying the divide in Northeast Asia amidst an emerging Hobbesian culture. The outbreak of hostilities however, also contributed to the emergence of Lockean norms within the two opposing blocs.

At the conclusion of fighting on the Korean Peninsula in 1953, little had changed among the actors in Northeast Asia. The Soviet Union and the United States remained the primary protagonists, while the weaker states became identified with the two respective camps. They became locked in a long-term competition as they tried to rebuild their nations through either capitalist or communist means. The Soviet Union extended official recognition to the PRC and DPRK while also solidifying military alliances with them. The United States limited its official recognition to Japan, the ROK, and the ROC, and concluded its own bilateral security treaties with them in 1951, 1953, and 1954, respectively.¹²⁴

It is clear that the interactions between the Soviet Union and the United States from 1948-1954 contributed to the spread of behaviors attributed to a predominantly Hobbesian order. Each identified the other as an "enemy" and perceived the allies of the "other" as extensions of the enemy. Eventually, enmity

¹²³ Lee, 41-42.

¹²⁴ U.S. Department of State, "Security Treaty Between the United States of America and Japan," September 8, 1951, in *U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements 1952*, Vol. 3, Pt. 3 (USGPO, 1955), 3329-3332; "Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea," October 1, 1953, in *U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements 1954*, Vol. 5, Pt. 3 (USGPO, 1956), 2368-2374; and "Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of China," December 2, 1954, in *U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements 1955*, Vol. 6, Pt. 1 (USGPO, 1956), 433-438.

became a normalized characteristic of the regional system in Northeast Asia. Regarding recognition and sovereignty, both the United States and Soviet Union provided few options for the weaker states in the region. Preservation of the domestic orders in the PRC, DPRK, Japan, and ROK relied a great deal on political direction, financial aid, technological expertise, and external security guarantees from their patrons, or else they would face the enormous pressures of subversion and coercion from the other side. Thus sovereignty was only extended in relation to the superpowers, but it was not a pervasive characteristic of the order as a whole.

The rapid build-up of conventional forces, nuclear arsenals, and strategic delivery platforms (aircraft) by the United States and the Soviet Union also demonstrated a willingness to use unlimited force by both sides, if it was necessary for their national survival. However, alliance-forming and proxy conflicts via the weaker states became the preferred means of competition due to the ramifications of initiating a nuclear conflict with each other. This avoidance of direct conflict does not negate the tenets of a Hobbesian order; it shows instead that Northeast Asia may have represented an *ideal* Hobbesian order in 1954—a bipolar arrangement where each side had maximized its security to levels of near parity.

Among the weaker nations of the region, relations were somewhat different, but still Hobbesian in nature. North Korea and South Korea each held claims to all of Korea, violating the internal concepts of national sovereignty, and neither side was recognized as being the legitimate government of Korea by the opposing bloc of states, which violated external concepts of sovereignty. Hostilities between the two Koreas also remained high with the threat of another devastating war a distinct possibility. The same can be said of the PRC-ROC divide in 1954. The CCP claimed to be the official government of all of China, as did the KMT. Neither side enjoyed the recognition of sovereignty or legitimacy from the opposing bloc while CCP-KMT hostilities continued to persist. Japan enjoyed the protection of the United States and shared some interests with South

Korea and Taiwan in thwarting the spread of communism; however, it was still viewed with a great deal of hostility due to the Greater East Asia War and its history of colonization in the region.

The results of the social processes which transpired in Northeast Asia from 1948-1954 indicate that the norms of sovereignty and the recognition of territorial boundaries were major concerns for most states at that time. While the region was noticeably bipolar, as Neorealists would highlight, this phenomenon can be attributed to the social patterns which emerged around the two superpowers and their respective ideologies and additionally through antecedent conditions pertaining to Japan's militaristic past.

The United States and the Soviet Union drove the regional social culture amidst their own Hobbesian relationship to establish a world order based on their preferred political and economic ideologies. Figure 4 reveals that by 1954 each of the smaller actors in the region had established themselves as essential states, and that the type of relationships among them included a mix of Hobbesian and Lockean paradigms. Of the twenty-one dyads, fourteen are considered Hobbesian while seven are Lockean, representing one distinct type of "Us" versus "Them" social arrangement. In this early Hobbesian-Lockean split however, it is appropriate to consider the idiom, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend."

	DPRK	ROK	Japan	PRC	ROC	USSR	USA
DPRK	--						
ROK	H	--					
Japan	H	H	--				
PRC	L	H	H	--			
ROC	H	L	H	H	--		
USSR	L	H	H	L	H	--	
USA	H	L	L	H	L	H	--

Figure 4. Micro-Structures of Northeast Asia, 1954.

In the early stages of Lockean recognition between the states of the Northeast Asia, it is difficult to classify any specific relationship as possibly transcending Lockean norms toward those of a Kantian arrangement. Although two distinct alliance systems developed between the communist and capitalist states, these appear to be based on self-interest, which conforms to Neorealist assumptions. Kantian norms, whereby the states would begin to identify with each other on a deeper level of shared interest, will be explored later in this discussion.

C. CASE STUDY 3: EAST-WEST RAPPROCHEMENT, 1971-1979

By the end of 1979, fundamental changes had taken place in the Northeast Asian order, especially among the four major powers, as a result of both international and domestic factors from the previous decades of Hobbesian culture. The period was preceded by an ideological chasm which developed between the USSR and the PRC, sparked by Nikita Khrushchev's surprise denunciation of Stalin in 1956 and his motions toward détente, or coexistence, with the West.¹²⁵ While the Soviet Union was seeking a global compromise with the United States, Mao Zedong utilized Khrushchev's Marxist "revisionism" to anchor his own political platform among a CCP that was already divided about the future of Chinese socialism.¹²⁶ As Sino-Soviet relations soured, tensions in both Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations eased beginning in 1971, eventually leading the way to American and Japanese recognition of the CCP in Beijing. Additionally, by the end of 1979, a noticeable coalescence of American and Japanese interests had occurred, making way for the introduction of new cultural norms in the region.

The ideological struggle between the USSR and PRC was compounded by several events which eventually produced a formal Sino-Soviet split. The first of these events were two Taiwan Straits crises—in 1954 and 1958—whereby the

¹²⁵ Harold Hinton, *China's Turbulent Quest; An Analysis of China's Foreign Relations Since 1949* (New York: MacMillan, 1972), 80.

¹²⁶ For the specific nature of the division that emerged between CCP elites in the PRC, see Liu Shao-chi, "8th CCP Congress Report," September 15, 1956 and Mao Tse-tung, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. 5 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1961), 409.

Soviet Union did not respond to U.S. intervention over PRC-ROC territorial skirmishes. This symbolic violation of their 1950 treaty was followed by the gradual withdrawal of all Soviet aid and assistance to the PRC by 1960¹²⁷ and then by the perceived Soviet-U.S. collusion against PRC nuclear weapons development in 1963.¹²⁸ In 1968, Sino-Soviet tensions were pushed to the brink during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, when the Soviet Union demonstrated its willingness to intervene in Eastern Bloc countries which were at risk of diverging from the socialist line (the Brezhnev Doctrine).¹²⁹ Isolated from other regional actors and wary of an aggressive Red Army on its border, the PRC prepared for “people’s war.” Finally, in February 1969, as border disputes along the Ussuri River turned in to armed clashes between Soviet and Chinese troops, full-scale war nearly became a reality between the former allies.¹³⁰

As the PRC began to view the Soviet Union along the same terms of enmity as the United States did, the United States was facing difficulties of its own in Southeast Asia. With the containment of communism at a tipping point, Richard Nixon ascended the American presidency on pledges to withdraw U.S. troops from Vietnam, but he needed a diplomatic victory to offset the constrained and failing military mission there. Therefore, in July 1969, he enunciated the Nixon Doctrine from the U.S. territory of Guam, sending signals to the countries of Asia that the United States no longer intended to directly interfere with Asian domestic issues¹³¹—a blessing to the PRC after it had proposed the renewal of Sino-American ambassadorial talks in late 1968.¹³²

It is apparent that the overt expansion of Soviet and American identities had finally reached its limits by 1969 and the PRC had been far too large to

¹²⁷ Denny Roy, *China’s Foreign Relations* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 22-24.

¹²⁸ Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997), 43.

¹²⁹ Michael Yahuda, *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific* (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 58.

¹³⁰ Roy, 27-28.

¹³¹ Yahuda, 122-123.

¹³² Robert Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Policy: Developments After Mao* (New York: Praeger, 1986) 16.

simply be absorbed by one side or the other. The revolutionary qualities of the CCP were initially well-suited for coordination with the Soviet Union, but isolation and economic failure pressured the PRC to look toward the American economic system—a system which Japan, the ROK, and the ROC were all flourishing in. This provided new incentives for the PRC by 1971 to seek rapprochement and “lean” to the West.

The first major milestone in the rapprochement came from Henry Kissinger’s visit to Beijing in July of 1971. Shortly after this visit, on October 25, the PRC was accepted into the United Nations, replacing the ROC as the sole China representative (amid U.S. efforts to establish two China seats). Unquestionably one of the most significant dates in PRC foreign relations history, acceptance in to the world body officially ended PRC political and economic isolation and it quickly established diplomatic relations with nearly 40 countries, including several Western partners of the United States.¹³³

In February 1972, the global significance of the PRC was enhanced even further when Nixon made the first-ever U.S. presidential visit to that country. Text from the resulting Shanghai Communiqué stated:

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states...¹³⁴

Although the United States and the PRC did not establish official diplomatic relations in 1972, each had made significant contributions to the Lockean norms of sovereignty and recognition throughout Northeast Asia.

The second major milestone in the regional transition toward Lockean norms came on the heels of the 1972 Nixon visit. Even though Japan had wreaked havoc on China during the Greater East Asia War and had fought extensively against the CCP’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), by September of

¹³³ Sutter, 75.

¹³⁴ China-U.S. “Joint Communiqué (Shanghai Communiqué),” February 27, 1972, in *Peking Review* 9 (March 3, 1972): 4-5.

1972 each side was ready to establish diplomatic relations, even though a peace treaty was not yet prepared. The PRC stood to benefit enormously from Japanese trade and investment while Japan gained another partner in its quest to keep the Soviet Union at bay (another nation which it lacked a peace treaty with and had fought against repeatedly in the 20th century).

The verbiage of the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement was similar to the one between Beijing and Washington and remains consistent with the *STIP* concepts of Lockean culture:

The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan agree to establish durable relations of peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity...equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.¹³⁵

The normalization of Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations was complete by the end of the decade, and all parties were still concerned foremost by the threats posed by the Soviet Union. Japan and the PRC finally concluded a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in August 1978, at which time the PRC pledged to abrogate the 30-year Sino-Soviet treaty which had originally been directed at Japan.¹³⁶

America's view of the PRC as a state which stood up to a common enemy, combined with the American need for fresh political capital in the wake of the Vietnam War eventually led to the *de facto* recognition of the CCP government in Beijing. On January 1, 1979, the United States and the PRC established official diplomatic relations, completing a perceived Sino-U.S.-Japanese front against the Soviet Union which had been inconceivable only a few years prior.¹³⁷ This recognition of the CCP as the legitimate government of

¹³⁵ PRC-Japan "Joint Statement," September 29, 1972, in *Peking Review* 40 (October 6, 1972): 12.

¹³⁶ PRC-Japan "Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between the People's Republic of China and Japan," August 12, 1978, in *Peking Review* 33 (August 18, 1978): 7-8.

¹³⁷ Hiroshi Kimura, "Japan-Soviet Political Relations from 1976-1983," in *Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1949-1999*, ed. Gilbert Rozman (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 92.

China truly signified the shift away from Hobbesian culture in Northeast Asia which began shortly after World War II. Although the PRC-Soviet-U.S. relationship took on the qualities of “tripolarity” or “multipolarity” as Neorealists and Neoliberals might suggest, the 1971-1979 East-West rapprochement in fact, indicates the initial turn toward widespread Lockean norms in the region.¹³⁸

While a major realignment had occurred among the four major powers in Northeast Asia, the sovereignty and recognition norms which were emerging did not completely diffuse among the two Koreas and on Taiwan. South Korea and Japan established diplomatic relations in 1965 as U.S. aid to South Korea was being diverted toward the war effort in Vietnam and represented an appropriate step for South Korean president Park Cheung-hee's economic development plan vis-à-vis North Korea.¹³⁹ However, ROK relations with the other states in the region remained essentially as they had been since World War II. It still lacked recognition and diplomatic relations from its immediate neighbors—the Soviet Union, the PRC, and North Korea.

The South Korean relationship with the United States had begun to change however, by 1979. In November 1978, ROK and U.S. forces established the Combined Forces Command (CFC); a binational defense arrangement at the operational level which was dedicated to the defense of South Korea.¹⁴⁰ This combined forces arrangement signified just how far ROK-U.S. relations had come—relations which encompassed fighting together in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, a long-term American presence and mutual defense treaty, and the rapid economic development of South Korea through preferential access to American markets.

Through these relations, it is evident that the two nations had begun to share many of the same priorities. However, prior to the establishment of

¹³⁸ The 1971-1979 period is also considered “Phase 1” of the tripolarity period between the Soviet Union, the PRC, and the United States. See Yahuda, 72-85.

¹³⁹ Joungwon Kim, *Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945-1972* (Seoul: Hollym, 1997), 257-261.

¹⁴⁰ United States Forces Korea, “Mission of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command,” <http://www.usfk.mil/usfk/index.html?/org/cfc.html> (accessed 28 Oct 06).

democracy in South Korea, it is difficult to suggest that the United States and South Korea had moved beyond their Lockean relationship and truly identified with each other. Whereas South Korea relied on the United States for recognition, defensive support, and economic growth, the United States primarily needed South Korea only in its bid to prevent the spread of communism (and thereby supported the anti-communist yet dictatorial leadership of Park Cheung-hee).

As the United States and South Korea grew closer throughout the 1970s, talk of DPRK-ROK unification also emerged. Each side's unification plans strongly indicated preferences to unify on non-compromised terms and a reluctance to accept the other as a *de facto* state. In 1970, Kim Il-sung reported to the Fifth Congress of the Korean Workers Party that the only path to unification is to "expel from South Korea the U.S. imperialist aggressors...overthrow the present [Park] fascist military dictatorship and win the victory of the revolution."¹⁴¹ In 1973, Park Cheung-hee announced a willingness to participate in international organizations with North Korea, but stated "the taking of these measures does not signify our recognition of North Korea as a state."¹⁴²

During this period, the ROC on Taiwan appeared to have lost the most, including its UN seat in 1971. Its relations with the United States and Japan, however, remained intact in all but an official diplomatic sense. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, passed by the U.S. Congress, committed America to "maintain the capacity...to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan."¹⁴³ This slide in terms of official recognition does not correspond with the normal tenets of Lockean culture, but the American commitment to Taiwan's defensive capabilities does confer a level of sustained

¹⁴¹ Byung Chul Koh, "Policy Toward Reunification," in *The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Korea*, eds. Youngnok Koo and Sung-joo Han (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 85.

¹⁴² Koh, 93.

¹⁴³ U.S. Department of State, "Taiwan Relations Act," http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive_Index/Taiwan_Relations_Act.html (accessed 15 Sep 06).

recognition. Due to the circumstances of the time, the TRA was the only way for the United States to maintain an upper hand against the Soviet Union and improve its relationship with China.

Whereas the regional culture from 1948-1954 evolved in to a strong Hobbesian order, much of that order had begun to degrade by the end of the 1971-1979 timeframe. The Soviet Union remained the primary threat to the United States and Japan, and the nuclear arms race between the opposing sides reached astounding proportions. During the same time, the PRC and the Soviet Union digressed from alliance partners to “recognized” enemies, as they no longer shared an understanding about global communism. The border clashes of 1969 established a high level of hostility while the threat of a general nuclear war also existed between the two communist states.

Amidst the initial shift toward a Lockean culture in Northeast Asia, the development of a Kantian relationship between the United States and Japan must also be addressed during this period. The United States had maintained a bilateral treaty with Japan since 1951, but by 1979 this relationship had transcended the simple alignment from which it began. First, the 1951 treaty was expanded in 1960 to include U.S. guarantees to defend against any external aggression aimed at Japan.¹⁴⁴ Then, in 1978, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee published the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, revealing a collective effort toward defense planning beyond the alliance basics—including the explicit use of American nuclear weapons if necessary.¹⁴⁵ Considering this integrated approach to Japan’s security, America’s long-term use of Japanese bases, Japan’s support of U.S. operations during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and the extensive levels of political, economic, and cultural ties between the two nations, it is appropriate to suggest that the two states had begun to identify on a Kantian level by 1979.

¹⁴⁴ U.S. Department of State, “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America,” January 19, 1960. In *U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements 1960*, Vol. 11, Pt. 2 (USGPO, 1961), 1632-1635.

¹⁴⁵ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,” November 27, 1978, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html> (accessed 15 October 06).

	DPRK	ROK	Japan	PRC	ROC	USSR	USA
DPRK	--						
ROK	H	--					
Japan	H	L	--				
PRC	L	H	L	--			
ROC	H	L	L	H	--		
USSR	L	H	H	H	H	--	
USA	H	L	K	L	L	H	--

Figure 5. Micro-Structures of Northeast Asia, 1979.

Aside from the common knowledge in the region of the Soviet threat, common knowledge also developed about the success of market economics and the export-led growth among Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan; growth that the PRC was also soon to experience after Deng Xiaoping's ascendance in 1978. Between 1971 and 1979, Northeast Asia began transitioning toward a Lockean order, based on recognition and rivalry, although some significant Hobbesian relationships persisted and one Kantian relationship began to emerge. Figure 5 captures the developments of the 1971-1979 period, indicating that by 1979, eleven of the twenty-one possible dyads remained Hobbesian, nine were considered Lockean, and one was appropriately Kantian. The changes among the dyads from 1954 are dramatic when considering that two Lockean shifts and one Kantian shift occurred among three of the four most powerful states in the region.

D. CASE STUDY 4: REGIONAL REORGANIZATION, 1989-1992

Just as the 1971-1979 rapprochement was a product of events from the decades prior, so to was the regional reorganization that took place in Northeast Asia from 1989-1992. The United States and the PRC understood the Soviet Union to be their primary threat, and once Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in 1979, that threat was only emphasized. Thus, the decade from 1979-1988

allowed for a unique period of Sino-American normalization that was propelled by increasing political, military, economic, and cultural contacts even though disagreements persisted about the U.S. relationship with Taiwan.¹⁴⁶

The protracted failure of Soviet forces during the invasion of Afghanistan coincided with several other strains on the Soviet Union throughout the 1980s. Large troop deployments in Mongolia and along the Soviet border with China, in addition to continued Soviet efforts to maintain control over Eastern Europe stretched the Red Army over an unprecedented amount of territory. This overstretch coincided with an attempt to maintain strategic parity with the United States during the presidency of Ronald Reagan, eventually proving to be too much for the Soviet economy to sustain. As the Soviet system began to stagnate, reform-minded Mikhail Gorbachev arose to the fore of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1985, espousing a new perspective on foreign relations. This new perspective was punctuated by the termination of the Brezhnev Doctrine which had thrust Soviet troops in to Czechoslovakia two decades prior.¹⁴⁷

The impacts of Gorbachev's outlook had immediate effects toward the Lockean norms of Northeast Asia and contributed to the gradual reduction of Soviet threats perceived by the PRC. In May 1989, with Eastern Europe in political tumult and the two Germany's approaching reunification, Gorbachev traveled to Beijing to reestablish diplomatic relations with the PRC. It was not only the first USSR-PRC meeting in twenty years, but also the first CPSU-CCP summit in 30 years.¹⁴⁸ Finally, the two communist states agreed to "develop their relations on the basis of the universal principles guiding state-to-state relations, namely, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity."¹⁴⁹ Just as the two foes were coming to terms with each other, however, the Soviet Union

¹⁴⁶ Nathan and Ross, 68-69.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 48-51.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 50.

¹⁴⁹ Sino-Soviet "Joint Communiqué," May 18, 1989, in *Beijing Review*, May 29-June 4, 1989: 15.

was on the verge of imploding and the PRC was on the brink of major political upheaval—events which were both of significant interest to the United States.

While the United States watched optimistically over the gradual dissolution of its long-time Soviet nemesis, the brutal PLA response to the June 1989 political demonstrations in Tiananmen Square generated new American outrage toward communism. Political progress and military cooperation between the PRC and United States was abruptly halted and the United States initiated a new isolationist policy toward Beijing, rallying much of the Western world to its cause. Members of Congress politicized Sino-American relations by failing to approve the PRC's most-favored nation (MFN) status in 1990, hoping to utilize an economic "stick" to communicate with the CCP. Quietly, the George H.W. Bush Administration maintained contact with the CCP, but in 1992, presidential candidate Bill Clinton criticized President Bush for "coddling dictators."¹⁵⁰

By the end of 1992, relations between the United States, Russia, and the PRC had returned to a pattern of independence from one another, similar to that before the 1971 period began. The primary difference between 1971 and 1992 however, was that over the course of two decades the Soviet Union, the United States, and the PRC had each come to recognize each other on Lockean terms; as legitimate states which would not be consumed by an opposing political or economic sphere. Each of the nations represented a major power in the Northeast Asian region that would not disappear, and despite a certain level of antagonism amongst them, a clear pattern of recognition and rivalry had developed.

As the Soviet Union was collapsing, its need for assistance, along with international political and economic pressure on the PRC after the Tiananmen Crisis prompted both states to reach out in Northeast Asia at the beginning of the 1990s. Throughout the Cold War, North Korea had benefited from significant aid and trade competitions between the Soviet Union and the PRC, especially in

¹⁵⁰ Nathan and Ross, 72.

critical resources like crude oil and grain.¹⁵¹ However, by 1990, North Korea had become a drain on both of its struggling benefactors. Moscow informed Pyongyang that it would have to begin repaying its debts and would no longer receive crude oil at reduced prices. Beijing approached the situation more pragmatically, hoping to avert instability in North Korea, but also sought to improve ties with Seoul, where its trade had ballooned to nearly \$6 billion per year.¹⁵²

In response to South Korea's outward-looking *Nordpolitik* policy, the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with South Korea in September 1990, to the chagrin of its historic ally North Korea.¹⁵³ Ahn Byung-joon wrote in 1991 that, "the Soviets have come to appreciate the economic value of the ROK more than that of the [security value of the] DPRK."¹⁵⁴ Accordingly, the same perception can be considered for the PRC, which followed suit in August 1992 and also established official diplomatic relations with Seoul. Even though the DPRK and ROK each earned seats at the UN in 1991, South Korea had clearly emerged as a widely recognized and central actor in Northeast Asia—a region in which geopolitics had previously been divided in to two antagonistic sides. Its partner to the North, however, was facing more isolation than ever.

¹⁵¹ Selig S. Harrison, *Korean Endgame: Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 311.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 315.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 315, 335.

¹⁵⁴ Ahn Byung-joon, "South Korean-Soviet Relations: Contemporary Issues and Prospects," in *Asian Survey* 31, No. 9 (September 1991): 4.

	DPRK	ROK	Japan	PRC	ROC	Russia	USA
DPRK	--						
ROK	H	--					
Japan	H	L	--				
PRC	L	L	L	--			
ROC	H	L	L	H	--		
Russia	L	L	L	L	H	--	
USA	H	L	K	L	L	L	--

Figure 6. Micro-Structures of Northeast Asia, 1992.

In Figure 6, the micro-structures of Northeast Asia are summarized, capturing the critical changes which took place from 1989-1992. Whereas only nine dyads had been considered Lockean in 1979, by 1992 there were fourteen relationships categorized as that type. Hobbesian relations had diminished from eleven to only six of the twenty-one possible, and the U.S.-Japan relationship remained the single Kantian dyad under consideration.

E. MACRO-LEVEL ASSESSMENT OF NORTHEAST ASIA

While it is impossible to fully explore each of the micro-level structures of Northeast Asia in detail in this discussion, an overview of key diplomatic events from 1946-1992 provides conclusive evidence regarding the evolution of the Northeast Asia macro-structure. Immediately following World War II, few of the states in Northeast Asia were fully sovereign and recognized by other actors in the region. The two most powerful actors set a course to establish a regional identity based on their own vision for the post-War world order and labored to implement that vision via the weakened states.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union reached the limits of their own overt influence during the 1970s in Vietnam and Afghanistan, respectively. Additionally, the PRC became a critical actor in an outwardly Hobbesian competition, which forced the West to recognize it beginning in 1971.

Throughout the dynamic processes of state interaction largely, initiated by the two superpowers, many of the Hobbesian characteristics of Northeast Asia eventually yielded to Lockean norms over time.

Concurrent with the trend of increasing Lockean norms from 1946-1992 is the decrease of Hobbesian norms, which peaked in 1954 when bipolarity was at its height. While the gradual decrease in regional enmity has been offset largely by norms of recognition and rivalry, not all states have experienced the same degree of cultural shift. South Korea represents one end of the spectrum in this “experience” of cultural shift, and is perhaps the one state which was most-situated in the Lockean paradigm as of 1992. At the other end of this spectrum is North Korea; a state which has not experienced any shift in regional culture since it claimed its independence in 1948. In fact, North Korea is still situated in a predominantly Hobbesian culture, fifty-two years after the peak of this culture in Northeast Asia.

Although Northeast Asia has clearly shifted toward a predominantly Lockean culture, there is little evidence to suggest that progress has been made beyond Lockean cultural norms. Progress toward a collective identity in Northeast Asia is extremely limited—indeed, this analysis suggests that only one Kantian relationship may have developed in Northeast Asia by 1992.¹⁵⁵ The single Kantian dyad in Northeast Asia is represented by the U.S.-Japan axis and functions essentially around democratic values and America’s economic and security preponderance in the region, of which Japan was incorporated in to from the initial periods of its post-World War II occupation.

¹⁵⁵ A case could be made that the ROC, and perhaps the ROK are presently included in a Kantian-type axis with the United States. The author however, does not favor this notion. Although American relations with both governments have persisted for several decades, domestic politics (in both cases) and regional security issues may have prevented true Kantian relationships from developing. The future of Sino-U.S. relations may impact ongoing U.S.-ROC and U.S.-ROK relations in a manner similar to Soviet-American relations throughout the Cold War. Pressures for ROC independence and for Korean unification remain pivotal domestic issues.




Figure 7. Macro-Structure of Northeast Asia, 1947-1992.

In Figure 7, the macro-structural trends of Northeast Asian international relations culture across time are graphically summarized by the aggregation of data from Figures 3-6. The number of Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian dyads identified from each of the 1947, 1954, 1979, and 1992 periods yield trend lines which demonstrate four *STIP* patterns which have already been discussed.

First, the height of Hobbesian culture is located in 1954 with fourteen dyads assessed in terms of enmity. Second, the initial shift toward Lockean culture occurred around 1979, when the number of Lockean and Hobbesian dyads were approximately equivalent. Third, the summary of dyads from 1992 indicates a clear preponderance of Lockean culture in Northeast Asia, with fourteen such relationships based on sovereignty, recognition, and rivalry. Finally, a Kantian trend is not apparent in Figure 7, as the only dyad assessed in terms of collective identity remained constant after 1979. The overall balance in favor of Lockean norms as opposed to Kantian norms in 1992 suggests that most states in Northeast Asia had not yet evolved to a social level conducive to legitimate multilateralism.

The preceding operationalization of *STIP* is intended to initiate further discussion about the nature of Northeast Asian international relations. Each of the four case studies was selected due to its significance as a defining period in modern regional history. However, as previously mentioned, this discussion is not adequate to fully explain the entire social structure. Many more data points are necessary, as well as more rigorous analyses of the periods assessed here. Conclusions drawn from the indicated trends are limited in scope, and again, are intended to foster further exploration of *STIP* concepts.

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IV. CONCLUSIONS

A. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TWO KOREAS

For the entire time since Korea has been officially divided, there has existed a competing vision by the governments on both sides of the 38th Parallel of how Korean unification should take place. The merits of South Korea's unification vision are touted by much of the West, especially since South Korea has been extremely successful in both its political and economic development. Contrary to this, the North Korean view of peninsula-wide socialism is undesirable and inconceivable. From an *STIP* perspective, this long-term competition of visions has occurred at the micro-level between the two states.

1. Micro-Level Relations

At the micro-level of relations between the two Koreas, an essentially Hobbesian state of nature spanned the Cold War, whereby long-term domestic success and military strength were sought to gain legitimacy over all of the Korean Peninsula. Through this process of state-building, each side feared the termination of its existence because its opponent did not recognize its right to exist. Life-threatening warfare remained a constant concern for both sides, forcing each of the two Koreas to establish and maintain beneficial relationships with other states which supported their goals.

While a deeper understanding about the nature of Korean micro-level relations is warranted, it can still be suggested by this discussion that the relationship from 1947-1992 was "Hobbesian." The next step of an *STIP* analysis of these two states would be to determine how internalized the Hobbesian relationship is between North and South Korea and how that particular degree of internalization could be altered positively or negatively. For example, an assessment demonstrating third-degree Hobbesian internalization may indicate that the two states value their Hobbesian relationship as a means of sustaining their own identities. This seems appropriate at face value. It would then be important to identify policy approaches which not only support their self-identities, but which could also diffuse state-to-state rivalry or make it worse.

The concept of the Sunshine Policy which led to the historic DPRK-ROK summit in 2000 may reveal an even larger, emerging problem within the micro-level relationship between the two Koreas. South Korea's recent attempts to reach out and collaborate with North Korea could indicate that it no longer feels threatened by Kim Jong-Il's regime. Furthermore, it could indicate that the South Korean perception of the DPRK-ROK relationship has moved toward Lockean norms of recognition. If, however, the North Korean perception remains Hobbesian, which is likely, then South Korea will still represent an ultimate threat to its existence. This divergence in DPRK-ROK perceptions may introduce significant complications in further cooperation between the two states.

2. Macro-Level Relations

Although much can be said about the significance of micro-level relations between divided states such as the two Koreas, this *STIP* analysis has focused primarily on the macro-level of structure around the two Koreas. Exactly how does the preceding analysis of Northeast Asian macro-level structure factor in to Korea's continued division?

From a macro-level perspective, North and South Korea are two states which have "grown up" under entirely different social conditions. These conditions have engrained very different views about the same region which surrounds each of them. Amidst their life or death struggle though, the rest of Northeast Asia has evolved toward a Lockean culture, and for South Korea, the evolution of widespread Lockean norms has been beneficial. Seoul has not only been incorporated into a pattern of regional recognition, but its perception of Northeast Asia as a place of sovereign "equals" has produced enormous shifts in South Korean confidence.

During this period of rising confidence, ROK expectations for cooperation within the region have also risen in a manner different than other actors. Accordingly, South Korean president Roh Tae Woo reached out across the communist-capitalist divide with his *Nordpolitik* policy. He was also the first leader in Northeast Asia to propose Northeast Asian multilateral security arrangements to the UN in 1988. After being elected president in 1997, Kim

Dae-jung followed Roh's efforts with a six-party Northeast Asian Security Dialogue proposal.¹⁵⁶ Although the issue was not addressed in-depth here, Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy toward North Korea also demonstrates the direction that South Korea's social perspective has evolved. Seoul clearly feels it has developed a unique position at the crossroads of Northeast Asia, capable of cooperating with all of its neighbors—even North Korea.

As South Korea continues to enjoy success and pursue cooperation among its neighbors in the Northeast Asian region, North Korea has been facing larger problems by the decade. The DPRK enjoyed the support of Moscow and Beijing during the Cold War, but by 1992 this support was largely cut off. North Korea, which has sustained the same pattern of regional relationships since 1954, has become almost completely isolated from the "social patterns" which are now normalized to all of its neighbors. Lacking the significant support it once enjoyed, combined with the Hobbesian world view it has always had, the DPRK has found itself reaching the extents of its state survival instincts.

Staring out across the four-kilometer wide DMZ, the DPRK has been backed in to a proverbial corner. South Korea, Japan, and the United States still represent the same hostile threat that they have since Korea's division, yet together they are enormously more powerful now than fifty years ago. Unable to rely on the PRC or Russia for more than mere hand-outs, it should not be a surprise that the DPRK has pursued the very weapons that its enemies do not want it to have.

This discussion in no way advocates DPRK nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs, but under an *STIP* assessment of state behavior, the acquisition of such weapons is an entirely consistent policy for states that perceive grave threats to their existence. Both the United States and Soviet Union pursued these same devices for the same reason. Therefore, the path of self-preservation that North Korea has chosen should not be misinterpreted as

¹⁵⁶ Kim, 17.

something else by other actors in the region. North Korea should be expected to maintain its current level of antagonistic and threatening behavior until it is recognized as a legitimate actor in Northeast Asia.

3. Structural Impacts on Korea

The structural impacts of Northeast Asia on the two Koreas, based upon this *STIP* analysis, have produced two main considerations for assessing the region's future. First, Lockean norms across much of the region suggest that life-threatening warfare between the two states would be unacceptable to the other actors and that this might help to deter the two sides from engaging in conflict. However, this perspective may not be completely accurate since North Korea maintains several Hobbesian relationships. It seems instead that South Korea has much less to fear from a North Korean attack, due to its high degree of Lockean relations. There would be much more for the states in Northeast Asia to lose if Seoul was subjected to a military attack.

Second, Lockean culture suggests that the two Koreas would be better served by accepting each other as-is and ceasing overt efforts toward unification. These efforts explicitly threaten the existence of each state. However, it is evident that South Korea perceives improving prospects for cooperation in the region—including cooperation with North Korea—and that North Korea has committed itself fully toward preservation as an independent state, at any political cost.

The diverging perceptions that each side has about the culture of Northeast Asia will inhibit a significant degree of reconciliation and progress toward unification. Furthermore, as this gap widens or becomes normalized (Seoul highly integrated and Pyongyang highly isolated), it will become more difficult for the two Koreas to see eye-to-eye. Thus, Korean perceptions about their micro-level relationship may prove to be the deciding factor in how, or if, the states unify one day. If the two states have a diverging view about the nature of their own relationship (Hobbesian versus Lockean), it could produce additional perception problems to overcome.

B. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY IN NORTHEAST ASIA

Along with South Korea, the United States has represented a primary threat to North Korea's existence since it was created. Regardless of American distaste for the communist regime in the DPRK, the United States has frozen its Hobbesian relations with the isolated state even though the region has clearly evolved in a Lockean manner. Making matters worse, the micro-level of structure between the two "enemies" is highly complicated by a thin level of DPRK-US interaction and communication. However, from an *STIP* perspective, regional stability could be enhanced by U.S. efforts to normalize relations with North Korea, albeit a failed and problematic state.

Diplomatic recognition is not the simple answer to resolving all of the differences between the United States and North Korea, but it can begin to increase official dialogue and cultural exchanges that enhance understandings about intentions. Once Washington officially acknowledges sovereignty of the regime in Pyongyang and reduces DPRK threat perceptions, American expectations placed on North Korea will become more meaningful; for now they are simply thrown out as "imperialist" or "aggressive" policies. Due to the strength and regional posture of the United States, it is in a unique position to ease the Hobbesian noose around North Korea's neck and contribute to the further expansion of Lockean norms. Politically, there is nothing for Washington to lose by redefining its "preemptive attack" policy and the members of the "Axis of Evil"—except a stated enemy. However, these are the "ideas" which *STIP* suggests are difficult to change.

The continued presence of U.S. combat forces on the Korean Peninsula also continues to shape the DPRK's perception about American intentions. Since there is no longer a need to defend against the communist threat, or to defend a weaker South Korea from a stronger North Korea,¹⁵⁷ the continued presence of U.S. combat forces serves to exacerbate inter-Korean relations. The

¹⁵⁷ Hamm Taik-young, "North Korea: Economic Foundations of Military Capability and the Inter-Korean Balance," in *North Korea: 2005 and Beyond*, eds. Philip W. Yun and Shin Gi-wook (Stanford: Shorenstein APARC, 2006), 186-189.

forces of communism were clearly defeated by 1992, of which the DPRK experienced first-hand, and thus, U.S. forces now provide the *raison d'être* for much of the DPRK's excessive defense posture. This perspective strongly correlates with recent comments made by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Speaking from Fort Greely, Alaska in August 2006, he said "the real threat that North Korea poses in the immediate future is more one of proliferation than a danger to South Korea."¹⁵⁸

Recently, Hamm Taik-young wrote that "[t]he role of the United States is no longer to maintain a balance; it has a preponderance of power in the inter-Korean conflict."¹⁵⁹ An American retrogression would not only alter the North Korean perception that it must defend itself at all costs—especially through the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles—but it would also provide Seoul and Beijing more diplomatic leverage in dealing with Pyongyang.¹⁶⁰ It would be increasingly difficult for Kim Jong-Il's regime to justify its highly militarized posture to its two primary sources of assistance if the American presence was reduced (not to mention among its own internal constituencies and favorable factions within South Korea).

In addition to establishing formal diplomatic relations with North Korea and reposturing combat forces within Northeast Asia, the United States should also lead North Korea, South Korea and the PRC to the conclusion of a formal peace treaty to end the Korean War. The fifty-three year armistice which has been nearly forgotten by the United Nations is a diplomatic failure often lost behind the DPRK's provocative ballistic missile or nuclear weapons tests. As the Cold War "winner," the nation which implemented the modern global economic system, and

¹⁵⁸ News Services, "Rumsfeld Unsure of Ability To Intercept Korean Missiles," *Washington Post.com*, 28 August 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/27/AR2006082700500.html> (accessed 9 December 2006).

¹⁵⁹ Yun and Shin (Hamm), 185.

¹⁶⁰ For a well-stated and matter-of-fact assessment about American obligations to South Korea and the general situation confronting U.S. policymakers over North Korea, see Ted Galen Carpenter and Doug Bandow, *The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 1-7.

the nation which recognized both Japan and the PRC after fighting wars against them, the United States should feel obligated to terminate old conflicts so that new ones can be concentrated on.

As the pressure for unification by South Korea continues to build, especially in the form of the Sunshine Policy and the emerging Kaesong Industrial Complex, Washington may find itself in the undesirable role of an obstructionist if it does not pursue progress in the realm of diplomatic relations, combat troop deployments, and the 1953 armistice. The recent nuclear threat by North Korea has served as a noteworthy distraction in U.S. diplomatic efforts, but nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles are symptoms of a problem which has existed for six decades. Continued failure by the United States to advance beyond a Hobbesian relationship with North Korea could ultimately threaten close cooperation with Seoul. It could also enhance U.S.-Japan polarization vis-à-vis the Asian mainland; a highly undesirable outcome considering the importance of the region.

A second perspective on the Korean situation is that from a regional perspective, Lockean norms have become more common. These norms should gradually increase the likelihood of limited warfare and cross-recognition among states. Although Korean unification is becoming less likely, pressure from the overarching regional culture should be impacting the behaviors and decision-making processes of those states which are not meeting the Lockean norms. These considerations are favorable for North Korea, which according to the transmission of Lockean cultural norms, should gradually gain confidence about its own existence in the eyes of its neighbors. Whether or not this will be the case may fall back on the current pattern of Hobbesian relations, which encompass it.

C. THE UTILITY OF *STIP*

The limits of this discussion have prevented a comprehensive understanding of all micro-level interactions in Northeast Asia from 1945-1992, and the macro-level assessment performed here serves only as a baseline for further study. Utilizing *STIP* however, has clearly enabled a different view on the

international relations of the region than would be provided by Neorealism; one based on the distribution of certain ideas, not power. Concepts of power are by no means excluded from having some explanatory power in the evolution of regional culture, but these occur primarily at the micro-level and are repeated in multiple instances. In the specific case of Northeast Asia from 1945-1992, power in the form of economics and military might became important factors in shaping common understandings about each of the actors, but these factors were not instrumental themselves. Instead, they contributed to a much larger pattern of social relations that evolved over five decades; a pattern which continues to shape Northeast Asia today.

Through this structural analysis of Northeast Asia, Alexander Wendt's *Social Theory of International Politics* proved to be as difficult to empiricize as some of the concepts are to understand. To truly grasp *STIP*, the preceding case study would have to be analyzed at both macro- and micro-levels, including the application of cultural internalization, across consistent and consecutive time periods. Micro-level relationships need to be assessed in relation to changes or continuity at the macro-level, and in relation to other micro-level relations. Cultural internalization would need to be thoroughly defined to reduce the ambiguity raised by certain Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian categorizations. Finally, the concepts of state identity formation, according to *STIP* definitions and multiple micro-level interactions would have to be addressed.

As a starting point for empirical testing, this thesis aims to generate deeper discussion about the potential use of *STIP* in contemporary assessments of international relations. Northeast Asia has proven to be a complicated region which is commonly understood through materialist Cold War literature. To improve modern understandings about Northeast Asia and other regions of the world, the study of systemic social culture and its effect on state behavior must be expanded. Greater work is needed in both the development of adequate criterion for classifying micro- and macro-level relations and also with how the varying degrees of cultural internalization are exhibited. Assessments of other complicated regions, including the Middle East and Africa are necessary, as are

the exploration of different cultural concepts, such as Confucian and Islamic social cultures. Unquestionably, there are elements of these cultures present in various geographic areas. The efforts to appropriately apply *STIP* to International Relations studies are extensive; however, based on the potential contributions to modern IR problems, pursuing *STIP* is a worthy endeavor.

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