Command and Control of U.S. Sealift: Strength or Achilles Heel?
Abstract
This study evaluates the command and control (C2) of U.S. sealift forces as measured against a generic near-peer adversary in 2018. The study begins with a vignette in which an enemy employs a creative operational scheme to delay U.S. power projection capability. This scenario forms the point of reference from which several weaknesses in U.S. sealift C2 capability are identified. The study offers a strategic context from which a similar scenario might develop in the future. The first section details U.S. National Sealift capability. The second section addresses C2 of U.S. sealift. Three elements of C2 are identified as potential critical vulnerabilities -- unity of command, interoperability, and in-transit visibility. The final section offers specific suggestions to reduce vulnerabilities vis- -vis an enemy attack. It also offers an important mindset shift that must take place within logistical circles to help U.S. C2 capability withstand likely attack against sealift forces in the future. The intent of this study is to raise the awareness of military leaders to significant vulnerabilities within U.S. power projection capability, and to suggest logical actions to reduce those vulnerabilities before an enemy can exploit them in the future.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Oct 23, 2006
- Accession Number
- ADA463371
Entities
People
- Sam C. Barrett
Organizations
- Naval War College