Exorcising the Demon: Airpower's True Role in America's Wars
Abstract
Air advocates have for too long claimed for the air arm a solo, war-winning capability. It has never obtained. After witnessing the horrific experience of trench warfare that was World War I, Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell were among the first to proffer theories that claimed airpower could bring about decisive, strategic results and possibly even obviate the need for surface forces involvement in wars. Their theories were expanded upon by the "Bomber Mafia" in the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) on the eve of World War II. In the 1990s, Colonel John Warden updated the ACTS theory based on the advent of precision weaponry and superior information technologies. The problem is that none of the air theorists got it right; means applied in air strategy throughout America's wars did not achieve ends anticipated by theory. Instead, the record shows that a joint force conception and execution of strategy is what has won wars in the past and will continue to win wars in the future. With that in mind, airpower must forever be considered one part of the joint force, not the decisive force. Airmen need to claim less universal applicability for airpower ideas and exorcise the demon that dwells in "cause-and-effect "thinking at the theater-strategic level. In addition, instead of using a generic, systems-based approach, strategy must be based on the particular needs of the situation at hand.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 16, 2006
- Accession Number
- ADA463428
Entities
People
- Gregory M. Cain
Organizations
- Naval War College