Post Conflict Operations and the Combatant Commander -- Lessons Learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom
Abstract
On May 1, 2003, before a live television audience onboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, President George W. Bush declared victory for the United States and the end of major combat operations in Iraq. Preceding the president's speech was perhaps the most stunning display of technological superiority and joint conventional fire power in military history. In just 26 days, the United States and coalition forces had invaded Iraq, defeated Iraqi conventional forces, ousted President Saddam Hussein from power, and terminated the Ba'ath party's 35-year hold on Iraq. Even the harshest critics of the war were claiming that there had never been a combat operation as successful as Operation Iraqi Freedom. Omitted from the President's jubilant speech, however, was that the United States' campaign in Iraq was far from over. The defeat of Iraqi conventional forces and subsequent regime change were trigger points for the coalition's transition to the final phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom -- post-conflict operations. Post-conflict or post-hostility operations are activities taken to stabilize, secure, and reconstruct an area of operations (AO) to transition the AO back to peace and civilian government control. Almost 3 years after President Bush's declaration of the end of major combat operations, the United States is still heavily engaged in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations in Iraq. This thesis states that U.S. Combatant Commanders struggled to transition to and execute post-conflict operations in Iraq for three main reasons. To support his thesis, the author examines shortfalls in the formulation of the plan for post-conflict operations; analyzes the lack of interagency coordination and communication and how it affected the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and its subsequent successor, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA); and examines how lack of operational intelligence and cultural awareness contributed to the problem.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 13, 2006
- Accession Number
- ADA463436
Entities
People
- Gavin A. Lawrence
Organizations
- Naval War College