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14. ABSTRACT Throughout history military leaders have recognized the importance of logistics to the success of their operations. Unfortunately, logistical support is often taken for granted. As a result, our logistical system has become sluggish, often unreliable, and expensive, in part due to its fragmented and inefficient organizational structure. The purpose of this paper is to show "Focused Logistics" will not be obtained until DoD consolidates distribution organizations under the authority of a single commander with the power to direct actions in peace and war. If DoD really wants to transform its distribution processes, it will take more than collaboration. Responsibility and authority must rest with one organization. Consolidation gives the warfighter exactly what he is looking for—simplicity, flexibility, responsiveness, and perhaps just as important—a single point of contact for his logistical concerns. He should demand no less.					
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FOCUSED LOGISTICS: TIME FOR FUNCTIONAL COMMAND

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.
The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy or the Department of the Air Force.

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17 May 2005

In war, many of our most important unsolved problems are logistical. If we fail to correct them, they may easily cause our defeat should we have to fight another global war.¹
Henry Eccles

Throughout history military leaders have recognized the great importance of logistics to the success of their operations. Unfortunately, logistical support is often taken for granted during the course of our planning and war gaming efforts. As a result, our logistical system has been allowed to become sluggish, often unreliable, and expensive, in part due to its fragmented and inefficient organizational structure.² Our distribution system--the parts of the Department of Defense (DoD) that manage and execute the storage and movement of supplies to military customers--consists of multiple entities and agencies made up of separate Services and commands. Each of these agencies is responsible for individual modal and Service commitments and functions. These functions have become “stove-piped” and have created seams in logistical processes that unnecessarily confine the operational limits of future campaigns. Warfighters question the effectiveness of the current distribution process--can it be fixed?

The purpose of this paper is to show that the warfighter will not achieve “Focused Logistics” until DoD consolidates its distribution organizations under the authority of a single commander with the power to direct actions in peace and war. On the surface this may appear purely a Title 10 strategic proposition; however, it is an operational issue for the Functional Combatant Commander (authority/responsibility) as well as Regional Combatant Commanders (expertise/efficiencies/effectiveness).

The methodology used to support the thesis is five-fold: 1) provide a brief background on historical distribution deficiencies and show that actions taken to remedy them have not resulted in the increased efficiencies anticipated, 2) discuss deployment and distribution in the 2004 Focused Logistics Campaign Plan, 3) discuss United States Transportation Command’s

(TRANSCOM) appointment as Distribution Process Owner and logistical initiatives under development as a result of this appointment, 4) evaluate the successes and shortcomings of these initiatives and 5) provide recommendations for the road ahead.

Background

The US has been very successful in a multitude of military operations dating back to World War II and Korea. Clearly, these operations would not have been successful without adequate logistical support. However, with each Service responsible for its own logistical processes and procedures, deploying and sustaining the joint force tended to be a cumbersome challenge. This fragmented approach to logistics was identified as a deficiency soon after World War II.³ Unfortunately, it would take another 40 years before actions were taken to begin the consolidation of logistical efforts.

In 1987, DoD took a step in the right direction by consolidating strategic transportation functions underneath TRANSCOM. However, DoD's implementation plan did little in the way of centralizing authority and control. The plan allowed the Air Force, Army and the Navy to retain their single manager charters for their respective modes of transportation and TRANSCOM was named purely a wartime-related command. TRANSCOM was later given peacetime authority; however, the processes and bureaucracies of Service-control over logistics remained in place.⁴ As a result, attempts to improve logistical processes fell short of addressing the underlying issues associated with the realities of matrix organizational structures and resulting stovepipes.⁵ A functional logistics organization was needed but was not created.

When the Gulf War surfaced, DoD's distribution system was primarily divided among two organizations--TRANSCOM and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) (**Fig 1**). Since these organizations did not work for one another, there was no "real" motivation to create a seamless

supply system. Each organization focused on its respective transportation and supply specialties. Materiel often took more than 35 days simply to get out of the US and visibility into the distribution system was marginal at best.⁶ For example, 20,000-30,000 containers shipped to the Southwest Asia theater had to be opened to determine their contents and eventual destination. Equipment and supplies were reordered time and again by units. Even more disturbing was the fact that 30,000 members of VII Corps were still waiting for their equipment at the start of the air war.⁷ Costs of shipping an item within the DoD system frequently was 2-3 times more expensive than necessary because of multiple billings.⁸ Information systems did not talk to one another and established metrics measured only organizational challenges. Since no single organization, short of DoD itself, was in charge of the distribution system as a whole, nobody possessed the “big picture” and improvements were slow in coming. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and the War on Terror helped garner support for change.

Cooperation and Collaboration

In early 2000, leaders of TRANSCOM and the DLA agreed to embark jointly on the Strategic Distribution (SD) program as a means to streamline and improve significant elements of the defense distribution system.⁹ Since no command arrangements existed between the various organizations, SD was founded on the principle of partnership.

An important aspect of SD was the development of a DoD-wide “distribution database,” aimed at giving stakeholders far better visibility of distribution activities than had previously been possible. This system gave DoD a way of looking at distribution activities comprehensively, including both performance (e.g., time) and cost.¹⁰ It soon became apparent that distribution inefficiencies were in large part due to organizational parochialism that developed during a time when the Services and DLA each owned their own wholesale supply

depots. “Though DLA took control of these depots in the early 1990s, the methods used to stock these depots were still controlled by the Services and subject to the same inefficiencies.”¹⁰

SD initiatives helped to significantly reduce delivery times to customers by maximizing the amount of stocked cargo at US and overseas locations. SD efforts also improved the distribution of materiel by improving the synchronization between supply and transportation. This cooperation and increased visibility into the distribution processes were catalysts for significant improvements during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.¹¹ For example, customer wait time for air-delivery cargo improved from 15 days to 10.7 days.¹² Though cooperation produced results, problems remained in the distribution system.

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM provided the U.S. with another opportunity to evaluate progress in the distribution chain. Total Asset Visibility and the Global Transportation Network vastly improved our transportation capabilities. In the 10 years since the Gulf War, we went from tracking items on paper to viewing them on the web. Taking materiel from the U.S. and moving it to theater ran very smoothly; however, the ability of logisticians to alter or follow the flow all the way to the foxhole suffered. Commanders still found themselves wondering where their equipment and resupplies were. Vice Admiral Holden, JCS J-4, stated

Many information technology investments made over the past decade have not yielded the asset visibility benefits expected and that during the 11 years since DESERT STORM, the Services produced a disparate, stove-piped logistics automation capability for Combatant Commanders.¹³

A 2003 GAO report found that though improvements were made in the distribution process, significant problems remained. These included:

- A backlog of hundreds of pallets and containers of material at distribution points
- A discrepancy of \$1.2 billion between the amount of materiel shipped to the Army and the amount received
- The cannibalization of vehicles and potential reduction of equipment readiness due to the unavailability of parts

- The duplication of requisitions and circumvention of the supply system as a result of inadequate asset visibility
- The accumulation at the theater distribution center of hundreds of pallets, containers, and boxes of excess supplies and equipment shipped¹⁴

These problems were at least partly attributed to poor asset visibility, an insufficient and ineffective theater distribution capability and our failure to apply lessons learned from previous military operations. This is due to the fact that no one agency had authority to direct the other logistical agencies (to include the Services) to comply with standardization objectives. The GAO stated that the asset visibility and distribution problems were attributed to systems that were not interoperable. “Customers, lacking confidence their parts were coming, duplicated their requisitions thus adding strain to already limited transportation assets.”¹⁵ Combatant Commanders were frustrated with the system and were looking for a single-point of contact for logistical issues--unfortunately, there wasn’t one.

Focused Logistics Campaign

*Focused Logistics is the ability to provide the joint force the right personnel, equipment, supplies and support in the right place, at the right time, and in the right quantities, across the full range of military operations.*¹⁶ 2004 Logistics Campaign Plan

In the wake of the Global War on Terror and continued military operations in the Middle East, DoD put forth new energy to transform our logistic capabilities to overcome past problems and to be more responsive to the forces they support. “Future joint warfighting will place an extraordinary premium on our abilities to make superior logistics support decisions.”¹⁷

The 2004 Logistics Campaign Plan consolidates various guidance and directives from senior officials and provides a strategic roadmap for the purposes of improving our logistical system. The central idea behind focused logistics is building the right capacity into the deployment and sustainment pipeline and exercising sufficient control over the pipeline from end

to end. It also entails providing a high degree of assurance to the supported commander that required logistical support and materiel will arrive where needed and on time.¹⁸

A recurring theme in the Logistics Campaign Plan is the importance of developing “an interoperable, joint command, control, communications and computer architecture with a capability to provide an integrated operational picture.”¹⁹ This capability would enable precision guided logistics by providing suppliers and consumers with access to real-time “end-to-end” logistical information. Suppliers would then be equipped to take appropriate actions to anticipate logistical requirements and meet a demand before it actually arose. This capability already exists in the corporate arena (i.e. Fed Ex, Walmart, UPS) using a single information system that could be modified to satisfy Service requirements. In an era of decreasing budgets, the U.S. can no longer afford to have five different systems to execute distribution and logistical processes. One organization must be given authority and responsibility to direct actions in an effort to adopt this single system and bring about changes required to streamline/standardize the distribution process.

Another requirement addressed in the campaign plan is control over the logistics pipeline. This means “possessing the ability to track and shift--and potentially reconfigure--forces, equipment, sustainment, and support, even while en route, and to deliver tailored logistics packages directly to the warfighter.”²⁰ This entails a high level of standardization to ensure end-to-end visibility of the distribution system and common access to metrics and decision support tools. For an example, if a Combatant Commander decides to shift his main effort in a campaign his team should be equipped to alter the flow of equipment and materiel to the new location by making adjustments to the logistic flow in a net-centric way--ideally, all at the click of a mouse.

Today, no agency has been given the command authority to perform this function for all DoD. Combatant Commanders rely solely on their J-4 staff with no Component Command.

Analyzing DoD's inventories around the world is another key component of transformed logistics. In today's environment, we should have sufficient knowledge about "use rates" to determine how much of an item needs to be kept on hand and at what rate resupply needs to flow. In doing so, we can properly plan transportation requirements to synchronize with the demand to create a much more efficient operation. Additionally, in an expeditionary environment, new supply warehouses need to be put in place or shifted from previous locations. These can be located on shore or off shore (as is the case of preposition equipment or in a sea basing construct). Without giving one agency the responsibility and authority to carry out this shift, execution is sub-optimized by the bureaucratic parochialism of other organizations.

A final aspect addressed in the plan is to consider changes to organizational structure to best integrate and execute the distribution system. Though no organizational structure is proposed, the plan does emphasize the importance DoD has placed on making sure the distribution process is fixed. Studies indicate that "DoD can make significant improvements in logistics and global supply chain management through organizational structural changes."²¹

Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics be designated the Defense Logistics Executive. This person possesses the authority to integrate process improvements into the global supply chain. SECDEF also designated the commander of TRANSCOM as the Distribution Process Owner charged with improving the overall efficiency and interoperability of distribution-related activities.²² This appointment is a step in the right direction.

USTRANSCOM As Distribution Process Owner (DPO)

*For the first time in the history of the DoD, somebody has been given the responsibility for distribution process, management, leadership, directive and ownership.*²³

Gen Handy, COMUSTRANSCOM

The designation of TRANSCOM as DPO marked a significant milestone in transforming the distribution system. TRANSCOM was tasked with developing efficient and effective distribution solutions to enhance strategic support to worldwide customers. The consolidation of authority under one process owner was aimed at realizing logistics efficiencies to:

1. “Eliminate existing seams between current distribution processes and standardize the policies, vision and performance goals in DoD’s supply chain.
2. Drive interoperable information technology solutions and enhance total asset visibility to distribution customers
3. Institutionalize sustainment planning into our contingency processes
4. Streamline distribution accountability under a single combatant commander.”²⁴

This appointment was the result of several studies in the aftermath of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. A lesson learned from these studies was that warfighters want simplicity, speed, visibility and reliability in their logistics systems. Just as important, they wanted a single face to deal with for answers.²⁵

Just months after this appointment, TRANSCOM combined existing structure and associated personnel within its command structure to form a Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (DDOC). In January 2004, the DDOC deployed a pilot group of about 65 of those experts to the US Central Command where they now serve in the CENTCOM DDOC (CDDOC) under the control of the CENTCOM Commander. Staffed with representatives from DoD’s national partners (**Fig 2**), this team is directing air and surface distribution operations in theater. The DDOC Forward, by plugging USCENTCOM directly into TRANSCOM’s material and transportation management systems and information technology, has achieved early

successes in facilitating key inter-and intra-theater movements, end to end throughput and total visibility in the factory to foxhole pipeline for which USTRANSCOM is now responsible.²⁶

Another initiative is the creation of integrated and defined “end-to end” distribution architecture in order to provide a framework for improving performance. Once the architecture is decided upon, it will drive the development of supporting information technology requirements. The distribution process will start with the DoD source of supply and end with material being received by the unit placing the order.²⁷

A fourth initiative is direct vendor delivery processes. This would help solve shortfalls in the system when vendors deliver cargo to DoD distribution nodes without proper documentation for it to continue. The focus of attention is to develop a web-based tool that customers use which automatically provides the required information and format to the vendors for shipping labels and proper addresses.²⁸ In an effort to build Combatant Commanders’ confidence in the distribution system, a fifth DPO initiative was adopted. Through coordination with various customers, metrics are being developed to measure delivery times of materiel. Timeframes are mutually agreed upon by all agencies within the system. The thought is that once confidence is returned to the distribution process, users will cease submitting duplicate orders.²⁹

A sixth initiative had already been underway through the use of Radio Identification Codes. This concept is used by commercial enterprises to adequately track content and location of shipments throughout the distribution process. The goal is Total Asset Visibility in theater and while in transit. Ultimately, this is supposed to eliminate the seams that exist between the inter- and intra-theater systems so the warfighter has visibility from fort to foxhole.³⁰

Clearly, there is a concerted effort to create a more efficient system. But improvements are slow in coming and standardization is difficult to obtain due to disagreements among the

various organizations involved with distribution--to include the Services. What is needed is a logistics boss. Until this occurs, logistics transformation will be tenuous at best.

Successes and Shortcomings

*If DoD is serious about efficiency, the management of the supply chain must be in the hands of a single organization, with clear lines of authority and unity of command.*³¹

Gen Handy, COMUSTRANSCOM

The most noticeable and immediate improvement in the distribution process has been the implementation of a CENTCOM Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (CDDOC). As stated previously, the CDDOC connects the Combatant Commander to the “national partners.” This organization plugs directly into the logistical structure already resident in theater.

Prior to March 2004, the Joint Movement Center (JMC) performed the majority of functions now being done by the CDDOC. Unfortunately, the JMC lacked the personnel, training, and equipment necessary to perform all distribution functions. The CDDOC brought to the theater an organization that was adequately resourced with personnel and information technology. One senior army officer described the “DDOC as the JMC with steroids.”³²

The CDDOC was in full operation during the largest movement and sustainment of forces and equipment since World War II. By determining and eliminating many bottlenecks, or interruptions in the distribution pipeline, the CDDOC assisted in the movement of more than 250,000 troops and one million tons of cargo. It has provided the theater with a process that gives better than 98 hours advanced notice of inbound cargo to the seaport and 24-48 hours notice of inbound cargo via air.³³ Its reach-back capability to national partners provides the theater with the immediate ability to positively influence the distribution pipeline. For example, the CDDOC identified excess Class IV (lumber, barrier materiel, etc.) in theater and noticed additional shipments scheduled inbound. The organization successfully avoided the shipment of

over 1,000 containers and saved over \$12 million in materiel cost and strategic lift.³⁴ The Army attributes CDDOC management with saving close to \$400 million in fiscal year 2004.³⁵

DDOCs are also being established in the other regional combatant commands and have shown similar success. Most notably, Pacific Command's DDOC was tested during the 2004 South East Asia Tsunami relief effort. According to PACOM staff members, the new arrangements worked extremely well and bolstered the efficiencies and effectiveness of the humanitarian mission.³⁶ A Korean DDOC will be evaluated during peninsula exercises this year.

Another improvement showing early success is the use of "pure pallets" constructed at depots and aerial ports. Pure pallets are built for a single customer or an authorized group of customers. The pallets require much less handling, which means quicker delivery because the material flows more directly to the warfighter. Additionally, more cargo is being prepared for shipment at consolidation and containerization points rather than sending large amounts of loose materiel to the aerial ports for processing. By preparing the cargo for shipment at these consolidation and containerization points, more cargo volume can be pushed through the system, equating to fewer and larger pure pallets moving more quickly to the warfighter.³⁷ Information systems are improving an agency's ability to know well in advance when shipments will be arriving and where they are located. Just as important, the equipment is being sent with one rather than multiple billings.³⁸

Despite improvements in the distribution process, the entire organizational structure (to include the DDOCs) remains extremely ad hoc. It lacks the legitimacy associated with being part of a single chain of command. As such, many of these people are still working for more than one master. While things work well when there is an environment of cooperation, one can anticipate problems when disagreements surface in the future.

Since there is no centralized logistical command structure (other than the JFC himself), there is no authority to direct actions to eliminate organizational seams. For example, if an Army unit requires materiel and it is excess in Air Force channels, the J-4 professionals should be able to divert the materiel without needing to gain the approval of a plethora of organizations. The J-4 is often unable to maximize the use of critical materiel in executing war plans due to Service parochialism and the fact that he doesn't possess equal rank or authority with other components.

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags have improved asset visibility; however, not everyone is using them and they are often removed once in theater creating a lack of visibility during the last tactical mile. Often frequencies that RFIDs operate on are unavailable in theater. As such, cargo information is lost during the transportation phase. Troops in the field still complain about lack of visibility and of supplies not arriving on time. Until these transmitters send signals via satellite and are used throughout the distribution system, problems will remain.

The Services recognize the importance of improving their distribution processes but still work issues in a manner that best satisfies their own budgetary constraints. Systems procured by the Services do not always talk to one another and the overarching system suffers. USTRANSCOM/J-3 stated that if one "agency could establish a standard and then hold the other organizations accountable for using the standard, problems would be significantly reduced."³⁹ As it stands, DoD is trying to modify outdated software to satisfy Service requirements rather than capitalizing on more capable software that best satisfies the requirements of the warfighter.

The Road Ahead / Recommendations (Fig 3)

*Unity of command is essential to coordinate national/theater logistic operations.*⁴⁰

Problems will persist in the logistical/distribution arena and seams will remain at the inter/intra-theater levels until foundational improvements are made to the system. The first

recommendation is to achieve unity of command for logistics at the functional level by creating a LOGCOM (consolidate TRANSCOM and DLA) (**Fig 4**). This action promises the best opportunity for transformational change and provides the best way to manage DoD's supply/transportation processes. Creating a single command for supply and transportation enables the entire system to respond to short decision cycles needed to manage the fulfillment of many competing requirements of the force projection, redeployment, and sustainment missions.

Creating a LOGCOM gives the commander the authority and responsibility to take actions to standardize and improve the system. Without this organization, logistical improvements will always remain at the mercy of the Services or supporting bureaucracies within each organization. If we want standardization across the spectrum where systems talk to one another, we must create an organization with the authority to carry it out. A Functional Combatant Commander can accomplish this.

A second recommendation is to create a theater logistics component command on par with the other components. The theater commander requires the expertise of a logistical component commander on his team to handle theater requirements. This idea has been under consideration for several years but not adopted. Today, the military is more joint than ever, more interoperable than ever, and leaner than ever before. With budget constraints and the increased importance placed on improving DoD's logistical process, now is the time to create the logistical component command to help expedite process improvements and champion initiatives undertaken by the newly formed LOGCOM.

A Logistics Component Commander would be charged with operating theater distribution centers for the Services at intermediate staging and or support bases. Distribution support would remain a Service responsibility. By creating a logistics component command, the Combatant

Commander would institute a command structure to accommodate the DDOC and personnel conducting day-to-day theater logistics operations. Without component command status, logistics does not get the attention it deserves throughout the planning process or in execution. A logistics component commander would have a seat at the table and his inputs would be heard by the joint force commander. The component commander would be in charge of the DDOC and possess the means to access the reach back capability necessary to ensure logistical requirements are satisfied early in the pipeline. He would also have the tools at his disposal to redirect supply to best satisfy warfighter needs.

The Army Science Board recommended each joint component designate a senior logistician to oversee distribution efforts similar to the Air Force's Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR). This DIRMOBAIR, DIRMOBSEA, DIRMOBLAND would be under the operational command of the Logistics Component Commander.⁴¹ This organizational structure (**Fig 5**) would provide the joint force commander with the required level of attention his logistical requirements deserve. The DIRMOB would be a key player in eliminating the seams between components and between theater and tactical logistics efforts.

Another recommendation and key component of logistical transformation is to provide LOGCOM with the authority to direct the Services to take actions necessary to improve the overall distribution process. This authority will help to break down the matrixed organization that currently exists and ensure standardization across DoD. LOGCOM should be given appropriated funds for the purpose of standardizing distribution processes. Additionally, LOGCOM should have the authority and responsibility for determining and collecting working capital funds--now accomplished by Military Sealift Command and Air Mobility Command. This would give the unified command the power of the purse and make it easier to procure

standardized technology and institute programs/policy necessary to eliminate stovepipes across the respective organizations. LOGCOM should also be responsible for establishing guidelines and metrics for distribution to include time to delivery, costs, customer service, and transportation efficiency/effectiveness. Without the authority of the purse and responsibility for establishing metrics and standards LOGCOM will be at the mercy of the various organizations that seek to maximize their own benefits--often at the expense of the distribution system as a whole and more importantly the warfighter.

A fourth recommendation is to continue DDOC implementation and other initiatives currently underway under the DPO initiative. These first four recommendations will facilitate DPO initiatives and ensure they are seen to fruition.

Once established, LOGCOM needs to construct key supply depots that contain high use assets--similar to that recently done in Kuwait. We need to get away from the idea that we order from the US and then it is shipped. In today's high tech environment we ought to know how much of particular items are used during a given timeframe and plan resupply around historical usage. This would be called Smart Push Logistics.

Finally, the Combatant Commander needs professionally trained logisticians to carry out these new responsibilities. "The logistics planner must know what level supply production may surge during a crisis, what avenues are available to fulfill the demands, what the transportation system can support, how retrograde will be handled, and what special requirements or procedures need to be put in place."⁴² He must also be able to interact with other agencies in order to best support the warfighter needs. Organizational changes and shifts in responsibility must be codified in doctrine. These changes can best be championed by the new component commands and the new Functional Combatant Command. The new generation of logisticians,

armed with command authority for theater logistical efforts, will give the warfighter the confidence to carry out his war plans knowing the logistical tail will be able to sustain the effort.

Counter-Argument to Proposed Road Ahead

A merger of the Defense Logistics Agency and USTRANSCOM is not the answer to current shortcomings in the military distribution system.⁴³ **VADM Lippert, Director, DLA**

Many have argued against the value of combining TRANSCOM and DLA due to the size of the new organization and the vast responsibilities one organization would possess across the supply and transportation spectrum. This argument is easily countered by the fact that TRANSCOM is already DoD's DPO and by the fact that adding DLA's 22,000 personnel to TRANSCOM's 150,000 is not an unmanageable increase in manpower.

Vice Admiral Lippert, Commander for DLA stated he "would much rather work on improving the process together than doing a reorganization."⁴⁴ He goes on to say that the distribution system is extremely complex "mostly oriented to moving ammunition, fuel, construction material, engines and other commodities/supplies, each with unique supply chain characteristics."⁴⁵ This comment actually highlights the need to create a unified distribution command structure. One agency able to set the standards for procedure and information technology is just what the system needs to become more flexible and simpler. As long as responsibility is divided between commands, accountability for performance, cost control and other requirements will always be in doubt.⁴⁶

Another argument against creating a LOGCOM or a component command structure at the theater level is that current Service and organizational bureaucracies will prevent the consolidation from effectively administering the distribution pipeline. This is always a concern in large bureaucratic organizations. However, the U.S. does not have unlimited assets to support military operations. Our distribution system, as well as that in the commercial sector, is shifting


from a supply based system with just-in-case inventory levels to a transportation-based just-in-time logistics system with leaner inventories and reliance on fast transportation. Recognizing this important shift adds credence to one commander synchronizing materiel and transportation to best suit the needs of the warfighter.

Another argument against creating a logistics chain of command is that the Combatant Commander will lose control of assets needed to support the new functional and component commanders. This argument is also faulty. The theater commander remains responsible for logistics matters within his area of responsibility. The difference is he will have professional logisticians overseeing his campaign just as the Land Component Commander oversees operations on land. Just as important, the Logistics Component Commander will possess equal rank and status as the other components. This frees the logistics component to best match supply requirements across the Services in order to maximize the effectiveness of the warfighting effort.

Conclusion

As demonstrated in the commercial sector, successful end-to-end distribution requires the union of both transportation and supply functions.⁴⁷ Despite the benefits associated with consolidating the transportation and distribution efforts, DoD has yet to adopt this structure. Instead, they have preferred to opt for collaboration between various organizations. This system allows each functional stovepipe to optimize itself at the expense of the greater joint distribution system. If DoD really wants to transform its distribution processes, it will take more than collaboration. Responsibility and authority must rest with one organization if true progress is to be obtained. Consolidation gives the warfighter exactly what he is looking for--simplicity, flexibility, responsiveness, and perhaps just as important--a single point of contact for his logistical concerns. He should expect no less.

Figure 1



Single owner of DTS in peace and war

Multiple owners of Defense Wholesale Supply System

USD (AT&L) Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics)

DUSD (L&MR) Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Logistics & Materiel Readiness)

Figure 2

NATIONAL PARTNERS

Air Force Materiel Command
Air Mobility Command
Army Air Force Exchange Service
Army Materiel Command
Army Medical Material Agency
Defense Commissary Agency
Defense Logistics Agency
Department of the Army G-4
General Services Agency
HQ Air Force Installations and Logistics
HQ Marine Corps Installation and Logistics
Joint Munitions Command
Joint Staff J-4
Marine Corps Exchange
Marine Corps Logistics Command
US Navy Supply Systems Command
US Navy Supply Systems Command
Navy Exchange
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness
Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command

Figure 3

Recommendations

Principles of Logistics: Simplicity, Flexibility, Economy, Responsiveness, Attainability, Sustainability, Survivability.

Item	Topic	Principle of Logistics Satisfied
1	Continue DDOC development for each theater	Simplicity; Flexibility, Economy
2	Create a Logistics Component Commander subordinate only to JFC	
3	Consolidate USTRANSCOM/DLA into LOGCOM—Functional Combatant Commander w/authority/responsibility to direct standardize DoD's distribution process/information systems	Simplicity, Flexibility, Economy, Responsiveness
4	Give LOGCOM Working Capital Funds and Distribution Modernization Funds to standardize information systems and distribution processes.	All
5.	Create DIRMOBLAND; DIRMOBSEA; DIRMOBAIR as liaison for new theater component command. Give Logistics Component Commander operational command authority	All
6	LOGCOM develop DoD Logistician Training to Prepare leaders for added responsibilities	All
7	Codify Organizational Structure, Authority, and Responsibilities of new Combatant Command and Component Command into Doctrine and Policy	All
8	LOGCOM create metrics to track success/shortcomings of entire distribution system—fort to foxhole.	All

Figure 4

Proposed Department of Defense Distribution Organization





Figure 5

In-Theater Command Structure



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