A Forgotten Lesson for Contemporary Counterinsurgency Operations: The Combined Action Program

Abstract

This research identifies and analyzes the Marine Corps Combined Action Program in the Vietnam War, how it was initiated and employed in a counterinsurgency strategy, and whether this concept has any validity in today's counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq. As this program developed over time, it proved successful in disrupting multiple tenets of the Vietnam insurgency. This program started in 1965 throughout the Marine Corps area of operations but did not receive support from the operational commander and his staff, therefore a unified strategy to defeat the insurgency never materialized. Critical to success for the operational commander in irregular warfare is first having an understanding of its nature, assisted by historical analysis, and then applying the proper solution to the problem. The Combined Action Program alone cannot defeat the insurgency but a contemporary program will provide US military leaders a supporting strategy as they continue counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 16, 2006
Accession Number
ADA463562

Entities

People

  • Patrick M. Lange

Organizations

  • Naval War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Asymmetric Warfare
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Counterinsurgency
  • Economic Systems
  • Governments
  • Insurgency
  • Iraqi-War
  • Marine Corps
  • Military Operations
  • Military Organizations
  • Military Science
  • National Security
  • Terrorists
  • Urban Areas
  • War
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies
  • Military and Counterinsurgency Studies.