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14. ABSTRACT Since the end of the Cold War U.S. military performance when called upon to execute lesser contingencies, including post conflict operations, have at best produced mixed results. In short, the essential point is this: the U.S. military's transformation since the end of the Cold War, while vastly enhancing its ability to wage war at the high end of the conflict spectrum, has not produced comparable increases in capacity at the lower end of the spectrum. This is the case despite the fact that the frequency and performance of U.S. military forces when involved in lesser contingencies clearly demonstrates the necessity to enhance U.S. military capabilities across the entire conflict spectrum. Ultimately, achieving U.S. national objectives in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), which range from complex contingencies and peace operations to winning the final peace following decisive combat operations, will require changes and improvements in several critical areas. First, mission success during complex contingency and post conflict operations requires that the U.S. military and its civilian partners within the United States government (USG) reach a new level of interagency jointness, at both the strategic and operational levels. Second, if properly resourced and supported, there are two prototype initiatives: the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) and the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ), which demonstrate great potential to bridge the interagency gap at the operational level. Last, COCOMs need to improve their ability to leverage not only other elements of national power, but also the contributions of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IO's).					
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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, RI**

**FULL SPECTRUM TRANSFORMATION:
NOT WITHOUT OUR CIVILIAN PARTNERS**

By

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

17 May 2005

Professor David R. Carrington

INTRODUCTION

At the end of the third inning we declared victory and said the game is over. It ain't over. It is not going to be over in future wars. We need to talk about not how you win the peace as a separate part of the war, but you have to look at this thing from start to finish. It is not a phased conflict; there is not a fighting part and then another part. It is a nine-inning game.

Anthony Zinni, *Understanding What Victory Is*

Since the end of the Cold War the Armed Forces of the United States have consistently demonstrated their dominance on the battlefield. The U.S. military's performance during major combat operations, such as those conducted during DESERT STORM, and more recently during the initial phases of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), clearly demonstrate the maturation of an unrivaled joint war fighting capability. However, the unmistakable truth of IRAQI FREEDOM, one that we often seem to forget, is that decisive military victory on the battlefield is frequently only the first step in achieving the desired political end state. Ensuring final victory will often require the coordinated and synchronized application of many elements of national power, all directed towards achieving a common strategic goal.

Since 1989, U.S. involvement in Panama, Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Iraq, typifies the wide breadth of employment possibilities for which the U.S. military and its civilian partners need to be prepared. As the less than optimal outcomes of several of these commitments reveal, U.S. military performance when called upon to execute lesser contingencies, including post conflict stability operations, have at best produced mixed results. In short, the essential point is this: the U.S. military's transformation since the end of the Cold War, while vastly enhancing its ability to wage war at the high end of the conflict spectrum, has not produced comparable increases in capacity at the lower end of the spectrum.¹ This is the case despite the fact that the

frequency and performance of U.S. military forces, when involved in lesser contingencies clearly demonstrates the necessity to enhance U.S. military capabilities across the entire conflict spectrum. Ultimately, achieving U.S. national objectives in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), which range from complex contingencies and peace operations to winning the final peace following decisive combat operations, will require changes and improvements in several critical areas. While the analysis and suggestions proposed in this paper are not all inclusive, improvements in these areas will help ensure that the combatant commanders and their civilian partners are better prepared to meet the challenges that lie ahead. As affirmed in the opening statement by General Anthony Zinni, former Commander of U.S. Central Command, the combatant commanders and their interagency partners need to be prepared to play a “nine-inning game”. Achieving final victory will often depend upon it.

First, mission success during complex contingency and post conflict operations requires that the U.S. military and its civilian partners within the United States government (USG) reach a new level of interagency jointness, at both the strategic and operational levels. This will only be attainable if the U.S. military accepts that these types of operations are an integral and necessary component of U.S. military capability. Second, if properly resourced and supported, there are two prototype initiatives: the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) and the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ), which demonstrate great potential to bridge the interagency gap at the operational level. Last, COCOMs need to improve their ability to leverage not only other elements of national power, but also the contributions of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs).

FULL SPECTRUM TRANSFORMATION

Over the past fifteen years, the United States has steadily moved to a military structure characterized by smaller forces, increased speed, precision weapons, and improved lethality. During this same period, the size of the force has decreased from 2.2 million active duty troops to approximately 1.5 million today. Touted by many as a revolution in military affairs, the services have sought, amongst other things, to leverage information and technology as a means to increase the precision and lethality of this smaller force. A brief examination of Operation DESERT STORM compared to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM helps capture the enormous success of this transformation. In DESERT STORM the coalition ground troops numbered approximately 540,000.² In contrast, when Baghdad fell during OIF there were fewer than 150,000 coalition forces on the ground.³ With regard to air power, DESERT STORM witnessed approximately 2,500 aircraft and 126,600 sorties compared to 1,900 aircraft and 41,000 sorties in support of IRAQI FREEDOM.⁴ During DESERT STORM approximately 8 percent of the air delivered munitions were precision guided, compared to approximately 66 percent during IRAQI FREEDOM.⁵ During OIF, the allies used less than one-third of the forces and one-seventh of the munitions in about one-half the time to reach “a far more ambitious objective as compared to DESERT STORM.”⁶ In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in June 2003, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz discussed this transformation: “The preliminary lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom suggest that U.S. forces, on a per unit basis, achieved a level of combat power that is at least several multiples greater than even the enormously capable forces that we deployed in Operation Desert Storm a decade ago.”⁷ Even this cursory look at the

differences between the two conflicts provides a comprehensible picture of the ongoing transformation of the U.S. military. However, the challenge for today's military is moving this transformation beyond the high end of the conflict spectrum. While it is essential that the U.S. military maintain its war fighting advantage, it must be equally capable of maintaining the peace during operations other than war or winning the peace during post conflict operations. Furthermore, the blurring of the transition between major combat and post conflict operations, as is characteristic of ongoing operations in Iraq, requires a full-spectrum force, not just one that is tailored for the first three innings. The common thread that ties success in these diverse types of operations together, from complex contingency to post conflict stability operations, is the significant requirement for interagency integration and civil-military coordination. Only by developing the team work, organizational structure, and mechanisms necessary to truly unify all elements of national power will the combatant commanders and their civilian partners be postured for success across the full-spectrum of operations.

INTERAGENCY COOPERATION HAS TO START AT THE TOP

In May 1997 President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, titled Managing Complex Contingency Operations. The document was built upon tenets contained in previously issued PDD 25, and directed the Department of Defense, Department of State, and other U.S. governmental agencies to create a cohesive program for educating and training personnel for complex contingency operations.⁸ The directive was also issued with the purpose of improving the planning and management of complex contingencies in response to failures in interagency coordination that occurred during the early 1990s.⁹ The principal requirement of the document was the development of a

political-military plan as an integrated planning tool for coordinating U.S. government actions in response to a complex contingency.¹⁰ One important facet of the document was the requirement “that the political-military plan include demonstrable milestones and measures of success including detailed planning for the transition of the operation to activities which might be performed by a follow-on operation or by the host government.”¹¹ Additionally, PDD 56 called for an interagency rehearsal and review of the political-military plan’s main elements. By rehearsing and reviewing all elements of the plan, differences in objectives, agency responsibilities, synchronization, and resource allocation could be identified and resolved prior to execution.¹² Although PDD 56 was an important step in improving the process of planning and managing complex contingency operations at the strategic level, the document was not applicable to the development of plans involving international armed conflict.¹³

In February 2001 the Bush Administration issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 1. Among other things, NSPD 1 replaced the Presidential Decision Directives as instruments of communicating presidential decisions regarding national security policies.¹⁴ While it abolished the existing system of interagency working groups, it transferred the oversight of ongoing operations assigned in PDD 56 to the newly formed regional Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs).¹⁵ Like PDD 56, the newly issued directive did not extend its application to the planning and management of post conflict environments following major combat operations.

Past difficulties in transitioning from major combat operations to post conflict stability operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq firmly support extending the requirements outlined in PDD 56 to the planning and management of post conflict environments

following major combat operations. While some would view this as treading on the sacred ground of the Department of Defense, it has become unmistakably clear that success in complex contingency and post conflict operations requires a team effort, and that this team work must start at the top. In today's world, there are few if any combat operations that will not require interagency coordination. Had executive level directives required the production of a detailed political-military plan at the strategic level for Afghanistan and Iraq, similar to those required by PDD 56, issues regarding agency responsibilities, differences in objectives, synchronization, unity of effort, and resource allocation could have been identified and resolved prior to execution. Without coherent and consistent direction from the strategic level, effective interagency collaboration, planning, and execution at the operational level is difficult at best.

LESSONS RELEARNED – OIF OPERATIONAL LEVEL PLANNING

It is essential that operational plans encompass all phases of the campaign including the post conflict phase. Additionally, “the reverse planning process should always be applied; otherwise, the execution phase will be incongruent and without a well-thought-out road map toward the ultimate objective.”¹⁶ Although much of the operational level planning for OIF is still classified, there are many unclassified sources that contend that planning for post conflict operations was insufficient and based on several incorrect critical assumptions. “These factors, coupled with a lack of security, loss of basic necessities . . . created challenges in accomplishing stability operations.”¹⁷ Taking it a step further, Michael O’Hanlon, in a recent article titled *Iraq Without a Plan*, states that the U.S. defense planning system did not work. While the first three phases of the operation were impressive, Phase IV planning was bungled so badly that its faults have come to

outweigh the virtues of the earlier parts of the operation.¹⁸ Observations by tactical level commanders leading units during OIF support the assertions that planning and guidance for Phase IV of the plan was lacking.¹⁹

The situation in Iraq is only the most recent example of the unwillingness “of civilian and military leaders to consider the establishment of political and economic order as a part of war itself.”²⁰ A decade earlier, similar shortfalls in the planning for the liberation of Kuwait occurred in the build up to Operation DESERT STORM. “Before mid-January, CENTCOM gave little attention to planning for civil-military operations in Kuwait after the liberation. CENTCOM’s operations plan for Desert Storm basically stopped with eliminating the threat of Iraq’s Republican Guard and did not address the post conflict phase.”²¹ Fighting the same enemy over a decade later, it can be argued that the plan again ended with the destruction of the Iraqi Republican Guard, confusing the defeat of the operational center of gravity with the attainment of the strategic objective.

By many accounts, post conflict stabilization and reconstruction plans for OIF were not addressed in sufficient detail, largely because of the overly optimistic assumption on how the U.S. military would be received. Relying on assumptions that are based on either the worst or the best case scenario is a violation of the fundamental rules of planning. Either extreme should be avoided for obvious reasons.²² As a result of overly optimistic assumptions, a U.S. military with too few troops on the ground was slow to respond to the deteriorating security environment following the fall of the regime.

On 20 January 2003 in preparation for the war and post conflict reconstruction in Iraq, retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner was appointed to head the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). From the start, there were

interagency conflicts and questions with regard to authority. Although General Garner would control no security forces, ORHA “was charged with administering the country, providing humanitarian aid, and rebuilding damaged infrastructure.”²³ On 17 March 2003, with less than two months to coordinate the planning efforts of the whole host of U.S. agencies that would be involved in the reconstruction, ORHA was relocated to Kuwait.²⁴ To compound the shortage of planning time, much of the post conflict planning that was conducted prior to the formation of ORHA by numerous organizations and agencies was not incorporated into their plans.²⁵ Furthermore, military planners with the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) “did not coordinate with ORHA on the interagency actions for stability and reconstruction.”²⁶ Even though ORHA would eventually fall under operational control of the CFLCC, early post conflict planning was stove-piped, uncoordinated, and incomplete.

Within days of the fall of the regime, ORHA repositioned from Kuwait to Baghdad. “ORHA was overmatched by the size of the problem it found in Baghdad and probably contributed little in a tangible way to resolving the conflict.”²⁷ Although there are certainly limits to the relevance of lessons learned from World War II, planning for the occupation and reconstruction of Japan and Germany began in 1942, a full two and one-half years before the end of the war. By the time the Axis powers were defeated, the United States was well prepared for a wide variety of eventualities.²⁸ The short-fused ad hoc formation of ORHA and the lack of coordination with the CFLCC, coupled with an increasingly challenging security environment resulted in an organization that was ill prepared and ill equipped to meet the reconstruction challenges that arose after the fall of the regime.

In mid-May just a few weeks after ORHA displaced from Kuwait to Baghdad, Ambassador Paul Bremmer succeeded General Garner, and the organization was restructured and renamed as the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).²⁹ Regardless of the change in leadership, the disparity between authority and resources remained. As the civilian authority in Iraq, the CPA continued to be responsible for rebuilding the country, but the military owned the security assets necessary to support the task. This relationship was even more challenged by the lack of stability in much of the country. Undoubtedly, U.S. Central Command should have maintained authority over all aspects of the occupation, including the commencement of reconstruction, until the security situation allowed for a coordinated transfer of authority. Failure to maintain unity of effort through the principle of unity of command, particularly during a critical period, can be a great source of weakness.³⁰ Finally, the transfer of authority from the military to the CPA should have been based on the attainment of specific identifiable objectives that were pre-planned in detail prior to the execution of hostilities.

BRIDGING THE GAP AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

It took the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 to finally elevate the importance of joint operations to a level necessary to penetrate and break down inter-service rivalries and barriers. Since Goldwater-Nichols, the Armed Forces have made quantum leaps in joint war fighting capability and today fight as a unified team. Recent performance during major combat operations, such as those conducted during DESERT STORM, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and most recently during OIF, clearly demonstrate the maturation of an unmatched joint war fighting capability. However, as we enter the twenty-first century, the emerging security environment requires the development of a new

level of interagency jointness, one that can synchronize the application of all elements of U.S. national power. “Whereas the Goldwater-Nichols Act successfully institutionalized ‘jointness’ among the military services, the need today is for similar structural adaptation ‘beyond jointness’ in civil-military collaboration.”³¹

For two very good reasons it is time for the combatant commanders and their civilian partners to integrate on a new level. First, with transnational and stateless terrorist organizations as a real and primary threat, mission success now depends on more than just dominance on the battlefield.³² Second, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and nation-building operations have become de facto missions for the U.S. military.³³ In many of these increasingly complex and challenging undertakings final victory will require the skills and resources not only of the defense department, but also other USG agencies, partner nations, NGOs, regional and international organizations, and agencies of the host country.³⁴ Today, unless the U.S. military and its interagency partners succeed in reaching a new level of interagency cohesion on their own, it is not inconceivable that Congress could once again mandate such a requirement.

Within the Department of Defense, the requirements to plan, coordinate, and execute multi-agency operations at the operational level rests with the combatant commanders. According to Joint Pub 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, “the geographic combatant commander is the focal point for planning and implementation of regional military strategies that require interagency coordination.”³⁵ Critical to success in the interagency environment is the ability to foster unity of effort despite philosophical and operational differences separating the agencies.³⁶ Additionally, attaining unity of effort can be made difficult by the agencies’ different and conflicting

policies, procedures, and decision making techniques.³⁷ Last, military organizations are generally more comfortable relying on unity of command as the means of ensuring unity of effort, even though this is not possible in interagency and multinational environments due to the lack of formal authority. Despite the challenges created by the diverse cultures, competing interests, and differing priorities of the parent agencies and organizations, achieving unity of effort is without question the combatant commander's responsibility and an essential requirement for mission success.

As currently organized and resourced, the combatant commander's ability to plan, coordinate, and execute multiagency operations at the operational level as called for in joint doctrine is at best a challenge. However, if properly structured, resourced, and supported, there are two prototype initiatives currently being assessed by Joint Forces Command that demonstrate great potential to bridge this interagency gap at the operational level. While not the panacea, they are certainly a step in the right direction and provide a solid foundation upon which to build.

JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP (JIACG)

The first initiative that is specifically being designed to bridge the gap between civilian and military campaign planning and execution efforts is the development and fielding of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG).³⁸ According to Joint Forces Command, the concept is an organizational solution to a recognized interagency void at the operational level. The purpose of the JIACG is to serve as the combatant command's "lead organization for the interagency community providing oversight, facilitation, coordination, and synchronization of agencies' activities within the command."³⁹ To date, real world employment of the JIACG concept in support of the

combatant commanders has focused largely in the intelligence, law enforcement, and counter-terrorism realms. While extremely important given today's threats, the JIACG concept has an equally significant role to play in the political-military and civil-military realms in support of both complex contingency and post conflict operations. Adequately resourced and trained, the JIACG would provide the combatant and joint task force commanders with the expertise and interagency relationships that are absolutely essential to mission success.

However, as currently envisioned by Joint Forces Command, the JIACG prototype falls short of providing the interagency organization required for success at the operational level. As presently proposed, the JIACG would be led by a Senior Executive Service Director and be comprised of a relatively small staff core element.⁴⁰ The maximum number of personnel envisioned in a full spectrum JIACG is twelve, with the capacity to be augmented with virtual or additional members.⁴¹ While a good initial first step, what is ultimately required is not just collaboration and planning support on the combatant commander's staff, but full interagency integration and coordination at the level of execution. It is essential that interagency representation on the combatant commander's staff be robust enough, not only to support the commander's planning requirements, but more importantly, to support the dedicated assignment of interagency personnel down to the Joint Task Force (JTF) level in support of both crisis planning and mission execution.

On the civil-military side, the manning of the JIACG must include, amongst other agencies, permanently assigned representatives from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to facilitate coordination with NGOs and IOs. As the primary U.S. government conduit to these organizations, USAID representatives would be best

positioned to leverage these organizations and to harmonize civil and military operations in complex contingency and post conflict environments. Furthermore, learning how to integrate and coordinate operations with the multitude of nongovernmental and international organizations that are often already on the scene should not be left to on-the-job training. During the U.S. intervention in Haiti in 1994, the U.S. military was involved with over 400 local and nongovernmental organizations on an ad hoc basis during the course of the operation.⁴² Whenever possible, nongovernmental, regional, and international relief organizations should be invited by the combatant commands to participate in training sessions, planning conferences, and scheduled exercises. Increased pre-crisis interaction and cross training with these organizations before involvement in complex contingency and post conflict operations would improve information flow, break down barriers to cooperation, and vastly improve coordination during execution.

USAID representation within the JIACG would be designed to enhance, not supplant, current relationships and channels of communication between and among the combatant commander's staff, Department of State, the Ambassador's country team, and numerous other agencies involved. During execution, USAID representatives embedded in the JTF staff would provide direct support to the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), provide critical liaison with civilian/international organizations engaged in the region, and provide expertise and advice to the JTF Commander on the best way to leverage the capabilities resident in these organizations.

While still embryonic, now is the time for the combatant commanders to fully support and shape the JIACG in support of their requirements. This will require a commitment of resources and necessitate an investment on their part. First, in designing

the JIACG's chain of command, the organization should report directly to the deputy combatant commanders. In addition to providing senior leadership and direction, this would ensure that interagency issues are given the appropriate level of command attention and that JIACG initiatives are fully supported by the combatant commander's staff. Second, the combatant commanders must provide sufficient military personnel to man the JIACG in addition to the interagency representatives in order to support major planning cells, JIACG detachments to JTFs in support of crisis planning and execution, and military liaison officers to critical agencies and organizations operating within their geographic regions.⁴³ Last, other U.S. governmental agencies cannot be expected to provide personnel to fully staff the JIACGs without a mutual commitment on the part of the Department of Defense to provide exchange officers to their staffs along with the necessary funding to support these assignments. Over time, the support and implementation of a robust officer exchange program would result in interagency cross pollination, similar to military inter-service cross pollination that occurs today on joint military headquarters staffs. Just as the individual military services have vastly improved their ability to function jointly by learning about the cultures, capabilities, and limitations of their sister services, over time so would the different agencies within the U.S. government.

STANDING JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS (SJFHQ)

The second initiative that demonstrates great potential to improve performance during complex contingency and post conflict operations is the creation of Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element) SJFHQ (CE) within each of the combatant command staffs. According to Joint Forces Command, "the SJFHQ (CE) exploits new organizational and operational concepts and capabilities to enhance the command's

peacetime planning efforts, accelerate the efficient formation of a JTFHQ, and facilitate crisis response by the joint force.”⁴⁴ The major impetus driving this concept is the desire to be able to rapidly form, deploy, and employ the joint force much earlier in a contingency than traditional ad hoc JTFs.⁴⁵

The major point of discussion here is not to conduct an in-depth assessment of the SJFHQ concept; rather, it is to explore the potential benefits that may be gained by permanently imbedding a JIACG element into the SJFHQ structure. By imbedding a JIACG element as a permanent component of the SJFHQ, in addition to vastly improved reaction to a crisis, the merger would provide the core C2 element with preexisting interagency relationships, enhanced knowledge of the area of operations, and the mechanism to integrate crisis planning and execution efforts across numerous agencies and organizations. This enhanced SJFHQ would provide a transformational planning and execution capability as the core element of a JTF headquarters in support of both complex contingencies and post conflict operations. By training, planning, and exercising together on a routine basis, the enhanced SJFHQ would provide an exceptionally ready core element around which the combatant commander could quickly form and build a JTF. With the option of assigning the deputy combatant commander or another three-star as the commander, the enhanced SJFHQ would be ideally suited to serve as the core headquarters element not only for war fighting missions, but also for post conflict operations, or as a stand alone JTF in support of a complex contingency. During post conflict operations, the “stability force” assigned to the JTF could be a tailored and separate force from the combat force, or they could be one and the same. Regardless of the forces assigned, the enhanced SJFHQ would provide a more capable and ready headquarters in a much shorter period of

time than would the ad hoc formation of traditional JTF headquarters. Last, as an operation progressed, the embedded interagency representation within the enhanced SJFHQ would facilitate a coordinated hand-off from the more military-dominated stages of post conflict or complex contingency operations to the more civilian-dominated stages.

Recent experience in both DESERT STORM and OIF suggest that the less than timely and ad hoc creation of JTFs to plan and oversee post conflict reconstruction, while the norm in the past, is perhaps not the best means of developing a coherent plan and ultimately ensuring mission success. During DESERT STORM it was not until the beginning of the air war in mid-January that Central Command established task forces to plan and execute the post conflict phase of the war, specifically Task Force Freedom and the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force.⁴⁶ “During his discussions at CENTCOM headquarters, [Ambassador] Gnehm detected little interest in preparing for post-liberation in Kuwait. General Schwartzkopf’s staff was understandably preoccupied with executing the offensive operations.”⁴⁷ Over a decade later in the build-up to OIF, the combatant commander’s staff was once again, and perhaps understandably so, fixated on planning and preparing for major combat operations at the expense of post conflict operations. It was not until January 2003, two months before the commencement of the war, that Joint Task Force Four (JTF-4) was established to develop the operational plan for Phase IV. This planning cell of approximately 40 personnel, under the leadership of a one-star Army general, formed the core of an organization that would ultimately become JTF-7, the post conflict force commanded by an Army three-star in Baghdad.⁴⁸

There was little coordination conducted in the two months leading up to the war between JTF-4, the military task force responsible for post conflict planning, and the

civilian-led Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, also responsible for planning post conflict operations, even though both organizations technically belonged to the department of defense. Unquestionably, an adequately manned and trained SJFHQ augmented by permanently assigned interagency representatives would have provided the combatant commander with an ideal core C2 element to plan and eventually execute post conflict operations in Iraq. This civil-military team would have provided the combatant commander a truly integrated and geographically knowledgeable JTF HQ core element, capable of both war fighting and facilitating unity of effort at the level of execution across the many agencies of the U.S. government. As the security environment allowed and post conflict objectives were met, this organization would also be ideally suited to facilitate the smooth transfer of supported/supporting relationships between military and civilian agencies and organizations who would eventually take the lead on reconstruction operations in the later stages.

CONCLUSION

For the military it is also a difficult realization that we will not (likely) fight the Fulda Gap scenario in the 21st Century instead, complex contingency operations are the expectation. This requires a perspective beyond the military, even while continuing to focus on basic war fighting skills. Tough, well trained, disciplined soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines can keep peace, as well as fight and win conventional conflicts.

Defense Is from Mars State Is from Venus

Overcoming the challenges that the U.S. military and its civilian partners are currently facing, and will continue to face as we move into the twenty-first century, is going to require a team effort. Towards this end, it is time for the U.S. military to stop viewing its operations and campaigns strictly through a military lens. Regardless of the military's war fighting prowess, given the complexities of today's threats, there are limits

to what any military force can accomplish in isolation from other elements of national power. In order to expand the transformation beyond the high end of the conflict spectrum, it is necessary for the U.S. military to look beyond just war fighting to wholly define its responsibility to the American public. Completing the transformation across the full spectrum of conflict will require a broader view and will require overcoming cultural resistance and barriers to interagency cooperation and integration, at both the strategic and operational levels. Overcoming the challenges that this country is likely to face in the future will require the effective blending of all elements of national power. The first and a necessary step in this process is the recognition by the U.S. military that “winning the war” is only an intermediate step, and that “winning the peace” will require the seamless and coordinated application of all elements of national power to ensure ultimate victory. As stated by General Anthony Zinni, wars and contingency operations cannot be split into a fighting part followed by another part. Success requires a team effort from the first pitch of the game, to the last out in the ninth inning.

NOTES

¹ James Dobbins and others, “America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq” (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003), xxviii.

² Thomas A. Keaney and Elliot A. Cohen, “Gulf Airpower Survey Summary Report” (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 7.

³ Naval War College, ISR and Information Operations in Iraqi Freedom (U), Appendix A (Unclassified), NWC 1-05, Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 2003, 64.

⁴ Michael Knights, “Iraqi Freedom Displays Transformation of U.S. Air Power,” Janes Intelligence Review (1 May 2003): 1. <<http://www4.janes.com>> [18 April 2005]

⁵ Paul Wolfowitz, “Statement,” U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Hearing on U.S. Military Presence in Iraq: Implications for Global Defense Posture, 18 June 2003, 6. <http://www.usembassy.it/file_2003_06/alia/A3061810.htm> [4 April 2005]

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., 5.

⁸ Presidential Decision Directive 56, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” May 1997, 1. <<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm>> [30 March 2005]

⁹ Sunil B. Desai, “Solving the Interagency Puzzle,” Policy Review no. 129 (February/March 2005): 57.

¹⁰ Presidential Decision Directive 56, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” May 1997, 4. <<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm>> [30 March 2005]

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., 2.

¹⁴ National Security Presidential Directives, “Organization of the National Security Council System,” 13 February 2001, 2. <<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm>> [30 March 2005]

¹⁵ Ibid., 4.

¹⁶ Milan Vego, Operational Warfare, NWC 1004, Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 2000, 421.

¹⁷ Paul F. Dicker, “Effectiveness of Stability Operations During the Initial Implementation of the Transition Phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership, 2004, 2.

¹⁸ Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Iraq Without a Plan,” Policy Review no.128 (December 2004/January 2005): 2. <<http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/ohanlon/20050101.htm>> [25 March 2005]

¹⁹ The author conducted interviews with two Battalion level commanders who led units during OIF-1. Based on their experience and from their perspective, both Commanders felt that Phase IV planning was lacking. While not involved in higher level planning, at the tactical level there was little guidance regarding Security and Stability Operations (Phase IV) until after the fall of the regime.

²⁰ Nadia Schadlow, "War and the Art of Governance," Parameters 33, no. 3 (2003): 85.

²¹ Janet A. McDonnell, "After Desert Storm: The U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait" (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), 47-48.

²² Vego, 414.

²³ Schadlow, 89.

²⁴ Francis Fukuyama, "Nation Building 101," The Atlantic Monthly 293, no.1 (January/February 2004): 159.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Dicker, 7.

²⁷ John Ballard, "Finishing the Job: A Historical Appreciation for Conflict Termination," NWC 4012, Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 2003, 11.

²⁸ Ray S. Jennings, "The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq" (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 27.

²⁹ Mark Yanaway, "Iraq Experience Project: Executive Summary," interview by Bernie Engel (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 14 July 2004). <<http://www.usip.org/library/oh/sops/iraq/gov/yanaway.pdf>> [10 May 2005]

³⁰ Vego, 187.

³¹ Michael J. Dziedzic, "Peace Operations: Political-Military Coordination," in The Global Century: Globalization and National Security, ed. Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2001), 322.

³² Christopher Briem, "Joint Is Dead, What Is Next?" Proceedings 130, no. 1 (January 2004): 56.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-08, (Washington, D.C.: 9 October 1996), v.

³⁵ Ibid., vii.

³⁶ Ibid., v.

³⁷ Ibid., vi.

³⁸ United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG): A Prototyping Effort, U.S. Joint Forces Command Fact Sheet, (January 2005), 2.

³⁹ United States Joint Forces Command, Doctrinal Implications of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), The Joint War Fighting Center Doctrine Series, Pamphlet 6, (27 June 2004), 5.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 7.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Briem, 56.

⁴³ Matthew F. Bogdanos, "Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step," Joint Force Quarterly 37 (2005): 17.

⁴⁴ United States Joint Forces Command, Doctrinal Implications of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), The Joint War Fighting Center Doctrine Series, Pamphlet 6, (27 June 2004), 17.

⁴⁵ Gene Myers, "Concepts to Future Doctrine," A Common Perspective, U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint War Fighting Center Doctrine Group's Newsletter 10, no. 1 (April 2002), 8.

⁴⁶ McDonnell, 43.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 45.

⁴⁸ Michael Braun, "Standing Joint Task Forces: The Need to 'Man as We Plan,'" Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, (2004), 9.

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