Toward a Comprehensive INFOSEC Certification Methodology
Abstract
Accreditors want to know what vulnerabilities will exist if they decide to turn on a system. TCSEC evaluations address products, not systems. Not only the hardware and software of a system are of concern; the accreditor needs to view these components in relation to the environment in which they operate and in relation to the system's mission and the threats to it. This paper proposes an informal but comprehensive certification approach that can provide the accreditor with the necessary information. First, we discuss the identification of assumptions and assertions that reflect system INFOSEC requirements. Second, we propose the definition of an assurance strategy to integrate security engineering and system engineering. The assurance strategy initially documents the set of assumptions and assertions derived from the requirements. It is elaborated and refined throughout the development, yielding the assurance argument, delivered with the system, which provides the primary technical basis for the certification decision. With the assurance strategy in place, certification of the trusted system can become an audit of the development process.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 23, 1993
- Accession Number
- ADA463939
Entities
People
- Carl E. Landwehr
- Charles N. Payne
- Judith N. Froscher
Organizations
- United States Naval Research Laboratory