Strategic Lift and the Operational Commander: It's About Time
Abstract
Phasing combat capability into a theater or across multiple theaters and then sustaining it has been central to a Combatant Commander's operational planning for decades. United States and coalition forces have been experiencing an increasing pace of operations throughout the post Cold War era, particularly as the Long War progresses. Strategic Lift has played a central role in the Combatant Commander's planning process in setting the stage for initial and sustained success. This paper addresses the role of Strategic Lift and whether it is adequate to ensure the success of Combatant Commanders both today and in the future. Operation Desert Storm is used as a baseline case study from which to evaluate Strategic Lift and claims that it was inadequate in the early 1990's. Operation Iraqi Freedom is then used to contrast Strategic Lift capability to determine if a Strategic Lift shortfall still exists. The overarching theme throughout is that Strategic Lift modernization and recapitalization must compete for scarce resources, therefore if a shortfall exists, the Combatant Commander must make the most effective use of assets available. To this end, the Combatant Commander's risk assessment will depend largely on time. Recommendations to improve Strategic Lift are: alternatives for addressing strategic tanker shortfalls, logistics visibility and unit phasing options, logistics war-gaming and reliance on Effects Based Operations to mitigate potential risk.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 16, 2006
- Accession Number
- ADA463988
Entities
People
- Mark R. Wise
Organizations
- Naval War College