PAKISTAN EDUCATION SYSTEMS AND THE RADICAL
ISLAMIC JIHADIST IDEOLOGY

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14. ABSTRACT

This thesis addresses the overarching question of whether or not Pakistan's education system significantly affects the spread of the jihadist ideology. The thesis continues to address how to affect the spread of the jihadist ideology, and how U.S. national policy can successfully moderate the spread through policy initiatives. The thesis addresses these issues by first determining whether credible links exist between education in Pakistan and the spread of radical Islamic jihadism. This analysis includes an examination of religious educational systems (*madrassas*)--both moderate and radical--and both public and private sector educational institutions. Next, the analysis determines if U.S. national policy can affect the propagation of the jihadist ideology through policy initiatives. Finally, the thesis discerns what feasible, acceptable and suitable ways exist to influence the spread of this ideology through US policy initiatives. This thesis demonstrated that the overall quality and availability of education in Pakistan is poor. The deteriorating education system has radicalized many young people and failed to prepare them to function in a global capacity. This thesis concludes by emphasizing that if US policy initiatives focus counterterrorism efforts on mitigating the vulnerabilities of educational systems governed by the Islamic state of Pakistan--which this thesis has demonstrated are linked to the propagation of the jihadist ideology--the breeding grounds for radical jihadism will prove far less fertile, and Islamic terrorism will prove far-less threatening.

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ABSTRACT

PAKISTAN EDUCATION SYSTEMS AND THE RADICAL ISLAMIC JIHADIST IDEOLOGY by MAJ Rebecca S. Ray, 99 pages.

This thesis addresses the overarching question of whether or not Pakistan's education system significantly affects the spread of the jihadist ideology. The thesis continues to address how to affect the spread of the jihadist ideology, and how U.S. national policy can successfully moderate the spread through policy initiatives. The thesis addresses these issues by first determining whether credible links exist between education in Pakistan and the spread of radical Islamic jihadism. This analysis includes an examination of religious educational systems (*madrassas*)--both moderate and radical-- and both public and private sector educational institutions. Next, the analysis determines if U.S. national policy can affect the propagation of the jihadist ideology through policy initiatives. Finally, the thesis discerns what feasible, acceptable and suitable ways exist to influence the spread of this ideology through US policy initiatives.

This thesis demonstrated that the overall quality and availability of education in Pakistan is poor. The deteriorating education system has radicalized many young people and failed to prepare them to function in a global capacity. This thesis concludes by emphasizing that if US policy initiatives focus counterterrorism efforts on mitigating the vulnerabilities of educational systems governed by the Islamic state of Pakistan--which this thesis has demonstrated are linked to the propagation of the jihadist ideology--the breeding grounds for radical jihadism will prove far less fertile, and Islamic terrorism will prove far less threatening.

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INTRODUCTION

The events of 11 September 2001 imposed a stark sense of vulnerability on the

United States and the international community. A lack of understanding has exacerbated

feelings of helplessness as the nation faces the threat of Islamic extremism: an enemy

with uncompromising objectives, unconventional tactics, and an arsenal of unprecedented

weaponry. The extremist, as defined by the *National Military Strategic Plan for the War*

on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT), is one who both opposes individual freedoms and societies

and willingly resorts to murder to advance his ideology. Extremists are

> motivated by extremist ideologies antagonistic to freedom, tolerance, and
> moderation. . . . [T]hey use terrorism--the purposeful targeting of ordinary people-
> -to produce fear to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of
> political, religious, or ideological goals. . . . [T]hey use terrorism to impede and
> undermine political progress, economic prosperity, the security and stability of the
> international state system, and the future of civil society.[1]

The term "radical jihadist," often used synonymously with extremist, further

distinguishes an enemy who believes in the creation of an Islamic utopia--which

necessitates the destruction of the secular world--and strives to supplant the present

international system, using as violent means as necessary, with a pan-Islamic caliphate

that conforms to the radical jihadist ideology.[2] This ideology promotes a brand of Islam

which emphasizes jihad against non-Muslims and defies US national interests; it is an

ideology that some analysts believe national efforts must successfully impede in its

developmental stages in order to be defeated.

Terrorist events akin to the Khobar Towers, the USS *Cole*, and the Twin Towers

of 9/11 demonstrate that radical Islamic jihadism is a viable alternative to engaging the

West in open combat--which the jihadists are presently unable and ill-equipped to do. These experiences have prompted transnational efforts, established as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) by the United States, to mitigate this ideological threat--aimed at safeguarding national interests and buttressing national security initiatives. The present challenge, however, remains stalled at determining how best to defeat this illusive threat.

The *NMSP-WOT* asserts that in order to wage a more effective war against the enemy, one must first understand the enemy's center(s) of gravity; once it is identified, one is better prepared to focus counterterrorism efforts more effectively.[3] By focusing counterterrorism efforts on Pakistan's educational systems--which the author purports are indirectly linked to the propagation of the jihadist ideology--the breeding grounds for radical jihadism would prove far less fertile, and Islamic terrorism would prove far less threatening. The GWOT, however, has yet to direct appropriate attention on the role of education in influencing or mitigating the propagation of the jihadist ideology.

<u>Research Question</u>

The overarching question is whether or not Pakistan's education system significantly affects the spread of the jihadist ideology. If it does, the analysis must determine how it affects this spread, and how US national policy can successfully moderate the spread through policy initiatives.

The first goal is to determine whether credible links exist between education in Pakistan and the spread of radical Islamic jihadism. The author must examine religious educational systems (*madrassas)*--both moderate and radical--and both public and private sector educational institutions. Next, the analysis must determine if U.S. national policy can affect the propagation of the jihadist ideology through policy initiatives. Finally, the

author must discern what feasible, acceptable and suitable ways exist to influence the spread of this ideology through US policy initiatives.

<u>Scope</u>

For the purposes of analysis, the scope of this thesis will focus specifically on the educational systems existing in Pakistan, as they present a significant challenge to US efforts in the GWOT. Although US-Pakistani joint counterterrorism efforts have been extensive, jihadist-linked threats still exist. Consider the following:

Subsequent to the 7 July 2005 London subway bombing, President Musharraf addressed the nation to condemn terrorism. He called for a "Jihad against extremism, announcing a crackdown on banned organizations, hate materials, and incitement by religious leaders; the expulsion of foreign madrassa students; and new registration and financial disclosure requirements on madrassas."[4] The Pakistani government and religious leaders continue to negotiate these measures.

After the 8 October 2005 earthquake that devastated Pakistan, al-Qaida-linked relief organizations took advantage of the opportunity to provide aid in the affected areas. Although the government of Pakistan has promised to shut down known terrorist relief camps, several of the terrorist-linked groups raised funds and reaped the public relations benefits from their provision of support.

Terrorist safe havens continue to provide a serious threat to Pakistan and US counterterrorism efforts. Denying terrorists safe havens is central to US counterterrorism strategy and core to UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which "targets terrorists' ability to move across international borders and find safe haven, to solicit and move

funds, and to acquire weapons. It also calls on states that do not have laws criminalizing terrorist activity and support to enact such laws."[5]

Despite the many successes of US-Pakistani joint initiatives, to include cooperative security efforts and many long-term training projects, jihadist-linked threats continue to challenge Pakistani education systems and US interests.

<u>Definitions and Key Terms</u>

To facilitate clear understanding, this section identifies and delineates key terms in the context in which they are used throughout this thesis. The definitions used are intended to preclude bias, endorse collective understanding, and inform misperceptions. They are not intended for debate, but rather provided for use and interpretation of this study only.

The *NMSP-WOT* defines terrorism as "the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological. The term "terrorist" refers to those who conduct terrorist acts."[6] Bruce Hoffman, renowned author of *Inside Terrorism*, combined over 100 definitions of terrorism from international and agency sources and defined the term as the "deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in pursuit of political change."[7] Both definitions are suitable and interchangeable for the purposes of this thesis.

The term "ideology" is basically a set of beliefs or principles that underlie one's actions in a political, economic or social system. Mr. John Cary, US Army Command and General Staff College instructor, elaborated by assessing the term in three components.[8]

Part one includes the "ideal," goal or end state one seeks to achieve. It may be simple, complex, tangible, intangible, or any mixture thereof. The second component of an ideology includes the present, or "less-than-ideal state of affairs . . . which must be accompanied by an explanation of how the present came to be."[9] It identifies who or what is responsible for the present state of affairs, and has a significant impact on the third component: how to change the less-than-ideal present to approach the ideal future. This component composes the ways and means or the "individual or group methods and actions . . . often directed at the 'cause of the perceived problem'."[10] This model is helpful in examining Islamist ideologies, which this thesis later addresses. In this vein, understanding how the second component developed and discerning the potential ways and means employed in the third, or "actions" component, are the most significant aspects of this model.

Another term of importance in this study is "Islamic extremist." According to the *NMSP-WOT,* the term "extremist" describes: "those who (1) oppose--in principle and practice--the right of people to choose how to live and how to organize their societies [the Islamic extremist believes God alone is the sovereign who tells man how to organize and live] and (2) support the murder of ordinary people to advance extremist political purposes." [11] Generally, Islamic extremists have direct links to terrorism. Many use this term synonymously with "radical fundamentalist," but it should not be confused with the stand-alone term, "fundamentalist," which, in its purely scriptural form, defines a person whose ideology embraces the literal interpretation of Islamic scriptures, asserts supremacy of religious law, maintains a situational-contingent propensity for violence,

and sustains generally "indirect" links to terrorism.[12] For the purposes of this thesis, the author will use the term "Islamic extremist" interchangeably with "radical jihadist."

More commonly used terms of note are "jihad," and "radical jihadist." People often and widely misunderstand and misuse these terms. Clarification of these terms is critical as they apply to this thesis. John Esposito, a leading Islamic scholar and author of *Islam: The Straight Path*, described jihad (to strive or struggle) in its most general sense as "the obligation incumbent on all Muslims, as individuals and as a community, to exert themselves to realize God's will, to lead virtuous lives and extend the Islamic community through preaching, education, and so on."[13] On the other hand, the term "radical jihadist"--often used interchangeably with "extremist"--further distinguishes an individual who believes in the creation of an Islamic utopia which necessitates the destruction of secular powers. The radical jihadist strives to supplant the present international system, using as violent means as necessary, with a pan-Islamic caliphate that conforms to the radical jihadist ideology.[14] This ideology promotes religiously sanctioned warfare against both non-Muslims and Muslim "apostates," to achieve its ends. This ideology is the principal target of the GWOT.

Lastly, the term "*madrassa*," in its most general form and for the purposes of this thesis, follows the *NMSP-WOT* definition of "a building or group of buildings used for teaching Islamic theology and religious law, typically including a mosque."[15] Esposito, in *Islam, the Straight Path*, explained that, in most Muslim countries, both governments and students favor the more modern secular educational institutions over the traditional *madrassas*.[16] They predominately view the *madrassas* as seminaries whose diplomas

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prove more limited and less useful. Thus, they attract fewer talented students (who favor training for modern jobs), and draw less state support for funding.

As stated, the goal of this thesis is to determine whether or not educational systems in Pakistan influence the spread of the radical Islamic jihadist ideology. If they do, the author must question how, and then determine how US national policy can affect this propagation through policy initiatives. The first goal is to question whether links exist between educational systems and the spread of the jihadist ideology. The author must examine Islamic religious educational systems (*madrassas),* and both public and private sector educational systems in Pakistan. From there, the thesis must determine how national policy can affect the propagation of the jihadist ideology; and then discern what feasible, acceptable and suitable ways exist to mitigate the spread of the ideology through policy initiatives.

The following chapter includes a review of literature relevant to the research questions. Chapter 3 outlines the research methodologies, and describes any adaptations made to those methods for the purposes of analysis. Chapter 4 includes analysis and interpretation of the evidence generated by the methodologies. Chapter 5 provides conclusions and recommendations based on the discoveries of the research.

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[1]Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT)* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 February 2006), 3-4 (hereafter cited as *NMSP-WOT*).

[2]Angel M. Rabasa, *The Muslim World after 9/11* (Arlington, VA: RAND Corp., 2004), 8.

[3]*NMSP-WOT*, 14.

[4]Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, *Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism* [document on-line]; available from http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64345.htm; Internet, accessed 10 October 2006.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid., 37.

[7]Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 43.

[8]John Cary, "Components of an Ideology" (CGSC Middle East Strategic Study Course Material, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, June 2006).

[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid.

[11]*NMSP-WOT*, 35.

[12]Rabasa, 7-9.

[13]John L Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 34.

[14]Rabasa, 8.

[15]*NMSP-WOT*, 35.

[16]Esposito, *Islam*, 232.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

There is a significant amount of information available on the subject of terrorism, most notably since the events of 11 September 2001. Likewise, there is abundant material examining the practice of Islam. In addition, the preliminary literature review revealed a moderate amount of information examining US policy initiatives in the GWOT. There are three relevant areas of information addressed in the literature review: the first is the resurgence of Islam, which includes discussion on the pillars, paths and practice of Islam; the second is twenty-first century terrorism, which examines the Islamic jihadist threat and the war on terrorism; the third area explores Islamic education, the GWOT and strategy.

The Resurgence of Islam

The Oxford History of Islam is an excellent resource that provided comprehensive insight on Islamic history, practice, philosophy, and law.[1] Edited by John Esposito, a leading Islamic scholar and former Director of the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University, *The Oxford History of Islam* is one of many relevant publications focused on enhancing the public's understanding of the Muslim world. Other works by Esposito that reflect his lifetime study of Islam provided excellent secondary-source reference material. They include, but are not limited to, *Islam: The Straight Path,* and *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality*. In addition to publications, preliminary interviews with analysts and professors suggested subject-matter experts are available for consultation.

John L. Esposito, in *Islam: The Straight Path*, explained that from the eighteenth century to present, Islamic revival and reform themes have dominated Islam. He attributed the revival to Islam's ability to provide a reason for the social and political decline Muslim communities experienced; it was the Muslim's response to challenges of their faith. Esposito asserts "Islam proved a potent force in both the response to internal decline and the reaction to European imperialism. Islamic modernists reinterpreted Islamic sources to obtain new answers and to assimilate some Western ideas and institutions. . . . Its emphasis on Islam as a progressive, dynamic, rational religion generated a sense of pride, identity, and conviction that Islam was relevant to modern life."[2] Some Muslims, however, opposed the modernist adaptation of Islam, seeking instead a self-reliant, autonomous Islamic social order. This opposition between modernists and traditionalists (fundamentalists) continues to progress.

Samuel P. Huntington, in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, provided an in-depth analysis that addressed the present conflict occurring among differing civilizations. He asserted that the resurgence of Islam "is the latest phase in the adjustment of Islamic civilization to the West, an effort to find the "solution" not in Western ideologies but in Islam."[3] He contended that although the resurgence represents an acknowledgment of modernity, the acceptance of the theme of modernity imposes on the Muslim the need to reject Western culture by recommitting to Islam as a guide to modern living. The goal of the Muslim, according to Huntington, is purportedly to modernize, but not Westernize. This movement is characterized as a "broad intellectual, cultural, social, and political movement prevalent throughout the Islamic world."[4] This movement, identified as generally mainstream and pervasive rather than extremist or

isolated, has affected Muslims globally and in almost all aspects of Muslim societies and politics.

The RAND Corporation provided a detailed examination of factors influencing the escalation of radical fundamentalism or jihadism as a component of the broader resurgence movement in its detailed study, *The Muslim World after 9/11*. These factors included economic stagnation and government failure to provide services, pervasive corruption and a lack of liberties, failure of early educational systems to teach tolerance, technological advances (e.g., mass media), tribalism, and radical recruitment methods.[5] The study explained that with an absence of conduits for freedom of expression, voices of dissent are oftentimes restricted to mosques, where radical fundamentalists are often found in control.

<div align="center">Pillars</div>

Although the practice of Islam is richly diverse, author John Esposito provided important insight on the core principles of the Muslim faith and the practice of Islam. Esposito delineated the five core or compulsory practices that all Muslims must adhere to, known as the *Five Pillars of Islam*.[6] The first is the *Profession of Faith*, whereby Muslims acknowledge that there is only one God--Allah--and that His messenger is Muhammad. This profession--given each day to affirm Islam's absolute faith in *tawhid* (the oneness of God and key to Islam's separateness from Christianity)--reminds the faithful that polytheism is not only sinful, but unforgivable: "God does not forgive anyone for associating something with Him, while He does forgive whomever He wishes to for anything else. Anyone who gives God associates [partners] has invented an awful sin (4:48)."[7] The second part of the *Profession of Faith* includes acknowledging

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Muhammad as the messenger of God, the last prophet (or "seal" of the earlier Jewish prophets, including Jesus), and the model for Muslims and their community.

The second pillar is "Prayer." Five times per day--daybreak, noon, midafternoon, sunset, and evening (as established by Muhammad)--Muslims are called to prayer. This practice may be done individually or in a group but must be performed while facing Mecca, the center of Islam. Esposito explained:

> The prayers themselves consist of two to four prostrations, depending on the time of day. Each act of worship begins with the declaration, "God is most great," and consists of bows, prostrations, and the recitation of fixed prayers that include the opening verse of the Quran (the *Fatihah*) and other passages from the Quran:
> "In the name of God, the Merciful and Compassionate. Praise be to God, Lord of the Universe, the Merciful and Compassionate. Ruler on the Day of Judgment. You do we worship and call upon for help. Guide us along the Straight Path, the road of those whom You have favored, those with whom You are not angry, who are not lost (1:1-7)."[8]

The intent of the recitations is to reinforce the Muslims' sense of belonging to a worldwide community of believers and as a constant reminder of their submission to God's will and direction.

The third pillar, *Almsgiving*, or *zakat*, is also a practice that reinforces a collective identity and obligation. "The Quran (9:60) and Islamic law stipulate that alms are to be used to support the poor, orphans, and widows, to free slaves and debtors, and to assist in the spread of Islam."[9] The collection and redistribution of alms in Islamic polities was traditionally a government responsibility, but in later years it was left to the individual to manage. More recently, many governments--to include Pakistan, the Sudan, and Libya-- have reasserted a governmental right to impose, collect, and distribute the *zakat* tax.

The *Fast of Ramadan*, identified as the fourth pillar, necessitates an annual, month-long fast--from dawn to sunset--for all adult, healthy Muslims, during the month

of Ramadan. It requires total abstinence from food, drink, and sexual activity. It is a time for "reflection and spiritual discipline, for expressing gratitude for God's guidance and atoning for past sins, for awareness of human frailty and dependence on God, as well as for remembering and responding to the needs of the poor and hungry. . . . The month of Ramadan comes to an end with a great celebration that lasts for three days." [10]

The fifth and final pillar is *Pilgrimage to Mecca* (the *Hajj*), which follows Ramadan by approximately two months, and remains obligatory for every Muslim to perform, at least once in his or her lifetime, if physically and financially able. Esposito explains that the rituals and compulsory measures comprising the pilgrimage "underscore the unity and equality of all believers as well as the total attention and devotion required."[11]

Important to note is the unofficial sixth pillar of Islam: "The Struggle" (jihad). Oftentimes misunderstood and misused, jihad, in its most general sense, suggests only an obligation of Muslims, "as individuals and as a community, to exert themselves to realize God's will, to lead virtuous lives and extend the Islamic community."[12] Jihad neither intends for nor implies "holy war," or aggressive warfare, as exemplified by the radical Islamic extremists of today. Anne Oliver and Paul Steinberg, coauthors of *The Road to Martyrs' Square*, explained the divergent interpretations of jihad as "the greater jihad," implying an internal or spiritual struggle, and "the lesser jihad," implying holy war or "fighting by the sword."[13]

Paths and Practice: Liberal, Moderate, Radical, and Others

The *Muslim World after 9/11* provided detailed and salient information concerning the Muslim world and practice of Islam. Its research addressed the diversity

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of Muslim religious interpretation and provides intelligible insight that is pertinent to this thesis.[14] RAND's research substantiated the importance of understanding the heterogeneous nature that characterizes Muslims worldwide. Although there are a number of references providing typologies to characterize the range of Muslim tendencies or orientations, this thesis will utilize the RAND study.

RAND explained that Islam, practiced by Muslims across the globe, is the world's second largest religion and comprises approximately one-fifth of the world's population. The Muslim population, as mentioned earlier, has significantly differing views on the practice of Islam, as well as differing concepts on political and social orientation. RAND provided defining characteristics of these orientations according to a range of Muslim tendencies from "liberal secularist" to "radical fundamentalist." [15] The term "range" includes "religious adherence and interpretation, both in the religious sphere and in the intersection of religion and politics. . . . [T]he critical distinction is between those with political goals--also referred to as Islamists--who use Islam to advance their quest for political power, and those whose emphasis is on religious observance and personal devotion."[16] The liberal secularist ideology or tendency supports liberal democratic or social democratic values as core to "civil religion." Liberal secularists usually oppose both terrorism and violence. The modernist ideology supports a return to core Islamic values that are consistent with the modern world; most Muslim modernists also oppose terrorism and violence. The traditionalist ideology seeks to fuse Islamic beliefs and local traditions; like the modernists, most oppose terrorism and violence. The scriptural fundamentalist ideology embraces a literal interpretation of Islamic scriptures. Followers have generally indirect links to terrorism, but links exist at several levels. Radical

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fundamentalists (also known as Islamic extremists or radical jihadist*s*) observe the literal interpretation of Islamic scripture, but manipulate it to their cause--to include observing the obligation of jihad in its most radical sense.

Generally, what is common to those Muslims who practice religious moderation is a more pronounced interest in democracy and a less pronounced propensity for violence. On the opposite end are the radical fundamentalists whose tendencies are ideologically radical, antidemocratic and violent. The RAND study demonstrated that the "main difference between the two spectra is that some fundamentalist groups, while ideologically radical, might nevertheless be nonviolent in their methods."[17] The range from liberal secularist to radical fundamentalist underscores the divergence of views in the practice of Islam, as well as the variance of concepts in political and social orientation.

<u>Twenty-first Century Terrorism: Welcome to the Information Age</u>

The Department of State (DoS) and numerous other US government agencies afford a generous assortment of credibly-resourced information and documentation relating to the transnational state of terrorism. Statistical information on terrorist attacks, regional overviews, background information on terrorist groups, and international policy initiatives comprise these resources. They present a useful, comprehensive, and global perspective of terrorism that is essential to establishing the relevance of this thesis.

Reviews of United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Congressional Research Service (CRS) documents indicate an ample number of unclassified reports, briefs, and summaries that provide pertinent information on the myriad aspects of terrorism relevant to this thesis. These documents include terrorism-

related initiatives, programs, policies, and procedures. There is also an array of literature in the form of professional journals and studies that cover all aspects of terrorism and Islamic extremism.

The Threat

> There are two central innovations in the ideology that allow--even demand--the destruction of the United States and the murder of thousands of innocents: an aberrant definition of *tawhid* [there is only one God and he has no partners], and a concentration on violence as the core of their religion. . . . [T]he extremists give *tawhid* political implications and use it to justify all their violent acts . . . democracy, liberalism, human rights, personal freedom, international law, and international institutions are illegal, illegitimate, and sinful.[18]

Twenty-first century terrorism is a "transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals--and their state and non-state supporters--which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends."[19] An example, the Al Qaida Associated Movement--comprised of al Qaida and affiliated jihadist*s*--is arguably the most dangerous present manifestation of such extremism. Although certain other violent extremist groups also pose a serious and continuing threat, Islamic jihadist*s*, who adhere to the radical jihadist ideology, pose the most serious threat to national security and stability world-wide.

Terrorism today is distinguishable from that of the past by a new structure, a new type of personnel, and a new attitude towards violence.[20] The information revolution has prompted a more flattened, networked approach to replace the old hierarchical one. This approach allows for a group of entities to act autonomously while remaining linked by advanced communications. The terrorist organization, therefore, has the advantage of

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more flexibility and adaptability. It also has the advantage of increased resiliency: if one or several of its entities are destroyed, others are still able to carry on.

Also characteristic is the terrorist movement towards an increased willingness to inflict mass casualties. Analysts explain this trend by addressing various factors, which include: "the diffusion of lethal technologies; the erosion of taboos against the use of weapons of mass destruction; the absence of restraint on amateur terrorists who, having no organization or sponsor to protect, see no reason to limit extreme violence that might generate a backlash."[21] There is a continuing need of terrorists to find innovative ways to attract attention and impose their will. Also emphasized is the importance of religion. As described in the *NMSP-WOT*, the terrorist threat is inextricably linked to religion. Many argue that religiously motivated terrorists are more likely to conduct attacks of mass casualty because, unlike politically motivated terrorists, they are not concerned or fearful that use of excessive violence will offend some citizenry, because of its religious sanction. Also unlike those politically motivated is the intent to simply destroy those with disparate beliefs rather than to pressure or persuade their opponent into some desired action. One could argue that the contemporary jihadist threat proves an even more lethal threat, as motivations are both political and religious--to the radical jihadist they are one in the same.

As indicated by the Joint Staff Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, the phenomenon of violent Islamic extremism is not a new one, nor did it begin on 9/11.[22] Religiously inspired violence is also not exclusively related to the Islamic faith. Rather, all faiths have resorted to violent extremism to promote and expand personal ideologies and causes for centuries. The growing culture of jihadism in the Muslim world--one that

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is being countered and resisted by many moderate Muslims as well as non-Muslims worldwide--is founded on an Islamic ideology that views and promulgates violent and irregular tactics as the primary application of the Quranic concept of jihad. One must understand the primacy of violent jihad as a central component of jihadism.

One must also understand the divergent views that exist among radical jihadist*s* concerning the prioritization of Islam's enemy. This is summarized in the concept of the "greater unbelief" versus the "lesser unbelief," or "the near enemy" versus "the far enemy."[23] The "greater unbelief" or "near enemy" is that which the jihadist believes poses the most threat to Islam. Some jihadist*s* believe that targeting and killing other Muslims, whose actions do not adhere to their jihadist version of Islam, is their first priority--their near enemy. Their far enemy is of secondary importance and may include targets such as the United States or other Western threats. Other radical jihadist*s*, such as Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaida in general, believe that targeting and destroying the United States and the West is of primary importance; that all energy should first focus the complete destruction of this threat before any other. Others believe that the "agent rulers," or those that rule in Muslim societies but not by Islamic law, are the worst of the near enemies because "not only do they refuse to follow God's laws themselves, but they also prevent other Muslims from doing the same."[24]

Violent extremism is a clear and present threat to global security and stability. However, the extremist is unlikely to ever fight and win a military battle against the United States; rather, he will resort to asymmetric tactics to prevail. What is less clear, however, is how US strategy can best enable the GWOT to effectively oppose the unconventional tactics the enemy presently leverages to defeat and deter the GWOT.

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The War on Terrorism

The *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terror (NMSP-WOT)* provides a plan to address the nation's fight against terrorism and complements *National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS)* initiatives in GWOT. It strives to "defeat violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society" and "create a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them."[25] In order to meet the stated goals, the strategy must realize the following stated objectives: denying terrorists' resources, enabling partner nations, denying or eliminating weapons of mass destruction, defeating terrorists, countering terrorist support, and countering ideological support.[26]

Dr. Graeme P. Heard, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) director of the Countering the Ideological Support for Terrorism (CIST) initiative, maintained that current counterterrorism approaches are weak and in dire need of an overhaul.[27] He asserted that there are numerous limitations inherent in the present Department of Defense (DoD) approach. First, GWOT efforts are tactically centered, rather than strategically--they stress tactical psychological operations, information warfare, and humanitarian relief. Furthermore, DoD attacks the enemy's operational structure, but because the enemy is adaptable and versatile, ideological support is not reduced. Specifically, DoD tactics attack the enemy's structure rather than undermine the core ideology. Third, the strategy inherent in DoD counterterrorism efforts may actually undermine the United States government's overall CIST strategy. Finally, *NMSP-WOT* initiatives coming before DoS CIST initiatives are in essence "wagging the dog." He advises that the Secretary of Defense's 2003 inquiry remains valid today: "Are we

capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the *madrassas* and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?" The answer appears to be no.

The war on terror is one that is protracted, global, and irregular. Often referred to as "the long war," one may expect it to last at least 10-20 years into the future. The enemy in this war is composed of a federated network of violent Islamists that employ terrorism to advance their ideology and cause; they are committed, prepared to fight to the death, and globally driven. Although the United States has redirected strategic efforts to better mitigate the terrorist threat and address current capability gaps, the need continues for the reorientation of national efforts. Carl Von Clausewitz said the following regarding the starting point to defeat an enemy: "One must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. This is the point against which all our energies should be directed."[28] His assertion remains valid today.

As mentioned earlier, the *NMSP-WOT* asserts that in order to wage a more effective war against the enemy, one must first understand the enemy's center(s) of gravity; once identified, one is better prepared to focus counterterrorism efforts more effectively.[29] The *NMSP-WOT*, along with other resources, have identified the jihadist ideology as the enemy's strategic COG.[30] The GWOT, however, has yet to direct sufficient attention towards the role education plays in affecting the jihadist movement; specifically, the role of education in affecting the spread of the radical Islamic jihadist ideology.

Islamic Education, GWOT and Strategy

The preliminary literature review confirmed that a moderate amount of information exists on US policy initiatives affecting Islamic societies. Research material addressing the role of education in mitigating the jihadist ideology in these societies was selective and controversial in nature. The significant discord that appeared to exist merited further examination. Research confirmed that both moderate and extremist curricula existed in the educational systems of more than one Islamic society. Disparate assessments, however, left one to question resource bias and statistical veracity. Research identified several subject matter experts, to include: John Esposito, Georgetown University professor; Ahmed Rashid, journalist for *The Far Eastern Economic Review*; and Michael Hudson, Georgetown's Center for Contemporary Arab Studies. Subject matter experts from the United States Army Command and General Staff College proved relevant, credible, and informed resources.

Andrew Coulson, author and senior fellow in education policy at the Mackinac Center for Public Policy, asserted: "To be effective, any long-term strategy for fighting international terrorism must abate the indoctrination taking place in thousands of militant schools."[31] He contended that: "The schools themselves do not generally provide training in physical combat, the use of firearms, or military tactics. . . . [T]hey arm their students with an ideology that justifies and endorses violence against all who fall short of the Islamist ideal." [32] Furthermore, he argued that the assumption that government schools refrain from promoting intolerance is specious: they have historically grown progressively more intolerant over time. Similarly, the Islamabad-based Sustainable Development Policy Institute, in its 2003 report entitled: "The Subtle Subversion: The

State of Curricula and Textbooks in Pakistan," alleged the following: "*Madrassa*s are not the only institutions breeding hate, intolerance, a distorted worldview, etc. The educational material in the government run schools do much more than *madrassa*s. The textbooks tell lies, create hate, incite for *jehad* [*sic*] and *shalhadat* [martyrdom in the name of Allah], and much more."[33] Allegedly, both the curriculum and the textbooks of government schools also perpetuate the radical fundamentalist ideological view.

Critics of this view, however, assert that Islamic educational institutions have been targeted erroneously as key catalysts for the extremist ideology and especially as cultivators of the jihadist threat and that they should not be a national security concern. Peter Bergen and Swati Panndey of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology argued, "Madrassas generally cannot produce the skilled terrorists capable of committing or organizing attacks . . . conceiving them as such will lead to ineffective policies, and cracking down on madrassas may even harm the allies that Washington attempts to help."[34] They argued that the strong correlation between terrorist attacks against the West and technological education intimates that terrorists need both a college education and technical expertise, something generally not provided in the *madrassa* or government educational systems. Their views and assertions are worthy of further analysis, but are outside the purview of this study.

The next chapter describes the methodologies used to analyze the relationship between Pakistan's education systems, the propagation of the jihadist ideology, and the present war on terror. The methodologies include: Center of Gravity (COG) analysis, Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis, and Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) analysis.

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[1]John L Esposito, ed., *The Oxford History of Islam* (New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1999).

[2]John L Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 156.

[3]Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York, NY, Samuel P. Huntington, 1996), 109.

[4]Ibid., 110.

[5]Angel M. Rabasa, *The Muslim World after 9/11* (Arlington, VA: RAND Corp., 2004), 82.

[6]Esposito, *Islam*, 88.

[7]Ibid., 88.

[8]Ibid., 89.

[9]Ibid., 90.

[10]Ibid., 91.

[11]Ibid., 92.

[12]Ibid, 34.

[13]Anne Marie Oliver and Paul F. Steinberg, *The Road to Martyrs' Square: A Journey into the World of the Suicide Bomber* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2005), xi.

[14]Rabasa, 5.

[15]Ibid., 7-9.

[16]Ibid., 5.

[17]Ibid., 6.

[18]Mary Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy:* Jihadist *Ideology and the War on Terror* (New Haven, Yale University, 2006), 161.

[19]*NMSP-WOT*, 4.

[20]David Tucker, "Combating International Terrorism," in *The Terrorism Threat and US Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors* (US Air Force

Academy, CO, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, March 2001). (hereafter cited as *Combating Terrorism.*)

[21]Ibid., 2.

[22]Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff, J-5, "Fighting the Long War: Military Strategy for the War on Terrorism," *Executive Lecture Forum,* 4.

[23]Mary Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror* (New Haven, Yale University, 2006) 154.

[24]Ibid., 156.

[25]*NMSP-WOT*, 22.

[26]Ibid., 27.

[27]"Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism," Dr. Graeme P. Herd, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, ITC Case Study Briefing, 23 March 2006.

[28]Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 1. Hereafter cited as "Clausewitz."

[29]*NMSP-WOT*, 14.

[30]Ibid., 14.

[31]Andrew Coulson, "Education and Indoctrination in the Muslim World," *Policy Analysis* (March, 2004), 29. Hereafter cited as "Andrew Coulson."

[32]Ibid., 4.

[33]A. H. Nayyar and Ahmed Salim, "The Subtle Subversion: The State of Curricula and Textbooks in Pakistan," a report of the "Civil Society Initiative in Curricula and Textbooks Reform" project, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan, July 2003, pp. 1-3 [document on-line] available from http://www.sdpi.org/ what%27s_new/reporton/State%20of%20Curr&Textbooks(final-BB).pdf; Internet.

[34]Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, "The *Madrassa* Scapegoat," *The Washington Quarterly* (spring 2006): 124.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This thesis analyzes the significance of the relationship that exists between education systems in Islamic Pakistan and the propagation of the radical Islamic jihadist ideology. Analytical methodologies employed in the analysis both facilitate the identification of principal implications of that significance and also help delineate how best to exploit those implications in support of the GWOT and the objectives delineated in the *NMSP-WOT*. The overarching focus of this thesis is to investigate how, and to what extent, education systems in Pakistan affect the spread of the radical Islamic jihadist ideology, in order to determine how US national strategy can exploit these systems in support of *NMSP-WOT* and *NSS* objectives.

Framework

In order to identify relationships between Pakistani education systems and the war on terror, demonstrate the significance of those relationships, and propose a strategy to affect GWOT objectives, the author incorporates three distinct frameworks for analysis: center of gravity (COG); Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT); and, Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic (DIME) instruments of national power. Center of gravity analysis establishes the relationship (or lack thereof) between education and the war on terror; SWOT analysis demonstrates strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and/or threats that exist in Pakistan's education system; and DIME analysis helps evaluate strategy to affect this system. A more detailed explanation of each component of this methodology follows.

Center of Gravity (COG)

As discussed, the *NMSP-WOT* asserts that in order to wage a more effective war against the enemy, one must first understand the enemy's center(s) of gravity; once it is identified, one is better prepared to focus counterterrorism efforts more effectively.[1] Although there are disparate views on how best to define, determine, protect and/or defeat enemy centers of gravity, Carl von Clausewitz, nineteenth century Prussian soldier, military theorist, and author, provided the foundation from which most build. Clausewitz described the COG as it apples to war planning as follows:

> Everything depends upon keeping the dominant characteristics of both states in mind. From these emerge a certain center of gravity, a focal point (*Zentrum*) of force and movement, upon which the larger whole depends; and, it is against the enemy's center of gravity that the collective blow of all power must be directed.[2]

Dr. Joe Strange, United States Marine Corps War College professor, integrated Clausewitzian theory into his concept of critical capabilities (CC), critical requirements (CR), and critical vulnerabilities (CV), (which have since been incorporated into current Joint doctrine) to assist the warfighter in "distinguishing between the true center of gravity and important abilities, conditions, resources and/or means that contribute to the center of gravity."[3] He defined the four integrated concepts as follows:

> Centers of Gravity (CG) are physical or moral entities that are the primary components of physical or moral strength, power and resistance. They don't just contribute to strength; they ARE the strength. They offer resistance. They strike effective (or heavy) physical or moral blows. At the strategic level, they are usually leaders and populations determined to prevail. At operational and tactical levels they are almost invariably specific military forces.
>   Critical Capabilities (CC): Every center of gravity has some primary ability (or abilities) that makes it a center of gravity in the context of a given scenario, situation or mission – including phases within campaigns or operations. Mostly simply stated: what can this center of gravity do to you that puts great fear (or concern) into your heart in the context of your mission and level of war? Within a critical capability, the key word is the verb: it can destroy something, or seize an objective, or prevent you from achieving a mission.

Critical Requirements (CR) are conditions, resources and means that are essential for a center of gravity to achieve its critical capability.

Critical Vulnerabilities (CV) are those critical requirements, or components thereof, that are deficient, or vulnerable to neutralization or defeat in a way that will contribute to a center of gravity failing to achieve its critical capability.[4]

Dr. Jack Kem, US Army Command and General Staff College instructor and author of "Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade," agreed with the utility of Strange's concepts and built on them by adding the concept of "critical weaknesses." Kem explained that "before you can determine what is vulnerable, you must first determine what the weaknesses or deficiencies are in the critical requirements for a force." According to Kem, unlike critical vulnerabilities, critical weaknesses may not be a significant contributor to a CC, nor vulnerable to attack, nor "targetable" entities. However, "once you have determined the critical weaknesses, you can determine those weaknesses that are vulnerable to attack--and contribute to the plan if attacked--and can be targeted, or are "targetable." [5]

This thesis will utilize the COG construct outlined above to analyze the relevance of education in Pakistan and the spread of the jihadist ideology.

Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats

Having determined the relevance of education as it relates to COG theory in the GWOT, this thesis will incorporate Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis to identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats intrinsic to educational systems in Pakistan. This framework, described in *Business Policy, Text and Cases* in the late 1960s, is a tool for analyzing alternatives derived from situational analysis at the strategic level. It proposes a comprehensive internal analysis to identify

existing strengths and weakness, and an external analysis to identify external influences in the form of opportunities and threats. SWOT analysis is simple but should not be over simplified. When correctly implemented, the resulting SWOT profile provides a framework for establishing goals, formulating strategy, and implementing change.

Table 1 provides the author's adaptation of the methodology used in this study to analyze Pakistan's education system. The metrics used to assess the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the education systems include an evaluation of demographic influences, financial influences, cultural/religious influences, societal influences, operational influences, economic influences, and political/regulatory influences. The thesis determines the significance of each metric by analyzing specific criteria that link the metric to Pakistan's education system. Table 1 provides an outline of questions in the analysis column to the right of each metric. These questions, when answered, establish the criteria and reveal the significance of each corresponding metric

Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic

With SWOT analysis complete, the thesis will utilize a modified DIME framework to guide the development of recommendations--across diplomatic, informational, military, and economic spectrums--as appropriate. A more detailed description of the DIME framework follows.

Table 1. SWOT--Internal and External Analysis	
Metric	Analysis
Demographic Influences	How are attendance trends linked to demographic influences? What are they and how do they affect the jihadist movement? Are educational options available and are students/parents aware of them (*madrassa* versus public versus private)? Poorly funded and staffed or adequately funded and staffed?
Financial Influences	Who funds (corrupt/radical/moderate/government/private)? Is funding used appropriately?
Cultural/Religious Influences	Are educational institutions linked to clans/Islamic propensities/terrorist groups? Are GWOT efforts focused appropriately or at all?
Societal Influences	How does/has social change (poverty, Islamic resurgence, presence of US forces, financial assistance) affect/affected the Islamic education system? How might it? Why do students attend the institutions? Do demographics/societal/political factors influence their choice?
Operational Influences	Who teaches? Radical, educated, uneducated, uncommitted? Who's in charge? Personal agenda or "ghost" school? Adequate resourcing/infrastructure?
Economic Influences	How does poverty or access to financial resources influence the education system? How can they?
Political and Regulatory Influences	How does the political/regulatory environment affect Islamic educational systems' curriculum (moderate, jihadist, contemporary, religious) attendance, availability, resources?

The DIME framework integrates instruments of national power--diplomatic, informational, military, and economic--to achieve strategic objectives. It affords policymakers an opportunity to utilize one or all elements of power, at any time and in any given situation, to affect change. The level of emphasis on any one element may vary with the strategic objective; for example, one situation may require a heavy diplomatic effort complimented with a moderate economic emphasis to influence desired change. Joint Pub 1 provides a useful description of the DIME construct:

> The ability of the United States to influence events to its advantage worldwide depends in large measure on the will of its citizenry, the vitality of its societal institutions, the strength of its relations with like-minded multinational partners, and the effectiveness of the Government in employing the instruments of national power. . . . [These] are the tools the United States uses to apply its sources of power; including its human potential, economy, industry, science and technology, academic institutions, geography, and national will.[6]

This construct affords communal understanding of strategic intent by its demonstration of strategic emphasis. Expressly, whatever element (or mixture thereof) of national power one employs for effect signifies ones belief in the utility of that element's ability to influence change. A description of DIME elements from Joint Pub 1 includes:

> Diplomatic
>
> The diplomatic instrument of national power is the principal instrument for accomplishing engagement with other states and foreign groups in order to advance US values, interests, and objectives. However, without the credible threat of force, diplomacy historically is inadequate against a determined and powerful adversary.
>
> Information
>
> The informational instrument of national power has a diffuse and complex set of components with no single center of control. In the American culture, information is freely exchanged with minimal government controls. Information itself is a strategic resource vital to national security. Constraints on public access to USG information normally may be imposed only for national security and individual privacy reasons. Success in military operations depends on acquiring and

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integrating essential information and denying it to the adversary.

Military

The Military Instrument of national power focuses on the employment of the Armed forces of the United States. In wielding the military instrument of national power, the Armed Forces must ensure their adherence to the values and constitutional principles of American society. They must also meet the standards for the profession of arms demanded by American society.

Economic

The economic instrument of national power is only partially controlled by governmental agencies. In keeping with US values and constitutional imperatives, American individuals and entities have broad freedom of action abroad. The responsibility of the US Government (USG) lies with facilitating economic and trade relationships worldwide that promote US fundamental objectives, such as promoting general welfare and supporting security interests and objectives. A strong domestic US economy with free access to global markets and resources is a fundamental engine of the general welfare, the guarantor of a strong national defense, and an influence for economic expansion by US trade partners worldwide.[7]

As discussed, the DIME framework incorporates diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. This thesis will utilize a modified DIME framework to guide the development of recommendations--across diplomatic, informational, military, and economic spectrums--as appropriate for the US government. The modified DIME framework expands the diplomatic instrument of national power to include diplomatic, political, legal, and government-to-government contacts; the military instrument of power to include military means and intelligence support; and, the economic instrument of power to include both economic means as well as financial activities.

The next chapter forms the analysis portion of this thesis. The three frameworks of analysis--center of gravity, SWOT, and DIME--will assist the author to first identify links that exist between Pakistan's education system and the propagation of the radical

jihadist ideology, and then propose strategy to positively affect the GWOT. Together, the

three frameworks provide a salient construct for analysis respective to this thesis. Center

of gravity analysis enables the author to identify potential relationships that exist between

education and the war on terror. SWOT analysis facilitates the identification of strengths,

weaknesses, opportunities and/or threats present in Pakistan's education systems. DIME

analysis provides a framework to inform strategy pertaining to education and affect the

GWOT. The three frameworks will help establish the relevance of this thesis; help

develop the relationship between education and the propagation of the radical Islamic

jihadist ideology; and help determine the role of US strategy in the war on terrorism.

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[1]*NMSP-WOT*, 14.

[2]LTC Antulio Echevarria II, *Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine-Again*, (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. Carlisle, Pennsylvania. September 2002), 12.

[3]Lt Col Stephen W. Davis, USMC, "Center of Gravity and the War on Terrorism" (Thesis, US Army War College, 7 April 2003), 13.

[4]Dr. Joe Strange and Colonel Richard Iron*, Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities,* Part 2: *The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct: A Useful Tool to Understand and Analyze the Relationship between Centers of Gravity and their Critical Vulnerabilities* (Quantico, VA: US Marine Corps Association, 1996), 7. (hereafter cited as "Strange").

[5]Dr. Jack D. Kem, *Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade* (US Army Command and General Staff College, 8 March 2005), 47.

[6]Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 14 November 2000), I5.

[7]Ibid., I6.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

"Education reform is a focal point of the Musharraf government's stated commitment to modernization and curbing extremism, a strategy that has won numerous international supporters."[1] To illustrate this commitment, Musharraf's government presented the Education Sector Reform (ESR) Program 2001-2004. The program's goal was to overhaul and modernize the education system with the support of the private sector. Today, as tensions are unstable both politically and socially, an examination of Pakistan's education system is critical. Specifically, a vital need exists to assess its systemic weaknesses responsible for the continued spread of violence and extremism.

This chapter will form the analysis portion of this thesis. The author will first utilize the COG framework to develop and integrate COG-CV-CC-CR factors that are applicable to the propagation of the radical Islamic jihadist ideology. The author will then focus specifically on Pakistan's education system utilizing the SWOT framework to delineate internal and external characteristics of Pakistan's education system. These characteristics, when developed, will typify the influence of Pakistan's education system on the spread of the jihadist ideology. The author will develop SWOT analysis by first examining the *madrassa* system of education, and then examining the public and private systems of education. Within each system examination, the author will evaluate characteristics that are salient to each system and to their relationship in the spread of the jihadist ideology. The author will identify each characteristic influencing the spread of the jihadist ideology in each system, and then identify its relationship to COG analysis by

annotating applicable factors from table 2, and its relationship to SWOT analysis by annotating applicable metrics from table1.

Center of Gravity Analysis

For the purposes of analysis, this thesis recognizes the jihadist ideology, as established by the *NMSP-WOT*, as a valid threat center of gravity. Furthermore, this thesis employs the COG methodology developed by Dr. Joe Strange to analyze the relevance of education as it relates to center of gravity theory in the GWOT. It will utilize the CC-CV-CC-CR concept to examine the relationship of Pakistan's education system to the spread of the jihadist ideology.

Strange contends that "by using accurate analysis of centers of gravity, we can recognize what is going to be decisive in an operation, and what shaping operations are necessary to make it happen."[2] Furthermore, he asserts that "experienced practitioners of the operational art aim to identify the enemy's center of gravity and its critical vulnerabilities then concentrate superior combat power to exploit those critical vulnerabilities, thereby forcing the enemy's culmination and so achieve decisive success."[3] He explains that there are three primary ways to defeat an enemy's center of gravity, and it is there that one must search for vulnerabilities. Specifically, one must look at intrinsic vulnerabilities, external vulnerabilities, and those vulnerabilities relied on by the center of gravity. The first method is to make the COG irrelevant; the second is to strip the COG of the support it needs; and the third is to defeat the COG by exploiting "systemic weaknesses." The following illustration utilizing the COG-CV-CC-CR construct demonstrates the relationship between education and the jihadist ideology. As delineated in table 2, each listed critical requirement has a corresponding critical

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vulnerability. All CRs and CVs are numbered to provide a reference for later use. The references will delineate CR/CV links within SWOT analysis.

The use of the COG construct delineated in Chapter 3 and factors illustrated in Table 2 demonstrate the potential relationship between education and the propagation of the radical jihadist ideology. The strategic endstate of the enemy is identified as the propagation of the radical jihadist ideology; the enemy COG the jihadist ideology.

Creating conditions to facilitate the spread of the radical jihadist ideology is the associated critical capability. Critical requirements listed in table 2 are those factors identified as essential for the jihadist ideology to spread. They include financial backing, discontent, disaffected Islamists, poverty, corruption, intolerance, recruitment and leadership. The associated critical vulnerabilities are the critical requirements in a neutralized or vulnerable state. They demonstrate that if the critical requirement is neutralized, then the means that are essential to spreading the jihadist ideology are neutralized.

SWOT analysis is the next system used to further develop the relationship of Pakistan's education system and the spread of the jihadist ideology.

Table 2. Enemy Center of Gravity Analysis	
Strategic Endstate of Enemy: Propagation of the radical Islamic jihadist ideology	
Enemy COG: Jihadist Ideology	
Critical Capability (CC): Create conditions/situations to facilitate the spread of the radical Islamic jihadist ideology	
CR (demonstrating the relationship of education to the propagation of the radical jihadist ideology)	CV (demonstrating the relationship of education to the propagation of the radical jihadist ideology)
1. Financial backing to promote and sustain the propagation of jihadism--Illicit funding to school systems that propagate the jihadist ideology (e.g., Saudi funding to radical *madrassas*).	1. If government and private funding is judiciously monitored, regulated, and controlled (school systems will not fall prey to corrupt influences)
2. Discontent to bolster jihadist appeal-influence--economies and government services not meeting demands of growing population	2. If government/education system provides adequate and viable educational opportunities for all (discontent will be mitigated)
3. Disaffected Islamists--Poorly educated and impoverished children vulnerable to jihadist influence	3. If government provides better resourcing and oversight of educational systems (better education will be afforded)
4. Poverty to fuel discontent--poorly educated workforce limits ability to compete in global economy	4. If curriculum addresses demands of globalization and Islamic governments ensure economic/educational opportunities for the impoverished (poverty will be curtailed)
5. Corrupt or poor governmental control--no government control exercised over educational systems and curriculum; government funded "ghost" schools and teachers	5. If government exercises better oversight of educational systems to ensure systems are functional and teachers are providing quality education (corruption will be mitigated)
6. Intolerance--schools provide venue for misinformation; propagate hatred of Western ideals/influence; teach intolerance	6. If education systems/curriculums are used as a venue for promoting tolerance (extremism will be tempered)
7. Continued recruitment of committed followers--*madrassas*, public and private schools provide pool of recruits, especially in ungoverned regions	7. If recruitment efforts existing in regions that are extremist in nature are interrupted by better governance; if schools that emphasize a jihadist curriculum are eradicated (recruitment efforts can be mitigated)
8. Influential leadership--Teachers/mullahs teach jihadist ideals in *madrassa*/public/private education systems	8. If curriculum is better regulated by the government systems in Islamic societies; if governments control the infiltration of those propagating/teaching the jihadist ideology in education systems (influential jihadist teachers will be reduced)

Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats

A (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) SWOT analysis specifically focusing on Pakistan's education system follows. The examination will delineate findings of internal strengths/weaknesses and external opportunities/threats, and analyze findings to evaluate the influence of Pakistan's education system on the spread of the jihadist ideology. For each system (*madrassa*, public, and private) the analysis establishes and delineates applicable factors to evaluate and measure strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats; and to identify corresponding links to the CR/CV evaluation criteria and SWOT metric criteria provided in Chapter 3. CR/CV evaluation criteria and SWOT metric criteria are annotated in parenthetical references. The thesis provides this information to inform each factor's links to specified CRs/CVs and SWOT criteria.

Pakistan's education system is highly fragmented and decidedly segmented.[4] There are three distinct educational options parents may choose from for their children: a *madrassa,* private for-profit school, or government-run public school. Both the *madrassas* and private school systems have profited from the failure of the state-run school system to meet Pakistan's educational needs. Table 3 delineates the distribution pattern of enrollment in 1998 to 2002 (the latest period for which data is available). The table reflects the highest enrollment pattern in government-run public schools in both urban and rural areas. Enrollment in private for-profit schools is significantly lower in most cases; and enrollment in the *madrassa* system is generally at 1 percent of the total enrolled population in both urban and rural areas. Although this percentage is small, it still corresponds to 7,000-10,000 *madrassas*, depending on the source.

Table 3.   Distribution of Enrollment

LEVEL AND TYPE OF SCHOOL	PERCENTAGE OF ENROLLED CHILDREN					
	1998-99 PIHS			2001-02 PIHS		
	URBAN	RURAL	OVERALL	URBAN	RURAL	OVERALL
PRIMARY:						
Government	49	84	72	46	83	72
Private	49	14	26	52	16	27
Deeni madrassa	1	1	1	1	1	1
NGO/Trust	0	0	0	1	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIDDLE:						
Government	68	89	80	59	83	73
Private	30	11	19	40	16	26
Deeni madrassa	1	0	0	0	0	0
NGO/Trust	0	0	0	1	0	0
Other	1	0	0	0	0	0
MATRIC:						
Government	74	93	84	70	86	78
Private	26	7	16	30	14	21
Deeni madrassa	0	0	0	0	0	0
NGO/Trust	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0
OVERALL:						
Government	57	86	75	52	83	73
Private	42	13	24	46	16	26
Deeni madrassa	1	1	1	1	1	1
NGO/Trust	0	0	0	1	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0

NOTES:
1.   Children enrolled in the specified type of school expressed as percentage of all children enrolled at that level.
2.   Primary level includes class 0 - 5, middle level includes class 6 - 8, and matric level includes class 9 - 10.

Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Integrated Household Survey 2001-2002; World Wide Web; available from http://www.statpak. gov.pk/depts/fbs/statistics/pihs2000-2001/pihs2000-2001.html; Internet; accessed 10 October 2006.

Important to note is that the fragmented distribution continues throughout the education cycle; Figure 1 illustrates this fragmentation. As shown, enrollment in the *madrassa* system limits education to religious study throughout the education cycle. Enrollment in the modern school system provides more options, which include private or public primary to university systems and technical-vocational schools. Besides the

directional limits imposed by the fragmentation, the system's fragmented construct complicates the administration and oversight of the education systems.

Figure 1.   Fragmentation and Segmentation of Education System
Source: Ishrat Husain, Education, Employment and Economic Development in Pakistan (Inaugural address delivered at the Conference on Education held at Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, on 15 April 2005.

Madrassas

Typically, each system of education--*madrassa*, private and public--determines its own curriculum, teaching methods and examination processes.[5] *Madrassas* provide a free room and board, as well as free education--a significant benefit to the homeless, impoverished, and less privileged. The *madrassas* are further divided among the Sunni and Shia sects.[6] Three subsects exist among the Sunni: Deobandis, Barelvis, and the Ahi-i-Hadith (also called Wahhabis). The Jamat-e-Islami (revivalist) also has its own *madrassas*. A short description of each follows:

Deobandis. Historically the Deobandis emphasized the traditional sciences and opposed the folk Islam of intercession by saints. The Deobandis have the largest number of *madrassa*s and are the movement associated with militant policies and revivalist fervor.

Barelvis. The Barelvis movement emphasizes studies based on the Dar-i-Nizami (human reasoning or *maqulat*), and appeals to the ordinary "folk" of the country. Their beliefs have been challenged by both the Deobandis and the Ahi-i-Hadith.

Ahi-i-Hadith. Also called Wahhabi, this movement seeks to purify and reform Islam. These *madrassa*s also emphasize studies based on Dar-i-Nizami but oppose folk Islam, practices like the anniversaries of saints, and popular mysticism.

Jamat-e-Islami. This is an Islamic revivalist political party that favors a more modernist education and emphasizes the refutation of Western culture. Traditional texts are taught; however, an emphasis on politics, economics, and history exists to prepare "the young *ulema* (religious teachers) for confronting the ideas of the West."[7]

Common to all *madrassas* is the teaching of modern subjects in varying degrees, as well as the teaching of the Dars-i-Nizami, or religious reasoning; however, the texts used differ according to sect and subsect. Also taught is a particular point of view--*madhab* or *maslak*--"which clarifies and rationalizes the beliefs of the sect (Sunni or Shia) and sub-sect (Deobandi, Barelvi and Ahi-i-Hadith.)"[8] Many teach students to oppose various Western ideas and those views believed unorthodox.

The Dar-i-Nizami is taught using canonical texts, which implies teaching through commentaries (*sharh*), marginal notes (*hashia*), and supercommentaries (*sharh*). "There are commentaries upon commentaries upon commentaries explained by even more commentaries. . . . [T]hey no longer explain the original texts being themselves in Arabic. They have to be learned by heart which makes students use only their memory [rather than] their analytical powers."[9] Accordingly, the implication of the Dar-i-Nizami is that the previously written "golden age" of the past need only be preserved by the present.

Madrassa: Factors Influencing the Propagation of the Jihadist Ideology

Historical ties of Islam have been reinforced generation by generation through the Islamic education system.[10] Traditionally, Islam in general influenced educational debate, philosophical thought and experimentation. However, with the introduction of the Wahhabist tendency within Sunni Islam, the *madrassa* system of education became characterized by extremist tendencies and rote memorization of the Koran and Hadith. Tariq Raman explains its effect this way:

> Muslim youth . . . are being indoctrinated into an extreme Islamic ideology. This indoctrinated youth will be exploited by the global Islamic extremist insurgency to further the Islamic extremist cause . . . according to Mustafa Setmarian Nasar, a senior Al Qaeda ideologue, the most effective method to foster the emergence of new local jihadi movements is to keep Muslim clerics actively involved at the

local level to train, educate, and indoctrinate the next generation of jihadis, who will eventually sweep away the old order. These *madrassa*s are a key aspect of this program.[11]

For centuries, the Islamic *madrassas* existed with the primary purpose of teaching Islamic law, history, and practice. Initially, the Sunnis established these *madrassas*, or theological schools, to combat the spread of Shiism.[12] More recently, critics claim that hundreds of *madrassas* were established after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to enlist Muslims in the fight against the Soviets. Today, these schools are sending their students to propagate jihadist terror.[13]

> This type of education system serves as a potential recruitment and indoctrination mechanism for Islamic extremists to promulgate Islamic extremist ideology. . . . These school systems offer an excellent vehicle to be exploited by Islamic extremists [and] often educate or, more correctly, indoctrinate their pupils in an extreme form of Islam called Wahhabism.[14]

The information provided in the parenthetical references below corresponds to associated SWOT metrics delineated in table 1, and CR/CV factors delineated from the COG analysis in table 2. It is provided to show the corresponding relationship between the factor referenced (i.e., Curriculum, Poverty, Corruption, Militant Funding, and Reform) and each SWOT metric and CR/CV factor from the COG analysis annotated.

Curriculum
(SWOT: Demographic, Financial, Cultural; COG: 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8)

*Madrassa*s are customarily fundamentalist or conservative in their approach. And although the legitimacy of many traditional *madrassas* is well established, many of the estimated 8,000 *madrassas* "in Pakistan alone" are said to provide "a breeding ground for terrorist organizations [that] encourage their students to join a jihad against the United States."[15] Rasul Shah, principal of the *Bahr al-um madrassa* in western Pakistan, boasts

that his school produced several midlevel members of the Taliban. His school also

promotes the rigid version of Islam "that calls for perpetual holy war against non-

Muslims and those Muslims who disagree with its literal interpretation."[16]

Javed Paach, a dedicated Isalmist, tribal leader, and lawyer who successfully

defended al-Qaeda suspects in the Peshawar High Court, says his proudest boast is

financing two *madrassas* that he also built, one of which he says produced many younger

leaders of the Taliban:

> They are the biggest madrasas in the [North-West] frontier…the books are free.
> The food is free. The education is free. We give them free accommodation. In a
> poor and backward area like this, our madrasas are the only form of education.
> The government system is simply not here.[17]

Although an overwhelming majority of *madrassa*s embrace the "quietist

tradition," emphasizing a rejection of Western ways without "calling upon believers to

fight unbelievers," many do teach violence and bore those beliefs in firmly.[18]

Additionally, few are known to actually offer weapons training. Graduated of the schools,

"imbued with a fervent world view and unqualified for jobs outside the mosques, have

been ready recruits for jihad groups like the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and assorted sects in

Pakistan and Kashmir." In fact, "it is estimated that as many as fifteen percent of

Pakistan's *madrassa*s preach violent jihad, while a few have even been known to provide

covert military training."[19]

The *madrassa* system of education is ideal for exploitation by the radical jihadist*s*

for several reasons:[20] it involves the relocation of children who are generally separated

from their families, villages, and friends, to the provisions of the *madrassa*s and the

guardianship of the mullahs; it imposes an environment typically restricted to males; it

emphasizes a curriculum of rote memorization of the one hundred and fourteen-chapter

Koran; it generally administers to 25-500 impressionable young students, from the ages

of 6 to 25; and it generally operates outside of government control and oversight.

Poverty
(SWOT: Demographic, Economic, Societal, Operational, Political/Regulatory; COG: 2, 3, 4, 5, 7)

Although many parents send their children to *madrassa*s out of conviction, the

chief motivation is money. Government schools are scarce in many rural areas, they

typically charge fees, and they are systematically wracked with corruption and poor

performance. For-profit private schools that emphasize academic curriculums are

abundant and growing, but they are beyond the means of the very poorest families and are

often not available in the more rural or impoverished communities. This is where

*madrassa*s come in. "The collapse of government schooling has meant that many of the

country's poorest people who want their children's advancement have no option but to

place the children in the *madrassa* system where they are guaranteed a conservative and

outdated, but nonetheless free education."[21]

Pakistan's current state of poverty is consequential to the abysmal state of

Pakistan's public educational system and elemental to the attraction of the *madrassas*.

Conditions common to the public schools scattered throughout the country include: no

working latrines, no drinking water, no electricity, any textbooks, and teachers who, if

they exist, fail to show for instruction.[22] According to the World Bank, only about half of

Pakistan's children ages 5 to 9 attend school; and only about half of those who graduate

from primary school are functionally literate. Poverty and deprivation thrive--40 percent

of 145 million children live below the poverty line. Children have little hope of ever

existing beyond a state of simple survival. The shortcomings of the public school system,

coupled with the prevailingly low living standards, have driven more than one-half million students to enroll in Pakistani *madrassas*.[23] (Although this number only represents approximately 1 percent of the total enrolled population of school children, the number of students--more than 500,000--is still significantly large). These religious seminaries not only provide their students with food, shelter, and training in the Koran, but also provide their youth with a clear direction and sense of belonging that they would otherwise never hope to achieve.

Much like countless *madrassa*s scattered throughout Pakistan, in which fifteen percent are reportedly without a proper building; fifty-two percent are without a boundary wall; forty percent are without water; and 71 percent are without electricity; are the public schools' deteriorating conditions. [24]

Corruption
(SWOT: Financial, Cultural, Operational, Political/Regulatory; COG: 1, 5)

Pakistan's public educational failures and widespread poverty are not necessarily due to poor macroeconomic performance--Pakistan has seen a respectable growth rate of an annual average of 2.2 percent per capita from 1950 to 1999.[25] Instead, "the problem most widely cited by experts here is the power of the nation's elites to rig markets and political contests for their own benefit at the expense of the poor."[26] The elite's capture of public goods throughout Pakistan is evidenced in their overtaking of school buildings for personal gain. It is further evidenced in their appointment of friends and relatives to "ghost" teaching and administration positions where they earn income without exertion. One prime example, in the Sindh province, is a cluster of village buildings--supposed to be serving as a boys' and girls' primary school, middle school and library that are instead

being used by the landlord, who is a local politician, as a meeting hall and personal guest quarters.[27] This is a pandemic practice that leaves the worst performing schools in regions where landlord power is strongest. Consequently, only 39 percent of Pakistani public schools have been deemed "functional," meaning only about four out of ten schools actually provide any measurable level of education.

Militant Funding
(SWOT: Financial, Cultural, Economic, Political/Regulatory; COG: 1, 5, 6, 7, 8)

Militant funding is yet another factor that illustrates the inherent threat of the radical *madrassas*. As many may now be aware, the Pakistani *madrassas* that practice the extremist *Wahhabi* form of Islam are where the Taliban movement was born. *Wahhabi* followers include Osama bin Laden and Saudi Arabia's ruling House of Saud.

> *Wahhabism* gained a foothold in the Muslim world in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, as the Saudis, tacitly encouraged by the United States and its allies, used their enormous financial resources to ensure that radical Shia Islam did not spread to the Sunni Muslim world. In order to check Iranian influence in Pakistan, for example, the Saudis financed the establishment of *Wahhabi madrassas*, or Islamic schools.[28]

Some 7,500 Pakistani *madrassas* that were made possible by Saudi funding continue to spread anti-US sentiment.[29] Evidence of Saudi sponsorship is prevalent, as the Roman letters IIRO and the Arabic words for International Islamic Relief Organization (a Saudi charity linked to bin Laden by US investigators) are stamped on countless *madrassas* and mosques throughout Pakistan. The mullahs have explained that countrymen accepted the Saudi facilities for the simple reason that they could not afford to build their own. Bin Laden has also made important allies among tribal chiefs by building and repairing mosques and *madrassas*, as well as by buying much needed materials.

Even with the prevailing evidence, the US is hesitant to address issues relating to Saudi support of the radical *madrassas*, as Saudi Arabia is a valuable political and economic ally of the US, due namely to its influence over oil and worldwide energy control. But it is this Saudi oil revenue that is spent "in part for the profligate luxuries of more than 5,000 princes with their large families and in part to operate Islamic centers and *madrassas* (Islamic schools) around the world that propagate the most extreme fundamentalism--the creed of Osama bin Laden."[30]

Reform
(SWOT: Demographic, Financial, Cultural, Societal; COG: 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8)

There are numerous obstacles associated with overcoming the inherent threat of the radical *madrassas.* General Musharraf's declaration that "the estimated 6,000 to 8,000 *madrassas* are playing a vital role in social welfare, sheltering more than 700,000 children, mainly boys . . . [and] abolishing the schools is out of the question, for practical and political reasons"[31] is testimony to the fact that reform is a daunting challenge. The infinite number of rivalries that exist between Pakistan's ethnic and religious factors also impact on educational quality. Children of poverty, and those not affiliated with the socially powerful, are excluded.

That said, Musharraf's efforts, encouraged by the US, to regulate the *madrassas* by requiring registration with the government, reporting foreign student enrollment, and expanding instruction in math, science and English, may prove fruitless. Musharraf's reluctance to abolish the schools is also due to the fact that "the army has long relied on *madrassas* as a source of holy warriors, or jihadis, in the struggle against Indian forces."[32] Furthermore, the religious extremists who support the *madrassas* are adamant

that the independence of the *madrassas* will not be compromised. Most say that if their freedoms are curtailed it will result in confrontation, or they will simply go underground. This would prove an even more dangerous threat to the government and counterterrorist efforts.

Private and Government Schools

The private and government-run schools are either English-medium schools, or Urdu-medium schools. English-medium schools are further divided into "elite" schools and "non-elite" schools. The majority of the English-medium schools is found in the private and not-for-profit sectors of the education system whereas the preponderance of the Urdu-medium schools is run by Pakistan's government. [33] This is another illustration of the fragmentation that exists in Pakistan's school system

As with the *madrassa* analysis, the information provided in the parenthetical references below corresponds to associated SWOT metrics delineated in table 1, and CR/CV factors delineated from COG analysis in table 2. The information will identify the corresponding relationship between the factor referenced (i.e., Attendance, Enrollment, Literacy, Economic, and Systematic) and each SWOT metric and CR/CV factor from the COG analysis annotated.

Attendance
(SWOT: Demographic, Societal, Economic; COG: 2, 3, 4)

Although only an estimated 57 percent of males age 15-19 have finished school, compared to a 15 percent completion rate for males age 60 and older, this number reflects a positive trend has taken place over the previous forty years. However positive this trend, these numbers remain dreary. Table 4 reveals that only one-half of the population

in the age group of ten years and older has ever completed school. This proportion is expressly higher in the urban areas, as well as considerably higher for males than females--most notably in the rural areas. Table 5 illustrates that the provinces of Punjab and Sindh maintain the highest proportions of attendance, and the province of Balochistan, the lowest.

Household income also affects the numbers--as household income increases, so does the likelihood of school attendance. Table 6 illustrates this relationship. This trend is much less pronounced, however, in the attendance numbers of females, as even in the wealthiest households a mere 15 percent of females have attended school. Overall, male completion rates at the primary level nearly double that of females, which increases two-fold in rural areas.

Dropout rates are also a factor, with an estimated 28 percent leaving school at the end of the primary level. This number is proportionally higher in rural areas, and reflects a pattern of dropping out before transitioning from primary to middle school. Like attendance, household income affects dropout rates, most notably in rural Pakistan, where 53 percent of the poorest and only 23 percent of the richest leave school prior to completing level six.

According to the *Pakistan Integrated Household Survey,* the reasons parents provided for dropping out include: a lack of motivation on the child's part (46 percent); prohibitive cost (most notably in urban areas); and parents not wanting their children to continue (more often for females).[34] Reasons given for nonattendance in order of prevalence include: cost--particularly in urban areas; not wanting the child to enroll (the most common reason for girls); and a lack of interest (the most common reason for boys).

Enrollment
(Demographic, Societal, Operational, Economic: 2, 3, 4, 5)

Gross enrollment rates have changed little since 1993, increasing less than one

percent per year between 1993 and 2000. In the primary school age bracket (5-9 years of

age), of the twenty-seven million children accounted for, an estimated thirteen million are

not enrolled in school (7 million of which are girls).[35] Table 7 illustrates attendance

patterns by age group and gender.

Tables 8 and 9 illustrate the relationship that exists between province and

enrollment. Overall, differences are sizable, most notably between rural and urban

populations. A marked difference is evident between genders as well, with a sizably

lower enrollment rate for girls than for boys, particularly in the rural areas. Although all

provinces show a relative decline (except in the North-West Frontier Province), the

decline in Balochistan is especially grave. In the urban sectors, a small increase is noted

in NWFP, and a small decrease in Sindh.

Data from the Education Management Information Systems' (EMIS) bi-annual

school census substantiates the trend reflecting an overall decline in enrollment rates of

publicly provided primary education.[36] In rural Balochistan, the decline is considerable.

Overall, the net enrollment rate for Pakistan is 42 percent; it remained at this rate from

1998-1999 and from 2001-2002.

According to the Ministry of Education, factors adversely affecting enrollment in

primary education are as follows:

> Access and Distance to School. Accessibility to government and non
> government schools in urban areas appeared generally equal with approximately
> four fifths of all PSUs having each of these types of school within I km. In rural
> areas, however, access to non-government primary schools was markedly poorer.

Household Income. Income decidedly affects attendance. As household incomes decreased, so did the likelihood of attendance, as less wealthy households are less able to afford tuition fees and school-related expenses. Additionally, as the number of children in a given household increased, the amount of funding for each child decreased.

Education of Parents. A parent not understanding the value of education and thus not allowing children to attend school was the most frequently noted reason for a child's non-attendance.[37]

Internal reasons for low enrollment include: distance to schools as well as a lack of adequate facilities in schools; substandard textbooks; curriculum which is beyond the student's comprehension level; and harsh attitudes of teachers. External reasons for low enrollment include: poverty of parents, parent's lack of appreciation for the value of education; and opportunity cost to the parents by sending the child to school.

At the middle and upper levels of school, the number of children enrolled in government schools is somewhat higher than at the primary level. Approximately 72 percent of children enrolled at the primary level are enrolled in government schools; whereas, at the middle level, the number increases to 73 percent, and at the matric level, to 78 percent. Pakistan's gross enrollment rate as a whole is 41 percent, a slight increase from the 1998-1999 level.[38] The numbers indicate that enrollment rates for females have increased somewhat, from 32 percent to 35 percent. As enrollment rates for males reflect an overall decline, the differences between genders have lessened considerably. Significant differences between urban and rural populations are also evident, with gross enrollment in urban areas almost twice that of rural areas.[39] Household income also appears to affect enrollment trends. Especially low is the female enrollment rate for poorer households in rural areas. At this level, an even wider gap in enrollment is evident between boys and girls in rural areas.

Literacy
(SWOT: Demographic, Economic, Political/Regulatory; COG: 2, 3, 4, 5)

For the purposes of this thesis and unless otherwise stated, a person is deemed literate if that person is able "to read a newspaper and write a simple letter."[40] Furthermore, "adult literacy" implies the literacy rate for individuals ten years-of-age and older.

Pakistan's urban and rural literacy rates are decidedly low at 63 percent and 34 percent, respectively, with rates varying significantly between area/district and gender.[41] See tables 10 and 11. Literacy is notably higher in urban areas than in rural areas and in males than in females. According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), Pakistan made up 5 percent of the world's illiterate population in 2000; ICG projects that number will increase to 7 percent by 2015.[42] Accordingly, the *EFA-2000: Literacy Assessment* reveals Pakistan's adult literacy rates are not reaching their stated goals.[43] Although an increase of 1 percent per year since 1981 was noted, in order to achieve the goal of doubling the literacy rate, an increase of 3.5 percent was required. The shortfall is significant.

The apparent relationship between literacy and age is also significant. See Table 10. The data suggests the younger the individual, the higher the literacy level. Data also implies a strong relationship exists between household income and literacy, as only "slightly more than one quarter of the poorest individuals are literate."[44] See table 12. Alarmingly, data also reflects a significantly lower literacy rate of 10 percent for poorer females in rural populations.

Economic
(SWOT: Demographic, Societal, Economic, Political/Regulatory; COG: 2, 3, 4, 5)

Tables 13, 14, and 15 reflect a strong relationship exists between household income and enrollment trends in both urban and rural populations. Table 13 shows the net enrollment; tables 14 and 15 break it down by private and government schools, respectively. Figures indicate that government school attendance decreases and private school enrolment increases as household income increases. According to the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey-2001-2002 and as the data reflects, "There is substantial demand for education but [as] government schools are failing to provide an acceptable service, parents turn to the private sector."[45] Unfortunately, this option is not enjoyed by all. The poorer populations are at a marked disadvantage and generally unable to benefit from the better education the private sector provides, as the costs associated with attendance are distinctly prohibitive.

A further affecting enrollment trend is the general belief that education is more an economic investment than a basic need.

> Here, a person who has been through [public] schooling is actually at a disadvantage. He is competing for jobs against people who have developed technical skills from working all their lives. Meanwhile the person who went to school has nothing to show for the education he has acquired; he was attending class while his peers were developing skills as technicians and farmers and electricians.[46]

In rural areas, economies are agriculturally based and families depend on their children as part of the workforce. The rewards of education are far less substantial than the increased agricultural output realized when a child works. Thus, the public school sector in both poor rural and urban sectors is in direct competition with the child labor market, and education as a whole suffers.

Systematic Deficiencies
(SWOT: Demographic, Societal, Operational, Economic, Political/Regulatory; COG: 2, 3, 4, 5)

Adding to the unfavorable impact of poverty and unemployment on education are "the unfavorable conditions of rural government-run schools and their surrounding environments, the poor quality and irrelevance of the education offered, widespread teacher absenteeism, and insufficient facilities." The absence of a viable and responsive public school system, combined with government neglect of infrastructure and development, provides few incentives for parents to invest in education for their children.

> Families want to send their children to school. But they are not going to send them to school, especially girls, if it means the child has to walk for 40 minutes up and down a rocky hill. Or if it means that in the schools they're thrown into one room like goats or sheep, with over 60 students in a single classroom.[47]

The International Crisis Group (ICG), an independent, nonprofit, multinational organization working to prevent and resolve deadly conflict, found that many Pakistani rural schools were located where public transportation did not exist and poor road systems required students to walk long distances in order to attend--in rural areas it was not unusual for it to take an hour to traverse ten kilometers. Water, electricity and other facilities were inadequate. A study conducted by the Sindh Department of Education found that out of an estimated 40,000 primary schools in the province, there were over 11,000 without electricity, over 85,000 without a water supply, and over 11,000 without toilet facilities or boundary walls.[48] The inhospitable conditions undoubtedly affect an environment that is far from suitable or conducive to learning.

Like the *madrassa*s of Pakistan, many public and private schools indoctrinate

their students in extremism and teach religious and ethnic intolerance. They also fail to

provide the quality of education necessary to allay the spread of poverty and discontent

known to foster radical indoctrination.

As previously delineated, the information provided in the parenthetical references

below corresponds to associated SWOT metrics delineated in Table 1, and CR/CV factors

delineated from the COG analysis in Table 2. This information is provided to reflect the

corresponding relationship between the factor referenced (i.e., Curriculum, Corruption,

and Reform) and each SWOT metric and CR/CV factor from the COG analysis

annotated.

Curriculum
(SWOT: Demographic, Financial, Operational, Economic, Political/Regulatory; COG: 3,
4, 5, 7, 8)

Notably, political Islam in the *madrassa* system has commanded international

concern; however, the role of political Islam in the Pakistani mainstream public education

sectors has largely been ignored. As in the *madrassa*s, the centralized curriculum in

Pakistan's public education system has also impelled the rise of political Islam. One

analyst notes:

> The United States and the European Union are both focusing on madrasa
> reform in Pakistan. . . . But Pakistan's allies in the war against terrorism have not
> focused on what Pakistan does in its regular mainstream schools. Bringing the
> madrasa into the mainstream would in some measure mean bringing the regular
> curriculum into the seminary. Is this curriculum any different from the twisted
> view of life taught to the boys who are then fed into jihad? [49]

The Sustainable Development Policy Institute, a Pakistani nongovernmental organization, reported in 2004 that it was the country's public schools that promoted hatred. They noted that the curriculum for many secular subjects, to include Urdu and social studies, was inundated with extremist teachings.[50] Indeed, few differences seem to exist between the *madrassa* and public school curriculum. The levels of intolerance for both are growing dangerously high. But as the public school system affects a much larger portion of the population, the need to address its curriculum is conceivably even more critical. "The government-prescribed syllabus has distorted historical data, nurtured intolerance for other religions, and confined the scope of the physical and social sciences."[51] The curriculum negates historical facts for the sake of political expediency--the biases in the curriculum fuel sectarian conflict.

The Provincial Textbook Boards (PTBs) have been responsible for textbook production and content since the 1960s. They develop content in accordance with the policies, guidelines and national curriculum framework of the Federal Ministry of Education's Curriculum Wing. According to the ICG, textbook content is monopolized by the PTBs, and the authors are prescribed. Thus, the government has severely limited the information available in the provinces' public schools. Restrictions on educational content are rigid--the government disallows any reflection of Pakistan's ethnic, social and economic diversity in any educational material. "Worse, the state distorts the educational content of the public school curriculum, encouraging intolerance along regional, ethnic, and sectarian lines, to advance its own domestic and external agendas." The government's record is unsettling:

In 1999 the federal ministry of education, in consultation with the National Committee on Education and the four provincial education departments, produced a document entitled, "National Curriculum 2000--A Conceptual Framework", which provided an outline to steer the education sector "away from ideological demagoguery" and towards modern education. Distressingly, it was never implemented.

In December 2003, just as the government and the MMA were finalizing agreement on the LFO, and responding to rumors that the government planned to reform the Islamiat syllabus and delete references to jihad, then Education Minister Zobaida Jalal declared: "I am a Muslim and a fundamentalist and cannot think of deleting Islamic concepts from the textbooks."

In a second related incident, rumors about a Curriculum Wing decision to delete Quranic verses from science books, as well as references to jihad in other parts of the curricula, became the centre of a political storm. The religious right, spearheaded by the MMA, protested [and blocked] this proposed "secularisation" of education, within and outside parliament.[52]

Corruption
(SWOT: Demographic, Financial, Operational, Economic, Political; COG: 1, 2, 5, 7)

Institutional corruption in the school system further damages the education sector.

Political appointments are common and a major source of state employment.

Unfortunately, the bureaucratic civil service hinders accountability. Educators find it easy

to rise through the public education system regardless of their interest or experience in

teaching. Symptoms of the bureaucracy are myriad and disturbing:

Educational qualification remains a principal determinant of salary and opportunity in both the public and private sectors. This has given the education department a strategic position in social, economic and political life. High school and university degrees are sold for profit or are granted to win favour.

The mushrooming of "ghost" schools and teachers that consume government resources despite being non-functional or nonexistent [are ominous]. In what international observers have described as "one of the country's worst corruption scandals," local officials obtain government funds for institutions and teachers that exist only on paper. There area also so instances of school administrators subletting school premises to private interests.

Recently in Kohat, the district nazim and education department identified eighteen public school teachers whose performance was lacking, each of whom had been transferred from other districts. The district government ordered their transfer and appointed new teachers in their place. The NWFP government, however, requested that the district stop the process. [53]

Pakistani highly centralized fiscal management and deficient resource allocation impedes efforts to monitor performance and detect abuse in the education systems. Remote districts are left unmonitored and educational needs left unmet. The prevailing corruption eats into an already limited budget. These unfavorable conditions suggest a school system that is wholly incapable of providing the quality of education that Pakistani youth need to dissuade influences of radicalism.

Reform
(SWOT: Financial, Operational, Economic, Political/Regulatory; COG: 2, 3, 4, 5)

Efforts at reform have been substantial. As far back as 1947, a goal of universal primary education within 20 years was set, but it was never achieved. Pakistan's Social Action Program (SAP) allocated billions in loans and grants for education and health. The results were a complete failure. This was evidenced in the scandal that revealed the existence of thousands of SAP-financed "ghost schools" and "ghost teachers." Payments to contractors never resulted in school buildings or working teachers. A revamped SAP II, which incorporated extensive control measures, ultimately ended in government and foreign backers losing sight of their goal and the honest public servants facing unassailable problems with the rigidity of the controls.

Still, the US has allocated millions for reform.[54] Additionally, the military regime in Islamabad has successfully appealed for billions in anti-poverty loans from the International Monetary Fund, with several billion more in loans and grants from the World Bank and other friendly governments. But skeptics have reason to doubt, as the education system is known to function outside of government control, and pumping more

money into a broken-down system is not likely to result in protecting children from the appeal of the radicalism.

Summary

This chapter formed the analysis portion of this thesis. Using Dr. Strange's COG framework of analysis, the author developed and integrated COG-CV-CC-CR factors that were applicable to the propagation of the radical Islamic jihadist ideology. The use of the COG construct demonstrated the potential relationship between education and the propagation of the radical jihadist ideology. Factors identified as essential for the jihadist ideology to spread included: financial backing, discontent, disaffected Islamists, poverty, corruption, intolerance, recruitment, and leadership. The construct demonstrated that if the factors were neutralized, then the means essential to spreading the jihadist ideology were neutralized.

Following the COG analysis, the thesis utilized the SWOT construct to delineate internal and external characteristics of Pakistan's education system and develop their relationship to the spread of the jihadist ideology. The author examined both the *madrassa* system of education, and the public and private systems of education. The analysis established the relationship between the COG factors and the SWOT metrics. The results of COG and SWOT analysis demonstrated the link between the education systems in Pakistan and the propagation of the jihadist ideology, and identified critical vulnerabilities that, if neutralized, would mitigate the propagation of the ideology. The next chapter will provide conclusions and develop recommendations utilizing the DIME construct. The DIME construct will delineate how to best apply US strategy to exploit the vulnerabilities developed in this chapter.

[1]International Crisis Group, *Pakistan: Reforming the Education Sector,* Asia Report N-84, 7 October 2004 (hereafter cited as ICG).

[2]Strange, 5.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ishrat Husain, Education, Employment and Economic Development in Pakistan (Inaugural address delivered at the Conference on Education held at Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, on 15 April 2005.

[5]ICG.

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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The overarching question of this thesis was whether or not Pakistan's education system significantly affects the spread of the radical jihadist ideology. Analysis utilizing Dr. Strange's COG construct and the SWOT framework demonstrated that credible links exist between both public and private education systems (including *madrassas*) in Pakistan and the propagation of the jihadist ideology (the *NMSP-WOT* center of gravity). It further identified critical vulnerabilities that, if neutralized, would mitigate the propagation of the ideology. Those vulnerabilities were linked to education and are associated with illicit funding, discontent, disaffection, poverty, corruption, intolerance, recruitment and leadership.

The goal of this chapter is to apply the modified DIME framework introduced in Chapter 3 to discern what feasible, acceptable and suitable ways exist to exploit these vulnerabilities through US policy initiatives, and consequently mitigate the spread of the jihadist ideology. The modified DIME framework expands the diplomatic instrument of national power to include diplomatic, political, legal, and government-to-government contact; the military instrument of power to include military means as well as intelligence support; and the economic instrument of power to include both economic means and financial activities.

This thesis demonstrated that the overall quality and availability of education in Pakistan is poor. The deteriorating education system has not only radicalized many young people but has also failed to prepare them for global integration. The widespread

conditions of poverty, fraudulence, and ethnic strife corrupting Pakistan provide ready targets for terrorists to exploit.

This thesis demonstrated that radical jihadist links to education follow two distinct venues. The first venue comprised those education systems that emphasize the radical jihadist ideology and propagate the ideology by way of indoctrination. The second venue comprised those education systems in which factors such as poverty, corruption and substandard curriculum exist and propagate the ideology by way of producing poorly educated or uneducated individuals who are resultantly disaffected or disenfranchised and consequently vulnerable to the radical jihadist ideology.

This thesis concluded that the *madrassa* system of education is not solely responsible for the propagation of the jihadist ideology with respect to education systems in Pakistan: they were determined to be only a potential contributing factor in a very extensive array of factors intrinsically linked to Pakistan's education systems in general. Analysis of the public and private education systems demonstrated that these systems contribute at least as fully as the *madrassa* systems in propagating the jihadist ideology. Therefore, policy must address vulnerabilities identified in Pakistan's education system as a whole--to include the *madrassas*, public, and private systems of education--and develop initiatives to mitigate these vulnerabilities accordingly.

By focusing counterterrorism efforts on educational systems governed by the Islamic state of Pakistan--which this thesis has demonstrated are linked to the propagation of the jihadist ideology--the breeding grounds for radical jihadism will prove far less fertile, and Islamic terrorism will prove far less threatening. US policy must focus appropriate attention on the role of education in affecting the spread of the jihadist

ideology, specifically on the role of education in influencing the propagation of the jihadist ideology.

Presently, US counterterrorism efforts are incomplete. Policy must also work to undermine the influence of the extremist by amplifying moderation throughout the Muslim world, especially among its youth.

Illicit Funding

In order to successfully mitigate vulnerabilities associated with illicit funding, better monitoring and oversight measures are necessary. First, interdicting illicit funding to educational institutions is imperative. The US government must support Pakistani efforts in identifying links of illicit funding sources to Pakistan's education systems. Of note are those links to Saudi funding sources believed to exist. Once accomplished, these links can be interdicted and exploited. Diplomatic, political, and economic measures can mitigate institutional and governmental illicit funding activities. This includes economic sanctions and/or restrictions on corrupt governments or institutions that are known or suspected sources of illicit support. Engaging in diplomatic initiatives to confront and tackle issues of corruption in the educational system are also viable options.

Poverty, Discontent, and Disaffection

Supporting Pakistan's economic development will help allay poverty and its resulting patterns of discontent and disaffection. Poverty impairs the quality of education and denies populations the educational opportunities they need to integrate globally. Economic systems and government services not meeting the demands of the population leave poorly educated and impoverished children vulnerable to jihadist influences. If the

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Pakistani government is able to provide adequate and viable educational opportunities for its citizens, then discontent will be mitigated.

"Economic freedom empowers individuals, and empowered individuals increasingly demand greater political freedom. Greater economic freedom also leads to greater economic opportunity and prosperity of everyone. History has judged the market economy as the single most effective economic system and greatest antidote to poverty."[1] The economic arm of national power is perhaps the most influential arm for educational reform to allay the spread of radical *jihadism.* From a national perspective, fostering Pakistan's integration into the global economy is of foremost importance, as it will enhance the nation's economic security. Supporting Pakistan's economic growth and prosperity is vital. Assisting Pakistan with economic reform initiatives will encourage future self-sufficiency and economic growth. More importantly, it will assuage the underpinnings central to the proliferation of radicalism--poverty and discontent.

Addressing systematic deficiencies presently marring the fiscal management of educational institutions in Pakistan is also imperative. Such actions will promote the expansion and broaden the accessibility of education for all. US diplomatic and economic support for the development and sustainment of for-profit schools is vital. These schools are prevalent throughout the developing world and generally provide the most academically effective and efficiently run educational systems, so their role is significant.

Directing foreign aid and channeling private contributions towards the expansion of fee-charging education will positively impact educational enrollment in Pakistani schools. "Programs that partially or temporarily subsidize fee-charging schools have dramatically increased both girls' and boys' enrollment in some of the poorest and most

religiously conservative areas of Pakistan."[2] Increasing enrollment in quality schools is the first step to Pakistan's academic advancement, and academic advancement will lead to an improved capacity of the population to function and integrate globally.

Corruption

In order to address vulnerabilities associated with corruption in Pakistan's educational systems, better oversight and management are required. Diplomatic efforts must focus on building alliances that support improvements in basic education and increase the participation of those traditionally less involved in education. The roles of schools, communities, NGOs and the media must be optimized. "Major decisions impacting schools must lend themselves to accountability and, therefore, be the mandate of the public servants who draw their authority from, and are responsible to, voters."[3]

Developing and institutionalizing performance-based initiatives for those responsible for the institutional governance of education systems in Pakistan is also essential. US economic policy should ensure fiscal transfers to Pakistan's district governments for education are performance-based, including such measures as enrollment rates, student pass levels, attendance levels, and gender balance.[4] "A lack of knowledge about school performance causes [governments] to inaccurately believe or be convinced that performance is adequate and prohibits clients from demanding school improvements from local or national authorities and from holding service providers accountable."[5] Tying fiscal support to performance measures would improve functionality and promote accountability.

Additionally, diplomatic and political initiatives to mitigate the risk potential of programs that promote effective oversight management are key to improving the

systematic deficiencies of Pakistan's education system. Building programs that can be managed primarily by Pakistani professionals is important. This will assuage the existing adversities associated with "foreign" involvement and interference. It will promote self-sufficiency objectives and target independent aims.

Mitigating the risk related to the management of assistance activities is also important. In order to ensure the success of those activities, the effective transfer of educatinal responsibility to the local government accompanied by effective oversight mechanisms is required. US diplomatic measures in the form of assistance support activities can ensure provincial education departments are further developed and restructured to provide greater mobility and monitoring capacity. Government officials must hold administrators accountable for their actions and be held accountable themselves. Schools must function under policies and laws that have mechanisms to ensure regulations are enforced and violators are punished. All of these measures will mitigate corruption by improving the accountability and performance of Pakistan's education systems.

<div align="center">Intolerance, Recruitment, and Leadership</div>

Mitigating threats of intolerance, jihadi recruitment, and corrupt leadership affecting Pakistani education systems is necessary. Ensuring control of misinformation, better management of education systems, and improved monitoring of personnel influencing education systems, are all measures that will support mitigation efforts. "Terrorists recruit more effectively from populations whose information about the world is contaminated by falsehoods and corrupted by conspiracy theories. The distortions keep alive grievances and filter out facts that would challenge popular prejudices and self-

serving propaganda."[6] The US government can assist Pakistan to create an environment inhospitable to the Islamic extremist message by formulating an information campaign that attacks the ideological foundation of Islamic extremism inherent in Pakistan's education systems.[7] "In place of a culture of conspiracy and misinformation…freedom of speech, independent media, and the marketplace of ideas, which can expose and discredit falsehoods, prejudices, and dishonest propaganda."[8]

The US must also support Pakistan's efforts to improve the oversight and management of Pakistan's education systems. This can be accomplished by utilizing both diplomatic and political support mechanisms. These support mechanisms should aid and encourage Pakistani government officials to improve administrative control measures over those responsible for developing and monitoring the instructional material in Pakistan's education systems. Instructional material must better support educational advancement and develop ideological tolerance. Pakistani officials must improve the oversight and management of institutions such as the Provincial Textbook Boards and the Federal Ministry of Education's Curriculum Wing. Instituting more stringent policies, guidelines and a national curriculum framework that better controls content and ensures the absence of radical ideological subject matter is imperative to reducing the threat of the radical jihadist ideology.

Helping Pakistan build and sustain the security and confidence of educational institutions and their support systems that oppose extremism is also key to reducing threats inherent to the propagation of the radical jihadist ideology. This includes encouraging and assisting efforts to disrupt the infiltration of extremism into education systems. US initiatives that support Pakistani police/security force training will improve

Pakistan's provision of physical security and discourage extremist activity within and around educational institutions. These assets, when appropriately trained and equipped, can also assist in identifying sponsors and supporters of extremist activities affecting the security of Pakistan's educational institutions and governance. Assisting the government in securing and safeguarding the districts and provinces surrounding Pakistan's schools will promote an environment inhospitable to the extremist threat and facilitate the provision of a quality education for the Pakistani population.

Conclusion

This thesis demonstrated that the overall quality and availability of education in Pakistan is poor. The deteriorating education system has radicalized many young people and failed to prepare them to function in a global capacity. This thesis demonstrated that radical jihadist links to education follow two distinct venues. The first venue includes education systems that emphasize the radical jihadist ideology and propagate the ideology by way of indoctrination. The second venue includes education systems in which contributing factors influenced the propagation of the jihadist ideology, by way of producing poorly educated, disaffected, and disenfranchised individuals who were consequently vulnerable to influences of the jihadist ideology.

This thesis concluded that the *madrassa* system of education was not exclusively responsible for the propagation of the jihadist ideology with respect to education systems in Pakistan. Instead, they were determined to be only one factor in an extensive array of factors intrinsically linked to Pakistan's education systems as a whole. This thesis identified links to the public and private education systems which demonstrated that they contribute at least as fully as the *madrassa* systems in propagating the jihadist ideology.

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The author therefore contended that policy must address vulnerabilities identified in Pakistan's education system as a whole system--to include the *madrassas*, public, and private systems of education--and develop initiatives that mitigate these vulnerabilities accordingly.

This thesis analyzed *madrassas* and public and private education systems in Pakistan, and concluded that the US may influence existing vulnerabilities with appropriate policy utilizing a modified DIME framework. Those vulnerabilities were linked to education and included: illicit funding, discontent, disaffection, poverty, corruption, intolerance, recruitment and leadership. This chapter delineated feasible, acceptable and suitable ways to exploit those vulnerabilities utilizing the modified DIME construct. These policy initiatives, if executed, will consequently help to mitigate the spread of the jihadist ideology.

By emphasizing that if US policy initiatives focus counterterrorism efforts on mitigating the vulnerabilities of educational systems in Pakistan--which this thesis has demonstrated are linked to the propagation of the jihadist ideology--the breeding grounds for radical jihadism will prove far less fertile, and Islamic terrorism will prove far less threatening.

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[2]Andrew J. Coulson, *Terrorism: The Next Generation* (CATO Institute, 5 March 2004); World Wide Webb; available from http://www.cato.org/dailys/03-05-04.htm; Internet; accessed on 14 May 2006.

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[6]*NSS*, 10.

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[8]*NSS,*10.

TABLES

Table 4.   Population That Has Completed Primary or Higher
by Region and Age Category

REGION AND AGE-CATEGORY	PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION 10 YEARS AND OLDER								
	1995-96 PIHS			1998-99 PIHS			2001-02 PIHS		
	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH
URBAN AREAS:	64	44	54	64	48	56	64	50	57
10 - 14 years	44	39	41	43	43	43	41	46	44
15 - 19 years	78	71	75	77	73	75	75	73	74
20 - 24 years	77	64	71	78	69	74	77	70	73
25 - 29 years	71	51	60	73	57	65	76	58	67
30 - 34 years	72	45	58	71	46	59	69	52	60
35 - 39 years	67	37	52	65	40	52	66	46	56
40 - 44 years	63	31	48	66	38	52	66	38	51
45 - 49 years	65	32	51	65	30	49	66	31	49
50 - 54 years	60	18	37	61	26	46	59	26	41
55 - 59 years	58	19	40	58	21	38	58	22	42
60 + years	43	10	29	44	14	31	44	10	29
RURAL AREAS:	43	14	28	42	15	28	42	17	30
10 - 14 years	33	14	24	30	18	24	29	19	25
15 - 19 years	67	32	50	65	31	48	64	34	49
20 - 24 years	62	23	41	61	21	40	62	26	43
25 - 29 years	51	13	30	49	14	30	53	17	34
30 - 34 years	46	8	26	43	10	26	47	14	29
35 - 39 years	46	6	25	42	9	25	42	9	26
40 - 44 years	39	5	22	40	6	23	37	7	22
45 - 49 years	37	5	21	33	4	18	39	6	23
50 - 54 years	31	2	14	33	3	19	33	3	16
55 - 59 years	30	2	16	31	3	15	30	3	17
60 + years	15	2	10	15	1	9	17	1	10
OVERALL:	50	23	37	49	25	37	49	27	38
10 - 14 years	36	22	29	34	25	30	33	27	30
15 - 19 years	71	45	59	69	45	57	67	47	57
20 - 24 years	67	36	51	67	36	51	67	40	54
25 - 29 years	57	25	40	57	28	42	61	30	45
30 - 34 years	54	20	36	52	21	36	54	25	39
35 - 39 years	53	16	34	49	19	34	49	20	35
40 - 44 years	48	14	31	49	16	32	47	17	31
45 - 49 years	46	13	31	43	12	28	48	14	32
50 - 54 years	41	7	21	42	10	28	41	10	24
55 - 59 years	39	7	23	40	8	22	39	8	24
60 + years	22	4	15	23	4	15	24	3	15

NOTES:
1.   Population in the relevant category that has completed primary level (i.e. Class 5) or higher, expressed as a percentage of the total population in the age-category.
2.   Completed primary level: For the 1995-96, 1998-99 and 2001-02 PIHS, all those individuals who report having completed Class 5 or higher (either in the past, or who are currently enrolled in class 6 or higher) are taken to have completed primary level.

Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Integrated Household Survey 2001-2002; World Wide Web; available from http://www.statpak. gov.pk/depts/fbs/statistics/pihs2000-2001/pihs2000-2001.html; Internet; accessed 10 October 2006.

Table 5.   Population That Has Completed Primary or Higher by Region-Province

REGION AND PROVINCE	PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION 10 YEARS AND OLDER								
	1995-96 PIHS			1998-99 PIHS			2001-02 PIHS		
	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH
URBAN AREAS:	64	44	54	64	48	56	64	50	57
Punjab	63	45	54	62	51	57	64	54	59
Sindh	67	48	57	68	49	59	64	49	57
NWFP	59	29	44	58	32	45	63	36	50
Balochistan	51	19	36	61	29	45	59	29	45
RURAL AREAS:	43	14	28	42	15	28	42	17	30
Punjab	45	17	30	42	19	30	43	21	32
Sindh	41	8	25	42	10	26	41	10	26
NWFP	40	9	24	42	10	25	44	12	27
Balochistan	38	6	23	37	5	22	37	6	23
OVERALL:	50	23	37	49	25	37	49	27	38
Punjab	50	25	37	48	28	38	49	31	40
Sindh	54	27	41	54	28	41	51	26	39
NWFP	44	13	28	45	14	28	47	16	31
Balochistan	41	9	26	40	9	25	41	11	27

NOTES:
1.   Population 10 years and older that has completed primary level (i.e. Class 5) or higher, expressed as a percentage of the total population aged 10 years and older.
2.   Completed primary level: For the 1995-96, 1998-99 & 2001-02 PIHS all those individuals who report having completed Class 5 or higher (either in the past, or who are currently enrolled in class 6 or higher) are taken to have completed primary level.

Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Integrated Household Survey 2001-2002; World Wide Web; available from http://www.statpak. gov.pk/depts/fbs/statistics/pihs2000-2001/pihs2000-2001.html; Internet; accessed 10 October 2006.

Table 6.   Population That Has Ever Completed School by Income and Province

PROVINCE AND INCOME GROUP	PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION 10 YEARS AND OLDER – 2001-02 PIHS					
	URBAN AREAS			RURAL AREAS		
	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH
PUNJAB:	78	64	71	62	30	46
1st Quintile	55	42	48	48	18	33
2nd Quintile	65	52	59	56	23	39
3rd Quintile	77	61	69	64	28	46
4th Quintile	80	66	73	66	35	50
5th Quintile	91	78	85	76	47	61
SINDH:	77	59	68	54	16	36
1st Quintile	62	36	49	41	7	25
2nd Quintile	60	39	50	54	14	35
3rd Quintile	69	50	60	57	17	38
4th Quintile	79	61	70	59	22	42
5th Quintile	89	73	81	71	24	50
NWFP:	79	47	63	65	21	42
1st Quintile	62	24	43	54	12	32
2nd Quintile	71	32	52	59	18	38
3rd Quintile	75	41	57	66	20	43
4th Quintile	82	50	66	72	24	47
5th Quintile	91	67	79	84	41	61
BALOCHISTAN:	74	39	57	50	12	33
1st Quintile	54	28	41	39	9	25
2nd Quintile	60	21	42	44	12	30
3rd Quintile	66	31	49	55	13	35
4th Quintile	78	38	59	53	12	35
5th Quintile	90	58	75	61	15	40
PAKISTAN:	78	61	69	60	25	43
1st Quintile	57	39	48	47	14	30
2nd Quintile	64	45	55	55	19	37
3rd Quintile	74	55	64	62	23	43
4th Quintile	80	62	71	65	30	47
5th Quintile	90	75	83	75	42	58

NOTES:
1. Quintiles: Quintiles are based on per capita consumption expenditure of 14,693 households and estimates are based on these quintiles may slightly be different, in some cases, from those based on the total sample of 14,831 households. For details on how the quintiles were derived, please refer to Appendix C.
2. The 1st quintile contains individuals with the lowest consumption level, whereas the 5th quintile contains individuals with the highest consumption level.
3. Attended school: All those individuals who have ever attended school (either currently attending, or attended in the past) were taken to have attended school.

Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Integrated Household Survey 2001-2002; World Wide Web; available from http://www.statpak. gov.pk/depts/fbs/statistics/pihs2000-2001/pihs2000-2001.html; Internet; accessed 10 October 2006.

Table 7.   Percentage of Children Attending Primary and Secondary Level by Age

| AGE IN COMPLETED YEARS | PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN - 2001-02 PIHS | | | | | |
| | BOYS | | | GIRLS | | |
	PERCENT IN PRIMARY	PERCENT IN SECONDARY	PERCENT NOT IN SCHOOL	PERCENT IN PRIMARY	PERCENT IN SECONDARY	PERCENT NOT IN SCHOOL
4 YEARS	16	--	84	15	--	85
5 YEARS	38	--	62	35	--	65
6 YEARS	54	--	46	45	--	55
7 YEARS	67	--	33	53	--	47
8 YEARS	74	--	26	57	--	43
9 YEARS	72	--	28	62	1	37
10 YEARS	70	4	26	49	4	47
11 YEARS	57	21	22	40	18	42
12 YEARS	36	29	35	22	24	54
13 YEARS	20	46	34	12	32	56

NOTES:
1. Rows show the percentage of children in each age-sex group who are enrolled in the level indicated.
2. Children enrolled in primary level: Enrolled in class 0 - 5.
3. Children enrolled in secondary level: Enrolled in class 6 - 10.

Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Integrated Household Survey 2001-2002; World Wide Web; available from http://www.statpak. gov.pk/depts/fbs/statistics/pihs2000-2001/pihs2000-2001.html; Internet; accessed 10 October 2006.

Table 8.   Net Enrollment Rate at the Primary Level by Region and Province

REGION AND PROVINCE	NET PRIMARY LEVEL ENROLMENT RATE (PERCENT)								
	1995-96 PIHS			1998-99 PIHS			2001-02 PIHS		
	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH
URBAN AREAS:	56	55	55	58	56	57	57	54	56
Punjab	55	55	55	54	57	56	57	58	57
Sindh	58	57	57	63	57	60	56	50	53
NWFP	52	50	51	59	49	54	59	51	55
Balochistan	57	41	49	58	51	54	55	41	49
RURAL AREAS:	47	31	39	43	30	37	43	33	38
Punjab	49	34	42	44	35	40	44	38	41
Sindh	45	24	35	37	21	29	41	25	33
NWFP	40	24	32	45	27	37	47	31	39
Balochistan	49	39	44	42	25	34	36	21	29
OVERALL:	49	38	44	47	37	42	46	38	42
Punjab	50	39	45	47	40	44	47	43	45
Sindh	50	39	45	47	35	41	46	34	40
NWFP	42	28	35	47	30	39	48	33	41
Balochistan	51	39	45	44	28	36	39	24	32

NOTES:
1.   Net enrolment rate: [Number of children aged 5 - 9 years attending primary level (classes 1-5) divided by number of children aged 5 - 9 years] multiplied by 100. Enrolment in katchi is excluded.
2.   Numerator of NER: Raised sum of all individuals aged 5 - 9 years who report currently attending primary level.
3.   Denominator of NER: Raised sum of all individuals aged 5 - 9 years who respond to the relevant questions.

Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Integrated Household Survey 2001-2002; World Wide Web; available from http://www.statpak. gov.pk/depts/fbs/statistics/pihs2000-2001/pihs2000-2001.html; Internet; accessed 10 October 2006.

Table 9.   Net Enrollment Rate at The Primary Level by Region and Province

REGION AND PROVINCE	NET PRIMARY LEVEL ENROLMENT RATE (PERCENT)								
	1995-96 PIHS			1998-99 PIHS			2001-02 PIHS		
	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH
URBAN AREAS:	67	65	66	67	63	65	65	63	64
Punjab	67	66	67	64	65	65	65	66	66
Sindh	68	66	67	71	61	66	64	60	62
NWFP	64	57	61	73	59	66	73	60	66
Balochistan	67	49	59	68	57	63	67	51	60
RURAL AREAS:	58	37	48	53	36	45	54	38	47
Punjab	61	41	51	55	42	48	55	44	50
Sindh	58	28	43	44	24	35	49	29	39
NWFP	52	31	42	58	33	46	60	36	48
Balochistan	57	42	50	52	28	41	46	25	37
OVERALL:	61	45	53	57	43	50	57	45	51
Punjab	62	48	55	57	48	53	58	50	54
Sindh	62	45	53	54	39	47	54	39	47
NWFP	54	35	45	60	36	48	62	39	51
Balochistan	59	43	51	53	32	43	49	29	40

NOTES:
1. Net enrolment rate: [Number of children aged 6 - 10 years attending primary level (classes 1-5) divided by number of children aged 6 - 10 years] multiplied by 100. Enrolment in katchi is excluded.
2. Numerator of NER: Raised sum of all individuals aged 6 - 10 years who report currently attending primary level.
3. Denominator of NER: Raised sum of all individuals aged 6 - 10 years who respond to the relevant questions.

Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Integrated Household Survey 2001-2002; World Wide Web; available from http://www.statpak. gov.pk/depts/fbs/statistics/pihs2000-2001/pihs2000-2001.html; Internet; accessed 10 October 2006.

Table 10. Literacy–Population 10 Years and Older by Region and Province

REGION AND PROVINCE	PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION 10 YEARS AND OLDER								
	1995-96 PIHS			1998-99 PIHS			2001-02 PIHS		
	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH
URBAN AREAS:	66	49	57	73	56	65	72	56	64
Punjab	65	50	58	71	58	64	71	60	66
Sindh	68	53	60	79	58	69	74	54	64
NWFP	58	31	45	66	40	53	70	41	56
Balochistan	58	23	41	72	39	56	71	36	54
RURAL AREAS:	45	16	31	52	20	36	51	21	36
Punjab	46	20	33	52	24	38	51	26	38
Sindh	47	10	29	53	15	35	51	14	33
NWFP	40	11	25	54	16	34	55	16	35
Balochistan	45	8	28	51	12	33	49	11	32
OVERALL:	52	26	39	59	31	45	58	32	45
Punjab	52	29	40	57	34	46	57	36	47
Sindh	57	31	45	65	35	51	60	31	46
NWFP	43	14	28	56	20	37	57	20	38
Balochistan	47	11	30	54	16	36	53	15	36

NOTES:
1. Population aged 10 years and older that is literate expressed as a percentage of the population aged 10 years and older.
2. Literacy: For all three rounds of the survey, literacy is taken as the ability to read a newspaper and to write a simple letter. Note the 1995-96 PIHS report defined literacy as the ability to read a newspaper, write a simple letter and perform a simple sum. Estimates have been recalculated for 1995-96 in this table using the standard definition, though the resulting change is very small.
3. The fall in literacy rate in case of Sindh Province is significant. Even in the labour force survey conducted in the same period shows 54.9%. The reason for decline from 51% in 1998-99 to 46% in 2001-02 is obviously due to data collection problems and the user may use literacy rate of 2001-02 PIHS with caution. If the literacy rate of PIHS (2001-02) of Sindh Province is adjusted by following LFS then the overall adjusted literacy rate is 47.06% for Pakistan.

Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Integrated Household Survey 2001-2002; World Wide Web; available from http://www.statpak. gov.pk/depts/fbs/statistics/pihs2000-2001/pihs2000-2001.html; Internet; accessed 10 October 2006.

Table 11.   Literacy–Population 10 Years and Older
by Region and Age Group

REGION AND AGE-CATEGORY	PERCENTAGE OF THE AGE GROUP THAT IS LITERATE								
	1995-96 PIHS			1998-99 PIHS			2001-02 PIHS		
	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH
URBAN AREAS:	66	49	57	73	56	65	72	56	64
10 - 14 years	56	57	57	73	71	72	69	72	70
15 - 19 years	76	72	74	82	77	79	79	75	77
20 - 24 years	76	64	70	82	71	77	80	71	76
25 - 29 years	70	52	60	76	59	67	79	59	69
30 - 34 years	71	46	58	75	50	62	74	55	65
35 - 39 years	65	38	52	70	43	56	70	48	59
40 - 44 years	63	32	48	71	41	56	69	41	54
45 - 49 years	65	33	52	70	32	53	69	34	52
50 - 54 years	63	21	39	65	31	51	64	28	45
55 - 59 years	59	21	41	65	24	43	63	28	47
60 + years	48	12	33	53	17	37	50	12	34
RURAL AREAS:	45	16	31	52	20	36	51	21	36
10 - 14 years	44	25	35	59	37	49	56	36	47
15 - 19 years	66	33	50	71	36	54	68	38	53
20 - 24 years	59	24	41	64	24	43	65	28	46
25 - 29 years	49	14	30	55	16	34	57	19	36
30 - 34 years	45	9	25	49	13	30	50	15	31
35 - 39 years	45	8	26	49	11	29	46	10	28
40 - 44 years	39	5	23	47	8	27	41	8	24
45 - 49 years	38	5	22	40	5	23	44	6	26
50 - 54 years	33	2	15	40	4	24	39	4	19
55 - 59 years	33	2	18	38	4	18	35	4	20
60 + years	19	2	12	21	2	13	22	1	13
OVERALL:	52	26	39	59	31	45	58	32	45
10 - 14 years	48	35	42	63	48	56	60	47	54
15 - 19 years	70	46	58	75	49	62	72	50	61
20 - 24 years	65	37	51	71	39	55	70	42	56
25 - 29 years	56	26	40	62	29	45	65	31	47
30 - 34 years	53	20	36	57	24	40	58	26	41
35 - 39 years	52	18	35	55	21	38	53	22	38
40 - 44 years	48	14	32	55	18	36	50	19	34
45 - 49 years	47	13	31	50	13	32	52	15	34
50 - 54 years	43	8	23	48	12	32	47	11	27
55 - 59 years	41	8	25	47	10	25	43	10	28
60 + years	26	5	17	29	6	19	29	4	18

NOTES:
1.   Individuals that are literate in each age group expressed as a percentage of the total number in each age group.
2.   Literacy: For all three rounds of the survey, literacy is taken as the ability to read a newspaper and to write a simple letter. Note the 1995-96 PIHS report defined literacy as the ability to read a newspaper, write a simple letter and perform a simple sum. Estimates have been recalculated for 1995-96 in this table using the standard definition, though the resulting change is very small.

Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Integrated Household Survey 2001-2002; World Wide Web; available from http://www.statpak. gov.pk/depts/fbs/statistics/pihs2000-2001/pihs2000-2001.html; Internet; accessed 10 October 2006.

Table 12. Literacy-Population Ten Years and Older
by Province and Income Group

PROVINCE AND INCOME GROUP	PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION 10 YEARS AND OLDER - 2001-02 PIHS								
	URBAN AREAS			RURAL AREAS			OVERALL		
	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH
PUNJAB:	71	60	66	50	26	38	57	36	46
1st Quintile	41	35	38	36	13	24	37	19	28
2nd Quintile	54	46	50	42	19	30	45	24	34
3rd Quintile	67	55	61	51	23	37	55	32	44
4th Quintile	73	62	68	55	29	42	61	39	50
5th Quintile	89	77	83	66	42	54	76	57	66
SINDH:	74	54	64	51	14	33	60	31	46
1st Quintile	53	29	41	38	6	23	41	10	26
2nd Quintile	56	35	46	50	13	32	52	19	36
3rd Quintile	64	46	55	53	15	34	57	26	42
4th Quintile	74	54	64	56	20	40	64	37	51
5th Quintile	87	72	80	69	20	46	81	55	69
NWFP:	70	41	56	55	16	35	57	20	38
1st Quintile	47	19	33	43	7	25	44	8	25
2nd Quintile	59	24	42	48	13	29	50	14	31
3rd Quintile	66	34	49	55	15	34	56	17	36
4th Quintile	71	44	58	62	20	40	64	24	43
5th Quintile	87	63	75	78	36	56	81	44	62
BALOCHISTAN:	71	36	54	49	11	32	53	15	36
1st Quintile	50	24	37	37	7	24	39	10	26
2nd Quintile	58	19	40	44	10	29	46	11	30
3rd Quintile	62	27	45	55	12	35	56	14	36
4th Quintile	77	34	56	52	10	34	57	15	38
5th Quintile	88	57	74	61	14	39	70	29	51
PAKISTAN:	72	56	64	51	21	36	58	32	45
1st Quintile	44	32	38	38	10	24	39	14	27
2nd Quintile	55	39	47	45	16	30	47	20	34
3rd Quintile	66	50	58	52	19	36	56	27	42
4th Quintile	73	57	65	56	25	41	62	36	49
5th Quintile	88	74	81	68	37	52	78	54	66

NOTES:
1. Population aged 10 years and older that is literate expressed as a percentage of the total population aged 10 years and older in the quintile indicated.
2. Quintiles: Quintiles are based on per capita consumption expenditure of 14,693 households and estimates are based on these quintiles may slightly be different, in some cases, from those based on the total sample of 14,831 households. For details on how the quintiles were derived, please refer to Appendix C.
3. The 1st quintile contains individuals with the lowest consumption level, whereas the 5th quintile contains individuals with the highest consumption level.
4. Literacy: For the 2001-02 PIHS, literacy was taken as the ability to read a newspaper and to write a simple letter.

Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Integrated Household Survey 2001-2002; World Wide Web; available from http://www.statpak. gov.pk/depts/fbs/statistics/pihs2000-2001/pihs2000-2001.html; Internet; accessed 10 October 2006.

Table 13.   Net Enrollment-Population Ten Years and Older
by Province and Income

PROVINCE AND INCOME GROUP	NET PRIMARY LEVEL ENROLMENT RATE (PERCENT) - 2001-02 PIHS					
	URBAN AREAS			RURAL AREAS		
	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH
PUNJAB:	58	57	58	43	38	41
1st Quintile	33	29	31	31	25	28
2nd Quintile	58	52	54	38	34	36
3rd Quintile	58	50	54	47	37	42
4th Quintile	61	70	66	54	47	51
5th Quintile	74	78	76	61	58	59
SINDH:	56	50	53	41	25	33
1st Quintile	46	28	37	29	16	23
2nd Quintile	44	35	39	42	26	34
3rd Quintile	54	44	49	44	30	38
4th Quintile	60	59	59	47	30	38
5th Quintile	67	68	68	59	44	52
NWFP:	58	51	55	46	31	39
1st Quintile	50	32	41	36	22	29
2nd Quintile	48	43	45	43	27	36
3rd Quintile	58	53	56	51	36	44
4th Quintile	71	56	64	56	34	45
5th Quintile	70	64	67	55	52	53
BALOCHISTAN:	55	41	49	36	21	29
1st Quintile	40	19	32	25	19	22
2nd Quintile	51	35	43	31	16	24
3rd Quintile	54	34	43	47	22	36
4th Quintile	51	46	48	41	24	33
5th Quintile	72	64	69	40	28	34
PAKISTAN:	57	54	56	43	33	38
1st Quintile	38	29	34	31	22	27
2nd Quintile	51	45	48	39	30	35
3rd Quintile	57	48	52	47	34	41
4th Quintile	61	64	62	52	40	46
5th Quintile	72	73	72	59	53	56

NOTES:
1. Quintiles: Quintiles are based on per capita consumption expenditure of 14,693 households and estimates are
based on these quintiles may slightly be different, in some cases, from those based on the total sample of
14,831 households. For details on how the quintiles were derived, please refer to Appendix C.
2. The 1st quintile contains individuals with the lowest consumption level, whereas the 5th quintile contains
individuals with the highest consumption level.
3. Net enrolment rate: [Number of children aged 5 - 9 years attending primary level (classes 1 - 5) divided by
number of children aged 5 – 9 years] multiplied by 100.

Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Integrated
Household Survey 2001-2002; World Wide Web; available from http://www.statpak.
gov.pk/depts/fbs/statistics/pihs2000-2001/pihs2000-2001.html; Internet; accessed 10
October 2006.

Table 14. Enrollment in Private Schools by Province and Income

PROVINCE AND INCOME GROUP	URBAN AREAS			RURAL AREAS		
	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH
PUNJAB:	59	52	56	21	20	20
1st Quintile	32	24	28	8	11	10
2nd Quintile	52	40	46	16	19	17
3rd Quintile	55	51	53	17	19	18
4th Quintile	65	53	59	25	18	22
5th Quintile	73	70	71	39	32	36
SINDH:	49	50	49	3	2	3
1st Quintile	9	5	7	0	0	0
2nd Quintile	16	35	24	3	2	3
3rd Quintile	47	35	42	2	2	2
4th Quintile	46	50	48	3	3	3
5th Quintile	74	74	74	9	5	8
NWFP:	41	33	37	15	12	14
1st Quintile	8	4	6	6	4	6
2nd Quintile	25	7	17	8	8	8
3rd Quintile	30	30	30	12	6	10
4th Quintile	58	47	53	25	11	20
5th Quintile	73	55	64	48	38	43
BALOCHISTAN:	26	21	24	1	0	1
1st Quintile	3	7	4	0	0	0
2nd Quintile	8	5	7	1	0	1
3rd Quintile	20	13	17	0	0	0
4th Quintile	25	24	25	2	0	1
5th Quintile	54	39	48	8	4	6
PAKISTAN:	53	49	51	16	15	16
1st Quintile	23	18	21	6	8	7
2nd Quintile	37	34	36	11	14	12
3rd Quintile	49	44	47	12	14	13
4th Quintile	57	51	54	21	14	18
5th Quintile	73	69	71	35	30	33

NOTES:
1. Quintiles: Quintiles are based on per capita consumption expenditure of 14,693 households and estimates are based on these quintiles may slightly be different, in some cases, from those based on the total sample of 14,831 households. For details on how the quintiles were derived, please refer to Appendix C.
2. The 1st quintile contains individuals with the lowest consumption level, whereas the 5th quintile contains individuals with the highest consumption level.
3. Children attending primary level in a private school expressed as a percentage of all children attending primary level in the quintile indicated. Only private, for-profit schools are included in this measure; children enrolled in NGO schools, deeni madrassa and other non-government schools are excluded from the numerator. Enrolment in katchi class is included.

Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Integrated Household Survey 2001-2002; World Wide Web; available from http://www.statpak. gov.pk/depts/fbs/statistics/pihs2000-2001/pihs2000-2001.html; Internet; accessed 10 October 2006.

Table 15.   Enrollment in Government Schools as a Percentage
of Total Enrollment by Province

PROVINCE AND	URBAN AREAS			RURAL AREAS		
INCOME GROUP	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH
PUNJAB:	40	46	43	78	79	78
1st Quintile	65	68	67	89	86	88
2nd Quintile	45	58	52	83	80	82
3rd Quintile	44	47	46	81	80	80
4th Quintile	34	45	40	74	82	78
5th Quintile	26	30	28	60	67	63
SINDH:	48	49	48	96	97	96
1st Quintile	90	94	92	99	97	98
2nd Quintile	83	65	75	96	98	97
3rd Quintile	52	64	57	96	98	96
4th Quintile	52	49	51	96	97	96
5th Quintile	19	24	21	90	95	92
NWFP:	58	63	60	84	87	85
1st Quintile	91	91	91	93	95	94
2nd Quintile	74	80	76	91	92	91
3rd Quintile	70	70	70	87	93	89
4th Quintile	40	53	46	74	88	79
5th Quintile	26	43	35	52	60	55
BALOCHISTAN:	72	79	75	97	99	98
1st Quintile	97	93	95	99	100	100
2nd Quintile	92	95	93	98	99	98
3rd Quintile	77	87	81	97	100	98
4th Quintile	71	76	73	98	100	99
5th Quintile	46	60	52	91	96	93
PAKISTAN:	45	49	47	83	83	83
1st Quintile	74	76	75	92	90	91
2nd Quintile	60	63	62	88	85	87
3rd Quintile	50	55	52	86	85	86
4th Quintile	42	48	45	79	85	82
5th Quintile	24	30	27	64	69	66

NOTES:

1. Quintiles: Quintiles are based on per capita consumption expenditure of 14,693 households and estimates are based on these quintiles may slightly be different, in some cases, from those based on the total sample of 14,831 households. For details on how the quintiles were derived, please refer to Appendix C.
2. The 1st quintile contains individuals with the lowest consumption level, whereas the 5th quintile contains individuals with the highest consumption level.
3. Children attending primary level in a government school expressed as a percentage of all children attending primary level (including katchi class) in the quintile indicated.

Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Integrated Household Survey 2001-2002; World Wide Web; available from http://www.statpak. gov.pk/depts/fbs/statistics/pihs2000-2001/pihs2000-2001.html; Internet; accessed 10 October 2006.

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