A Cost-Based Framework for Analysis of Denial of Service in Networks

Abstract

Denial of service is becoming a growing concern. As computer systems communicate more and more with others that they know less and less, they become increasingly vulnerable to hostile intruders who may take advantage of the very protocols intended for the establishment and authentication of communication to tie up resources and disable servers. This paper shows how some principles that have already been used to make cryptographic protocols more resistant to denial of service by trading off the cost to defender against the cost to the attacker can be formalized based on a modification of the Gong-Syverson fail-stop model of cryptographic protocols, and indicates the ways in which existing cryptographic protocol analysis tools could be modified to operate within this formal framework. We also indicate how this framework could be extended to protocols that do not make use of strong authentication.

Open PDF

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 2000
Accession Number
ADA464449

Entities

People

  • Catherine Meadows

Organizations

  • United States Naval Research Laboratory

Tags

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Authentication
  • Case Studies
  • Communication Channels
  • Computer Access Control
  • Computer Networks
  • Cryptography
  • Denial Of Service Attack
  • Information Operations
  • Internet Routing
  • Language
  • Message Processing
  • Military Research
  • Network Protocols
  • Notation
  • Resistance
  • Risk
  • Security Protocols

Fields of Study

  • Computer science

Readers

  • Applied Combinatorial Optimization and Logic Circuit Design.
  • Strategic Security Studies
  • Tactical Satellite Communications Systems Engineering.