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14. ABSTRACT The U.S. government must develop and institutionalize mechanisms to identify, train, and deploy civilian expertise in a unified manner with military command structures from the outset of conflict in order to accomplish the political-military objectives of complex contingency and Phase IV post-conflict operations. Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom starkly demonstrated the need for standardized procedures to deliver civilian expertise to the tactical level, but more importantly to deliver it to the operational level—theater commands—where they can provide crucial expertise, advice, and interpretation of strategic directives, as well as oversight of the on-the-ground implementation. New civilian-military interfacing methods and structures will also require changes to current military doctrine and to current budgeting procedures. New procedures and mechanisms can be established relatively quickly, without the need for new legislation, and several are now being created through the development of the State Department's Office for Crisis Response and Stabilization (S/CRS). The U.S. government must conduct future conflict and post-conflict operations with not just joint and combined, but unified civilian-military operations to achieve its political and military objectives.					
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Naval War College
Newport, RI

Getting It Right

Operationalizing Civilian Capacity
For Conflict and Post-Conflict Environments

By

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U.S. Department of State

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of State.

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February 14, 2005

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Abstract: The U.S. government must develop and institutionalize mechanisms to identify, train, and deploy civilian expertise in a unified manner with military command structures from the outset of conflict in order to accomplish the political-military objectives of complex contingency and Phase IV post-conflict operations. Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom starkly demonstrated the need for standardized procedures to deliver civilian expertise to the tactical level, but more importantly to deliver it to the operational level—theater commands—where they can provide crucial expertise, advice, and interpretation of strategic directives, as well as oversight of the on-the-ground implementation. New civilian-military interfacing methods and structures will also require changes to current military doctrine and to current budgeting procedures. New procedures and mechanisms can be established relatively quickly, without the need for new legislation, and several are now being created through the development of the State Department’s Office for Crisis Response and Stabilization (S/CRS). The U.S. government must conduct future conflict and post-conflict operations with not just joint and combined, but unified civilian-military operations to achieve its political and military objectives.

The Army Lieutenant Colonel squinted in the warm Afghan sunshine as he spoke to the State Department officer who'd arrived with a convoy from the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) from neighboring Paktia province. The Lieutenant Colonel's own PRT in the capital of this southeastern province bordering Pakistan was still in the process of standing up, but he told his colleague it would be ready to accept civilians in a month or so. "Can you get over here for a week or two a month?" he asked. "We still get the occasional rocket lobbed into the base, but with the bunkers and barracks set up, it's pretty secure now."

"Unfortunately," the civilian told him, "It's almost impossible for either me or the USAID rep to get over here regularly and for longer than a few days at a time, given our duties in our other three provinces and the lack of regular transport. But I can ping the Embassy and Washington and ask them to send someone out, even if it's only TDY... What do you need?"

The Army officer crumpled his empty Mountain Dew can and tossed it into the nearby trash barrel. "I really need an AID guy," he replied. "I'll take a State guy or an Agriculture guy or anybody. But we need to start getting the big money projects like roads and dams and provincial buildings going. I can't CERP¹ those. I need AID here to get that done. Can I get an AID guy?"

--Personal conversation between the author and
LTC Mark Patton, PRT Commander, Khost

Introduction

The U.S. government must develop and institutionalize mechanisms to identify, train, and deploy civilian expertise in a unified manner with military command structures from the outset of conflict in order to accomplish the political-military objectives of complex contingency and Phase IV post-conflict operations. Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom starkly demonstrated the need for standardized procedures to deliver civilian expertise to the tactical level, but more importantly to deliver it to the operational level—theater commands—where they can provide crucial expertise, advice, and interpretation of strategic directives, as well as oversight of the on-the-ground implementation. New civilian-military interfacing methods and structures will also require changes to current military doctrine and to current budgeting procedures.

New procedures and mechanisms can be established relatively quickly, without the need for new legislation, and several are now being created through the development of the State Department's Office for Crisis Response and Stabilization (S/CRS). The U.S. government must conduct future conflict and post-conflict operations with not just Joint and Combined, but *Unified* civilian-military operations to ensure unity of effort achieve U.S. political and military objectives.

Ad hoc response continues to hallmark civil-military integration at the tactical level, while civilian agencies almost entirely lack theater-operational presence. Recent American operations in Afghanistan and Iraq again exposed the lack of civilian agency capacity to respond and deploy in a timely manner with adequate resources. Those operations also highlighted the continuing lack of operational synergy between military and civilian efforts.

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) confronted the U.S. military with non-sequential combat operations: Battlefield Execution Operations (Phase III) continued as the need arose for Stabilization and Transition Operations (Phase IV), a role the military traditionally assumes will be performed by civilian agencies. Coalition forces in both OEF and OIF found that reconstruction could not precede immediate physical security, but that long-term security depended upon successful reconstruction activities. Current Joint Doctrine does not reflect the new reality of such non-sequential battlespace developments (see Appendix A). OEF and OIF present theaters of ongoing warfare concomitant with transition and reconstruction operations, but doctrine has yet to catch up.

The problem is not new. Though “nation-building” fell out of vogue with the advent of the Bush Administration, the United States military performed such duties magnificently in postwar Germany and Japan. Then as now, military and civilian practitioners identified the key problems, a lack of civilian capacity and inadequate military-civilian (or interagency) coordination. Following the experiences of OEF and OIF, the subjects of post-conflict operations and nation-building became two of Washington’s hottest topics in the past year.²

In February 2001, the Hart-Rudman Commission Report recommended sweeping reforms to the national security structure, but was lost amid a change of administration and (ironically) the events following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.³ More recently, the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ (CSIS) March 2004 Report *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols*, intended to address current Defense reform, and devoted an entire section to problems of civilian response. CSIS cited as critical issues the lack of civilian capacity to respond to complex crises; inadequate interagency coordination, and especially military-civilian coordination; *ad hoc*, personality-driven processes rather than institutionalized mechanisms; inadequate military doctrine to integrate interagency participation; and finally, a lack of a thoroughgoing USG approach and resources to provide overarching political-military funding, training, planning, response, and implementation process for complex operations.⁴

Antecedents—CORDS and PDD-56

Pacification is as much a military as a civilian process, because there can be no progress without constant real security...and let’s face another fact: The military are far better to organize, manage, and execute major field programs under chaotic wartime conditions than are civilian agencies, by and large.

--Amb. Robert Komer,

Deputy Commander for Pacification,
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV)

Four decades ago, the United States faced similar challenges to achieving political-military objectives in another grey twilight war zone. Like Afghanistan and Iraq, the outcome of the Vietnam conflict depended directly upon the success of building a credible, legitimate regime capable of defeating a determined insurgency and providing services to its population. Vietnam posed an additional level of complexity in the form North Vietnam, a state determined to overthrow the South and create a united, communist nation. Nonetheless, parallels with today's conflicts remain.

Confronted with a pernicious insurgency that sapped the South Vietnamese government's capacity to defend and service its population in numerous provinces, in May 1967, the United States unified its counterinsurgency, or "pacification" efforts into a single program known as Civil Operations, Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). Realizing the U.S. Embassy in Saigon was too isolated from the provinces to conduct rural pacification efforts, President Lyndon Johnson appointed his Special Assistant for Non-Military Programs, Robert Komer, as his personal representative for pacification in-country. Komer received Ambassadorial (four star equivalent) rank; and CORDS was placed under MACV. .

As Gen. Westmoreland's deputy in the command chain, and senior CORDS official, Amb. Komer received *operational* authority over almost all pacification programs, irrespective of agency. Komer exercised command responsibility over 6500 personnel and for military and civilian resources in four regions subdivided into 44 provinces and 234 districts.⁵ Komer directed programs supported by USAID to develop the rural economy, such as land reform, road building, and inducing defectors, as well as

programs to develop government cadres and resolve grievances of the population, administered by the CIA. Regional military teams addressed security issues and Army Psychological Operations (PSYOP) units worked with the U.S. Information Service (USIS) in the countryside. Overall, uniformed soldiers represented approximately 80 percent of the CORDS personnel. Civilians provided the largest presence at the higher levels of responsibility in the command chain, decreasing in numbers and proportion down to the village level, which was almost entirely military-manned.⁶ CORDS' mission was to deprive the Viet Cong of social infrastructure through arrests, attacks, and denial of friendly territory and population, while improving the security and quality of life for Vietnamese civilians—or as Komer later wrote, “Clear, Hold, and Rebuild.”⁷

CORDS became a *joint, interagency* organization that retained civilian authorities and *operational* control within an existing military structure, and succeeded in using that military command structure to accomplish its purposes without becoming overwhelmed or absorbed by it.⁸ Despite the failure in Vietnam and the South Vietnamese government's subsequent collapse, numerous observers later pronounced CORDS a successful program that began much too late. At least one posited that had such robust counterinsurgency measures begun earlier in Vietnam, the guerrilla war in the provinces might well have led to a stronger, more capable Vietnamese government and an unsuccessful communist insurgency.⁹

Planning: The PDD-56 Approach

The Clinton Administration wrestled with civil-military coordination issues during the 1990s as it became enmeshed in complex contingency operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, and Macedonia. To redress the lack of interagency planning and

coordination at the Washington level, the Administration issued Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56) in May 1997. PDD 56 directed the Deputies Committee “to establish appropriate interagency working groups to assist in policy development, planning, and execution of complex contingency operations.”¹⁰ The Directive defined Complex Contingency Operations as “peace operations composed of such components as political/diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, economic development and security.”¹¹ It did not apply to humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, or to combat operations.

In practice, the Deputies Committee formed appropriate Executive Committees (ExComm) for each contingency or crisis, with membership composed of the agencies concerned, with White House oversight provided by an NSC representative. PDD-56 also directed the ExComms to develop political-military plans (Pol-Mil plans) to provide USG-wide integrated planning and execution of such operations. Pol-Mil plans were to be developed whenever response was contemplated for an emerging or potential complex crisis.¹² PDD-56 also called for rehearsals of Pol-Mil plans, After-Action Reviews, and training for agency officials to plan for and conduct such operations within the framework of a PDD-56 complex contingency operation.

PDD-56 attempted to address key gaps in civilian capacity, namely inadequate or non-existent civilian agency planning and coordination with military operations, but at the *Washington level*. PDD-56 mechanisms were used most successfully in the Kosovo operation, but gained little traction among interagency players. Unfortunately, no funding came with the directive to provide training or planning staffs. PDD-56’s intentions toward some civilian capacity for deliberate planning generally fell by the wayside in favor of immediate crisis planning. Hobbled by its lack of applicability to

combat operations, PDD-56 did not address the civil-military relationship below the Washington-strategic level, failed to address the gap between military and civilian operations, and provided little guidance on how to manage an operation moving into transitional peacekeeping/reconstruction phases--resulting in continued overemphasis on military measures and execution.¹³

As noted above, not all agencies bought into the PDD-56 concept, and ExComms became one more Washington forum for agencies to clash unproductively over policy. Though intended to replace *ad hoc*, personality-driven approaches to complex operations with a standardized government approach, PDD-56 encountered mixed success at the Washington level, and never attempted to address planning and coordination gaps at the operational level. CINCs continued to operate without operational civilian equivalents during complex operations. The Bush Administration issued NSPD-1 in February 2001, which established a Contingency Planning Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) interagency structure to replace ExComms. PDD-56 remained in effect but with its working group structure abolished, and fell into disuse. The Administration stated its intent to issue an NSPD “XX” to address complex contingency and peace operations, but has yet to do so.

The Current Situation—Afghanistan and Iraq

OEF and OIF again revealed the lack of an integrated civilian-military approach to complex political-military operations, the blurring of the line separating Phase III and Phase IV, the continuing lack of civilian capacity to respond to such efforts, and the continuing personality-driven, *ad hoc* nature with which they do respond. In Afghanistan, to confront continuing insecurity and insurgency, the Department of

Defense developed the civil-military Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), deploying the first in December 2002. Arising from cooperative efforts between Civil Affairs teams in key cities and USAID civilians who traveled to work with them from Kabul, PRTs were (and continue to be) formed around the nucleus of a Civil Affairs team, with robust force protection components and civilian augmentees from USAID, State, the Department of Agriculture, representatives of the Afghan government, and occasionally even foreign government representatives such as DFID, the British analogue to USAID.

Intended to stabilize areas outside the capital by providing quick-impact reconstruction support in the name of the government in Kabul, PRTs deployed to wide acceptance by the Afghan people and national government, though their blended military-humanitarian mandate and activities caused consternation with many in the NGO and UN communities. They are currently overseen by three regional military commands of Task Force 76, the maneuver command at Bagram Airbase. Applying the PRT concept to Iraq, the USG embedded civilian personnel (usually State and USAID) with military commands, and eventually established a few Regional Embassy Offices (REOs), which function as constituent posts of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.¹⁴

PRTs in Afghanistan do bring stability to the cities to which they deploy in the form of fewer security incidents and increased monitoring of persons and entities not compliant with the national government, though it is still too early to tell if the entire venture will be successful. PRTs and their counterparts in Iraq mirror in some respects the tactical level, in that they attempt to coordinate civilian and military resources in an effort that might be termed “counterinsurgency by another name.” There the similarities end. Each agency retains stovepiped chains of command—in the case of State and

USAID back to the Embassy in Kabul or Baghdad, even if a civilian advisor exists at one of the military regional commands.

Funding flows through agency stovepipes, with civilian resources in theory coordinated by the Country Team in Kabul. Civil Affairs teams primarily rely upon the quick and flexible Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), as Department of Defense quick-impact funding mechanism that provides PRTs with the ability to address immediate, local needs, and to request larger projects as well.¹⁵ Civilian staffing of the ever-growing numbers of PRTs and REOs remains problematic, and until 2004 was approached on an *ad hoc* basis of short-term agency volunteers and some longer term USAID contractors. State and USAID have since established one-year permanent rotations for these positions, but staffing still comes via individual volunteers.¹⁶ Civilians receive little to no training for the positions before arrival, and at State, provision of basic resources for items such as laptops, phones, and protective vests was an afterthought considered only when volunteers arrived at their posts and wrote back their requirements.¹⁷

The story of the lack of interagency post-conflict planning and coordination for OIF is well known.¹⁸ Despite the potential for a post-conflict security vacuum, one USAID officer who took part in the planning noted, "In the plan that went to POTUS, 2 of 128 slides dealt with humanitarian issues, mainly on the preservation of the oil for food distribution network we were told we would not need to plan for anything beyond that."¹⁹ The internationally-perceived "unilateral" approach to Iraq also did not help. Whereas CENTCOM planners received "unprecedented support" from NGOs and UN personnel for OEF planning and execution, the same organizations refused to

participate in the planning with CENTCOM, and overall proved much less cooperative.²⁰ Potential operational-level civil-military coordination was thus stillborn.

Current Efforts to Operationalize Civilian Capacity

To address the urgent need for a standardized, coordinated, government-wide approach to complex contingency operations, in July 2004 the State Department created the Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and appointed Ambassador Carlos Pascual Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, reporting directly to the Secretary of State. S/CRS' Mission Statement is to

Lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy.²¹

Created from existing State Department resources, with exchange officers from the Department of Defense and USAID, S/CRS currently possesses only a small budget. It plans to implement its mission through five distinct methods:

--Skills and Resources: S/CRS will establish and manage interagency surge and crisis response through the standby capacity of an "Active Response Corps" and a "Technical Corps." S/CRS envisions the Active Response Corps will consist of in-place civilian employees who volunteer for identification as "first-response" and receive training to plan and deploy for such operations. The Technical Corps will provide specific post-conflict transition expertise to follow on and relieve the rapid deployers. This means compiling a database of USG personnel and skills, including police, judicial, civil administration, legal, economic, and other key functions. S/CRS has already developed a civilian database of personnel and relevant crisis-response skills for potential

call-up. These databases would form the pool of civilians to be drawn upon to stand up interagency crisis response teams (see below) and provide follow-on resources for Phase IV.

--Mobilization and Deployment: S/CRS will coordinate the deployment of USG resources and implementation of programs, cooperating with international and local entities. S/CRS is developing the concept of “Advanced Civilian Teams” (ACTs) of approximately 20 persons of specific expertise (e.g., police, judicial, governance) drawn from the Active Response Corps, Technical Corps, and S/CRS itself. ACTs would be specifically identified personnel within civilian agencies who would sign a contract in advance for potential future deployment. ACT team members will receive specific training upon identification. ACTs will deploy with the military at the brigade or division level, optimally arriving in theater with the RCC HQ in Phase II or III. ACTs in a given crisis will be controlled by an ACT Integration Cell, which will deploy to the RCC and become the operational civilian command in theater at the JTF HQ or U.S. Embassy, whichever circumstances permit.

--Monitor and Plan: S/CRS and USAID will establish early warning mechanisms to identify countries and regions of greatest risk and importance to U.S national interest. S/CRS will lead planning for these contingencies, focused on averting crises if possible, integrated with military planning and exercises. To accomplish this critical function at the theater-strategic level, S/CRS envisions establishing interagency “Humanitarian Reconstruction, Stabilization Teams” (HRSTs). HRSTs would be composed of interagency civilians who would receive planning training (perhaps at the Joint Forces Staff College), deploying as needed to Regional Component Commands (RCCs) in the

lead-up to crises. They would not be standing bodies, but would be activated as needed. Alternatively, one full-time HRST might be established to travel to the RCC's on a rotating basis, vetting the Annex V (Pol-Mil Section) of Operations Plans and participating in crisis planning exercises.

--Coordinate International Resources: S/CRS will work with international organizations and financial institutions, states and NGOs to coordinate planning, accelerate deployment, and increase the interoperability of personnel and equipment.

--Lessons Learned: S/CRS will maintain a lessons-learned database and review process to incorporate best practices and key lessons into future training, planning, exercises, and operations. In this effort, S/CRS seeks to remedy a key weakness in USG civilian capacity.²²

Getting it Right or Slapping on a Band-Aid?

S/CRS' mission and efforts hit to the heart of the major problems of civil-military planning and coordination. Its mission and functions address planning, operational level command and control, surge capacity, and personnel. However, it remains thin on the critical resource issues. S/CRS was created out of existing agency resources (primarily from State, with some USAID and military exchange officers), possesses only a small operating budget, and most of its deployment activities rely on a call-up concept at the time of crisis. As Guy White of the National Defense University notes, "Taking it out of hide almost always fails."²³ White also argues for embedding standing HRST and/or ACT nuclei at the RCCs to build relationships, gain and share experience, and provide civilian regional expertise, from which crisis operations could build and expand.²⁴

Will S/CRS' efforts be enough? Ambassador Pascual believes so, if Congress will pass certain budgetary legislation.²⁵ Pascual would like to see a Conflict Response Fund established under S/CRS control, functioning in some respects like USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives' (OTI) budget. OTI receives a core budget of approximately 50 million dollars that can be rolled over from year to year and has some transfer authority, which provides the quick response monies to send disaster assistance teams to the field and begin programs (nevertheless, OTI lives on supplementals to carry out its expensive post-conflict function).²⁶ Pascual further argues that the Secretary of State should be empowered to move State Department funds across accounts, irrespective of restrictions, to the Conflict Response Fund so that S/CRS begins to address a crisis with funds to facilitate initial call-ups, deployments, and equipment. Congress would allot additional monies on a yearly and a supplemental basis to the fund, which State could push out to other agencies as needed for training, planning, deployment, equipment, and other functions. Ideally, funds could be directed for transfer from other *agencies* to the fund in a more expeditious fashion than exists today. "Green is green," Pascual wryly notes. Among the interagency, he notes, the department with funding controls the direction, and Pascual believes other agencies will come along if State controls the money.²⁷

CSIS Senior Advisor Michele Flournoy argues that in some respects it does not go far enough, though "right now S/CRS is the best thing going."²⁸ Beyond the resource constraint problems, Flournoy describes the concept of assembling HRSTs as crises loom and sending them to RCCs as "'interagency-izing' a military plan" rather than developing a true Pol-Mil plan within an interagency process into which the RCC plays.²⁹ Noting that Congress prefers not to give programmatic authority to personnel who don't have

confirmation, she states she doesn't believe Congress would approve putative Conflict Response Fund money without significant explanation of the spending systems in advance.³⁰

Operationally, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols* recommends that one and only one senior official (either the country ambassador or a Special Representative to the President) be designated as in charge of and accountable for integrating U.S. interagency operations.³¹ Konrad Huber of USAID/OTI echoes CSIS' preference for a "direct chain to the President" from the RCC during complex operations, one that can break deadlocks and oversee the operation—the same solution President Johnson arrived at with Ambassador Komer during Vietnam.³²

What About "Enhanced POLADS" and JIACGs?

Each RCC currently has one State Department Political Advisor (POLAD) assigned to its staff, detailed through State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. POLADs often come with significant regional expertise and important senior level relationships in Washington and overseas. POLADs have no civilian staffs of their own, however, and while they play a pivotal role in bringing perspective to the RCC and its commander, they often can "walk a fine line" with the regional bureaus at State and with other agencies. Some propose enhancing the POLADs with additional civilian staff and resources as a solution to interagency coordination with the RCCs.³³ Such an option does not address the operational-deployment question, and moreover, the POLAD possesses no indigenous constituency within State, much less among other agencies in Washington.

Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) were created in November 2001 to improve unity of effort in the Global War on Terror to bring civilian expertise

directly to the RCCs.³⁴ JIACGs retain their counter-terrorism focus today, and as one observer notes, the JIACG not only walks a fine line with the POLAD, but its members are bound to represent the interests of their parent agencies as well.³⁵ Structurally, one might hang operational teams off the JIACG infrastructure, but the JIACG's conceptual purpose is too narrow to become a complex operation planning and deployment cell.

Making Civilian Capacity Operational: Recommendations

S/CRS is, as Michele Flournoy stated, “the best thing going” to operationalize civilian capacity to plan for, train for, and deploy to complex operations. Whatever the merits of a thoroughgoing national security overhaul, or of establishing an independent agency for complex operations, the political will for such measures has yet to form in either the executive or legislative branches. S/CRS has made a good start, but a number of measures must be taken at the national and operational levels by State, Defense, Congress, and the executive branch agencies to “get it right.” At a minimum:

--The Administration should issue NSPD-XX immediately and provide adequate resource authorities to implement it across the interagency arena. PDD-56 technically remains in effect, but was not used in either OEF or OIF, and interagency processes broke down almost entirely during planning for OIF. In the world of the Global War on Terror, the USG simply cannot continue to “wing it” from operation to operation.

--The NSC should establish a Special Representative to the President for each complex operation. The Special Representative should reside at the RCC until transfer to the U.S. Embassy in-country is possible. The CORDS experience in Vietnam showed that civilian-military operational processes are best served by a phone line back to the ultimate decision-making authority of the executive branch. Referring major disputes

back to Washington to any number of senior committees will only delay action and cause additional friction. In critical early stages of such operations, and in non-linear battlespace, time and lives cannot be wasted with interagency bickering.

--Congress should establish the Conflict Response Fund and provide multiyear, flexible funding. Congress needs to support the current reform effort by immediately establishing the Conflict Response Fund for S/CRS, similar to USAID/OTI's operating budget. Congress should immediately pass budgetary legislation to provide State authorities to rapidly move funds for conflict response between State Department accounts, and to accelerate the process for such shifts between agencies for conflict response. Congress should appropriate enough money to establish new permanent crisis response positions for State, USAID, and other concerned agencies at the RCCs, as well as equipment, and to provide the training, support, and sustainment resources this effort will require.

--Embed standing Humanitarian Reconstruction Stabilization Teams in the Regional Combatant Commands. HRSTs need to develop the relationships and planning experience with the RCCs over time. To stand one up periodically to review RCC plans will not provide sufficient linkage to interagency processes in Washington, nor true theater-strategic perspective. HRSTs should "hang off" the JIACG infrastructure and form the initial nucleus of an ACT Integration Cell as a crisis spins up.

--Develop a standing Advanced Civilian Team concept. ACT team members cannot be expected to function immediately as a team on the basis of initial training that lies dormant until called upon. The best solution would be to embed reduced "nucleus" ACTs in the RCCs, which could engage in exercises, training, and gain/share experience

in non-complex operations (such as disaster relief). Alternatively, ACT roster members could be called up periodically to form a team that would travel to individual RCCs for training and exercises. Nucleus members would then serve as the preferred ACT Integration Cell members during an actual complex operation.

--Beef Up USAID/OTI and USAID/OFDA. OTI and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance currently provide the only USG operational capacity for rapid response to complex operations, and are overstretched in both personnel and financial resources. The need for them in future operations will likely only grow.

Taken together, these steps will significantly improve USG capacity to plan for, train for, and respond to future complex operations. By providing interagency operational capacity to the RCCs, and connecting it to the national level with clear chains of command, civil-military cooperation should see fewer gaps in its planning, communication, and operations. S/CRS has already taken important first steps, but it requires support for its effort from the Congress, the White House, and other Cabinet agencies. The need to operationalize interagency capacity and unify it with the military effort has come full circle since the pacification effort in Vietnam. The United States today confronts a world fraught with instability inimical to its security and national interests, and finds itself committing its full resources to combat a murky new enemy in some of the world's most unstable regions. The United States cannot afford to continue getting it wrong.

Appendix A

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS				
	Military Operations	General US Goals	Representative Examples	
COMBAT	War	Fight & Win	<u>Large Scale Combat Operations</u> Attack / Defend / Blockade	
	NONCOMBAT	Military Operations Other Than War	Deter War & Resolve Conflict	Peace Enforcement Counterterrorism Show of Force/Raid/Strike Peacekeeping/NEO Nation Assistance Counterinsurgency
			Promote Peace & Support US Civil Authorities	Freedom of Navigation Counterdrug Humanitarian Assistance Protection of Shipping US Civil Support

Figure I-1. Range of Military Operations

Source: Joint Pub 3-07 “Military Operations Other Than War,” 16 June 1995

U.S. military joint doctrine for “military operations other than war” (MOOTW) has not been updated since 1995, and that for interagency processes since 1996. Current doctrine continues to show a hard line between warfare and “Noncombat Operations.” OEF and OIF conclusively demonstrate the fallacy of drawing a distinct line that ends warfare and combat operations and then transitions neatly into “Noncombat Operations.” Soldiers fighting Taliban and Iraqi insurgents re-learned all too well that security emanates as much or more from a populace served by good government providing services as from killing the enemy.

British counterinsurgency expert Sir Julian Thompson eloquently summed up the security paradox in 1966. Drawing on British experiences in Malaya and American experiences in Vietnam, he wrote:

“a situation will arise in which military operations produce no lasting results because they are unsupported by civil follow-up action. Similarly,

civilian measures, particularly in areas disputed with the insurgents, are a waste of time and money if they are unsupported by military operations to provide the necessary protection.”³⁶

British doctrine reflects this reality, as does its operational command structure. British Civil Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) doctrine gives as its purpose “(the) function of operations conducted to allow the commander to interact effectively with all parts of the civil environment within the Joint Operations Area (JOA).” The same doctrine defines the applicability of CIMIC operations as “applicable *throughout the full spectrum of tension, and in all phases of conflict* it assists in shaping the operational environment to the mutual benefit of both military and civil actors.” (emphasis added by the author).³⁷ British doctrine does not differentiate between Civil Affairs specialists vis-à-vis maneuver commanders. British commanders and forces are expected to perform both missions, employing all of the civil and military tools at their disposal, to accomplish the mission at each level of conflict.

At a minimum, U.S. Joint Doctrine regarding interagency coordination and MOOTW must be overhauled to reflect the reality of conflict and transition operations that U.K. CIMIC doctrine recognizes. Whereas British doctrine eschews direct civil-military command and control relationships, though, U.S. doctrine should define operational command relationships during crisis operations between military and civilian officials at the RCC, similar to the MACV arrangement created by Gen. Westmoreland, Amb. Komer and President Johnson. Such relationships will allow the USG to more effectively employ all of the tools in the U.S. kitbag.

A recommendation to reform current U.S. military doctrine would thus read:

The Department of Defense should overhaul Joint Doctrine for MOOTW and Interagency Operations. Doctrine must reflect the new world of non-sequential battlespace, and it must be directive to the RCCs to integrate and synchronize with the civilian processes beyond a narrowly-focused JIACG. During complex operations a civilian Deputy within the ACT Integration Cell should be under the operational control of the Combatant Commander and possess directive authority over the civil-military activity below it, until control passes to the U.S. Ambassador on the ground.

NOTES

¹ Commander's Emergency Response Program. See note 16 for a brief explanation of the program.

² Several recently published studies approach the subject of post-conflict operations primarily through case study analysis, beginning with the most famous and successful examples of post-WWII Germany and Japan and continuing to present-day Afghanistan and Iraq. For a comprehensive study of seven modern U.S.-led cases, RAND Corporation's America's Role in Nation-Building, from Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2003, James Dobbins, ed.) analyzes seven cases and draws the conclusion that the most critical consideration in any such effort is the level of effort put forward in terms of time (minimum of five years), troops relative to the population, and external assistance. RAND also concludes that unity of effort of the civilian and military command structures is a critical factor to success. Ray Salvatore Jenning's thoughtful lessons-learned review "The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq" (Washington, D.C.: The U.S. Institute for Peace, April 2003) concisely distills lessons from those three cases into eight useful recommendations to any commander or political leader contemplating a post-conflict operation. The Center for Strategic and International Studies provides concrete recommendations in a functional and structural approach to U.S. involvement in complex operations in Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Robert C. Orr, ed., Washington D.C.: CSIS, 2004). Winning the Peace heavily influenced the structure and mission of State's Office for the Coordinator of Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS). For a truly sweeping survey of the subject, readers will find David A. Edelstein's "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail" (International Security 29, no. 1 Summer 2004, 49-91) a provocative, thorough and insightful attempt to evaluate and draw measures of success and failure from some twenty-four occupations from post-Napoleonic France forward.

Other authors and commentators cite the need for early warning and prevention processes as hope to avert post-conflict and complex operations. Stuart Eizenstat eloquently presents the case for crisis prevention and rapid response in Foreign Affairs ("Rebuilding Weak States," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 1: 134-147) For a thorough and recent treatment of the subject of weak and failed states, and the case for intervening early to prevent costly operations later, the reader is recommended to Francis Fukuyama's State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, in which the author argues that certain weak, failed, and impoverished nations and regions will impinge upon U.S. national security interests, and that the United States will be better served to intervene early (but not necessarily with military force).

³ U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission), Road Map for National Security, Phase III Report (Washington, D.C., February 2001). As found at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nssg/>, accessed February 3, 2005.

⁴ Clark A. Murdock, et al. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase I Report. Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2004, pp. 60-68 and 76-79. CSIS proposed some limited reforms for civilian agencies, but after DOD review was requested to amplify the problems and responses in a separate study. CSIS will issue a second Beyond Goldwater-Nichols report addressing interagency reform in detail in Spring 2005.

⁵ Richard J. Macak, The CORDS Pacification Program: An Operational Level Campaign Plan in Low Intensity Conflicts. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: The School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1989, 14.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ambassador Robert Komer. "Clear, Hold, and Rebuild." *Army* 20, no. 5, (May 1970): 19.

⁸ Macak, 12.

⁹ Gordon Wells, “No More Vietnams: CORDS as a Model for Counterinsurgency Campaign Design.” Ft. Leavenworth KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990-91, 28-29.

¹⁰ President, White Paper, “PDD/NSC 56—The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations.” May, 1997, 2.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹² *Ibid.*, 2

¹³ William P. Hamblet, and Jerry G. Kline. “PDD 56 and Complex Contingency Operations.” *Joint Force Quarterly*. Washington, D.C.: The National Defense University, Spring 2000, 97.

¹⁴ U.S. Department of State, Cable no. 208196, “Embassy Baghdad and its Regional Offices Offer Historic Opportunities,” July 2004.

¹⁵ Presentation by Dr. Dov Zakheim, Undersecretary of Defense for the Comptroller to the PRT Commander’s Meeting at Kabul, Afghanistan, February 5, 2004. DOD created CERP through the Office of the Comptroller in response to widespread condemnation of slow disbursement of traditional military assistance funds such as OHDACA (Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Appropriation), whose processes often required a year to disburse funding for submitted project requests. Undersecretary Zakheim structured the CERP program to provide PRTs and maneuver unit commanders with a set disbursed sum of money, and commanders the authority to approve projects costing up to \$25,000. Projects with costs exceeding that sum required additional higher-level approval by command at Bagram Base; Any project costing over \$1million required Washington level approval. CERP funding provided a fast mechanism for quick-impact projects and proved enormously popular in both Afghanistan and Iraq—so popular, in fact, that projects occasionally needed to be reined in for fear of spending the entire year’s CERP budget too quickly.

¹⁶ U.S. Department of State, Cable no. 005929, “Continuing Need for Volunteers in Iraq,” January 2005.

¹⁷ Harold Ingram, Military Analyst for Afghanistan and Iraq, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, interview with the author, Washington, D.C., 6 January 2005. Ingram served as the State Department officer at PRT Kandahar from May through August, 2003.

It is worth mentioning in this context the vast disparities of size and budgets between DOD and any civilian agency, but especially the State Department. With a budget of roughly \$ 500 billion, DOD dwarfs the combined budgets of State, USAID, and the Peace Corps, which would total approximately \$20 billion. In contrast to the millions of military and civilian personnel under DOD command, State employs 6500 career Foreign Service Officers, the professional diplomats who staff key embassy and Washington positions and who are required for post-conflict operations. Of a total State Department workforce of approximately 48,000 persons worldwide, 30,000 are local-hire employees in host nations. The remaining 11,500+ are career civil servants and critical support staff such as couriers, communicators, and office assistants. Given such vast disparities, military capacity will by sheer size continue to be required in large measure to accomplish future post-conflict operations no matter how much civilian capacity is augmented. The crucial point is to develop and deploy the appropriate civilian expertise to the right military structures, and at the right planning and operations stages to effect civilian-driven policy of military operations to support the national mission.

¹⁸ Bathsheba Crocker, “Iraq: Going It Alone, Gone Wrong.” Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Robert C. Orr, ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004). For a comprehensive account of the lack of interagency planning in Iraq

(among other failures), and particularly the sharp disagreements between State and Defense, see “Going It Alone, Gone Wrong” by Bathsbeba Crocker, found as Chapter 16 in the CSIS study Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Washington, DC: The Center for International Studies and the Association of the United States Army, 2004).

¹⁹ Steve Catlin, USAID/DCHA/OFDA, interview with the author, Washington, D.C., January 7, 2005.

²⁰ Catlin.

²¹ U.S. Department of State, Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, Public Power Point Presentation, April, 2004, slide #2.

²² The five functions of S/CRS were taken from slide #5 of the Public Power Point Presentation. The author is indebted to S/CRS for its assistance.

²³ Col Guy White, Professor of National Security Studies, National Defense University, interview with the author, Arlington VA, 6 January 2005. Col. White served as Defense Attaché at Embassy Kabul from 2003-2004.

²⁴ White.

²⁵ Ambassador Carlos Pascual, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, interview with the author, Washington, D.C., 5 January 2005

²⁶ Kirk Day, USAID/OTI, interview with the author, Washington, D.C., 7 January 2005,

²⁷ Comments on budgetary legislation taken from interview with Ambassador Carlos Pascual, 5 January, 2005, U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C.

²⁸ Michele Flournoy, Senior Adviser, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, interview with the author, Washington, D.C., 6 January 2005

²⁹ Flournoy also argues for Standing Regional Security Councils *at* the RCCs, chaired by an NSC representative, to ensure “top-level planning by forward-deploying the civilians.”²⁹ The Councils would perform deliberate and crisis planning, but more importantly, would establish the key relationships between the military commands and the interagency process and build consensus. However, this approach essentially places an extra level of bureaucracy at the RCC in the form of a theater-level PDD-56 style miniature ExComm. Civilian agencies presumably will not be keen to place scarce staff at RCCs during peacetime. Standing HRSTs and ACTs at the RCCs would provide the expertise needed, with a Presidential Special Representative providing the policy guidance required in time of crisis.

³⁰ Flournoy and CSIS also recommended in *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols* establishing a Deputy Assistant to the President for complex operations at the NSC staff and an agency for Stability Operations. The agency would report to the Secretary of State essentially with the functions of S/CRS, administrative authority to coordinate the interagency process for complex operations, and would be provided with appropriate congressional authorities and resources to ensure success. While other Washington agencies may not wish to follow S/CRS’ lead as an office within the State Department, it is unclear what bureaucratic advantage a new agency would have over the current arrangement. Efforts to create the Department of Homeland Security and reform the intelligence process do not give much hope that another competing bureaucratic organization in Washington would be more effective. The Deputy Assistant concept at the NSC, however, merits serious consideration if that position will have the ear of the National Security Advisor and the President. Such an individual could advance the agenda laid out here significantly by increasing coordination and fighting for additional resources.

³¹ Murdock, Clark A., et al. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols : Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase I Report (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2004), 63-65. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols makes a series of recommendations in addition to those mentioned above, relating to training, planning, and resourcing at the agency level as well. CSIS plans to issue a separate report on reform of interagency processes and structure vis-à-vis complex operations in Spring 2005.

³² Konrad Huber, Senior Human Rights Adviser, USAID/DCHA/OTI, interview with the author, Washington, D.C., 7 January 2005.

³³ Howard D. Belote, “Proconsuls, Pretenders, or Professionals: The Role of Regional Combatant Commanders.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition (Washington, D.C.: The Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2004), 16-17.

³⁴ National Defense University Institute for Strategic Studies, “Interagency Transformation, Education and After-Action Review (ITEA) Program, Power Point Presentation, 10 June 2003, slide #15.

³⁵ Catlin.

³⁶ Sir Julian Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966), 55.

³⁷ Interim Joint Warfare Publication 3-90: Civil Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) (Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, Shrivenham, U.K: November 2003), 1-3.

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