Dolev-Yao is no better than Machiavelli

Abstract

We show that all attacks that can be mounted by a traditional Dolev-Yao intruder against common cryptographic protocols can be enacted by an apparently weaker `Machiavellian' adversary in which compromised principals will not share long-term secrets and will not send arbitrary messages. We also show that a Dolev-Yao adversary composed of multiple compromised principals is attack-equivalent to an adversary consisting of a single dishonest principal who is only willing to produce messages in valid protocol form.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 2000
Accession Number
ADA464936

Entities

People

  • Catherine Meadows
  • Iliano Cervesato
  • Paul Syverson

Organizations

  • United States Naval Research Laboratory

Tags

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Abstracts
  • Computer Programming
  • Computers
  • Contracts
  • Cryptography
  • Information Operations
  • Military Research
  • Publicly Available Information
  • Security
  • Security Protocols
  • Skeleton

Fields of Study

  • Computer science
  • Mathematics

Readers

  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies
  • Radio communications and signal processing.
  • Regression Analysis.