A Taxonomy of Computer Program Security Flaws, with Examples
Abstract
An organized record of actual flaws can be useful to computer system designers, programmers, analysts, administrators, and users. This paper provides a taxonomy for computer program security flaws together with an appendix that carefully documents 50 actual security flaws. These flaws have all been described previously in the open literature, but in widely separated places. For those new to the field of computer security, they provide a good introduction to the characteristics of security flaws and how they can arise. Because these flaws were not randomly selected from a valid statistical sample of such flaws, we make no strong claims concerning the likely distribution of actual security flaws within the taxonomy. However, this method of organizing security flaw data can help those who have custody of more representative samples to organize them and to focus their efforts to remove and, eventually, to prevent the introduction of security flaws.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 01, 1994
- Accession Number
- ADA465587
Entities
People
- Alan R. Bull
- Carl E. Landwehr
- John P. Mcdermott
- William S. Choi
Organizations
- United States Naval Research Laboratory