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THESIS

**DO PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BENEFIT FROM THE USE OF
HOST NATION MEDIA?**

by

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OF HOST NATION MEDIA?**

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ABSTRACT

Organizing and conducting effective psychological operations (PSYOP) in support of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives is a complex endeavor fraught with many challenges. The challenges include: a general negative attitude towards PSYOP / deception operations, the emphasis on kinetic platforms as the solution set for all crises to include unconventional warfare (UW), the sheer lack of numbers in both PSYOP personnel and equipment, and a recent upsurge of negativity from the world media of U.S. PSYOP due to the utilization of host nation media assets that portrays the U.S. as having a heavy hand in censoring the Iraqi and Afghan media. This thesis will examine the benefits of host nation media from World War II to the present that include the utilization of media personnel and infrastructure in mediums of radio, newspapers, leaflets, posters, magazines, comic books, radio stations, satellite and terrestrial television. The merits of host nation media will be examined by analyzing their effect upon Psychological Operations (PSYOP) from the perspective of opposing countries in previous wars as well as U.S. PSYOP programs in both past and present conflicts in addition to the impact of counter-PSYOP from an adversarial point of view. The final goal of the thesis is to illustrate the need for the use of host nation media assets relevant to U.S. military and civil operations.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. OVERVIEW AND PURPOSE

Following the terrorist attacks on September 11th, the United States Government (USG) and the overwhelming majority of the American people have been perplexed as to the reasons for the attacks, as well as wondering what measures are being taken to convince the world, specifically, the Middle East, to attenuate the ever growing threat of radical Islamic fundamentalism. An enormous amount of time and resources have been spent by the Bush administration, State Department, Department of Defense, and various OGAs (Other Government Agencies), on how best to reach target audiences that have a profound effect on U.S. national security and objectives.

The U.S. has been continuously engaged in two enormous military endeavors in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001. The campaign in Iraq has been deeply plagued by a seemingly difficult quagmire against a stubborn insurgency, rising sectarianism, an increasingly hostile and disenchanted population that has begun to lose faith in the Coalition, as well the enormously difficult task of winning the battle of ideas. So how does the U.S. win the battle of the story? From a military perspective, the onus for swaying target audiences has fallen on psychological operations (PSYOP).

Since the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, a plethora of PSYOP and information campaigns have been conducted in order to influence key target audiences in favor of U.S. operations. Such PSYOP campaigns have used every medium imaginable in getting the message out. For example, PSYOP in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) have used loudspeakers, leaflets, posters, handbills, satellite television, FM, AM, shortwave radio, bumper stickers, T-shirts, and soccer balls, as well as face-to-face communication from all servicemen in contact with local populaces. Additionally, PSYOP campaigns have been tailored to match the receiving target audience in terms of size and specificity of the message. Specific PSYOP products have focused on the smallest village or town, while more broad and all-encompassing messages have been tailored for specific regions of a country, an entire country, or an entire set of countries in a similar culturally geographic region. Ultimately, the goal of influencing target audiences in support of OEF / OIF is to have Iraqis, Afghans, and

Middle Easterners in general, espouse the PSYOP objectives of: legitimacy, non-violence, and eliminating safe havens for violent Jihadist ideology.

The problem is that the U.S. is currently incapable of producing the conditions for winning the battle of the story with its PSYOP force structure and composition of personnel and equipment. Simply stated, the U.S. military and the United States Government (USG) does not have the ability to sustain a psychological campaign that can reach millions of Iraqis and Afghans at the same time because of the few media systems that the U.S. military possesses. Essentially, years of solely spending on kinetic systems, undercutting the Voice of America (VOA), and various instruments of persuasion, have now come to a head in terms of engaging in the war of ideas. As a point of comparison, consider the fact that a single company, Phillip Morris, spent more in one year on advertising (\$2 billion) than the combined budgets of all U.S. agencies engaged in information operations and public diplomacy.¹ So naturally, the only other alternative is to use the somewhat controversial solution to U.S. psychological requirements; the use of host nation media.

As a growing trend, more and more of the broad PSYOP messages have been disseminated via host nation media. Essentially, the host nation media allows U.S. forces to utilize existing platforms such as radio stations, TV stations, newspapers, and magazines that were originally meant for large audiences. Rather than solely relying on limited U.S. PSYOP dissemination assets, the use of host nation media adds an important facet to the PSYOP tool kit. Media dissemination platforms that were once used to transmit state propaganda and keep the public in the dark can be reframed to assist with a variety of PSYOP and information campaigns designed to support U.S. operations in a given theater. Accordingly, during Phase I of OEF and OIF, targeting officers viewed radio stations, signaling towers, and newspaper plants as potential assets for future operations. Usually such targets were not destroyed unless deemed absolutely necessary due to the potential benefit of Psychological Operations.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the impact of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) that effectively utilizes host nation media as a means to persuading a given

¹ Walter Laqueru. "Save Public Diplomacy: Broadcasting America's Message Matters." *Public Affairs* (September / October 1994), 20.

target audience towards a behavior that is beneficial to U.S. objectives in a war or conflict. Utilizing host nation media can have many benefits for the U.S. For one, delivering PSYOP messages via host nation media outlets utilizes mediums that are familiar to the target audience and are often seen as more legitimate than foreign sources of media. Secondly, the host nation media is a platform that has the ability to reach across the broad populace of a given nation, thus effectively disseminating PSYOP messages that are meant for larger and broad audiences. Third, utilizing host nation media can be beneficial while augmenting existing U.S. PSYOP programs by assisting with: locating high value targets, voting information, command messages, highlighting civilian reconstruction programs, et al.

Utilizing host nation media also helps to create a PSYOP message that the target audience can identify with, is far more cost effective than trying to replicate the target audiences' preferred media, and lastly, it sets the given nation, namely Iraq, with a media investment for the future. Unfortunately, for as many good things that can come from host nation media, there can also be negative effects. Controlling the message and its dissemination is more difficult when working through proxies, and the very act of turning host nation media into proxies for U.S. PSYOP, if uncovered, can undermine the indigenous media. Additionally, historical evidence has shown that the enemy can just as effectively use counter PSYOP as well as imitating and perfecting the exact PSYOP used against them to turn the tide in their favor. Therefore, in order to avoid the pitfalls and maximize the benefits for future operations, this thesis attempts to draw out the past lessons of when the utilization of host nation media enhanced the achievement of mission objectives by analyzing the PSYOP strategies used by opposing forces from World War II to the present.

This thesis is also important because it is the first of its kind: to date, no one has investigated the tradeoffs of using host nation media to pursue PSYOP goals, and therefore the major contribution of this thesis will be to generate a set of testable propositions about when host nation media utilization is likely to be effective, and when it is not. Although the thesis is novel in thought, the subject matter is derived from experts in the field that have written extensively on the topic of PSYOP to include the infusion of host nation media. Such experts in the field include: Stanley Sandler, David

Owen, Joseph Goebbels, Sefton Delmer, Henry Latimer, Lawrence Soley, Herbert Friedman, Edward Kaufman, and many others in the Psychological Operations Group (POGs) that have illuminated the importance of host nation media as a pillar of Psychological Operations.

Ultimately, this thesis will shed some light on the effectiveness of utilizing host nation media in light of the recent upsurge in criticism due to the use of such assets. Such criticisms paint the U.S. PSYOP programs as buying the Iraqi or Afghan press, and thus controlling the press like the previous dictatorships. Others see the use of host nation media as a pitfall because of the target audiences' perception that the message is no longer credible. My goal is to analyze the historical as well as the contemporary data to illustrate the impact upon forces both friendly and foe and to look into the historical data to see which forces used it best. This will provide valuable insight on how best to utilize or in the least, deal with the impact of host nation media upon combat operations in the future.

B. METHODOLOGY

Overall, the chapters in this thesis will highlight the negative and positive aspects of utilizing host nation media gleaned from historical and contemporary data. One difficult facet is that PSYOP is not a clean cut science where conclusions can be easily drawn; it is more of an art whose effects can be subtle and inconclusive, yet quite effective when employed correctly. Another aspect is that PSYOP takes time for it to take its course. Successful PSYOP campaigns often have identifiable Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) that allow the PSYOP planner and the combatant commander indicators that PSYOP is being successful. However, judging the effectiveness of a PSYOP campaign is extremely challenging. The effect is often cumulative, such as getting an enemy force to surrender after repeated PSYOP efforts coordinated with several military attacks. It is a frustrating aspect of PSYOP that there is usually no immediate and observable link between the cause (PSYOP) and effect.² Because of the difficulty in assessing this particular thesis topic, it was decided that the historical

² Stephen E. Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950-1953* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania :Stackpole Books, 1992), 12.

analysis should be a holistic amalgam of the contributions that host nation media has had on PSYOP as well as its impact on the battlefield.

In terms of evaluating the success of PSYOP, there is no general way to evaluate results as the benchmarks for success for each PSYOP mission are unique to themselves. Instead of a general rubric for evaluating the campaigns, in this paper “success” will be evaluated through the use of measurable actions by the target audience that correlate to the objectives and related MOEs that are specific to each PSYOP campaign.³

As planners develop a PSYOP campaign, they establish specific MOEs that provide a systematic means of assessing and reporting the impact a PSYOP program (series of PSYOP products and actions) has on specific foreign target audiences. PSYOP MOEs, change from mission to mission, and encompass a wide range of factors that are fundamental to the overall effect of PSYOP. PSYOP impact indicators collectively provide an indication of the overall effectiveness of the PSYOP campaign. Development of MOEs and their associated impact indicators are done during the planning process. By determining the measure in the planning process, PSYOP planners ensure that organic assets and PSYOP enablers, such as intelligence, are identified to assist in evaluating MOEs for the execution of PSYOP. Evaluating the effectiveness of PSYOP may take weeks or even longer given the inherent difficulties and complexities of the battlefield environment.⁴

Examples of MOEs are: behavior that is in concert with a specific PSYOP product, a sudden increase in surrenders, enemy admissions about the effectiveness of PSYOP, enemy counter-PSYOP, combat after action reports (AARs), and interviewing prisoners to ascertain whether PSYOP played a role in their capture or surrender. Conversely, determining MOEs are often hard to accomplish because results are usually vague, often unknown, and are difficult to assess due to its relativity to human nature. Additionally, the fog of war makes it difficult to assess due to the numerous variables that are working in concert with PSYOP on a daily basis.

³ It is difficult assessing human behavior related to a PSYOP message because there are so many other factors in a combat environment that can indirectly sway a target audience to meet a specific PSYOP objective. However, there are conclusive MOEs such as EPW polling data, a sudden increase in surrenders, or behavior that is so specific as it leaves no doubt that the PSYOP message was being adhered to.

⁴ U.S. Joint Publication 3-53. *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations* (Fort Monroe, Virginia: September 2003), 23.

One example where determining an MOE can prove challenging is a PSYOP program that is employed to lower the morale of a foreign target audience. The lowering of morale in itself is a difficult outcome to measure, especially if access to the target audience is difficult as well. However, the lowering of morale can lead to situations that can easily be discerned such as riots, civil discontent among the youth, an overthrow or a favorable election of a foreign government. In the end, the challenges of linking PSYOP with outcomes are an everyday facet that continuously has to be dealt with. Such disparities and vagueness of MOEs are addressed in this thesis by utilizing experts with the benefit of hindsight in the field to fill the gaps and provide a clear assessment of the true impact of host nation media. Unfortunately, many of the documents and records that are crucial in determining the effectiveness of PSYOP have long been destroyed, lost, or continue to be secretly held.⁵

C. THESIS OUTLINE

In Chapter I, the thesis problem is introduced. In Chapter II, aspects of U.S. PSYOP and the host nation media are briefly discussed as a primer in order to allow the reader to gain insight on the nuances of each media and how their inter-relations effect each other. Chapter III will examine historical case studies whereupon host nation media have been used. It will also provide the foundation and the direction of the thesis based on the positive and negative aspects of utilizing host nation media in a variety of combat operations. Chapter IV will be a continuance of chapter three but with a detailed emphasis on two contemporary conflicts; OIF and the Merlin shortwave initiative during OEF. And lastly, Chapter V will draw upon conclusions based on the case files examined that will either support or negate the use of host nation media assets in support of PSYOP.

⁵ Michael Balfour. *Propaganda, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany* (London: Routledge and Kegan 1979), 99.

II. APPLICATION OF PSYOP AND DEFINING HOST NATION MEDIA

A. APPLICATION OF PSYOP

The moral of the enemy is the target of high priority, its reduction an essential preliminary to the armed clash.

--Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*⁶

The overall purpose of this thesis paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of utilizing host nation media assets in support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP). Before we can define host nation media, it is necessary to provide a clear understanding of what PSYOP is and is not. Generally, in terms of the U.S., PSYOP is viewed as an effective force multiplier at every level to include: U.S. politicians, the media, the U.S. populace, and military commanders. However, what is not agreed upon are the usage of tactics that are deceptive in nature in spite of their effectiveness. Although PSYOP is a viable combat multiplier, it has different meanings and connotations to many that include being seen by decision makers, a large number of Americans, and even military commanders in a negative light. Others see PSYOP as sort of a mystic spoon-bending apparatus and perceived as un-American in nature.

The 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne) defines PSYOP as planned operations that convey selected information and indicators to foreign target audiences (TAs) to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The emphasis is placed on foreign audiences because in accordance with U.S. law, it is not permissible to target U.S. citizens with PSYOP messages.⁷ Essentially, PSYOP messages of all forms are the maneuver commander's tool to communicate with foreign target audiences. While PSYOP is considered a combat and diplomatic multiplier, more importantly, it is also considered a combat reducer. The basic fundamental role of PSYOP is to get the desired target audience to adhere to the commander's objectives without the use of kinetic means, since that entails loss of life and equipment on both sides, as well as

⁶ Samuel B. Griffith trans. *Sun Tzu: The Art of War* (New York: Oxford Press, 1971), 54.

⁷ 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne). PSYOP Officers Course 1-04 Lecture Notes (Fort Bragg, NC 2005), 2.

employing forces that are possibly needed elsewhere. To effect the mission, the target audience must feel that adhering to the U.S. PSYOP message benefits them in some sort of fashion. For many it could mean self preservation, prosperity, financial gain, reducing terrorism, and increasing the ambient security.

Through these methods, PSYOP campaigns attempt to use carrots instead of sticks, persuasion instead of force. In this way, PSYOP campaigns are meant to alleviate the pressures put on kinetic units. The logic is that since the fighting forces cannot be everywhere they are needed, “soft power” techniques augment their presence.⁸ As defined by Joseph S. Nye Jr., soft power “is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”⁹ Because PSYOP campaigns aim to influence behavior as well winning the hearts and minds of a target audience, they can be considered as instruments of soft power that operate at the strategic, operational, and tactical level.

Strategic level PSYOP include international information, campaigns conducted by U.S. Government Agencies to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in favor of U.S. goals and objectives during peacetime and conflict. These endeavors predominantly take place outside the military arena but can use DoD assets and receive support from military PSYOP forces. Operational level PSYOP is conducted across the range of military operations in a defined operational area to promote the effectiveness of the Joint Force Commander’s (JFC’s) campaigns and strategies, and to strengthen U.S. and multinational capabilities to conduct military operations. A clear example of operational PSYOP is a product or message that is intended for the entire audience of Iraq. The operational aspect of the message is broad enough for the entire target audience of Iraq to consume without getting too specific, or alienating one group from another. Such uses of operational PSYOP are most effective when used with broad ranging mediums such as FM, AM, shortwave radio, satellite, terrestrial television, and newspapers due to the broad and general nature of the message. Tactical PSYOP are operations conducted in the area assigned by a tactical commander across the range of

⁸ Joseph S. Nye PhD. *Soft Power, The Means to Success in the Political World*. (New York: Public Affairs a member of the Perseus Books Group 2004), 5.

⁹ Ibid.

military operations to support the tactical mission against opposing forces, and shape and influence military and civilian perceptions within the tactical commander's area of operations. Tactical PSYOP provides a means to minimize resistance and interference while facilitating military objectives.¹⁰ An example of tactical PSYOP could be a message from a division commander in Fallujah, Iraq that implores the local citizens to inform coalition forces of any possible insurgents within their neighborhoods. This thesis will primarily analyze operations conducted at the Operational PSYOP level, and depending on the message, the tactical PSYOP as well.

In addition to the levels of PSYOP (strategic, operational, and tactical), there are also different forms of PSYOP based on the target audiences' perception of where the source of the message is coming from. The perceived source of the PSYOP is a critical factor for the use of host nation media assets in terms of maintaining credibility with the target audience as well as disguising the origin of the message. Generally, PSYOP messages at all levels can be classified as white, gray, or black PSYOP. White PSYOP, which comprises the overwhelming majority of all PSYOP products, is PSYOP in which the target audience can clearly discern the actual source of the message. An example is a radio message or a television commercial that is directly from the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) commander describing the need for the local populace to call the terrorist hotline if a suspicious activity is observed. Overall, the message leaves very little doubt in the target audience's mind where the source is coming from.

The second type of PSYOP is gray PSYOP. Gray PSYOP is one which the source of the message is unclear to the target audience. An example might be a television commercial that is depicted as being directly from the Iraqi government but its actual content and source is actually from MNF-I. This form of PSYOP is quite critical since it allows the fledgling Iraqi government to take credit for the actual source of the message. When discussing the use of host nation media to disseminate messages, we mostly refer to this form of PSYOP. The third type is black PSYOP. Black PSYOP occurs when a carefully crafted message intentionally misrepresents the source. An example of black

¹⁰ 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne). PSYOP Officers Course 1-04 Lecture Notes (Fort Bragg, NC 2005), 3.

PSYOP could be a doctored letter that is perceived to be from one terrorist to another that falsely states an intention to surrender. It is important to note that just because a product is considered white does not mean that it is truthful. The same can be said with gray and black PSYOP. However, the overwhelming majority of PSYOP is truthful because messages and PSYOP campaigns are based on maintaining credibility with the target audience. Essentially, a PSYOP product ceases to become viable once the target audience recognizes it to be false. This is an important and also delicate aspect of utilizing host nation media. If false stories are prevalent, and the target audience recognizes that the host nation media is a propaganda outlet for the U.S., the entire premise of utilizing host nation media is then jeopardized.

B. DEFINING THE HOST NATION MEDIA

Host nation media is the medium or source of information that is readily watched, read, or listened to by the target audience that the U.S. is trying to influence. In many areas of conflict the host nation usually hold a decisive advantage against any U.S. PSYOP systems in regards to sophistication, range, quality, quantity, and accessibility to the desired target audience. If the majority of a given nation attains their news and entertainment via satellite television, then it would make sense to take advantage of the media vectors that the target audience gravitates to. It is important to understand that what is seen or heard in one country, may not be the case in another. Simple cookie cutter PSYOP programs seldom work, as they must have the correct cultural nuances, language, and dissemination mediums that are specific to a desired target audience. An example is the comparison of media in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, the predominant means of attaining information is satellite television, radio, and newspapers in that order.¹¹ In Afghanistan, the primary medium is shortwave radio with very little television and print. Effectively, Iraq and Afghanistan are two countries with different cultural norms, languages, literacy rates, and mediums for acquiring information. Therefore, utilizing host nation media assets in each country require PSYOP campaigns that are appropriate for each type of media.

¹¹ MNF-I, Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) media poll conducted (Baghdad, Iraq: March 2005).

Just as intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is important in determining the disposition of the enemy, equally important is the intelligence that accurately depicts cultural fault lines as well as identifying the most popular forms of media. In targeting the media outlets, a detailed map of the region with all the newspapers, radio stations, television stations, power stations is crucial in understanding the information environment.

Attaining critical data such as transmission power, coverage, gain, wattage, and propagation are critical in understanding what assets will be available once operations commence within a given theater. Out of this information, the U.S. military prepares an information propagation picture that details the countries' top television and radio stations, newspapers, print presses, and any form of media that could be critical in gaining advantage in PSYOP. In Iraq, the information propagation picture depicted below was prepared by November of 2003. During this period, many of the newspapers and radio stations were assessed to be cooperative or receptive for potential U.S. PSYOP broadcasts and print while others were perceived as hostile. This was important because it defined the host nation information battle space in relation to U.S. operations during the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom.¹²

¹² MNFI-I Strategic Communications (STATCOM) Media Assessment (Camp Victory, Iraq; November 2003).




Figure 1. Iraqi host nation media as of November 2003.¹³

In addition to the host nation media, U.S. PSYOP has to also contend with an international media such as Al Jazeera that are even more sophisticated than anything the U.S. is currently capable of producing.¹⁴ Additionally, with the advent of satellite TV, the U.S. not only has to compete with anti-coalition media within a country, it now has to contend with neighboring satellite reception and programming that is anti-U.S. as well. Essentially, cable and satellite TV and radio, and especially the public internet, offer far more choices than over-the-air networks did formerly.¹⁵ Yet technological advances,

¹³ MNFI-I Strategic Communications (STATCOM) Media Assessment (Camp Victory, Iraq; November 2003).

¹⁴ Office of the Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict." (Washington D.C.: May 2000), 13.

¹⁵ Office of the Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict." (Washington D.C.: May 2000), 13.

while they pose challenges to PSYOP programs, also present new opportunities. For one, the new technologies introduce a broad range of channels that a target audience in a host nation can now watch. This multiplies the possible entry points for PSYOP messages. This has the potential of broadening the target audience's horizon by exposing them to objective programming. Another positive is the target audience in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, poses a strong demand for satellite television, of which many are receptive to sell air time to the U.S. government. On balance, however, the U.S. PSYOP effort is placed in a definite disadvantage due to the collective and virtually unlimited investment that the world-wide media possesses compared to the very limited amount of money invested by the U.S. in PSYOP as a whole.

In addition to considering all the possible forms of media for PSYOP exploitation, it also must be flexible and adaptive. A good PSYOP program must recognize that it cannot remain postured as it was during the beginning of hostilities. It must adapt and change with the current environment. For instance, when despotic regimes are overthrown, there is a tendency for a surge in communications of all sorts. This is due to a breakdown of the strict monopoly that was once previously held by the state - now being turned into an information vacuum.¹⁶ During my time in Kosovo in 2001-02, I was amazed how quickly satellite dishes were popping up once the oppressive regime fell. From a good vantage point, one could see at least a thousand dishes from any direction.

In order to be successful, changing and adapting the PSYOP plan may have to mirror the current trends in the media. Unfortunately, that is not an investment that the U.S. normally makes as opposed to "E Qaeda" who remain high-tech and always managing to stay parallel with the current media fore structure.¹⁷

There is no doubt that the PSYOP effort for the U.S. is an uphill and arduous battle. The battle of the story is up for grabs, and it seems that Al Qaeda has mastered it superbly. For Al Qaeda, they do not have a massive expenditure on advertising budget

¹⁶ Phillips W. Davison, "The Third Person Effect in Communication." *Public Opinion Quarterly* (1983), 47.

¹⁷ Remarks of John Arquilla during a presentation at the Naval Postgraduate School on the "Warfare in the Information Age" (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California September 2005), 12. John Arquilla is a professor of defense analysis at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey California. Dr Arquilla is a former policy analyst at the RAND Corporation who has written extensively on terrorist networks and foreign policy. His works include: *From Troy to Entebbe*, *In Athena's Camp*, *Networks and Net wars*, and the *Reagan Imprint*.

that doles out money to the world media; they simply let their actions receive air time for free.¹⁸ The relationship with Al Qaeda and the media is an interesting paradox. The news outlets are always hungry for a story, and Al Qaeda's spectacular attacks give them that source. Al Qaeda then has a willing source to project their terror via the newspapers, radio stations, satellite and terrestrial television. It is almost a pseudo-symbiotic relationship. How many thousands of hours of news time did the attacks on 9/11 produce? The amount is staggering. Overall, Al Qaeda is executing an effective job of manipulating the media to spread its terror. The U.S. should not expect anything less than Al Qaeda continuing ongoing operations with the same methodology for the next several decades.¹⁹

In addition to Al Qaeda, the U.S. also has to contend with the endemic hatred for U.S. foreign policy around the world. U.S.-backed repressive rulers such as the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia, Suharto in Indonesia, and General Sani Abacha in Nigeria, while discreetly making deals with their American patrons and often enriching themselves from oil revenues, have proven their piety to the masses by encouraging the state-controlled press to demonize America.²⁰ The media have thus provided the government a safety valve through which to redirect anger from their social and political failures. Nowhere is this threat greater than in Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden is, in many ways, that country's true son, a product of the contradiction between the sheikdom's support for U.S. strategic interests and the virulent anti-Americanism that the Saudis cultivate and export from their mosques and madrasas.²¹

Clearly the U.S. response to an ever challenging war of ideas should come from all aspects and at all levels from the U.S. government. One answer to stem the tide of hatred towards the U.S. is the formulation of an international voice comprised of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). Formulated in 1999 as a result of the alarming success that hate radio had in the Balkans, its goal was to influence foreign audiences' and conduct objective broadcasting. The BBG is reported to have over a 100 million

¹⁸ Remarks of John Arquilla during a presentation at the Naval Postgraduate School on the "Warfare in the Information Age" (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California September 2005), 12.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ David Hoffman. "Beyond Public Diplomacy" *Foreign Affairs* (March / April 2002), 86.

²¹ Ibid.

listeners that tune into the BBG for U.S. sponsored TV programs that range in over 65 languages. The overall objective is promoting democracy through timely and objective broadcasting.²²

However, despite the BBG playing a critical role in delivering information to critical areas around the world, to this date, the U.S. has not established programming that adequately addresses the growing surge in satellite television and the internet.²³ The lack of satellite usage as a medium can be solved with the buying of more air time. The problem with purchasing more air time, though, is budgetary: since the BBG was created in 1994, its budget has declined by about 12 percent, from \$573 million to \$507 million.²⁴ The BBG has the programming, but needs more satellite time and modern television production facilities and equipment, not only in the United States but also in regional centers overseas, to combat biased stations such as Al Jazeera.²⁵ Conversely, Al Qaeda can be seen and heard on the internet, satellite television, as well as radio for free of charge because their message is newsworthy. Likewise, Usama Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders are aired internationally via high tech satellite television, while the U.S. message is concentrated on a secondary form of media throughout most of the world. It seems ironic that Al Qaeda can deliver a video tape to Al Jazeera within hours; the tape is then played or aired to millions around the world. Therein lies the challenge in Strategic Information and PSYOP planning at all levels in terms of winning the war of ideas.

Fortunately for the U.S., the platform that Usama Bin Laden enjoys has also been available to the U.S. Sadly, the opportunity has been squandered. In his September 20 speech to the nation, President Bush defined the U.S. attitude to the rest of the world – but particularly to toward Arabs and Muslims in unequivocal terms. “Either you are with us or with the terrorists,” President Bush warned the rest of the world in his speech to a

²² Stephen Johnson, Dale Helle. “How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy.” *The Heritage Foundation: Background*, April 23, 2003. Journal on-line. Available from <http://www.ifa.de/b/volltext/us-publdipl.pdf>; Internet; accessed 23 October 2006.

²³ Antony J. Blinken. “Winning the War of Ideas.” *The Washington Quarterly* (2003). The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology : 25:2 , 110. Antony J. Blinken is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and served on the National Security Council from 1994 to 2001.

²⁴ Ibid., 311.

²⁵ Ibid.

joint session of congress. Such a polarized message does not address the threat of terrorism and leaves little room for dialogue.²⁶ The lesson that can be inferred strikes not only at the importance of having the ability to convey the message, but more importantly, actually saying the right message to the right target audience. A secondary lesson is the diffusion of the message from the intended target audience to the unintended target audience. Although the speech was effective in terms of the American populace, the message soon reached foreign governments that were not necessarily receptive to being placed on the spot, especially countries such as Pakistan whose government possesses a tenuous and fragile control over much of its territory.

²⁶ Lamis Andoni. "Deeds Speak Louder Than Words." *The Washington Quarterly* (2003). The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology : 262. Lamis Andoni, a Middle East analyst, is widely published in Western and Arabic newspapers.

III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

A. INTRODUCTION

In supporting the thesis, it was important to examine the utility of host nation media not only in the present, but in the past as well. Instead of just picking specific instances in history, it was important to examine several engagements, going back six decades to establish a historical baseline that would prove its importance regardless of the time period. However, with so many historical case studies to choose from, it is imperative that the case studies represent pertinent examples for the examination of the benefits and drawbacks of utilizing or replicating host nation media assets.

In this chapter, the case studies that were picked include significant uses of host nation media from World War II to the present era that had a dramatic impact. In that sense, the use of host nation media can truly be examined in a holistic manner whose merits can be judged as standing the test of time. The analysis begins with World War II because that is where the use of radio and the maximization of host nation media first came into effect. The Germans and the English felt so highly about the importance of host nation media that they chose to replicate national media outlets in their black PSYOP programs. The next case is the Korean Conflict, which is important because it showed how a previously non-existent and severely undermanned PSYOP fore structure benefited from host nation media. An analysis of Vietnam, provide accounts of specific campaigns of PSYOP that were effective and successful in their goals of winning the war of ideas for the North Vietnamese. The aspects of Desert Storm and the Balkans are important because these cases transition into the use of host nation media in the era of the 24 hour news cycle.

In terms of the metrics in examining each case, the historical case studies will not have a uniform set of evaluation criteria because of the variances in MOEs. Instead, the analysis will hone in on whether the MOEs specific to the PSYOP campaign in a particular conflict were successfully achieved with the aid of host nation media. The MOEs that support the thesis will be driven from enemy behavior, imitation, opposing accounts on the effects, and the long-term historical analysis from veterans and experts alike. Historical analysis is important because MOEs are often uncovered years

or even decades after a conflict is over. An example is a veteran of a war being interviewed or archives discovered that addresses the impact of a particular PSYOP program.

The advent of radio, television, and newspapers, as a source for psychological operations has been prevalent throughout most of the 20th century. Since people in either peacetime or war depend upon the media for information, naturally, opposing forces have tried to utilize the host nation media to gain a psychological advantage over the enemy and the populace. Additionally, since the host nation media is often the most trusted media in a given country, opposing states have also gone to great lengths in re-creating host nation media with the hopes of injecting occasional psychological products that supported their wartime objectives. The cases examined include the use of media in World War II by the English and the Germans. Additionally, historical examples in Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, and the Balkans will establish a step-by-step chronological analysis of the benefits and drawbacks of host nation media. The analysis will then set the stage for Chapter IV in which contemporary use of host nation media will be examined.

B. WORLD WAR II

Out of the many examples throughout the 20th century, the PSYOP and propaganda efforts in World War II are distinct due to the uninhibited environment and the nature of the PSYOP and propaganda campaigns of both the Allies and the Axis powers. As a result, the PSYOP efforts had a profound effect on the outcome of the war. In the book *The Radio War*, David Owen describes how radio waves carried signals and communications between ships and aircraft, bases and units, headquarters and agents, on a scale never experienced. The very medium of radio waves and print became an entirely new battlefield with its own weaponry, its own tactics and its own rules.²⁷ In terms of assessing the impact that host nation media had, the primary MOEs for determining success in World War II for this thesis will be: captured prisoners, enemy counter

²⁷ David Owen. *Battle of Wits: A Study of Deception in Warfare* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Crane Russak & Company, 1979), 70.

PSYOP, recorded behavior in direct concert with the PSYOP message, enemy admissions, captured documents, imitation of the enemies' PSYOP strategies, and historical hindsight.²⁸

Prior to and during the beginning of the war, the predominance of the campaigns consisted of mainly white PSYOP. As mentioned in Chapter II, white PSYOP utilizes messages whose sources are easily identifiable by the intended audience. Such messages were expanded during this period when there was an explosion of mass communication-broadcasting, worldwide wire news services, mobile printing presses, and motion pictures that provided instruments of psychological operations previously undreamed of.²⁹ White PSYOP was masterfully used by the Minister of Information, Joseph Goebbels, who orchestrated the use of radio, the press, demonstrations, group meetings abroad, agents, displays, and once the attacks started, screaming dive bombers. The Nazis gave the first full dress-demonstration of what psychological operations can accomplish with the new tools of mass communication.³⁰ Its effect was so profound that the Allies began following suit.

PSYOP campaigns of both the Allies and Axis powers expanded to not only conducting white PSYOP, but also conducted black PSYOP deception operations that set propaganda campaigns to a whole new level. This was quite a change since white PSYOP was the norm that typically was used for surrender appeals and the lowering of the enemies' morale.³¹ The recognition of both sides of the effects of host nation media led to multiple efforts to control, negate, and replicate such information mediums. Such replication of PSYOP took hold and evolved into effective black PSYOP campaigns that had a dramatic effect upon the war.

White PSYOP broadcast from England to Germany, and vice versa, would concentrate on overt radio messages that concentrated on German or British defeats while also encouraging morale within their country and lowering morale upon the citizens and

²⁸ William Daugherty *A Psychological Warfare Casebook* (New York: Arno Press, 1979), 428.

²⁹ Phillip P. Katz (LTC retired), Mclaurin, Ronald, Abbot, Preston S. *Psychological Operations Principles and Case Studies: A Critical Analysis of US PSYOP*. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1996), 122.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 123.

³¹ Kermit Roosevelt. *War Report of the OSS* (New York: Walker and Company, 1976), 123.

military personnel of their adversary. The broadcasters were well known, which meant that the goals of the broadcasts were obvious to the target audiences, and the recipients, knowing the source of the messages, would already know what the content of the message would be. This limited the utility of white PSYOP, because it only spoke to those already “converted” to the message.³²

On the other hand, if a so-called British radio station were to produce normal pro-British broadcasts, the effect of any occasional hint of bad news would be greatly magnified, as its listeners would tend to accept it as the truth; thus the essence of black PSYOP.³³ Therefore, as opposed to white PSYOP, black PSYOP was carefully disguised. Black PSYOP had to be quite clever to be believed by the target audience. Radio stations that produced black PSYOP produced broadcasts that were in accordance with the target audiences’ expectation. As the listeners tuned in to familiar music, various entertainment shows, and news updates, the listeners would then be ripe for occasional bits of information that would be misleading. The uncertainty of the listeners would often cause panic, a lowering of morale, and wasted resources and time in reaction to the false PSYOP.

During World War II, black PSYOP was relatively easy to create because the British and the Germans were no stranger to each other’s culture. Such familiarity allowed for the re-creation of host nation media that were incredibly identical to actual host nation media in terms of content, colloquialisms, language, and even the expected regional accents within Germany or Great Britain. The results of such familiarity allowed for fake message broadcasts to be believed by the target audience because they could not discern the difference between legitimate media and external PSYOP. In fact, the PSYOP broadcasts were so close to the actual host nation media that it created an aura of confusion when the targeted country would refute the broadcast. An example is a PSYOP radio broadcast from Germany to France that is then refuted by the French and then followed by another PSYOP broadcast refuting Frances’s counter PSYOP message. This PSYOP game of “who’s on first-who’s on second” left the target audience not

³² David Owen. *Battle of Wits: A Study of Deception in Warfare* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Crane Russak & Company, 1979), 71.

³³ Ibid.

knowing who or what to believe. Joseph Goebbels thrived on such confusion by insisting that the PSYOP messages be “genuine to British listeners by making scathing attacks on Germany and the Nazis, but underneath this sugar-coating came the propaganda pill.”³⁴ Such deceptive tactics were mastered by the Germans and was a factor in their success early in the war.³⁵

The Germans began their psychological offensive in the winter of 1939-1940 under the strict supervision of Joseph Goebbels. By January and February, two secret transmitters began broadcasting against the British and the French. One transmitter was passed off as a secret station run by the French Communist Party, while the other posed as an anti-government British station that was based in Ireland. On 10 May, 1940, German forces swept into Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg and France while also shattering or overtaking all communication nodes in the process. All throughout Western Europe, people were worried and impatient with official broadcasts that shed little light on the situation. Rumors were rampant and a target audience evolved as well as an information void that the Germans could exploit. Thus the conditions were set for the Germans to begin to take advantage of a vulnerable target audience in need of any news and information.³⁶

Seizing the communications advantage, the Germans began transmitting news items via German and captured host nation transmitters about the “Fifth Columnists” that were perceived by many to be rampant throughout Western Europe. The concept of the “Fifth Columnists” was a fabrication by German propagandists that according to radio, “to be found anywhere and everywhere, organizing acts of sabotage, treachery and murder to help the French defeat.”³⁷ Hitting multiple targets in one message, the Germans also transmitted that many of the saboteurs were Germans in the guise of Jewish refugees, which helped the Germans to manipulate the French into persecuting Jewish refugees who were seeking escape from persecution in Germany. This was evidenced in

³⁴ David Owen, *Battle of Wits: A Study of Deception in Warfare* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Crane Russak & Company, 1979), 72.

³⁵ Ibid., 73.

³⁶ Ibid., 70.

³⁷ Ibid., 72.

Joseph Goebbels's secret conference notes. In these notes, Goebbels commented on the "Fifth Columnists" programs, saying "in the present situation, even Jews from Germany are nothing but German agents."³⁸

As the Germans pushed their advance deeper in French territory, and the French military was in utter chaos and retreat, the confusion and panic amongst the populace grew even worse. It was then that the German transmitters began stepping up their transmissions with their "watch out for the Fifth Columnist" scare with unprecedented success.³⁹ As predicted and planned by the Germans, the "Fifth Column" scare began to creep into the French newspapers and continued to cause even further damage to an already desperate and depressing situation. This was helped by the fact that German influence had crept into the French news papers to the tune of 350 million francs reported during a six month period leading up to the Munich agreement and much more thereafter.⁴⁰

The PSYOP broadcast caused the French populace to worry about the "Fifth Column" and concentrated on looking for traitors in their midst as opposed to countering the true threat, the German advance. Amazingly, the panic was started and perpetuated by mostly French officials who "were obsessed by what they imagined the Fifth Column to have done."⁴¹ Additionally, the Germans planted stories in the broadcasts that warned the Germans were pillaging all the cash from banks, thus causing the French to precipitate an economic breakdown as a result of a panic to withdraw their money from the French banks.⁴²

Overall, is there is "evidence that there was a large listening audience that tuned into the German broadcast such as the Stuttgart broadcasts even despite the realization

³⁸ William A. Boelcke., Ed. *The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels: October 1939 – March 1943* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1970), 72.

³⁹ Ibid., 73.

⁴⁰ Michael Balfour. *Propaganda, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany*. (London: Routledge and Kegan 1979), 181.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² David Owen. *Battle of Wits: A Study of Deception in Warfare* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Crane Russak & Company, 1979), 72.

that some channels were German in disguise.”⁴³ Unfortunately for the French, the listening audience was also the French military that would eventually find itself struggling with collaboration and resistance towards the invading Germans.⁴⁴ Ironically, even if the Black PSYOP broadcast was discovered to be German, “the French public and the military listened because they distrusted their government and the French media; a distrust that was hardened by the French government’s vacillating policies, past deceptions, and failure to clearly explain why it was at war with Germany over Poland.”⁴⁵ The final testament to the effectiveness of the broadcasts was the mistrust of the French government as a result of the propaganda effort of the black German PSYOP broadcasts throughout the early part of the war, of which the primary target was Prime Minister Paul Reynaud. As France collapsed, Reynaud was arrested and nearly executed while Marsal Phillippe Petain established the pro-Nazi Vichy government, per the wishes of the various clandestine (seemingly French) radio broadcasts.⁴⁶

The decisive defeat of France was a culmination of kinetic and soft power assets that took advantage of a populace panicked by tanks and dive bombers, as well as the threat of the fabricated “Fifth Column” that was perceived to be around them. Such panic was then amplified by the French media by prominent writers such Charles Rolo. Like many writers in the 1940s, Rolo believed that a “Nazi fifth column undermined France’s ability to fight and led to the rapid defeat of the French army during the brief May-June 1940 war.”⁴⁷ Similarly, Edmond Taylor⁴⁸ a journalist in France during the German invasion and later turned OSS agent, described in his book, *The Strategy of Terror*, “how

⁴³ Lawrence C Soley. *Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA subversive propaganda* (New York: Praeger Publishers 1989), 14.

⁴⁴ Janos Radvanyi, Pierre Lacoste. *Psychological Operations and Political Warfare in Long-Term Strategic Planning: The French Army and Psychological Warfare* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Pub Group. 1990), 36.

⁴⁵ Central and Western Europe: Prospects of Russian Dominance” (January 11, 1944), FDR, Map Room Files, box 73, OSS Numbered Bulletin 94.

⁴⁶ Lawrence C. Soley. *Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA subversive propaganda* (New York: Praeger Publishers 1989), 18.

⁴⁷ Gaston Coblentz. “German Revolt Asked by Exile Group in Russia. “ *New York Herald Tribune*, 22 June 1943, 6.

⁴⁸ Edmond Taylor became a widely cited author among psychological warfare theorists due to his extensive experience as a journalist in France and as an OSS agent.

rumors, sabotage, and above ground and clandestine broadcasts worked together to bring about the defeat of France.”⁴⁹ In fact, the German PSYOP was so good that he recommended the need to utilize Fifth Column tactics- “fighting fire with fire” to the eventual creator of the OSS (the present day CIA).⁵⁰ Soon Bill Donovan, who recruited Taylor, began to believe in the effectiveness of this strategy that would ultimately have a measurable impact on how the OSS viewed PSYWAR.⁵¹

The overall use of PSYOP media started with a few German transmitters and then grew with captured French transmitters, and then snowballed into the full-force German PSYOP that made its way into the actual host nation French media. The result was a German attack designed to “demoralize the enemy, to destroy the cohesion, discipline, and collective morale [of France]....to break the enemy’s will to win or simply his will to resist.”⁵² The result was a “systematic and complete collapse of a European superpower, and the world being stunned at a German military machine that had just decimated the French.”⁵³ Additionally, the method and rapidity of the French collapse profoundly affected the British who soon began to believe there were Fifth Columns in England as well.⁵⁴

Most historians agree that the Germans were beat in World War II by the Allied Forces imitating their tactics and producing similar weaponry. The German use of Panzer tanks, air-land doctrine, and the first use of paratroopers were all mimicked to perfection by the allies.⁵⁵ The Allies also incorporated the Germans’ PSYOP techniques and used

⁴⁹ Andrew Roth, “Free Germany Aims at Nazi Morale,” *New York Times*, 5 September 1943, E4.

⁵⁰ Lawrence C. Soley. *Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA subversive propaganda*, (New York: Praeger Publishers 1989), 14.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁵² Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 27 July 1943, D14.

⁵³ David Owen. *Battle of Wits: A Study of Deception in Warfare* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Crane Russak & Company, 1979), 72.

⁵⁴ Lawrence C.Soley. *Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA subversive propaganda*, (New York: Praeger Publishers 1989), 18.

⁵⁵ History Learning Site. “Hitler and the Nazi’s.” December 2006. Article on-line. Available from http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/paratroopers_and_world_war_two.htm: Internet; Accessed 15 December 2006.

similar campaigns to affect the demise of the Third Reich. The British soon became quite adept in the information domain and soon began conducting black PSYOP that replicated German host nation media and exploited target audiences in similar fashion.

Such exploitations were made infamous by a journalist named Sefton Delmer, the mastermind of the British black PSYOP campaign during WWII. Sefton Delmer was an Australian professor who spent time as a newsman in Berlin became very familiar with the German culture and mindset, as well as being fluent in German. Eventually, through various connections in the media, Delmer became acquainted with Adolf Hitler, Joseph Goebbels, Heinrich Himmler, Hermann Goering, and various Nazis within the Third Reich. By 1940, he moved to England due to his opposition to the Nazi regime and quickly gained acceptance into the intelligence world after a lengthy security clearance process.⁵⁶

After obtaining his clearance, Delmer began work immediately by manning two radio programs. One was led by a group called The Émigré German Marxists that ran the program: *Radio of the European Revolution*. The other was run under the guise that targeted the right-wing opposition to the Nazis. Like the Germans, Delmer, made his listeners believe that a large and active resistance organization was thriving within Germany. In a clever move, Delmer made the programs patriotic whose target audiences were lower ranking Nazis. His broadcasts criticized the senior Nazi officials “who were bungling the direction of the war, letting down the soldiers and the people, and feathering their own nests at the expense of Germany.”⁵⁷ Other radio programs he made gave the German soldiers manning the Atlantic Wall a feeling of isolation and hopelessness, while many of their colleagues were being sent to the Eastern front to face the Soviets.⁵⁸

Delmer’s programs cut at the heart of natural curiosity. Much of the success was because “they secured a hearing as does gossip, or a newspaper columnist, by gratifying curiosity and anxiety, the desire to know as much as possible, to get the [‘inside story’],

⁵⁶ Sefton Delmer. *Black Boomerang* (London: Secker and Warburg Ltd, 1962), 75-76.

⁵⁷ David Owen. *Battle of Wits: A Study of Deception in Warfare* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Crane Russak & Company, 1979), 76.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 86.

even at the cost of not knowing how much of it is reliable.”⁵⁹ To appease such a curiosity, Delmer concocted stories how blood was being obtained from Russian and Polish POWs, and then were given to German soldiers and citizens despite the fact that much of the blood supply was infected with venereal diseases and various impurities. The result was another series of morale killers that made many within Germany become leery of receiving blood transfusions or giving blood in general.⁶⁰

As the programs began to make their mark, Delmer switched themes in order to keep up with changing attitudes. For instance, Delmer began focusing on pro-desertion programming that gave subtle hints that Americans and British officials had been very generous with German POWs by supplying them with a healthy food quota, as well as emphasizing the ever increasing numbers of deserters as well.⁶¹ As the war progressed, the programming became so effective that even the Allies were fooled into believing they were credible. One example is the Delmer lead radio station, *Gustav Siegfried*. American attaches in London not privy to the Black PSYOP programs, mistook the programming to be German in nature, and reported back to Washington that there was a “dramatic increase in hostilities between Nazi party and army leaders.”⁶²

As the war progressed, opportunities began to appear for British PSYOP broadcasts. The assassination attempt of Adolf Hitler provided an incredible angle for which to manipulate. During the aftermath of the assassination attempt, the programs emphasized and suggested that the plot was far larger than anyone in Germany had realized, and that the time was now to seize power and bring piece to Germany at last. The result was a deepening of the German ranks and a growing distrust for the Wehrmacht by the Nazi regime.⁶³ Such distrust is further evidenced by the secret Gestapo files that showed estimates of listenership rising from 1 million in 1941 to 15 million in 1944 with the penalty for being caught rising proportionally from being a

⁵⁹ Michael Balfour. *Propaganda, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany*. (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1979), 428.

⁶⁰ Michael Balfour. *Propaganda, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany*. (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1979), 87.

⁶¹ Ibid., 91.

⁶² Sefton Delmer. *Black Boomerang* (London: Secker and Warburg Ltd, 1962), 75-76.

⁶³ Owen, David. *Battle of Wits: A Study of Deception in Warfare* (London: Crane Russak & Co. June 1979), 74.

misdeemeanor, to a felony, and then ultimately to death. Amazingly, even at the cost of death, the PSYOP stations increased their target audience by 1,500 percent.⁶⁴

Other evidence to the effectiveness of the broadcast can be measured by the “extent to which the German broadcasters devoted themselves to answering both overt radio stations such as the BBC as well as clandestine radio stations, usually but by no means always saying where they came from.”⁶⁵ One such radio station that was constantly challenged by the Germans was called *Der Chief*. The purpose of the black PSYOP station was to turn the ordinary fighting German against their Nazi leaders with programs meant create a rift within the ranks such as this excerpt:

If it should be a question of choosing between Goering or Himmler, then, by God and all the saints, let us have 30,000 hundred-weight of Hermann, rather than one milligram of this scheming political out-house flower, of the anemic inflated windbag, Heinrich Himmler...⁶⁶

As the tide started to turn against Germany, the British began culminating their PSYOP campaign that would further destabilize an already chaotic and war-torn Germany. At the request of Winston Churchill, PSYOP radio programming began targeting the civilian populace who were now stricken with strife and panic. In a radio program called *Soldatensender Calais*, the British began targeting civilians who were fleeing as fast as the German military via a massive wattage transmitter. The aim was to confuse the people by announcing false staging points and evacuation orders and thus clog the road arteries that were badly needed by the retreating German forces. Such confusion caused the German people to second guess the Nazi regime, and was further enforced by *Soldatensender Calais*’ “rumors and gossip that portrayed German political and military leaders in a bad light.”⁶⁷ During the closing months of the war, when the German populace was starved for information, the German radio stations would only play

⁶⁴ Asa Briggs. *The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom. Vol.2*, (New York, London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 34. *The Golden Age of Wireless Volume 3* (New York, London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 67. *The War of Words* (New York, London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 123.

⁶⁵ Michael Balfour. *Propaganda, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany* (London: Routledge and Kegan 1979), 181.

⁶⁶ Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). (April 20, 1943), Y3.

⁶⁷ Lawrence C. Soley. *Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA subversive propaganda*, (New York: Praeger Publishers 1989), 32.

classical music, failing to satisfy the demand for information.⁶⁸ The German populace then started to turn to whatever outlet for information that was available, and this source turned out to be *Soldatensender Calais*. After the war, a survey was conducted that “found that 23 percent of respondents who had turned to a non-domestic German station had turned to the *Soldatensender*.”⁶⁹

A campaign of this magnitude required technological innovation. In order to carry out the synchronized broadcasts across all the territory they needed to cover, the British purchased from the Americans an RCA 500,000 kilowatt mammoth Aspidistra. The Aspidistra was the largest transmitter ever built, and from the moment it started broadcasting, the entire countries of France and Germany could be reached. Additionally, all other stations near its bandwidth could be bled out at a time when a large transmitter was considered to range from 150,000 to 200,000 kilowatts.⁷⁰



Figure 2. 500,000 KW Aspidistra transmitter used against Germany.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Lawrence C. Soley. *Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA subversive propaganda*, (New York: Praeger Publishers 1989), 32.

⁶⁹ “Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEP), Psychological Warfare Department (PWD): Intelligence Section- Listening to Allied Radio Broadcasts by German Civilians Under the Nazis” (June 5, 1945), *Lerner*, box 87, file 7.

⁷⁰ David Owen. *Battle of Wits: A Study of Deception in Warfare*. (New York: Crane Russak & Co. June 1979), 89.

⁷¹ Robert Rowen. “Gray and Black Propaganda Against Nazi Germany.” Presented to the New York Military Affairs Symposium, 18 April 2003. Journal on-line. Available from <http://www.libraryautomation.com/nymas/radioproppaper.htm>; Internet; accessed 4 December 2006.

In addition to the newly found broadcasting range, the British became extremely efficient in switching frequencies and cutting in on actual German radio stations, so that when signed off the air, the listeners could not discern between factual transmissions and enemy PSYOP. As soon as a German transmission was complete with an actual evacuation order, the *Soldatensender* team would then break in with false instructions with alternate gathering points. The final result of the programming had thousands of Germans on the roads of Germany making their way to fictitious rendezvous locations while impeding the movement of military units. By the war's end, Aspidistra would broadcast on *Radio Frankfurts's* frequency for several hours each day when the real station was silenced because of air raids. The fake broadcasts urged the citizens to evacuate as soon as possible or face death at the hands of the Allied war machine.⁷² David Owen describes the situation at the wars end as "Germany alive with frightened people, marching they knew not where."⁷³

The lessons of World War II illustrated superb PSYOP tactics that were implemented by Nazis with incredible success in France and the Low Countries. The British built on what the Germans started and soon began winning the air waves by imaginative programming that replicated host nation media and soon found its way into the actual host nation media of Germany itself. The PSYOP campaign by the British had been a critical factor in dismantling the German war machine. Additionally, the lessons of World War II showed that despite successes in manipulating and replicating host nation media, it can also be twisted and used against your own country as the Germans found out.

C. THE KOREAN CONFLICT

The Korean conflict had PSYOP advantages and disadvantages due to the exact culture and language shared by both North and South Korea. In South Korea, there were

⁷² The Psychological Warfare Division Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, *An Account of its Operation in the Western European Campaign 1944-1945* (Bad Homburg, Germany: SHAEF, October 1945), 55; "Use of Aspidistra to Break Down German Resistance" (January 19, 1945), JCS 1218/ 1, JCS, P.1: 1942-45, The European Theater reel 11, nos. 469-506; Delmer, Sefton *Black Boomerang*, pp.195-200; Charles Cruickshank, *The Fourth Arm* (London: Davis Poynter, 1977), 153-58.

⁷³ David Owen, *Battle of Wits: A Study of Deception in Warfare* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Crane Russak & Co. June 1979), 32.

a plethora of host nation personnel and media that could be used against the North. However, the obvious disadvantage was the ability for the North to do exactly the same to the South. The majority of the PSYOP effort was concentrated on coercing and keeping support within North and South Korea respectively, and then transitioned into targeting enemy military forces. During the first five months of the war, enemy troops did not receive as much leaflet and broadcast attention as did the Republic of Korea civilians and soldiers; it was mainly PSYOP conducted on our allies to support their will to fight.⁷⁴

PSYOP operations by the U.S. military had screeched to a halt after the end of World War II as all military PSYOP units were completely disbanded. Far more significantly, PSYOP instruction were removed from the Army training curriculum, schools, and from Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E).⁷⁵ By the start of the Korean War in 1950, the U.S. was scrambling to assemble a patchwork PSYOP program that would be needed for the conflict. The upstart Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) which consisted of only 6 personnel, slowly built to a staff of 35 personnel by the summer of 1952.⁷⁶ By that time, millions of PSYOP leaflets were being delivered by aircraft and howitzers to target audiences of North Koreans, South Koreans, and Chinese forces that invaded the Korean peninsula.⁷⁷

From the start of the Korean War, U.S. PSYOP developed slowly and was generally unorganized, ad hoc, reactive, and was conducted with little host nation support. Target audiences were not well known, which meant that there was little knowledge about appropriate themes, symbols, cultural nuances, and susceptibilities of Koreans and Chinese alike. By the eve of the Korean War, a report on the status of

⁷⁴ “Korean War Leaflets” box, USASOC Directorate of History and Museums, “Evaluation and Analysis of Leaflet Program in the Korean Campaign, June-December 1950” (ORO, Washington: 23 January 1951), 9-10.

⁷⁵ PSYWAR Administrative Office Records Branch, Record Group 319, Decimal File 1951-54, entry 338, box 17, folder 314.7; K.K. Hansen, “Psywar in Korea” (Joint Subsidiary Activities Group, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington: 1960).

⁷⁶ Stephen Pease. *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950-1953* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole books), 16.

⁷⁷ Herbert Friedman. “The American PSYOP Organization During the Korean War”, 18 January 2006; [Article on-line]; available from: <http://www.psywarrior.com/korieaPSYOPhist.html>; Internet; accessed 23 January 2007.

PSYWAR stated “that it was abundantly clear that the ‘know how’ of PSYWAR, gained in World War II, had largely vanished and was not set forth in writing, but was locked up in the minds of operators who had gone back to civilian pursuits...”⁷⁸

Given these constraints, the U.S. effort concentrated mainly on the quantity as opposed to the quality of PSYOP products. The “throw manure on the wall and hope it sticks” mentality of developing PSYOP was the mantra from the beginning throughout midway through the war. Overall, very little thought was given to the PSYOP products as the push to get as many leaflets out was the order of the day.⁷⁹ During the early phases, the concentration of PSYOP was focused towards the South Korean populace and military due to the rapid push by the Communists. Many of the themes at the beginning of the war were aimed at convincing the South to hold on and to keep on fighting.⁸⁰ As the war went on, U.S. PSYOP efforts began to improve dramatically. A critical advance was the “realization that surrender or defection was a sequential process.” As a result,



Figure 3. “The UN Troops Treat Them Good”⁸¹

⁷⁸ M. Dyer, J. Segal, *The POWWAR TMs: An Assessment of ORO PSYWAR Research* (Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore: 13 June 1956), 12.

⁷⁹ Herbert Freidman, “The American PSYOP Organization During the Korean War”, 18 January 2006; [Article on-line]; available from: <http://www.psywarrior.com/korieaPSYOPhist.html>; Internet; accessed 23 January 2007.

⁸⁰ Stephen Pease. *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950-1953* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole books), 46.

⁸¹ 8th BN Product Development Center (PDC) Files (Unclassified) , 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne). Historical Archives (Fort Bragg, North Carolina).

the “themes of homesickness, loneliness, fear of death and safety like the leaflet below were used to ‘soften up’ enemy troops for surrender.”⁸²

Throughout the war, many of the millions of PSYOP leaflets that were being dropped on the enemy soon began to be augmented with limited radio broadcasts that utilized Koreans in the PSYOP effort. The first radio station was set up in the destroyed American embassy in Seoul on October 4, 1950. This station began its broadcasts with General Douglas MacArthur's demand that Kim Il-Sung, the chief of the North Korean troops, surrender. As battle lines changed and the Korean War progressed, the station broadcast from mobile trucks and had many names such as: *Radio Kilroy*, *Radio Vagabond*, *Radio Comet* and *Radio Mercury*.⁸³ Such radio stations, albeit possessing a small daily broadcast cycle compared to the Soviets and the Chinese, along with the hundreds of millions of leaflets dropped began to have moderate success with getting North Koreans and Chinese to surrender. The Army contract study, *PSYWAR in Korea*, interrogated 2,728 POWs on one occasion; 904 claimed that PSYWAR print and broadcast were responsible for their surrender. A smaller sampling of 561 POWs reported that no less than 377 attributed to a PSYOP product or loudspeaker.⁸⁴ In fact PSYOP has been credited with over 100,000 Chinese and North Korean surrenders by the end of the war and one third of all POWs interviewed expressed that they had been influenced by UN PSYWAR⁸⁵

One major problem that affected PSYOP in Korea was the fluid battlefield. During the war, Seoul was captured twice as battle lines went back and forth. The effect was troublesome on the establishment of radio stations that needed static transmitters and antenna towers to operate. The problem was thus solved by utilizing mobile radio stations as the one pictured below that comprised of PSYOP personnel and host nation

⁸² Stanley Sandler. “*Cease Resistance: It’s Good For You*”: A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 1999), 207.

⁸³ Nick Grace. “Investigative Report: Radio and U.S. Military PSYOPS,” The Institute of Communications Studies, 11 February 1998 [Journal online] ; available from <http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&requesttimeout=5008folder=648paper=930> ; Internet; Accessed 2 December 2006..

⁸⁴ R.C. Sheldon and H. Senft, “Preliminary Evaluations of Psywar Leaflets and Broadcasts from IPOR POW Interrogations,” International Public Opinion Research, (Washington D.C.: 22 February 1951), 3.

⁸⁵ Carl Berger. *An Introduction to Wartime Leaflets* (Washington D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, American University, 1959), 123.

personnel to man the radio station. Perhaps the only drawback was the lack of continuity and stability that limited air time significantly. However, radio in Korea played a pivotal role due to the rates of illiteracy that was prevalent throughout the North Korean and Chinese ranks. It is estimated that 30% of the North Korean soldiers, based on POW camp observation were functionally illiterate, which obviously made PSYOP via radio a valuable commodity.⁸⁶ In reaction to the instability of the war front early on, PSYOP broadcasts were augmented by strategic broadcasts from Tokyo. Over 19 medium and shortwave broadcasters were being used to transmit PSYOP programs to Korea. With the infusion of host nation assets, personnel, and committed resources from the UN, broadcasts later in the war were considerably more sophisticated and ecumenical, adding cultural programs, commentaries, and even soap operas to their schedules.⁸⁷



Figure 4. The Army's Armed Forces Radio Service began as a mobile clandestine radio stations during the Korean War.⁸⁸

By April of 1952, three organizations were conducting PSYOP operations in the battle for Korea. Strategic PSYOP was conducted by the Psychological Warfare Section, GHQ, FECOM, in Tokyo. The Psychological Warfare Division, G-3, Eighth Army, eventually located in Seoul, conducted operational and tactical PSYOP with the help of 139 military, civilian and indigenous personnel (which included 10 professional Chinese

⁸⁶ Stephen Pease. *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950-1953* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole books), 16.

⁸⁷ Goerge S Pettee. "Psywar Operations in the Korean War," Operations Research Office, (Fort McNair, Washington: 23 January 1951), 23.

⁸⁸ Herbert Freidman, "The American PSYOP Organization During the Korean War", 18 January 2006; [Article on-line];available from: <http://www.psywarrior.com/korieaPSYOPhist.html>; Internet; accessed 23 January 2007.

and Korean translators and interviewers).⁸⁹ Consolidation activities (dissemination of war and morale news in an attempt to bring piece by convincing the populace to support their government) were conducted by the State Department's U.S. Information Service, based in Pusan.⁹⁰ Three of these PSYOP efforts utilized host nation personnel and assets, and were starting to have success against the North Koreans and Chinese. This is evidenced by increasing percentages of enemy POWs responding to PSYOP messages.

As the war progressed and the Communists were driven north, further studies showed 68 percent of Chinese Communist and 65 percent of North Korean POWs responded that they had been influenced by U.S. PSYOP. Of the voluntary surrenders the figures were no less than 90 percent of the Chinese and 77 percent of the North Koreans.⁹¹ Clearly the message was getting out on multiple levels while studies across the board were showing positive results. Additionally, in terms of operational PSYOP, the capture of Seoul boosted the tactical PSYOP programs in the mainland. One 50 kilowatt transmitter was broadcasting in the medium wave, a 10 kilowatt in the shortwave, and to reach Pyongyang, a 500 kilowatt transmitter was utilized to broadcast PSYOP messages. The lynchpin of the broadcasts was the successful application of host nation media personnel to such information platforms that the target audiences identified with.⁹²

In addition to radio broadcast, utilizing host nation media personnel also had a huge part in the millions of leaflets that were dropped in North and South Korea. As the war progressed, so did the effectiveness of leaflets that were dropped due to the influence of utilizing Korean and Chinese personnel. This was evidenced by the similar leaflets

⁸⁹ Stanley Sandler, *"Cease Resistance: It's Good For You": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 1999), 207.

⁹⁰ Herbert Friedman, "The American PSYOP Organization During the Korean War", 18 January 2006; [Article on-line]; available from: <http://www.psywarrior.com/korieaPSYOPhist.html>; Internet; accessed 23 January 2007.

⁹¹ Memo, General McClure, R. to Comptroller of the Army, subject: "Effectiveness of Psychological Warfare in Korea," HRC GEOG V, Korea, 091.412, (Washington D.C, Center of Military History 6 March 1952).

⁹² Herbert Friedman, "The American PSYOP Organization During the Korean War", 18 January 2006; [Article on-line]; available from: <http://www.psywarrior.com/korieaPSYOPhist.html>; Internet; accessed 23 January 2007.

used against the UN personnel that were increasing in effectiveness and quality.⁹³ One leaflet that was directed at black soldiers was effective in terms of targeting the American vulnerability of inequality and race:

LEST YOU FORGET!....Between January 1950 and June 1951, 85 negroes have been lynched in the United States....NEGRO SOLDIERS! You've got a fight on your hands at home...⁹⁴

Conversely, there were plenty of U.S. and UN PSYOP products that were unsuccessful due to the lack of cultural knowledge in producing them. An example was a leaflet produced for New Year's Eve 1952, showing a traditional Chinese family feast, with a ghost-like soldier at the table, and the caption "Your place Will Be Empty." Americans with Chinese experience criticized the product due to the gross inaccuracies. The food was arranged in the wrong order, incorrect seating arrangements, the family would be too rich to have a son in the army, and the display of a bountiful feast was quite confusing. Additionally, the ghost was Caucasian in appearance. Such errors in products were immediately discredited by the enemy if the details were wrong, thus taking the seriousness immediately away from the product. It begs the question, would the Chinese really believe the entire concept and proposal of the product if the sender could not even get the minor details right? The answer is obviously no. Had the product been filtered through properly selected host nation personnel or cultural experts, the leaflet would have at the least gotten the point across and possibly be effective.⁹⁵

⁹³ Stanley Sandler, *"Cease Resistance: It's Good For You": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 1999), 238.

⁹⁴ United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) History Archives, "Korean War Collection" box (Fort Bragg, NC).

⁹⁵ Radio, Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, "List of the 1400 Most Frequently Used Chinese Characters" (Tokyo: 1954 edition); Avedon, "CCF Propaganda Man" (May 1954), 14-16.



Figure 5. (Your Place Will Be Empty) Korean War Leaflet 7115⁹⁶

Through trial and error, leaflets started to progress from standard behavior modification products to actual two sided newspaper clipping that provided objective and factual events concerning news about the Korean War as well as global news. Since reliable news was hard to come by, the leaflet newspaper was greatly received by the Communists forces. The most popular were the United Nations newspaper leaflets of: *Parachute News*, *Free World News*, *Free World Weekly Digest*, *Free Korea*, and *Rehabilitation News*.⁹⁷ Below is an example of a product containing objective news mixed with PSYOP. It reads: “*United Nations Troops Break Red Offensive, Red Timetables Falter, Red Troops Starving, UN Air Force Bolstered, and Netherlands to send Forces to Korea.*”

⁹⁶ 8th BN Product Development Center (PDC) Files (Unclassified) , 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne). Historical Archives (Fort Bragg, North Carolina).

⁹⁷ Berger, Carl. *An Introduction to Wartime Leaflets* (Washington D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, American University) 1959, 150.



Figure 6. Parachute News No. 11 Korea 1952.⁹⁸

By the wars end, there were a thousand days of radio broadcasts, tens of thousands of loudspeaker appeals, and billions of PSYOP leaflets. Overall, historians have argued back in forth as to the effectiveness of PSYOP during the Korean War. There is no doubt that the brutal combat condition for the communists fighter coupled with PSYOP had an enormous effect on surrendering. Many surrendered because “food was scarce, equipment was barely adequate, shelter and medical were practically non-existent, and many soldiers pressed into combat were lonely, were missing their families, and did not know what they were fighting for.” Soldiers would often eat their cotton from their medical kits and UN forces would be alarmed to see Korean and Chinese soldiers attack en masse without rifles in the hopes of picking one up from their dead comrades or enemy.⁹⁹ This led to staggering losses for the communists while providing an angle for PSYOP to exploit the themes of why they were fighting, and why were they dying for the Russians?¹⁰⁰

The extent to which the Koreans or Chinese adhered to the U.S. and UN PSYOP programs and campaigns is debatable due to all ambient factors related to combat, however the studies and polls throughout the war greatly supported the overall worth of PSYOP with the pillar being host nation support. The PSYOP campaigns combined American resources with Korean and Chinese culture and language that could be easily understood by the target audiences. As a result, the host nation assets added authenticity and relevance, as well as a greater chance of the products ‘sinking in’.

⁹⁸ Radio, Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, List of the 1400 Most Frequently Used Chinese Characters [Tokyo: 1954 edition]; Avedon, “CCF Propaganda Man” (May 1954), 14-16.

⁹⁹ Pease, Stephen. *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950-1953* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole books), 77.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 86.

Overall, there is no doubt that Americans with very little language and knowledge of the Korean and Chinese culture could have had as much success had they not used host nation personnel and media assets. Such is evident by another final report that concluded:

The amount of PW (PSYWAR) received by the target audience appears to be a definite causal factor in producing disaffection behavior and willingness to surrender...Psychological Warfare acting even without the 'favorable' influences of lower morale and lesser battle experience tends to influence disaffection behavior.¹⁰¹

PSYOP was proven as a combat multiplier and paid for itself many times over. A study on the cost of prosecuting the Korean War determined that it "took about \$1,100-\$1,200 to garner one POW by way of PSYWAR, contrasted to an Eighth Army estimate of \$150,000 for each enemy soldier killed, a 70:1 ratio in favor of PSYWAR."¹⁰²

D. THE VIETNAM CONFLICT

The 1960s and the Vietnam War are considered to be when radio, television and PSYOP truly converged. President Kennedy was a believer in "unconventional war," that is guerilla war, and as such he increased CIA funding to target Vietnam and Cuba as well as establishing the Green Berets. The war saw one of the most intensive PSYOP campaigns ever executed, far surpassing any PSYOP effort in World I, II, and Korea.¹⁰³ In World War II there were 1,000 personnel conducting PSYOP, in Korea there were 600 personnel with 130 host nation Koreans and Chinese. In Vietnam, the numbers ballooned to over 1,200 personnel and over 750 indigenous Vietnamese conducting PSYOP with an annual budget over 12 million dollars.¹⁰⁴ Additionally, because PSYOP was a priority with the Kennedy and Johnson administration, it became a priority with various inter-

¹⁰¹ Punturo and Wilmoore Kendall, "Psychological Warfare Operations: Intelligence" (ORO, Washington: 28 April 1952), 50.

¹⁰² Stanley Sandler. *"Cease Resistance: It's Good For You": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 1999. page 253. Kilchoon Kim and E.A. Johnson, Evaluation of Effects of Leaflets on North Korean Prisoners of War (ORO, For Lesley J. McNair: 20 February 1951), 7-8.

¹⁰³ Harry Latimer. Monogram on National Security Affairs, "U.S. Psychological Operations in Vietnam (Brown University, Providence, RI, 1973), 3. It is noteworthy to mention that Harry Latimer was the first author to analyze and write about the aspects of psychological operations in Vietnam in 1979.

¹⁰⁴ Harry Latimer. Monogram on National Security Affairs, "U.S. Psychological Operations in Vietnam (Brown University, Providence, RI, 1973), 11.

agencies involved in PSYOP such as: the State Department, USAID (United States Agency for International Development), CIA, MACV (Military Assistance Command-Vietnam, and the USIA (United States Information Agency).¹⁰⁵ Essentially, the U.S. would not be caught with the abysmally low number of 6 personnel conducting PSYOP as in the start of Korean War.

To coordinate all the agencies, President Johnson oversaw the development of the JUSPAO (Joint United States Public Affairs Office. The Chief of JUSPAO, Barry Zorthian, who was also the director of USIA, was appointed in May of 1965. His job was to upstart and promote the Government of Vietnam radio, TV, motion picture, information services, as well as his normal duties of directing the USIA with information and cultural programs.¹⁰⁶ On the South Vietnamese side, the government established the General political warfare directorate. However, there were problems from the start of the war. This was mainly due to differing priorities between South Vietnam and the U.S., questionable and corrupt personnel, as well as a fear that the Vietnamese had of being controlled by the U.S. Additionally, between 1964 and 1971, there were 12 different ministers of information in that time period. That created considerable problems with maintaining stability within the organization. As a result, the U.S. circumvented the Vietnamese government and began to engage the Vietnamese people on their own.¹⁰⁷

By 1966, the U.S. began to fund dissemination outlets for PSYOP by starting and funding a seven-station radio network in South Vietnam. When these transmitters were not being used to broadcast overt messages to the North, they were used to broadcast "black" clandestine stations that claimed to be from the Communists. A declassified interdepartmental task-force memo in 1966 argued for an increase in these broadcasts as well as all forms of media in order to "harass the Communists and to maintain (the anti-

¹⁰⁵ Stanley Sandler, *"Cease Resistance: It's Good For You": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 1999), 265.

¹⁰⁶ Stanley Sandler, *"Cease Resistance: It's Good For You": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 1999), 5.

¹⁰⁷ Harry Latimer, Monogram on National Security Affairs, "U.S. Psychological Operations in Vietnam (Brown University, Providence, RI, 1973), 12.

Communist) morale of the North Vietnamese population.” Additionally, the use of host nation personnel would be emphasized in bettering PSYOP products.¹⁰⁸

Just as in the author’s experience in Iraq (OIF), host nation translators and journalists became extremely adept in the PSYOP development process because they did it on a daily basis.¹⁰⁹ In Vietnam, PSYOP leaflets with the exception of a few specialized ones were conducted by Vietnamese locals under the supervision of JUSPAO or the 4th POG (Airborne).¹¹⁰ The products were then checked by both U.S. and Vietnamese PYSOP officers for three basic criteria: 1) Does it follow present policy guidance, 2) Is it credible and culturally acceptable?, and 3) Is it grammatically correct and understandable? The final testing was with POWs or civilians who most closely approximated the target audience.¹¹¹ Overall, there is credible evidence that the system did keep PSYOP products consistent, concise, correct, and followed the guidance of JUSPAO.¹¹²

However, most PSYOP efforts in the grand scheme were virtually ineffective due to the success of the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) and Viet Cong in dictating when and where they would fight. Additionally, when enemy forces did fight, seldom were the enemy pursued, thus enforcing the mentality of survivability within the enemy ranks, further decreasing the pressure to surrender. Additionally, the North Vietnamese conducted the most important type of PSYOP, face to face communication. While the

¹⁰⁸ Lawrence C Soley, John S. Nichols. *Clandestine Radio Broadcasting* (Praeger. New York: 1987), 43.

¹⁰⁹ It is inferred from reference material concerning host nation personnel in Vietnam, that many became very adept in the PSYOP development process; a parallel that I found consistent in Iraq as well. In regards to deploying and redeploying of PSYOP soldiers, often, the Iraqi translators provided stability, and advice from proven journalist were highly regarded and had substantial affect on the content of the products.

¹¹⁰ 4th POG (A), briefing (n.d.), RG 472, U.S. Army in Vietnam, Psywar and CA, box 1, “4th POG (A)”, folder; Army Regulation No. 515-5, 20 November 1968, “Psychological Operations: Pre-testing, Post-Testing, Evaluation and Review / Critique Procedures for Propaganda, “ibid., box 17, “4th POG (A) S-1” folder.

¹¹¹ Stanley Sandler, “Cease Resistance: It’s Good For You” A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 1999. page 290. Latimer, Harry, Monogram on National Security Affairs, “U.S. Psychological Operations in Vietnam,” (Brown University, Providence, RI, 1973), 46.

¹¹² 4th POG (A), briefing (n.d.), RG 472, U.S. Army in Vietnam, Psywar and CA, box 1, “4th POG (A)”, folder; Army Regulation No. 515-5, 20 November 1968, “Psychological Operations: Pre-testing, Post-Testing, Evaluation and Review / Critique Procedures for Propaganda, “ibid., box 17, “4th POG (A) S-1” folder.

U.S. and South Vietnamese were busy producing and delivering billions of leaflets, and hundreds of thousands of magazines, newspapers, posters, broadcasts, pamphlets, et al, the Viet Cong were executing the tactics of Mao;¹¹³ going from hamlet to hamlet to indoctrinate the local populace while establishing a presence that was coercive in nature.¹¹⁴

Overall, the lack of success that PSYOP had, was not because of the actual PSYOP being ineffective, it was rather that the enemy was not convinced that the PSYOP messages were credible due to their success in the jungles and tunnels of Vietnam as well as coercing the local populace to support them and replenish their ranks.¹¹⁵ The politics that inhibited attacks on North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia allowed the enemy safe haven without the fear of ground pursuit or air attacks. The North Vietnamese, because they could pick and choose when and where they wanted to fight, did not have to suffer though constant barrages, continuous attacks, and the everyday battlefield elements that put American PSYOP at an immediate advantage in previous wars. By the wars end, the amount of enemy personnel that had surrendered to the Americans and South Vietnamese was miniscule in both actual numbers and in comparison to the surrender numbers that the U.S. had enjoyed in previous wars.¹¹⁶

In contrast, it was the North Vietnamese who delivered a more lethal psychological blow due to the overwhelming effects of the PSYACTS (Psychological Acts) produced by U.S. personnel killed and the tactical disaster but strategic success of the Tet Offensive in 1968.¹¹⁷ Tet caught the Americans completely by surprise and

¹¹³ Mao Zedong who influenced Ho Chi Minh, Fidel Castro, Che Gueverra, Abe Mel Guzman and other revolutionaries was instrumental in developing guerrilla warfare from the concept of indoctrinating the populace in the rural areas while slowly building support in an eventual mass uprising against a particular government. Such irregular warfare would involve asymmetrical attacks from insurgents that would eventually tax the state and result in it's collapse.

¹¹⁴ Harry Latimer Monogram on National Security Affairs, "U.S. Psychological Operations in Vietnam (Brown University, Providence, RI, 1973), 23.

¹¹⁵ "The Battle for Hue, Vietnam". Military Channel, (Television Documentary, 2007). Viewed 26 January 2007.

¹¹⁶ Stephen T. Hosmer "The Information Revolution and Psychological Effects." Rand Institute Journal, March 1996 [Journal online]; available from www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1016/MR1016.chap8.pdf ; Internet; accessed online 12 December 2006.

¹¹⁷ "The Battle for Hue, Vietnam". Military Channel, (Television Documentary, 2007). Viewed 26 January 2007.

resulted in several key towns such as Hue being overrun by the North. The offensive opened up with 84,000 North Vietnamese and VC attacking isolated border areas of Con Thien, Loc Ninh, Dak To, Khe Sanh and then evolved into attacks upon 60 district cites throughout Vietnam. Khe Sanh was particularly riveting because many observers remarked on its similarity to the siege of the French disaster at Dien Bien Phu.¹¹⁸ However, after a few days in some cites and several weeks in others, the Americans and South Vietnamese forces began to overtake them after bitter fighting. In Saigon, which until Tet had been impervious to the war, enemy suicide squads delivered crippling blows to government installations. The once quiet city of Hue was the most effected by the Tet offensive with over 3,000 of its residents massacred by the North Vietnamese.¹¹⁹

By the end of February 1968, the North Vietnamese were soundly defeated. The North had sustained a staggering 40,000 casualties compared to 500 for the Americans and South Vietnamese combined. General Westmoreland had announced that the Communists were defeated and that nowhere in Vietnam did the occupants of the invaded cities welcome the North as liberators.¹²⁰ But there were other consequences that would be strategic in scope that would forever change the perception of the war. For one, the offensive added six hundred thousand more people in the South to the rolls of refugees. The most severe was the perception of the war within the United States. Over the previous year, President Johnson had reassured the American public that the Communists forces were defeated did not pose an invading threat to the South, and were firmly in command of the tempo of the war. Now the war pictures (like the two below) and footage transmitted into American living-rooms of combat in the embassy garden, several hundred Americans killed, a war spiraling out of control, as well as doubts about the administration's claims of military progress.¹²¹ Finally, in demonstration of how thoroughly the message had penetrated American consciousness, following the Tet Offensive on 27 February 1968, Walter Cronkite closed with: "Report from Vietnam:

¹¹⁸ Joel Myerson, *U.S. Army in Vietnam, Images of a Lengthy War* (Washington D.C. Center of Military History United States Army, 1990), 142.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 144.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 142.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 147.

Who, What, When, Where, Why?" He expressed his view to the nation that the war was un-winnable, and that the United States would have to find a way out.¹²²



Figure 7. (American casualty at Khe Sanh and an execution of a Viet Cong).¹²³

At Tet, Ho Chi Minh had essentially turned a devastating tactical and operational defeat into a strategic psychological victory. He benefited from the Western press covering the offensive and utilized the American host nation media to deliver constant psychological barrages to the American public. Such images became the focal point for protests throughout college campuses, raised doubts among ordinary American citizens, placed a considerable amount of political pressure to begin withdrawing from Vietnam, and ended the credibility of President Johnson and his chance for a second term.¹²⁴ Worse off, the images from the home-front had a psychological effect on the average 18 year old who was just 'doing his or her duty.' Lastly, it made psychological operations in Vietnam even more challenging then it ever had been because of the enemies' benefit from strategic PSYOP.

It is ironic that in Korea, a small scale PSYOP operation was able to have success due to cold, exposed, battle ravaged, and starving North Koreans and Chinese. In Vietnam, a large scale PSYOP operation did not have the battlefield conditions to

¹²² Daniel Hallin. "Vietnam on Television," Museum of Broadcast Communication, n.d. [Journal online]; available from <http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/V/htmlV/vietnamonte/vietnamonte.htm>; Internet; accessed 23 January 2007.

¹²³ These are two examples of the many images that were seen throughout the world. The picture on the right is by Eddie Adams of the Associated Press. The photograph is the execution of a Viet Cong Lieutenant by Vietnam's National Police Chief, Nguyen Ngoc Loan. The picture won a Pulitzer Prize.

¹²⁴ Joel Myerson. *U.S. Army in Vietnam, Images of a Lengthy War* (Washington D.C. Center of Military History United States Army, 1990), 142.

capitalize on because the battle space involved the hamlets and villages of Vietnam which the North could easily manipulate.¹²⁵ Most importantly, the dominance of strategic PSYOP by the NVA and VC diminished the U.S. will to fight on a national level. Amazingly, staggering losses and a decisive defeat for the Communists was enough to produce a strategic PSYOP effect that influenced the war; this was evidenced by Johnson placing a ceiling on troop levels as well as de-escalating the air campaign in North Vietnam.¹²⁶

Regardless of the strategic psychological boost that Tet gave to the North, an enormous amount of resources, manpower, and host nation personnel contributed to many successful U.S. PSYOP programs that were very effective in themselves on a tactical and operational level, even if they failed to turn the tide and help the U.S. win the larger conflict. An example is the amount of surrenders of VC and NVA soldiers in 1967-68 under the Chieu Hoi surrender program. It is estimated that 29,276 NVA / VC (the equivalent of 95 infantry battalions) surrendered to MACV or ARVN forces. At the time, MACV estimated that eliminating an equivalent force via conventional means would have cost the U.S. 6,000 dead and many more wounded.¹²⁷

Such successes of the Chieu Hoi programs were from millions of PSYOP leaflets, PSYOP loudspeaker teams with host nation translators, as well as radio and TV programs. However, JUSPAO quickly realized that radio was limited because there were parts of Vietnam where the populace did not possess radios much less TVs. There needed to be diversity within the PSYOP mediums as opposed to just dumping millions of leaflets throughout the countryside due to the civilians and the Communists military forces being inextricably intertwined. In other words a friendly villager by day could be

¹²⁵ "The Battle for Hue, Vietnam". Military Channel, (Television Documentary, 2007). Viewed 26 January 2007.

¹²⁶ Phillip Davidson. (MG, USA, Retired). *Vietnam at War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988), 483.

¹²⁷ Paul Valley (COL U.S Army). "From PSYOP to Mind War", (Presidio of San Francisco, CA: Headquarters 7th PSYOP Group, United States Army Reserve), page 4. "Chieu Hoi" The Winning Ticket". MACV Command Information Pamphlet, 6-69, March 1969.

a VC who launches mortar rounds at U.S. camps by night. It was necessary to maximize all means of communication to get a repetitive pro U.S. and pro South Vietnamese message to as many civilians as possible.¹²⁸

One solution was to provide thousands of radios and television sets that would be set to South Vietnamese radio stations such as Voice of Freedom (Tiếng Nói Tự Do), Mother of Vietnam ((Me Việt Nam), and the Sacred Sword of Patriotism ((Gươm Thiên Ái Quốc).¹²⁹ The radios would then be air dropped, floated down rivers, distributed throughout the major cities, and would contain PSYOP material to convince the local populace that the radios were not harmful or contained explosives per the North Vietnamese. One example of this campaign can be found in the leaflet reproduced below: “This girl is picking up the white package containing a radio from the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. She is not afraid to pick it up because she knows the radio will bring her and her family knowledge and entertainment.”¹³⁰



Figure 8. Leaflet HQ-8-68.¹³¹

The distribution of radios was a clever move by the Americans because it gave the target audiences a voice from their countrymen. Radio soon began to play PSYOP messages to 95% of the country around the clock. The Americans tapped into the U.S. funded local radio stations and began utilizing them as a medium for deploying PSYOP

¹²⁸ Stanley Sandler. “Cease Resistance: It’s Good For You”: A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 1999), 290.

¹²⁹ Herbert Freidman, “The American PSYOP Organization During the Korean War”, 18 January 2006; [Article on-line];available from: <http://www.psywarrior.com/RadioLeaflet.html> ; Internet; accessed 23 January 2007.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

messages. Essentially, the American PSYOP personnel would formulate the direction and campaign, and the Vietnamese would provide the on air voice and personality as pictured below.¹³²



Figure 9. PSYOP radio broadcast in Vietnam.¹³³

Throughout the war, a number of Allied radio stations broadcast messages throughout Vietnam. The Ministry of Defense in Saigon operated the *Voice of Freedom* with transmitters in Hue. The Americans provided financial, technical and advisory assistance to the Vietnamese broadcasters. Some other stations broadcasting to the Vietnamese were *Radio Saigon*, the *Voice of America*, and the *British Broadcasting Corporation*.¹³⁴

In addition to the use of radio stations, PSYOP programs capitalized on the vulnerabilities of the Vietnamese culture such as messages that emphasized superstitions.¹³⁵ In the Vietnamese culture, one such superstition was the belief in the wandering soul. The Vietnamese believe that the dead must be buried in their homeland, or their soul will wander aimlessly in pain and suffering. According to these beliefs, if a person is improperly buried, his or her soul wanders constantly. During the war, an attempt was made to use this belief against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. Since

¹³² Harry Latimer. Monogram on National Security Affairs, "U.S. Psychological Operations in Vietnam (Brown University, Providence, RI), 23.

¹³³ Herbert Friedman, "The American PSYOP Organization During the Korean War", 18 January 2006; [Article on-line]; available from: <http://www.psywarrior.com/RadioLeaflet.html> ; Internet; accessed 23 January 2007.

¹³⁴ 8th BN Product Development Center (PDC) Files (Unclassified) , 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne). Historical Archives (Fort Bragg, North Carolina).

¹³⁵ PSYOP-POLWAR *News Letter*, 30 November 1969.

it was clear that they would die far from home, their bodies would probably never be found or properly buried, it was certain that they would become a wandering soul after death.¹³⁶

The operation was code-named "Wandering Soul." Engineers spent weeks recording eerie sounds. They were similar to the sounds employed during a scary radio show or movie; they were very creepy and designed to send shivers down the back. These cries and wails were intended to represent souls of the enemy dead who had failed to find the peace of a proper burial. The wailing soul cannot be put to rest until this proper burial takes place. The purpose of these sounds was to panic and disrupt the enemy and cause him to flee his position.¹³⁷ Helicopters were used to broadcast Vietnamese voices pretending to be from beyond the grave. They called on their "descendents" in the Vietcong to defect and cease fighting. This campaign played the sounds and messages all night in order to spook the superstitious enemy. Despite eventually realizing that they were hearing a recording beamed from a helicopter, the enemy gunners could not help but fear that their souls would some day end up moaning and wailing in a similar fashion after death.¹³⁸

{Funeral Music and the Wailing Sounds of a Moaning Ghost}

{The Daughter "Hai" Crys Out for Her Father}

Daddy, daddy, come home with me, come home. Daddy! Daddy!

{The Ghost Father Responds}

! Hai !

*Who is that? Who is calling me? My daughter? My wife?
Your Father is back home with you, my daughter
Your Husband is back home with you, my wife
But my body is gone. I am dead, my family*

¹³⁶ Herbert Friedman. "The Wandering Soul, - Vietnam Psychological Operations (PSYOP)", n.d.; [Article on-line]; available from: <http://pcf45.com/sealords/cuadai/wanderingsoul.html>; Internet; accessed 23 January 2007.

¹³⁷ PSYOP Policy Number 36, JUSPAO, (Saigon, Vietnam: 10 May 1967).

¹³⁸ Herbert Friedman. "The Wandering Soul, - Vietnam Psychological Operations (PSYOP)", n.d.; [Article on-line]; available from: <http://pcf45.com/sealords/cuadai/wanderingsoul.html>; Internet; accessed 23 January 2007.

Tragic ... how tragic

*My friends, I come back to let you know that I am dead ... I am dead
I am in Hell ... just Hell
It was a senseless death. How senseless ... how senseless
But when I realized the truth, it was too late ... too late*

*Friends ... while you are still alive ...
There is still a chance that you can be reunited with your loved ones
Do you hear what I say?*

*Go home ... Go home friends
Hurry ... If not, you will end up like me
Go home my friends before it is too late...Go home! ... Go home friends!*

*! Ve Di ! ... ! Ve Di Ban !
!! VE DI !! ... !! VE DI !!*

{More Moans From the Afterlife}¹³⁹

Like similar PSYOP programs and campaigns, the use of host nation personnel was the critical lynchpin in delivering a product that really hit home and delivered an instant connection to the target audience. Below are some of the translators and radio journalists that worked on The Wondering Soul project.



Figure 10. Vietnamese Journalist produce The Wondering Soul recordings¹⁴⁰

¹³⁹ USASOC History Archives, "Vietnam War Collection." Fort Bragg, NC, 1967.

¹⁴⁰ 8th BN Product Development Center (PDC) Files (Unclassified), 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne). Historical Archives (Fort Bragg, North Carolina).

As The Wondering Soul project took hold, a common occurrence happened every time the recordings were played, it always drew enemy gunfire. In Vietnam, drawing enemy gunfire was one of the most difficult things to achieve because the enemy was trained to fire when it favored them the most. However, The Wondering Soul recordings made them fire out of emotion and fear, which is just what the U.S. military in the air and ground wanted. An excerpt from an AC-130 Specter Gunship (Spooky) crewmember who flew with an accompanying C-47 stated that: “we stumbled on to a Battalion-sized Viet Cong force and they were bold enough open fire when they heard the recordings. Of course that was what we wanted. Over the Commanding Officer’s objection I scheduled our C-47 for a repeat visit over the same target. The next night they went up again, but what I wasn’t told until later was that Spooky went along with our aircraft and flew the speaker mission in opposing orbit and all blacked out. When our aircraft played the recording, the ground fire erupted again and Spooky “hosed em” with all three cannon in full cyclic rpm.”¹⁴¹ Another excerpt from an unknown VC stated: “these audio messages were hard to ignore, for the sound even penetrated through the earth to VC hidden in the underground tunnels.”¹⁴² This was considered a positive MOE since it effected the behavior and decision cycle of the target audience by causing them to go against his normal routine of firing at the Americans when it best suited them. Instead, the PSYOP message elicited an emotional response that caused them to fire at the Americans only to be decimated by patrolling AC-130s with their counter fire.¹⁴³

Like The Wondering Soul project, there were thousands of other PSYOP programs during the long conflict in Vietnam, and like most military operations in Vietnam, went through its trials and errors as well. However, PSYOP alone was not destined to win the Vietnam Conflict. As effective as many of the PSYOP programs were in meeting their specific goals, in order to affect the larger war effort, they needed to play off of the situation happening on the ground. In this case, the war on the ground

¹⁴¹ 8th BN Product Development Center (PDC) Files (Unclassified), 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne). Historical Archives (Fort Bragg, North Carolina).

¹⁴² Duane Yeager. “Winning Vietnamese Minds was what the U.S. Army’s 4th Psychological Operations Group was all about,” *Vietnam*. December 1990), 6.

¹⁴³ 8th BN Product Development Center (PDC) Files (Unclassified), 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne). Historical Archives (Fort Bragg, North Carolina).

failed to disrupt the North Vietnamese from controlling the battlefield and gaining support from the Vietnamese populace. The end result was a populace that became coerced and institutionalized by the Communists forces exacerbated by the U.S. refusal to break the cycle of support coupled with a media nightmare that crippled America's resolve to continue the war. Naturally, PSYOP would then be relegated to convincing hardened soldiers and a controlled populace to an unrealistic alternative. However, despite the un-permissive environment, PSYOP programs as a whole, made the most of what they could and incorporated host nation assets with much success. In turn the use of host nation assets gave PSYOP its greatest posture for success in Vietnam.¹⁴⁴

E. OPERATION DESERT STORM

Operation Desert Storm introduced a new element into the PSYOP world: it was the first war to be covered on a global scale, 24 hours a day. Such news coverage turned certain aspects of host nation media upside down by the mere aspect that local news could become global news in a flash. This put the news media as a major player in the conflict and instantly placed the war in a media fishbowl with the eyes of the world watching. Both Iraq and the U.S. saw the news media as an arm to their strategic PSYOP reach due to the coverage that it commanded. In the months preceding as well as during the conflict, both Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and U.S. officials used CNN as somewhat of a diplomatic back channel, sending complex signals to each other and to their respective publics at the same time.¹⁴⁵ This resulted in a high stakes media chess game with PSYOP being a major force provider in all phases: strategic, operational, and tactical.

The effectiveness of PYSOP during Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM was made evident by its dramatic effect that spurned many of the enemy soldiers to surrender. The images were then seen on news footage around the world of scores of Iraqis with their hands raised, with many holding PSYOP leaflets. PSYOP was used so effectively during the Gulf War that an estimated 87,000 Iraqi soldiers

¹⁴⁴ Paul Valley (COL U.S Army), "From PSYOP to Mind War", (Presidio of San Francisco, CA: Headquarters 7th PSYOP Group, United States Army Reserve, 1983), 5.

¹⁴⁵ L.A. Friedland "Democracy, Diversity, and Cable: The Case of CNN." (University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1991).

surrendered.¹⁴⁶ However, PSYOP alone was not the reason that thousands of soldiers surrendered. Instead, PSYOP was the tipping point, that extra edge that forced enemy soldiers that were exposed to horrendous barrages from U.S. military platforms to surrender. Unlike Vietnam, where the enemy was afforded safe haven both politically and geographically, Iraqi soldiers were exposed in the open desert to be picked off systemically by massive firepower from coalition forces. However, the success of PSYOP was not merely happenstance, it was precipitated by a PSYOP force structure that was deployed to the region far before hostilities commenced.¹⁴⁷

With the U.S. being caught unprepared for PSYOP in previous engagements, the 4th PSYOP Group was deployed to the Gulf region to avoid such a similar mistake. As quickly as 11 August 1990, nine days after the invasion of Iraq, a cell of 12 PSYOP specialists, under the supervision of the commander of the 4th POG (A), COL Anthony Normand, assembled at MacDill AFB, Florida, the headquarters of the joint services U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to commence strategic PSYOP planning for possible operations in Southwest Asia. The coordinated PSYOP plan took into account the cultures, languages, and sensibilities of the people of Southwest Asia. Such planning ahead paid dividends because it also prepared and coordinated for host nation media support that would be advising U.S. forces on leaflets, various print products, as well as arranging host nation personnel to broadcast PSYOP messages via television and radio.¹⁴⁸

However, Saddam Hussein quickly gained the momentum on strategic PSYOP after requested PSYOP directives specified by General Norman Schwarzkopf were categorically denied by various agencies and staffing bureaucracy within DoD due to sensitivities to Coalition partners. Schwarzkopf's patience was wearing thin as he stated

¹⁴⁶ 4th PSYOP Group Estimate. "PSYOP MOE" (Fort Bragg, NC, 10 October 1991).

¹⁴⁷ USASOC, Psychological Operations During Desert Shield / Storm: A Post Operational Analysis, 2d ed., revised (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: 5 November 1993), 2-5 to 2-6.

¹⁴⁸ Stanley Sandler. *"Cease Resistance: It's Good For You": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 1999, 332. USASOC, Psychological Operations During Desert Shield / Storm: A Post Operational Analysis, 2d ed., revised (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: 5 November 1993), 2-5 to 2-6.

rather pointedly on 20 December 1990 that “Psychological Operations are going to be absolutely critical, critical part of any campaign that we must get involved in.”¹⁴⁹

Precious weeks and months passed as Saddam Hussein soon began disseminating his own strategic PSYOP as well as trying to convince his fellow Middle Eastern countries that the invasion was another example of an infidel crusade. His strategic PSYOP had considerable success in mounting a campaign that reached a wide domestic and foreign audience.¹⁵⁰ Within Iraq, all broadcast facilities were owned and operated by the Broadcasting and Television Organization of the MCI. Prior to the invasion, Iraqi broadcast capabilities included two prime-time television broadcasts, two domestic radio services – “*Baghdad Domestic Service*” and “*Voice of the Masses*” (VOM) – and shortwave radio broadcasts of VOM in Kurdish, Turkoman, and Assyrian.¹⁵¹

Shortly after the invasion, Iraq seized several Kuwaiti media centers and began operating the *Provisional Free Kuwait Government Radio Program*. They also implemented at least five additional shortwave radio programs destined to undermine the Saudi and Egyptian governments and the morale of Arab troops in the Gulf. However, coalition bombing raids soon started attacking the communication nodes of Iraq which completely destroyed their television capability as well as leaving Iraq with only two radio stations at reduced signal strength.¹⁵² Ever relentless, the Iraqis began to turn to foreign resources to get their message out. The Iraqis aired clips via ARABSAT and INTELSAT as giving feeds to the international media via the *Iraqi News Agency (INA)*. Additionally, Iraq invested in controlling media resources such as the “*Voice of Palestinian Liberation Organization*,” and the news agency *Jana*. The result led to rallying officials of Palestine, Tunisia, Jordan, Yemen, Mauritania, and Sudan to issue a

¹⁴⁹ “Introduction to PSYOP” Slides. 1-04 PSYOP Officers Course (Fort Bragg, NC 5 January 2004). USSOC, *Psychological Operations*, 4-1; (U) USSOCOM Classified Briefing (S), n.d., J-28. Info used was from instructional reference material Unclassified.

¹⁵⁰ Richard Blair (MSG Retired), Goldstein, Frank L (COL Retired). *Psychological Operations, Principles and Case Studies: The Iraqi Propaganda Network*. (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, September 1996), 243.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid. These five shortwave radio programs were “Holy Mecca Radio,” first observed on 10 August 1990; “Voice of the Egypt of Arabism,” first observed on 11 August 1990; “Voice of the Peninsula and the Arabian Gulf,” implemented on 29 August 1990; “Voice of Peace,” implemented on 11 September 1990; and “Voice of Arab Awakening,” first observed on 13 October 1990.

joint statement endorsing the Iraqi position as well as organized ways to counter the Coalition's media.¹⁵³ At first, Iraq's strategic PSYOP scheme was highly imaginative and did have some success. Iraq's use of PSYOP and the world media painted Iraq as a formidable foe. This led to an overestimation of Allied casualties that were far off the mark.¹⁵⁴

For all of Iraq's successes in PSYOP at the start, they were slowly eroded by a series of mistakes that became laughable items throughout the world. Iraq's version of Tokyo Rose would broadcasts that the wives of American soldiers were having an affair with the likes of Tom Cruise, Arnold Schwarzenegger, and Bart Simpson.¹⁵⁵ Reacting to the ridiculous broadcasts, The British newspaper *The Guardian* wrote in 1991:

BAGHDAD BETTY, Iraq's English-language radio service, has taken a credibility nosedive. Over the weekend Betty indulged in some mischievous bitchery by telling US soldiers that their wives back home were committing adultery by sleeping with movie stars. Big-screen heartthrobs like Tom Cruise, Arnold Schwarzenegger and Bart Simpson. The first two might have presented some cause for anxiety, but who initiated the deviant practice of molesting under-age, primary coloured cartoon characters?

Three months later, Baghdad Betty would be sacked after she became the object of laughter and ridicule throughout the media world. The Iraqis continued to make further mistakes in their attempt to win the hearts and minds of the CNN audience. On 23 August 1990, Saddam went on television with a young child named Stuart who was being held hostage during the Coalition bombing. Saddam thought that it showed his fatherly side. Americans and British viewers were incensed that he would use and frighten a child, and the Kuwaiti government-in-exile immediately prepared a brochure comparing Saddam with WWII photographs of Adolf Hitler in a similar fatherly pose. Besides the

¹⁵³ Ibid., 243.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 246.

¹⁵⁵ "Introduction to PSYOP" Slides. 1-04 PSYOP Officers Course (Fort Bragg, NC 5 January 2004).

photograph of Saddam with the hostage, the brochure also depicted dead Shi'ite and Kurdish children, the destruction of buildings in Kuwait, and other illustrations of Iraqi inhumanity.¹⁵⁶



Figure 11. Similar depiction between Hitler and Hussein¹⁵⁷

Soon the Coalition forces were winning on three fronts: the lack of Iraqi credibility, the un-defendable Iraqi position of plundering Kuwait, and the sudden rise of the patriotic media in the United States.¹⁵⁸ The U.S. benefited tremendously from a media that was friendly while demonizing Saddam Hussein at the same time. The major syndicates showed “video postcards” from the war front- smiling soldiers sending love kisses to moms, dads, and girlfriends, as well as holiday greetings. Magazines and tabloids were equally patriotic. A *New York Post* headline read: UP YOURS. *Newsweek*’s read: BAGHDAD’S BULLY and the *New York Times*, of all newspapers, ran a special supplement of two African-American soldiers embracing, with one holding an American

¹⁵⁶ Herbert Friedman, “PSYWAR Mistakes”, 18 January 2006; [Article on-line];available from: <http://www.psywarrior.com/PSYOPMistakes.html>; Internet; accessed 23 January 2007.

¹⁵⁷ 8th BN Product Development Center (PDC) Files (Unclassified) , 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne). Historical Archives (Fort Bragg, North Carolina).

¹⁵⁸ Kalb, Marvin. *Taken By Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War* (New York: Bantam 2004), 23. The Patriotic media has been described as jingoistic coverage of a popular war. Kalb asserts that the press during DESERT STORM was in reaction to the image that the press lost the war in Vietnam. Kalb contends that the media covered by most anchors, retired Generals, and Admirals were too war friendly in DESERT STORM and this aided the Coalition tremendously.

flag. The cumulative effect of such coverage was indicative to the war's popularity of 89% among the American populace.¹⁵⁹ This gave the Coalition a tremendous advantage because not one of the media sources would dare question the administration or the way in which the war was prosecuted.

Seizing upon the information initiative of the media, the 4th PSYOP Group began broadcasting the "*VOICE OF THE GULF*" (*VOG*) radio network on 19 January 1991. The *VOG* was a 100 man cell comprised of 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (A), British, Egyptian, and Kuwaiti representatives whose first mission was to encourage Iraqi "line crossers."¹⁶⁰ It operated continuously through 1 April 1991 with more than 210 hours of live broadcasting and 330 hours of prerecorded programs. A total of 2,072 news items were aired along with 189 PSYOP messages. The *VOICE OF THE GULF* network consisted of a 50 KW AM transmitter located at Abu Ali, Saudi Arabia broadcasting on AM 1134; a 10KW AM transmitter located at Qaisumah, Saudi Arabia broadcasting on AM 1179; a 1KW FM transmitter located at Qaisumah, Saudi Arabia broadcasting on FM 87.5 and two Volant Solo EC-130 aircraft of the 193rd Special Operations Wing broadcasting on AM 690 and FM 88.5 and 87.9.¹⁶¹ Reports from Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs) after the conflict were encouraging. Most believed it was a true Arabic radio station that encouraged them to surrender, and the *VOG* was the third most listened to radio station behind the *BBC* and *Radio Monte Carlo*.¹⁶²

Throughout the war the PSYOP radio programs were produced with the assistance of Kuwaiti exiles and Saudi Arabians, and shared transmitting facilities with two *Armed Forces Desert Network* radio station vans that broadcast to U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia. Additionally, the U.S. Army and CIA helped to set up the radio stations: *The Future* and *The Iraqi Broadcasting Corporation*; two stations developed with host

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ USACAPOC, *Psychological Operations During Desert Shield / Storm: A Post Operational Analysis*, 2d ed., revised (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: 5 November 1993), 4-5.

¹⁶¹ USACAPOC, *Psychological Operations During Desert Shield / Storm: A Post Operational Analysis*, 2d ed., revised (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: 5 November 1993), 4-5.

¹⁶² Ibid.

nation assets that also continued broadcasting long after Desert Storm.¹⁶³ The audio and visual PSYOP programs drove home what the Iraqi soldiers were experiencing on the ground: destruction from Coalition ground forces, destruction from the air, most communication nodes destroyed, contributing to a sense that the situation was hopeless. US PSYOP messages sought to capitalize on the reality that the Iraqis experienced, driving it home with visuals such as the one below.



Figure 12. Iraqis Surrendering.¹⁶⁴

Use of host nation media was not limited to just broadcasting. It was imperative that the Iraqi soldier and citizen be familiar with the visual products that they would encounter. Drawings and pictures have uniqueness to themselves in the Middle East that is quite distinctive from Western illustration. To provide such an effect, the Coalition hired the Saudi Royal illustrator and well known cartoonists to draw leaflets that were then double checked by the Arab member of the Combined PSYOP cell.¹⁶⁵ Such leaflets were then delivered to enemy soldiers and civilians in the millions. The leaflets ranged from standard surrender pleas, brotherhood, or the inevitability of destruction if they continued to fight. However, at no time did any PSYOP product in any form denigrate the Iraqi soldiers. Learning from past mistakes in Vietnam, as well as past foes of the U.S. who denigrated the American fighting soldier, the U.S. portrayed the Iraqi soldier as

¹⁶³ Nick Grace. "Investigative Report: Radio and U.S. Military PSYOPS," The Institute of Communications Studies, 11 February 1998 [Journal online] ; available from <http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&requesttimeout=5008folder=648paper=930> ; Internet; Accessed 2 December 2006.

¹⁶⁴ USSASOC History Archives (Fort Bragg, NC: 2004).

¹⁶⁵ USSASOC History Archives (Fort Bragg, NC: 2004).

a brave good soldier that was led astray by the evil Saddam and who would be treated with dignity and respect upon leaving the one-sided fight.¹⁶⁶



Figure 13. Smiling Iraqi EPW; Surrender campaign leaflet.¹⁶⁷

As short as the Gulf War was, it solidified the use of host nation media assets due to the lack of Arabic linguists in DoD and the U.S. Government. Many Iraqis felt that listening to Arabic broadcasts that foretold their doom while bombs were raining from the sky was the worst morale killer they had faced. The final analysis was quite telling. Overall, Coalition leaflet messages had gone out to 98 percent of the EPWs, 80 percent of whom had been influenced by it, and 70 percent of the EPWs had been influenced enough that it affected their surrender decision. Radio gained 58 percent target exposure rate, of which 46 percent found it persuasive and 34 percent claimed it had a bearing on the surrender decision.¹⁶⁸

F. THE BALKANS

During the tumultuous period in the Balkans in the 1990s, hate was used as a catalyst to motivate people, while the use of host nation media was at the center. According to U.S. embassy staff, Slobodan Milosevic had used the state controlled media to inflame Serbian Christians against the Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo. According to U.S. embassy staff, Serb soldiers began committing crimes because of the daily broadcast

¹⁶⁶ Sandler, Stanley, *“Cease Resistance: It’s Good For You”: A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 1999, 341.

¹⁶⁷ USSASOC History Archives (Fort Bragg, NC: 2004).

¹⁶⁸ USSASOC History Archives (Fort Bragg, NC: 2004).

of the manufactured atrocities of the Bosnian Muslims, provoking a desire among the Serb population to exact revenge. Such fabricated stories tore into the core of the Serb populace by reporting exaggerated stories such as Muslims raping nuns and killing babies. Slowly and methodically, the media was being used to enrage the Serbians and justify the ensuing genocide against Bosnians.¹⁶⁹

During the Kosovo Conflict, the U.S. intensified the pressure on the Serbs by initiating a series of sanctions that included economic, diplomatic and ultimately - military action. All three foreign policy alternatives were covered extensively by the news media. In fact, the U.S. instituted the most concentrated media focus directed toward a single foreign country in its entire history. Essentially, the media became a major partner to the military, economic, and diplomatic efforts that would ultimately win the Kosovo campaign.¹⁷⁰

Since 1943, the U.S. had been utilizing host nation media and broadcasting in the Balkans as a media counter during World War II against the Nazi, the Cold War against the Eastern Bloc nations, and now against a Serb government determined to bring genocide to the Balkans. At the center was the VOA (*Voice of America*) and RFE / RL (*Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty*) that began broadcasting 40 hours of shortwave programming in Albanian, Bosnian, Croatian, Serbo-Croatian, and Serbian. However, since hostilities escalated, Milosevic began to shut down access to the local affiliates. To counter, the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and NATO forces that consisted of: the U.S., Germany, UK, Romania, Turkey, Italy, France, Spain, and Poland stepped in and expanded the shortwave, medium wave, and internet transmissions in their specific assigned sectors of Kosovo.¹⁷¹ The result became known as the “ring of fire” around Serbia: Multinational Brigade Northeast (MNB-NE), Multi-national Brigade East, Multi-National Brigade

¹⁶⁹ Edward Kaufman. “A Broadcasting Strategy to Win Media Wars”: *A Washington Quarterly Reader*. “The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks.” Ed. by Alexander T. J. Lennon. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts / London, England. 2003), 300.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 301.

¹⁷¹ Peter Beschmidt (LTC, German Army). “NATO Psychological Operation” brief. (Raleigh, NC: 2004 World Wide PSYOP Conference, 20 November 2004), 27.

Southwest (MNB-SW), and Headquarters KFOR (HQ KFOR).¹⁷² In producing such a “ring of fire” within Kosovo, Milosevic unwittingly helped the Coalition when he shut down the local affiliates. The result was a clearing of the airwaves and made transmission into the region much less difficult.¹⁷³ Soon a convergence of NATO countries began assembling an information campaign aimed at gaining support from the Serb populace and ultimately overthrowing Milosevic per the intent of the leaflet below.



Figure 14. Leaflet 04-B-02-L005.¹⁷⁴

“War and sacrifice for you
Good money for him, his family and his friends”.

Serbia's economy is crippled; her war machine under attack. but through it all, Milosevic, his family, and his inner circle have managed to make millions. Tight control of state-run monopolies has given Milosevic an illicit financial empire at the expense of those he claims to defend. His son Marko waits out the war in comfort. He does not serve as ordinary Serbs must. While your sons and husbands fight, Marko Milosevic parties in Belgrade or works on his sun-tan at the family villa in the Mediterranean. Milosovic's nepotism, cronyism, and genocide in Kosovo have drained Serbia's economic resources and dragged the country into war with the world. Is he the kind of leader you really want?¹⁷⁵

¹⁷²Edward Kaufman. “A Broadcasting Strategy to Win Media Wars”: *A Washington Quarterly Reader*. “The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks.” Ed. by Alexander T. J. Lennon. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts / London, England. 2003), 300.

¹⁷³ Steven Collins. “Shaping Perceptions During the Latest Balkans’ Imbroglia”: Submitted for Publication Consideration to European Security. 30 May 2000.

¹⁷⁴ Peter Beschmidt (LTC, German Army). “NATO Psychological Operation” brief. (Raleigh, NC: 2004 World Wide PSYOP Conference, 20 November 2004), 21.

¹⁷⁵ NATO Leaflet 04-B-02-L005. February 1998. Pristina, Kosovo.

The challenge of overthrowing the Milosevic government meant conducting an extensive information campaign aimed at breaking support or indifference amongst the populace. Working in concert with each other, the NATO countries worked with their respective host nation personnel in the form of journalists, broadcasters, music disk jockeys, translators, and cultural advisors. The results were products and programs that were specific for the region, and specifically for the cultural make-up within their sector. Translators and journalists were also used in leaflet operations that consisted of over 100 million being dropped on the Kosovo populace. However, PSYOP in Kosovo had negligible effects at the beginning of the conflict. Most notably, the Kosovo air campaign was used by Milosevic as a propaganda boost due to the unavoidable collateral damage as well as the unfortunate and embarrassing incident of the bombing of the Chinese embassy.¹⁷⁶ Additionally, the mass of cultures that consisted of the UN meant a mass of psychological products that ranged from being effective, ineffective, and even counter productive.¹⁷⁷

Despite the initial challenges, NATO did have a vast swath of visual, audio visual, and audio that dominated the information spectrum within Kosovo. Additionally, just as in the case of DESERT STORM, the world media that was also being watched by Serbians, was demonizing the Milosevic government for its acts of atrocities as well as showing the unforgettable images of women and children helplessly fleeing towards Albania.¹⁷⁸

Once NATO established their perimeter boundaries, momentum in information operations began to take hold. Susceptibilities, vulnerabilities, and cultural nuances became evident as well as an aggressive strategy that began to take hold to meet politicians, businessmen, station directors, newspaper outlets and various key communicators within their sector. It was clearly evident, that the key to successful PSYOP in Kosovo was convincing the Serbians that the atrocities committed by the Milosevic regime were inhumane and blatantly wrong. Additionally, a key PSYOP

¹⁷⁶ NATO Leaflet 04-B-02-L005. February 1998. Pristina, Kosovo.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ During the time, the impact of CNN and BBC playing images of old ladies with their belongings on their back in a seemingly hopeless situation created an impetus to act in terms of the morale outrage that such images ensued.

objective was also convincing the Albanians who comprised 90 percent of the population, not to retaliate for past atrocities as well as instilling faith that the new government would protect them.¹⁷⁹ Additionally, in the American sector, a key PSYOP objective was targeting the youth of Kosovo to stop the cycle of violence and to accept each other as Kosovo citizens. Overall, the key to PSYOP success was repetition, getting the message out on all channels, and avoiding ineffective general themes (lazy PSYOP) for the entire populace. Specializing was the key as well as getting the right message, at the right time, to the right audience.




Figure 15. NATO PSYOP composition and accompanying host nation media personnel.¹⁸⁰

Such specializing in terms of dominant target audiences, key communicators, and the youth was and continues to be critical in Kosovo today. In the American sector, CPT David Lloyd, OIC of the Kosovo PSYOP radio and broadcast cell, ran 10 radio and 2 television contracts to broadcast in the MNB-E region that was south of Pristina. All but 1 radio station and 1 television station covered entertainment, news, weather, sports, and a mixture of PSYOP products for the majority Albanian target audience as well as the minority Serb populace. Many of the themes revolved around a safe and secure

¹⁷⁹ Perception based on the authors daily observation and NATO meetings and assessments during KFOR rotations 3A (2001) and 4A (2002).

¹⁸⁰ Peter Beschmidt (LTC, German Army). "NATO Psychological Operation" brief. (Raleigh, NC: 2004 World Wide PSYOP Conference, 20 November 2004), 21.

environment, ethnic tolerance, legitimacy, peaceful coexistence with the Serbian populace as well as preventing revengeful sectarian violence.¹⁸¹ These included a TV program in Strpce, a radio show in the town between the American base at Camp Bondsteel and Gnjillane, and one in Vitina. A critical lynchpin was “our interpreters listening to the programs to ensure that they were promoting messages consistent with our themes.”¹⁸²

The most successful programs from the American sector were “Media day” and “remote broadcast.” Media day consisted of advertising and selecting the top honors kids from various high schools that consisted of half being Serb and half being Muslim Albanian in a intercultural event. The students would then collaborate together in a magazine called *K Teen* that was in itself a PSYOP product designed for the younger target audience produced by the brightest kids in MNB-E; the future of Kosovo. The PSYOP product was a win-win because it was produced under supervision by the actual target audience and then distributed nation-wide to their peer age group.¹⁸³

Equally effective, “remote broadcast” consisted of PSYOP personnel, translators, and broadcasters that would go to an actual radio station and would play live music interjected with PSYOP messages of peaceful coexistence and legitimacy as well as hand out items such as: soccer balls, t-shirts, and stationary with PSYOP messages on them. Overall, the radio station owners, town mayors, and local populace welcomed such events as “remote broadcast” were quite popular and extensively requested in the major towns of Strpce, Gnjillane, and Vitina.¹⁸⁴

So how effective was the amalgam of information operations ranging from magazines, newspapers, radio stations, television, face-to-face, “remote broadcast”, and the world press had on changing the culture in Kosovo? Overall, the results achieved by the U.S. and NATO media effort was evident in a nationwide survey in October 2000 that showed the international media played a significant role in informing the Serbian people

¹⁸¹ Oral Interview, David Lloyd (CPT, 321st PSYOP Company, 7th PSYOP Group, Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo).

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Oral Interview, David Lloyd (CPT, 321st PSYOP Company, 7th PSYOP Group, Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo).

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

during the crisis. The poll showed that 40 percent of Serbian adults tuned to *RFE / RL* and the *VOA* for news during the elections and the beginning of the massive street demonstrations between September 24 and October 4 2000.¹⁸⁵ During this time, more Serbs listened to *RFE / RL* (37 percent) than Radio Belgrade (31 percent). On 3 October 2000, the day before the demonstrations that overthrew Milosevic, 25 percent of Serbs tuned in to *RFE / RL* and 20 percent tuned in to the *VOA*. Additionally, surveys by the Broadcasting Board of Governors also confirmed that international radio was used as a major source of information for the Kosovar refugees that fled to Albania during the conflict.¹⁸⁶

Overall, the impact of the international media that was packaged and delivered in a Balkan tongue that was extremely pivotal in overturning the unfortunate events that had taken place. Again as in previous information and psychological campaigns, it was the use of the host nation media assets, interpreters, journalists, and linguists that were the critical piece that broke the monopoly on the Milosevic state controlled media that had enflamed the populace to a path of genocide.

¹⁸⁵ The Institute of Social Sciences, University of Belgrade poll, October 2000.

¹⁸⁶ Edward Kaufman. *A Broadcasting Strategy to Win Media Wars: A Washington Quarterly Reader. The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks.* Edited by Alexander T. J. Lennon. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts / London, England. 2003, 303.

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IV. OIF / OEF

A. INTRODUCTION

During the cold war, the U.S. utilized the “United States Information Agency, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, military special operations and psychological operations forces, covert propaganda and influence capabilities, and, not least, a Psychological Strategy Board in the White House to high level direction and coordination.”¹⁸⁷ The result of all the investment in instruments of soft power painted the Soviet Union as evil and oppressive, while painting the U.S. more favorably. Unfortunately, the perceived lack of threat from a viable power during the post war era led to the dismantling of information apparatuses in the 1990s that had been painstakingly developed during years of fighting the Cold War. The effects of the shut down of agencies that took generations to establish their niche are still being felt today as the U.S. struggles to regenerate such soft power assets.

In the war in Iraq, it has appeared that painting the Iraqi government as legitimate, quelling the Ba’athist insurgency, as well as defeating Al Qaeda from an informational and a PSYOP perspective has been incredibly difficult to achieve. A number of issues, such as the unpopularity of the war in Iraq, the Iraqi outlook on security, lack of electricity, gas shortages, the incidents at Abu Ghraib, and the perception of detainment facilities as instruments of torture, all have proven to be difficult roadblocks to overcome in the war of ideas.¹⁸⁸ The difficulties are further exacerbated by Iraq and the fact that its neighboring countries already had pre-conceived notions of mistrust, dislike, and misgivings about U.S. foreign policy. Equally challenging was the sectarian divide that plagued Iraq from the onset of the invasion.

It has been well versed in the global media, polls, and in political punditry that the U.S. has diminished its popularity throughout the world, with the greatest unpopularity stemming from the Middle East. According to a 2005 Pew study, 17 nations of various geographical locations were polled to determine global attitudes towards the U.S. The

¹⁸⁷ Carne Lord. *Attacking Terrorism*. (Washington DC: Georgetown Press, 2004), 220.

¹⁸⁸ Angel Heart Media and Recordings (Host Nation Iraqi Media Outlet). (Baghdad: “The Crisis.”) April 2005. Angel Heart was a contracted media outlet by the JPOTF in Iraq to poll average Iraqis in Baghdad as to the problems of Iraq.

poll numbers showed waning numbers since 2000. Not surprisingly, approval ratings were abysmally low within Middle Eastern nations and has decreased every year in Iraq since 2003¹⁸⁹

The total accumulation of all the negative aspects of anti-Americanism and the outright global rejection of the U.S. led invasion of Iraq has placed psychological operations at a disadvantage from the onset. One cannot but compare the irony behind the juxtaposition of Operation DESERT STORM and OIF: in the first case it was easy to sell the idea of the war as being justifiable cause. This message was relatively easy to convince since the American approval rate of DESERT STORM was 89 percent while the global approval rate was 75% in the early 1990s, compared to approval ratings in the twenties and single digit percentages in the Middle East for OIF.¹⁹⁰ Such waning numbers in terms of the general attitudes towards the United States presents a strategic PSYOP dilemma. Consequently, it places a tremendous burden on operational and tactical PSYOP which depends heavily on the credibility of the United States. At all levels of PSYOP, convincing specific target audiences of an idea is a lot harder if the rest of the world does not believe in what the U.S. is doing, especially in Iraq where the target audiences are privy to BBC and CNN.

Anti-Americanism within the Arab world has placed a wall between psychological operations and the Arab target audience. In much of the Arabic media, negative rumors about Americans abound. To provide a few examples, these rumors include the following: American soldiers harvest organs from dying Iraqis; Washington caused the Indian Ocean tsunami in order to kill Muslims; and American soldiers possess special sunglasses that can see through women's clothes.¹⁹¹ Such negative repetitive sensationalism coupled with the stigma of support for Israel has put a serious drain on winning over the Middle Eastern target audience. When coupled with the fact that the U.S. still has a conventional force of 150,000 military personnel stationed in Iraq, that

¹⁸⁹ Pew report, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=247>: June 2005.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ David Kaplan. Amamir Latif. Whitelaw, Kevin, Barnes, Julian E. "Hearts, Minds, and Dollars." U.S. News & World Report (Dateline:Pakistan) 25 April 2005.

these forces have worn out their welcome, and the negative media attention following American missteps (Abu Ghraib and Haditha, for example), the situation becomes even more difficult in the war of ideas..

Despite these strategic inadequacies, there are PSYOP programs that are bringing positive results to Iraq at the nation-wide and lower level. The adoption of the constitution and the democratic processes that resulted in a democratically elected government was a major milestone that was supported by an extensive PSYOP plan from the 4th POG (Airborne) JPOTF, STRATCOM and the United Nations (through UNAMI, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq), that have been instrumental in changing perceptions. In terms of capturing high value targets (HTVs) PSYOP was at the forefront delivering products in every medium imaginable. A tips hotline run by the U.S. military has led to the arrest of hundreds of key former Ba'athists and Al Qaeda and the eventual bombings that finally killed Zarqawi. Such programs were and continue to be highly dependent on host nation media.

In regards to OEF, this chapter will examine the utility of the Merlin shortwave broadcast system. A strategic PSYOP shortwave radio program designed to give news, entertainment, and PSYOP messages to the AFGHAN populace. Merlin is unique as it is produced by host nation personnel from Fort Bragg, NC, sent to the British company VT Merlin in London, and then sent via powerful shortwave transmitters to Afghanistan and beyond.¹⁹²

B. PSYOP / PHASE I OIF

The start of the PSYOP campaign in Iraq started months prior to the March invasion and it consisted of a campaign of leaflet drops, cell phone text messages, emails and radio broadcasts that targeted the Iraqi leadership. Over 80 million leaflets were dropped in March of 2003. Some leaflets threatened to destroy any military formation that stood and fought, while others encouraged the Iraqi populace and military to ignore the directives of the Baath Party leadership.¹⁹³ The Air War College in a debriefing of

¹⁹² VT Merlin is a broadcasting company that specializes in global communications. It operates out of London and transmits powerful shortwave signals from the UK, UAE to Afghanistan. Such shortwave broadcast are transmitted across Europe and all throughout Asia; specifically meant for Afghanistan. Broadcasts are in Pashtu and Dari.

¹⁹³ Steven Collins (LTC, Chief of PSYOP / Operations Division. SHAPE). "Mind War" (Mons, Belgium) June 2003.

captured Iraq General Officers estimated that the U.S. Military faced only 15% of possible Iraq firepower due to PSYOP combined with precision bombing.¹⁹⁴ In addition to leaflet operations, the Coalition broadcasted from fixed transmission towers as well as from the flying airborne broadcast platform, the EC-130E aircraft Commando Solo. The Coalition established *Information Radio* that used a similar format to *Radio Sawa* with a great deal of popular music interlaced with news and a few announcements. Leaflets were then produced to inform the target audience of the time and frequency of the radio broadcasts.¹⁹⁵



Figure 16. Information Radio Leaflet IZD-001 and IZD-002C.¹⁹⁶

Local PSYOP radio stations were also set up outside of major population centers – one being the UK PSYOPS radio station, *Radio Nahrain* (Two Rivers), an FM radio station established on the outskirts of Basra. In addition to setting up its own radio

¹⁹⁴ Michael Ceroli (LTC, P), former commander of the 8th PSYOP Battalion (A), 4th PSYOP Group (A). Oral Interview (9 February 2007).

¹⁹⁵ Radio Sawa is an Arabic language radio station that was established on 23 March 2002 by the BBG. Its broadcasts are recorded to host nation personnel in Washington D.C., Morocco, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, Dubai, and the UAE. Funded by the U.S., Sawa provides balanced news and information to a TA of youth mixed with Arabic, Spanish, and English music.

¹⁹⁶ 8th BN Product Development Center (PDC) Files (Unclassified), 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne). “Leaflets IZD-001 and IZD-002D,” (Fort Bragg, North Carolina).

transmitters, the Coalition electronically jammed Iraqi radio stations, in order to gain a monopoly on the information available to the Iraqi people through this medium.¹⁹⁷

On 20 March 2003, Coalition aircraft and ground units poured into Iraq from Kuwait. Three days later the much famed “shock and awe” air campaign commenced with Baghdad, Mosul, Basrah, Kirkuk, and Tikrit being rocked with 1,500 bombs and missiles. Within days the Iraqi military was reeling in one defeat after another. The commander of the Republican Guard 51st Division instantly surrendered with many of the 9,000 soldiers holding 4th PSYOP Group (A) leaflets in their hands as well as the seizure of 200 tanks.¹⁹⁸ However, the PSYOP results were not fully maximized as most Iraqi soldiers who surrendering were allowed to leave the battlefield and fade back into the populace. Such leaflets like the ones dropped on the 51st Division and many others were also being monitored by the Iraqi government. Full knowing the power of PSYOP from the previous Gulf War, the Iraqi government established a special psychological collection committee to monitor and track Coalition leaflets. To counter the American PSYOP, the Iraqi government warned its citizens that if they were caught with any PSYOP material, that they would be executed.¹⁹⁹ Additionally, in an attempt to hijack the American PSYOP efforts, the committee distributed leaflets that imitated the American propaganda.

¹⁹⁷ Steven Collins (LTC, Chief of PSYOP / Operations Division. SHAPE). “Mind War” (Mons, Belgium) June 2003.

¹⁹⁸ 4th PSYOP Group (A) JPOTF assessment and summary. March –April 2003.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.



Figure 17. Enemy Propaganda found by the 10th Mountain Division.²⁰⁰

In addition to radio and leaflets, the Coalition also broadcasted television signals via the EC-130 Commando Solo platform.²⁰¹ By April 2007, Commando Solo had established a television broadcast to the Iraqi populace called “*Towards Freedom TV*.” The messages on *Towards Freedom TV* depicted Saddam Hussein as a tyrannical leader who had ruined Iraq and made its people suffer. Other broadcasts highlighted the luxurious palaces that Saddam had built throughout Iraq while his people lived in squalor. Still others focused on imploring Iraqi unit commanders and the populace to not destroy the oil fields. An equally important PSYOP theme was the imploring of all civilians to stay in their homes.²⁰² Despite the effectiveness of such messages, the only limitation to Commando Solo was the few numbers of such platforms, as well as constraints with on-station time, maintenance, and commitments elsewhere.²⁰³

In addition to Commando Solo, the U.S. employed mobile ground PSYOP broadcasting units called SOMS-Bs (Special Operations Media Broadcasting System) once the ground forces began closing in on Baghdad. The advantage of the SOMS-Bs

²⁰⁰ 8th BN Product Development Center (PDC) Files (Unclassified) , 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne). “Leaflets IZD-001 and IZD-002D,” (Fort Bragg, North Carolina).

²⁰¹ The Commando Solo is a C-130 type aircraft that is designed to provide strategic PSYOP via shortwave, FM, AM, television signals (UHF, VHF), as well as the capabilities to interfere and jam frequencies.

²⁰² 4th PSYOP Group (A) JPOTF assessment and summary. March –April 2003.

²⁰³ During my tour in Iraq in 2005. a Commando Solo aircraft was diverted for strategic PSYOP operations off the coast of Cuba broadcasting Radio Marti against the Castro regime.

was their mobility on the battlefield to produce FM, AM, Shortwave, television broadcasts to the Iraqi populace.²⁰⁴ A total of three units supported Phase I operations. The first unit was in Kuwait as early as December of 2002, a second unit was with the 3rd Infantry Division as it raced to Baghdad, and the third was placed at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) just 6 miles west of Baghdad.²⁰⁵ One final platform was added when the USS Tarawa began broadcasting shortwave off the coast of Kuwait.



Figure 18. SOMS-B in BIAP May 2003.²⁰⁶

As Coalition forces information systems were being established, PSYOP from Iraq was severely limited due to its information nodes being mostly eliminated. However, as the push for Baghdad was being waged, Iraq conducted ad hoc strategic PSYOP by allowing Al Jazeera to film the dead bodies of captured soldiers from the 507th Maintenance Company. The intent was to provide a PSYACT against the American

²⁰⁴ The other 3 SOMS-Bs were supporting OEF in Afghanistan. However, by 2005, they were rotating 5. Three in Afghanistan and two in Iraq, and one to Fort Bragg, NC for refitting and repairs. The SOMS-B consisted of two parts:

1. Mobile Radio Broadcast System (MRBS)

AM -- 560 kHz - 1710 KHz

FM -- 87.5 MHz - 108 MHz

SW -- 1.5 MHz - 29.9 MHz

2. Mobile Television Broadcast System (MTBS)

TV -- 47 - 88 MHz, 174 - 230 MHz

²⁰⁵ Determining the effectiveness of the SOMS-Bs, Commando Solo, and Sawa have been difficult to assess, especially in Phase I. However, in my interviews with Iraqis who worked in the Green Zone in Baghdad, the majority stated that they listened to the broadcast due to the media void as well as for information concerning the bombing campaign. They also received the frequencies from the millions of radio leaflets that were dropped on Baghdad.

²⁰⁶ 3rd BN Product Development Center (PDC) Files (Unclassified), 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne). "Leaflets IZD-001 and IZD-002D," (Fort Bragg, North Carolina).

public that was similar to the desecrated bodies of Americans in Somalia.²⁰⁷ Another strategy used by Saddam Hussein was to accentuate the mistakes made by the U.S. in 1991 in leading a revolution in Iraq, only to abandon the Kurds and the Marsh Arabs who Hussein then punished severely.²⁰⁸ Hussein, knowing that the Iraqi people were critically concerned about the U.S. leaving prematurely, played on this PSYOP theme extensively.²⁰⁹ He reminded the populace that the U.S. would only go as far as the oil fields and would never get as far north as Baghdad. This was highly believable to the populace who had no reason not to believe Hussein.²¹⁰

In countering Saddam's PSYOP, the 3rd Infantry Division assigned the attached Combat Camera (COM –CAM) to take footage of the unit's progress as well as the footage of the Coalition assisting the Iraqi populace with humanitarian aid. The footage would then be uploaded to Commando Solo aircraft and SOMS-Bs, and played throughout Iraq. Such images were difficult to counter by the state run media and many citizens in Baghdad had locally made, black market, satellite dishes, even though owning one meant six months in an Iraqi prison and a life-time of monitoring by Iraqi intelligence.²¹¹

The Iraqi people soon began taking note on the regime's lack of credibility, especially when the denial became comical when Muhammed Saeed al-Sahaf ("Baghdad Bob") repeatedly stated that there were no Americans in the country, despite rapid troop advances. Combat camera effectively showed the Iraqi people that the regime was lying to them by showing American units alongside known landmarks within Iraqi cities. The most discreditable images for the Ba'athist regime were the undeniable evidence of

²⁰⁷ 4th PSYOP Group (A) JPOTF assessment and summary. March –April 2003.

²⁰⁸ 3rd U.S. Infantry Division (Mechanized). "3rd Infantry Division After Action Review (AAR)" (Fort Drum, New York: February 2004), 269. The 3rd Infantry Division was the "tip of the spear" in the push to Baghdad. Other units were the 101st Airborne, 82nd Airborne, and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Unit.

²⁰⁹ Even upon the capture of Saddam Hussein, many Iraqis that I talked to still feared that somehow some way, when the Americans left, that Saddam or members of the Ba'athist party would take over Iraq and punish those who consorted with the Americans.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid., 270.

columns of American units entering Baghdad.²¹² Below are the themes and messages from SOMS-B, Commando Solo, and the USS Tarawa that were conducted in May 2003.

Frequencies: 756 AM, 11292 SW
Broadcasting Times: 0001 - 2400Z
Broadcast Programs and Themes

PROGRAM 108

- Support the new government / refrain from engaging in ethnic or religious violence
- UXO awareness / stay away from convoys
- Aid in the capture of war criminals
- Do not loot / Maintain order
- Turn TV antennae south of Baghdad

PROGRAM 113

- Do not interfere with Coalition Operations
- Work together to help build Iraq
- Stay off HWY 8 / Use HWY 9
- Turn antennae south of Baghdad
- Scientists and engineers: Come forward with info on WMD locations

PROGRAM 115

- Mine awareness / Report mine locations
- Thanks for reporting mine locations
- Dangers of UXOs
- Take ownership of your country
- Return objects taken from museums

PROGRAM 119


- Iraqi scientists: Cooperate with Coalition Forces
- Coalition is committed in delivering HA
- Everyone is needed to help rebuild Iraq
- Iraqi scientists and engineers: Come forward with info on WMD, you will be treated with respect
- Refrain from separatist violence

PROGRAM 122 (INJECT IZB 354)

- GEN FRANKS' Freedom Message

PROGRAM 125

- Tariq Aziz's capture
- Foreign fighters put down your weapons and return home
- Report information on foreign fighters
- You will choose your own government
- Iranian nationals: do not bring weapons into Iraq
- Come forward with info on WMD



PROGRAM 129

- International organizations that meet the needs of children
- How to interpret HA handbills and posters
- Various international agencies attempting to recover stolen artifacts
- Foreign fighters have entered Iraq to disrupt Coalition efforts
- US Army helped organize a government in Bayji

PROGRAM 135 NEW!

- BBC NEWS SEGMENT (01 MAY 03)

Figure 19. SOMS-B Coverage and Messages from Kuwait.²¹³

²¹² 3rd U.S. Infantry Division (Mechanized). "3rd Infantry Division After Action Review (AAR)" (Fort Drum, New York: February 2004), 269.

²¹³ 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2003-04).

Frequencies: 690 AM, 9715 SW
100.4 FM RADIO SAWA
 Broadcasting Times: 2101 - 1559Z

Radio Programs and Themes

PROGRAM 103

- Requests voluntary surrender of anyone with any knowledge of the Iraqi WMD program
- Report any known foreign fighters to Coalition forces
- Tikrit and Baiji: Cooperate with the Coalition
- Turn TV antennae south of Baghdad
- Keep order and obey existing laws
- Inform Coalition soldiers of para-military forces and Baa'th Party members

PROGRAM 106

- Turn TV antennae south of Baghdad
- Coalition's and International community's initiative for a fair representative gov't in Iraq
- Return to work
- Most of suicide bombers are not Iraqis
- Do not commit acts of revenge / focus on rebuilding Iraq

PROGRAM 108

- Support the new government / refrain from engaging in ethnic or religious violence
- UXO awareness / stay away from convoys
- Aid in the capture of war criminals
- Do not loot / Maintain order
- Turn TV antennae south of Baghdad

PROGRAM 113

- For your safety, do not interfere with Coalition Operations
- Shi'a, Sunni, Kurdish elites, and tribal leaders: work together to help build Iraq
- Reward for the successful return of historical materials / these items belong to the people
- Stay off HWY 8 / Use HWY 9
- Turn antennae south of Baghdad
- Scientists and engineers: Come forward with info on WMD locations, you will be treated with respect

UK RADIO PROGRAM (Twice daily)

- Music, News, Sports

INJECT 2505

- Rules, regulations, and guidelines to follow to ensure your safety

PROGRAM 115 NEW!

- Mine awareness / Report mine locations
- Thanks for reporting mine locations
- Dangers of UXOs
- Take ownership of your country / act as responsible citizens
- Return any objects that have been taken from museums

PROGRAM 118 NEW!

- BBC NEWS SEGMENT (21 APR 03)

INJECT 2577

- Coalition forces are in your towns temporarily to restore safety and security

INJECT 5044

- Volunteer to help rebuild Iraq




Figure 20. SOMS-B Coverage and Messages from BIAP.²¹⁴

²¹⁴ 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2003-04).

Frequency: 750 AM, 9715 SW
100.4 RADIO SAWA
 Broadcasting Times: 1600 - 2100Z

Broadcast Programs and Themes

PROGRAM 115

- Mine awareness / Report mine locations
- Thanks for reporting mine locations
- Dangers of UXOs
- Take ownership of your country / act as responsible citizens
- Return any objects that have been taken from museums

PROGRAM 119

- Iraqi scientists: Cooperate with Coalition Forces
- Coalition is committed in delivering HA
- Everyone is needed to help rebuild Iraq
- Iraqi scientists and engineers: Come forward with info on WMD, you will be treated with respect
- Refrain from separatist violence

PROGRAM 122 (INJECT IZB 354)


- GEN FRANKS' Freedom Message to the Iraqi people

PROGRAM 125

- Tariq Aziz's capture
- Foreign fighters put down your weapons and return home
- Report information on foreign fighters
- You will choose your own government
- Iranian nationals: do not bring weapons into Iraq
- Come forward with info on WMD

PROGRAM 129

- International organizations that meet the needs of children
- How to interpret HA handbills and posters
- Various international agencies attempting to recover stolen artifacts
- Foreign fighters have entered Iraq to disrupt Coalition efforts
- US Army helped organize a government in Bayji



INJECT 2505

- Rules, regulations, and guidelines to follow to ensure your safety

INJECT 2577

- Coalition forces are in your towns temporarily to restore safety and security

INJECT 5044

- Volunteer to help rebuild Iraq

Figure 21. SOMS-B Coverage and Messages from Commando Solo.²¹⁵

²¹⁵ 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2003-04).

Frequency: 9715 SW
Broadcasting Times: 2101 - 1559Z
Radio Programs and Themes

PROGRAM 050

- Do not mine Iraqi waterways
- Negative outcome of releasing oil into waterways
- Negative consequences of interfering with Coalition Operations
- Do not assist Iraqi leadership escape via waterways

PROGRAM 101

- Provide information about WMD
- Mine awareness
- Shi'a leadership: encourage lawful behavior
- HA is being provided and distributed by the international community
- Keep order and obey existing laws
- Return to work / you are important in rebuilding a new Iraq

PROGRAM 102


- Utility workers: return to work to insure the well being of the general population
- Turn TV antennae south of Baghdad
- Keep order and obey existing laws
- Stop looting, take ownership of your country, and act as responsible citizens
- Report known human rights violations and atrocities

PROGRAM 103

- Requests voluntary surrender of anyone with any knowledge of the Iraqi WMD program
- Report any know foreign fighters to Coalition forces
- Tikrit and Baiji: Cooperate with the Coalition
- Turn TV antennae south of Baghdad
- Keep order and obey existing laws
- Inform Coalition soldiers of para-military forces and Baa'th Party members

PROGRAM 106

- Turn TV antennae south of Baghdad
- Coalition's and International community's initiative for a fair representative government in Iraq
- Return to work
- Most of suicide bombers are not Iraqis



PROGRAM 119

- Iraqi scientists: Cooperate with Coalition Forces
- Coalition is committed in delivering HA
- Everyone is needed to help rebuild Iraq
- Iraqi scientists and engineers: Come forward with info on WMD, you will be treated with respect
- Refrain from separatist violence

INJECT 2505

- Rules, regulations, and guidelines to follow to ensure your safety
- INJECT 2577**
- Coalition forces are in your towns temporarily to restore safety and security
- INJECT 5044**
- Volunteer to help rebuild Iraq

Figure 22. SOMS-B Coverage and Messages From the USS Tarawa.²¹⁶

Although gauging direct indicators of MOE are challenging in a combat environment, there were several positive indicators that showed successes in conjunction with the Coalition PSYOP themes. For one, there were enormous surrenders from the regular army units, including the elite Republican Guard. When encountered by Coalition units, these Iraqi soldiers were doing exactly what the PSYOP leaflets had instructed them to do, and they were also frequently holding the leaflets themselves when they were discovered by American forces. Secondly, there were very few Iraqis who were internally displaced during the major combat operations, following the PSYOP campaign the Iraqis had been instructed to stay in their homes due to the precision bombing

²¹⁶ 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2003-04).

campaign. Third, the Coalition managed to convince the Iraqi civilian and military target audiences that preserving the oil fields would only benefit them in the future.²¹⁷

C. PSYOP / DURING OCCUPATION IN OIF

Once the Coalition began to establish itself in Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority came into effect as the proxy government whose aims were to immediately begin the process of establishing a democratically elected self ruling government in Iraq. To do this, a part of the overall plan to legitimize Iraq was to foster the growth of the media in Iraq.²¹⁸ The four goals of the CPA included:

1. Foster a professional Iraqi media industry which operates under the conventions of unbiased reporting and freedom of speech.
2. Establish regional governorate strategic communications support teams to coordinate and facilitate campaigns.
3. Establish regulations and licensing requirements for Iraqi media companies.
4. Foster development of independent media companies to include production, market research, advertising, publishing and broadcasting companies.²¹⁹

From the four provisions, arose the *Iraqi Media Network (IMN)*. IMN was established to provide the needed jumpstart to satellite television, radio, and newspaper industries that would be at the heart of establishing credible media network in Iraq.²²⁰ At the same time, MNF-I established strategic communications (STRATCOM) as the coalition's arm in conducting information operations at all levels within Iraq. Under STRATCOM, there were the subordinate organizations of the Joint Psychological

²¹⁷ JPOTP. "Brief on current Operations in support of OIF" (Baghdad, Iraq: May 2003).

²¹⁸ To this day, one cannot talk about the CPA without talking about the egregious errors that it made during its initial establishment. One – was the disbanding of the Iraqi military into the public sector that proved to be disastrous mistake that is being paid for today. This decision de-legitimized the CPA as well as discredited them in the eyes of the Iraqi military that was waiting for them to be included in the plan to re-shape Iraq. This decision continues to have a negative effect to this day, as well as a having a negative impact on PSYOP at all levels.

²¹⁹ CPA. "Strategic Plan. Strategic Communications assessment" (Baghdad, Iraq 25 June 2004).

²²⁰ Ibid.

Operations Task Force (JPOTF) headed by 8th Battalion / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne), Civil Affairs, Public Affairs (PAO), and Information Operations (IO).²²¹ Additionally, civilian companies like Balloch & Roe were active in providing liaison support between military units and Iraqi media.²²²

Once the occupation phase of Iraq was commenced, the JPOTF began establishing contracts with the local media. The JPOTF was given the means by MNF-I to fund the infusion of PSYOP in the various media throughout Iraq. This allowed the Coalition and the Iraqi government to benefit from white truthful PSYOP that would foster the legitimacy of the fledgling Iraqi government, legitimacy of the upstart Iraqi National Army and the Iraqi Security police, discrediting the former Ba'athist regime, and the tracking down of wanted insurgents and Al Qaeda fighters.

The media organizations that the JPOTF came in contact with consisted of former Ba'athist news outlets that were either Sunni, Shia, or Kurdish in slant. There were also formerly expelled news media such as *Azzaman* newspaper that had been run in London by expelled or fleeing Iraqis as well as the new IMN backed media, all of which were funded by the CPA.²²³ In a matter of months, news outlets in all forms began to sprout in Iraq. As each month progressed, the expanse of media in Iraq could be made evident in the explosion of satellite dishes that were being put up around the country.²²⁴

As a consequence in a growing media infrastructure, there are a myriad of media outlets that can be used in addition to Iraqi merchandise companies that have been and will continue to be an important part of the Coalition information campaign. One of the fastest growing industries in Iraq has been the swell of satellite, radio, and newspaper media outlets in Iraq that are quite novel to the country due to years of the state controlled the media. During the time of the Hussein regime, there were no independent satellite television, radio stations, or newspapers allowed. When the regime fell, a media

²²¹ 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2003-04).

²²² Such coordination entailed receiving PSYOP products from the JPOTF and PSYOP staff and infusing them in the host nation media platforms.

²²³ 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2003-04).

²²⁴ Similar to my experience in Kosovo, as soon as the Ba'athists regime was removed, my operations entailed driving throughout Iraq under cover to monitor and coordinate with the media for the JPOTF. As each week and month passed, there was a noticeable difference in the amount of satellite dishes that were being placed in residential homes.

void was filled by newspapers, radio stations, and satellite television stations that would run the gamut of ideology from pro-coalition, neutral, to anti-coalition.²²⁵

Such a swell in media growth was also helped by a moderate portion of the Iraqi populace that could read and write English. During the 1970s, Saddam Hussein implemented English in schools due to the connection with oil and commerce. As a result, the Iraqi populace today, has a moderate proportion of English speaking citizens, which aids in Coalition PSYOP efforts. By having a pool of translators, journalists, and broadcasters, the hired host media personnel could not only produce products in Arabic, but also produce them in English as well. This was especially convenient since most PSYOP products are approved at the flag officer level.²²⁶ Additionally, knowing English also meant knowing about the American culture as it bridged the gap and led to worker relationships that were ideal. In fact, many Iraqis became so proficient and trusted, that they became quite knowledgeable of PSYOP and their opinions weighed heavily when it came to developing products.²²⁷

It was also not surprising that some radio stations chose on their own to broadcast in English. In fact, the radio station atop the tallest building in Iraq, the Sheraton Ishtar Hotel, is an English speaking radio station that is used extensively by the Coalition due to its secure location. The station called *IQ4*, on the 104.5 frequency, reaches out to a young Iraqi target audience with popular western music that is mixed with PSYOP messages. Throughout the day and evening, the JPOTF would monitor the station and soon the PSYOP personnel began to notice a trend of Iraqi youth calling the station in English and

²²⁵ Baghdad Mosquito. Observations from daily reports (Baghdad, Iraq 2004-2005). Baghdad mosquito is an organization that works directly for the embassy in Iraq. Its task is to track or report on all media in Iraq as well as their slant and talking points. They also conduct polling data as well as operate throughout Iraq to assess rumors, attitudes, and morale of the populace.

²²⁶ 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2003-04). From 2004 to the current date, insurgent and Al Qaeda have targeted such workers of the coalition. Zarqawi targeted such personnel that worked for the coalition. He would then execute them and make video DVDs to threaten the populace. I felt this intimidation has not worked since most Iraqis are desperate for work. Despite the bombings and kidnappings, there are still long lines for a variety of jobs throughout Iraq.

²²⁷ 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2003-04).

requesting songs (usually rap and R&B).²²⁸ At *IQ4*, the Coalition found a radio that was secure and that was able to play PSYOP radio injects²²⁹ of themes related to legitimacy of the Iraqi government, the terrorist tips hotline, as well as establishing unity in Iraq.²³⁰

The second radio dissemination asset was the National Media Dissemination Platform. Instead of just one radio station, the National Media Dissemination Platform would receive PSYOP radio injects from the JPOTF and then distribute them to five radio stations throughout Iraq. Since the messages were going to a broad audience, the content had to be broad as well. As the case, PSYOP injects concentrated on the broad operational themes of capturing Al Qaeda terrorists, legitimacy of the Iraqi government, voting, and the repetitive message of Iraqi unity. The radio stations were: *KHAK FM* in Sulaymaniya, *Kurdistan FM Radio-Dahuk*, *Baghdad FM*, *Baghdad AM*, and *Basrah FM*. The success of the radio stations were evident, as they were a few attempted attacks that luckily failed. Additionally, the paid translators that worked at the JPOTF were given the task to monitor the radio stations to ensure that they were playing the right messages or any messages at all. Consequently, receiving payment was predicated on the precise injects being placed.²³¹

An example of a PSYOP product played would be the “The Crisis.” “The Crisis” was made by an Iraqi production company called Ocean Heart. The POTF would give them a theme and they would do a show, interview guest, and discuss the latest issues that were pressing Iraq. After the one hour radio broadcasts was approved by the JPOTF

²²⁸ The Iraqi station manager from *IQ4* stated that the youth would call to the station and speak English as a form of rebellion and self expression. It is also noteworthy that *IQ4* is positioned atop the tallest building in Iraq; the Baghdad Sheraton Ishtar Hotel, thus giving a propagation advantage.

²²⁹ Injects are PSYOP broadcasts that are technically formatted to the mediums of radio, television or internet.

²³⁰ *IQ4* was my most reliable dissemination source for radio because of the relationship that our team developed with the station manager. The station was owned by Balloch & Roe and was controlled by Ghassan Ridah, a self starting Iraqi who was the most trusted agent that the JPOTF employed. Unfortunately, he was kidnapped in December 2006 and his whereabouts are still unknown.

²³¹ Initially I had problems with the NDMP because I felt that they were not playing the correct injects that I instructed them to play. I solved the problem by asking the tactical PSYOP teams in the area to verify with their translators, as well as using our own translators and Arab speaking soldiers to listen in to the stations in Baghdad. Additionally, I tasked the NDMP, to bring in recorded transcripts of the messages played.

and the assigned translators, the injects would then be given to *IQ4* and the National Media Dissemination Platform. An example of a show that was translated by the POTF is as follows:

1. The Crisis” starts the program with the following lines. “The crisis winds storm us, from the electricity Crisis to Benzene (gasoline) and the Kerosene or natural gas is not the last one..... The drastic one is about the terrorists.
2. The program continues with the overall theme; the reason for the electricity, kerosene, and natural gas crisis is due to the terrorists. The program then links the acts of the terrorists with the long lines at the gas stations, the ever increasing gas prices at the fuel pumps. Additionally, Iraqi citizens who depend on gasoline such as taxi drivers pay up to 10 to 15 times the regular price in the black market. Overall the first portion links the terrorists to the answer of the ironic question of a land so rich in oil but yet so deficient in the common fuels for the average Iraqi consumer. The show then transitions into the specifics of the electricity crisis. It states that Iraqi endure only 2 hrs of electricity a day. During the 2 hrs, the electricity often goes down on an average of 5-6 times. For the electricity, it is the acts of the terrorists who destroy the power plants and kidnap the foreign workers that repair and work on the oil and power facilities. Overall for this segment, it blames the terrorists for the acts that destroy the infrastructure. It also depicts the terrorists as them not wanting a viable infrastructure for Iraq, as they link it with the success of the coalition and the much hated new democracy of Iraq. The tail end of the program wraps the entire issue of the attacks on the infrastructure on the issue of security. It implores Iraqis to stand up and fight the terrorists, support the police, Iraqi National Guard (ING), and the Iraqi army; as they cannot do it alone. The program ends with the call to dispose and rid the terrorist from Iraq. It is the terrorist that wishes to turn Iraq into a “dark epoch”. The program then ends with Iraqi National Anthem.²³²

Overall, the success of playing PSYOP products paid off in dividends, especially with the tips hotline for wanted insurgents that would be played on our broadcasts. The tips hotline would feature messages about the top 5 wanted insurgents in Iraq in a given week. MOE amounted to receiving hundreds of phone calls from both inside and outside of Iraq on the whereabouts of insurgents. If a given tip amounted to a capture, the source would be financially rewarded. Additionally, the two SOMS-Bs that were west of Baghdad, played the same mirror programs as in *IQ4* and the National Media

²³² Ocean Heart Productions, Baghdad, Iraq. “The Crisis”. April 2005.

Dissemination Platform.²³³ The combination of military and civilian radio stations gave the total number of 8 radio stations playing in Iraq. Clearly, two military radio stations (SOMS-Bs) could have not covered the necessary area to reach the entire Iraqi audience. Host nation media was essential in filling the gaps. The two figures below show the propagation of the SOMS-Bs and the host nation radio stations. The first figure shows just the SOMS-Bs and it is quite evident that just using military radio stations would have not covered Iraq. The second figure shows the SOMS-Bs with the augmented host nation media that provides a much better coverage of the radio target audience within Iraq.²³⁴ From the comparison, it is clearly evident that the host nation media assets are a critical part of the information campaign in Iraq.²³⁵

²³³ 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005).

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ibid.




Figure 23. SOMS-B Coverage in Iraq.²³⁶

²³⁶ 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005). Note that the SOMS-B package is quite limited in coverage. Additionally, it could only broadcast in one mode; either AM or FM in this case.

Yoom.²³⁹ Additionally, PSYOP inserts were also given to the National Media Dissimination Platform which had access to eight newspapers. The following are the newspapers, locations, slant, and circulation:

- *Kbit-Irbil*-(Kurdish)-20,000
- *Hawlati*- Sulaymaniyah (Weekly newspaper)-(Kurdish) / 10,000
- *New Kurdistan*- Sulaymaniya- (Kurdish) / 20,000
- *Al Hadbaa*- Mosul (Only a weekly newspaper)-(Kurdish) / 4,000
- *Al Sabah*-Baghdad-(IMN controlled no known bias) 30,000
- *Al Mada*-Baghdad-(Communist) / 5,000
- *Al Manarah-Basrah*- (No known bias / Printed in Kuwait) / 10,000
- *Al Nadah-Basrah*- (Sunni) / 5,000
- *Iraq Al Yoom*- (Pro Coalition / Shia Owner) / 10,000
- *Al Taakhi*- (Pro Coalition / Kurdish Newspaper / 17,000
- *Azzaman Newspaper*- (No known bias) / 50,000²⁴⁰

The listed newspapers would receive a weeks worth of PSYOP products and then print them in their daily newspapers. Overall, the print media reinforced and focused attention on the visual (electronic) PSYOP. A typical PSYOP product in the *Azzaman Newspaper* would feature an opinion piece written by the JPOTF's Iraqi journalist / translators, supported by a cartoon that usually targeted insurgents and Zarqawi.²⁴¹ Additionally, the tips line would also be placed in the newspapers that included visual

²³⁹ Balloch & Roe were instrumental in ensuring PSYOP messages were playing correctly at each media outlet. Balloch & Roe hired Iraqi contractors and journalists that were absolutely superb. They provided feedback on broadcasts and print issues, picked up the daily injects and print products from the JPOTF, and networked extensively throughout all the media networks in Iraq. It was their networking prowess that allowed the JPOTF to establish a viable satellite television contract.

²⁴⁰ Data provided to the author by Balloch and Roe during my assignment in Iraq. Albeit by good intentions, Information Operations in Iraq established an enormous contract with an inexperienced company named Lincoln Group, that was in excess of over 100 million dollars to establish PSYOP contacts. Besides the Lincoln Group products being ineffective, the JPOTF had already established contracts with newspapers in every major urban center of Iraq. The Lincoln Group would then pay the exact same media outlets that the JPOTF had established. This led to confusion as to who had contracts with the established media as well as establishing a dysfunctional precedence with the Iraqi media as well.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

recognition, points of contact, and a reward if the information led to the capture. Below are two examples of cartoons that would be placed alongside an OP / ED narrative in the various newspapers:



Figure 25. (Zarqawi Campaign 2005)²⁴²



Figure 26. (ISF and Iraqis Voting in 2005).²⁴³

²⁴² 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005).

²⁴³ Ibid.

BACK

عبد الباقي عبد الكريم عبد الله السعدون



عبد الباقي السعدون كان مسؤولاً لفرع محافظة ديالى لحزب البعث السابق ومسؤولاً عن تنظييمات المنطقة الجنوبية في العراق. يقوم عبد الباقي السعدون بتجنيد وتمويل نشاطات المتطرفين في المنطقة الشرقية والوسطى من العراق. ويشتهر في توزيعه أموالاً ونقوداً من النظام السابق والتي هي أصلاً أموالاً تعود للشعب العراقي بهدف تقديم التسهيلات لإثارة العنف ضد الحكومة العراقية. والسعدون مطلوب أيضاً للجرائم التي إقترفها ضد الإنسانية في عام ١٩٩٩ خلال الإنتفاضة الشعبية على النظام وأثناء ماكان مسؤولاً عن تنظييمات حزب البعث في مدينة البصرة. وكعضو في نظام صدام البائد فقد سرق عبد الباقي السعدون أصولاً مالية عائدة للشعب العراقي. وإن أي أصول مالية تستعاد من السعدون سوف تستخدم في إعادة إعمار العراق. وإعتقال عبد الباقي السعدون سيؤدي الى مستقبل آمن للعراق. إذا كان لديك أية معلومات بخصوص هذا المجرم، يرجى إبلاغها إلى أقرب سلطة معنية؛ وبذلك ستقدم خدمة عظيمة لنفسك ولبلدك.

Figure 27. (Rewards for Tips Program 2005).²⁴⁴

To supplement PSYOP via radio and newspapers, the JPOTF along with a variety of units in Iraq used billboards to communicate with the populace. The billboard messages were designed to foster support from the Iraqi populace for the national army, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and the Iraqi government. Usually the billboards would stay up for three to six months and would be immediately replaced if they were damaged by weather or vandalism. In terms of the JPOTF's experience with billboards, the most popular were the ones that showed ISF or Iraqi armies as a powerful force. Additionally, billboards were also used to drive home the message about Iraqis protecting their kids from terrorists by informing the authorities of their whereabouts or activities. The billboards were used in conjunction with all the forms of media that were intended to provide a repetitive PSYOP message while Iraqis were on the road. Below is an example of a billboard that was placed along Route Irish, regarded as the most dangerous road in Iraq.²⁴⁵

²⁴⁴ 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005).

²⁴⁵ Ibid.



Figure 28. (Anti-terrorist billboard along Route Irish near BIAP).²⁴⁶

To augment the visual print media of newspapers, the JPOTF produced with the help of Iraqi journalists, translators, and artists, the *Shanasheel Magazine* (later renamed *Yenebia*) and the *Thunder Team Comic Book*. *Shanasheel magazine*, Iraq's first national magazine, was a cultural magazine that featured interviews with key Iraqi figures in government, as well as stories on infrastructure improvement such as schools, oil fields, and commerce. The magazine was produced monthly with 50,000 copies that were printed and disseminated throughout Iraq. The success of the *Shanasheel magazine* was negligible due to staffing and production issues that were later remedied by hiring an entire new crew to develop, print, and disseminate the magazine. Once that occurred, the magazine became quite popular due to the content and the shiny paged appearance that the magazine featured.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁶ 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005). An Iraqi billboard company named Ninevah Billboards were contracted by the JPOTF to emplace billboards. Unfortunately, the contract work was abruptly ended after Ninevah billboards was destroyed by an Iraqi car bomb.

²⁴⁷ Ibid. The JPOTF discovered that a magazine with attractive shiny paper of good quality was very popular among the Iraqi populace. Based on the culture, magazines and newspapers were passed between friends and family members. Therefore, one print product can have the potential of 10 to 50 viewers.



Figure 29. (Shanasheel Magazine in Baghdad)²⁴⁸



Figure 30. (Shanasheel Magazine in Mosul).²⁴⁹

Once *Shanasheel Magazine* was established, the JPOTF decided to go for a target audience that was younger by developing the *Thunder Team Comic Book*. Thanks to a great staff both U.S. and Iraqi, a quality paper source, and a reliable print contract, the *Thunder Team Comic* was an instant hit. This was evident from the Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs) requesting more be made due to the instant following that the comic book created.²⁵⁰ The overall theme of the comic book involved the Thunder Team elite unit from the Iraqi Police (IP) and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) that would fight and defeat

²⁴⁸ 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005).

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

the evil terrorists in Iraq; a good guy- bad guy story. The plots always involved a terrorists trying to kill or harm innocent civilians only to be thwarted by the ever vigilant and powerful Thunder Team.

In addition to the popularity with the youth of Iraq, the comic book became very popular among the Iraqi Security Forces who loved seeing themselves in a superhero role. The result was the JPOTF benefiting from having multiple target audiences respond to the comic book that enforced the themes of legitimacy of the Iraqi government as well as capturing or killing the insurgents and terrorist.²⁵¹



Figure 31. (The Thunder Team Comic Book)²⁵²

²⁵¹ 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005).

²⁵² Ibid.



Figure 32. (“Tracking the Terrorist”).²⁵³

The final PSYOP piece that the JPOTF added in 2005 was the use of satellite television. By 2005, other than a few public service announcements, there were no long term contracted agreements with the satellite network affiliates for broadcast of PSYOP products. This was a troubling fact since by 2005, Iraqis received most of their news and entertainment via satellite television.²⁵⁴ The two dominant satellite stations were *Al Iraqiya* and *Al Sharkia*; the two stations that evolved as major networks due to their initial funding in 2003 from the *IMN* and the *CPA*.

For the JPOTF, the priority was contracting *Al Iraqiya*, because it was the most watched satellite channel for both news and entertainment: a STRATCOM poll had found that *Al Iraqi* held 50 percent of the viewers, while *Al Sharkia* captured only 30 percent.²⁵⁵ Surprisingly, *Al Jazeera* and terrestrial television ranked at 10 percent equally.²⁵⁶ This

²⁵³ 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005).

²⁵⁴ STRATCOM, “Media Poll in Baghdad and surrounding cities” (Baghdad: April 2005).

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

showed what the JPOTF had believed: that Iraqis wanted their news and entertainment from fellow Iraqis and not from a foreign source. However, it was also assumed that in the hotbed areas of anti-coalition sentiment, *Al Arabia*, *Al Jazeera* and *Al Sawa* received much higher viewership. There were other satellite stations that received negligible viewership such as *Rotana*, a satellite station owned by *Rotana Hotels*, a company out of Dubai. Another was *MBC*, a Saudi -owned company broadcasting a mix of free-to-air news and entertainment channels via satellite from its headquarters at the Dubai Media City in the United Arab Emirates.²⁵⁷

By May of 2005, the JPOTF established a contract with Al Iraqia that was greatly assisted by Balloch & Roe as an intermediate agent.²⁵⁸ Once the contract was firmly established, the JPOTF decided to include PSYOP products that would air during prime time hours (1900-2200 hrs) on the *Al Iraqiya* satellite network.²⁵⁹ The use of *Al Iraqiya* provided the JPOTF an incredibly prolific platform for the dissemination of PSYOP. The use of the expensive media platform was used almost extensively for countering Al Qaeda and the insurgency. Breaking into the satellite TV market was a huge step, and one that was long over do, as the JPOTF was only utilizing PSYOP inserts in newspapers, magazines, comic books, and radio stations.

Since most Iraqis watched satellite TV for both news and entertainment, PSYOP began to have a greater effect due to the fact it was now reaching an Iraqi wide audience. With hundreds of hours of video tape on hand that showed the destruction at the hands of insurgents, torture during the Saddam Hussein regime, and footage detailing the legitimacy of the Iraqi government, it was all too easy to incorporate the videos towards

²⁵⁷ STRATCOM Assessments Division, Baghdad. (MNF-I Assessment Poll). April 2005).

²⁵⁸ Ghassan Ridah, an Iraqi national single handedly established the contract with Al Iraqia due to his connections with the media outlets and IMN. Ghassan was the JPOTF's "go to" person when it came to coordinating for PSYOP throughout the country until he was abducted in December 2006.

²⁵⁹ It was the contracting process at MNF-I at Camp Victory that was the most frustrating portion of the process. The contract had to be briefed to the STRATCOM commander, an Air Force Brigadier General. Afterwards, we had to establish a series of justification paperwork and then go before a Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB).²⁵⁹ After the JARB approved the contract, the funding then had to be approved via the combined land forces command in Kuwait. After finally being approved, the JPOTF then had to transfer the documents from MNF-I to the Baghdad contracting office. Once there, the contract was prepared and finally signed by Al Iraqia. This process took an eternity compared to Zarqawi who could easily take advantage of satellite television in a day's time. The JPOTF had to wait 3 months!

the PSYOP satellite TV campaign.²⁶⁰ During the onset of the *Al Iraqiya* contract which began in May 2005, the JPOTF began to experiment with graphic scenes that included women and children laying in the streets in the aftermath of insurgency terrorist explosions as well as referencing the Al Maeda verses of the Koran. The results created a wave of anger at the insurgency and helped to further demonize Abu Musab Al Zarqawi.²⁶¹ In one notable video, Zarqawi's famous human shields speech stated it was okay to kill the human shields regardless of being Muslim. The video included his speech behind a backdrop of horrific explosions and actual footage of body parts. The video set quite a ripple through Iraqi viewers as they were not accustomed to such PSYOP from the Coalition. A good measure of effectiveness was the amount of phone calls from angry citizens to the satellite TV stations expressing their anger with terrorism, especially Zarqawi.²⁶²

To make the PSYOP videos even more effective, they were placed during commercial time in the highest rated show in Iraq, "Terror in the Hands of Justice."²⁶³ "Terror in the Hands of Justice", was a reality show that aired the grieving families of the victims while calling for justice against the terrorist responsible for their love ones' death, while also airing actual terrorist who confess and repent for their actions. The PSYOP campaign was different than the traditional antiseptic peace dove or children playing while depicting the future of Iraq. The more Zarqawi bombed citizens, the more the JPOTF demonized him through every form of media available, over-and-over again to the Iraqi populace.

Finally in October of 2005, Ayman al-Zawahri, Al Qaeda's number 2 leader, wrote a letter that questioned Zarqawi's methods that involved killing thousands of

²⁶⁰ There is no doubt that the Iraqi people have no faith in the current government due to the inability to provide security. However, what the Al Iraqia contract established for the JPOTF, was a platform that was technically at par with the global media, as well as the ability to reach the Iraqi government. The graphic details from insurgency and Al Qaeda suicide attacks created considerable hatred towards those elements by the Iraqi people. JPOTF PSYOP programs capitalized on this and strove to create an even bigger wedge between the populace and the insurgency. However, a critical setback for PSYOP is the general attitude amongst Iraqis that their government and the presence of the Coalition are ineffective in stopping the violence in the country.

²⁶¹ 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005).

²⁶² Ghassan, Ridah, Balloch & Roe. Assessment from Al Iraqia Television (Baghdad: May 2005).

²⁶³ Al Iraqiya. "Terror in the Hands of Justice." (Mosul, Iraq: May, 2005).

Muslims. Zawahiri devoted significant attention to al-Zarqawi's attempts to start a civil war with the rival Muslim Shiite sect, the majority that now dominates the new Iraqi government. Ultimately, al-Zawahiri concluded that violence, particularly against Shiite mosques, only raises questions among Muslims.²⁶⁴ He also pointed out that "more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media...we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our umma," or community of Muslims."²⁶⁵ In short, Zawahiri's complaints about Zarqawi's methods - were directly in line with the themes and objectives of the Zarqawi PSYOP campaign that the JPOTF was conducting.

In addition to the tips hotline and the Zarqawi broadcasts, there were other videos that highlighted the positives in Iraq. For instance, the JPOTF began airing videos that featured the construction projects that the military and civilian engineers had built. By May 2005, the 1,000th project was built in Iraq with little fanfare. Besides the local populace, most Iraqis had no knowledge of the projects being built for Iraq. As a result, the JPOTF developed video commemorating the 1,000th project and featured a video per week on the status of construction operations within Iraq. The construction videos were considered a success as it exposed to the Iraqis that progress was being made. The videos were especially important during times when Iraqis were upset at shortages in electricity and gasoline.²⁶⁶

In terms of the JPOTF disseminating video products, it had for the first time, a platform that could reach the entire Iraqi audience via the most watched form of media throughout the country. Below are the locations and stations that satellite TV was aired throughout Iraq.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁴ Ayman Zawahiri. "12 October Letter to Zarqawi" (Baghdad: 12 October 2005).

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005).

²⁶⁷ Al Iraqiya. "Terror in the Hands of Justice." 2005.

Table 1. Locations of Satellite TV coverage.²⁶⁸

\$151,200 / \$1,814,400 / \$.84 PER SECOND IN PRIME TIME HOURS.					
LOCATION	CHANNEL	DURATION	LOCATION	CHANNEL	DURATION
Baghdad	7	1 Min.	Karbala	5	1 Min.
Baghdad	9	1 Min.	Karbala	6	1 Min.
Baghdad	37	1 Min.	Maysan	11	1 Min.
Mosul	7	1 Min.	Basrah	11	1 Min.
Mosul	9	1 Min.	Al Garbi	9	1 Min.
Kirkuk	6	1 Min.	Dewenia	12	1 Min.
Baquba	22	1 Min.	Tikrit	6	1 Min.
Al Qaim	7	1 Min.	Suq Shiokh	26	1 Min.
Kut	9	1 Min.	Ramadi	5	1 Min.
Haditha	6	1 Min.	Najaf	5	1 Min.
Al Nasir	9	1 Min.			

The addition of the Al Iraqia satellite contract added 21 Iraqi satellite channels that the JPOTF could now disseminate products throughout Iraq. This was critical in diversifying the JPOTF's PSYOP capability in reaching the entire populace of Iraq. All together, this allowed the JPOTF to now disseminate products via satellite TV, radio, terrestrial TV, newspapers, internet, magazines, comic books, posters, handbills, as well as a variety of imaginative items such as soccer balls, stickers, match books, and stationary.

Essentially, a good PSYOP program should have a saturation effect that involves a variety of media sources; the addition of satellite television added that dimension. An example below is the Zarqawi program. Just as MNF-I dedicated a considerable amount of resources in trying to capture or kill Zarqawi, the JPOTF followed suit by dedicating an entire PSYOP campaign to this individual who was creating so much destruction in Iraq. This campaign was executed by utilizing every form of media available to the JPOTF. Although Zarqawi's foolish tactics of destroying Shia mosques and beheadings

²⁶⁸ Al Iraqiya. "Terror in the Hands of Justice." 2005.

demonized him on his own merits, PSYOP was able to capitalize by repetitively attacking him on all fronts while creating an even bigger wedge with him and the populace.²⁶⁹

Zarqawi Program



Medium	Method	POC	Suspense	Frequency	Remarks
Newspapers	Press Conference CPA Press Release MNF-I PSA Newspaper Adverts	PAO (CPA/MNF-I) PAO PSYOP	D Day D Day D Day D +1	Weekly (Reseed Monthly)	Scripts/notes D-1 After Press Conference Issue FRAGO in adv, so PSA ready to del Prep in adv (D-7), execute D+1
Radio	Inject on IMN, IQ4 Inject on SOMS-B Local Radio	CPA PSA PSYOP PSYOP	D Day D Day D Day	2/day for 7 days, Then 1 daily.	Delivered after Press Conference Prep in adv as part of FRAGO Prep in adv as part of FRAGO
Face-to-Face	Tribal, political and religious leader engagements Populace engagements Border Patrols	IO	D Day	Daily until capture	TPs in FRAGO issued in adv MSCs/TPTs
TV	Press Conference PSA/Report on IMN	PAO (CPA/MNF-I) PAO	D Day D Day	Daily	
Handouts	Leaflets Wanted Posters	MNF-I PSYOP Div	D Day		Prepared in advance for circulation
Loudspeakers	TPT LSAs	PSYOP	D Day		
Internet	PSYOPS Product	PSYOP	D Day	Reseed Monthly	Posted to net

Figure 33. (Zarqawi Campaign 2005-6).²⁷⁰

However, despite the eventual killing of Zarqawi, the ongoing PSYOP campaign now has to contend with the legacy he left Iraq with: the sudden rise in sectarian violence that has claimed thousands of Iraqi lives. The challenge of controlling Iraq's surge of violence has left Iraqis with a bitter taste in their mouths concerning the U.S. presence there. This has made the PSYOP mission in Iraq extremely challenging to pull off.

The recent Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) published some alarming figures about the confidence in the Coalition and the new government to stabilize Iraq. Recent polls suggest an information and PSYOP crisis within Iraq. Only 36 percent of Iraqis feel their country is headed in the right direction, and 79 percent have a "mostly negative" view of the influence the U.S. has had on their country. Even more alarming, is that 61 percent

²⁶⁹ 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005).

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

approve of attacks on U.S. forces.²⁷¹ This is coupled with an unfavorable opinion throughout the world and a growing unfavorable opinion in the United States populace as well as its lawmakers. The result is a growing trend that parallels the findings in Chapter 3 with how PSYOP was affected in Vietnam. Essentially, the challenges of the combat situation on the ground have created a discrediting effect upon most of the PSYOP effort because the target audience sees the reality on the ground. The Iraqis have become frustrated at a U.S. force that fails to stop the daily car bombings that are killing so many Iraqis. Getting the Iraqis to believe that the sky is blue when all they see is red is a good analogy to the campaign there. However, the one ace in hole for PSYOP has been the populace's disdain for Al Qaeda due to all the carnage they have caused. This continues to be an angle that PSYOP will exploit for months to come with considerable success.²⁷²

Throughout OIF, the U.S. has shown an incredible resiliency by sticking with the commitment of not leaving Iraq like it did in Vietnam. The U.S. has now committed to altering its ground strategy while intensifying its efforts to train-up the Iraqi military and police force. Fortunately, for the U.S., most Americans feel that pulling out of Iraq would be a mistake; the national will to continue the fight is obviously much different than in Vietnam. With the new strategy implemented, hopefully Baghdad will be wrestled away from the clutches of the insurgents, the hope of stability and an increase confidence in the populace will make the job of reaching the hearts and minds that much easier there. Then you have to do the same with rest of Iraq while slowly squeezing the insurgency.

There is no doubt that PSYOP along with other elements of Special Operations in Iraq will be needed for years to come. Just as the U.S. were conducting PSYOP missions in Iraq long before OIF, so too will the need to conduct PSYOP in Iraq long after most U.S. forces have redeployed and the mission in Iraq becomes advisory in nature. That message will continue to be a slow and methodical process of products, series, and campaigns whose results may not take effect in months or even years from now; even so, the results will be difficult to gauge as history has shown. However, what has been

²⁷¹ Iraqi Study Group. "The Iraq Study Group Report" (Washington D.C.: December 2006).

²⁷² 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005).

clearly evident is the fact that Iraqis respond better to the PSYOP message when it is coming from their fellow Iraqis via the Iraqi media.²⁷³

D. PSYOP / THE MERLIN INITIATIVE IN SUPPORT OF OEF

By 2004, the Combined Forces Campaign-Afghanistan (CFC-A), were distributing PSYOP products to over 54 radio stations throughout Afghanistan in addition to two SOMS-Bs. Overall, the PSYOP broadcasts were effective in keeping the populace informed, distributing information of wanted Taliban and Al Qaeda, and delivering news and entertainment via the dominant form of broadcast in Afghanistan; shortwave radio. However, with 54 stations spread all throughout Afghanistan, it was difficult to gauge whether the radio stations were up to date in playing the correct PSYOP injects, or even playing them at all. Additionally, the radio stations were quite weak in strength and had only a 20-30 km range.²⁷⁴ Traveling through Afghanistan was quite difficult due to the mountainous terrain, poor roads, and pockets of Taliban resistance. What was needed was a nationwide propagation medium that could blanket the entire country with shortwave radio. The answer was VT Merlin out of London, England.

VT Merlin was and continues to be a leading provider of critical communications services to customers in the space communications, broadcast, defense, and security market sectors. VT Merlin had the extensive experience that CFC-A desired as well as powerful transmitters that could not only reach Afghanistan, but could also provide a strong signal against Chinese jamming or attempts to overpower the frequencies in Afghanistan.²⁷⁵

Once the contract with VT Merlin was established, broadcasts to Afghanistan soon followed with the first signal being transmitted in September of 2004. What made the Merlin program unique was that it was a radio station whose programming was produced in Fort Bragg, NC, by Afghan natives who were hired as journalists, broadcasters, and translators. Together with the PSYOP personnel, the group recorded

²⁷³ 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (JPOTF FWD Afghanistan: 2005).

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ VT Merlin. "Operational Summary Brief" (London, England: October 2004). VT Merlin had extensive contracts with the European Space Agency (ESA), BBC World Service, UK Ministry of Defense (MOD), and the U.S. DoD. VT Merlin delivers 1,000 hours of broadcasting per day.

12.5 hours of news, entertainment, weather, sports, music, as well as scheduled PSYOP messages each hour. By December of 2004, the group had reached a tempo of creating 18 hours of recordings for each day, and the 3rd and 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) worked around the clock to produce a fresh new 18 hour program for each day. Once an 18 hour disk was made, it was immediately transferred to VT Merlin via a File Transfer Protocol connection (FTP). Once received, the engineers at VT Merlin would double check the disk and then blast the broadcast via shortwave from England at their station sites in the United Arab Emirates. The result was a powerful shortwave signal that blanketed Afghanistan.²⁷⁶

The program was an instant success with a powerful signal that reached by 95 percent of the entire Afghan populace. To track the propagation, VT Merlin engineers were positioned in Pakistan and Uzbekistan, supplemented by ground tactical PSYOP teams (TPTs) that monitored the station while conducting their missions. Below is one such signal report that was conducted by the TPTs.

²⁷⁶ 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (JPOTF FWD Afghanistan: October 2004). Propagation in Afghanistan was quite strong with the VT Merlin signal. However, due to the mountainous terrain, there were signals in some areas that were weak, moderate, and strong. Overall, the signal was carried consistently throughout Afghanistan.




Figure 34. (Merlin Signal Reception).²⁷⁷

A critical piece to our operations was getting the target audience to tune with the broadcasts. This was conducted months before the first broadcast took place by announcing the oncoming arrival of the new broadcast. The populace of Afghanistan was informed via leaflets, posters, *The Peace Newspaper*, as well utilizing various radio stations to broadcast the arrival date and most importantly, the frequencies on which the Merlin broadcast would play.²⁷⁸

As hoped, the Merlin initiative proved to be a big success. It easily gained nationwide recognition and soon started to compete with BBC broadcasts throughout Afghanistan. The big picture was the 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) had produced a product that was made in North Carolina and then broadcasted to the other side of the world to cover all of Afghanistan. It is and continues to be a strategic PSYOP tool that is

²⁷⁷ 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (JPOTF FWD Afghanistan: 18 November 2004).

²⁷⁸ Ibid.


helping shape Afghanistan as well as a perfect example of how 6 Afghan host nation media personnel can reach and capture an entire Afghan listening audience.²⁷⁹ Below are examples of scripts and an average 1 hour radio wheel produced at Fort Bragg.

Product #	Topic	Length (d,p)
1251	Coalition is strong and has solidarity and resolve	D0:37, P0:23
1253	Report Illegal checkpoints	D0:31, P0:30
1261	Non-interference, deadly force authorized	D0:27, P0:33
1262	Do not Support terrorists	D0:34, P0:24
1263	Terrorists not safe in Afg.	D0:45, P0:22
1264	Neg. results of supporting terrorism	D0:29, P0:17
1277	Support the ANA and Coalition	D0:29, P0:24
1294	Leader targets are discredited	D1:19, P1:10
1309a	Reward for Bin Laden	D1:16, P1:00
1310a	Reward for Ayman Al-Zawhiri	D1:45, P1:08
1327	Informed of activities, plans, etc.	D1:11, P1:03
1328	Informed of activities, plans, etc.	D1:44, P2:05
1337	Do not shine lights at aircraft	D0:57, P1:09
1356	Do not play with toy guns	D1:40, P1:29
1357a	Turn in ACM equipment	D1:40, P1:29
1395	Support Afghan Government	D1:30, P1:24
1449a	Rewards for terrorist info	D0:39, P1:07
1459	Evils of the Taliban	D1:58, P1:47
1469a	International Support to AF	D1:39, P1:30
1471a	Report ACM activity	D1:37, P2:05
1472a	Report ACM activity	D0:41, P0:57
1473a	Rewards for ACM information	D0:34, P0:24
1484	Desertion and defects with Taliban	D2:09, P1:05
1494	Searching of females need	D2:16, P2:38
1498	Mine and UXO dangers	D1:33, P1:58
1499	Wash hands and Boil Water	D1:05, P1:22
1501	LAG and CF here to help and stay	D1:39, P1:30
1502	Don't attempt to bribe CF for PUCs	D1:28, P0:36
1517	Landmines and explosives deadly	D1:40, P1:36
1518	ACM offering monetary rewards	D1:37, P2:05
1532	ANA motivation to battle terrorism	D1:36, P2:15
1535	Don't kill CFs or AMFs for money	D1:44, P2:00
1536	Road linking Asadabad and Jalalabad	D0:41, P0:57

Figure 35. (PSYOP injects for a two week period).²⁸⁰

²⁷⁹ The fact that the Merlin project is strategic in scope is noteworthy. Strategic PSYOP is usually done by OGAs or the state department. However, the federal government has been remiss in conducting strategic PSYOP as it doesn't have or provide the funds to do so on an effective basis. This is my opinion after being the lead officer in charge of the Merlin initiative.

²⁸⁰ 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (JPOTF FWD Afghanistan: November 2004).



1 Radio wheel =
1 hour of broadcast

1 Day =
13 radio wheels

1 Day = 18 hrs
of broadcasts

Figure 36. 1 Hour Radio Wheel.²⁸¹

²⁸¹ 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (JPOTF FWD Afghanistan: November 2004). Above is an example of 1 hour radio wheel. The majority of the hour is information, news, and music that the target audience is accustomed to. 18 of these wheels are produced each day and then sent to VT Merlin. Also note that each PSYOP message has to be stated twice for the Pashtu and Dari speaking audiences of Afghanistan.




Figure 37. (Shortwave propagation strength).²⁸²

²⁸² 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (JPOTF FWD Afghanistan: November 2004). Above is the shortwave propagation that is transmitted from the UK out towards Afghanistan. There were no problems with the countries in between due to VT Merlin coordinating and reserving frequencies at the yearly broadcasting convention. However, the signal does carry out to China.

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V. CONCLUSION

This thesis set out to investigate the question of whether or not psychological operations benefit from the use of host nation media. To answer this question, the thesis examined a series of historical periods that began from World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Operation DESERT STORM, and the Balkans, focusing on the use of host nation media by parties to the conflict in each of these encounters. The thesis then provided information from current operations in Iraq and a specific platform in Afghanistan were analyzed to see if using foreign personnel to broadcasts the U.S. PSYOP message was beneficial in today's era as well. Overall, the answer is yes, utilizing host nation media enhances psychological operations efforts, but that the efforts can be used against a country and that on their own, are not enough to turn the tide of a war that is being lost on the kinetic battlefield.

One fact that was made certain throughout this thesis, was that every major conflict analyzed from World War II to the present did in fact utilize host nation media assets whether it was beneficial or not. Secondly, as an example relevant to U.S. operations, every major conflict from the same time period, involved military operations in areas where the American soldier and civilian were not truly familiar both in culture and in language. In World War II the culture and language was German and Japanese. In Korea the culture and language was Korean. In Vietnam it was Vietnamese. In the Balkans it was Albanian and Serb / Croat. In DESERT STORM and OIF it was Arabic. In Afghanistan it was Pashtu and Dari. In each of the these cases, Americans have been sent being fully expected to win the information and the PSYOP battle with an enemy that knew the language and culture better than 99 percent of most the Americans involved. The same could also be said for the Germans, British, Korean, Vietnamese, as well. So how do you level the playing field? The answer of course, is the use of host nation media assets.

However, did the historical examples back up that conclusion? In examining the historical impact of incorporating or manipulating host nation media, this thesis delved into its impact during World War II, The Korean Conflict, The Vietnam Conflict, Operation Desert Storm, the peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, as well as OEF and

the examination of the Merlin program in OEF. Whether it was establishing clandestine radio stations, influencing the legitimate media, incorporating host nation journalists, linguists, and broadcasters; the use of host nation media has left an indelible mark on deception, psychological, and information operations.

In World War II, the concept and implementation of setting up black PSYOP radio stations by both the Germans and the British lends credence to the importance and profound impact of utilizing host nation media. Essentially, if the host nation media was not important, the opposing forces would have not gone through the extensive trouble and expending precious resources in replicating it. However, the dividends for successfully replicating the media were plentiful. With just a few radio stations and a powerful transmitter, the British misinformation campaigns created havoc among German troops and civilians. By the wars end, many in German populace were perplexed by the confusion in their perceived trusted media. As soon as the proper German authorities gave instructions to the German populace, a British radio station would immediately dial in to the frequency and give false instructions. Overall, affecting the host nation media had an immediate impact on the morale of the populace, tying up the enemies' resources, and PSYOP as a whole.

In Korea, the U.S. began with a non-existent PSYOP program that was instantly stood up once the Koreans and Chinese were broadcasting PSYOP messages to the North and South Korean populaces, as well as to the North Korean and Chinese soldiers. Additionally, the millions of leaflets that were delivered to the enemy were perfected by local nationals that added all the nuances of culture into effective PSYOP products that would encourage the enemy to surrender as well as lowering the morale of the North Koreans. For the poorly clothed and ill-equipped North Korean and Chinese soldiers, hearing or reading PSYOP messages in their own language in the midst of freezing, being continuously bombed or shelled contributed to a lowering of morale and fighting resolve, as well as successfully enticing thousands to surrender.

In Vietnam, PSYOP planners were inhibited because of the combat situation on the ground. The United States was fighting a determined enemy that dictated where and when they would fight. Essentially, the U.S. was fighting a guerrilla war with conventional forces and tactics. The successes of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong

limited the success of PSYOP because it undermined the credibility of the US messages. In order for PSYOP to have worked, the enemy would have been convinced that their effort was futile and that it was inevitable that the Americans and South Vietnamese would be victorious. On a daily basis, the situation on the ground contradicted the messages being created in the PSYOP campaigns, and thus the PSYOP efforts were only able to secure small-scale, limited successes.

In the end, Vietnam reinforced the fact that PSYOP alone is not enough to turn the tide of a war that is being lost on the ground. However, the individual successes that PSYOP achieved cannot be forgotten. Campaigns such as The Wondering Soul as well as the PSYOP radio programs did have a profound effect on the enemy. Such successes were only possible because it incorporated local personnel as well as host nation radios and newspapers. Unfortunately, PSYOP did not enjoy the staying power because the overall message was neither believable nor credible to the enemy. Vietnamese PSYOP was extremely effective at breaking the will of the American people. Giap and Westmoreland met 30 years after the war and Westy said "you never won a tactical battle" Giap replied "we never had to". They were focused on the strategic fight of breaking America's will to fight with daily casualty reports and fostering the anti-war movement. In an indirect way, the North Vietnamese benefited from the use of host nation media of the U.S. It was the media in the U.S. that brought the war to the living rooms of Americans, tape delayed just in time for the evening news. This had a profound impact on the national will to carry on with the fight. This then affected the politicians to begin cutting funds for the war and then ultimately brought all soldiers home from a war that would be America's first defeat.

In Desert Storm and the Balkans, the U.S. was dramatically affected by the 24 hour news cycle that affected both wars. In both those conflicts, the U.S. learned to cope with and even use the international media to its advantage. In Desert Storm the U.S. isolated Iraq from the rest of the world by knocking out most communication nodes. Much of what was gleaned from the war is what the Americans fed CNN. The Iraqi government was thus dependent on the international news which was being fed by the Americans. This led to the perfect trap of feinting in the East while the Coalition forces struck in the West. Additionally, PSYOP planners would take advantage of favorable

combat conditions resulting in over 150,000 Iraqis surrendering. Such success was the culmination of leaflets, radio programs, television, that was driven by host nation assets and personnel from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait as well as other Arab states. The result was a complete collapse of the Iraqi ground forces. The PSYOP successes were further underscored due to the Iraqis following the exact instructions that were read or heard in Arabic via host nation media.

In OIF, the use of PSYOP was instrumental in convincing the Iraqis to surrender as well informing the populace to stay in their homes as the American forces were racing up to Baghdad. During Phase I, the use of host nation personnel left their mark on every PSYOP product via television and radio broadcast, newspapers, leaflet, magazine, and billboards that left Iraq paralyzed and toppled within a matter of a few weeks. However, the occupation of Iraq has gone counter to everything achieved during Phase I.

Insurgent tactics coupled with a resilient Al Qaeda network have turned the “battle for ideas” in the favor of enemy. The U.S. is no longer seen as dominating or even having control of the war. Such events have crept into the global media with troubling results such as: lawmakers actively split over withdrawing troops, world wide condemnation of U.S. actions, support for the war waning in the U.S., a disgraced White House, over 3,000 U.S. personnel killed, Iraq appearing to head into a civil war, and the most unfortunate: and an emboldened Al Qaeda / insurgency that is willing to fight to until the U.S. concedes defeat and pulls out. Effectively, the insurgents have taken a page from the tactics of Ho and the NVA.

In OEF, the Merlin shortwave program demonstrated the power of strategic reach that is capable of blanketing all of Afghanistan with their primary medium for information, shortwave broadcasting. A team of 7 soldiers and 6 Afghan personnel have become the number 2 listened program behind the BBC, all why being made in Fort Bragg, NC, emailed to London, and then sent out to Afghanistan.

In closing, the analysis from World War II to the present shows not only that host nation media is beneficial towards conducting PSYOP, but it is absolutely essential if you want to do PSYOP at all. With the host nation personnel, the U.S. would be simply relegated to conveying their message in an American way with an American tongue. Such efforts would result in most products being lost in translation while our hard power

assets would have to fight opposing hard power assets that would have no doubt surrendered under favorable combat situations. However, an additional lesson that this thesis has demonstrated is that if a country does not attempt to win the war of ideas, the enemy will do it for you. Additionally, the best PSYOP in the world coupled with the best host nation media in the world is not enough to overcome a losing combat situation on the ground. Vietnam taught us that, and hopefully Iraq will not follow suit.

Ending Scenario:

Just as the messages that were heard in the native tongues of the enemies that the U.S. has fought since World War II, imagine such a similar twist if the United States were ever invaded. Imagine if you will, in a scenario similar to the movie *Red Dawn*, if a foreign enemy were to invade and successfully occupy the United States. It can be certain that there would be a pitch battle, state by state, against the invaders. However, imagine if the enemy was beginning to win the war and many American assets and personnel were beginning to be used for the enemies' PSYOP campaign. Imagine tuning into your radio station or reading your newspapers only to hear the voice of a fellow American urging all their fellow Americans to quit and surrender. Americans (host nation media) on every dial telling you that to fight is futile and will only result in the death of you and your family. The effects of hearing and reading a message in your own language and from fellow Americans would be unnerving to many, and would no doubt challenge the fighting resolve of most, especially if the fighting was not going well and the situation seemed hopeless. Such was the effect of utilizing host nation media in the previous wars.

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