

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**EMBEDDED STRENGTHS TEAM: RESURRECTING, REDESIGNING,
REDEPLOYING COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS**

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ABSTRACT

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In the 21st century, Chaplains can be the newly discovered instruments employed in innovative approaches to 4th-generation warfare. This SRP explores the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) initiative; it assesses past and current relevance and challenges to CAP implementation in stability operations. It will then describe how the proactive use of the “strengths revolution” serves as a catalyst to a new type of CAP initiative called Embedded Strengths Team (EST). Finally, it proposes an unconventional and possibly controversial implementation of Chaplain leadership into this new program - a program based on 4th-generation warfare methodology that will no longer reside solely in the hands of non-state actors.

EMBEDDED STRENGTHS TEAM: RESURRECTING, REDESIGNING, REDEPLOYING COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS

In the 21st century, Chaplains can serve as newly discovered instruments employed in innovative approaches to 4th-Generation Warfare (4GW). This SRP explores the Combined Action Platoon (CAP)¹ initiative; it assesses past and current relevance and challenges to CAPs implementation in stability operations. It then assesses how the proactive use of the “strengths revolution”² can serve as a catalyst to a new type of CAP initiative called Embedded Strengths Team (EST).³ Finally, it proposes an unconventional and possibly controversial implementation of Chaplain leadership into this new program; a program based on 4th- generation warfare methodology that will no longer reside solely in the hands of non-state actors.

The following proposal builds on work done by Colonel W.S. Lee, ARNG; Lieutenant Colonel C. J. Burke, USAF; Lieutenant Colonel Z. M. Crayne, ANG; as well as Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, USMC; Captain Matt Danner, USMC; and Alan Morton Dershowitz. Additionally, CAP, though initiated during the Vietnam War but never allowed to develop to full maturity, will be the operational framework to implement the Embedded Strengths Team concept. The CAP structure and mission, explained in more detail later, provides the foundation for organization, methodology, and theory used to actualize the EST. The core of the following proposal is not new. However, the proposed details are; details that support practical and innovative application for successful implementation of ESTs as early as the culmination of the “Dominate” phase (Phase III) described in the “Phasing Model” of Joint Publication 3-0.⁴

The mandate for innovation such as ESTs originated more than 20 years ago when the Goldwater-Nichols Act (Joint Force Model) empowered the services to bring their finest and brightest to work together in synergistic ways to accomplish the mission. More recently, NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD-44 (December 7, 2005)⁵ directed the Secretary of State to coordinate, plan, and execute reconstruction and stabilization assistance in regions transitioning from civil strife or conflict. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (November 28, 2005)⁶ detailed how the Department of Defense (DOD) would support this initiative.

Campaign success must include stabilization operations so that non-state actors, such as criminal organizations, insurgents, rebel opposition groups, local militia, and warlords among others cannot re-gain a foothold by exploiting the oppressed. Furthermore, while there may still be fighting going on in the vicinity of employed ESTs, they will have the unique capability to continue their work toward stability operations. This focus on stability operations is the critical role ESTs play in the Dominate phase, and enables a smooth transition to the remaining phases

leading to conflict termination. Our emerging doctrine clearly recognizes the importance of the actions following combat as noted in DODD 3000.05:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission. ... They should be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities, including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.⁷

While some might say little has been done regarding the implementation of these directives, the EST is the perfect model to help facilitate transition from combat through stability operations and ultimately to civilian control of the situation. Why ESTs? In order to answer this question we must first explore EST's roots and evolution, which began with CAP.

Combined Action Platoons

Everyone sees the debate regarding the U.S. policy on Iraq daily in the news. The indisputable constant is that we must win the trust and confidence of the citizens in order to achieve success. Currently, we are not fully exploiting all the resources we possess. Yet the framework is available, and the model has been tested. So it is time to reconsider the use of our soft power potential, in much the same way the Marine Corps used the CAP program during the Vietnam conflict, to achieve results now!

The CAP program placed a squad of Marines and one Navy Corpsman in villages from Chu Lai to the DMZ in South Vietnam from 1965 to 1971...The Marines and Corpsmen of the CAC/CAP units attempted to isolate the people of select villages from the ravages of the war. CAP villages were no longer targets of the indiscriminate **Search and Destroy** mentality so prevalent during the Vietnam War. We shared the risk of living in the villages 24 hours a day, thereby earning the love and respect of thousands of our villagers who simply wanted to survive a war they didn't want.⁸

The Combined Action Platoons conceived in Vietnam have been resurrected and used again successfully in Iraq. Today CAPs are supporting local Iraqis by guarding water pumping facilities, hospitals, schools, and oil facilities in support of the Iraqi National Guard. Captain Matt Danner, USMC, commanded a CAP in Haditha:

Living and working with the [Iraqi Security Forces] ISF we demonstrated our commitment to supporting them. In addition to material support in the form of weapons, vehicles, ammunition, uniforms, etc, Marines provided moral support for both civilian and military leadership. This was at least as important as the material support. Men of the ISF were not short on courage or willingness to do their duty. What they lacked was the conviction that the Coalition Forces were committed to maintaining security and rebuilding Iraq, and would stick around when the going got tough.⁹

In theory, the CAP mission must continue to provide support until the local populace can support themselves and until the locals believe their new government is worth supporting and defending. In most cases, these citizens have been beaten down for so long that it will take time for them to understand that it is worthwhile for them to stand up for themselves.

Necessity for Innovation

When the hijacked planes crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001, our understanding and theory of war changed forever. War was no longer waged between nations, but between ideologies, and the necessity for different and innovative thinking to meet our enemies on this new battlefield had been thrust upon us. This is 4GW.

Fourth generation warfare uses all available networks -- political, economic, social and military -- to convince the enemies' political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit...Whether the problems [are]...tactical, logistical, doctrinal, or political.... [terrorists / insurgents have] attacked them from a direction that simply would not occur to a Western-trained soldier...¹⁰

Today, insurgents' IEDs continually remind us of this new 4GW approach to war. The daily news depicts the success of these mostly inferior forces inflicting chaos and harm on the U.S. led coalition forces in Iraq. While we have been slow in adopting non-traditional methods to counter these threats, U.S. military members have learned, adapted, and developed innovative and inexpensive techniques of their own through tactical experience:

Silly string has served me well in Combat especially in looking for I.A.Ds.[sic], simply put, booby traps. . . . When you spray the string it just spreads everywhere and when it sets it lays right on the wire. Even in a dark room the string stands out revealing the trip wire.¹¹

However, out-of-the-box thinking is required organizationally and operationally as well. Such thinking must involve not only interdepartmental, but also intradepartmental alliances and partnering. It will also require some calculated risk taking. When Department of State (DOS), United Nations, or other civilian organization follow behind military forces, ESTs can provide an efficient, effective bridge for transition from military authority to civilian authority. They can enhance stability operations to achieve greater success.

Stability will not be achieved without realistic methods for ensuring that the chosen solutions are selected with the concurrence of the local affected citizens. Such solutions must meet not only their physical needs, but also their cultural and religious needs. Embedded Strengths Teams that work closely with the local population for extended periods of time will be our greatest resource for assessing the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats

(SWOT)¹² of our efforts. Ongoing, valid assessments enable stability operations to take hold and expand toward success.

There is rarely a clear line of demarcation between combat and stability operations. In war it is often fluid. One area may be stabilizing, restoring services, and maintaining security, while another area within close proximity may be in the heat of battle, months if not years from this kind of progress. Stability operations must remain flexible; mandated change is always resisted and rarely successful. Figure 1 provides a schematic of just such a transition.




Figure 1: Transitions Schematic

1. Letting go means the affected populace are giving up their old ways and are willing to assume a new identity. This first phase of transition is an ending; at this time, we need to help people to deal with their losses.
2. There comes an in-between time when the old is gone but the new has not been fully accepted. We call this time the "neutral zone". Critical psychological realignments and repatternings take place in the neutral zone.
3. The transition begins to succeed when the populace embraces a new beginning. Then the people develop a new identity as they emerge from the transition and make a new beginning. Then the people develop a new identity, experience new energy, and discover a new sense of purpose. The change is working.¹³

ESTs bridge the Neutral Zone between Letting Go and the stability phase of a New Beginning. Security has been established and services have been restored. The New Beginning enables a new regime or government to assume legitimate authority.¹⁴ The ESTs interact with follow-on civilian agency personnel for the transition to facilitate a quicker and more comprehensive turnover. Follow-on agencies can tie into relationships already established by

the EST. This assures a more rapid transition to local civilian control and offers a greater chance for success, as well as a lower failure rate for civilian agency personnel entrusted with the mission of enabling local civil authorities. Without the input and buy-in of those who are left to maintain, operate, govern, and live in the new framework, success will be illusive and virtually unattainable for all involved. The old adage of changing horses in midstream comes to mind.

Without question, the U.S. possesses the biggest and best in terms of armaments, technology, and communication. However, there is only so much information to be gained outside the human dimension. Indeed, our material resources do not provide sufficient information to decide who the enemy is. As CAP veterans have noted, Marines and Corpsmen were exposed to many cultural nuances of the Vietnamese people, thus they learned to live among the citizens, gaining their affection and trust by showing respect for the indigenous religion, culture, values, and traditions. These valuable lessons learned have not been fully heeded in recent U.S. engagements.

CAP Veterans learned the meaning of ***"When in Rome, do as the Romans do."*** When we sat in their homes, we didn't cross our legs; we bowed appropriately and shook [sic] hands with both hands, and, most importantly, when we ate in their homes we **never** emptied our plates!¹⁵

In his book *The Sling and the Stone*, USMC Colonel (Ret) Hammes recommends "overhaul[ing] our personnel system, analyz[ing] the actual enemies we face and organiz[ing] forces to deal with them."¹⁶ Hammes then elaborates on this new model:

To achieve success, we must be prepared to fight across the spectrum of political, economic, social, and military spheres. We not only have to win battles, we have to fill the vacuum behind them – starting with rapidly establishing security. This means just not police and security forces, but also the court system and prison system to support them. We must establish banking, currency, public health organizations, public sanitation, air traffic control, business regulation, a system of taxation and every other process needed for running a modern society. And all of these must be done in conjunction with the people of that nation. We know that solutions imposed from outside rarely remain in effect once the occupying power leaves.¹⁷

Our current reliance on sophisticated armaments and technology, rather than building on and supporting existing human ingenuity to complete the transition, is negating valuable resources. "Instead of expensive weapons, we must...invest in human capital, developing expertise in an adversary's language, culture, and history."¹⁸

The U.S. is currently reviled in many parts of the world, especially the Middle East, because we are perceived as trying to impose our values, culture, and governmental structures on other countries. But we have learned much over the years about our enemies and those they

dominate. As we engage with a Muslim culture, we must be open to thinking as they do! If we work from the ground level, we can prevent and preempt possible violence and combat by non-state actors. "Anyone who has watched modern conflict on CNN can see the United States easily dominates high-technology war. ... In contrast the daily video of our soldiers struggling to bring order to Iraq, the difficulty they have with unconventional forces and attacks... provide a living example of how to fight the United States."¹⁹

Instead of relying heavily on technology, we must continue to nurture and support existing creative human ingenuity on the battlefield, allowing for risk-taking and innovation. As Clausewitz advises, "If you entrench yourself behind strong fortifications, you compel the enemy to seek a solution elsewhere."²⁰ Although current trends in Iraq are moving coalition forces away from their "fortress mentality" more must be done. If we use EST's "soft power" potential to engage the local populations and demonstrate our understanding of their religions, values, and cultures, we will better position the civilian teams that follow for greater success with minimal loss of life.

Our enemies have creatively used our own technology against us. They have studied us by every means possible and know us quite well. They watch our television endlessly. They know that we crave quick-fix solutions. They note that in 30 to 60 minute television segments, we overcome a crisis and reach a happy resolution. We are a nation seeking instant gratification with short attention spans. We do not have staying power; we want to achieve our objectives rapidly. In fact, the nation is tired of this current war. "What American family looks forward to the daily news of the results of another IED attack, the downing of an American helicopter, or a truck bombing at a U.S. military post?"²¹

The terrorists involved in the 9/11 attacks themselves acknowledged the reality of a "long war"; they had been in and out of the United States for years. They built lives, formed identities, and established relationships requiring years to achieve. Our military forces, as well as our political leadership, need to demonstrate a similar patience to sustain a protracted campaign. If we remain impatient and keep looking for instant fixes, 4GW strategies will continue to be very successful against us.

The U.S. Armed Forces add to this problem by insisting on limiting tours of duty in combat zones to periods as brief as six months and rarely longer than one year. Thus our military personnel become mere placeholders in the region of strife. The experience they gain when working with the local citizens is wasted when they are rotated every year or more frequently. More importantly, whatever trust and confidence they have earned with the local populace goes away when they do! When a tour of duty lasts only six months our personnel do not assimilate

their new experiences. We must acknowledge that 4th-Generation Wars do not lend themselves to quick-fix solutions as:

Fourth generation warfare uses all available networks -- political, economic, social and military -- to convince the enemies' political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.²²

We are engaged in a long, irregular war on terrorism and we need to face that reality. Success will take patience, perseverance, and commitment. If the U.S. is not willing to unleash all of the technological capability developed since WWII to win all-out war, then we must develop alternatives to achieve success in this new and unfamiliar environment. Recently the question was raised: Does Iraq have the will to continue with the current military action to defeat its insurgent enemies? If the Iraqi citizens are not willing to sustain the needed vigilance and pressure to make the required changes, the U.S. contributions will bear little fruit.

The December 2006 *Iraq Study Group Report* offered a clear message: leave the doors of engagement open to soft power possibilities and employment of non-combatants in unconventional ways. Buried in the report are recommendations (particularly #75 and #76)²³ which reiterate the requirement for solutions using elements other than military forces. Additionally, these recommendations emphasize the need for interservice and interdepartmental collaboration. The uses of ESTs perfectly meet these requirements.

In *Preemption: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways*, Alan Dershowitz speaks of a "...conceptual shift in emphasis from a theory of deterrence to a theory of prevention, a shift that carries enormous implications for the actions a society may take to control dangerous human behavior."²⁴ Dershowitz brings us face to face with the "Us and Them" mentality as well as our own prejudices in the matters of preventive and preemptive actions.

Prevention refers to ... steps undertaken to disable or dispense with a potential threat at a very early stage while still gathering. Preemption, by contrast, is action intended to eliminate a more concrete and immediate threat. Both stand in contrast to deterrence, the doctrine that prevailed during the nuclear stand-off of the Cold War.²⁵

His thought-provoking words provide further justification for the Embedded Strengths Teams. We must abandon our Cold War mentality and dismiss a primary reliance on deterrence and reaction. We must be proactive and engage the enemy on his playing field. We especially need to position ourselves to combat his ability to influence his people and the citizens of the world. But we cannot do this without knowing the culture of the enemy we are confronting, and of the citizens we are protecting. Only by living among the people can ESTs acquire sure and intimate knowledge of their culture.

The fact that Dershowitz has spent his career as an advocate for civil rights makes his arguments especially powerful. Our nation has been built on Judeo-Christian law: “For hundreds of years, a fundamental principle of Western justice [based on Abraham pleading with God to save Sodom] has been the doctrine that 10 guilty people should go free rather than one innocent person be wrongly convicted.”²⁶ The EST model enables us to differentiate between the enemy and the innocent because we will live among the local citizens and gain on-the-ground relevant insights. When they are without electricity or water, we will be without as well.

The U.S. is perceived by much of the international community as a bully – a Goliath, so those we aggressively engage are the Davids. Preemptive action from a Goliath will be regarded as unprovoked aggression. Preemptive action from a David will be seen as a protective self-defense measure. One of the cornerstones of U.S. culture is respect for freedom of the individual. Preemption by the state negates that freedom and presents the state as a Goliath. Therefore, we must adopt a stance of prevention that will place us in positions to preempt only if there is no other course of action. And, because we are perceived as a Goliath, we must be able to clearly, and quickly, justify our preemptive actions to the international community.

Present and future military encounters require an emphasis on balance, on utilizing all the resources at our disposal. We no longer have contained and well-defined targets on which to employ our superior technology. The targets are most often dispersed non-state actors intermingled with innocent citizens; they are using unconventional and simple strategies to gain an advantage and achieve victory. To compete in this arena, we must be willing to engage differently than we have done in the past or are doing now.

The strategic model of the three-legged stool clearly demonstrates that we must engage the proper balance of ways and means to achieve the ends of peace and stability. We need to balance our resources with our available personnel, using soft power to achieve our objectives. Our enemies have adapted the fighting technique. They know we are not prepared to use our full arsenal; indeed our enemies are banking on our restraint. By leveraging the capabilities, wisdom, and judgment of all the soft power military resources at our disposal, we will be in a better position to gain the necessary information and perspectives to make decisions regarding preemption or prevention.

Our nation must focus on the human component - both from the most basic necessities of life to the cultural, religious, social, and economic aspects of a good quality of life, especially as we enable the transition from military operations to civilian control. In order to accomplish such goals, it is important that ESTs are formed with other key skills in mind.

Skill Sets

Strategic leaders must build teams comprised of the right players. Effective leaders do not surround themselves with those who think and act just like the leader himself. The EST model provides a framework to form teams with diverse skill sets tailored to the local situations. Ken Blanchard's H.O.T.S.²⁷ model gives strategic leaders a foundational tool for building efficient teams that can serve as force multipliers. Ken Blanchard advises that, rather than surrounding yourself with team members who reflect your opinions back to you, take note of the people around you, evaluate their strengths, and use these strengths to complete your leadership skill set.

The H.O.T.S. model is simple enough to be adopted by leaders at any level, yet sufficiently comprehensive to meet the needs of senior strategic leaders. An effective team will have members with diverse skill sets. The acronym H.O.T.S. stands for Hare, Owl, Turtle, Squirrel, which represent the diversity of characteristics needed for an effective team. Each animal represents a different strength.

Hares are the creative, idea-generating members. Hares are the risk-takers; however, they lose interest quickly and generally fail to follow through. Owls are project managers; they pave the path to make the idea a reality. Turtles are those that will say we've never done it that way before; turtles are your risk managers. They will bring up every possible thing that can go wrong and try to convince the team that a catastrophe is about to happen. Finally, nothing could be accomplished without the squirrels. These are the proponents of Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for which documentation and instructions are written. Presented with a decision tree, they will have a difficult time choosing which path to take.²⁸ Given effective SOPs, they can take the organization in the right direction.

Significantly each member has a weakness. But these weaknesses are compensated for by the other members of the team. Effective leaders thus focus on strengths of their team members, rather than weaknesses. Captain Danner embodies this in his selection of members for the CAP he led in Haditha.

Some Americans expect everyone to speak English and disrespect those who don't. I sought out some Marines who were immigrants to the U.S. and English was a second language. My rationale was that they would be more tolerant with language difficulties than others might be.²⁹

Chaplains are often trained to do precisely this – see people's strengths, either because of their pastoral work running a church in civilian life or from the training they get in the military as an astute observer of human nature. As a key member of the EST, Chaplains will assist in selecting other team members. Acting as the arbitrators for the requisition of needed skills,

Chaplain possess the asset of consistently looking at the strengths of individuals rather than the capabilities they do not have.

This methodology for focusing on the strengths of team members, rather than their weaknesses - especially when operating under time constraints - will be utilized. A different perspective begins to emerge for the leader who focuses on strengths.

Marcus Buckingham's and Donald O. Clifton's innovative leadership program based on a "strengths revolution"³⁰ illustrates the leadership model that enables ESTs to be efficient, effective, and ultimately successful.

Perhaps some of these ideas are out-of-the-box. However, they can trigger an explosion of innovative leadership in our military, a new leadership based on the Buckingham's "Strengths Revolution." Leadership truly is a delicate balancing act. But the best leaders highlight the strengths of their people so that they glow in the sunlight of a thriving organization, rather than waste away like Sundials in the Shade.³¹

As strategic leaders build ESTs, they must assure that they are bringing together the proper mix of skills and human dispositions. They should not spend much time or effort to strengthen the perceived weaknesses in their people. Rather, they should encourage and exploit the strengths and talents already found in the team members.

The unique success of an EST relies on identifying team members' talents and strengths so that leaders and team members can be more productive and successful. Imagine how much more effective and productive a team would be with all members performing tasks in areas in which they had demonstrated talent or interest. There will be less need to "sell" the value of the task, to motivate, and to train individuals to perform functions they already do well. Fewer resources would be needed (money and time, particularly) to enhance existing strengths, rather than attempting to overcome weaknesses. Individuals are more apt to excel when they are encouraged and praised for their accomplishments, rather than assisted to improve.

What are the ramifications of this strengths revolution for our commanders engaging in 4GW? First, they must exhibit strategic leadership rather than good management. They must work with others to initiate change. They must maintain an awareness of the bigger picture through their vision of the organization's end state. As stewards of the profession, strategic leaders influence and direct the organization into the envisioned future.³²

We must, therefore, be confident that the general measures we have adopted will produce the results we expect. Most important in this connection is the trust which we must have in our lieutenants. Consequently, it is important to choose men on whom we can rely and to put aside all other considerations. If we have made appropriate preparations, taking into account all possible misfortunes, so

that we shall not be lost immediately if they occur, we must boldly advance into the shadows of uncertainty.³³

The following table depicts the matrix of emotional and cultural intelligence skills desired in both EST leaders and members. This list is by no means exhaustive.³⁴

Skills Required	EST Team Leader	EST Team Member
Cultural Intelligence (language, culture sensitivity, inclusiveness, adaptability, etc.)	X	X
Strategic Thinking	X	
Out of the box thinking	X	X
Self Disciplined	X	X
Self-Motivated	X	X
Ability to execute	X	X
Communicate Clearly & Concisely, both verbally & written	X	X
Seeing ideas bigger than self	X	
Selflessness	X	X
Listening	X	X
Independent Learner	X	X
Risk Taker	X	
Empathy	X	X
Organizational Abilities	X	
Assess Situations, Evaluate Options, Execute Decisions with speed and precision	X	X

Table 1: Skills Matrix

Clearly team members should strive to achieve all skills, but years of experience will develop and refine these skills and differentiate between leaders and members.

Team Composition

To determine the composition of the Embedded Strength Teams, the organizational model already employed by the U.S. Military Forces provides the optimal means for successful operations. Each branch has a specific mission and brings unique capabilities to the force, so the elements are in place for success based on strengths inherent in the model.

ESTs will vary by size, much like the CAPs used in Vietnam. A smaller village/town would rate a team leader at the rank of Captain /Lieutenant (03); his Chaplain would possibly have the same rank or one higher, though the Chaplain would never be in command of the team. In more populous areas where the EST has more members, the team leader should have the rank of Major/ Lieutenant Commander (04), with a Chaplain of similar rank or experience assigned to it. Once again the Chaplain, though he plays a pivotal role in the continuity of the team, would never assume command. This allows him the freedom to move actively among the population

with more neutrality and freedom to engage the local Imam or religious leaders, who presumably have a pulse on their communities.

The Chaplain can serve as the expert embedded catalyst with abilities and tools to assess the environment and then requisition strengths to meet the needs of the community. The Chaplain understands the bigger picture and can move among many different worlds with ease and comfort, without arousing suspicions among the local citizens. Chaplains are indoctrinated in the constitutional requirements of freedom of religion.

It makes sense for the Chaplain to serve in this key role on an EST to assess the needs of the citizens and then request resources to meet those needs. EST members would normally consist of functional subject matter experts which could include but not be limited to: Engineers, JAG, Intel, Medical and Dental Corps, Security Personnel, Communications, and Logistics personnel. These joint team members would conduct assessments and interact with their counterparts in the community. They would coordinate with Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs), and follow-on civilian organizations, and have reach back to military capabilities to employ in support of EST initiatives. Success will hinge on gaining/sustaining the people's trust and by doing what we say we are going to do.

Since Chaplains are non-combatants, Chaplains are sensitive to cultural and religious nuances. This sensitivity also allows the Chaplain to move easily between such agencies as DOD and Department of State, so when the time comes to transition from combat operations to stability operations, Chaplains are uniquely prepared to embrace the cultures and traditions of the new environment. The commanding officer will rely heavily on the Chaplain for entrée into the local community after the team is formed.

The screening process for these teams must be rigorous. In order to be assigned to this elite group, the candidate must have endorsements from current superiors, as well as from peers and subordinates and/or current customers or clients. This range of endorsements exploits the 360 review model and clearly reveals the strengths an individual will bring to the team, rather than the areas that need growth or improvement.

For example, Navy Chaplains are unique in that they can serve one tour wearing a USMC uniform, then the next tour of duty in a USCG billet wearing the USCG uniform, and finally the third tour donning their Navy uniform. The Navy Chaplain has the unique ability to act as a sort of chameleon, transitioning effectively among ingrained cultures and traditions.³⁵ This is business as usual for Navy Chaplains.

We can no longer utilize role-playing for evaluating and training in activities for which cultural intelligence is required. As previously noted, Chaplains' chameleon characteristics are

critical. The superficial orientation to new countries that teaches personnel how to say “Good Morning” and “Good Bye” in the national language has become obsolete. As has been noted above, ESTs success will reside in their ability to identify the strengths within the local communities and exploit them, along with their ability to persuade individual leaders to reinforce the message of stability. This cannot be done with a phrase book.

EST training should focus on increasing identified strengths, along with enhancing assessment skills and problem-solving techniques. The traditional Standard Operating Procedure remains relevant for processes and procedures. But given the available sophisticated communication and technology, SOPs should be living documents built on the knowledge base gathered with each new encounter with the local citizens.

Chaplains as New Instruments

Chaplains in the 21st century can serve as a newly discovered instrument employed in innovative military soft power approaches to accomplish the transition from the military's full-spectrum superiority to culmination in the transfer of responsibilities back to the civil authorities. Fundamentally, it is critical that leaders consider using Chaplains in innovative ways. Strategic leaders need to be more receptive to the use of soft power in order to implement the EST concept. After all, “Leadership is the art of getting others to do something that you believe should be done.”³⁶ The persuasive power of Chaplains is legendary.

Chaplains are the glue that will bind the EST as it matures over time. In an unconventional and possibly controversial implementation of Chaplain Leadership, the Chaplain's role in the EST model means he must have a longer tour than the rest of the team. Continuity has always been a critical component of the CAP program. It was the one thing that contributed most towards success of the team, so it must be a critical element of the EST. Chaplains are the constant pivot point as other team members move in and out. Because it takes time to build trust within a community, the Chaplain's introductions of new team members will be critical for their acceptance. If the Chaplain is trusted among the local populace, and he says they are okay, the new team members are more likely to be accepted by the local community.

In order to be effective, Chaplains must commit to a tour of 24 months. Ideally, the EST commander would be on a 24 month tour as well. Assuming a 12-15 month tour of duty for the other members of the EST, the Chaplain will assist in the integration of new members and be entrusted with maintaining detailed turnover information for all EST members, the history of how and why things were done. The Chaplain's extended service provides continuity and a show of

commitment for the people in the community in which the EST is embedded. The EST Chaplain will gratefully volunteer for this role!

In the transition from military operations to civilian authority and control, Chaplains serving with the proposed Embedded Strengths Teams will be instrumental in the process. The EST facilitates the efficient use of resources in multiple arenas by piggy-backing on the trust that Chaplains have established. Chaplains have mediation skills as well as the wisdom and patience to persevere. Chaplains can proactively support stability operations.

To test the concept, this paper proposes that initially, five Chaplains will be selected to serve in ESTs by the Chief of Chaplains at the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations. They would then go through rigorous training at a joint training facility with the subject matter expert members from joint communities and inter-agencies selected for the initial ESTs. The Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)³⁷ is well suited to organize, train, equip, and be the umbrella organization for ESTs, although they could reside under any service or joint organization. (The reader should keep this in mind for the remainder of the paper wherever the term NECC is used.)

A second group would be made up of eight Chaplains, three of whom would be alternates to be used in case there is an emergency or one of the Chaplains needs to be replaced quickly. At about the 20-month point for the original five Chaplains, the second wave of eight would then deploy to the ESTs. The alternates, if not needed, would observe and periodically return to the NECC to continue modifying and developing the training criteria.

The new group of specially selected Chaplains would receive extensive turnover briefings through After Action Reports (AAR) from the original five EST Chaplains. Turnover should be seamless. The foundation of the EST is that trust is established and maintained so that the rotation is seamless to the community in which the Chaplain will live and work.

If the original Chaplain sees that the new EST Chaplain is not fitting in or does not seem to be able to establish relationships to gain the trust of the local community, then the legacy Chaplain has the responsibility to quickly bring this issue to the attention of the EST's Commanding Officer. Decisions will need to be made quickly to draw from the reserve pool. It may mean that the initial Chaplain may have to extend his tour, a reality of which he had been informed before he signed up for the EST.

In any case, the extended tour length of the Chaplain would be the linchpin between the EST and the community demonstrating U.S. commitment and assurance to the local citizens. The Chaplain would also impress upon the local leaders of the commitment needed from them to transition fully to reconstructing their community and nation.

Once the initial five EST Chaplains have finished their tours they would then return to the NECC where they would have a follow-on tour as an EST experts and trainer. These Chaplains would contribute to a more detailed and focused training program for subsequent groups of Chaplains preparing for deployment with ESTs. It will be critical that the first phase team of EST Chaplains be willing to return for periodic in-country training visits with the second team of EST Chaplains. This would ensure that the second team is not set up for failure; rather they would realize they are supported by their predecessors and can rely on their expertise and experience either through a direct site visit or through periodic teleconferences from the NECC training site. This EST model, with the Chaplain at its center, can be tailored and easily deployed to a village in the Middle East, Africa, the Philippines, South America, or wherever needed.

The U.S. military has sometimes been slow in executing the cross functional solutions that the business world has been exploiting for over two decades. Moreover, the business community has realized that if you do not measure your progress toward an objective, you cannot ensure that it is being achieved. How will we know if ESTs are successful? Although joint legislation and accompanying regulations mention a requirement for reporting, there is no mention of metrics to demonstrate success. ESTs can help to measure the success of our stability operations. A smooth transition from stability operations to local civilian control of a secure and prosperous environment, along with building new schools, hospitals, city halls, and playgrounds, will be the metrics of success. A Chaplain's success is measured by his ability to move through the land mines of the world's religions without proselytizing or alienating other faiths in attaining these goals.

Conclusion

The time is right to try a different approach by exploiting our soft power assets to the fullest. We can place soft power in the hands of military Chaplains who can often move far easier among the local citizens and gain the trust of influential Imams and religious leaders who might otherwise foster resistance. There can be no "Us and Them." It is only US!

This proposal is about redesigning CAPs as ESTs and the need for strategic leaders to be more receptive to the use of soft power to implement ESTs. What better way than by using ready available resources and strengths, like the Chaplain.

Some may think this reliance on ESTs is extremely risky. However, as Clausewitz notes, "Never forget that no military leader has ever become great without audacity. If the leader is filled with high ambition and if he pursues his aims with audacity and strength of will, he will reach them in spite of all obstacles."³⁸ Embedded Strengths Teams may seem audacious. But

they represent just the boldness required in today's environment. Further, Chaplains are strategically selected and trained with the necessary skill set and opportunities to play a central role in initiating this resurrected, redesigned, and redeployed Combined Action Platoon.

The age of deterrence is over. It is no longer a question of who has the bigger gun. Our enemies are networked and flexible. They operate with less hierarchy and with the critical ability to adapt quickly. Employing 4GW for future victories will require compromise between liberal and conservative viewpoints – thinking outside the box is just the beginning. Audacity will be the instrumental characteristic for success.

Admiral Mike Mullen, CNO, has acknowledged our need for a totally new approach to national security: "Today's uncertainty and today's threats are of an entirely unique sort, caused by new challenges. We therefore need a new maritime strategy for this era and for this war - for our time and the incredible and growing challenges that we face."³⁹ Utilizing our Chaplains in Embedded Strengths Teams provides a new strategy to resurrect CAPs, a heretofore overlooked resource.

Endnotes

¹ *US Marines Combined Action Platoons Web Site*, available from <http://www.capmarine.com>; Internet; accessed 19 January 2007. The CAP program placed a squad of Marines and one Navy Corpsman in villages from Chu Lai to the DMZ in South Vietnam from 1965 to 1971.

² Marcus Buckingham and Donald O. Clifton, "The Strengths Revolution," *Gallup Management Journal* (2006); available from <http://gmj.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci=547&pg=1>; Internet; accessed 4 October 2006. The Strengths Revolution refers to management by building team member's strengths rather than focusing on improving weaknesses.

³ Embedded Strengths Team (EST) is a term created by the author to denote the importance of focusing on strengths in forming a team, rather than looking to develop skills once the team is formed.

⁴ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3-0, Joint Operations, X Month 2006. p IV-27.

⁵ NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD-44 (December 7, 2005) ; available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html>; Internet; accessed 14 February 2007. The purpose of this Directive is to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.

⁶ Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (November 28, 2005) available from http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005_112805/300005p.pdf; Internet; accessed 14 February 2007.

⁷ Ibid, 4.1

⁸ *US Marines Combined Action Platoons Web Site*.

⁹ Matthew Danner, Capt., USMC, "The Combined Action Platoon: Seeds of Success In Iraq"; 2005; available from <http://capmarine.com/personal/iraq/danner.htm>; Internet; accessed 28 February 2007.

¹⁰ Thomas X. Hammes, Col., USMC, *The Sling and the Stone* (St. Paul, Minnesota: Zenith Press, 2004), ix.

¹¹ Military applications for "Silly String" 4 November 2005; available from http://www.boingboing.net/2005/11/04/military_application.html; Internet; accessed 12 December 2006.

¹² "SWOT Analysis"; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWOT_analysis; Internet; accessed 15 January 2007. SWOT Analysis is a strategic planning tool used to evaluate the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats involved in a project or in a business venture or in any other situation of an organization or individual requiring a decision in pursuit of an objective. It involves monitoring the marketing environment internal and external to the organization or individual. The technique is credited to Albert Humphrey, who led a research project at Stanford University in the 1960s and 1970s using data from the Fortune 500 companies.

¹³ William Bridges, *Managing Transitions: Making the Most of Change*, 2nd edition; Perseus Publishing, 2003.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ *US Marines Combined Action Platoons Web Site*.

¹⁶ Charles L. Armstrong, "Fourth-Generation Warfare Comes Alive," *Marine Corps Gazette* (November 2004); 88 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; Internet; accessed 12 September 2006.

¹⁷ Hammes, 231.

¹⁸ Edward J. Metz, "Hammes' The Sling and the Stone: On war in the 21st Century," *Library Journal* 129, no. 18 (2004): 109.

¹⁹ Hammes., 227.

²⁰ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. And trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 126.

²¹ Jim Saxton, "Al Qaeda's Weapon Of Mass Influence"; *The Washington Times*, 26 February 2007, Pg. 17

²² Ibid.

²³ *The Iraq Study Group Report*, December 2006, available from http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps76748/iraq_study_group_report.pdf; Internet; accessed on 20 December 2006. RECOMMENDATION 75: For the longer term, the United States government needs to improve how its constituent agencies—Defense, State, Agency for International Development, Treasury, Justice, the intelligence community, and others— respond to a complex stability operation like that represented by this decade's Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the previous decade's operations in the Balkans. They need to train for, and conduct, joint operations across agency boundaries, following the Goldwater-Nichols model that has proved so successful in the U.S. armed services.

RECOMMENDATION 76: The State Department should train personnel to carry out civilian tasks associated with a complex stability operation outside of the traditional embassy setting. It should establish a Foreign Service Reserve Corps with personnel and expertise to provide surge capacity for such an operation. Other key civilian agencies, including Treasury, Justice, and Agriculture, need to create similar technical assistance capabilities.

²⁴ Alan M. Dershowitz, *Preemption: A Knife that Cuts Both Ways* (New York, New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), 2.

²⁵ Andrew McCarthy, "Early Action", *Commentary*, Jul/Aug 2006, 88-91.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ken Blanchard; "H.O.T.S Speed Meeting"; available from <http://www.oneminutemillionaire.com/tools/hots.asp>; Internet; accessed 12 December 2006.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Captain Matthew Danner, USMC, telephone interview by author 3 March 2007.

³⁰ Marcus Buckingham and Donald O. Clifton.

³¹ The following reference is from the quote by Ben Franklin which states, "Hide not your talents. They for use were made. What's a sundial in the shade." Found in, Benjamin Franklin; <http://stranko.com/ben/index.html>.

³² I am paraphrasing a statement made by COL. Mark Eschelman during one of our early seminar lectures. The premise of his argument is that the strategic leader must not be passive but proactive.

³³ Clausewitz, p. 187.

³⁴ For a good resources on cultural intelligence refer to the work of P. Christopher Earley and Randall S. Peterson, "The Elusive Cultural Chameleon: Cultural Intelligence as a New

Approach to Intercultural Training for the Global Manager," *Academy of Management Learning & Education* 3 (March 2004): 100 -116.

³⁵ *United States Navy Chaplain Corps Home Page*; available from <http://www.chaplain.navy.mil/>; Internet; accessed 15 February 2007.

³⁶ Vance Packard, *The Pyramid Climbers*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962.

³⁷ *Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Home Page*; available from <http://www.necc.navy.mil/>; Internet; accessed 12 December 2006.

³⁸ Clausewitz, 134.

³⁹ *Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Home Page*.

