

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

“SOLDIERS HAVE TO EAT SOUP TOGETHER FOR A LONG TIME”

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ABSTRACT

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The Department of Defense is the authoritative body for unit mobilization by executive order. The events of September 11, 2001 and previous lessons learned drove the Department of Defense to provide a mobilization policy that narrowly defined the Partial Mobilization law. Constrained policy and practices and steady demand for Army forces has forced the Army to provide mitigations in hopes of reducing the frequency of mobilization of its soldiers. Often the required mitigations, such as remobilizing the unit flag, but not remobilizing soldiers, and cross-leveling soldiers out of identified donor units to fill the mobilizing unit, negate the cohesion of units. However, unit cohesion is imperative to achieve success during the Global War on Terror. This project evaluates the consequences of current Department of Defense policy of mobilizing soldiers for not more than 24 cumulative months and the mobilization practices of less than 24 months. The project also depicts how those policy and practices negatively impact unit cohesion. Further, this project will explain why unit cohesion is so essential. Lastly, the case will be supported that successful execution of the Global War on Terror depends on the cohesion of units.

“SOLDIERS HAVE TO EAT SOUP TOGETHER FOR A LONG TIME”

The premise of this Strategy Research Project is the execution of the Global War on Terror depends on cohesive units and current mobilization policy and practices that have negatively impacted unit cohesion. The definition of cohesion used for this project is that of “social cohesion” or trust based on shared successes during training and operations.

Much of this information about mobilization and unit cohesion has been gathered over a period of years in a hard working cell residing in the basement of the Pentagon and propagated via multiple briefings developed there.

Law, Policy, Practices

Law

The law for Partial Mobilization, which is the authority being used to execute the Global War on Terror, is Title 10 United States Code 12302. 10 USC 12302 stipulates a mobilization period of not more than 24 consecutive months.

TITLE 10, Subtitle E, PART II, CHAPTER 1209, § 12302, Ready Reserve (a) In time of national emergency declared by the President after January 1, 1953, or when otherwise authorized by law, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may, without the consent of the persons concerned, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in the Ready Reserve under the jurisdiction of that Secretary to active duty for not more than 24 consecutive months.¹

Policy

On September 20, 2001, the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) issued a memorandum and guidance to the Service Secretaries limiting the involuntary mobilization period for the Ready Reserve to 24 cumulative months. The memorandum stated, “No member of a Reserve Component called to involuntary active duty under 10 U.S.C. 12302...shall serve on active duty in excess of 24 months under that authority...as long as the total of combined periods of service...does not exceed 24 months.”² This policy is commonly known as the 24 month mobilization clock.

The authority for the mobilization of units resides with the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) established an approval process for all mobilization. The SECDEF retained the approval for involuntary mobilization of the Ready Reserve for himself. This also gave him complete control of any involuntary remobilizations. Remobilization means to mobilize a unit or soldier for a period more than one time, but not to

exceed a total of 24 months or 730 days. The SECDEF did approve an occasional remobilization of units and soldiers if there were extenuating circumstances. For instance, he may approve remobilization if a unit had been mobilized but not deployed overseas and the military needed that capability. If the service could provide justification for the need and there was no available unit to complete that mission, he would approve it for a remobilization.

Practices

However, on November 3, 2005, the SECDEF revised his policy; he informed the Army that he would no longer approve any involuntary remobilizations. This practice is commonly referred to as “one and done.” The involuntary mobilization policy and practices required the Army to develop some very unorthodox methods to fulfill its Combatant Commander (COCOM) requirements for the Global War on Terror.

Impact of the Policy and Practices

Reserve Component Unit Impacts

Though each component was affected differently, the entire Army was impacted by this policy and practices. The Reserve Component soldier mobilizations were constrained from 24 consecutive months to 24 cumulative months of involuntary mobilization. There were two mobilization authorities in effect for involuntary mobilization: Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) with a limit of 270 days and a Partial Mobilization (PM) which, by law, is limited to 24 consecutive months, but by policy 24 cumulative months. Yet there was no limit on the amount of time a Reserve Component soldier could serve if he/she volunteered. Since 1999 any involuntary mobilization of an RC soldier was counted on their 24 month clock during the approval process. Therefore, all deployments prior to and after September 11, 2001, counted on the individual's mobilization clock. For example, a Reserve Component unit that mobilized for Bosnia prior to September 11, 2001, under a Presidential Reserve Call-up used nine of their 24 month mobilization clock. That same unit was needed to support Operation Iraq Freedom with an eighteen month deployment requiring the individual soldiers that previously deployed to use fifteen months as involuntary mobilization. To complete the use of their 24 month mobilization clock under the Partial Mobilization authority they had to mobilize voluntarily for the remaining three months to meet COCOM requirements. This voluntary mobilization was encouraged via incentive pay for those three months the soldier volunteered.

Prior to 2001, Reserve Component units were mobilized to locations such as Bosnia and Kosovo. The rotations to Afghanistan began in 2001 and the rotations to Iraq started in 2003.

The rotations for the Reserve Component units were planned for 18 months to allow time for train up, deployment, completion of the mission, redeployment back state side, and leave time if desired. The average period of mobilization was about 16 months, but some varied. By the third rotation to Iraq and the fifth rotation to Afghanistan, along with the other previous mobilization requirements such as CONUS Force Protection, and rotations to the Balkans, many of the Reserve Component Soldiers had spent much of their 24 month clock. It was deemed time to apply new methods to meet the COCOM requirements. The new methods used were to first use any unit that had not been mobilized. The second method used was if the unit had been mobilized before then remobilize the flag, but not the soldiers. In other words, the unit itself had previously mobilized, but the soldiers that were previously mobilized would not be mobilized again. Therefore, to fill out the unit completely required using soldiers mobilizing for the first time and fill in the rest of the unit with volunteers. This practice caused units to become splintered. Taking soldiers out of one unit to fill out another unit became known as cross-leveling units. As time went on, more and more cross-leveling of units was required to fulfill the COCOM demands. The US Army Reserve has reassigned 62% of soldiers from non-deploying units into deploying units for the last two rotations, compared to 6% in FY02 and 39% in FY03. A typical unit is the 890th Transportation Company; the map below shows that it required 68% personnel cross-leveling to meet the full mobilization requirement of 169 for the third rotation of Operation Iraqi Freedom.




Figure 1: (68% Cross-leveled) ³

“Reserve commands, in practice, are cannibalizing the force to meet short-term deployment needs.”⁴ This scenario is not much better than what the Defense Department concocted for the Vietnam War. “Former Lieutenant General Alexander M. Weyand, for example, reflecting on the lessons of Vietnam, wrote: [The] Decision not to call up the Reserves placed even greater reliance on the Draft, resulting in an individual replacement system which eroded unit cohesion.”⁵ The lessons learned from the Vietnam War about cohesion should not be ignored. The only difference between that approach and the one we are using today is that today we are cobbling together soldiers that have already been professionally trained and have volunteered to serve. Therefore, the individual soldier should be of a better quality and motivation, but the unity of a unit is still left in question.

Voluntary Mobilization

The concept of relying on Reserve Component volunteers was first put on paper on July 19, 2002 from the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The specific section regarding the use of volunteers was titled “Tailor Mobilization and Demobilization Decisions.” The memorandum states “Emphasis shall be placed on the use of Selected Reserve units and individuals, and volunteers of any category of the Ready Reserve, prior to involuntarily calling member of the IRR or ING...”⁶ Again on July 3, 2003 the Under Secretary of Defense addressed the use of Reserve Component soldiers as volunteers.⁷ This memorandum mentions some concerns about advantages and disadvantages of using volunteers, but neither memorandum provides any guidance regarding unit integrity. There is neither concern nor consideration for such an important matter as the cohesion of units. A “donor” unit, which was whole at the beginning of the process, was required to provide volunteers to a deploying unit in order to fill the unit’s demands. The vacancies in the donor unit cause it to be less effective. Due to the lack of soldiers in each of the donor units, the units are no longer ready to go to combat, degrading the overall readiness of the Reserve Component. Ironically, the Department of Defense Directive 1235.10 stipulates volunteerism should not degrade the readiness of the units, but that is exactly what happens. Further, because each unit no longer has all its original soldiers, cohesion is negatively impacted and training effectiveness is reduced. Therefore, personnel readiness is degraded and potentially the training readiness as well. The deploying unit has all the soldiers it needs, but cohesion of that unit is not as strong as it might be if the unit had been training together all along. The illustration below depicts this process and its effects on units.

OSD-Mandated Volunteer Policy Stresses the Force




Figure 2: (Impacts of Volunteerism on Units) ⁸

In this scenario, the lack of cohesion becomes a risk. The level of risk associated with cohesion is directly proportional to the complexity of that unit's mission or purpose. For instance, a truck unit that is required to transport goods from one location to another is quite different and less complex than a truck unit that not only transports goods, but is required to provide convoy security against the likes of insurgents and Improvised Explosive Devices. Units that are required to be directly involved in combat are more reliant on a cohesive unit than those that provide services only. Napoleon astutely pointed out that "Soldiers have to eat soup together for a long time before they are ready to fight." ⁹ Napoleon was referring to social cohesion or trust based on shared successes during training and operations. The DoD's mobilization policy degraded the donor unit's personnel and potentially its collective training readiness, as well as the cohesion and readiness of the deploying units. The inability to remobilize units or use the full 24 month mobilization clock is taking the operational Reserve Component off of the battlefield since the units are no longer available with significant numbers of their soldiers having time left on their 24 month clock. As the DOD policy and practices continue to drain the Reserve Component soldiers' clock, causing them to be unavailable for deployment, the Active Component soldiers' deployments must accelerate in order to meet the COCOM needs.

Active Component Unit Impacts

Since the Reserve Component combat veterans can only return to Afghanistan or Iraq as volunteers, the Active Component soldiers have an increasing number of combat veterans, which grows with each rotation. Three of the Active Component combat formations returned between 40 to 62 percent of their veterans during FY05-07. Some Active Component Soldiers have returned three times to Afghanistan or Iraq. Units and soldiers returning repeatedly to Iraq and Afghanistan is a challenge for the combat units, but that is only a portion of the force. Combat support units and combat service support units are a greater challenge because often these types of units reside in the Reserve Component and often their 24 month clock has expired. One consideration to reduce the stress placed on the Active Component units is to reduce the need for US Army combat units by using a replacement unit from the host nation or coalition forces.

Impacts on Combat Arms Units Versus Other Types of Units

Combat replacement units might be provided by allies or indigenous forces. The problem with this option is that these types of combat units very often do not have sufficient organic combat support and combat service support capability. Hence, the need for US combat support and combat service support units is not reduced. The resulting conundrum is the majority of the combat support and combat service support units reside in a now inaccessible Reserve Component. So, with the continued use of the Reserve Component Soldier's mobilization clock, what is left in the Reserve Component to go to war?

What's Left in the Reserve Component?

Currently in the Global War on Terror all Reserve Component units have contributed at least some individuals to the fight. There are no units left unscathed by DoD policy and practices. The need for leaders to train the Afghani and Iraqi Armies and Police has caused an increase in the operational tempo of the US Army's leaders as trainers. Due to this operational tempo increase and the sustained commitment in this battle, there are few leaders left in the Reserve Component with time left on their cumulative 24 month clock. There have also been some Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) that have been depleted. A few of the MOSs in high demand are civil affairs and certain types of military police and engineers. DoD policies and practices have depleted critical portions of the Reserve Component and these high demand units require exceptional levels of cross-leveling.




Figure 3: (Effects of Cross-Leveling on Units) ¹⁰


Many of the difficulties with cross-leveling are depicted in the illustration above. As previously discussed, cross-leveling of units decreases unit cohesion even though the military has always relied on some “fillers”. For instance, when units experience battle field losses the military’s personnel system replaces the soldier to the unit. However, it is the degree of “fillers” that determines when a unit is negatively impacted. The degree of cross-leveling that is acceptable is contingent on the units’ purpose and mission. If the unit is required to conduct any type of direct engagement mission in the course of their operation, such as convoy security then unit integrity and cohesion are a must. The cross-leveling of units not only causes stress on the donor units but also the deploying units. Whether it is a donor unit or deploying unit additional stress is felt by all members. Some of the effects on the “left behind units”, more commonly known as donor units, are degrading both training and personnel readiness. This cross-leveling action also obstructs resetting and training of the unit for future deployments.¹¹ The cross-leveling action leaves units without leaders and often missing equipment or the ability

to maintain the unit's equipment. Training is diminished due to the lack of participants and morale is reduced; hence, readiness deteriorates. "The National Guard alone has had to transfer over 74,000 individuals from one command to another just to fill the ranks of units with sufficient trained and qualified personnel before they deployed. Equipment shortfalls are also significant. Since 9/11, the Army has transferred over 35,000 pieces of equipment from non-deploying units to forces in Iraq, leaving the stay-behind commands lacking more than a third of their critical equipment." ¹² It is impossible to reset a unit when only part of the equipment and some of the soldiers are available to participate in this complex endeavor. Active duty units, that are together nearly everyday of the year, take approximately 4-6 months to accomplish resetting their units. To exacerbate matters further, soldier's families are involved in this challenge as well. This makes caring for the families of the deployed soldiers very challenging as the families are now spread across the country at the location of donor units rather than locally or regionally. But the donor units are not the only units to suffer, deploying units also experience impediments.

The deploying units, also known as the ad hoc units, present leaders with the very difficult challenge of integrating sourced soldiers from other units. Moral and esprit de corps are encouraged in units. Soldiers take great pride in "their" unit. When cross-leveling to another unit is required, assimilating donor soldiers into the unit culture is very difficult. It is equally difficult for soldiers in the deploying unit to accept an outsider. Soldiers' well being and sometimes their lives depend on that bond of "brother in arms". Soldiers that have deployed with other units have remarked that individuals inside of these units will remain strangers to each other throughout the mission. Cross-leveling requires an increase in collective training and battle drills at the mobilization station, resulting in increased time needed to mobilize. Further, this presents a serious set-back to the Reserve Component goal of moving from a mobilize-train-deploy model to one of train-mobilize-deploy. When cross-leveling requires a reclassification of the soldier's military occupational specialty additional stress is caused to the soldiers. Due to the fact that families are now spread all over America because of the requirement to cross-level soldiers into units, it makes it difficult to provide support to their families. This is added stress to the soldier as he/she may be worried about the care of his/her family causing an unnecessary distraction.

890th Transportation Co (USAR)

Home Station – Green Bay, WI



Stress to Families:

- Family Readiness Groups work from the unit's Home Station
- Distance precludes fellowship with other families or participation in unit family events

Figure 4: (Example of Geographic Dispersion) ¹³

Family readiness groups are the epicenter for units at home station. The distance created by the need to cross-level units precludes fellowship with other families or participants in unit family events, as depicted in the picture above. Tricare issues, which are already difficult, become more difficult to address for the dependent due to the distance created by cross-leveling units. All of these factors are contributors to debasing unit cohesion. Sadly, individual soldiers deployed with other units often return home to a small to non-existent celebration, whereas the unit the individuals deployed with is greeted by a warm welcome home gathering.

Unit Cohesion

Cohesion is the bond of trust between members of a group. Cohesion is achieved through shared challenges. The military provides those challenges through training and combat experience. As the unit achieves success, the confidence and trust among the members grows and a bond is formed.

Outcome-Based Cohesion

Why is unit cohesion so imperative to Army units? Unit cohesion is imperative because of the outcomes of that cohesion. The outcomes desired to be achieved include: the unit doesn't disintegrate under stress; they consistently train better and to higher standards; they require less administrative support; they provide a higher quality of life; and most importantly they fight

better and suffer fewer battle and non-battle casualties. ¹⁴ Trust built over time with the leaders and peers in the unit ensures maintenance of discipline; therefore, the unit does not disintegrate under stress. Combat operations are an excellent example of stress that must be endured by units. Research has determined that stabilized units are necessary for progressive training; the type of training required for combat. Research further found that refresher training is quicker and more effective with units that have already formed a bond that exemplified cohesion. These types of units require much less administrative support. Both legal and rudimentary administrative problems are fewer and there are also fewer unauthorized absences. Because this trust and bond that was developed over time, members of these units have a sense of belonging. There is a social recognition. This social recognition creates a feeling that causes members to protect each other and to provide resources and support for one another. Why might cohesive units fight better? There is an increase in their confidence, in their combat ability as individuals and collectively. We know from experience that service members will join the military and go to battle over their values and beliefs, but what keeps them fighting in the face of fear is the fear of losing their buddy; they will sacrifice all to save their buddy. ¹⁵ Because of extensive training anxiety is reduced. Leaders know the strengths and weaknesses of their unit members. Therefore, leaders will take more appropriate risks and units will suffer fewer battle and non-battle casualties. In fact, cohesive training is integral to the successful accomplishment of any mission.

What Unit Cohesion Looks Like

As the 1949 Studebaker advertisement stated, "Success breeds success." Stability is the fiber that creates the foundation of cohesion. Stabilizing personnel naturally creates the bonding process, which forms cohesion and provides the desirable outcomes called success. Personnel stability is a vital requirement for leaders and soldiers to achieve cohesion. Stability is the length of time that members of the group spend together, creating familiarity. Personnel stabilized and placed under stress that achieve success create an unshakable bond termed cohesion. As momentum is generated even more desirable outcomes are attained. Cohesion is a shared Army value which is demonstrated through a commitment to comrades.

Recipe for Cohesion

Cohesion Dimension	Social Component	Task Component
Horizontal	Peer Bonding	Teamwork
Vertical	Leader Caring	Leader Competence
Organizational	Pride and Shared Values	Attainment of Needs and Goals
Societal	Behavior aligned with group's values and culture	Behavior demanded of others in the group

Source – Siebold, G. L. (1999). *The evolution of the measurement of cohesion.* Military Psychology.

The long-term benefits of cohesion are competence and readiness.

Figure 5: (Outcome-Based Cohesion) ¹⁶

Outcome-based cohesion satisfies the social needs of the individual and achieves the goals of the organization.¹⁷ There are four types of cohesion which can be developed. Those types are horizontal, vertical, organizational, and societal.¹⁸ Optimally, one should strive to attain all four types of cohesion. Horizontal cohesion is developed with one's peers. This is moral and emotional cement that binds members of a fighting unit together during intense combat stress. These teams are built via the shared experiences of the same people placed under stress through the training process of attaining successful accomplishment of missions. Vertical cohesion is the bond developed between unit members and their leaders. This cohesion is built by leaders who consistently demonstrate competence and integrity thereby creating an allegiance of soldiers to a dedicated leader. Organizational cohesion is founded on history and tradition and is exhibited by pride in membership. Finally, societal cohesion is behavior in accordance with the values and culture of the group. This behavior is demanded by other members of the group. For the Army, these traits are espoused through the Army's values and Warrior Ethos. Soldiers are indoctrinated with these values and ethos during Army entry training called Basic Training and is reinforced through out the soldier's time in the service. Achieving cohesion at all of these levels is no small task and is never taken lightly by members of the Army. However, this is a process that requires much time, a great deal of attention, and

dedication to realize. During combat, a great deal depends on the fact that a unit fights as a unit and not a melding of individuals. This is a life or death situation with the attainment of the nation's interest hanging in the balance of success or failure.

What can be Expected if Unit Cohesion is not Achieved?

The Army instills its values by repeated emphasis during training and instilling those values throughout the career of a soldier. These values are emphasized through leaders setting the example and requiring soldiers to uphold and live those values taught from the beginning.¹⁹ If the values are not given emphasis throughout a soldier's career those organizational values can decay over time. One thing the Army cannot allow is poor leadership because it may produce undesirable outcomes, which can be devastating to the unit. If permitted, loyalty to the group transcends loyalty to the organization. This is displayed when members of the group demonstrate values, attitudes, beliefs, and/or norms that are contrary to the organization. It is an imperative practice of the Army that its members and more specifically its leaders ensure the expectations are well understood and consistently and constantly reinforced. There exist external stressors that could place undo strain on unit cohesion which may be outside of the purview or control of the Army. Some of these types of strains that units involved in GWOT have experienced are personnel and leader turbulence, equipment shortages, mission changes, and family-related well-being issues. These strains have been previously shown to impact cross-leveling.

The current mobilization policy and practices have created turbulence for the personnel and leaders of our Reserve Component units. Though the Army has put a great deal of effort and money into its equipment, shortages still exists. The shortages are caused primarily by a lack of funding rather than a lack of management. Post hostility operations require a very different unit set than combat operations. The Army has undergone and continues massive efforts to balance the force to mitigate the difference between the needs for combat and those for Post Hostilities. Consequently, we have had a number of units built as one type of unit, but perform a completely different mission in GWOT. One of the more common examples is field artillery units that have been reconfigured to perform military police missions. For example, through thorough analysis and much deliberation the Army determined that it has an over abundance of artillery units. In an effort to rebalance the force the number of artillery battalions has been reduced and much needed military police units have been activated. Many of the artillery units were restructured into military police or other type of units. The Army has done a wonderful job of ensuring these units have the correct personnel, equipment, and training

needed to accomplish their mission, but cohesion suffers and individual stress increased especially for those forced to reclassify. Family-related well-being issues are a huge challenge as unit cross-leveling increases due to several reasons not the least of which is the geographical dispersion created from this cross-leveling action.

(See Figure 4)

What is at Risk?

The desired operational goals are at risk, as is the reputation of the Armed Forces. It is widely known that units are more likely to disintegrate under stress. This fact is observed daily during training events and actual combat missions. Units are known to train less effectively when cobbled together and will likely achieve lower standards. This fact will impact how well the unit performs its combat mission. If the unit is not unified, more administrative and legal support is required, which slows the mobilization process for other units. This in turn slows down the deployment process and requires the Army to extend the soldiers that are already deployed. Another risk is to the soldier and his/her family's quality of life. Soldiers and their families know when they can or cannot count on other members of their units. If they feel they have little to no support from the unit it becomes a distracter, another thing to worry about. Most importantly they may not fight as well and suffer more casualties. Ultimately, when a unit breaks down they experience mission failure. This eventually is simply something that cannot be tolerated nor chanced. Why is all of this important to policy makers? The risk of mission failure and increased casualties is unacceptable for the citizens of the United States of America. Casualty numbers and mission failures are the very things media seems to focus on. Napoleon espoused concern with this matter, "Four hostile newspapers are more to be feared than a thousand bayonets."²⁰ If left unchecked, these types of stories will likely proliferate and the will of the people will be lost. In other words, everything desired to be achieved is at risk, to include the national interests.

What is the solution?

A program titled COHORT, which stands for cohesion, operational readiness, training program was a stabilization effort tried between 1981 and 1986.²¹ COHORT focused on forming and maintaining combat arms units through common themes such as, keeping soldiers together in the same unit for longer periods and curtailing unit turbulence to achieve cohesion. COHORT units scored consistently higher on most dimensions of psychological readiness for combat. These units were able to resist potentially adverse actions such as leader turbulence, changes in equipment, and changes in fighting doctrine, organizational reconfiguration and

rotation. COHORT units were consistently better at movement, maneuver, occupation, and communication skills at small-unit levels such as platoon and company. They consistently performed collective tasks and sustained themselves under stress better than conventional units. The COHORT research also determined that the potential for family unit bonding was enhanced.

There are a few options that would work, but some options are better than others. Ideally, the recommendation is to follow the current mobilization laws and permit the Reserve Component to manage its units and personnel as they see most fitting. This would permit the Reserve Component to employ their units just as they exist today, requiring far less cross-leveling and allowing units to remain intact. The difficulty with this option is that units will have some soldiers that were previously mobilized going back to a combat zone while other members will be experiencing deployment for the first time. This situation is not insurmountable. It is not uncommon for members of units in the Army National Guard to be together for many years, perhaps even nine or ten years in one unit. The type of cohesion created over that period of time can not be under valued. Another possibility is to use the current SECDEF policy of a cumulative 24 month period. This would require a change to the SECDEF's current practice of "one and done," meaning that mobilizing for a period of time that could range from a few months to 18 months and when that is completed you can no longer be mobilized for GWOT again. This would permit a larger population of soldiers that exist in units to deploy together, but not all soldiers could be used from the unit. For instance, soldiers who have already mobilized for 24 months would not be eligible unless they go as volunteers. Also, it would be foolish to remobilize soldiers who have mobilized for more than six months previously since they would not be able to complete the mission with the unit within the allotted 24 months. The choice that makes the most sense is to reset the mobilization clocks of the Reserve Component units and allow them to manage their assets accordingly. NDAA 07 increased the number of days for a Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) from 270 to 365 days. A policy change within the current Partial Mobilization law or using the new PRC authority along with increasing the number of Active Component soldiers would permit the Army to meet current missions, reset the force, and address any emerging crisis.

Conclusion

In the earlier stages of the Global War on Terror the plan was for a war of short duration and with far less troops than we are experiencing today. It is now known that the Global War on Terror has been and will be a long war. The current troop level is considerably higher than

planned for this stage of the operation and was just recently raised an additional 20,000 soldiers. The need for more soldiers in theater is apparent. The United States President has also seen the need to increase the Army's Active Component and Marine Corps which should assist overcoming the shortfall. But this measure will not completely remedy the need. The current mitigations are degrading both the deployed units and the donor units. In order to renounce the use of these harmful mitigations, using the Reserve Component forces again is necessary.

Because we are in a long war that has already lasted over five years and the stress is being felt across all military branches and components, a change is required for continued military success. The Army's force generation plan assumes soldiers and their units will deploy for a year, and then be home for two years for the Active Component and five years for the Reserve Component prior to their next deployment. The Army built its force structure based on that parameter. But the OPTEMPO has not permitted this time for rest and rejuvenation of soldiers or units and units have no opportunity to reset.

Given the current requirements in the strategic environment what is the best way to meet COCOM requirements and permit unit integrity? On January 19, 2007, the incumbent SECDEF, Robert Gates, provided guidance to the military regarding the matter of unit cohesion. He raised the question of whether we have the right policies to govern how we utilize members of the Reserve, National Guard and Active Army Component units. His guidance was "...mobilization of ground combat, combat support and combat services support will be managed on a unit bases. This will allow greater cohesion and predictability in how these Reserve units train and deploy."²² Let's hope his guidance and the lessons from GWOT lead to correction of our current mobilization dilemma and prevents similar problems in future mobilization. Because as Ardant du Picq aptly pointed out in 1870,

Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely.²³

Endnotes

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