

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY

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ABSTRACT

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The US is considered the world's sole superpower. However, America has recently suffered setbacks and faces dangerous foes intent on its destruction. Many strategists regard the Principles of War as the bedrock of US military doctrine; others suggest that they should be discarded. Some aspects of the 21st Century battlefields have changed considerably, while others aspects remain unchanged since time immemorial. Is there an immutable nature to the Principles of War as well - or should they be discarded? This SRP offers a historical campaign analysis of three major amphibious operations that had unique and distinctly different outcomes because of commanders' applications of the Principles of War. Current battles are then analyzed with the same methodology to discern if there are recurring trends in present day warfare, if there are distinguishable developing trends, and whether the Principles of War are still applicable.

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY

A litany of wars marks world history – battles won and lost. Nations and their cultures have flourished or perished based on the outcome of these epic fights. (I have never met a person of Carthaginian decent!) How were some nations and their leaders able to put it all together and win? Multitudes of militarists have studied this question to find “a rule of conduct that produces a specific effect”- victory.¹ Consider victories won by the likes of Alexander the Great, Caesar, Scipio, Attila, Washington, Nelson, Wellington, Grant, Foch, Mannerheim, Zhukov, MacArthur, Eisenhower, Swartzkoff, McKiernan, Sattler – and myriad other warriors that march from ancient to modern history. Can the fog and uncertainty of war be reduced to a point where a set of winning principles are established? When commanders abide by these principles, are they certain of victory?

Development of the Principles of War

Antoine Henri Jomini, 1770–1860, is recognized as one of the first modern strategists to realize and acknowledge the existence of recurring trends necessary for victory. Using a systematic analysis, he put them into writing.² Jomini's Principles of the Art of War is considered by militarists as a classic and is still widely studied today.³ Carl Von Clausewitz, 1780-1831, a prolific writer on strategy of the same period produced On War and The Principles of War.⁴ Jomini and Clausewitz disagreed over the question of whether war is a science or an art. Yet in many aspects, they were in striking agreement with each other. Over time, their concepts of principles started to meld as students of war carefully considered the merits of their work.⁵

After the 'Great War' military thinkers attempted to refine these principles, seeking to prevent the insane horrors of trench warfare.⁶ Most prominent in the West was British historian J. F. C. Fuller. Studying broadly, Fuller concentrated on recognizable recurring trends and developed principles that could significantly contribute to success on the battlefield. Fuller identified The Principles of War: mass, objective, offensive, simplicity, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, and surprise – the Immutable 9.⁷ Fuller then presented the Immutable 9 as guidelines planners could use as they developed battle plans that would help secure victory.

France, Russia, and China developed similar principles and incorporated them into their doctrine, but the Immutable 9 were decidedly Western, based on capabilities of industrial societies. As the U.S. military developed its warfighting doctrine in the late 1930s and into the post-WWII era, Fuller's acclaimed principles were consistent with the U.S. vision of warfare.

The Immutable 9 were fully integrated into U.S. doctrine and acclaimed as “represent[ing] the best effort of military thinkers to identify those aspects of warfare that are universally true and relevant.”⁸ Thus, Fuller’s principles serve as the bedrock of U.S. doctrine at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.⁹ But are the Immutable 9 still viable principles for determining the level of success that can be expected on the battlefield? Did the recurring trends on the battlefields of the 20th Century look much like those in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when Jomini and Clausewitz proselytized their principles of war?

Campaign Analysis

A comparative analysis of three historic campaigns that had a major impact on a war effort reveals the worth of applying Fuller’s Immutable 9. Historically, amphibious operations have been considered the most complex and dangerous of all military operations.¹⁰ Accordingly, consider the following analysis of three notable amphibious operations in modern history: Gallipoli, Iwo Jima, and Inchon.

Gallipoli was part of the insane horrors of WWI that prompted militarists to develop principles for waging war.¹¹ It was an absolute disaster for the Allies and stands as an example of how not to plan and conduct a major military undertaking such as an amphibious operation. Although J. F. C. Fuller had yet to articulate his principles of war, their immutable nature can be seen in the costly lessons of Gallipoli.

Iwo Jima is widely considered the pinnacle of World War II’s amphibious assaults. It represents the culmination of numerous bloody lessons learned at places such as Tarawa, Guam, Saipan, and Peleliu.¹² It was unique a sledgehammer assault into the teeth of one of the most formidable defensive positions ever assaulted. The Japanese defenders had tunneled an expansive labyrinth of defensive positions into the Iwo Jima’s eight square miles of lava rock.¹³ There was no place to retreat or maneuver. Combatants expected no quarter – the engagement was a win or lose, live or die proposition.¹⁴ It stands as an example of successful application of the Immutable 9 – and of the cost when some of the principles cannot be fully exploited.

Inchon stands as a masterful example of the application of the Immutable 9. Considered by many as the most successful amphibious assault in history, Inchon is a standard by which to measure all military operations.¹⁵ Inchon offers a fascinating study portending the developing trends that loom for U.S. military operations in the 21st Century. The assault forces conducted a forcible entry from the sea and immediately attacked into complex urban terrain where the enemy had prepared heavily fortified positions. Within 72 hours of the initial landings, they were

attacking into a national capital conducting house-to-house fighting. Seoul was cleared in five days.¹⁶

Gallipoli

The Allied objective in the invasion of Gallipoli was to break the deadlock on the European continent by securing the Peninsula, taking Constantinople, and opening the Black Sea for Allied shipping. This would sever the Turkish eastward communication lines and free Russia from her significant isolation.¹⁷ But the strategic objective was lost when the Allies failed to achieve their initial tactical and operational objectives – expanding the beachheads and driving inland.¹⁸ Nonetheless, forcing the Dardanelles was a bold offensive gamble.¹⁹ However, the offensive quickly went to the Turks as they immediately and repeatedly attacked the Allies as they were slowly forming on the beach. The conflict devolved into trench warfare and a bloody stalemate ensued.²⁰ A clear, concise, well-understood, and well-executed plan illustrates the principle of simplicity. The Gallipoli landing plan lacked detail and was devoid of redundancy and contingency planning.²¹ Last minute changes turned the landing into a deadly debacle.²² Unity of command was absent from the start. Because of interference from the British government, the War Council, and the Admiralty - along with the inability of six different commands to communicate - control disintegrated.²³ The central principle of mass requires commanders to emplace the right resources at the right place at the right time. Allied plans took no account of this vital principle. The Turks had arrayed 84,000 defenders on the Peninsula before the invasion started. The Allies hamstrung themselves with a 75,000-man cap for the initial landing force and it took days to get them all ashore. The Allies decided to assault with as small a force as they could, misapplying the principle of economy of force. In fact, they jeopardized the operation by using an insufficient assaulting force. More telling was the Turk's expert use of superior interior lines that allowed them to mass on the Allies' attempts to break out from the beachhead.²⁴ This greatly disadvantaged the Allies and denied any opportunity of maneuver.²⁵ The Allies lost the principle of surprise when they conducted an elaborate "naval prelude" to the assault.²⁶ Given this warning, German General L. Van Saunders created a rapid response force that was able to readily meet and stop Allied offensives and raids.²⁷ The only successful surprise action was the Allies' withdrawal from the beaches.²⁸ The security of the Allies forces was constantly in jeopardy. Mines and submarines claimed several ships and the ground forces had their backs to the beaches the entire period.²⁹ Gallipoli was a disaster for the Allies. Total mission failure and 265,000 casualties make it the greatest amphibious debacle in modern history.³⁰

Iwo Jima

The Iwo Jima invasion, part of the Allies' larger island-hopping campaign, was planned in accord with the principles offensive, objective, maneuver, and economy of force.³¹ An amphibious operation to facilitate bomber strikes at mainland Japan, its objective was to deny the landing strips and radar systems to the Japanese, and allow for fighter escorts for U.S. bombers.³² The Navy and the Marines clearly established unity of command.³³ The invasion plan was simple and straightforward with firepower focused in advance of the landing force. Maneuver was limited because of the island's tiny eight square miles of real estate.³⁴ After taking Hill 382 – The Meat Grinder, Marines were able to maneuver behind enemy defenses.³⁵ Security was obtained thru the vastly superior naval force whose big guns and carrier planes protected the invasion force. Marines also quickly established a beachhead and pushed inland.³⁶ The invasion force was denied surprise, and this accounts for the high cost of the victory. The Japanese commander, General Kuribayashi, knew the invasion was coming and perceived that his forces could attain a strategic victory if his men were able to extract a 10 - to - 1 kill ratio against the Marines.³⁷ He felt this would discourage the U.S. from invading mainland Japan.³⁸ It is doubtful that he knew of Japan's efforts to build an atomic bomb.³⁹ What did surprise the Japanese was the mass of the invasion force - 74,000 well-trained, well-equipped, and well-led Marines, providing a 3 - to - 1 advantage over the defenders.⁴⁰

Iwo Jima was a successful operation, but it was costly. Over 6000 US servicemen were killed and 22,000 wounded. 20,000 Japanese were killed.⁴¹ Iwo Jima's early warning system was destroyed and an emergency landing strip for crippled bombers was made available.⁴² P-51 Mustang Fighter escorts were only partially enabled. Out of grim necessity, mass compensated the deficiency in surprise. With Iwo's airstrip no longer a threat and in friendly hands, B-29 bombers could land there if necessary.⁴³ In the Pacific campaign of WWII, the Navy-Marine team refined the amphibious assault technique that was used in the Korea War in most remarkable fashion.

Inchon

North Korea's 1950 surprise attack smashed the US Army into the "Pusan Punch Bowl."⁴⁴ The NK Army's critical vulnerability was their over-extended supply lines. The heart of this supply network was the railroad systems in Seoul – precisely where Gen D. MacArthur decided to strike with an amphibious end run.⁴⁵ The principles of objective and offensive merged as the landing at Inchon directly attacked the NK Army's critical vulnerability and completely routed the army.⁴⁶ Simplicity was intentionally sacrificed to enhance surprise. Because of the tides; the

mudflats; the obtrusive location of Wolmi-do, a fortified island in the mouth of the channel; the proximity of complex urban terrain on the beachhead; and the heavily fortified positions in Inchon and Seoul, many strategists felt that an amphibious assault in Flying Fish Channel would be impossible.⁴⁷ Unity of Command was firmly established, a mirror image of the chain-of-command employed during the later WWII amphibious assaults.⁴⁸ Mass was achieved with a 75,000 man landing force.⁴⁹ Economy of Force was masterful. MacArthur used the Marines to bolster and solidify the lines in the Pusan Punch Bowl, then redeployed them on an Amphibious Task Force for the end run to Inchon and Seoul.⁵⁰ Security was a gamble – there was little flexibility in the plan and no reserve back-up force.⁵¹ Just before the invasion plans were compromised, a spy ring was busted.⁵² Security was maintained and maximized by a swift decisive attack directly aimed at the enemy's critical vulnerability. Maneuver and surprise were employed, brilliantly multiplying effects of mass, simplicity, and economy of force. The plan required no deception since it caught the NK Army completely by surprise.⁵³

Inchon was a masterful victory. It exemplifies creative application of the Principles of War – albeit in extraordinary fashion. It also illuminated the reciprocity of the Immutable 9 – surprise overcame shortfalls in simplicity. Maneuver and mass amplified surprise. Surprise and security uniquely enhanced one another. Mass and economy of force revealed their singular potency.⁵⁴ The reward was stunning accomplishment of the mission with minimal casualties. Clausewitz's theory that war is an art and that good generals are geniuses is evident in the Inchon Campaign.⁵⁵ General MacArthur's brilliant vision was rooted in his knowledge of a recurring trend on the battlefield - that armies were defeated when they over-extended their supply lines. His crafty, unique application of the Immutable 9 enabled his army to take full advantage of the enemy's vulnerability⁵⁶

Clearly, in these historic cases adherence to the Immutable 9 led to victory, while violation of them assured defeat. The basic characteristics of the Immutable 9 greatly augment the Western industrialized approach to warfare. They are reciprocal in nature: Used in the right combinations, they multiply our strengths and marginalize our weaknesses. Throughout the late 20th Century, the U.S. displayed tremendous prowess in the area of conventional warfare. Annihilating the Axis powers; sweeping communist forces from the southern portion of the Korea peninsula; crushing the NVA and Viet Cong in the 1968 Tet offensive; achieving a stunning 100-hour victory in Desert Storm; overwhelming Milosevic, Noriega, and the Taliban; and occupying Baghdad following a headlong assault - the U.S. has consistently demonstrated unparalleled conventional warfighting capabilities. When the USSR decided to quit trying to

compete against U.S. conventional and nuclear power, the U.S. emerged as the world's only superpower.

However, since the early stages of the 21st Century, some new foes are embracing asymmetric 4th Generation Warfare (4GW) tactics as a means to circumvent this decided conventional advantage.⁵⁷ Countering the aforementioned military triumphs, U.S. was rebuffed as early as the Bay of Pigs incident, in Viet Nam, in the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, and again in Beirut and Somalia. American strategic thinkers recognized the need to augment the Immutable 9 to develop a 4GW strategy. US Joint Publication 3-0 (revised), released in 2006, states that "Although the historic nine principles of war have been consistent in joint doctrine since its inception, extensive experience in missions across the range of military operations has identified three more principles:" restraint, legitimacy and perseverance - now the Immutable 9 + 3.⁵⁸ A product of post-Westphalia Europe, forged from the horrors of WWI, built into US military doctrine more than 60 years ago and updated in the early 21st Century - do these principles apply today in an 4GW environment characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA)?⁵⁹

An analysis of recent conflicts identifies recurring trends of war, along with new and developing trends. Now we must consider whether the Immutable 9+3 are applicable today in their present form, or are they now insufficient for planning and executing contemporary operations?

Grozny, Chechnya 1994.

Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev stated he would stabilize Grozny in two hours with one Parachute Regiment and calm all of Chechnya in 72 hours.⁶⁰ In hindsight, this bravado reveals the miscreant mindset that created the stage for the bloody fiasco that the Battle for Grozny and the Chechen War turned out to be for the Russians. The Russians mistakenly identified Grozny as the rebel center of gravity and designated its capture as their strategic objective.⁶¹ Grozny was never captured, but it was destroyed with nearly 100,000 dead and over 240,000 wounded.⁶² The rebel's center of gravity was their will to fight, not Grozny.⁶³ The Russians never set the course or pace of the battle. The offensive was lost during the first assault of Grozny in December 1994 when the Russians lost 105 of the 120 tanks and armored personnel carriers in one attack column alone.⁶⁴ Another 120 tanks, mostly T-72s, were lost on New Year's Eve 1994.⁶⁵ Russian commanders violated unity of command and simplicity: No operations order was delivered past the division level and a chain of command was non-existent.⁶⁶ Calls placed from the Kremlin and Regional HQs hundreds of miles away directly to

ground commanders issued orders that countermanded the generals who were supposed to be in control.⁶⁷ Russian soldiers were asking reporters where they were and who they were supposed to be fighting. The Russians clearly had numerical superiority, but their assault columns were canalized into narrow city corridors where the Chechen rebels were able to mass, isolate the lead elements, and destroy them in piecemeal fashion.⁶⁸ Again, we see that mass does not simply amount to greater overall numbers. Economy of force was lost in the organization of the Russian force. Horrible maintenance, absence of training, and undermanned units forced the Russians to simply flesh out their assault battalions. Ad hoc units were thrown together and sent into battle with men who had never seen their equipment before and did not know the names of their comrades.⁶⁹ Maneuver consisted of attempts to penetrate through narrow frontages towards the city center without coordination with adjacent units, and with unprotected flanks.⁷⁰ Rebels outmaneuvered these columns and attacked them in parallel fashion, cutting them into smaller isolated pockets that they later eliminated. Hundreds of Russians were captured.⁷¹ Later the Russians modified their effort by surrounding the city and “clearing it” with massive firepower and on-line assaults section by section.⁷² This proved effective in killing the defenders who had not already slipped out of the city, but it destroyed the city and caused high casualties in non-combatants.⁷³ Security and surprise favored the rebels. Sympathizers and spies in the Kremlin fed accurate, real-time information to the rebels via phone and laptop.⁷⁴ This information enabled them to sidestep the massive firepower directed at them and to mass on unprotected vital points.

The Chechens took the fighting into the realm of 4GW with their superb information operations campaign.⁷⁵ Both sides realized early on that Information Operations (IO) were as important for the outcome as what was actually happening on the ground.⁷⁶ The Chechens initially won the IO battle as they turned world opinion against the Russians and persuaded the Russian public to oppose the war effort. The Chechens successfully attacked Russian legitimacy and questioned their restraint.⁷⁷ They concentrated on Russian casualties. Both sides resorted to misinformation, but the Chechens quickly resorted to terror tactics. They took full advantage of the Russians’ initial concern for civilian casualties.⁷⁸ Chechen civilians fled Grozny, leaving mostly ethnic Russians in the urban areas that the rebels then used as shields and hostages.⁷⁹ Chechen civilians also helped fighters by interrupting Russian convoys, puncturing tires, and burning fuel tankers.⁸⁰ Chechens routinely used civilian structures - such as schools, courtyards, and residential areas - to launch attacks.⁸¹ Chechens raided Russian towns taking hostages in Budyonovsk, Kizlar, and later in Moscow.⁸² Female suicide bombers

attacked airliners.⁸³ These terror tactics culminated in the attack on Beslan, where scores of children were taken hostage, brutalized, and murdered.⁸⁴

The recurring trends are evident. The Russians paid scant attention to the planning considerations requisite for combat operations in urban terrain; then they were defeated with staggering losses. After they regrouped and refocused on the principles of war, albeit in Russian fashion, they attained some measure of success. The Chechen attack in Beslan using children as hostages and the Chechens' alignment with Al Qaeda have not served them well in the IO war, especially in gaining support in the West. Although it waned considerably, the Russians have not lost their perseverance. Russians also became more ruthless in the control of the press and the prosecution of the war. It seems that the tide has slowly turned toward Russian victory since they have not allowed the rebels to win. Although the Russians have offered concessions to the Chechens' aspirations for independence, Chechnya remains in the Russian Federation. The Russians have displayed the will to take off the gloves and have become nearly as vicious as their opponents. Chechen rebel leaders are being tracked down and killed. It has been 13 years since this crisis started and it is still playing out in deadly fashion. The newly developing trends of 4GW clearly manifested themselves in this late 20th century fight.⁸⁵ IO operations, hostile press/media, asymmetric attacks targeting the clumsiness of conventional forces to respond, terror tactics, and the terrorists' nimble leverage of technology have played large roles in the conflict. These trends have carried over to the 21st century and continue to develop as non-traditional threats.

Fallujah I, March 2004

Al Jazeera thoroughly exploited the murder and mutilation of the Blackwater Contractors in Fallujah. A video stream of charred corpses and throngs of jeering Arab males played across the world's television screens.⁸⁶ These images sickened but also angered US policy makers. Operational commanders offered a plan to hunt down the responsible parties. The Pentagon and Ambassador Bremer demanded a more aggressive retaliatory response without allowing sufficient time to shape the battlefield, especially in the area of IO.⁸⁷ Orders were issued. The objective was to attack into Fallujah and either capture or kill those responsible – a difficult if not impossible mission.⁸⁸ Four US Marine Corps infantry battalion task forces (approximately 1,000 men each) then attacked into the city.

Attempting to observe principles of Restraint and Legitimacy, Marine Commanders closely monitored use of firepower. Some believed that the objective was the hearts and minds of the good citizens of Fallujah, so collateral damage had to be minimized.⁸⁹ Hundreds of insurgents

were dug in and ready for a fight, while conflicting objectives and constricting rules of engagement restrained the offensive.⁹⁰ Significantly, four major battles were raging in the Al Anbar Province during the month of April 2004 –in Ramadi, in Fallujah, in Al Najaf, and in the sweeps of Regimental Combat Team 7 from Fallujah to Baghdad.⁹¹ These combined coordinated operations raised some security and economy of force concerns. The crushing troop-to-task ratio of OIF complicated efforts to mass and derailed offensive, maneuver, and economy of force initiatives. During the Fallujah offensive the western portion of Al Anbar, most notably the Syrian border region, was largely unattended.⁹² There simply were not enough troops to meet all the demands. Maneuver was used to great effect because of the excellent command and control of the Coalition forces. As insurgents collected in areas and intelligence was developed, accelerated targeting took effect while units maneuvered to isolate, fix in place, and destroy the enemy. Simplicity is attained when clear, concise, attainable objectives are identified. 4GW fighters are difficult to cull from the citizen population, especially when the population is complicit, if not openly supportive of, the fighters, as was the case in Fallujah.⁹³ Directly attacking into the city with the objective to kill or capture those responsible for the Blackwater murders did not acknowledge the complexity that prevailed in Fallujah. Despite the urgency to act, viable, detailed plans were developed and delivered via the operational chain of command. Unity of Command was achieved at the tactical and operational levels. Fighting was vicious, but Coalition forces inexorably crushed the insurgents killing them in meaningful numbers.

US policymakers at the Pentagon and the Coalition Provincial Authority failed to recognize the kinds of support the Coalition needed to engage in a nasty 21st century urban fight. The stunning capture of Baghdad and clearing Fallujah were two very different operations. Insurgents operating in and around Fallujah and Ramadi had the time to build an insurgency force that was willing to stand and fight. Using 4GW tactics, they were much harder to rout. This intense urban warfare proceeded slowly; the offensive was very deliberate. Al Jazeera used misinformation to portray the Fallujah offensive as an indiscriminate butchering of innocent civilians, portraying the offensive as tit-for-tat revenge for the Blackwater murders.⁹⁴ Over and over again, Al Jazeera released photos of wounded and dead whom they described as innocent non-combatants.⁹⁵ Doctors working at the hospital that supported the insurgency conducted interviews, claiming that Coalition forces were wantonly murdering innocents.⁹⁶ Iraqis and Coalition allies, most notably the UK, believed it. Protests were lodged, some directly to the White House. Some Coalition partners threatened to withdraw from the Coalition if the attack was not halted.⁹⁷ Unity of command at the higher levels wavered. The men who had

demanding the attack eventually stopped it mid-stride.⁹⁸ General Conway, Commanding General of 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, declared, “Al Jazeera kicked our butt.”⁹⁹ When the offensive was called off, Marines found themselves stuck in a difficult position – politically stymied half-way into the city that was swarming with insurgents who felt that they had just defeated the US offensive. Objective, offensive, maneuver, surprise, mass, economy of force, and security all turned against Coalition forces. In order to extract himself from this untenable position, Gen Conway facilitated the creation of the Fallujah Brigade.¹⁰⁰ This Iraqi unit was tasked to police the city of Fallujah and hand over the insurgents. Insurgents then took over the Fallujah Brigade. Despite their artful employment of most of the Immutable 9 + 3 principles, Coalition forces were kept from attaining their objectives.

Three major factors contributed to this outcome: Lack of adequate forces prevented Coalition forces from fulfilling the requirements of the National Security Strategy for Iraq – Clear, Hold, Build.¹⁰¹ You cannot build until you clear and hold. Clearing and holding require significant commitment of ground forces – boots on the ground. But boots on the ground are not a component of a lighter, leaner, faster more technologically oriented military –the military the U.S. was structuring and provisioning at the onset of OIF. This lean, mean fighting machine provides no mass.

Secondly, unity of command and perseverance collapsed at the higher decision making levels. Coalition forces were ordered into the attack. The enemy was able to use information operations and a hostile press to attack the will of our leaders who yielded to political pressure and stopped the attack. Commanders on the ground were closely adhering to the Immutable 9+3, but they could not offset the impact of negative IO. 4GW fighters use IO to stymie a superior military force that can systematically destroy them.

Finally, operational commanders’ situational awareness was seconded to political concerns. The Pentagon and the CPA, despite resounding protests from the commanders on the ground, believed that our aggressive offensive against the murders of the Blackwater contractors would strengthen our strategic position. In reality, due to the enemy’s IO campaign and a hostile press, to include our own media/press which was exploited by the enemy, the aborted attack of Fallujah I actually weakened our strategic position and reinforced the insurgents.¹⁰²

Following Fallujah I, the insurgents proclaimed “Destruction of the USMC” and called Fallujah “The Graveyard of America.”¹⁰³ Fallujah became an insurgent stronghold reinforced with thousands of fighters, many of them foreigners from all over the Muslim world. Al Qaeda leader Abu Musab Zarqawi (AMZ) set up operations in the city, which then became an insurgent

depot for thousands of tons of ammunition and weapons. Improvised explosive device (IED) factories were set up in assembly-line production fashion, to include internet links with electrical engineering data down-loaded from U.S. universities. Kidnappings, torture, and murder - to include the beheading of Nick Berg - took place there. DVDs of these murders were produced and rushed to Al Jazeera in Baghdad for release.¹⁰⁴ AMZ teamed up with other Sunni resistance elements, radical Islamists, and criminals in an attempt to hijack Iraq as a terrorist haven. Suicide bombings surged, killing thousands across the country.

Fallujah II – Operation Phantom Fury

Fallujah II started with Fallujah I. Traffic Control Point 1 was established at the main entrance to the city as a means to control access in and out of the city. However, it mainly served as a key location for shaping the city for further actions. The most important aspect of this shaping was the political effort to bring all parties to an agreement on the final outcome of continued operations in and around Fallujah– agreement on an objective. Ultimately, Iraqi political leaders directed that the city be cleared of insurgents. The city was then targeted with IO in an effort to get as many civilians to leave as possible. This had a deleterious effect on surprise, but it significantly reduced the number of civilians who were still in the city when the offensive started. Fewer civilian casualties meant less concern over the principles legitimacy and restraint. Mass was addressed through artful maneuver and economy of force. Use of fires was closely scrutinized, but when troops were in contact, requested fires were delivered. The goal was to clear the city of insurgents, not to destroy it. Collateral damage was the main issue the press and media were seeking to exploit. Restraint cost lives but it was a necessary requirement to prevent loss of legitimacy for Coalition actions. A simple plan of attack included appropriate maneuver for assault elements.¹⁰⁵ Unity of command was not hindered primarily because of the careful coordination between multiple decision-making bodies before the assault started. This coordination also provided legitimacy. Gen Sattler, the I MEF Commander, expertly addressed IO. Furthermore, reporters working with the insurgents armed themselves and thus qualified as combatants; they were subsequently killed. As ground forces started to uncover the terrorist network that included torture chambers, execution rooms, and multiple IED factories, the IO campaign reinforced the Coalition's legitimacy. As insurgents' illegitimate use of mosques, schools, hospitals, and civilian dwellings increased, they provided more footage for IO exploitation. World opinion then held that Fallujah II was a necessary and legitimate operation. The insurgents were crushed. And in the process, they were exposed as the brutal, murdering savages that they are.

The Immutable 9+3 were skillfully applied and appropriate and effective measures were taken to dominate the IO campaign. Fallujah II provides a 21st century example of a conventional force penetrating a complex urban terrain to conduct combat operations against a well-prepared, experienced insurgent force, winning a major battle at all three levels of warfare.

Preliminary Lessons of the Israeli – Hezbollah War (2d Lebanon War)

Although full details for the 2d Lebanon War are not available, recurring trends of warfare are evident in it, as well as new developing trends. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah exhibited mixed performances at all three levels of warfare.¹⁰⁶ Objective, legitimacy, and restraint are in question for both sides. This war is an example of 21st century warfare conducted on the littorals in complex urban terrain, with large numbers of civilians involved. The Israelis used conventional tactics and tried to avoid civilian casualties, while the Hezbollah 4GW fighters used Lebanese civilians as shields and specifically targeted Israeli citizens.¹⁰⁷ It is unclear whether the Israelis gained a strategic victory, despite killing ‘meaningful numbers of Hezbollah’ and smashing much of their operational structure along the Israeli border.¹⁰⁸ Israelis openly admit that they lost parts of the IO battle.¹⁰⁹ The Hezbollah were caught red-handed using homes, schools, courtyards, and hospitals as firing points to randomly fire hundreds of rockets at Israeli population centers. Despite this, the Israelis failed to convey the message that they were striking military targets and responding to the multiple rocket attacks. The press/media was quick to report the Hezbollah’s portrayal of the Israelis targeting power grids, fuel depots, bridges, and other infrastructure, but slow to point out why : The Israelis sought to prevent the movement of short-to mid-range rockets to border firing points and the exfiltration of Hezbollah fighters and leadership. Hezbollah’s IO campaign successfully portrayed the Israelis as heavy-handed, indiscriminate, and bent on revenge for the cross border raid and kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers.¹¹⁰ Hezbollah, with Iranian support, was able to build a modern net-centric missile command and control apparatus that they successfully used to terrorize large regions of Israel.¹¹¹ Hezbollah fortified civilian structures and used asymmetric tactics and operational art reminiscent of the Chechens. They engaged the IDF with some success.¹¹² They succeeded in killing just over 100 IDF soldiers and knocked out some tanks and armored personal carriers. It would appear the Israelis successfully applied many of the Immutable 9+ 3 and won at the tactical and operational levels. But the IO campaign has provided the illusion of a strategic Hezbollah victory.

Battlefields of the Future: Water, the Urban Triad, 4th Generation Warfare and Information Operations

Chaos in the littorals has been a developing trend for the past fifty years.¹¹³ Water to drink, to use for commerce, to transport goods and for agriculture – this is why the human species is congregating in great numbers in the world's littorals. 80% of the world's population lives in the littorals; 80% of all nations have a water border; 80% of the world's capital cities and nearly all of the world's market places for international trade are found in the littorals.¹¹⁴ Follow the rivers that flow on the surface of the earth, as well as those that flow below the earth's surface, and you will find the rest of the world's population centers. These waterways have been an integral part of human activity and behavior throughout history. America is a direct reflection of this condition. Our population centers are concentrated on the coastal areas. The population centers of our interior are squarely centered on other major waterways - either great rivers or the Great Lakes. From ancient times until today, these waterways have been the locus of issues we face today - national aspirations, ethnicity, religion, markets, transit routes, and cultures.¹¹⁵ The good, the bad, and the ugly of humanity - whether they are legitimate or criminal, peaceful and cooperative, or confrontational and destructive - are found on the world's waterways.

Water supports population density. Population density creates cities. Then cities create the Urban Triad which consists of the physical terrain, the population, and the infrastructure.¹¹⁶ The Urban Triads centered upon water sources are primarily where the fighting of the late 20th and early 21st centuries has taken place: Desert Storm's key terrain objectives were Kuwait City and Basra. In Chechnya, it was Grozny; in Somalia, it was Mogadishu. The key battles in OIF I centered on Iraqi cities that sat squarely on the Tigris, the Euphrates, and the watersheds that run from them. Operations for OIF II have centered on major cities built on water sources that dominate Iraq's terrain - Haidytha, Mosul, Baghdad, Ramadi, Fallujah, and Basra. In Afghanistan, a land-locked arid country, Kandahar, which sits on the Arghandad River; Kabul, which sits on the Kabul River; and the associated irrigation systems on which the nation's survival hinges, are the nation's strategic locations. We are fighting in complex urban terrain centered on waterways; we will continue to fight on this terrain in the future.

4GW fighters are exploiting the Urban Triad as they capitalize on the advantages afforded them through asymmetric warfare conducted in complex urban terrain. Non-state actors have embraced and are mastering 4GW, seeking to circumvent our conventional warfare superiority. Nations such as Iran and Syria are sponsoring non-state actors and using state mechanisms to recruit and train branches of their military in terror and 4GW tactics. Civilian population centers

are specifically targeted as bases for operations.¹¹⁷ Innocent non-combatants are used as shields from conventional firepower. When civilians are killed as a result, the enemy has been relentless in connecting this into their IO campaign as a means to attack legitimacy, restraint, and the perseverance of the civilian populace and its leadership. Civilian populations are targeted for direct attack as a means to discredit the government, and in the case of Iraq, to foment sectarian violence. Suicide mass-murder attacks are a norm, conducted regularly in Israel, Russia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the U.S. The press/media are exploited to foster fear and de-legitimize terrorist targets as they deliver the terrifying news to the world. 4GW IO tactics use misinformation and intimidation aimed directly at civilians and their leadership. IO efforts are used for recruitment and to garner financial support. In 21st century 4GW, the population is more than the seas in which the fish swim: Terrorists feed upon the populace by whatever means necessary.

4GW fighters are often criminals, with the ethics (or lack thereof) of criminals. They often narcotize the conflict: They use drugs as a means to fill coffers, to pay fighters, and to exploit new recruits (get high on their own supply). When cornered and about to be destroyed, they also use drugs to anesthetize themselves to lessen the experience of being killed. This allows them to incur fatal wounds and remain a threat for some time. Marines referred to this as the “Night of the Living Dead” experience as they cleared Fallujah. Terrorists pump drugs into the societies that they target as a means to weaken their moral fiber. Negotiating with Westphalian state actors is significantly different from dealing with drug dealing criminals who have ascended to warlord positions. Stone-cold realism rooted in Hobbsian theory is better suited for dealing with these individuals than deontological ethics. Presently we are fighting Islamist extremists. However, many other zealots will embrace 4GW tactics to further their causes, which may be only anarchism.

As intimidating as these threats seem, they are not new. War-planners and warfighters have dealt with these challenges in the past. The Crusades demonstrate that there is nothing new about combating religious fanatics. IO is not a new concept. Propagandists attempted to convince the Ottoman soldiers that the Gallipoli campaign was a crusader invasion to recapture Constantinople. The Yellow Press of the late 1800s and the press and media-driven anti-Viet Nam war movement are described in U.S. history. The public outcry over the reports of the blunders and resulting losses on Gallipoli contributed to the Allies’ withdrawal. Suicide tactics are not new. The Divine Wind – Japanese Kamikazes – savaged the Allied fleets as they approached the Japanese mainland. Use of WMD in the form of biological attack against wells and water sources took place during the sieges that predate modern history. Non-state actors

in the form of U.S. Indian Agents used biological warfare when they supplied the Plains Tribes with smallpox-contaminated blankets. This killed thousands and facilitated a highly effective ethnic cleansing effort.¹¹⁸ Chemical weapons were used in WWI and the Iran-Iraq war. Nuclear weapons were used in WWII have been a world threat for 60 years. Terrorism and asymmetric warfare has been a documented part of history dating back to the Persian Assassins and Jewish Zealots.¹¹⁹ A Serbian of the Black Hand terrorist organization assassinated Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo and ignited The Great War. But what is a new developing trend is the sophisticated assimilation of these tactics by 4GW fighters and their access to new technology provided through increasing globalization.

A Net-Centric Enemy and the Impact of Information Operations

21st century IO is new and different. The Immutable 9+3 do not sufficiently address this new trend. The ability to influence other parties, even with the use of misinformation, is a key factor in all of the recent battles reviewed in this SRP. The Immutable 9 did not anticipate globalization and the development of information transmission technology. Restraint, legitimacy, and perseverance were added to the original 9 to address the impact of press/media coverage. Still, it is entirely possible that a successful military campaign conducted with masterful application of The Immutable 9 + 3 could be presented to the world by the press/media, including those from the victorious nation, as a resounding defeat. Media-shaped and manufactured perceptions turn into reality, as we saw in Fallujah I and the 2d Lebanon War.

The Iwo Jima campaign offers a stark contrast. Shown the carnage that the Marines suffered on the landing beaches, President Roosevelt gasped in horror and cast the photos away.¹²⁰ He stated that the U.S. public should not be exposed to these images, for it would hurt the war effort.¹²¹ The battle was portrayed to the American public through the legendary image of the flag-raising on Mt Suribachi. A very tired nation with empty coffers was buoyed up, and the war effort continued. The goal of unconditional surrender was popularly supported, unblemished by the image of Marines who suffered violent deaths on Iwo Jima.

In contrast, the Abu Ghraib incident was already under investigation when the unsettling photos of U.S. mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners were plastered all over the media nets. Al Jazeera enabled Al Qaeda by repeatedly showing these photos which resulted in an effective recruiting tool for Al Qaeda. Young Muslim males were targeted with catchy DVDs depicting U. S. forces as new crusaders humiliating Muslim brothers.¹²² They responded by the hundreds and entered the pipeline of foreign fighters headed to Iraq. Violence surged and Coalition forces suffered KIA and WIA as a result. Liberal media networks aired these photos as an effort

to influence the 2004 Presidential elections; they resurfaced during the 2006 elections as a means to influence voters to be against the war effort in Iraq. What would have been the result had these smear tactics been used against the Roosevelt administration during WWII? Some claim that we would have never progressed past North Africa after the Kasserine Pass debacle. Had Japan or Germany been able to sue for peace without the terms of unconditional surrender, we would have had to deal with them later, possibly when they also had atomic bombs.¹²³

Summary

Fighting in the 21st Century is taking place primarily in dense complex urban terrain centered on water and waterways. This will continue to be the case in the foreseeable future.¹²⁴ 4GW will be the battle order used by the enemy. Terrorism tactics will be employed and IO will be a centerpiece strategy. Fighting from the Urban Triad, the enemy will be more difficult to locate, target, and destroy.¹²⁵ Specially trained fighters are required to clear and hold urban terrain.¹²⁶ A recurring trend, reaching back to WWII, is the absolute necessity of mass in the form of combined arms, especially the tank /infantry team. The Urban Triad will sustain damage as the enemy is destroyed. The press and media quickly seize upon collateral damage. The Russian experience in Grozny, the Israeli experience in Lebanon, and the US experience in Iraq have demonstrated that conventional forces armed with precision ordnance can defeat 4GW fighters in the urban setting, while satisfying the principle of restraint (albeit in lesser form in the case of the Russians).

This Immutable 9+3 principles will continue to be very applicable to warfare in the 21st Century. These should remain bedrock principles for US Doctrine into the 21st Century. But they are not a checklist that, if adhered to, will guarantee success. They must be applied in the fashion that they were initially developed - as guidelines for preparation of a battle plan designed to execute national strategy. However, the Immutable 9+3 must be constantly reviewed to assess how well they will meet the demands of the 21st Century and the threat of 4GW. Their most glaring deficiency is their vulnerability to enemy Information Operations. This shortcoming must be addressed at all three levels of warfare – most importantly, at the strategic level. Admiral Mullins, Chief of Naval Operations, suggested that IO should be the main order of battle and kinetic operations should be an annex. LTG Boykin USA, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, believes that the Department of Defense should create another department for IO, headed by the Vice President.¹²⁷ However, maneuver, offensive, and objective could use speed and tempo to neutralize hostile IO portals.

The impact of a hostile press/media enjoying access to the battlefield needs study. Presence of a hostile press/media, operating as a tool of IO, has weakened the Immutable 9 + 3. The press/media cannot be relied on to report in a fair and balanced manner. Major press/media agencies clearly state that they believe that they have a responsibility to report the news, but they only select what they believe the news is. They avoid responsibility for the results of what, how, and when they report on what they deem is news. It is unequivocally clear that press/media agencies have political agendas. They are often critical of military action. Further, Al Jazeera and Al Arabia are decidedly anti-western. With open access to the battlefield and using state-of-the-art information transmission capabilities, they can pose a direct threat to mission accomplishment. Major battles of the early 21st Century have taken place mostly in complex urban terrain. Based on the steady trend of chaos in the littorals, it is likely that an amphibious assault in the form of forcible entry from the sea directly into the Urban Triad will be required in the not-too-distant future. History affirms that a successful outcome will be dependent on which side most creatively applies “a rule of conduct that produces a specific effect.”¹²⁸ In the final analysis, Principles of War are principles for victory.

Endnotes

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