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**UKRAINE'S SEARCH FOR ITS PLACE IN EUROPE:
THE EAST OR THE WEST?**

by

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March 2007

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THE EAST OR THE WEST?**

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ABSTRACT

The pace of democratic political and economic reforms in Ukraine has been slower than that of some other democracies of post-communist Eastern and Central Europe. Ukraine is still uncertain of its future development orientation. The reasons for this uncertainty involve internal factors such as the historically diverse political, cultural and ethnic affiliations of Ukraine's population. At the same time, the impact of external factors, especially Russian and Western geo-strategic interests relating to the future of Ukraine, also contribute to the current crisis.

The thesis examines the historically-based geopolitical and cultural attachments of the Ukrainian people in relation to the nation-formation process in independent Ukraine. The absence of a common national identity in Ukraine is one of the obstacles to successful national development. In the case of Ukraine, a sense of national identity cannot be based purely on ethno-cultural and regional bonds. On the contrary, the emphasis on the rise of civic consciousness among all strata of Ukrainian society seems crucial. The successful integration of major democratic values might afford a clear direction for the country's future development, and help define its place in Europe in a way that would be acceptable to a majority of the Ukrainian people.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. GENERAL HYPOTHESIS

It is not easy for a state to establish democratic governance, popular sovereignty, political unity and a market economy while maintaining a good standard of living for its people. The case of Ukraine illustrates the difficulties of such transitions. The process of transformation has been slower in Ukraine compared with other democracies in the post-communist space in Eastern and Central Europe. Why?

Ukraine is uncertain of its future in Europe. Reasons for uncertainty include internal factors like the historically diverse political, cultural and ethnic affiliations of Ukraine's population. At the same time, one should not underestimate the influence of external factors, especially Russian and Western geo-strategic interests.

Development of an independent Ukraine could be furthered by a strong common national identity, based not only on ethnic affiliation, but also on the values of democracy and a liberal market economy. The successful integration of such values might afford a clear direction for the country's future development, and help define its place in Europe in a way that would be acceptable to a majority of the Ukrainian people. This thesis analyzes how the internal and external pressures arising from Ukraine's history and geographical location may help or hinder the development of national identity. It surveys the process of national identity formation and investigates how that process contributes to current uncertainties about Ukraine's future.

The primary questions to be answered in this research include:

- How does the lack of national identity in Ukraine influence its development?
- Why is there still no common national identity in Ukraine?
- What is the likely vector of Ukraine's national development?

B. IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH

This research advances understanding of the historically-based geopolitical and cultural affiliations of the Ukrainian people and how this influences the nation-formation process in Ukraine. How Ukrainian society sees itself and the surrounding world is

heavily affected by the Soviet legacy. This thesis ventures some recommendations on how to overcome the obstacles to successful consolidation. A sense of national identity cannot be based purely on ethno-cultural and regional bonds. On the contrary, civic consciousness among all strata of Ukrainian society is crucial.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

There is a significant social science literature focused on ethnic problems, the role of nationalist movements, and the influence of such movements on foreign policies in post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Well-known contributors to the field include scholars such as Ted Hopf, Paul D'Anieri, Robert Kravchuk, Taras Kuzio, Anthony Smith, Paul Magosci, Illya Prizel, Roman Szporluk, Mikhail Molchanov and Andrew Wilson. Works by these authors are discussed below. Most relevant studies were written in the 1990s and acknowledge that the world order changed dramatically after the collapse of communism as a state ideology and the disappearance of a stable bipolar system. The authors discuss the inevitable emergence of a security vacuum in post-communist space. They see sparks of nationalism, along with uncertainty among political elites and the general population in newly emerged or re-emerged post-communist countries, as indirect responses to the dissolution of the Soviet empire.

In contrast, this thesis examines national identity and its relationship with, and influence on, further state development. The focus is specifically on integration processes in the context of Ukraine's choice of its place in the contemporary geopolitical space.

The school of social constructivism focuses on the importance of various domestic influences. This thesis considers different theoretical approaches that illuminate the nature and origins of state foreign policies. A hypothesis consistent with the social constructivist account is that the situation in contemporary Ukraine, with its unclear perception of itself and surrounding others, is due to two factors: Ukraine's historical lack of a unified society and its very short period of statehood.

The school of social constructivism provides valuable analytical tools for studying social identity, treating it as a complex entity that influences foreign policy choices.

Social constructivists like Ted Hopf believe that all societies consist of social structures.¹ Hopf argues that every individual in society has a whole spectrum of identities. Each identity has associated with it a collection of discursive practices, including, for example, a written or spoken language with a vocabulary, and characteristic physical behaviors, such as gestures, dress, customs, habits, and so on.² Particular individual identities predominate in particular spheres of social life. Hopf's main insight is that the complexity of numerous individual identities contributes to the creation and recreation of discourse and a "social cognitive structure" which creates boundaries for every society. Although Hopf's *Social Construction of International Politics, Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1995 and 1999* does not consider in detail such inextricable constituents of people's identity as a sense of ethnic belonging or the origins of political and cultural affiliations, he nonetheless provides useful insights in this area. His analytical work focuses on recovering major social identities that evolved in Soviet and post-cold war Russia within existing social cognitive structures; he demonstrates how certain types of domestic identities could influence state policies. This assumption is relevant to the case discussed in this thesis, if one takes into account the immediate proximity of Ukraine to Russia and the persistent congruence of domestic discourse among large parts of the population, especially in the Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine.

Domination of one or another type of discourse among political elites means different visions of state interests and different perceptions of others. These visions of state interests and perceptions of others shape domestic and foreign policies.

Anthony D. Smith, in *National Identity*, provides a straightforward introduction to the nature, causes and consequences of national identity as a collective phenomenon. Smith identifies five fundamental features of national identity:

- A historical territory or homeland
- Common myths and historical memories
- A common, mass public culture

¹ Ted Hopf. *Social Construction of International Politics, Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1995 and 1999*. (New York: Cornell University Press, 2002), 1.

² Hopf, 2.

- Common legal rights and duties for all members of society
- A common economy with territorial mobility for all members of society³

These features are examined in this thesis to determine which are absolutely crucial for Ukraine and which have remained underdeveloped.

Smith provides interesting insights. For example, he states that the “nation” draws on elements of other kinds of collective identity, which explains how national identity can be combined with other types of identity, such as class, religious or ethnic identity, and also explains “the chameleon-like permutations of nationalism, the ideology, with other ideologies like liberalism, fascism and communism.”⁴ He argues that nations and nationalism cannot be understood simply as an ideology or form of politics; they must be treated as cultural phenomena as well.⁵ He emphasizes that national identity can oppose other kinds of collective cultural identifications, and that a national identity is fundamentally multidimensional and can never be reduced to a single element. Smith suggests that “national identity” and “the nation” are complex constructs composed of interrelated components—ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic and legal-political. To understand the notion of the nation, conceptually, one must blend two important sets of dimensions, one civic and territorial, the other ethnic and genealogical, in varying proportions in particular cases.⁶ The difficulty is finding the balance between these dimensions. It seems reasonable to consider the possibility of that this phenomenon is occurring in Ukraine.

The school of Marxism-Leninism provided ideological guidance to Ukraine’s political elites for more than seventy years. The *Communist Manifesto* says, “The workers have no fatherland. They cannot lose what they do not have.”⁷ As everyone now

³ Anthony Smith. *National Identity* (Reno, Nevada: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 14.

⁴ Smith’s assumptions seem applicable to the Ukrainian case. In Ukraine, the nationalist mood among those living in the western part of the country is matched by absolute indifference among those who have been more influenced by communist ideology in the eastern part of the country.

⁵ Smith.

⁶ Smith, 15.

⁷ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (New York: International Publishers, 1948), 156.

knows, utopia never arrived. However, Soviet leaders from Lenin onward understood that nation-building in a country with an extremely diverse population could not be based only on a sense of belonging to a particular social class, and that historically formed ethnic, cultural and regional traits had to be taken into account. Numerous attempts were made to eradicate any self identification other than as part of the Soviet working class, the socialist peasantry or the Soviet intelligentsia. Nonetheless, Lenin and Stalin both acknowledged that complex and quite sophisticated ethnic, linguistic, and territorial policies were needed for Soviet “nation building.” Consequently, Stalinist policy was characterized by the imposition of historical origin myths to convey that segments of the population were “predestined” to unite as a single “Soviet nation.” This applies specifically to the western territories gained by the Soviets in 1939-45, including western Ukraine, Moldavia, the Baltic republics and western Belarus. After 1939, when the western and eastern parts of Ukraine were united, Kremlin ideologists realized that if their “experiment” was to continue, it would have to be confined to clearly defined “democracy-proof” borders within which the masses could be subordinated to a totalitarian system. Nonetheless, there was some state support for the development of numerous Soviet nationalities, although always under the strict control of the Communist Party to insure consistency with the Soviet framework.

With regard to the Slavic republics of Ukraine and Belarus, the Russians were assigned an indisputable leading role in the “indivisible” Slavic fraternity. Soviet historiographers insisted that all three peoples originated from one ancestral polity, Kyivan Rus’, centered on what is today Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine.⁸ Although the argument can now be disputed, it is more important to understand which stages of Ukrainian history shaped its identity and the people’s common beliefs.

Paul D’Anieri, in *Politics and Society in Ukraine*, mentions that since the Mongol invasion, along with a large territory under Moscow rule, considerable portions of Ukraine were included in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the subsequent Polish state, while the Crimea was controlled by the Crimean Tatar Khanate with close

⁸ Paul D’Anieri, Roman Kravchuk and Taras Kuzio, eds. *Politics and Society in Ukraine*. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), 45.

ties to the Ottoman Empire. Despite frequent Cossack uprisings and wars for independence, most of the time Ukraine was divided between Russia and Poland.⁹ These two nations play a crucial role in shaping the Ukrainian people's identity, historically and perhaps in the foreseeable future as well. In assessing these influences, Paul Magosci states:

While Ukrainianism was being suppressed in the Russian Empire, all the fundamentals that make possible a viable national life – ideology, language, literature, cultural organization, education, religion and politics – were being formally established in the Austrian Empire [where Poland while being a part of it had a determining influence on the western part of Ukraine].¹⁰

Because of the historical presence of the attributes of nationhood in Western Ukraine, and the lack of these attributes in its other parts, Magosci implies that a clear division between western and eastern areas should be visible in contemporary Ukraine as well.

In addition, a review of different academic approaches reveals that national identity, as a cultural phenomenon, is widely considered in association with ideological nationalism as a political program. Despite the abundant literature on nationalism in Eastern Europe, the relationship between the formation of a common national identity in Ukraine and the absence of clear direction of national development has not been studied in depth.

D. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

The thesis investigates the relationship between the slow process of forming a Ukrainian national identity and the frequently changing domestic and foreign policies pursued by the Ukrainian political elites. In light of the hypothesis that challenges to the consolidation of a national identity in Ukraine have deep historical roots and are inextricably linked with the successes and failures of state development since 1991, Chapter II focuses on the concept of national identity and discusses which of its necessary features are lacking or remain underdeveloped, and why.

⁹ D'Anieri, Kravchuk and Kuzio.

¹⁰ Paul R. Magosci. *A History of Ukraine* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996), 456.

The thesis defines a basic set of variables relevant to Ukrainian national identity and national development. The independent, dependent and intervening variables considered by this model include the following:

Independent Variables

- Geographic location of Ukraine between the East and the West
- Ukraine's complex ethnic composition
- The historical lack of national statehood
- Different cultural, linguistic, religious and geopolitical attachments in different regions

Dependent Variables

- The process of national consolidation
- National consciousness and a common vision of national development among the Ukrainian people
- The major orientation of Ukraine's national development, which might include multidimensional integration with the West or deepening relationships with institutions of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and increasing political, economic and socio-cultural dependence on Russia

Intervening Variables

- Domestic and foreign policies pursued by Ukrainian political elites
- External influences on national development at various levels (international institutions, national governments, interactions between ordinary people and foreigners that shape Ukrainians' self-identification and perception of others)

These variables are investigated to clarify which are most important for Ukrainian national development and to test the importance of consolidated civil society versus consolidation purely along ethnic lines.

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II. THE CREATION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY: MYTHS AND REALITIES

A. THE LINK BETWEEN NATIONAL IDENTITY AND STATE DEVELOPMENT

National identity is a complex phenomenon that must be studied from different angles. There are a large number of publications on national identity and it is surprising to find a great deal of confusion in terminology and disagreements about the origins and nature of nations. Guntram Herb, a scholar of nationalism, notes that “as a result of the blurred distinction between civic identities and ethnic nations, it is a common practice to use *nation* and *state* as synonyms, despite the significant differences between them.”¹¹ For example, international relations refers to relations between states; the United Nations represents the states of the world rather than national groups. The notion of nationalism is related to an ideology that seeks to make a population identify with the institutions of the state, even though “patriotism” would be a more appropriate term.¹²

Two general trends can be identified in studies of national identity, nationalism, and nations: the primordialist and constructivist approaches. The former argues that nations are organically grown entities, which it is impossible to construct or artificially create, and the whole world is inevitably and fatally divided into nations. It holds that nations are based on distinctive national spirits or essences and should be seen as “collective answers to the call of blood [that are] the only true organic group identities and crucial for the survival of the planet because these nations have evolved through a harmonious relationship with the local environment.”¹³ According to this view, pre-modern identities were mostly products of historical ethnogenesis,¹⁴ which can be traced

¹¹ Guntram H. Herb and David H. Kaplan, eds. *Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory, and Scale*. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 13.

¹² Herb and Kaplan, 13.

¹³ Herb and Kaplan, 14.

¹⁴ Taras Kuzio discusses the primordialist account which considers nations in the context of ethnogenetic or “ethnicist” conceptions based on the assumption that “ethnos” is a generative phenomenon for any stage of a civilization's development. Taras Kuzio and Paul D’Anieri, eds. *Dilemmas of State-led Nation Building in Ukraine*. (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), 30-35.

as ethnicities or nations far into the pre-modern era. The ethnogenetic account of nation formation generally does not acknowledge that a nation may be constructed or invented; therefore it cannot be formed except in a natural way. This author tends to agree that nation-formation is a process, not an occurrence.

Another major trend, the constructivist approach, considers nations as mostly artificial creations founded on myths of common historical origins and memories. An extreme assumption of this camp is that belonging to an ethnic group is often a matter of attitudes, perceptions and sentiments that are necessarily fleeting and mutable. In the words of Anthony Smith, this “makes it possible for ethnicity to be used ‘instrumentally’ to further individual or collective interests, particularly of competing elites who need to mobilize large populations to support their goals in the struggle for power.”¹⁵

According to this view, nations have four major characteristics. They are: “1) the product[s] of structural change; 2) the product[s] of a discourse of domination; 3) the project of elites; and 4) a bounded community of exclusion and opposition.”¹⁶ Constructivists seeing nations as products of structural change also argue that modernization, industrialization and the blossoming of capitalism gradually changed ancient, isolated communities. They became societies where emerging elites played a significant role in the transformation of loyalty to tradition-based communities with a sense of membership in larger social structures.¹⁷ Literacy-based abstract cultures replaced traditional communal bonds and facilitated solidarity among larger groups of people who tended to realize own distinctiveness also through the construction of outsiders as the “Other.”

Some authors define nations as communities in juxtaposition to some other groups and focus on the importance of their boundaries. Daniele Conversi, for example, says, “the tendency of nations to stress antagonisms against other groups is dependent on the strength of their internal cultural content.”¹⁸

¹⁵ Smith, 20.

¹⁶ Smith.

¹⁷ Herb, 14.

¹⁸ Herb, 15.

In accordance with the constructivist argument, it is important to point out that these boundaries are always in flux. National identity is not a constant and can change dramatically over time with changes in internal conditions and external influences.

Despite the differences in the explanatory models, some helpful generalizations are possible; neither the primordialist nor the constructivist position should be rejected or taken for granted. The generalizations include the following.

- A nation evokes stronger loyalty from its members than do other communities. The sense of belonging can be interpreted as having evolved over time, whether as an organic phenomenon or as an artificially created construction. Collective identity is not static but influenced by prevailing discursive processes.
- Historical memories, which can be based on actual historical events or relevant myths, are important for strengthening national identity.
- Territory is vital to national belonging. The geographical location of the territory, with its specific historical legacy and the neighbors that affect it, is important in defining national identity.

This author believes that the problems of nation-building are tightly intertwined with the process of state-building. Some nations form gradually, through a long historical process, with the state emerging later as the ultimate legitimate authority over ethnic groups willing to unite in a single political, economic and cultural space. In such cases, the nation-state is the final product of a process that provides general guidance and protection to people who live in the same territory and share the same or similar origins. There unlikely might be clearly defined periods or stages when the process of nation formation ends and state building begins, since the two processes are interlinked and often overlap in time and space. Western European countries like France, England, or Italy serve as examples. The emergence of these separate nation-states was preceded by a long process in which the distinctive national consciousness of each was formed through multiple ethnic, religious and territorial conflicts for ethnic dominance within particular territories. Of course, the situation has changed dramatically since the first modern nation-states emerged in Europe and put an end to the feudal age. And in other cases, state formation preceded the stage of active national consolidation. The United States is a good example of this sort of historical development.

In the contemporary world, as liberal democratic ideals are gradually accepted by more and more countries, national consolidation processes, especially in Eastern Europe, are rarely associated with bloody ethno-nationalist wars for dominance or the claim to be “the highest race.” With exceptions (the fierce ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia), the general trend in newly emerged or re-emerged countries is acceptance of basic principles of pluralistic civil societies as common norms. The pace of this process varies, as domestic and external factors galvanize or hamper national consolidation.

Contemporary Ukraine represents quite a complicated situation. What are the major characteristics for self-identification? What really serves as the basis for state and nation building in Ukraine?

The factors that national identity could depend on include those proposed by both Kuzio and Smith.¹⁹ They take similar approaches to defining nations, arguing that national identity should be understood through the same factors as nations to include:

- shared historical memory and common ancestry
- shared religion
- common language
- a sense of political community
- a demarcated bounded space with which the citizens feel they belong (the “homeland”)
- a single code of rights and duties
- a common economy with territorial mobility for members of society
- common mass public culture
- common institutions

This wide range of factors seems plausible and relevant if one considers a particular case. However, it is not easy to determine which factors are most important for a sense of common national identity among the population of a country with clearly defined and internationally recognized borders. This is not to say that a sense of common national identity cannot be developed without a state. Some peoples, for instance Kurds, have managed to develop and preserve a distinctive feeling of unity. While they have

¹⁹ See D’Anieri and Kuzio, 12-15.

never rejected the idea of their own nation state, for centuries they have been divided, living on the territories of multiple adjacent states. This proves that for some peoples, the control of the territory they live in is not crucial for self-identification.

In order to assess the case of Ukraine, which today has all the attributes of independent statehood but at the same time remains in limbo, the dependent, independent, and intervening variables discussed in Chapter I are used to explore the real causes of slow national development and how this might be affected if some variables were to change.

A brief analysis of some interpretations of the history of the Ukrainian people, beginning with the Middle Ages, illustrates which factors are most important for successful nation-building in Ukraine and which are relevant but to a lesser degree. Considering Ukraine's ethnic composition reveals whether it might, within existing borders, develop some kind of overarching identity based purely on ethno-nationalistic ideas. In other words, can Ukraine consolidate its people (which this author considers a necessary precondition for successful state and nation development) along ethnic lines?

It is fair to assume that the state was formed before the nation. It is not that the distinctive Ukrainian "ethnie" was nonexistent before 1991.²⁰ However, the contemporary notion of a nation in most cases involves a civic and pluralistic polity built on liberal democratic principles. A conscious choice in favor of a democratic future was made by a majority of the Ukrainian people when Ukraine became independent. Fortunately Ukraine, unlike Russia, does not show signs of growing authoritarianism.

Examination of the period between 1991 and 2006 reveals which domestic and external influences play positive and negative roles in national consolidation and might shape the future of national development. Finally, to place Ukraine in historical context and reveal the importance of a common historical memory, the chapter discusses the ongoing debate over rights for those of Kyivan Rus' ancestry.

²⁰ The term "ethnie" is used by Smith to identify premodern precursors of modern nations.

B. KYIVAN RUS': WHO ARE ITS SUCCESSORS? CONTESTING NATIONAL ORIGINS IN THE SEARCH FOR A NATION'S CONTINUITY

The search for a distinct Ukrainian ethnies or people, with ancient historical roots, has engaged domestic politicians, academicians and ordinary citizens. This indicates that historical continuity is a factor defining national identity and relevant to national consolidation.

The years since Ukraine gained its independence from the dissolving Soviet state have seen a number of disparate interpretations of local history. During the communist period, because historiographers were simply not allowed to disagree with the Party-imposed Soviet interpretation, the dominant understanding of the historical origins of all Slavic people remained uncontested. The Communist historiographers stated that three East Slavic peoples, the Ukrainians, Belarusians and Russians, descended from a single ancestor, Kyivan Rus'. This was seen as the first state formation that was put together by the equal participation of the East Slavic tribes that lived in the river Dnipro basin between the 7th and 9th centuries.

In the mid-twelfth century, Kyivan Rus' extended from the Carpathian Mountains and the Black Sea in the southwest to the White Sea in the northeast, thus including about two-thirds of what later became Ukraine and most of present-day Belarus. The ethnic Russian heartland of contemporary Vladimir, Pskov, Suzdal, Novgorod, Tver, Smolensk, Riazan' and some other regions of central Russia were also part of the empire ruled by great princes of Kyiv. It is known that the political organization and culture of the early Rus' were formed in interaction with a number of neighboring peoples, of which the Scandinavians (Varangians) and Turkic tribes (Pechenegs and Khazars) were among the most influential.

Some chronicles provide evidence that the most celebrated dynasty of the Kyivan Rus' was begun by the Varangian warrior Riurik, but circumstances surrounding this event spawned controversy about the origins of East Slavic statehood. While the so-called Normanist school of historians denied the local population any role in state making and argued the Norse origins of the word "Rus," the anti-Normanist tradition, begun by

Mikhail Lomonosov and the 19th century Russian historians, views Scandinavian involvement in the Old Rus politics as secondary and dependent on the choices made by the indigenous elite. However, some relatively new analyses show that the name “Rus” and “Ros” appear in sources that predate the northerners’ arrival by several hundred years.²¹

In independent Ukraine, with the discrediting of the Soviet Marxism paradigm, numerous new studies of Ukrainian history appeared at first. Most present a mix of Soviet categories and previously suppressed classical Ukrainian national historiography, and infuse these with Western social science theories and historiography. The latter became popular in the newly found openness of the Ukrainian academies, which had been thoroughly infiltrated by the secret police in the years before independence.

Ukraine clearly demonstrates the difficulties in finding continuous historical memories, a problem that also applies to European countries like Slovakia, Poland and Romania. European national histories show that states have not always been continuous, administrative boundaries change frequently and peoples have been intermingled. However, the situation in those countries differs significantly from the Ukrainian case. In these other countries, the dominance of the ethnic groups around which national consolidation occurred did not encounter serious rivalry from other local ethnic minorities. Andrew Wilson, in *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation* clearly demonstrates the long evolution of the Ukrainian people with all its discontinuities and paths not taken.²²

Because one factor considered important in defining national identity is shared historical memory and recognition of common ancestry, it is appropriate to discuss the ongoing conflict between Ukrainian and Russian historiographers over the historical roots of these two peoples. Kyivan Rus’, believed to be the first state formation of Eastern Slavs, has been a subject of severe disagreements among historians, who dispute the

²¹ Mikhail A Molchanov, *Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 60.

²² Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation*, 2nd edition. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002).

actual identity of the Rus'. Linguistic imprecision and, unfortunately, Soviet Russo-centrism led to the assumption that the Rus' were simply early medieval Russians, an assumption that denies Ukrainians and Belarusians any separate identity. However, Rus' most likely preceded the appearance of all three Eastern Slavic peoples, at a time when collective identities were extremely loose and modern nations did not exist.

Why does any of this matter? One answer can be found by examining a current discourse that is widespread in Russia and quite harmful to Ukraine and especially to the populations along the Ukraine-Russian border. The practical impact of the discourse is that Russians are still raised with the idea of a single ancient Rus' or Russian nation and manifest great difficulty or unwillingness to accept Ukrainians' separate origin as a people, not to mention the fact of a separate Ukrainian state. These sentiments can be found in overtly anti-Ukrainian propaganda campaigns conducted by some Russian media outlets and think tanks, purportedly independent but obviously sponsored by the Kremlin. Suffice it to say that half a billion rubles were secured in Russia's budget in 2006 for spreading "Russian-style" visions of the past and future of the huge territory of the CIS through a network of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to be established for this purpose.²³

As a result of these Russian interpretations, Ukrainian historians often swing to the opposite extreme, claiming the unity of Rus' as their own—claiming, in other words, that Rus' was Kyivan and therefore a Ukrainian state, and seeking to deny Russians their traditional theory of national origin.²⁴ Neither approach is likely to explain the history since the Kyivan Rus, and neither is based on clear and undeniable evidence from reliable written sources, and therefore the ongoing contest between Ukraine and Russia over their respective ancestry has little purpose for Ukraine. However, it really does make sense in Russia, where perception of the historic greatness of the Russian people is a good fuel for social mobilization and national consolidation. Historians and other intellectuals' arguments and pseudo-evidence are widely used in political circles to advance Russian

²³ See Marek Menkiszak, "The Russian Idea of 'Great Europe' vs. the European Neighborhood Policy" Center for European Studies. (<http://www.csis.org/>), accessed 2 December 2006.

²⁴ Wilson, 2.

neo-imperial ambitious and their influence in the border regions. As a result, there is a growing distance between the populations of the eastern and western parts of Ukraine, which significantly hampers national consolidation.

To summarize, for any contemporary nation, it is quite important to have common historical memories and myths that can serve as a unifying factor for the people. Ukraine's attempt to proclaim its nation as an "historic" one while using arguments based on ethno-nationalistic views produces contradictory results, like the deepening divide between the Russified east which sees its own history, and especially the period of Kyivan Rus', tightly linked to Russia's, and the Ukrainian west, where distinctive national consciousness has been much stronger and the vision of history quite different.

C. THE COMPLEX ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF UKRAINE: THE SECRETS OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE

Ukrainian ethnic composition is one of the independent variables in the applied analytical framework. The peculiarity of the national structure of Ukraine's population is its multi-ethnic composition. According to All-Ukrainian population census data, more than 130 nationalities and ethnic groups live in Ukrainian territory. Some figures highlight the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of these groups.

According to the most recent census, as of 2001 the population was 48,457,000.²⁵ Of this total, 77.8 percent, or 37,541,700 people, were registered as ethnic Ukrainians. Russians constituted the largest minority with 8,334,100 residents, or 17.3 percent of the population.²⁶ The remaining 2,581,200 people, or 4.9 percent of the population, comprised 128 different ethnic groups. Some of the most numerous include Jews, Tatars, Poles, Belarusians, Greeks, Romanians, Moldovans. Another important fact revealed by the census is that some 5.5 million ethnic Ukrainians claimed Russian as their native language and were considered partly or entirely Russified. In addition, 85.2 percent of

²⁵ Unless otherwise noted, all data are from the official web site of State Statistic Committee of Ukraine, (<http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua>) accessed 5 January 2007.

²⁶ In comparison with the 1989 census, the number of ethnic Russians in 2001 was three million less, dropping from 22.1 to 17.3 percent of the total population.

Ukrainian ethnics were exclusively Ukrainian speakers, while 95.9 percent of Russian ethnics declared Russian as their first or exclusive language (3 percent less than in the 1989 census).

About the same number of marriages in Ukraine were identified as mixed both by the 1989 and 2001 censuses (20 percent) but with one distinctive characteristic: in 1989 most offspring of mixed marriages identified themselves as Russian, whereas in 2001 the majority of young people from mixed marriages considered themselves Ukrainians.

Taking into account obvious changes between 1989 and 2001, it is hard to claim that even simple membership in an ethnic group can be considered a steady characteristic of any individual or group of people. It is not something that should be taken for granted, especially considering ethnicities such as Russians and Ukrainians, with their closely intertwined pasts. The large number of ethnically mixed families makes it possible to conclude that between two extremes—clearly distinctive groups of people like ethnic Russians of the Crimean Peninsula and western Ukrainians of the Galicia region—there is a third category of people with blurred identities and an extremely weak sense of distinctive cultural, linguistic and political belonging. The eastern Ukrainian regions of Donbas and Luhansk, which are mostly populated by this category of people, are poorly understood by outsiders and sometimes deliberately misinterpreted by Ukrainian nationalists. Although they show no strongly expressed popular commitment to Ukrainian statehood and independence, nor do they demonstrate a clearly developed sense of national identity, it is too simplistic to characterize the majority of inhabitants as secessionists or seeking reintegration into Russia or the CIS.²⁷

The Kremlin has sponsored a massive campaign to mobilize Russian minorities in the region in an attempt to increase its influence on public opinion and achieve Russia's geopolitical goals, but the people do not have strong loyalty toward Moscow and are

²⁷ Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zviglyanich, eds. *Ukraine*. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 171.

reportedly not attracted to the nationalist movements in Russia.²⁸ Indeed, this population exhibits a tangible regional identity that is neither monoethnic nor multiethnic but rather a “de-ethnified” identity with Russian as the major language.²⁹ People in eastern Ukrainian regions like Donbas, Luhansk and Dnipropetrovsk view themselves simultaneously as Ukrainian, Russian and Slavic, but for them the regional focus takes priority.

A key characteristic which explains the absence of serious ethnic conflicts in Ukraine is that this “transitional identity” predefines national allegiance on the basis of local economic self-interest rather than ethnonationalist commitment, particularly after the collapse of Communism. To a large degree the policies toward ethnic minorities pursued by Ukrainian political elites since independence have prevented negative developments. One important step, for example, in respect to the language policy, appears in Article 10 of the 1996 Ukrainian Constitution.

The state language in Ukraine is the Ukrainian language. The state guarantees the all-around development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life on the territory of Ukraine. In Ukraine the free development, use and protection of Russian, other languages of national minorities of Ukraine is guaranteed. The state promotes the study of languages of international communication.³⁰

This suggests a balanced approach, incorporating the ideas of Ukrainophone nationalistic thinking while not diminishing the rights of the Russian-speaking population. In practice, however, the language issue remains the subject of agitation by pro-Russian political forces and always emerges during the periods of parliamentary and local elections.

²⁸ Wolchik and Zviglyanych describe this campaign as a means to push the Ukrainian authorities into defining the state along ethnic grounds, and to provoke alienation of the large segment of Russian-speakers. The Russophone lobby has attempted to manipulate ethnic and linguistic distinctions and has raised the specter of forceful Ukrainization to increase popular fears, mobilize public opinion behind their policies and increase opposition to Kyiv.

²⁹ Wolchik and Zviglyanich, 171.

³⁰ Adapted from the English language version of the Ukrainian constitution. (<http://www.rada.gov.ua/const/conengl.htm#r2>) accessed 16 January 2007.

Concerning the choice of language, most people in eastern and southern regions use Russian as their first language. Numerous attempts by center-left political activists to gain political capital on language issues, even requiring that Russian be designated the second state language, have not noticeably affected the attitudes of westerners and easterners toward each other. The sphere of Russian usage had not grown smaller, and Russian speakers retain all opportunities to exercise traditional cultural rights. However, the pro-Russian and left parties have frightened the electorate in the east and south with the threat of impending “Ukrainization.” On the other side, western scholars who implicitly support the idea of “nationalizing Ukraine” along ethnic lines bitterly criticized the Ukrainian government under President Kuchma for its unclear policy of multivectorism.³¹ Kuzio was among the critics; he emphasized his negative impression of Kuchma’s policy by saying, that Kuchma

pays lip-service to both communist and nationalist symbols, flirts with both Russophone and Ukrainophone leaders, sends mixed messages, and deliberately contributes to the total confusion, aptly called a “social schizophrenia”...There is no coherent, consistent cultural policy in Ukraine that could be interpreted as either radical deSovietization, decommunization, or decolonization (unlike in the Baltic, Central, and Eastern European states) or a further Sovietization and colonization-creolization (like in Belarus). Ukraine remains stuck between these two models ...The confusing eclecticism of Ukrainian life and Ukrainian cultural (and any other) politics results from the ambivalent nature of Ukrainian society, which is divided along regional, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious, generational, and many other lines.³²

The situation he depicts changed dramatically during the 2004 presidential elections when pro-Kuchma candidate Viktor Yanukovich, armed with an extensive staff of Russian “political technologists,” allegedly attempted to falsify the results of the

³¹ Multivectorism is the term widely used to characterize the official foreign policy pursued by the former President Kuchma’s administration. The policy resulted in a significant rapprochement with Russia in all spheres of political, economic and cultural life. At the same time the idea of Euro-Atlantic integration was also a part of the official political discourse. This incoherent position of the Ukrainian political elite did not allow them to conduct necessary reforms and hampered national development in Ukraine.

³² D’Anieri and Kuzio, 52.

elections, which were consequently declared illegitimate.³³ The run-off election revote, called for by the Ukrainian Supreme Court due to wide-spread election fraud in favor of the governmental candidate, was convincingly won by Viktor Yushchenko by a margin of 52 to 44 percent.³⁴ Election fraud prompted public protests by millions of people and played a major role in that election; the term Orange Revolution, which Yushchenko was seen as leading, was applied interchangeably to the protests and to the election itself. November and December 2004 was characterized by the awakening of Ukrainian civil society which, for the first time since independence, demonstrated its resolve to no longer be politically manipulated by old-regime political forces. The results of the 2006 parliamentary elections, in which Viktor Yanukovich's pro-Russian political party won a majority of seats in Verkhovna Rada, shows significant support from the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. The Yushchenko administration appears incapable of consolidating divergent political forces under the banner of the European model of national development, mostly because of its incoherent economic policies and diverse visions of Ukrainian foreign policy. However, the main achievement of the Orange Revolution remains. The Ukrainian people have become aware that their political will matters and that nothing can be achieved without joint efforts by ordinary citizens. That the citizens of Ukraine have been able to use normal democratic means to voice their preferences is no small part due to the state's inclusive citizenship policy and the absence of political discrimination along ethnic lines. During the Orange Revolution, Ukrainians proved that

³³ The concept of "political technology" is one of the more sinister recent developments to come out of Vladimir Putin's Russia. "Political technologists" have become one of the fastest growing new professions in Russia. More than mere spin doctors or propagandists, political technologists use every means at their disposal – fair or foul, no holds barred – to achieve the political results demanded by their political masters. See Robert Amsterdam: "A Russian 'Political Technologist' Weighs in on the Arrest of Khodkorkovsky's Lawyers" (http://www.robertamsterdam.com/2007/02/a_russian_political_technologi.htm) accessed 17 January 2007.

³⁴ Data available on the official web site of the Ukrainian Central Election Commission. (<http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011>) assessed 26 January 2007.

voter preferences would be important in determining how far a real or imagined nationalizing agenda can be pursued. This is not to rule out the possibility of ethnic conflict in Ukraine, but if Ukrainians continue on the path of democratic reform, the likelihood that differences will continue to be dealt with through the democratic process remains high.³⁵

D. REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN UKRAINE: TWO “POLES” OF MUTUAL MISUNDERSTANDING?

Beside the problem of state language, interethnic relations in Ukraine are negatively affected by an ad hoc dispute related to the federalization of Ukraine. Such ideas, again, are mostly generated by the center-left, the Communists and the so-called Progressive Socialists who advocate decentralization with more pronounced regional autonomy, especially in regards to the economies of the eastern and southern regions. It is not hard to understand what is behind attempts to weaken the subtle civic consensus among the 130 ethnic groups which is crucial for peace and security in the region. Several eastern and southern regions, particularly Crimea and Donbas, are fully empowered and have wide-ranging political autonomy granted by the Constitution, so the advocacy of more regional autonomy reflects attempts by local elites, partly inspired by the Kremlin, to expand their own control at the expense of national unity, a campaign camouflaged by the concept of federalization. This factor undoubtedly serves as an obstacle to national consolidation. The unilateralist-federalist dispute continues to spread negative mutual perceptions between Ukraine's westerners and easterners. Western Ukrainians tend to believe that easterners lack a national identity and value material conditions instead of state sovereignty and national integrity. In this view, if given the opportunity for a good life, easterners would betray Ukrainian independent statehood. This idea is widely accepted, despite the fact that in the 1991 referendum, 90.3 percent of the public voted for independence, including those in the most Russified eastern and southern parts of Ukraine.

³⁵ D'Anieri and Kuzio, 97.

This western opinion seems reasonable in some respects. The east and south of Ukraine are indeed considerably Russified (both linguistically and because of Russia's explicit and implicit intrusive policies toward bordering regions) so it will take a long time to construct a common Ukrainian national identity.

On the other hand, easterners have widespread suspicions concerning the intentions of westerners. After independence, there was a pervasive belief that western Ukraine wanted national development only through forced Ukrainization, meaning state policies to base a new ethnonational identity on purely west Ukrainian principles. Although this trend was evident under President Kravchuk (1991-1994), his successor's administration deemphasized Ukrainization. To strengthen the state's civic orientation, the authorities introduced enlightened legislation furthering nondiscrimination toward ethnic minorities. The 1996 Ukrainian constitution codified opportunities for cultural development and political participation for national minorities. The constitution confirmed the right of all citizens to preserve and protect their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious affiliations (Article 11) and to equality before the law regardless of nationality, language, religion, or race (Article 24); it also specified a host of civil, political, economic, and cultural rights. It stressed the creation of a civil society based on equal rights, self-organization, and self-government, while avoiding any overt focus on ethnicity.³⁶ This shows that government policy since the mid 1990s emphasizes the civic direction of national and state development.

Despite severe foreign policy disagreements between Yushenko's administration and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine headed by Yanukovich, there have been no significant changes in governmental policies toward ethnic groups, but it is another thing to create a mature civil society. So far, the regional divide has barely narrowed.

³⁶ See the Ukrainian constitution.

E. PERSPECTIVES ON UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

Ukrainian nationalism is rooted in centuries-old events that divided Ukraine among the Hapsburg Empire, Poland and Russia.³⁷ To understand recent developments and the nationalist movements, Ukrainian nationalist agendas, both domestic and foreign, must be examined.

1. Major Aspects of Nationalist Discourse on Domestic and Foreign Issues

A key question for nationalists is whether Ukraine should be the state of the “Ukrainian people”—of ethnic Ukrainians alone—or of the “people of Ukraine”—of all Ukraine’s inhabitants whatever their ethnic origin. Ukraine is not the only Soviet successor state looking to balance the rights of the titular nationality and those of the rest of population, but in Ukraine the dilemma is particularly acute. Compared with other post-Soviet states, only Belarus suffered a greater degree of Russification. Nationalists argue that Russification should be reversed by positive discrimination in favor of the indigenous population.

It is noteworthy that the majority of Ukrainian nationalists stress adherence to the principles of a liberal and civic state. For example, in 1992 the major Ukrainian nationalist movement since the late 1980s, Rukh, admitted that for historical, ethnic, economic, political and socio-psychological reasons, Ukrainian society is not homogenous.³⁸ Therefore, they say, “Rukh views Ukraine as a multinational state [formed] from the multinational nature of Ukrainian society.”³⁹ Similarly, a Republican Party leader has argued that

³⁷ The complexities of Ukrainian history are beyond the scope of this thesis.

³⁸ Rukh (in English, “Movement”) is a popular civic movement founded in 1989 with the introduction of Gorbachev’s policy of Glasnost. The major goal of Rukh was to establish an independent democratic Ukrainian State. Soon afterwards Rukh was transformed into an influential political party with a considerable base of popular support. The party’s proclaimed goal was to act as an instrument of the people in the drive for national independence and the rebirth of a Ukrainian national identity. Rukh became instrumental in the building of an open society in Ukraine, while also calling for the immediate dismantling of all vestiges of the Soviet totalitarian system. Detailed information can be obtained on Rukh’s official website (<http://www.nru.org.ua>).

³⁹ *Konseptsii derzhavotvorennia v Ukraïni* (Kyiv: Rukh, 1992), 4-5.

the most integrating factor in building a new Ukrainian state will be 'territorial patriotism,' that is a sense of solidarity between all inhabitants of Ukrainian lands regardless of their social status, religious affiliation, ethnic origin or even national-cultural consciousness.⁴⁰

The national referendum on independence conducted on December 1, 1991, shows that the majority of voters in Ukraine supported independence because they believed that an existence separate from the Soviet Union might be the best guarantee of their economic well-being. Most Ukrainian political elites who campaigned in favor of independence "did not do so in the name of ethnic Ukrainian nationalism, but in the name of potential economic advancement."⁴¹ Because Ukrainian politicians, including outspoken nationalists like Rukh leader V'iacheslav Chornovil, did not embrace an ethnic exclusivist platform, it was much easier for 11 million ethnic Russians in Ukraine to support independence. Again, to a large degree, they did so expecting economic benefits. Actually, there was widespread agreement among the people in Ukraine and also in Russia that the independence path would relieve the economic burdens imposed by the USSR central authorities on the Union Republics.

One might argue that nationalist moderation on this important issue has been a key factor in helping independent Ukraine establish itself as a modern civic polity with liberal citizenship and language laws in marked contrast to the more restrictive approach of countries like Latvia or Estonia. Formal public policy on the nationality issue of all Ukrainian governments since 1991 is undoubtedly more liberal than in the above-mentioned Baltic States.

However, the true picture is rather more complex. On closer examination, the structure of the Ukrainian nationalist argument on nationhood, citizenship and ethnic rights is not much different from that of their Baltic counterparts. Some Ukrainian nationalists even deny that Ukraine is a multinational state.

⁴⁰ Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s, a Minority Faith* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 148.

⁴¹ Astrid S. Tuminez, "Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 5, Number 4 (Fall 2003), 114.

Wilson identifies three major concepts of contemporary Ukrainian nationalism, drawing a parallel with nationalism in the Baltic States and other forms of ethno-nationalism. These concepts are, first, “homeland” and the special rights of indigenous people, second, the right to cultural self-preservation, and third (to a much lesser extent) the notion of forced incorporation into the Soviet state and the illegitimacy of subsequent changes to national demographics and language use patterns.⁴²

The first, the claim to indigenesness, is a common feature of nationalist movements that emphasize an association with a specific homeland or historic territory. According to Ukrainian nationalists,

Only states on whose territory different peoples have lived since time immemorial can be considered multinational (such as India or the Russian Federation). On the bulk of its territory Ukraine is mononational, because only one people has lived here since time immemorial – the Ukrainian (in Crimea – Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar). Other peoples arrived later, at different times and for different reasons, having left their ethnic fatherland.⁴³

In addition, most nationalists agree that Ukraine, as the state of the indigenous Ukrainian nation, is at the same time the state of the Ukrainian political nation, that is, of all citizens regardless of their nationality.⁴⁴ It is clear that on this issue, the nationalist discourse cannot be considered very ambitious.

A second common theme in Ukrainian and Baltic nationalist discourses refers to the right to cultural self-preservation, mostly based on the fact that centuries of Russian and Soviet domination have nearly destroyed the distinctive Ukrainian ethnos, leaving its very existence in doubt.⁴⁵ Ukrainian nationalists also frequently claim that their own nation’s sufferings are historically unparalleled. Evidence of this discourse is available if one just recalls the millions of victims of the 1932-33 Great Famine, when Stalin forced collectivization in Ukraine. That tragedy was officially recognized recently as “genocide

⁴² Wilson, 150; see also Smith, 126.

⁴³ “Zaiava tsentral’nogo pravlinnia vseukrains’kogo tovarystva ‘Prosvita’ im. T.Shevchenka,” *Literaturna Ukraina*, (July 1999).

⁴⁴ Wilson, 151.

⁴⁵ Wilson, 151.

against the people of Ukraine” with legislation passed by the parliament.⁴⁶ Furthermore, it is hard to dispute the Ukrainian nationalist claim that three centuries of Russian rule have been a demographic catastrophe for Ukraine.

The third concept which Ukrainian nationalists share with many Baltic nationalists is the idea of forcible incorporation. Most nationalists believe that the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR), which emerged in 1917 and lasted only three years, was overthrown because “Russian chauvinist Bolshevism unleashed a war of conquest against the young Ukrainian state.” Blaming Bolshevism rather than internal weakness, they referred to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic before 1991 as an “occupying administration.”⁴⁷ In western Ukraine, the argument of forcible incorporation also applies to the period of 1939-45, although Ukrainian nationalists, unlike their Baltic counterparts, do not view the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact as illegal because it produced the desirable unification of most Ukrainian lands. However, unlike the arguments based on indigenous rights or the need for cultural renewal, the idea of delegitimizing the whole period of Soviet rule has little public support. This makes Ukraine unlike the Baltic states, where the refusal of Western powers to accept the legality of Soviet occupation was psychologically important for the general process of national consolidation.

Nevertheless, one can argue that Ukrainian nationalists, even the mainstream Ukrainian national-democrats, use many of the same core concepts as their Estonian and Latvian counterparts, including the rights of indigenes versus in-migrants, the privileged status of a single national homeland, and discrimination in favor of a near-extinct language and culture.⁴⁸ On the other hand, as noted above, most Ukrainian nationalists support the idea of a civic state. There is an obvious contradiction in the nationalist discourse when the emphasis on the formal civic framework of the state is laid alongside the idea of homeland and special rights for indigenous people. The latter undoubtedly

⁴⁶ Detailed information available from the European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity web site (<http://www.europeanforum.net/news/310>), accessed 20 January 2007.

⁴⁷ Wilson, 153.

⁴⁸ Wilson, 153.

estranges not only Ukraine's ethnic minorities, but also many Russophone Ukrainians, which explains why Ukrainization has remained a sensitive issue despite the careful approach of Ukrainian authorities.

The nationalist agenda on Ukraine's external affairs is quite straightforward. Their main idea is that Ukraine is an organic part of Europe and European civilization, unnaturally separated from it by centuries of Russian rule. Russia, on the other hand, has always been an Asiatic, despotically-expansionist and imperialist state which throughout the history has attempted to deny Ukraine's self-determination, and moreover, to destroy Ukraine's very existence.⁴⁹ Consequently, according to the nationalist view, Ukraine's primary foreign policy tasks should be to secure a "return to Europe" and build a strong independent state free from harmful Russian influence.

In contrast with Poland and the Baltic States, Ukraine cannot use these principles as the basis of a stable foreign policy. Unlike Latvia or Estonia, Ukraine's economic policy unfortunately has not provided favorable conditions for enfranchising its huge Russian community. The Russian community, along with a substantial number of ethnic Ukrainians, does not share the nationalist vision, and sees Ukraine and Russia linked by a history of mutual interchange as much as by colonial dependency.⁵⁰

For most Ukrainian nationalists, the CIS, created in December 1991 by the former regional communist party leaders, is a stumbling block in Ukraine's way back to Europe. Nationalists have pressed for Ukraine's rapid integration into Europe's overlapping political, economic and security architecture (OSCE, EU, NATO, Council of Europe, etc.). However, as more realistic nationalists acknowledge, admission into core European institutions is neither an easy task nor an immediate possibility. Ukrainian nationalists may see Ukraine as a indivisible part of civilized Europe, but its very long separation from European affairs means that Ukraine is not often perceived as a natural partner in European institutions, where *realpolitik* will probably dictate the preservation of the

⁴⁹ Wilson, 173.

⁵⁰ Dmitrii Kornilov, "Tak kto zhe bol'she lubit Ukrainu?" Donetskii kriazh, no. 3, 21-7 January 2006 (<http://www.donkr.ukr-info.net>) accessed 10 December 2006.

traditional special relationship with Moscow.⁵¹ Moreover, recent turns in Russian foreign policy under Putin's administration, characterized by increased emphasis on political use of oil and natural gas, solidifies the dependency of key European players like Germany and France on Russian energy resources.

Ukraine occupies an uneasy position at the crossroad of the East, the Russian Federation desperately trying to expand its influence, and the West, the European Union with its own spectrum of problems. Nationalist solutions to foreign policy dilemmas are to a large extent impractical and unrealistic. Ukraine has no easy escape routes from its external difficulties. As Russia is likely to remain a hegemonic regional power, its attitude toward near abroad will not change, and as a result, Ukrainian nationalists are likely to continue to push their agenda.

F. RELIGION AND SELF-IDENTIFICATION

Since Ukraine's independence in 1991, the new state authorities have never abandoned the idea of a united and truly national church. This is clearly illustrated by the most recent government decision regarding religious affairs, which in November 2006 established the State Committee on Matters of Nationalities and Religions.⁵²

The way relationships between the state and the church are supposed to be is stipulated by Article 35 of the Ukrainian constitution, which shows fairly clear secular principles and a lack of state interest in siding with any specific church or involvement with intra-Church disputes. According to the Constitution, "everyone has a right to freedom of personal philosophy or religion...the Church and religious organizations in Ukraine are separated from the state, and the school – from the Church. No religion shall be recognized by the state as mandatory."⁵³

⁵¹ Kornilov.

⁵² The authorization is Regulation 1575 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, referring to the reorganized State Committee on Matters of Nationalities. See the Religious Information Service of Ukraine at the official website (<http://www.risu.org.ua>) accessed 27 January 2007.

⁵³ Ukrainian Constitution.

However, state authorities and the most influential religious functionaries, including Filaret, Patriarch of Kyiv and of all Rus'-Ukraine, constantly emphasize the necessity of a united national church to advance the nation's spiritual consolidation. As Filaret said at a recent All-Ukrainian International Christian Assembly in Kyiv,

the process of state-building in Ukraine has lacked the necessary spiritual foundation, that is one United Ukrainian Orthodox Church...the development of Ukrainian society needs to have two mutually supportive elements: an independent state and independent Church...is it really necessary to separate the Church from the state and the school from the Church so unconditionally, or should the law give some kind of priority to the traditional Church?⁵⁴

One might argue that this is not a bad idea, as a single faith is naturally quite a strong unifying factor for believers. However, considering the obvious divisions between traditional faiths in different regions of Ukraine (discussed below), giving state support to a particular church would probably not help preserve Ukraine's fragile social peace.

To see how strong religious affiliation affects self-identification, the thesis now describes Ukraine's main religious jurisdictions.

According to the Religious Information Service of Ukraine, more than 97 percent of registered religious communities are Christian.⁵⁵ About half are in the Orthodox tradition. The other half is divided among Catholics and Protestants. There are three major Orthodox jurisdictions in Ukraine:

- Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP)
- Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyivan Patriarchate (UOC-KP)
- Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC)

⁵⁴ Vseukrains'ka Mizhnarodna Khrystyans'ka Asambleia (Zbirnyk materialiv) The quotation is from one of the assembly's official appeals. Available on-line (<http://cerkva.info/category/docs/>) accessed 16 January 2007.

⁵⁵ Data provided by Religious Information Service of Ukraine. Official website of RISU: (<http://www.risu.org.ua/>) accessed 17 January 2007.

There are also three Catholic churches represented in Ukraine:

- Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC)
- Roman Catholic Church (RCC)
- Armenian Catholic Church (ACC)

The two biggest jurisdictions are UOC-MP and UOC-KP (9049 communities and 2781 communities, respectively). There has been an ongoing dispute in Ukraine regarding religious legitimacy between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate, created in 1990 as a “self-governed” off-shoot of a Russian Orthodox Church which is still canonically subject to the Moscow Patriarchate, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyivan Patriarchate, created in 1992, which was encouraged by some civil authorities, members of parliament and nationalist political parties. Since October 1995, Filaret has been the head of this church, with the title Patriarch of Kyiv and all Rus-Ukraine. The UOC-KP does not presently have official recognition from Orthodox Churches in other countries and so is considered “not canonical.”⁵⁶

Ukrainian historian Viacheslav Lypynskyi in the early 1990’s wrote that “the fate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is not tied to directing all its energies to an outward, generally materialistic ‘Ukrainization,’ but rather it is tied to a great internal, spiritual religious revival.”⁵⁷ This still seems applicable. In the beginning of the 1990’s, most newly independent churches could not compete with the UOC-MP in the context of the old church model; this model had crystallized in Soviet times as a much worse copy of the Orthodox synod model. It is easy to track the actual dynamics by looking at some figures. A few years ago, the UOC-MP had 9047 communities, compared to the 3796 of the other two independent churches combined—that is 2.4 times as many communities. In 2000 the number of UOC-MP communities increased by 557, the UOC-KP by 290, and the UAOC by 26.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Religious Information Service of Ukraine.

⁵⁷ Volodymyr Lypynskyi, *Religion and Church in the History of Ukraine* (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 1993), 94.

⁵⁸ Religious Information Service of Ukraine.

Despite these figures, which show a seeming advantage to the UOC-MP, a paradoxical trend is obvious. Multiple opinion polls on church membership conducted by various think tanks and non-profit organizations in 2006 show that a greater number of those polled belong to the UOC-KP than to the UOC-MP. Various sociological services have carried out research on this topic. They find that between 25 and 32 percent of respondents belong to the UOC-KP; from 7 to 21 percent belong to the UOC-MP; from one-half to 2 percent belong to the UAOC. Most of those surveyed who claimed UPC-MP membership are ethnic Russians. Those who belong to UPC-KP, UAOC or UGCC are ethnic Ukrainians or Ukrainophones.

The survey results can be only interpreted in one way. By declaring membership in the Kyivan and not the Moscow Patriarchate, a person declares his or her identity, and that identity has a Ukrainian vector. In the vast majority of cases, therefore, these are obviously nominal Christians, “non-practicing,” and sometimes “non-believing Orthodox.”⁵⁹

Gretchen Knudson Gee provides interesting insights on religious issues in Ukraine. She personally conducted a survey of a great number of Ukrainian young people. Her data indicate that the regional location and a nationality of young people are very likely to affect their religiosity and their choice of religion.⁶⁰ Indeed, western Ukraine is much more religious, and loyalty to the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian ethnicity are both associated with religiosity there. Eastern Ukraine is much less religious, and those who are religious are strongly associated with the UOC-MP.

Therefore, for Ukrainian youth and for older generations as well, religious issues are linked to the political debates dividing Ukraine, and existing religious divisions may contribute to cleavages between supporters of a pro-western and nationalist agenda and those who advocate the Eurasian vector of national development.

⁵⁹ Data from various recent opinion polls provided by Religious Information Service of Ukraine.

⁶⁰ Gretchen Knudson Gee. “Geography, Nationality, and Religion in Ukraine: A Research Note.” *Journal for Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 34, no. 3 (September 1995), 383-390.

Ukraine today has among the most democratic laws on state-church relations; Ukrainian citizens are totally free in their choice of religious affiliations. On the other hand, the existing situation is very far from a religious consensus. The continuous efforts of Ukrainian political elites and some influential religious jurisdictions to create a national church have been unsuccessful and have deepened the social divide. Therefore, there is a little hope that religion, which has undoubtedly contributed to individual identity in Ukraine, will become a means of national consolidation any time soon.

G. PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL CULTURE IN UKRAINE

Political culture usually refers to national traditions of governance. In the case of Ukraine it is difficult to apply that definition since through most of its history the country was governed from outside. The question is what should be the basis for analysis: local self-administration, or the methods used by the indigenous elite when dealing with external powers?

Focusing only on the state or quasi-state existence of the nation, there are four major periods in the Ukrainian history: the Cossack Hetmanate from 1654 until 1775; the nationalist governments between 1917 and 1920; the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic within the Soviet Union and finally, the contemporary Ukrainian state. This focus allows consideration of the degree of “stateness” in analyzing the four periods. These state-formations have not included participation of all parts of the nation. For example, the nationally conscious Galicia, though now eager to appropriate the traditions of the Ukrainian Cossacks, actually never hosted a Cossack movement of its own. Likewise, the memories of Soviet Ukrainian quasi-statehood apparently meaningful for the eastern and southern Ukrainian regions such as Donbass and Crimea are less welcomed by western Ukrainians. Different parts of Ukraine experienced different and sometimes mutually exclusive political and cultural traditions through the centuries.⁶¹

Any new or re-emerged state has an obvious advantage if it can claim a domestic political tradition to build upon. In Ukraine there is a severe deficit of such traditions. More than one hundred years of Cossack Hetmanate were marked by the hetmans’

⁶¹ Mikhail A. Molchanov. *Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations*. (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 171.

unstable authority. Their power was increasingly supplanted by the Russian imperial government and constantly and sometimes successfully challenged by other external powers.

The more recent tradition of the nationalist governments in Ukraine, including the Central Rada, initially did not go beyond securing some autonomy within a larger Russian Federation. According to the Rada's Third Universal, autonomous-federalist arrangements were accepted as a model for national development, although this option was later rejected by nationalists led by the prominent Ukrainian historian and politician Mykhailo Hrushevskyi. Hrushevskyi aimed toward full independence after the Bolshevik government's unfortunate "experiments" in Petrograd, and played very important role in forming a distinctive and sovereign Ukrainian political tradition.⁶² As head of the short-lived Ukrainian People's Republic, he attempted to expand the Central Rada, which represented solely ethnic Ukrainians, to unite other ethnic and national groups under a common banner. The precedents in parliamentary democracy and the appreciation of national independence established under the UNR were never completely forgotten in the Soviet period, even though the independent UNR was quickly overrun by the more powerful Bolshevik Russia in 1918.

The Soviet regime which established a Ukrainian quasi-state within its totalitarian socialist empire obviously had nothing to do with democratic principles of self-government. The Ukrainian political elite throughout the whole Soviet period until the breakup of the Soviet Union was a puppet sub-regime built upon the political culture of accommodation and passivity. The grim experience of catastrophic events like massive Stalinist repressions in the 1930s, the Great Famine and World War II all left their sad footprints in developing a "survival" consciousness among the Ukrainian people and their political elite. Ukrainians often turned against one another, as some actively resisted the Soviet westward advance while others were part and parcel of that advance.⁶³ The seventy long years of Soviet rule, with the Kremlin policies of intense Russification and

⁶² Molchanov, 176.

⁶³ See John Alexander Armstrong. *Ukrainian Nationalism*. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1963), 134.

promotion of the socialist way of life, deepened the gap between eastern and southern Ukraine, dominated by Russian culture and language, and the ethno-nationalist western part of the region. The post-Soviet period can be simply characterized as a period of a long transformation without a consistent political course or clear strategy to develop the state and society.

A period of transition by definition leads to a crisis of identity in the society, which might be exacerbated if there is no common political culture. The depth and duration of the crisis largely depends on the ability of the political elite to accomplish two tasks. First, they must propose a course of development acceptable for the society and so set value-based coordinates for the formation of its new identity. Second, they must steadily keep up the chosen course, ensure stability and provide for social mobilization.

So far in Ukraine, there are no value-based coordinates. After 15 years of independence, the country waivers between Western and Eastern vectors of development in terms of geopolitical integration and prevailing civic values. There is still no developed national tradition of governance in Ukraine which can establish a more or less predictable future for the country acceptable to all social strata. This assessment is confirmed by the views of Ukraine's ordinary citizens. The most reliable general public opinion polls show that people tend to describe Ukraine as "an uninfluential European country looking for its place in the world." In December 2005, this description was chosen by a majority (65.5 percent) across the country, including 61.7 percent in the eastern Ukraine and 69.1 percent in its western part.⁶⁴ The polls also show significant alienation of Ukrainian citizens from the state which obviously damages the important link between ordinary citizens and the governing political elite. It is possible to conclude from the survey results that elected authorities in Ukraine tend to break from their electorate as soon as they obtain high government positions; once in power, the principle of democratic

⁶⁴ The cited figures are taken from the poll conducted by the non-profit NGO, the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies, in December 2005. The figures represent the aggregate of "agree" and "tend to agree" responses. By region, the results are: West, 69.1 percent; Center, 66.4 percent; South, 67.4 percent; East, 61.7 percent. Respondents were also given options to assess Ukraine as "an influential European state," "a 'buffer' state between Europe and Asia," "a state staying under Russian/Western influence," "an uninfluential country of the 'third world' with an indefinite foreign policy," "a 'bridge' state connecting Europe and Asia." However, none of those opinions was shared by at least half of those polled in any region. Data available on-line from (<http://www.uceps.org/>) accessed 12 January 2007.

representation simply loses force. According to a poll in July 2006, the overwhelming majority of citizens (75.9 percent) gave a negative response to the question: “Do you feel yourself to be a master of your state?” In contrast, 16.4 percent feel that they are, and 7.8 percent found it “difficult to say.”⁶⁵

An important element of political culture in any country is the institutional and legal relationship between central and regional authorities. According to some expert assessments, due to the ineffectiveness of the central authorities, an ultra-conservative model of local self-government was formed in Ukraine, rather than a conservative-liberal one as required by the European Charter of Local Self-Government ratified by Ukraine in 1997. One might argue that this demonstrates that a mix of political and legal cultures (radical populist, oligarchic and traditional bureaucratic) dominate in society and among the political elite.⁶⁶ As a result, heads of local authorities gradually transformed into true owners of municipal facilities. This led to the establishment and regional domination of financial-industrial groups (FIGs). These successfully lobby for their own interests and are represented in local and central state bodies through the “pocket” political parties in governmental offices. The FIGs described below are among the most economically powerful and politically influential.

Donetsk business group (DBG), has an annual turnover of several billion US dollars. It consists of several corporations and operates mostly in Donetsk Region in the southeastern Ukraine, where 10.4 percent of the nation's population produces about 20 percent of its industrial output. The main shareholders are the MP Rinat Akhmetov, who is a founder of the oligarchic “Party of Regions,” and Andriy Kluev, current Vice Premier Minister. Both backed the party financially and supported its official leaders, like Viktor Yanukovich during the 2004 and 2006 election campaigns.

⁶⁵ Data provided by the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies, July 2006.

⁶⁶ “Development of Local Self-Government in Ukraine: Legal Monitoring and Legal Policy.” 2002-2003 – Report by the Monitoring and Legal Commission of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Ukraine for the plenary meeting of the third session of this Congress held on 5 December 2003. Available online in Ukrainian: (<http://www.alau.org.ua/congress.php>), accessed 16 January 2007.

“Industrialnyi Souz Donbassa” (ISD), has an annual turnover of about 1.7 billion US dollars. The main shareholder of ISD is the company “Visavi,” owned by the President of ISD, Sergey Taruta, and Vitaliy Gayduk, current Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council.

Dnipropetrovs’k business groups “Interpipe” and the “Privat” Group are monopolists in their respective fields. The former has a monopoly on production of large-diameter pipes used by the Russian oil and gas industry; it is headed by MP Viktor Pinchuk, who owns 65 percent of the company. The latter produces 45 percent of ferroalloy in Ukraine and owns 100 percent of Ukraine’s manganese resources.⁶⁷

As this demonstrates, the eastern and central regions of Ukraine are more developed economically than the western regions. Also, they are more autonomous economically, since their economy is based on export-oriented enterprises with more involvement in world trade and more developed ties to foreign partners. The data demonstrates the unequal economic development of different regions. In 2005, the per capita export potential of the country’s West equaled \$281. In the East, the same figure is 4.6 times higher (\$1,295). Real incomes of the population in the central and eastern regions exceed the corresponding indices in the Western and Southern regions of Ukraine by 1.2 to 1.3 times.⁶⁸

This situation also obtains in regard to regional economic specialization (industrial East and South, mainly agro-industrial Center and West) and there are weak cooperative ties between the regions.

In Ukraine, the domestic factors discussed above promote geographic localization of regional differences, and therefore different perceptions of political culture in the eastern and western regions. To reiterate, the specific domestic factors influencing

⁶⁷ Sergiy Maslichenko, *Privatization and Financial-Industrial Groups in Ukraine* (Oxford University, April, 2003). See also Alexander N. Kostyuk and Konstantin Tchernyshov, “Financial-industrial Groups at the Markets for Corporate Control and Investments: The Case of Ukraine” (Corporate Ownership and Control Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2004), 77-90 (<http://www.virtusinterpress.org/journals-coc-index.html>) accessed 16 January 2007.

⁶⁸ Socio-Economic Development of Ukraine (regional section). (<http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/>) accessed 10 January 2007.

geographic localization and, indirectly, perception of political culture include the following: mutual incorporation of large businesses with regional and central bodies of power, disproportionate regional economic development, underdeveloped economic ties between the regions, and lack of effective state policy of to provide equitable regional development. All this makes national consolidation extremely complicated.

D'Anieri points out that for Ukraine today, the process of nation building is tightly bound up with state building. Many argue that a strong democratic state cannot be built without a strong political community, which requires a nascent political culture, and that a strong civil society cannot be built without the notion of commonality that national identity builds. Others say that a strong nation can emerge in the near term only through the nation building that results from a strong and effective state government.⁶⁹ Although opinion varies on just how serious these problems are and how they might be overcome, there is no doubt that creating a common national identity has been a profound problem in Ukrainian politics since 1991. The problem shows up in the fragmentation of political parties, in the regional basis of the party structure and of public support, and in questions concerning the relationship between central and local authorities.

To comprehend the whole spectrum of existing factors which contribute to or retard national consolidation and the formation of a common identity, it is important to investigate major external influences, the subject of Chapter III.

⁶⁹ Paul D'Anieri, Robert Kravchuk and Taras Kuzio, eds., *Politics and Society in Ukraine*. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), 91.

III. BALANCING BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

A. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS

The geographic location of Ukraine is unique in that it both literally and figuratively lies at the crossroads between former Soviet bloc countries and Russia. The former are now democratic, and more or less economically developed members of the European Union; the latter insistently attempts to extend and solidify geopolitical influence beyond its western borders and regain its superpower status.

With independence, Ukraine inherited a complex set of issues. First it had to define a path to development while legitimizing itself as an independent state on the domestic level among own, extremely diverse population and within the world community. Second, it had to establish a model of governance to satisfy already existing nationalistic political forces as well as the old Communist Party political nomenklatura supported by a large Soviet-minded layer of Ukrainian society. The Communist Party leadership remained virtually in power by default, representing remnants of a quasi-state left behind by the Soviet Union. Then they suddenly changed their colors to become democrats; they started establishing democratic government institutions to provide a gradual transition from an authoritarian regime dependent on Moscow with a completely ineffective centrally planned economy, to the effective democratic state model with a market-oriented economy.

The next step, which overlaps with the state building stage, is the recreation of Ukraine as a modern European nation. This turned out to be a difficult task for the first generation of political leaders led by then-former Communist ideology boss (and future president) Leonid Kravchuk. The task has not become easier for their successors. Ukraine has experienced 15 years of desperate attempts to develop efficient state domestic and foreign policies which would win support from the political elite and the general population while advancing key national interests in the international arena. A further challenge is to define those key interests in a constantly changing and complex international political and security environment.

The situation Ukraine inherited from the Soviet Union was clearly more complex and less amenable to rapid reform than its western neighbors' circumstances. Whereas some states in Eastern Europe, like Poland and Hungary, needed both democratic and economic transitions, Ukraine had to undergo a "quadruple" transition that required state building and nation building in addition to democratization and the creation of a market economy.⁷⁰

B. UKRAINE'S RUSSIAN DILEMMA AND THE SOVIET LEGACY

1. A Difficult Divorce?

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the relationship between Ukraine and the Russian Federation has been determined by several factors. The significance of these factors, particularly for the Ukrainian people's self-concept, extends beyond the initial uneasy adjustment to the realities of a separate post-Soviet existence. One might argue that so far, neither Ukraine nor Russia has become fully independent during the democratic transition.⁷¹ Despite all Ukraine's diligent distancing from the former Soviet state, Russia's presence is still very much felt throughout the country, causing huge uncertainty about Ukraine's national development.

Since independence the problem of Ukrainian-Russian relations has been among the main preoccupations of the Ukrainian political establishment. On one hand, both Ukraine and Russia face uncertain prospects for their integrated economies. On the other hand, 11.35 million ethnic Russians who found themselves in independent Ukraine and 4.36 million Ukrainians left in Russia had been accustomed to what they believed was their larger common home, the USSR. Many of these people harbor reintegrationist sentiments that can be used to justify Russia's intrusion in Ukrainian domestic affairs. Most importantly, Russian state officials, supported by state ideological activists, have equivocated on the issue of Ukrainian independence, giving the rise to the fear that Russia might even attempt to literally bring Ukraine back under its control.⁷²

⁷⁰ D'Anieri, Kravchuk, and Kuzio, 3.

⁷¹ Molchanov, 245.

⁷² Molchanov, 207.

The goal of empire restoration was a pertinent feature of the course pursued by Russian political and military elites in the 1990s. That course was camouflaged by politicians and journalists who invoked the rights of “Russian speakers” in the area known as the near abroad as a justification for Moscow’s pressure or direct intervention. More candid commentators admitted that some people believe the only way to properly secure the rights of ethnic Russians outside the Russian Federation is to bring those newly independent republics back into empire.⁷³ What seems paradoxical is that Russia’s attitude toward Ukraine should have triggered a natural resistance among the Ukrainian population, including the most easily influenced Eastern area. This logically should have galvanized social consolidation if only because of the widespread appreciation of independence (demonstrated by the 92.7 percent vote for independence in 1991). Surprisingly, Russia’s continuing imperial ambitions in regard to Ukraine, especially during Boris Yeltsin’s presidency (1991-2000), have done little to create a sense of belonging, loyalty and distinctiveness from Russia. This can be explained by two factors: an extremely low level of attachment to any ethnic group at all, and the underdeveloped civic identity in the East.

2. Recent Russian Policy toward Ukraine

Since 2000, under President Putin, Russian anti-Ukrainian sentiments have not been reduced, but their nature has changed. In hands of the current administration they became part of a more sophisticated strategy. Russia reassessed its approach to the issues of the Russian Diaspora to reassert Russia’s influence and ability to exert control within neighboring countries. In addition, a new hard-line policy emphasizing Ukraine’s dependency on Russian energy supplies, and widespread use of political technologies to spread secessionist and anti-Western sentiment in Eastern and South-Eastern Ukraine both have a negative effect on Ukraine’s national consolidation. Specifically in these

⁷³ Roman Szporluk, *Russia, Ukraine and the Breakdown of the Soviet Union*. (Stanford, California: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, 2000), 322.

regions, there is a uniquely underdeveloped sense of both ethnic and political belonging, whether to the Russian or Ukrainian nationality.⁷⁴ This served as fertile ground for political speculations from outside.⁷⁵

3. Political Technologists in Service to the Putin Administration

The new generation of political thinkers has become involved in foreign policy making in Moscow. In the Kremlin, an environment dominated by ordinary apparatchiks, KGB-minded civilians, KGB-at-heart officers and ruthless business politicians with murky pasts, political technologists represent a new wave.⁷⁶ Why should we take them seriously in the context of Ukraine's identity issues? The use of political technologies is not new in the world of politics, but their potential for harm is worth discussing. Therefore, the answer to this question is simple: political technologies are a main source of new ideas about exerting Russian influence in the wake of its losses after the "color revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine.

Political technologists like Gleb Pavlovsky, Sergei Markov and Modest Kolerov were appointed to the highest positions in a special department created by Putin to promote Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space. Their influence today is comparable only to that of the neo-conservatives on American policy after the 9/11 attacks.⁷⁷

Political technologists, with flourishing NGOs, think tanks, information agencies and media outlets, have inspired new policies aimed at mobilizing ethnic Russians and emphasizing Russia's economic presence and potential as a labor market of last resort for the Eurasian societies. Stability and preservation of the territorial integrity of the post-Soviet states are no longer the primary objectives of Moscow's policies. On the contrary, the Russians are now exporting their own version of democracy and building pro-Russian constituencies in nearby areas, with particular emphasis on Ukraine. This process reveals

⁷⁴ According to research conducted by Ukrainian social scientist A.P. Ponomar'ov, in 1970, 55 percent of the registered marriages in Donbass region (Eastern Ukraine) were multiethnic, which facilitated a blurred and unclear ethnic self-identification in those families. A.P. Ponomar'ov, *Suchasna sim'ia I simeinyi pobut Donbasu*. Kyiv, 1978, 38.

⁷⁵ Ivan Krastev, "Russia's Post-Orange Empire," Open Democracy website (<http://www.opendemocracy.net/>) accessed 1 December 2006.

⁷⁶ See Krastev.

⁷⁷ See Krastev.

Russia's attempt to counterbalance the sweeping force of globalization coming from the West. The Russian attempt is characterized by a significant role assigned to the Russia-dominated NGO network which is supplied with ideologies and money from the state and "near-state" business circles. Their participation in the Russian policy-making process is heating up anti-Ukrainian sentiments in the border regions. However, there are some positive achievements of democratic consolidation in Ukraine, including the increased dependence of democratically elected state officials on their constituents. In response, the Russian ideological machine attempts to promote pro-Russian attitudes among ordinary Ukrainians at the expense of national consolidation, which obviously hampers the formation of a politically mature civil society.

Today, the popularly elected Parliament represents a significant political force. Verkhovna Rada is controlled by the Party of Regions whose electoral platform was based mostly on a pro-Russian vector of national development. The radical left deputies even propound eventual re-union with Russia. It is crucial to understand how such attitudes can exist in Ukraine after 15 years of independent statehood. One answer lies in the ambivalence toward national consciousness of people in Eastern and Southern Ukraine and the state's inability to achieve political consensus among ordinary citizens, political and business elites. This situation has been used by Russia's political technologists to promote Russian-style pseudo-democratic values in Ukraine. They spread various myths of "eternal Slavic fraternity" and the impossibility of Ukraine existing without Russia and so on. Significant financial resources have been spent by Russia's government to spread Russian-style democracy in the CIS through a network of NGOs. This "soft-line" campaign is supported by Putin's hard-line energy policy, an economic weapon of last resort.

Other influences from Ukraine's long membership in the Soviet Union are also relevant, and will be examined further below. The question is this: why is it so difficult to eradicate the Soviet way of thinking and the mythical sense of belonging to something "big and powerful"? To illustrate one side of this phenomenon, the thesis now investigates some problems encountered by Ukrainian authorities while nationalizing part of the former Soviet military.

4. Aspects of Ukrainian Defense Reform in Relation to National Identity

The armed forces of any country that has embarked on the path of democratic transition represent the whole society. They are its mirror, but with one distinctive characteristic: a military organization cannot exist and function properly if its personnel (from the commander-in-chief to the lowest private) cultivate any allegiance other than to the nation. If the military serves not the whole nation, but only some fraction of it, and if ethnic or cultural divisions are encouraged or admitted in the military environment, the outcome can be frustrating and unpredictable. Recent troubles in Thailand and Fiji provide examples. The political elites of those countries obviously failed to reach a consensus in their populations on the necessity of serious defense sector reforms with functioning civilian control over the military organizations, instead giving priority to the development of the armed forces capabilities.

Ukraine's armed forces depend on their members' political neutrality and undisputable loyalty to the entire nation or people, and not to the state alone.⁷⁸ This is one reason why this ethnically and regionally diverse country has seen no escalating internal conflict. It is hard to even imagine what could have happened had the military machine that independent Ukraine found itself with in 1991 (780,000 personnel, 6,500 battle tanks, 1,494 combat aircrafts and the world's third largest nuclear arsenal) suddenly became a tool in ethnic or territorial conflict.⁷⁹

Military allegiance to "the people of Ukraine" instead of "the Ukrainian people" resulted from a long uneven process pursued by civilian and military authorities.⁸⁰ Today the Ukrainian military still mirrors Ukrainian society in terms of self-perceptions and perceptions of the "other." Compared to the rest of society, however, the military is much less divided. For this reason, it is relevant to consider policies aimed at strengthening the military's sense of patriotism.

⁷⁸ See the Law of Ukraine of 12/06/1991 № 1934-XII "On the Armed Forces of Ukraine" with amendments Available online: (<http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?user=annot>) accessed 5 February 2007.

⁷⁹ For details see Ukraine's Ministry of Defense official website (<http://www.mil.gov.ua/>) accessed 5 February 2007.

⁸⁰ 'The people of Ukraine' is inclusive notion which refers to all citizens of Ukraine regardless of their ethnic belonging. 'The Ukrainian people' sounds more nationalistic and underlines ethnic belonging.

5. The Ukrainization of the Former Soviet Military

Since the large military inherited by Ukraine was part and parcel of the former Soviet armed forces, it was considered a primary task for the state authorities in 1991 to transform this former Soviet military into a Ukrainian military whose servicemen would patriotically defend Ukraine. Consequently, a “Ukrainization” campaign was immediately launched. The effort to quickly instill Ukrainian patriotism in the armed forces was an important test of state-led nation-building efforts in general. The program envisaged several changes, including a switch from Russian (the only language of communication and instruction in the Soviet military environment) to Ukrainian. The most important aspect of the program was patriotic indoctrination of the troops using historical examples of Ukraine’s military traditions and heroes. The task of creating an all-encompassing patriotism based on historical examples seemed impossible. With the divisions in the Ukrainian population, the fact is that the more nationalistic Western Ukraine and more “slavocentric” Central, Eastern and Southern Ukraine took totally different people as heroes.

The military’s Ukrainization program shows that the consequences of the nation’s ethnic, regional and linguistic divisions are difficult to overcome even with a forceful ideological campaign. Ukrainization initially alienated many non-Western Ukrainians, due to its glorification of anti-Soviet and anti-Russian military units like the SS Galician Division and Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists – Ukrainian Insurgent Army (OUN-UPA), which fought against both German and Red Army troops in World War II. Western Ukrainians, for their part, were alienated by the continuous celebration and glorification of Soviet historical events and heroes, if only because the core of the armed forces was active duty officers who for many years were taught little but the glories of the Russian and Soviet Army traditions.

One of the most active advocates of patriotism among soldiers was Major General Volodymyr Muliava, then head of the Social Psychological Service (SPS) in the Ministry of Defense.⁸¹ In practice, the SPS succeeded its Soviet predecessor, the Main

⁸¹ Volodymyr Muliava, before his assignment to head the SPS, was a member of Rukh, the ultra right movement and later political party; he has a Ph.D. in Philosophy. For details see D’Anieri and Kuzio, 148.

Political Administration (MPA), which had officers in all military units down to the company size as assistants in “political affairs.” The SPS and the MPA had basically the same task: to provide ideological support for unit commanders in their work with subordinates. The only distinction was that the MPA was a Communist Party propaganda machine and the SPS was called to instill nationalistic myths and “rally the servicemen around the ideal of an independent Ukrainian state, inculcating in them a consciousness of the historical development of Ukrainian independence ... and a deep sense of respect and love for Ukraine, its people, culture, traditions and churches.”⁸² Under Muliava, the SPS espoused the Ukrainian “national idea.” In practice, the teaching of the “national-liberation struggle” meant that SPS was to teach a purely nationalist version of Ukrainian history and glorify all prior anti-Soviet and anti-Russian military units. They created a legal basis for the program. Another influential public organization, the Union of Ukrainian Officers (UUO), even offered its own interpretation of section 11 of the Law on the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which states that “the military-patriotic education of military servicemen is to be realized using the national-historical traditions of the people of Ukraine.” The interpretation included the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and the SS Galician Division.

Naturally, attempts to glorify military units like SS Galician Division were met with hostility from large segments who grew up with Soviet characterization of that division as Nazi collaborators. By glorifying the Ukrainian “national liberation struggle” the SPS, with total support from Defense Minister General-Colonel Kostiantyn Morozov, accused Russians of having been the enemy and a negative “other.” However, in reality, Russians were never considered the enemy by most Ukrainians, and efforts to instill a particular notion of patriotism caused great dissension in Ukrainian military and political circles. The SPS’s Ukrainization program failed. Later, although the general idea of an ideological apparatus within the armed forces was not abandoned, the approach to patriotic education changed and became more moderate in order to release tensions provoked by its previously ultra-nationalistic character.

⁸² Central military media outlet Narodna Armia, 22 January 1993 (<http://uamedia.visti.net/army/>) accessed 5 February 2007.

One reason for that transformation was the fact that until now there has been no common interpretation of particular events in Ukrainian history. Therefore, it would be better for the Ukrainian military, in terms of developing patriotism among the troops, to focus less on the apparently divisive eras in Ukraine's history and more on individuals and periods that found general positive reception, like prominent leaders and military chieftains Boghdan Khmel'nits'kyi, Mikhail Kutuzov, Oleksandr Suvorov, and the warriors of the Kyivan Rus' and Cossack periods. The history taught as part of the Ukrainization program must be objective and truthful and based only on generally recognized facts.

6. The Soviet Past as an Obstacle to the Creation of a Common Identity

The strength of the seventy-plus year heritage of Soviet rule on Ukraine's national consciousness is revealed by some historical predicaments. The Soviet legacy touched every aspect of politics and society, and only a brief overview is possible here.

The record of the Soviet government attitudes toward a distinctive Ukrainian national identity is mixed. The Soviet regime initially promoted Ukrainian identity and language in the 1920s and then ruthlessly suppressed both, but at the same time also established the territorial basis for the current Ukrainian state. Politically, the Soviet central authorities unconditionally forbade ethno-national sentiments, extinguished citizen-based initiatives that might have provided the beginnings of a civil society, and created a set of institutions, largely corrupted by the time the Soviet regime collapsed, that drove Ukrainian politics after independence and are still used by Ukrainian political elite.

Any brief examination of Soviet nationality policies, especially if one focuses on some of the most brutal and repressive aspects, reveals that Soviet attitudes toward the republics had a clear nation-destroying effect. In fact, the Soviet legacy is somewhat more complicated and confused. Policies calculated to destroy nations in a direct, physical sense persisted throughout the Stalin era, and were succeeded by policies of enforced linguistic and cultural de-nationalization when Khrushchev and Brezhnev held

power.⁸³ However, as D'Anieri notes, "Soviet nationality policy, despite its professed goal of subverting ethnic loyalties and destroying ethnic difficulties, promoted and accelerated the process of nation-building."⁸⁴ The Soviet Union disintegrated largely because Soviet nation-building failed. Ukrainians now have to deal with the residual loyalty to the Soviet empire deeply rooted in the consciousness of the older generation of Ukrainians, insufficient to sustain the Soviet state in the end, but nevertheless an obstacle to its replacement. Their pro-Soviet sentiments are supported by Ukrainian left radicals like the Progressive Socialist Party headed by Natalia Vitrenko. They relentlessly promote the idea of economic and political reintegration into something like a new Union State of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.⁸⁵ It is hard to overestimate the harmful influence of such political forces on national consolidation in Ukraine. Psychological dependence on Russia is apparent among those who reject Ukraine's integration into the Euro-Atlantic security system, and who resist by all means even the hypothetical possibility of integration into the European Union. There is no doubt that such openly anti-Western attitudes could not be sustained without Russian support, which insistently imposes its own style of democracy and human values in lieu of those accepted by the Ukrainian political elite and genuinely appreciated by the Ukrainian public.

It would be unfair to claim that the Soviets left only destructive tendencies for nation building. The Soviet heritage had some positive features. For example, Ukraine's secession from the USSR was peaceful largely because there were defined boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR that became international borders. Soviet internal administrative borders therefore played a role in shaping the identities of the peoples within their respective republics, including Ukraine. This factor reduced the chances that Ukraine would start its independent existence with bloody interstate conflicts.

⁸³ The proportion of Ukrainians listing Ukrainian as their native language in Soviet censuses declined from 93.5 percent in 1959 to 91.4 and 60 percent in 1970 and 1989, respectively. This was part of greater bilingualism, on the one hand, and greater Russian-language proficiency, on the other. See D'Anieri, Kravchuk and Kuzio.

⁸⁴ D'Anieri, Kravchuk and Kuzio.

⁸⁵ For details regarding their political platform, see official web site of the Progressive Socialist Party. (http://www.vitrenko.org/start.php?lang=1&part_id=3) accessed 2 February 2007.

C. UKRAINE AND THE WEST

1. The Influence of Western Values on Ukraine's National Development

Foreign policy pursued by Kyiv in the early 1990s sought to bolster development of a Central European identity for Ukraine as a condition for its integration into European institutions. This policy stemmed from the image of Ukraine held mostly in the western part of the country, where national identity is at least as strong as it is in Poland, the Czech Republic or Hungary.⁸⁶ Therefore, strong national consciousness in western Ukraine is linked to the positive influence of its geographical neighbors with their own distinctive national identities and their experience of the nation-state.

The period from 1994 to 2004 in Ukraine saw a gradual decline of the taken-for-granted pro-western vector of national development. Moreover, despite numerous rhetorical exercises to convey a positive image of the West and the institutionalization of various practical multileveled relationships with it, partial rapprochement with Russia became a reality. It is argued here that in contrast to authoritarian regimes, in democracies the main political course is tightly linked to, and should be based on, existing attitudes and preferences of the general public. Political elites cannot emerge from nowhere and impose their vision without support from the larger society. Therefore, this thesis considers that any government which represents all democratically designed branches of power is a product and direct reflection of the state of affairs in society itself. When a government obviously lacks a clear position on its course of national development and geopolitical orientation, it means that society as a whole lacks consensus. This explains the years of hesitation and lack of political clarity in Ukrainian politics. Of course, external foreign interests are relevant as well. As noted above, the Ukrainian government and the orientation of state policies focused mostly on the “back to Europe” thesis, which found significant support among the population.

The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 increased openness and broadened appreciation for basic western values such as democratic governance, rule of law, liberal market economy and civil and political liberties. Because the former Soviet Union had no

⁸⁶ Stephen Burant. Foreign Policy and National Identity. *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 47, No. 7, November 1995, 1126.

competitive alternatives to the Western principles of political, economic and cultural development, it was relatively easy for political leaders in the early 1990s to gain majority support and win temporary allegiance on the wave of euphoria that accompanied independence.

Some changes in mass consciousness occurred when four years (1991-1994) of desperate attempts by official Kyiv to gain recognition and support from the Western world for nation-building in Ukraine did not bring the desired results. The subsequent problems centered around the inability of the governing establishment to carry out radical economic reforms to improve living standards. Here the word “radical” should be underlined, because the bright example of such “shock therapy” in neighboring Poland proved the only means to economic development in the long term.

It is hard to name any democracy where the political leaders’ rhetoric always matches their practices, and it is very difficult to make the only right decisions or to find solutions which satisfy all strata of society. Sometimes, in order to achieve more it is necessary to undertake unpopular and painful reforms. The crucial thing is to be able to explain and convince society that they should sacrifice something now in order to get more in the future. Politicians naturally seem to feel that they know what is best for their country, but do not think that people would vote for the undistorted truth. Perhaps, especially in new Europe, successful democratic and national reform requires not only honest politicians but also an honest electorate, willing to admit that sometimes the only choice is between unpalatable options.

Unfortunately, except during the short peaceful uprising of the Orange Revolution in 2004, the years since 1994 have been marked by unclear and inconsistent efforts by political elites to determine Ukraine’s future. Pro-Western President Yushenko has taken steps toward democratic consolidation and progressive political change, advancing the idea that Ukraine should become a prosperous European country instead of remaining vulnerable to the depressing Eurasian influence with its murky prospects.

How much Ukraine might draw to the European community depends on Yushenko’s ability to implement a new stage in Ukraine’s relationship with the

European Union and to step closer to membership. This seems a difficult task which will take longer than expected.⁸⁷ Moreover, the administration's effort to promote pluralism and the rule of law, necessary for a truly democratic state, at the same time fosters new elites whose views on political and economic transformation differ.

The imperfect political reforms in 2006 exacerbated the current unclear distribution of powers between the president, the prime minister and the legislature.⁸⁸ Ukraine has become a parliamentary-presidential republic, and considering that the right to determine state foreign and domestic policies is now no longer solely the presidents' prerogative, the policy-making process has become extremely complicated. Additionally, the EU continues to question whether Ukrainian domestic developments are moving in the "right" direction. As long as the EU refuses to consider even a hypothetical possibility of Ukrainian membership, as Arkady Moshes notes, it "will be less interested in promoting Ukraine's transformation, since successful reform would make the EU's current wariness of Ukrainian membership less sustainable."⁸⁹

During Kuchma's presidency, despite his obviously pro-Russian orientation, a certain appreciation of the western model of development in political, economic and social spheres took root in Ukraine, as demonstrated by the numerous political and economic agreements he signed with the western powers. Especially noteworthy is that significant steps were made in building the national security system. Ukraine's armed forces have established unusually tight ties with western security institutions within the Partnership for Peace Program, Intensified Dialogue, NATO-Ukraine Action and Targets Plans and various bilateral ties as well. However, Ukraine's chances of full integration into Euro-Atlantic structures are questionable, given recent changes in the internal and

⁸⁷ Volodymyr Dubovyk, "The Foreign Policy of Ukraine: One Year After the Orange Revolution," Center for Strategic International Studies. PONARS Policy Memo No. 372, 2005), 30. (<http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/pm/>) accessed 5 February 2007.

⁸⁸ For detailed information on political reform in Ukraine see official website of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (<http://www.kmu.gov.ua/>) accessed 7 February 2007.

⁸⁹ See Arkady Moshes, "Ukraine Between a Multivector Foreign Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration," Center for Strategic International Studies. PONARS Policy Memo No. 426, 2006), 2 (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pm_0426.pdf) accessed 5 February 2007.

external political climates. How reforms in the security sector relate to the general process of nation-building and creation of a national identity, along with the evolving perceptions of NATO, are considered next.

2. The Evolving Image of NATO

The gradual adoption of a western model in national defense can be traced to Ukraine's strengthening relationship with NATO. There is already an organically developed understanding among the officer corps that Ukraine's success requires, along with democratic civilian control, a professionalized military to upgrade defense efficiency and effectiveness.⁹⁰ Of course, the achievements in the defense sphere in the West serve as an impetus to this approach, especially since the Cold War ended and new requirements for organization have appeared in the tremendously changed security environment. The way leading western powers quickly reassessed the roles and missions of their armed forces and built a new transatlantic security architecture while continuing to rely on NATO made a tremendous impression in Ukraine. An obstacle to increased Ukrainian integration with Europe, Russian proximity, should be emphasized here, as Russia's leaders have used this factor to exert influence on Ukraine. Among their most effective tactics is to spread anti-western images and speculation among those with weak national consciousness in the less politically mobilized Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine. Obvious harm has been done to Ukraine by this influence. A strategy of ideological and economic blackmailing has slowed the process of national consolidation in Ukraine. This confirms that the way a significant part of society collectively identifies itself in opposition to others is crucial in shaping the future of a democratic country. For sure, in countries with authoritarian regimes based on coercion, where public attitudes are seen as irrelevant by authorities, the situation is different.

Returning to the question of military reform in Ukraine, considering the clearly insufficient financial and material resources for military needs, notions like "defense efficiency" and "military effectiveness" are of great importance. They have been

⁹⁰ These terms originally introduced in the context of CMR by Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas in "Democratization as a Global Phenomenon and its Impact on Civil-Military Relations," Naval Postgraduate School, National Security Affairs Department (http://www.ccmr.org/public/library_file_proxy.cfm/lid/5554) accessed 5 February 2007.

underlined in the major legislative acts and Ministry of Defense guideline documents. Only careful and efficient distribution of available resources will allow ongoing military reform.

As to the general motivation for defense reform, Ukraine has a history of participation in many activities within the framework of the Partnership for Peace Program and various peacekeeping missions, and this is related to Ukraine's understandable desire to join NATO. NATO membership requires that Ukraine meet certain standards in terms of defense efficiency and military effectiveness. However, there is a common appreciation among the military that with or without NATO, the Ukrainian armed forces must be modernized and used appropriately. Given the complex international security environment with dramatically changed threat perceptions, including growing danger from global terrorism, only well-orchestrated international efforts and wise use of military forces can withstand danger. To a great degree this contributes to global trends in the military sphere, where common standards and perceptions are developing of what a modern military should be like if it is to effectively face emerging challenges. This underlines the necessity that Ukraine's armed forces develop high interoperability on all levels with NATO forces and staff elements in order to act jointly if needed. Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas note that "counter-terrorism operations may also provide an impetus for better military effectiveness, particularly in those countries that have been the targets of terrorist attacks."⁹¹ Even though Ukraine has not experienced direct terrorist attacks, just the understanding that there can be no guarantee against them drives Ukrainian political and military officials to take the problem seriously and revise the general plans for strategic use of military force to recognize new challenges.

Paradoxically, today's military, unlike the general public, clearly understands which course of national development is most suitable for Ukraine.⁹² The military people

⁹¹ Bruneau and Trinkunas, 22.

⁹² Data based on recently conducted polls by the most trusted Ukrainian think tank in all regions of the country shows that NATO is seen as an aggressive block by 70.7 percent of those in the East and 57.3 percent in the South. However, polls conducted by other Ukrainian institutes show no significant difference.

mostly recognize the advantages of integration into the Alliance as a first step to eventual integration in the EU, and believe that the whole society will benefit. They think so because integration requires progressive domestic changes which are important for Ukraine with or without final membership in NATO or the EU. The required changes include:

- The necessity of effective liberal economic reforms
- Increased transparency of the authorities on all levels of the executive, legislative and judicial powers
- Effective anti-corruption measures
- A general political consensus in civil society
- Further maturing of democratic changes and guaranties that civic liberties and human rights will not be violated⁹³

But why do those seemingly acceptable and desirable social changes meet resistance in particular regions of Ukraine? There is a strong “fifth column” (discussed in earlier sections) eager to sow seeds of animosity between Russophones and Ukrainophones in order to deepen existing divergence in people’s self-identifications and prevent national consolidation in Ukraine.

Through the lens of the relationship between Ukraine and NATO, continuity and a fairly deep level of institutionalization is evident. Some relevant milestones include:

- Immediately upon gaining independence Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later replaced by EAPC)
- In 1994 Ukraine became the first member state of the Commonwealth of Independent States to join the Partnership for Peace
- Ukraine is active in NATO-led operations in the Balkans
- In 1997 Ukraine’s President and NATO heads signed a Charter for Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine; a NATO- Ukraine Commission (NUC) was also created
- In 2002 the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan was adopted which is the foundation of NATO-Ukraine relations

⁹³ For details see the NATO official website (<http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-ukraine/index.html>) accessed 7 January 2007. For details on development of the EU-Ukraine relationships, see the EU official website of (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ukraine/intro/index.htm) accessed 7 January 2007.

- In 2005 an Intensified Dialog on Ukraine's aspirations to NATO membership was launched at the NUC meeting of foreign ministers in Vilnius

These facts naturally suggest that civilian and military personnel work continuously with the Alliance's structures and can see the advantages of being associated with this powerful and highly developed security and defense organization. Their view of what the Ukrainian armed forces need in order to become more effective and efficient, along with their sense of the necessary changes at the national level, are formed mostly through interactions with various NATO subjects. Despite the remarkable improvements between official Kyiv and NATO member states, the next logical step, full membership in the Alliance, seems unrealistic, at least in the short term.

Strong awareness of NATO—its roles, missions and activities—among the military suggests a corresponding acceptance of basic democratic values promoted by the West, one of whose embodiments in the eyes of Ukrainian people is the Alliance itself. Unfortunately, the lack of well-organized educational programs to objectively deliver to the bulk of Ukrainian society the truth about NATO is “generously” compensated for by well-organized ideological programs spreading anti-NATO ideas. An example is the campaign organized by Russian political and ideological functionaries and Ukrainian pro-Russian politicians in Crimea in advance of NATO-Ukraine military exercises in 2006. The exercises were protested, attempts to declare the Crimea Peninsula as “a territory without NATO” were undertaken, and some separatist accords took place there. The situation finally calmed down, and in a fair decision by Ukrainian authorities, some Russian radical politicians who had implicitly roused the local Crimean population against legitimate authorities were deemed dangerous to national security and forbidden to enter Ukraine.⁹⁴

Leading powers of the European Union (NATO members) are reluctant to enlarge NATO eastward to include Ukraine, effectively mirroring and compounding Ukraine's blurred prospect for EU membership. NATO officials offer various reasons, including the necessity to concentrate collective efforts and resources on the Global War on Terrorism

⁹⁴ One of them is Konstantin Zatulin, a member of the Russian State Duma and Director of the Institute for CIS Countries.

and to focus on the Alliance's internal problems related to the recent wave of enlargement. Other reasons exist, like certain geo-strategic interests connected to energy resources. Here Russia plays a central role as an important provider of natural gas for Western Europe. Moreover, taking into account the dramatically increased scope of NATO tasks and recent tendencies in the Alliance to focus on energy security, there is an obvious link between Russia's growing influence through its expansionist energy policy and Western European reluctance to bolster Ukraine's integration into European political, economic and security space.

3. Consequences of the "Energy Game" for Ukraine

Certain geo-strategic interests, particularly those pursued by Germany and France, play an important role in the geopolitical situation Ukraine confronts. Energy security in Western Europe today is an acute issue, especially since January 2006 when the Russians cut off natural gas to Ukraine (and, since major transit routes to Europe go through Ukraine, to other consumer countries in the West). As a follow up, Russia dramatically raised the price of natural gas to Ukraine. Many saw this move as an effort to squeeze Ukraine politically and economically in order to secure Kyiv within Russia's orbit, and this interpretation may well be true.⁹⁵

It is no secret that these countries rely on Russia for natural gas supplies which constitutes about a quarter of their total need. Realistically, it is natural that Germany or France would prioritize their own energy security and pay less attention to Russia's increasing use of the energy leverage to influence Ukraine.

A powerful deal in the energy sphere was concluded by Russian and German gas giants a year before the Russian gas cutoff. The so-called "Schroeder-Putin pact" came about on April 12, 2005, when leaders of both countries signed a "groundbreaking 'Deal of the Century' between two power giants – the German BASF and the Russian

⁹⁵ See Paul Gallis, "NATO and Energy Security," *CRC Report for Congress*, 21 March 2006. Available online (http://www.usembassy.at/en/download/pdf/nato_energy.pdf) accessed 10 February 2007.

Gazprom.”⁹⁶ This memorandum of cooperation is groundbreaking for several reasons. For the first time in history, Putin’s administration allowed foreign experts to get involved with gas extraction in Siberia. Furthermore, the German leader agreed to the construction of a new North European pipeline at the bottom of the Baltic Sea, outflanking Germany’s partners in the EU and NATO. Those partners are Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic countries. The estimated cost of this project is about \$8 billion.⁹⁷

Another powerful player in European energy market, Gaz de France, is the largest distributor of natural gas to Europe and is also heavily dependent on Russian energy supplies.⁹⁸ According to the agreement signed in December 2006 between Gazprom and Gaz de France,

[I]n return for access to Gaz de France’s pipelines, Gazprom agreed to extend its natural gas supply contracts, which were set to expire, to 2030, agreeing to sell 12 billion cubic meters a year to Gaz de France. In addition, Gaz de France will receive 2.5 billion cubic meters annually from the new Nord Stream pipeline, a joint Russian-German project in which Russia will be able to send natural gas directly to Europe by building a pipeline under the Baltic Sea.⁹⁹

Upon the completion of the Nord Stream pipeline project, given the very slight possibility that Ukraine will diversify its own energy sources by then, Ukraine will fall into the orbit of Russian geopolitical influence. Diversification of energy sources for Ukraine is complicated by the obvious reluctance of some European countries, for example Poland, to act on the commitment to complete the Odessa-Brody-Gdansk oil pipeline, which was to become the transit corridor for Caspian oil to Europe and an alternative to the Russian Druzhba pipeline which transports crude oil along the Black

⁹⁶ See Simon Araloff, “Schroeder - Putin Pact: Germany and Russia Divide Europe Again.” *Axis: Information and Analysis*, May 2005. Available online: (<http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=51>) accessed 10 February 2007.

⁹⁷ See Araloff.

⁹⁸ The French state owns 80.2 percent of Gaz de France, so agreements between Russian state-owned Gazprom and Gaz de France can be considered state agreements.

⁹⁹ See Judy Dempsey, “Russian Company to Sell Natural Gas Directly to French Consumers: Russian Monopoly Expands in Europe,” *International Herald Tribune*, December 2006.

Sea. The Odessa-Brody-Gdansk project has great importance not only for Ukraine, but also for Poland, especially considering Russia's decisive advance in the European energy markets.

Here there is a parallel between Russia's aggressive posture in energy and its official, traditionally negative attitude toward NATO and the EU enlargement. President Putin confirmed this at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in February 2007. Russia considers the prospect of Ukrainian membership in NATO and the EU a direct challenge to its geopolitical interests in Eastern Europe. Therefore, Moscow's goal is to prevent NATO from playing a central security role in Europe, because Russia does not and will not have direct means of influencing its conduct. In addition, it is understandable that Russia, under an administration like Putin's, with its overblown imperial ambitions, will continue to use its energy leverage and all means available to hamper Ukraine's rapprochement with the West.

For these reasons, appreciation of the value of multidimensional integration with Europe is not growing in Ukrainian society. For example, recent public opinion polls show that as an option for the top priority in Ukraine's foreign policy, a deepening of relations with Russia was chosen by 42 percent of those polled, versus 40 percent who support joining the EU.¹⁰⁰ This situation, in turn, adds to the uncertainty in Ukraine. Will Ukraine find the necessary support from the West to withstand Russian influence or will it remain a stagnant buffer between the European Union and Eurasia?

¹⁰⁰ Data provided by the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies, July 2006. (<http://www.uceps.org/>) accessed 12 January 2007.

IV. CONCLUSION

A. THEORY AND PRACTICE

Before constructing an analytical framework for studying the problems of national consolidation in Ukraine, it was quite challenging to find a plausible definition for a phenomenon such as national identity. This thesis argues that it is impossible to apply a purely primordialist or constructivist account to national identity in Ukraine. As discussed in Chapter II, the primordialist approach considers that nations are organically grown ethnogenetic entities which cannot be constructed or artificially created. In this view, the whole world is inevitably and fatally divided into nations. Premodern identities as products of historical ethnogenesis can be traced far back as ethnies or nations. In contrast, the major constructivist account suggests that nations are mostly modern artificial creations founded on myths of common historical origins and memories, and denigrates even the importance of ethnic roots. Moreover, it considers that belonging to an ethnic group is often a matter of attitudes and perceptions.

The case of Ukraine clearly demonstrates that neither approach should be rejected, just as neither by itself is adequate for understanding the process of Ukrainian nation building.

The contemporary notion of a Ukrainian nation represents a mix of a preserved distinctive ethnic identity, with some attachment to territory controlled by an ethnie, and a modern political entity produced by structural change under a particular discourse of domination, the project of elites and a bounded community of exclusion and opposition at the same time. The role of a distinctive Ukrainian ethnie which most Ukrainian nationalists would argue has ancient historical roots has proved insignificant to modern nation building.

The research also shows that the process of a nation formation in Ukraine differs significantly from the process in most contemporary European countries, where modern nations were based on people's sense of belonging to distinctive ethnic groups bounded

within historically-defined territories. In contrast, in Ukraine this stage of nation formation was heavily affected by outside influences, and the modern nation formation in Ukraine started much later.

The explanatory models of a nation formation used in the research permit several generalizations.

- 1) “National identity” and “nation” are complex phenomena composed of interrelated ethnic, territorial, cultural, economic and legal-political components.
- 2) Nation is a concept which should be considered in two sets of dimensions: civic and territorial, and ethnic and genealogical.
- 3) Nation as a sense of belonging can be interpreted as having evolved over time whether as an organic phenomenon or as an artificially created construction. Collective identity is not static but influenced by prevailing discursive processes.
- 4) Historical memories strengthen the identity of the nation only if they are based on events that have actually taken place or on relevant historical myths accepted by a majority of society.
- 5) Territory is vital to national belonging; the specific geographical position of the territory with its historical legacy and surrounding powers is important in defining national identity.

B. UKRAINIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY

Having analyzed the theoretical approaches to national identity, another goal of this thesis is to discover and use the most relevant tools for understanding the current weak sense of common national identity in Ukraine. Ukraine, with all the attributes necessary for independent statehood, nonetheless remains in a state of limbo with an unclear future. Therefore nation building should be considered the most important national project, given that Ukraine has no clearly dominant ethnic group which historically consolidated the nation and also lacks historical experience as a nation-state.

Another goal of the thesis is to show the dependence of variables like national identity on a multitude of factors which influence its unique creation. The thesis, in addition, considers why an undeveloped sense of national identity hinders the general process of national development.

Ukraine embarked on a democratic development path 15 years ago and declared a commitment to democratic governance, popular sovereignty, political unity and a market economy. However, the pace of transition has been slow compared with other countries due to specific factors described in the thesis.

The most important factors, identified as the independent variables in the analytical framework, are the following: Ukraine's unique geographic location, the historical absence of national statehood, and contemporary differences in cultural, linguistic, religious and geopolitical affiliations of the populations in different regions of Ukraine. As discussed in detail in the thesis, the combination of these factors proved to be the reason for uncertainty among Ukrainian society and political elites about the future of national development in Ukraine.

The thesis also describes the results of recent sociological surveys that clarify the sense of Ukrainian citizens' identity. The research confirms serious regional differences in that domain, including evidence of specific regional identities and manifestations of mutual estrangement between residents of different regions. Relevant poll results can be found in the Appendix. The survey research also makes it possible to conclude that the only basis on which Ukrainian national identity can be formed is an active civil society that does not place emphasis on ethnic distinctiveness or the superiority of one ethnic group over others. So far, no common civic identity has formed in Ukraine. However, empirical evidence suggests that the chance for a positive change remains.

The current state of affairs in Ukraine hinders national consolidation, democratic development, and the construction of civil society, and therefore of a state governed by the rule of law. It may create serious risks for social solidarity, the integrity of Ukrainian society and even state sovereignty. The historical rifts between socio-cultural, geopolitical and religious affiliations are now difficult to transcend, in large part because of external influences.

The first factor is a powerful ideological campaign throughout the media conducted by Kremlin ideologists and Russian pseudo-historians. Its apparent goal is to sow seeds of animosity between the Russian-speakers in the East and South, on one hand, and those in the nationally conscious Western part of Ukraine, on the other, in order to expand and preserve Russia's geopolitical influence.

A second, still influential factor is the connections felt by the older generations to the Soviet past, which explains the low level of national consciousness and social mobilization. This factor is a direct ramification of the 70 years of Soviet ideology as well as contemporary Ukrainian authorities' failure to provide economic and political stability in the country.

As highlighted in Chapter III, the third important factor is Western influence, which has given Ukraine a general understanding and appreciation of "Western values" like true democracy, liberal market economy, the rule of law, human rights, etc. However, this appreciation is incomplete. The Ukrainian people's acceptance of those basic virtues, to whatever extent they do accept them, has no clear and steady support and no "maintenance," so to speak. Ukraine has a critical need for Western support, at least from the countries which are concerned with the direction of Ukraine's development. In order to illustrate Western attitudes, Western Europe energy policies are discussed, revealing that Ukraine finds itself deadlocked at the crossroads between major powers pursuing their own independent interests.

The external influences considered in the thesis should be viewed as the major cause of the regional differences in the self-identification of the Ukrainian people. They are apparently echoed in socioeconomic, humanitarian, political and cultural subfactors, not only stabilizing the differences, but deepening them and transforming their inconsistencies into more serious contradictions.

The traditional approach, which considers national identity as something given and static should therefore be rejected and indeed reversed. Only in offering practical solutions to the political, economic and cultural problems facing Ukraine and its people

can the modern national identity emerge. As the thesis demonstrates, in Ukraine the process of nation building is tightly intertwined with the process of state development.

The continuing absence of a clear vision for Ukraine's development, among both the political elite and mass society, hampers the formation of a common civic consciousness as well as the whole process of national development. At the same time, the lack of civic unity among ordinary citizens, which is essential for national identity, exacerbates existing divisions among political elites on the crucial, as yet unanswerable question: Will Ukraine become a "European" country, or will it fall into orbit around an increasingly authoritarian Russia by integrating into Eurasian space or joining an Eastern Slav union with Russia and Belarus?

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APPENDIX. PUBLIC OPINION POLL RESULTS





This appendix contains results of public opinion polls conducted in 2005-2006 by the independent Olexandr Razumkov Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies. All tables were translated by the Center itself, which maintains an on-line website at <http://www.uceps.org>.


The sociological surveys done on December 20-27, 2005, polled 2,009 respondents aged 18 years or older in all regions of Ukraine; the sampling error does not exceed 2.3 percent. Those conducted April 20-May 12, 2006 polled 11,216 respondents over 18 years in all regions; the sampling error does not exceed one percent.

The regional division of Ukraine, reflected in the attached tables, is as follows:

- West: Volyn, Transcarpathian, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi
- South: the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Mykolayiv, Odesa, and Kherson
- Center: Kyiv city, Vinnytsya, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, and Chernihiv
- East: Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhya, Luhansk, and Kharkiv





What is your mother language? % of the polled









What most of all determines the choice of the language you speak? % of the polled					
	UKRAINE	West	Centre	South	East
I speak this language since childhood	49.0	46.8	48.7	62.2	44.6
This language is most spread in the city (village) I live, and spoken by most residents	15.4	4.2	13.2	18.2	22.6
It is the language of my nation	13.9	28.9	14.3	5.4	8.6
It is the language spoken in my family	4.9	2.6	7.3	4.2	4.2
It is the language of my country, it is my civic duty to speak it	4.0	9.6	5	0.8	1.1
It is the language of the country I consider my historic motherland	2.5	4.8	2.8	1.9	1.0
I can get more information in this language – read books, papers, magazines, watch TV, etc.	1.9	0.3	1.2	2.9	2.9
When I speak this language, they better understand me at work, state institutions, shops, markets	0.7	0.2	0.4	0.9	1.3
This language is spoken where I work	0.6	0.2	0.6	1.0	0.7
In this language I can get a better education	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.8	0.4
This language is more convenient for my specialization	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3
Other	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.0
Difficult to say	6.2	1.8	5.3	1.3	12.3

With what cultural tradition do you associate yourself, in the first place?
 % of the polled







**What cultural tradition will prevail in Ukraine
in the future (in 20-25 years)?**
% of the polled




How close to you are the residents of different areas of Ukraine and neighbouring countries by the character, customs, traditions?*

середній бал







What does “being a citizen of Ukraine” mean for you personally? % of the polled					
	UKRAINE	West	Centre	South	East
Care of the authorities, proper social guarantees	24.0	20.7	23.0	28.6	24.7
Ukrainian citizenship, Ukrainian passport	21.2	15.7	21.1	22.4	23.9
Feeling a part of the single Ukrainian people, its culture and traditions	19.9	35.7	23.9	11.9	10.5
Ability to elect the President of the country, the Verkhovna Rada, local councils, take part in referendums	10.3	6.7	7.5	14.6	13.1
Being proud of the achievements of my country and its representatives in different sectors – economy, science, arts, sports	9.3	8.1	10.2	8.4	9.4
Confidence that the Ukrainian authorities will defend its citizen who appears in a tight situation abroad	6.0	4.3	6.9	4.4	6.8
Distinction from representatives of other states	1.6	1.9	2.1	1.1	1.1
Other	0.5	0.2	0.6	1.1	0.4
I am not a citizen of Ukraine	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
I am a citizen of Ukraine but do not want to be one	1.2	0.5	0.3	2.9	1.7
Difficult to say	5.9	6.2	4.3	4.5	8.3

	West	South	East	Centre	UKRAINE
If you had to give up Ukrainian citizenship to obtain the citizenship of another country, would you do it? (among those who want another citizenship) **	no (56.1%) yes (17.5%) Difficult to say (26.4%)	no (51.0%) yes (27.8%) Difficult to say (21.2)	no (48.3%) yes (36.2%) Difficult to say (25.5)	no (53.3%) yes (19.6%) Difficult to say (27.1)	no (52.7%) yes (23.6%) Difficult to say (23.7%)
Do you consider yourself a patriot of Ukraine?*	yes (56.3%) rather, yes (31.2%)	rather, yes (42.7%) yes (31.8%)	Rather, yes (34%) yes (33.4%)	rather, yes (40.1%) yes (35.2%)	yes (38.1%) rather, yes (36.7%)
Are you ready to defend the country in case of war?*	yes (66.3%)	yes (61.6%)	yes (42.1%)	yes (52.6%)	yes (53.1%)
Which qualities are the most important for a patriot of Ukraine?*	The most important Upraising children in terms their love for Ukraine (75.2%) Work for the benefit of Ukraine (71.4%) Care about the stable well-being of one's family (70.7%) The least important Stand against Ukraine's rapprochement with Russia (22.4%) Stand against Ukraine's rapprochement with the USA (18.5%) Birth in Ukraine (9.5%)	The most important Aspiration for the equality of rights of all nationalities (57.3%) Work for the benefit of Ukraine (51.5%) Care about the stable well-being of one's family (48.3%) The least important Stand against Ukraine's rapprochement with Russia (61.3%) Use of the Ukrainian language alone in private life, in public places and state institutions (53.5%) Affiliation with a Ukrainian church (UAOC, UOC-KP, UGCC) (38.5%)	The most important Work for the benefit of Ukraine (60.7%) Care about the stable well-being of one's family (59.8%) Aspiration for the equality of rights of all nationalities (57.6%) The least important Stand against Ukraine's rapprochement with Russia (61.5%) Use of the Ukrainian language alone in private life, in public places and state institutions (44.8%) Affiliation with a Ukrainian church (UAOC, UOC-KP, UGCC) (38.0%)	The most important Work for the benefit of Ukraine (47.1%) Respect for the laws of Ukraine and institutions of government (46.2%) Care about the stable well-being of one's family (42.8%) The least important stand against Ukraine's rapprochement with Russia (35.3%) Affiliation with a Ukrainian church (UAOC, UOC-KP, UGCC) (27.3%) Stand against Ukraine's rapprochement with the USA (27.0%)	The most important Work for the benefit of Ukraine (56.0%) Care about the stable well-being of one's family (54.6%) Respect for Ukrainian laws and institutions of government (49.2%) The least important Stand against Ukraine's rapprochement with Russia (45.5%) Affiliation with a Ukrainian church (UAOC, UOC-KP, UGCC) (28.9%) Stand against Ukraine's rapprochement with the USA (25.2%)
Do you agree that "Ukraine should enhance economic independence from other countries, even if this leads to deterioration of the living standard of its citizens"?*	tend to agree (23.7%) neither agree nor disagree (19.7%)	tend to disagree (32.8%) disagree (30.8%)	disagree (40.9%) tend to disagree (23.0%)	neither agree nor disagree (25.5%) tend to disagree (20.6%)	disagree (26.5%) tend to disagree (22.5%)

Which of the listed definitions of the Ukrainian nation is the most acceptable for you?*	all citizens of Ukraine (34.3%) citizens of Ukraine irrespective of their ethnic affiliation who speak Ukrainian, observe national traditions and bring up their children in such traditions (27.6%)	all citizens of Ukraine (44.4%) citizens of Ukraine-ethnic Ukrainians (21.4%)	all citizens of Ukraine (48.1%) citizens of Ukraine-ethnic Ukrainians (20.2%)	all citizens of Ukraine (42.4%) citizens of Ukraine-ethnic Ukrainians (21.5%)	all citizens of Ukraine (43.1%) citizens of Ukraine-ethnic Ukrainians (19.8%)
What would you call all residents of Ukraine, in the first place?*	Ukrainians (21.4%) Ukrainian people (18.2%) citizens of Ukraine (17.5%) fellow nationals (4.0%)	people of Ukraine (15.4%) Ukrainians (15.2%) compatriots (14.9%) fellow nationals (6.0%)	citizens of Ukraine (17.6%) Ukrainians/people of Ukraine (16.2%) Ukrainian people (13.4%) fellow nationals (3.6%)	Ukrainians (23.0%) Ukrainian people (16.0%) citizens of Ukraine (15.9%) fellow nationals (3.8%)	Ukrainians (19.3%) citizens of Ukraine (16.5%) people of Ukraine (15.0%) fellow nationals (4.1%)
LANGUAGE IDENTITY					
What is your mother language?*	Ukrainian (90.3%) Russian (3.8%) Ukrainian and Russian alike (3.3%)	Russian (52.0%) Ukrainian (27.7%) Ukrainian and Russian alike (17.0%)	Russian (54.0%) Ukrainian and Russian alike (23.5%) Ukrainian (21.3%)	Ukrainian (72.0%) Ukrainian and Russian alike (14.3%) Russian (13.0%)	Ukrainian (52.0%) Russian (30.7%) Ukrainian and Russian alike (15.6%)
What language do you mainly speak at home?*	Ukrainian (89.2%) Ukrainian and Russian (3.8%) Russian (3.5%)	Russian (59.9%) Ukrainian (21.4%) Ukrainian and Russian (15.3%)	Russian (63.4%) Ukrainian and Russian (19.8%) Ukrainian (16.0%)	Ukrainian (62.3%) Russian (20.9%) Ukrainian and Russian (15.6%)	Ukrainian (46.0%) Russian (37.6%) Ukrainian and Russian (14.7%)
What most of all determines the choice of the language you speak?*	I speak this language since childhood (46.8%) it is the language of my nation (28.9%) it is the language of my country, it is my duty to speak it (9.6%)	I speak this language since childhood (62.2%) this language is more widespread where I live (18.2%) it is the language of my nation (5.4%)	I speak this language since childhood (44.6%) this language is more widespread where I live (22.6%) it is the language of my nation (8.6%)	I speak this language since childhood (48.7%) it is the language of my nation where I live (14.3%) this language is more widespread where I live (13.2%)	I speak this language since childhood (49.0%) this language is more widespread where I live (15.4%) it is the language of my nation (13.9%)

	West	South	East	Centre	UKRAINE
How would you assess your command of the Ukrainian language?*	fluent (89.0%) sufficient (8.0%) poorly understand (3.0%)	sufficient (47.7%) fluent (35.4%) poorly understand (14.1%)	sufficient (48.4%) fluent (36.8%) poorly understand (11.7%)	fluent (70.6%) sufficient (26.3%) poorly understand (6.9%)	fluent (57.6%) sufficient (33.4%) poorly understand (6.9%)
What translation of a book by a foreign writer would you choose: Ukrainian or Russian?*	Ukrainian (69.7%) does not matter (17.4%)	Russian (58.4%) does not matter (25.9%)	Russian (62%) does not matter (24.3%)	does not matter (40.1%) Ukrainian (34.3%)	Russian (36.8%) Ukrainian (28.7%)
What translation of a reference book in your specialty would you choose: Ukrainian or Russian?*	Ukrainian (68.5%) does not matter (15.2%)	Russian (56.7%) does not matter (22.3%)	Russian (57.7%) does not matter (22.1%)	Ukrainian (34.9%) does not matter (34.4%)	Russian (33.8%) Ukrainian (28.6%)
Status and coexistence of the Ukrainian and Russian languages*	Ukrainian should be the only state and official language (78.6%)	both should be state languages (54.8%)	both should be state languages (57.8%)	Ukrainian should be the only state and official language (41%)	both should be state languages (37%)
CULTURAL IDENTITY					
With what cultural tradition do you associate yourself in the first place? What cultural tradition will prevail in Ukraine in 20-25 years?	Ukrainian (79.9%) pan-European (9.0%) different in different regions (13.8%)	Ukrainian (35.0%) Soviet (24.4%) Russian (22.7%) pan-European (14.4%)	Ukrainian (37.7%) Soviet (22.7%) Russian (20.0%) pan-European (13.1%)	Ukrainian (71.9%) Soviet (13.3%) pan-European (6.2%) different in different regions (13.8%)	Ukrainian (56.3%) Soviet (16.4%) Russian (11.3%) pan-European (16.1%)
History of Ukraine*	Ukraine is the only heir to the history and culture of Kyivan Rus (13.8%)	Ukraine's history is an integral part of the history of the great Eastern Slavic nation, like that of Russia and Belarus (53.5%)	Ukraine's history is an integral part of the history of the great Eastern Slavic nation, like that of Russia and Belarus (49.2%)	Ukraine's history is an integral part of the history of the great Eastern Slavic nation, like that of Russia and Belarus (50%)	Ukraine's history is an integral part of the history of the great Eastern Slavic nation, like that of Russia and Belarus (51.6%)
In Ukrainian history of the 20th century, there were periods when Ukrainians en masse exterminated one another. Which way of doing away with mutual resentment is the best?*	make peace with no right or wrong (57%)	make peace with no right or wrong (53.5%)	make peace with no right or wrong (49.2%)	make peace with no right or wrong (50%)	make peace with no right or wrong (51.6%)

NATIONAL (ETHNIC) IDENTITY					
Whom do you consider yourself by ethnic nationality? **	Ukrainian (91.5%) Russian (4.2%) other nationality (3.0%)	Ukrainian (54.4%) Russian (38.0%) other nationality (5.4%)	Ukrainian (67.7%) Russian (27.4%) other nationality (3.8%)	Ukrainian (89.0%) Russian (8.2%) other nationality (1.8%)	Ukrainian (77.2%) Russian (18.3%) other nationality (3.2%)
What should determine the ethnic affiliation of a person? **	ethnic origin (32.5%) own choice (23.8%) yes (58.9%) does not matter (19.5%)	own choice (33.5%) ethnic origin (31.5%) no (36.1%) does not matter (31.1%)	ethnic origin (43.4%) own choice (27.2%) no (43%) does not matter (30.2%)	ethnic origin (41.8%) own choice (21.4%) yes (35.7%) no (32%)	ethnic origin (39.0%) own choice (25.6%) yes (34.5%) no (33.5%)
Should the Ukrainian passport specify the ethnic nationality of a citizen? *	yes (58.9%) does not matter (19.5%)	no (36.1%) does not matter (31.1%)	no (43%) does not matter (30.2%)	yes (35.7%) no (32%)	yes (34.5%) no (33.5%)
GEO-CULTURAL AND GEO-POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS					
Present place of Ukraine in the world *	An uninfluential European country looking for its place in the world (23.2%)	An uninfluential European country looking for its place in the world (28.9%) A country staying under the Western influence (24.5%) An uninfluential country of the "third world" with an indefinite foreign policy (24.5%)	A country staying under the Western influence (25.2%) An uninfluential European country looking for its place in the world (24.1%)	An uninfluential European country looking for its place in the world (21.2%)	An uninfluential European country looking for its place in the world (23.7%)
Ukraine's future *	A developed, democratic, influential European country (67.7%)	A developed, democratic, influential European country (26.9%)	A developed, democratic, influential European country (24.7%)	A developed, democratic, influential European country (35.8%)	A developed, democratic, influential European country (36.8%)
Priority line of Ukraine's foreign policy *	Relations with the EU member states (58.8%)	Relations with Russia (56.6%)	Relations with Russia (62.1%)	Relations with Russia (32.4%)	Relations with Russia (42.2%)
Should Ukraine join the EU? *	yes (64.6%) for - 31.3% against - 32.1%	no (54.5%) against - 79.7%	no (45%) against - 77.6%	yes (45.9%) against - 53.2%	yes (40.7%) against - 61.4%
Hypothetical voting for Ukraine's accession to NATO *	for - 31.3% against - 32.1%	no (37.8%)	no (48.5%)	no (43.8%)	no (40.8%)
Do you feel like a European? **	rather, no (28.0%)	no (37.8%)	no (48.5%)	no (43.8%)	no (40.8%)

	West	South	East	Centre	UKRAINE
What prevents you from feeling like a European?*	low living standard (70.8%) socio-cultural conditions (36.9%)	low living standard (72.4%) socio-cultural conditions (47.9%)	low living standard (71.3%) socio-cultural conditions (34.7%)	low living standard (75.7%) socio-cultural conditions (41.0%)	low living standard (72.9%) socio-cultural conditions (39.0%)
What ethnic group do Ukrainians resemble the most?*	none (54.7%) Russians (23.8%) similar (25.5%)	Russians (71.9%) none (15.2%) very similar (63.8%)	Russians (66.8%) none (23.3%) very similar (58.3%)	Russians (50.8%) none (32.7%) similar (38.5%)	Russians (54.1%) none (31.3%) very similar (44.2%)
How similar or different are the cultures, traditions and ways of citizens of Ukraine and citizens of Russia?*	similar (28.8%) not very similar (33%)	very similar (59.9%) very different (37.9%)	very similar (67.9%) equally similar and different (29.9%)	very similar (39.6%) equally similar and different (31.2%)	very similar (48.6%) equally similar and different (27.9%)
...residents of Ukraine and citizens of the EU member states?*	similar (26.4%) equally similar and different (27.7%)	equally similar and different (30.8%) different (24.5%)	equally similar and different (33.5%) equally similar and different (37.6%)	equally similar and different (31.9%) equally similar and different (27.7%)	equally similar and different (31.5%) equally similar and different (29.2%)
How close to you are the residents of different areas of Ukraine and other countries by nature, ways and traditions?*	Galychyna Volyn Bukovyna Transcarpathia Crimea Donbas	South Crimea Russia Donbas Volyn Transcarpathia Bukovyna Galychyna	Donbas Russia Slobozhanshchyna Crimea Bukovyna Transcarpathia Volyn Galychyna	Kyiv Centre Slobozhanshchyna Volyn Bukovyna Galychyna Transcarpathia	Kyiv Centre Slobozhanshchyna South Donbas Russia Belarus Volyn Galychyna Bukovyna Transcarpathia
What ethnic groups would you like to live next to?*	Ukrainians (49.9%) does not matter (32.2%) Poles (31.4%)	Russians (40.9%) Ukrainians (39.9%) does not matter (28.9%)	Russians (57.3%) Ukrainians (50.5%) does not matter (30%) Jews (29.9%)	Ukrainians (49.3%) Russians (42.9%) does not matter (33.7%)	Ukrainians (46.4%) Russians (44.3%) does not matter (31.5%) Poles (27.8%)

SOCIO-ECONOMIC IDENTITY				
How would you describe the financial standing of your family?*	It is sufficient for food and acquisition of inexpensive necessary items (38.5%) You can live with it, but acquisition of durables causes difficulties (37.1%) We hardly make ends meet, our money is insufficient to buy even necessary foodstuffs (11.5%) We do well but cannot afford some purchases (an apartment, a car, etc.) (10.6%)	It is sufficient for food and acquisition of inexpensive necessary items (44.3%) You can live with it, but acquisition of durables causes difficulties (29.3%) We hardly make ends meet, our money is insufficient to buy even necessary foodstuffs (18.0%) We do well but cannot afford some purchases (an apartment, a car, etc.) (6.3%)	You can live with it, but acquisition of durables causes difficulties (38.6%) It is sufficient for food and acquisition of inexpensive necessary items (35.0%) We hardly make ends meet, our money is insufficient to buy even necessary foodstuffs (17.8%) We do well but cannot afford some purchases (an apartment, a car, etc.) (6.8%)	It is sufficient for food and acquisition of inexpensive necessary items (35.5%) You can live with it, but acquisition of durables causes difficulties (36.2%) We hardly make ends meet, our money is insufficient to buy even necessary foodstuffs (16.3%) We do well but cannot afford some purchases (an apartment, a car, etc.) (7.2%)
Which social class would you affiliate with?*	middle (61.7%) lower (31.4%)	middle (56.8%) lower (37.1%)	middle (57.1%) lower (34.7%)	middle (57.4%) lower (35.8%)
VIEW OF THE PROSPECTS OF STATE DEVELOPMENT AND WAYS OF UNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY				
Which path of the state development of Ukraine do you consider the most acceptable for you?*	It will stay a unitary state (43.4%) It will stay a unitary state with broader powers of the regions (27.9%) aspiration for a substantial increase of the wellbeing of all citizens of the country (38%) knowledge and understanding of the Ukrainian culture and language (20.3%) equal rights and co-existence within one state (19.3%)	It will stay a unitary state with broader powers of the regions (34.5%) It will stay a unitary state (21.5%) aspiration for a substantial increase of the wellbeing of all citizens of the country (34.9%) equal rights and co-existence within one state (33.2%) common Eastern Slavic culture and historic heritage (15.9%)	It will stay a unitary state with broader powers of the regions (31.3%) It will stay a unitary state (23.3%) aspiration for a substantial increase of the wellbeing of all citizens of the country (38.1%) equal rights and co-existence within one state (33%) common Eastern Slavic culture and historic heritage (9.3%)	It will stay a unitary state (33.3%) It will stay a unitary state with broader powers of the regions (27.9%) aspiration for a substantial increase of the wellbeing of all citizens of the country (33.4%) equal rights and co-existence within one state (28.2%) common political principles and ideas (11.6%) common Eastern Slavic culture and historic heritage (11.5%)
What factor can best unite the people of Ukraine into one community?*				

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