

# **Finishing Together: Coalition End-State Development Since 1990**

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“At the strategic level, a fundamental tension underlies contentious end state debates: the military's insistence on specificity often conflicts with the desire of political leaders for maneuver room. While we cannot wholly eliminate this tension, we can assuage it if military and civilian leaders seek a better understanding of war termination dynamics.”

James Anderson<sup>1</sup>

## **Abstract**

Since the end of the Cold War multinational structures have dominated operational level command and control during crisis response. A key factor in the effective execution of these operations was the development of consensus among the national desired end states for each contributing nation. Lessons learned from the attempts to find end state consensus for operations in Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor can aide significantly in the development of coming C2 arrangements, transition operations, future training opportunities and developing C2 doctrine. This paper also looks at the strategic interoperability issues and policy dilemmas among different nations participating in recent operations and the methods those nations have used to cope with such C2 challenges. It offers an assessment of the level of consensus attained by multinational force commanders in their search for military end states. Several useful techniques provide a clear foundation for future improvement in this vital arena.

## **Introduction**

Since the end of the Cold War multinational/coalition structures have dominated operational level command and control during crisis response. Operations Desert Storm, Uphold Democracy, Provide Hope, Allied Force and Stabilize all depended to one degree or another on coalition cohesion. A key factor in the effective execution of these operations was the development of consensus among the national desired end states for each contributing nation. Although coalition command and control structures from the period have been studied in some detail, this critical development of end states has received little attention. Given the likelihood of similar operations in the near future, endstate development during multinational operations merits ongoing study. As coalition interoperability is critical to effective C2 and to maintaining partnerships in the modern battlespace, lessons learned from the attempts to find end state consensus for operations in Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor can aide significantly in the

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development of coming C2 arrangements, transition operations, future training opportunities and developing C2 doctrine. This analysis also improves our understanding of the linkages between strategic objectives and operational tools and techniques – particularly as they pertain to C2. Finally this analysis attempts to consolidate lessons learned from multiple operations in the post Cold War environment to show practical solutions to problems that will certainly confront future commanders.

This paper examines the issues surrounding attempts to develop multinational exit strategies and conflict termination mechanisms. Inherent in the paper is the understanding that conflict termination goals must be accounted for within command and control relationships. The paper also looks at the strategic interoperability issues and policy dilemmas among different nations participating in recent operations and the methods those nations have used to cope with such C2 challenges. Finally, it offers an assessment of the level of consensus attained by multinational force commanders in their search for military end states. These observations can reorient C2 planning and can be used by future staff members and commanders to minimize the confusion inherent in terminating modern, multinational military operations. Several useful techniques used by recent multinational staffs provide a clear foundation for future improvements.

### **That “Damned U.S. Grant” – the Beginning**

“... proposing armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works.”

General U.S. Grant  
Fort Donaldson, 1862

The debate continues as to whether the American Civil War was a total war,<sup>2</sup> but there can be no doubt that the use of the term unconditional surrender by General Grant before Fort Donaldson has had a lasting impact on American military policy. Grant certainly did not invent the concept but his conviction to fight to the ultimate end in a war between brothers made the seriousness of the fight un-debatable. Grant has been labeled with a host of unflattering terms because he is considered by some to have been an attritionist butcher, yet his drive and commitment to victory were undoubtedly key to the Union victory, which was negotiated by the military, in the person of Grant himself.

As a by-product of Grant’s influence, the American army took on a doctrinal approach after the war focused on mass and annihilation.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, the American Navy took on the theories of Mahan and moved in a very different direction. Yet, as many historians assert, it was Grant’s influence on military policy that became a driving factor in American endstate development during the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

One recent study, Bullitt Lowry’s, *Armistice 1918*,<sup>4</sup> clearly shows the importance of the Civil War and Grant’s influence in the development of the Armistice of 1918. He notes that little precedent existed at the time for the development of peace terms between two warring combatants.<sup>5</sup> The Russians had previously signed a treaty and the leaders of

Great Britain, France and the United States had different ideas about terms. Although the famous Fourteen Points came to form a central core for the conditions laid down at Versailles, they were initially considered “murky and ambiguous... and did not constitute a precise guide for peacemaking.”<sup>6</sup> Only based upon the German request for peace sent directly to President Wilson did British Prime Minister Lloyd George suggest the Allied leaders draw up principles for an armistice to refer the matter to their military leadership. For the French, the armistice was initially just to be a preliminary cessation of the fighting in order to develop agreement of peace terms.<sup>7</sup> When the realization that any armistice would set the baseline for the territorial aspects of the peace to follow the Allied politicians soon turned to their military leadership to hone concrete demands.

This appeal to Wilson put the allies in a scramble to develop realistic and agreeable terms. Lloyd George accepted advice from his cabinet and summoned his key military commanders to confer prior to attending discussions with the other national leaders. Although, he held a very hard stance, which his Chief of General Staff, Sir Henry Wilson and Navy Fleet Commander, Sir David Beatty shared, the commander of the British Expeditionary Force, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig was developing different views. In Paris, the political and military leaders also differed in their approaches. French Premier Georges Clemenceau and Marshal Ferdinand Foch simply disliked one another. Even so, the Premier did not initially prevent Foch from attempting to play a dominant role in the drafting of terms. Foch tried to become the single representative of the various national military commanders in the field as well as the Allied Commander-in-Chief.<sup>8</sup> The influence of the other allied powers was effectively minimized during initial discussions. As for America, President Wilson did not even make his military chief in the field, General Pershing, aware of the German proposal.

As events progressed, Foch drafted some very harsh conditions that led Marshal Haig to fear that an unconditional approach was brewing, and Haig believed the Allied conditions at the front to be too weak to push for such strong terms.<sup>9</sup> For its part the British admiralty was also pushing for the harshest of terms for fear of German seapower. No one knew how weak the Germans really were. Clemenceau finally muzzled Foch in late October by directing that the French military would provide only technical advice during the armistice discussions.

Foch and General Pershing shared lunch on 23 October and that was the first time that the American commander became involved with any armistice discussions. He had not been advised by Washington, yet overall, he seemed to agree with Foch.<sup>10</sup> At a meeting two days later, the Allied military chiefs tried to come to consensus on military conditions for an armistice. Marshal Pétain presented the French view of things, Haig disagreed and Pershing largely accepted the harsh French proposal.

Wilson sent his personal representative, Edward M. House, to Paris to develop support for the Fourteen Points and he only seemed to muddy the already dark waters. Only after the French and British butted heads over the surrender of the Turks did the allied political leadership begin to settle on the basic concepts of conflict termination.<sup>11</sup>

Still, the debate between President Wilson and General Pershing over the terms to end the war remained difficult. In fact Pershing sent a letter directly to the Supreme War Council in an attempt to block the acceptance of his own President's proposal. Pershing wrote: "I believe the complete victory can only be obtained by continuing the war until we force unconditional surrender from Germany...."<sup>12</sup> Unconditional surrender had become a bookend for war termination options. Although the allied leadership finally put a modified version of the Fourteen Points to Germany, and the Germans accepted what they believed to be those terms, others clearly pushed the terms to a harsher extreme at Versailles.

### **Roosevelt's Tree Limb – The U.S. as a Major Player**

Unconditional surrender was clearly attractive to President Franklin Roosevelt as he sought to pull America together in order to fight a great crusade against the Axis in the early days of the Second World War. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in fact, a Roosevelt partner in almost every great decision of the war, was surprised and dismayed at the FDR pronouncement of "Unconditional Surrender" in Casablanca in January 1943. Although the problematic Versailles Treaty was a stimulus for war in the 1930s, Roosevelt's use of the term was most likely linked back to Grant's image, not Wilson's maligned Fourteen Points.<sup>13</sup>

The pronouncement at Casablanca sounded good at the time, but became problematic during subsequent operations. In the end, such terms were only held for Germany. General Eisenhower was able to provide more lenient terms to the Italians in order to pull them away from the Axis coalition and after the defeat of Germany, the Japanese threat was re-evaluated in light of the progress of the Pacific campaign and was eventually modified under the conditions of the Potsdam Declaration issued on July 26<sup>th</sup> 1945.<sup>14</sup> These terms had been developed by Russia, Britain and the United States in the Cairo Conference during December 1943 and by the mutual agreement of China, Britain and the United States as reflected in the Potsdam Conference in July and August 1945.

Previously, the most extreme terms had already been executed on Germany. Hitler's representatives had signed the armistice on 7 May stating, "We the undersigned, acting by authority of the German High Command, hereby surrender unconditionally to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces and simultaneously to the Soviet High Command all forces on land, sea and in the air who are at this date under German control."<sup>15</sup> On the Allied side the terms were approved by General Eisenhower and his counterparts, including Soviet Marshal Georgi Zhukov, British Air Marshal Tedder and French Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny.<sup>16</sup>

The real question for this study is not the appropriateness of the terms "unconditional surrender" but the impact of such a stance on the efforts of America's allies and the relationships among the various nations involved in the conflict termination process. In the First World War the real diplomatic goal, as pursued by President Wilson, had been an end to war through the development of the League of Nations. The result had been a second world war after the conditions of the Versailles Treaty stimulated a revitalized

Germany in the 1930s. In the pursuit of victory during the second war, extreme measures seemed to be warranted, even if they were only fully applied to Nazi Germany. In this the Allies were mostly agreed due to the enormity of the threat. First World War conflict termination was a concurrent effort by both political and military leaders conducted over a matter of weeks. During the Second World War the politicians seemed to craft the broad conditions of surrender well in advance and then allowed their military commanders to develop the specific military techniques to force surrender. In particular, Eisenhower was given significant freedom of action in relation to Italy and significant coordination authority with the Russians for Germany. What has happened to these ideas of conflict termination since the end of World War Two?

### **The Cold War Status Quo**

Since 1945, the world has known no other total war. The umbrella of the “Cold War” changed the dynamic of both warfare in general and conflict termination specifically.

#### ***Korea***

Work to find a solution to the Korean Conflict illustrates more realistically the issues that affect coalition end state development. Because the Korean Conflict seemed to offer neither side an opportunity for decisive victory by 1951, both sides came to see that some negotiation had to facilitate an end to the conflict. These negotiations brought two coalitions together, the North Korean, Chinese and to a lesser degree the Soviets on one side and the American-led United Nations coalition on the other.<sup>17</sup> In reality the Peoples Republic of China led to talks for its side and the Americans (represented by Generals Ridgeway and Clark) deliberately excluded their allies to lead the policy development on the other.

Of course, the effort that ended at Panmunjom was initially designed only to stop the fighting and not to develop terms for peace. Like the 1918 peace discussions held in Paris the effort in Korea suffered from fits and starts and much disagreement among the various coalition partners. The Truman Administration worked to ensure the talks were limited to military matters to the degree that General Ridgeway’s request to have his political advisor attend the talks was denied by the State Department.<sup>18</sup> Even more serious was South Korean President Syngman Rhee’s opposition to a truce reinforcing the division at the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel, but this too was largely ignored in the effort to stop the fighting. Still, although the baseline for the armistice was worked out among the negotiators by late November 1951 the final cease-fire did not occur for nearly two more years. First differences of opinion concerning the repatriation of prisoners of war caused a breakdown so severe that only the intervention of outside partners, the Indians supported by the British in the United Nations General Assembly, was able to heal it in late 1952. Meanwhile Chinese troop strength in Korea reached its highest levels of the war.<sup>19</sup>

Only the advent of the Eisenhower Administration, its willingness to step up military measures to the level of a nuclear exchange and the concurrent devastation of North

Korea by the continuing combat eventually forced sufficient concessions to move the peace process forward.<sup>20</sup> An agreeable proposal for termination was finally identified on 25 May 1953, but Syngman Rhee still objected to the terms of the evolving consensus. He was so adamantly opposed that he threatened to remove his forces from the UN coalition and unilaterally released all Korean prisoners of war from the camps on his soil.<sup>21</sup> Rhee's opposition evaporated in the face of heavy Chinese attacks that decimated two of his divisions and a sweet military aid package from the United States.

The armistice signed at Panmunjom on 27 July 1953 remains in effect to this day. Under the threat of nuclear war limited conventional conflicts were prosecuted for nearly forty years following without decisive result. Many argue that the nuclear umbrella helped contain war; it certainly restrained the development of the multinational conflict termination process.

### ***Vietnam***

Terminating the conflict in Vietnam became a very different matter and but shared many process similarities with the termination of the war in Korea. Although the negotiations were conducted over several years in a neutral location far from the fighting (Paris), the United States again pursued a "carrot and stick" approach, mixing offers to end the fighting with a series of increasingly effective (after 1972) military operations. Again, the supported government – South Vietnam – had serious objections about the terms of peace, but finally acquiesced after significant American pressure. China again played a strong role in the process. One difference for the Vietnam case was the overwhelmingly large role of the diplomatic effort, specifically the role of Henry Kissinger as President Nixon's national security advisor, and the relatively small role of the senior commanders in the development of the peace terms.

"Unconditional surrender" was clearly not an option. But the question of coalition partner goals should also be asked. The United States was engaged in Vietnam alongside the military forces of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and of course South Vietnam. None of those other nations actively participated in the development of the Peace Accords and of course South Vietnam continued unsuccessfully to fight even after its coalition partners departed.

### **Recent Challenges**

Since 1990, the termination of the Gulf War, the crisis in Kosovo and the resolution of a number of smaller scale peace operations have dominated the scene. These crises have brought new emphasis on multinational conflict termination. Partially because the extreme conditions of Unconditional surrender were appropriate for political or military reasons.

## *The Gulf War*

During the Gulf War the coalition leadership was a central element of the planning and execution of the campaign that returned “freedom to Kuwait.” General Schwarzkopf shared leadership of the coalition military forces with Sultan Bin Khaled and the national leaders of the coalition seemed to have maintained sufficient dialog to maintain a cohesive effort through the point of liberating Kuwait City. The debate over the destruction on the Basra road and the dilemma of pursuing the defeated Iraqi forces north is well known. What is less well understood is the degree of consensus among the political leaders of the coalition for the end state conditions of the conflict. It appears that the overall consensus supported only restoration of Kuwait and would not have condoned a continuation of the fighting. Clearly, General Schwarzkopf’s negotiation guidance, or lack thereof,<sup>22</sup> placed the authority for conflict termination in his hands but severely limited the flexibility he had to develop terms.

Unconditional surrender was neither a goal nor a reasonable expectation following the Gulf War. Circumstances in Iraq clearly called for an emphasis on regional stability and maintenance of at least sufficient military power in Iraq to avert a power vacuum in the region. This forced the victorious coalition to develop terms that made the victory less than obvious to the Iraqi people and resulted in the continuation of the Saddam menace. The speed of the victory probably made coalition flexibility on conflict termination conditions extremely difficult. President George Bush also clearly felt the need to rapidly resolve the crisis. Yet the precedent established in the First World War clearly indicates that a great deal of coalition consensus development can be achieved in a short amount of time given the right mechanisms (such as a Supreme War Council or Forum of Ministers.) Unfortunately the surprising speed of the victory combined with the desire to see a rapid and humanitarian end to the conflict greatly complicated the result.

Without coalition agreement on the punishment of Iraq no conditions limiting its offensive striking power were effective and even efforts to aid indigenous opposition groups failed to restrain Saddam’s aggression. As the coalition was happy to return to peacetime pursuits it rapidly evaporated just when it could have been an important weight against Saddam’s threats. Since 1991 a series of operations, both within and alongside United Nation’s efforts have maintained pressure on Saddam, yet the once extensive coalition has dwindled to only two effective partners – the United States and the United Kingdom.

“I think that more importantly people were saying “What, what will the end game be? You know, when do we terminate all this? What is it we’re trying to accomplish at the end of the day? What do we expect to see on the ground? What are the terms of cessation of hostilities? Will we use nuclear weapons?” You know, looking for some sort of an outline and form within which, you know, the military people could in fact make the decisions that the military people needed to make, once the political decisions had been made. We never had that.”

General Norman Schwarzkopf<sup>23</sup>



“But the political judgment was made with my military advice and with General Schwarzkopf’s concurrence, that this was the time to stop the war. And I think it was a sound, sustainable, justifiable, political decision for the President to make.”

General Colin Powell<sup>24</sup>

## ***Somalia***

Initially the coalition that responded to the crisis in Somalia viewed famine and draught as its primary opponents. Because the United Nations endorsed the effort and the United States agreed to serve as the lead nation a host of other countries soon sent forces and aid to the embittered nation on the horn of Africa.<sup>25</sup> Providing relief was soon accomplished, but the underlying problems in Somalia proved too enticing for many coalition partners and many who had agreed to provide relief soon found themselves supporting the hope of political reform and improvements in Somali security. Such a change in mission should have stressed the coalition as much as true conflict termination and as one might expect the consensus soon frayed. As more force was applied and more involvement in Somali affairs became evident nations began to slip away from active support.

The departure of the Italian contingent in 1993 should have been a warning bell for the United States. Transition to UN control in March was the driving force for an end state for providing hope in Somalia.<sup>26</sup> What no one anticipated was the course the United Nations command would take after it was established in the country. UNISOM II<sup>27</sup> had a very different approach to its mission than did its predecessor. The organization suffered a significant blow with the deaths of Pakistani soldiers in June and saw its death knell on 3 October with the defeat of American rescue forces in the streets of Mogadishu. This lead directly to the end of UNISOM II in March 1995.

Although forces from seven nations returned to conduct operation United Shield – the withdrawal of UN forces from Somalia, the spirit of the coalition effort had already been seriously diminished. With the forums of the UN General Assembly and its Security Council available to develop consensus it would have seemed that the transitions between UNISOM I and UNISOM II could have been well managed. Unfortunately, the real gap in coordination seemed to be at the military staff level within the United Nations. Only after the Somalia excursions was the Peacekeeping Department of the United Nations reformed and expanded.

## ***Haiti***

The intervention in Haiti was also supported by the United Nations, under the provisions of its Chapter VII and led by the United States, but it was remarkably different from the crisis in Somalia for three significant reasons. First of all the coalition was primarily regional in nature and the percentage of coalition forces within the military structure was quite small. Secondly, operation Uphold Democracy had been planned with a longer-term coalition endstate in mind. Finally, like in Somalia, termination of the military

aspects of the intervention were woven into a transition to another international UN force. Yet, unlike in UNISOM II the UN force in Haiti, UNMIH, was specifically tailored for the mission of rebuilding the Haitian security apparatus – thus avoiding the coalition splitting mission creep that ravaged the group effort in Iraq and Somalia.<sup>28</sup>

Command and control in Haiti took lessons from the Somalia experience to ensure that member nations of the coalition<sup>29</sup> and the UN were represented very early in the operation even though in its initial stages the effort was overwhelmingly American in strength. End date criteria were developed to ensure security conditions were created to support the transition to UNMIH and the two organizations (the U.S.-led joint task force and the UN mission) had face to face transition meetings in advance of the actual turnover of control. The United States even decided to provide the UN commander in order to ensure minimal decrease in operational effectiveness during and after the change of control. Eventually, the military component of UNMIH itself successfully transitioned to a Canadian lead and the mission was later shifted through the use of another UN mission, the UN Support Mission in Haiti, with a new mandate.<sup>30</sup>

### ***Kosovo***

Operation Allied Force in Kosovo was primarily and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) effort,<sup>31</sup> not a true coalition intervention, yet, even after the successes in Haiti, it suffered from many of the same weaknesses that plagued the operations in Somalia. One of the significant complicating factors in Kosovo was the plethora of multinational organizations that became involved in solving the crisis. The NATO Committee report on “Kosovo Aftermath and Its Implications for Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management” noted conflicting actions by NATO, the UN, the European Union, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well as the European Union (EU) and other national players.<sup>32</sup>

Allied Force also suffered from a lack of cohesion between its military and political leaders. This was particularly evident in the restriction placed upon military commanders and the lack of coordination concerning the possible use of ground forces. It was also manifest in the unwillingness of the Alliance to subscribe to an overall military campaign plan.<sup>33</sup> Finally, national perspectives began to drift under the strain of the effort and friction points between nations like Greece and Turkey as well as traditional preoccupations such as Italy’s focus on Albanian refugees, France’s ties with Serbia and the United States interest in protecting Montenegro began to wear on effectiveness.

Even in the strongest form of multinational arrangement – the alliance – were realistic endstate conditions viable in the case of Allied Force. In fact some would say that even the strategic objectives were blurred to ensure sanctity of the coalition. As of last year we still had a long way to go to see real coalition endstate development in a region under credible threat.

## ***East Timor***

With little warning Australia had to form and lead a coalition operation authorized by the United Nations following the independence referendum by the East Timorese in August 2000. In a paradigm busting act, a regional power stepped up to global coalition leadership and executed, over six months, a highly effective campaign to facilitate the introduction of the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). Coalition partners were assigned/accepted roles that matched well with their regional goals and the entire effort was managed to specific end date criteria without mission-creep.

Australia's national lead, fully supported by the United States and the United Nations [as well as France, the United Kingdom, Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea (ROK) among others] responded well to the needs of the host nation and the international community. Meanwhile, the military commander, General Peter Cosgrove, worked very effectively within the UN structure while decisively executing his immediate military responsibilities. He remained fully cognizant of the sometimes divergent views and objectives of the participating nations and melded the whole into an effective and responsive team.

East Timor illustrated that coalition operations can successfully be conducted with provider nations that do not share a common view of the appropriate crisis response. The Thai and ROK forces committed in East Timor did not intend to conduct combat operations, while the New Zealand and Australian forces provided were designed to do just that. Still the C2 arrangement facilitated the full engagement of each national contingent and the operation was concluded successfully and on time.

## **Lessons Learned or Remaining ...**

From this analysis it would seem that coalition endstate development is an ideal far from realistic. Yet, credible hope should be retained! Progress has been made, unfortunately the difficulty of conducting major operations has increased at the same time, due to the much more powerful scrutiny of the media and near-instantaneous information flow among other things. In addition, each of these crisis situations in the past decade has involved a different mix of players and confronted different problems.

Since 1945, conventional warfare involving "western powers" has been relatively rare and when such conflicts have occurred they have been conducted quite rapidly. While many nations may freely discuss endstate conditions for a humanitarian operation, few will confide real national objectives in a crisis near their borders. In the same way, conventional operations conducted over several years by the same nations permit much more deliberate discussions to develop consensus. There is no doubt that the objectives of the British and American leaders in 1942 were widely different; the military campaign in North Africa served as much to reconcile such divergent opinions over time as it did attriting the Axis forces in the field. Similarly, the consensus and trust that facilitated General Eisenhower's negotiations with Italy were key to success in terminating conflict

between the that nation and the Allies.<sup>34</sup>

In a century when multinational structures clearly dominated operational level command and control during crisis response a number of tools have shown themselves valuable. First of all, supra-national organizations (normally the United Nations) can provide valuable forums for discussion and consensus development. This was true in Korea and to a lesser degree during Vietnam and the Gulf War. Some value was provided by the UN during Allied Force and it was certainly a key player in Somalia, Haiti and East Timor. In Africa, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has never been strongly empowered, but in other regions, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have provided assistance.

More operationally focused tools have been developed to aid in the purely military aspects of conflict termination. The Coalition Command and Control Interoperability Center (or cell, C3IC) provided great value during Desert Storm, even though it did not function often at senior enough levels to affect termination criteria development. As valuable at the time was the decision to prosecute the military campaign with a parallel command structure. This permitted the coalition to function under two different yet coordinated poles, one managed by General Schwarzkopf and the other by Sultan Bin Khaled. In addition to the C3IC, commanders have developed civil-military centers (CIMIC or CMOC) which have been significant contributors to understanding and the development of common approaches particularly among the non-military actors in the battlespace. The CMOC structure was vitally important to operations in Haiti and East Timor.

A key factor in the execution of these operations was the development of broad consensus among the nations involved to smooth together the desired end states for each contributing nation where possible. The Gulf War and the initial Somalia operations clearly showed this attribute. Broad guidance can also hamper effective military planning though, as during Allied Force. Conflict termination can only be accomplished effectively with specific terms. Each of the operations over the past century have shown that military commanders can develop and negotiate terms for ending conflict, but the long term impacts of military negotiations have been uneven at best – witness lingering problems following Korea and the Gulf War that were tied to non-military factors.

A combination of the role of supra-national players and the operational transition may show they way for greater future success. In Somalia, the transitions between UNISOMI and UNISOM II were badly managed, but in Haiti and East Timor such transitions, combined with clear end dates showed much greater effectiveness. With a strengthened UN organization and better awareness of the transition process real improvement in this area may be forthcoming.

Even with the assessment that our past accomplishments offer a mixed bag for success, lessons learned from the attempts to find end state consensus for operations in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor should aide significantly in the development of coming C2 arrangements, transition operations, future training

opportunities and developing C2 doctrine. Education is certainly a key to improving success in the future. This will depend on political leaders understanding as much about military conditions for success as it does on military leaders understanding political imperatives. James Anderson and others have begun to address this issue and we are currently placing much greater emphasis on such mutual understand within the military education system. One can justifiably hope for continued improvement in the near future.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> James Anderson, "End state pitfalls: A strategic perspective," *Military Review*, Sep/Oct 1997, 95.
- <sup>2</sup> See Mark E. Neely's "Was the Civil War a Total War?", *Civil War History*, March, 1991, for just one recent example.
- <sup>3</sup> See Russell F. Weigley's classic *The American Way of War, A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press), 1977, 149-152 for a discussion of this issue.
- <sup>4</sup> Bullitt Lowry, *Armistice 1918* (Kent University Press, Kent, Ohio), 1996.
- <sup>5</sup> Lowry, x.
- <sup>6</sup> Lowry, xii.
- <sup>7</sup> Lowry, 17.
- <sup>8</sup> Lowry, 64.
- <sup>9</sup> Lowry, 46. His nominal senior, General Sir Henry Wilson proposed German disarmament and an occupation of all German territory to the Rhine. Haig feared such demands would cause the Germans to continue the fight.
- <sup>10</sup> Lowry, 67.
- <sup>11</sup> Lowry, 95.
- <sup>12</sup> Lowry, 96
- <sup>13</sup> Lowry agrees with this, 167.
- <sup>14</sup> After noting that "the following are our terms. We shall not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay." The terms of the conference called for Japan to: "proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction." found 17 April, 2001 as a part of the Yale University Avalon Project at < <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade17.htm>>
- <sup>15</sup> *Act of Military Surrender Signed at Rheims at 0241 on the 7th day of May, 1945* found 17 April, 2001 as a part of the Yale University Avalon Project at < <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/gs3.htm>>.
- <sup>16</sup> President Roosevelt was happy to announce, "General Eisenhower informs me that the forces of Germany have surrendered to the United Nations."
- <sup>17</sup> The coalition included Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.
- <sup>18</sup> Donald W. Boose, Jr. "The Korean War truce talks: a study in conflict termination." *Parameters*, Spring, 2000, 104.
- <sup>19</sup> Boose, 108.
- <sup>20</sup> According to Boose, the Soviets were also pushing for an end to the war, 109.
- <sup>21</sup> Boose, 110.
- <sup>22</sup> Schwarzkopf says that he received no guidance and made his own terms of reference. See *Frontline's* Oral History of the Gulf War: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/schwarzkopf/7.html>.
- <sup>23</sup> From *Frontline's* Oral History of the Gulf War: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/schwarzkopf/2.html>.
- <sup>24</sup> From *Frontline's* Oral History of the Gulf War: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/powell/5.html>.
- <sup>25</sup> The participating nations in UNOSOM I included military units from Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway,

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, the United States and Zimbabwe.

<sup>26</sup> Joseph P. Hoar, "A CINC's Perspective," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn, 1993, 62.

<sup>27</sup> Including military personnel provided by Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United States, and Zimbabwe.

<sup>28</sup> See John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy, the United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997*. (Greenwood, 1999).

<sup>29</sup> UNMIH included forces from Algeria, Bangladesh, Canada, Djibouti, France, Mali, Netherlands, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States.

<sup>30</sup> See [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unsmih.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unsmih.htm).

<sup>31</sup> Military forces were contributed by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

<sup>32</sup> Markus Meckel, "Kosovo Aftermath and Its Implications for Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management" 28 April 200, found at: <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/2000/at-120-e.htm#T3-2-1-1>.

<sup>33</sup> This because the creation of a campaign plan would demonstrate a long term vision for endstate and no NATO endstate seemed sufficiently ambiguous to develop full approval by the North Atlantic Council.

<sup>34</sup> Eisenhower's efforts were still extremely painful, see Dwight D. Eisenhower. *Crusade in Europe*, (London, 1948), 202-205.