

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

INTERAGENCY SUPPORT FOR THE TACTICAL COMMANDER

by

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ABSTRACT

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Brigade combat team commanders (BCT) will be habitually told in future conflicts to conduct stability operations. One of the purposes of conducting stability operations is to promote sustainable and responsive provincial institutions. Those institutions include government, economic, military, police, education and, agriculture components. Depending on the culture and level of development of the country the United States has committed to help, there could even be more institutions that require the attention of the BCT commander. Yet the BCT commander, responsible for executing this mission, is not normally given anyone who is trained to advise the commander on starting the institutions mentioned above and then assisting the indigenous population in sustaining those institutions. Civil Affairs Teams are trained to assist a small population in some of the tasks required of the institutions but not to the size and scope needed for a province. In my Strategy Research Project, I will demonstrate a need for and the composition of an interagency team that is responsible to both the BCT commander and their respective agencies for advising the commander and overseeing the creation and training to sustain provincial institutions.

INTERAGENCY SUPPORT FOR THE TACTICAL COMMANDER

In order to conduct successful stability operations in the twenty-first century, tactical commanders will be required to integrate United States government interagency skills and knowledge into the plan. Stability operations are an ever-present task and intrinsic to modern warfare. Warfare in the twenty-first century has shown that stability operations can not be an after thought when planning or executing operations¹. Field Manual 3-07 clearly links Stability Operations with political objectives. "Political objectives influence stability operations and support operations at every level from strategic to tactical. These operations are distinguished by the degree that political objectives directly influence operations and tactics."²

In Iraq and Afghanistan, stability operations are the essential task tied to success. Recent history has shown that the destruction of the enemy force often sweeps away any semblance of governance, leaving an expeditionary Army to fill the roles of temporary government, emergency service provider, and stopgap law enforcer until a new civil order commensurate with the political objectives of the war can be put into place and undertake permanent nation building strategies³. Even when the destruction of the enemy force is not undertaken, a failed state loses any semblance of government. It will not matter what type of operation the United States military is tasked with in the future, the result will be the requirement to synchronize the interagency team as part of stability operations.

The purpose of conducting stability operations is to promote American national interests by influencing the threat, political and informational dimensions of the operational and tactical environment.⁴ At the local or provincial level, this means the support for sustainable and responsive institutions. Those institutions include but are not limited to government, economic, military, police, intelligence, education and, agriculture entities. These are institutions that are essential to meeting the strategic goals of any intervention. Yet tactical commanders are not normally task organized with anyone that possesses the expertise required to develop the institutions mentioned above and then assist the indigenous population in sustaining them. This necessitates the requirement for direct interagency support to the tactical commander. His success is directly tied to a plan that brings all the elements of national power to bear and to produce a unity of effort in his area of responsibility. In order to bring this about the staff must have the required expertise. This paper will demonstrate a need for, and the composition of an interagency team that is responsible to both the tactical commander and the respective agencies for advising the commander and overseeing the creation and training to sustain provincial institutions.

In the overall scheme of stability operations the brigade combat team (BCT) is the first level of command that has the ability to coordinate all facets. In rural areas the BCT is normally given one or more provinces or prefectures as an area of responsibility. Within large cities a BCT is given responsibility for administrative districts. Both of these levels of government require the BCT to be the predominate implementer of United States political objectives. This is especially true when the security environment prevents other agencies from operating freely. At any given time the BCT commander or his representative will be faced with all of the issues a governor or mayor deals with. Issues of politics, economics, infrastructure, social institutions, information distribution and security are all facets that demand attention. For example an early issue that must be dealt is the police force. Early on the issue will be manning, training and equipping the force. Members of the BCT will be embedded at all levels as the process evolves. As the police force matures issues of how the force interacts with the public will arise. Are the police fair in their enforcement of the law or do they show favoritism toward some group? What are the second and third order effects of their favoritism? The list of police issues that a BCT must deal with until local leadership can take over is almost endless. The BCT must stay actively engaged when the local leadership does take over in order to ensure that American policy objectives are met. That is just one example of the issues a BCT will face while conducting stability operations.

Current policy on stability operations does not address the need for interagency expertise at the tactical level. National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD44 directs the State Department to coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts involving all U.S. departments and agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. The State Department must coordinate responses for reconstruction and stabilization with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations, including peacekeeping missions, during both the planning and implementation phases. The State Department will lead the United States government in the development of a strong response capability including necessary surge capabilities; analysis, formulation, and recommendation of additional authorities, mechanisms, and resources needed to ensure that the United States has the civilian reserve and response capabilities necessary for stabilization and reconstruction activities to respond quickly and effectively.⁵ While the policy does appoint a lead agency and guidance for planning and implementation it does not give any guidance on what is expected to make the policy work below the department level. The policy also fails to give the Department of State any tasking

authority. Each department or agency can choose whether it wants to participate or not and there is no direction requiring them to do so.

The Department of Defense (DoD) has declared that stability operations are a core mission for the United States military on par with combat operations. DoD also addresses the need for interagency support to the military because military-civilian teams are a critical United States government stability operations tool. The Department of Defense shall continue to lead and support the development of military-civilian teams. Their functions shall include ensuring security, developing local governance structures, promoting bottom-up economic activity, rebuilding infrastructure, and building indigenous capacity for such tasks.⁶ But the directive does not give guidance on how to implement the policy or what expertise needs to be included on the teams. DoD's directive indicates that military-civilian teams should be focused on local level institutions. Interagency personnel on a BCT staff could operationalize that. They would be able to plan for stability operations and have the ability to task subordinate units for execution.

One of the products of DoD's current commitment to military-civilian teams is requisite support to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). These teams have been operating in Afghanistan and in Iraq. PRTs have had mixed reviews with an identified shortfall of a lack of central controlling authority and less than full participation from the civilian governmental sector.⁷ Given their size, normally less than one hundred personnel including security, PRT's cannot accomplish all the necessary tasks required to reestablish a provincial government. Most importantly PRTs operate in the battlespace with no requirement to answer to the military commander responsible for the area. BCT commanders can feel they have no responsibility for reconstruction efforts and that they are free to concentrate on security issues, combat operations and training the local indigenous military. The PRT can feel it is not responsible for security issues and can concentrate on reconstruction. Security issues and reconstruction are interrelated. Security does not improve without reconstruction efforts and reconstruction cannot go forward without security. In the end the two efforts suffer because of the lack of unity of effort and United States national policy is not implemented.

As with policy, American military doctrine does not address the need for interagency support to a BCT commander. Tactical commanders are told that success in stability operations depends on the ability to blend all elements of national power in order to forge the link between the military and other entities of the United States government as well as non-governmental organizations.⁸ They must create an environment that achieves unity of effort by constant coordination with all involved agencies.⁹ Traditionally, doctrine has implied that a BCT commander should create unity of effort through the S5 Civil-Military Affairs Officer on his staff.

The S5 section at the brigade level does not have the capability to bring to bear all of the United States governmental assets required to adequately support the need when operating at the local level. For example, a United States Army trained civil affairs officer does not have the necessary skills to help an indigenous population bring a banking system back from failure. Working the banking problem through the chain of command takes months due to a lack of expertise. In the mean time the positive effects that a bank can have on the economy of a province are lost.¹⁰ The Civil Affairs element is another asset the BCT commander has traditionally been allocated for stability operations. Doctrinally civil affairs companies are placed in support of a BCT commander. At that level they are capable of conducting humanitarian assistance to prevent a crisis.¹¹ Civil Affairs soldiers will remain a vital part of the BCT in stability operations but they do not have the resident knowledge or experience to bring to bear all of the elements of United States national power. They are best used as civil-affairs scouts tasked to determine the needs of the local population in close concert with the interagency team on a BCT staff.

Current interagency support to tactical commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan is very limited and driven from above. Stabilization efforts have been focused on building from the top down on market reforms, infrastructure, and exports. Little or no Iraqi input is called on when reconstruction projects are considered.¹² With this top driven approach most interagency personnel have been centralized in Baghdad. Because of the risks, civilian agencies have been extremely resistant to moving outside of secure compounds to where their expertise is needed. The difficulty for interagency personnel to operate in Iraq and Afghanistan is very well illustrated by how USAID and the Department of State operated in 2004 and 2005

*"In contrast, (to the 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad) USAID operated from the heavily fortified Green Zone and was more risk adverse. USAID was also required to follow the Department of State's Diplomatic Security (DoS) policies and procedures, which offered as much protection to the staff as possible, and were stringent. These policies mandated that trip requests outside the Green Zone be submitted two days in advance, so the best and safest route could be determined, as well as alternate routes. In April 2004, DS policy required that passengers ride in a convoy of two fully armored vehicles with two armed security personnel in each vehicle. Often, trips were cancelled or personnel recalled, based on new security intelligence. Each day, trips were prioritized, resulting in some being denied or postponed owing to the limited number of vehicles available."*¹³

Lack of security is the key factor that does not allow United States government, international and nongovernmental agencies to freely operate and take over the reconstruction effort from the military. Without security a concerted civilian lead reconstruction effort is not viable. In order for risk adverse civilian agencies to assure security for its' employees the agency must put into place rules and restrictions that in the end take away a large portion of the employees effectiveness. This illustrates why from 2004 to 2005 a tactical commander in Iraq rarely had interagency support of any kind. Some exceptions existed but they were few and did not nearly address the problem. Despite the military working around the problem with innovative ideas such as emailing photographs of reconstruction projects to interagency personnel working in secure areas,¹⁴ unity of effort was never achieved.

The problem has been recognized and attempts have been made to remedy a lack of interagency participation and unity of effort in stability operations. But these efforts have been focused at the strategic and operational level. One such effort has been the proposal by Senators Joseph Biden and Richard Lugar to introduce The Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004. This bill established the Office of International Stabilization and Reconstruction (OISR) and created the Response Readiness Force (RRF). The Department of State was directed to manage both organizations. The OISR is to coordinate stability operations across executive agencies. RRF is to be a pool of up to two hundred fifty USAID personnel who would provide assistance in stability operations. There is also a call for an additional five hundred non-federal employees who would volunteer to support stability operations provided they have been trained. The bill also called for an education program for interagency personnel involved in stability operations.¹⁵ In Fiscal Year 2006 the Department of Defense transferred \$100 million to the Department of State for the OISR. The Department of State has contracted with a civilian company to conduct a study on the requirements for establishing and managing a civilian reserve.¹⁶ While this is a step in the right direction the bill does not direct that the proper mix of skills be pulled from across the interagency.

There is a need for an interagency team at the tactical level as defined as the BCT. Other than the Department of Defense, United States government agencies and nongovernmental organizations are prevented from freely operating inside Iraq and Afghanistan. When they are able to operate they require a commitment from the military for security. This situation hinders affective stability operations. But even when security is provided, there are times that civilian members of the United States government are not allowed to leave forward operating bases because of the security situation. The United Nations has not made a commitment to aid Iraqi development by placing personnel there because of the security

situation. This also adds to the perception that the insurgency is effective in Iraq. Given the lack of freedom of movement for civilian agencies and no United Nations personnel located in Iraq, the need for an interagency team with a BCT staff is needed for effective and successful stability operations. This would allow stabilization efforts to have a bottom up component. The BCT staff, including the interagency team, would establish the effects or goals to be achieved in the BCT area. Units from the BCT working with the local population would build reconstruction programs focused on the desired effects identified by the BCT staff. This allows the the local population the opportunity to have a voice in the process and build the programs from the bottom up. When the local population gets a voice in the process they will be more likely to support projects. Once the United States military is in place and supporting a central government in a country no enemy will attempt to dislodge the indigenous government by a coup.

An interagency team embedded with a BCT staff solves the security issue for the civilian agencies. The interagency team imbedded with a BCT staff also allows the commander to create unity of effort for stability operations in his area of responsibility. With the exception of nongovernmental organizations, all United States government agencies are working toward the same goals in the local area. At any phase of an operation the commander must address not only security but must also deal with diplomatic, economic, informational, intelligence and social issues. These issues must be dealt with as quickly as possible. The longer a local issue remains, the more likely the enemy will be able to turn that issue into a win for them. This fosters an underlying willingness in the local population to support the enemy. The interagency team works and lives with the BCT planning staff as part of the targeting and effects cell. As the BCT staff develops and monitors desired effects the interagency team works as part of the staff to inject their knowledge into operations orders and non-lethal effects targeting annexes. During weekly BCT targeting meetings they would be an invaluable asset as measures of effectiveness and new ideas to solve problems are discussed and decided on. Their expertise and experience translates into operations orders and targeting matrixes that provide commanders at all levels a unified road map. They also provide a resource to subordinate commanders and staff. As a battalion or company commander works through the issues of stability operations he has a ready resource that can provide professional guidance and advice. The interagency team is also in support of its parent agency during the time they are with the BCT. This arrangement allows for increased visibility of operations to all the agencies involved with the effort. It also gives the interagency team the ability to reach back for support or information to their parent agency as issues arise.

The interagency support that a tactical commander requires to conduct effective stability operations is the same as that of a failed government and economy that may have suffered years of neglect. The failure to quickly address the needs of the local population will damage relations with that population and provide avenues for our enemies to establish resistance to any new government we support. United States policy objectives are not furthered and it will lengthen the time required for American military support to the local government. The security situation also drives the need for support to the BCT commander. If the security situation is not permissive the United States military must take the lead in stability operations. In the following paragraphs it must be kept in mind that in the initial stages of stability operations someone from the BCT must either establish or support the establishment of police and fire departments, social institutions, infrastructure repair, government, economic development, and information distribution. As time goes by, the requirement for supervision by BCT personnel will diminish; but the requirement to have knowledge of the status of each area will not diminish until the security situation stabilizes and another agency of the United States government or non-governmental organization can take over.

The interagency team allocated to a BCT commander must at a minimum have an interagency representative for each of the following areas:

A local police force must be established. It is imperative that security be provided to the local population by members of the community as soon as possible. A personnel system must be established that handles recruitment, equipping and training of the force. An important function of the personnel system is the selection of leadership. Leaders must be committed to the establishment of security but at the same time they must be willing to accept modern police methods. Methods that engender support from the local populace and addresses civil rights must be inculcated in the culture of the police force from the beginning. Establishing a logistical support system for the police is fundamental to their effectiveness. Each officer must be equipped with the tools of his trade and put into a uniform. The vehicles the police use in their daily jobs must be kept in working condition. Another consideration for public security and safety is the establishment of a fire response capability. The consideration for this can be delayed but not forgotten. Large cities will require assistance at some point to man and equip a fire department. The same considerations for a police personnel and logistics system have to be put into place for the fire department with even more emphasis on vehicles and equipment.

Social institutions are nearly as important as providing security. Reestablishing a health care system will strengthen the relationship with the local populace as well as help establish legitimacy for the local and provincial government. Health clinics must be established quickly or

groups opposed to United States interests may fill the need. Health clinics provide a clear message that the government cares about the people and fosters good will. Hospitals in larger cities provide definitive care and are another symbol of the government. Reestablishing schools and supporting an effective education system provides a way to get local people involved and invested in the government.

Infrastructure repair, improvement or creation requires national effort and projects requiring large investments. But issues at the province level still require attention. Local electrical systems for villages will be imperative for social and economic development. Water and sewer systems for cities solve many health issues. Good roads provide an economic boost to the local area. Trash collection and disposal must be established. The provincial government must establish committees in order to identify and prioritize infrastructure projects. Every project is a way to employ the indigenous population. Roads built by locals will not be up to established United States standards and the building methods will be primitive. But an enormous number of people can be employed.

A provincial government must be put into place that encompasses local versions of all three branches of government. Consideration must be given for executive, legislative and judiciary roles and responsibilities. Every aspect of governance will require some form of support from the BCT. As the government is put into place all aspects must be considered. The interagency representative on the BCT staff must be able to advise the commander on establishing good government that is consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, equitable, inclusive, effective, efficient, participatory, and follows the rule of law. Putting laws and policies into place to achieve all that is just one of the multiple tasks required at the provincial level. After the provincial government is in place daily interaction between the BCT and local leadership is imperative for progress. The BCT leadership must stay on a fine line of providing helpful guidance that does not take away the power of local leaders. An interagency staff member with experience in government can greatly improve the effectiveness of the BCT leadership in this task.

Economic considerations must be addressed. The local banking system must be established to facilitate the central government's printing and distribution of money. Banks are essential to the start up of small businesses and small businesses are the nexus for job creation in a developing economy. The BCT staff will be responsible for advising the provincial government on economic issues that will require more experience than a BCT staff can call on.

The BCT staff will be required to advise and assist the local population in information distribution. Television, radio, and newspaper entities must be started or supported. Information

is one of the key weapons against those who are attempting to undermine the United States backed government. At the provincial level the support for rural newspapers and radio stations and a central government television station are important avenues for getting key messages and news out to the populace. Journalists from the local population can influence large numbers and must be engaged by BCT personnel in order to build a trust relationship. Information distribution expertise is not resident in a BCT staff.

Lastly, intelligence support at the BCT level is in need of improvement. Timely access of all source information is hampering tactical commanders in their stability operations. Transnational enemies of the United States do not respect borders and routinely sidestep identification by exploiting the seams between areas of responsibility. When the United States military gets close to individuals who form resistance groups, the individuals will slip across a seam and continue to operate. Requests for information processed through normal systems takes too much time and may fall victim to prioritization issues of an overworked staff at higher echelons. The reach back capability of a national intelligence representative pays big dividends as the BCT commander acquires information about his area of responsibility.

What civilian agencies can fulfill the roles of an interagency team at the BCT level?

The Department of Justice maintains the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). This program is designed to “conduct two types of assistance projects: those which involve development of entire police forces, and those involving rehabilitation or enhancement of specific capabilities of existing police organizations.”¹⁷

Members of this organization would be a natural fit for developing security organizations at the provincial level. This organization has already contributed to stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. ICITAP employs volunteer retired and active law enforcement personnel who perform advisory duties.

The Corps of Engineers has been supporting stability operations since long before the Global War on Terrorism and currently has district offices in both Iraq and Afghanistan. They are the agency that should support the BCT commander in the area of infrastructure. A Corps of Engineer representative on the BCT staff would greatly enhance efforts toward building all types of civil engineering projects. In addition to technical assistance the Corps normally deals with contracting issues for infrastructure. The BCT staff normally does not have construction contracting experience and can draw upon this.

The Peace Corps has the necessary skills and core competencies to meet the need for the social development member of the interagency team. The Peace Corps already has a history of developing educational, public health care, agricultural, and small business programs

in developing nations. The Peace Corps has a large number of past and current volunteers to draw from for stability operations.¹⁸ In order for this idea to work there would have to be a change in United States government policy and the culture of the Peace Corps.

Since its inception the Peace Corps has promoted world peace and friendship. Its mission statement proclaims three broad themes: helping people of interested countries to meet the need for trained men and women, promote better understanding of Americans, and help Americans better understanding others. The Peace Corps is also a product of the Cold War. It was brought into existence to promote American values around the world in opposition to communist ideology.¹⁹ In light of today's realities, involving the Peace Corps with the United States military maintains the values and historic mission it has always operated by. The reality of the world today is that countries that need the expertise of the Peace Corps the most are not secure and the Peace Corps will not place personnel into a non-permissive environment. The way that the Peace Corps can remain viable and true to its historic beginnings is to work with the military in the reconstruction of troubled states. If Peace Corps volunteers were working with BCT staffs today there would be less than twenty personnel imbedded with the military working in a relatively safe environment. Those twenty could be making a contribution to world peace in areas where they would not normally be allowed to go.

The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) already has the task of supporting military operations world wide. An intelligence representative from OMA could be part of the interagency team on the BCT staff. Properly equipped, the individual could have reach back capabilities that would enhance stability operations in the BCT area of responsibility.²⁰

The Department of Commerce has a sub-department dedicated to communications and information and has another sub-department for economic development. As the department responsible for developing telecommunications policies they have the necessary background to assist in developing the television and radio mediums needed at the provincial level. They have an overlapping competency with the State Department and the Peace Corps for economic development²¹.

As the lead agency for stability and reconstruction, the Department of State (DOS) is the main organization to draw interagency team members from to supplement the BCT staff. The State Department representative would be able to bring economic, political, and refugee expertise to stability operations.²² The arrangement would also allow the State Department to have first hand knowledge down at the provincial level to allow the department to take the lead once the security situation permitted the transfer.

The transformation of the military to a joint force and the use of effects based operations have provided the vehicle to enable the military to more fully use the knowledge and experience of an interagency team at the tactical level. Effects based operations have not yet been brought into the body of the United States Army doctrine.

The transformation of the United States military has brought a focus on Effects Based Operations (EBO). Military commanders have always sought to create the conditions for success; have planned and executed campaigns to create the conditions that enable victory. “EBO provides a methodology for planning, executing, and assessing operations designed to attain specific effects that are required to achieve desired national security outcomes... EBO is not simply a mode of warfare at the tactical level, nor is it purely military in nature. EBO encompasses the full range of political, military, and economic actions.”²³ In order for EBO to succeed and to achieve United States policy goals all members of the interagency team must participate.

The Rand Corporation has suggested that a unified civilian and military structure should be established with all agencies participating. Some efforts have been made to move in this direction by the current administration. This can be seen in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. Each of the eight pillars of strategy contained in the national strategy has an interagency working group assigned. While this is a step in the right direction it is insufficient. The current interagency working group process is not focused on execution. It can generate options but any one agency can decide to support the option or not. Each participant in the working group is responsible to his or her own agency and not to the group. The agencies are left to execute on their own and do not answer to a central controlling authority. This situation causes lack of focus and inadequate coordination among the agencies, particularly at lower levels in each agency.²⁴

An interagency team on a BCT staff solves the execution problem that the RAND study identified. The members of the interagency team are able to put the best practices of their individual agencies to use through the orders process a BCT uses to transmit instructions to subordinate units. The interagency members of the BCT staff are able to craft orders and instructions to subordinate units within the BCT that focus their efforts on solving problems of establishing security, social institutions, infrastructure improvement, government, economic recovery, and information distribution. More importantly the BCT commander is able to create unity of effort in his area of responsibility by placing the interagency team together with the BCT staff to work stability operations. United States national security policy is best implemented by creating unity of effort.

Recommendations:

To date, the House of Representatives, the Senate, the Administration, and the Department of State have not fully funded the Office of International Stabilization and Reconstruction and have not implemented the Response Readiness Force. Both houses of congress zeroed out the request for funding from the administration for the Office of International Stabilization and Reconstruction.²⁵ The Department of State should place more emphasis on this effort. Recruiting and training civilian personnel for interagency teams will take years even when fully funded. The Department of State currently includes the Department of Defense, Army Corps of Engineers, Department of Justice, Department of Treasury, the Central Intelligence Agency and several internal entities as members of the Reconstruction and Stabilization Team²⁶. The Department of State should also leverage knowledge and expertise from other agencies. For example the Peace Corps has extensive knowledge in stabilization tasks and has a large number of individuals already trained.

The leadership of the United States should introduce legislation that would force better interagency cooperation and make agencies responsible for providing knowledgeable personnel for stability operations. We can not afford to have elements of the United States government unwilling to contribute to national security policy goals. The culture of those agencies must be changed to allow for creative thinking in supporting national security policy. The Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 is a good example of forcing cultural change on an organization that is unable to change from within. Just as the act created a “joint” mindset and culture in the United States military; similar legislation could create an interagency mindset in the executive branch. The National Security Council staff is already in place and should serve as the joint interagency tasking authority.

The Department of State should model the Response Readiness Force after the Joint Interagency Fire Center’s Interagency Fire Program Management and the Incident Qualification and Certification System. The Fire Program Management and Incident Qualification System outlines the qualification standards and education required to act as a member of a fire management response team. The system also provides guidelines for extra pay and benefits to individuals who volunteer to work as a member of a fire management team.²⁷ The program is already in place and could be used as the basis for a Department of State program without going through a costly and lengthy study of how to build a unique program.

The Department of State should be given tasking authority over other agencies in the executive branch for implementation of the Office of International Stabilization and Reconstruction. This would allow the Department of State to staff the Response Readiness

Force much more quickly and to begin now to integrate interagency teams with BCT staffs as the units are identified to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan. Including the interagency team now would jump start the program and give those individuals who have volunteered for the duty valuable training for future conflicts or interventions. As the BCT conducts its train up for deployment the interagency team should be included in all command post exercises and planning. This would allow the civilians and the BCT staff to work through the inevitable cultural differences. The civilians would work through the military orders process and understand what is expected of them during orders production. The BCT staff would be able to acclimatize to working with members of the team who bring very unique problem solving skills and an even more unique world view.

The Department of Defense should be named the lead agency for stability operations up to the point where a permissive environment allows for withdrawal of most United States military forces. The Department of State in its responsibility to implement a Response Readiness Force should be named the supporting agency. The United States military cannot assume that outside civilian agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) will be able to carry out stability operations any longer. By placing the United States military as the lead agency puts the responsibility for stability operations on the agency most likely to have the capability to accomplish the mission. This also clears up the question of who is in charge of the situation and further allows commanders at all levels to create unity of effort and, with the exception of NGOs, unity of command within their area of responsibility. This also gets the military back to a core historical task that we have done well in the past.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) should be disbanded and the personnel integrated into BCT staffs. They represent an outside entity that does not answer to the commander responsible for the area and therefore detracts from the commander's efforts to create unity of effort. PRTs also represent a large manpower and material drain on local units in order to provide security and equipment. The tasks they perform in the BCT area should be accomplished by the battalion and company given responsibility for that terrain. The interagency team at the BCT level can mentor the battalion and company commanders as they perform the tasks previously accomplished by the PRT. As part of their normal operations battalion and company commanders require their soldiers to accomplish the tasks that a PRT would have sporadically accomplished. The soldiers become intimately familiar with the areas they work in each day and know the issues preventing the accomplishment of desired effects. They then can focus on solving the issues with the help of the interagency staff members through their chain of command.

The interagency team should work for the BCT commander with day to day supervision assigned to the BCT plans officer. An employee from one United States government agency working for a supervisor from another agency is not new. Military personnel have been working for ambassadors for almost as long as the United States has been in existence. While the interagency team must have the ability to reach back to their parent organizations for information, a clear understanding of their chain of command must be established or unity of command and effort will suffer. The commander on the ground must be able to direct actions in his area of responsibility in order to accomplish the reconstruction tasks that support the national political objectives.

Endnotes

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²¹ Ibid, A-B-1

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