Paradigmatic Entrapment
Abstract
With the onset of the 21st century, new threats have emerged throughout the world that seek non-traditional means to attack the United States. In an effort to characterize possible non-traditional threats, the "National Defense Strategy of the United States of America," March 2005, recognized that one future challenge to the nation could be from an enemy who employs disruptive technologies that negate current U.S. advantages. To meet the nature of this threat, a concept defined as paradigmatic entrapment provides an avenue for thinking about the problems an organization faces when an enemy employs disruptive technologies as an architecture in war. While developing operational art, military leadership must understand the danger of the phenomenon of paradigmatic entrapment and develop strategies to effectively deal with it. Using historical examples from World War I involving the French and German armies, the concept of paradigms and how they develop at the operational level of warfare is explored. The paper analyzes the development of the French army through the years leading up to World War I and the accompanying emergent technologies. After showing how the French became entrapped by their paradigm, the paper shows how the German army broke through essentially the same paradigm late in the war and almost won it. The German army's breakthrough while engaged by an enemy in war uncovers underlying, timeless ideas that provide a foundation for overcoming the phenomenon of paradigmatic entrapment. By focusing on organizational processes, lessons learned from these historical examples are applicable to organizations faced with disruptive technologies both now and into the future.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 17, 2007
- Accession Number
- ADA468763
Entities
People
- John K. Lussier
Organizations
- National Defense University