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JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



UNDERSTANDING THE ENEMY

by

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Defense Intelligence Agency

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in
partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in
Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The contents of this paper reflect on my own personal views and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense

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ABSTRACT

This study defines the nature of the war on terrorism by assessing the definition of terrorism itself; why terrorism exists, and develops an analytical framework within which to assess United States political strategies towards terrorist actors and organizations. It seeks to define terrorism and terrorists; to provide an understanding of Islamic reasons leading to current-day jihad; the concept of nationalism in majority Muslim states; and give visibility to a new way ahead in Iraq, potentially leading to regional stability. This new strategy requires aggressive implementation by the United States, the west and key state actors in the Middle East to ensure victory in the Global War on Terrorism.

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UNDERSTANDING THE ENEMY

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INTRODUCTION

The years between 1990 and 2005 saw a marked increase in fundamentalist Islamic hostilities against America and the West; America and her allies were under attack, at home and abroad. The suicide” bombings” of the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and Flight 93 on February 26th, 1993; the suicide bombing of the USS Cole, while harbored in the Yemeni port of Aden in which 17 sailors died and 39 were wounded; the August 7, 1998 U.S. embassy simultaneous car bomb explosions at the United States embassies in the East African capital cities of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya where 257 people were killed and over 4,000 wounded; the September 11th attacks on U. S. soil in which over 3000 were killed and wounded; and, the July 7th London train bombings that killed 56 and injured over 700 were the result of the outgrowth of miscommunication and lack of understanding between East and West; between secular, democratic nations of the west and a small fundamentalist Muslim movement based in the east.

War had been declared upon America and her allies in February, 1998 as a call to jihad by Osama bin Laden, leader of the Islamic terrorist organization al Qaeda. On September 11, 2001 that war was brought home to Americans, ushering in a new era in American warfare: the “Global War on Terrorism.” Spurred by the horror of September 11th, President George W. Bush declared a “Global War on Terrorism” against those who would see America and her democratic ideals destroyed. The U.S. Department of State has identified terrorist organizations in the war on terror largely as militant Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda and its affiliates¹ as the primary threat to the U.S. The National Security Council, in the War on Terror or “Long War” has the stated goal of "ending

¹ US Department of State; List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. October 11, 2005

international terrorism; preventing terrorist groups from carrying out attacks and posing a threat to America and its allies; spreading freedom and liberal democracy; and putting an end to state sponsorship of terrorism in so-called rogue and failed states.”² The Western response to terrorism began in October 2001 with “Operation Active Endeavor”, a North Atlantic Treaty Operation (NATO) naval operation in the Mediterranean Sea, designed to prevent the movement of terrorists or weapons of mass destruction, and to enhance security of shipping in general. It was one of the eight NATO responses to the attacks of September 11th.³ In 2001, in the U.S. led “Operation Enduring Freedom”, the Taliban government in Afghanistan was overthrown as it was a known safe haven for al Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden. In 2003, the United States and a coalition of allies in “Operation Iraqi Freedom.” invaded and overthrew the Sunni government of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, as intelligence sources identified Hussein as having ties to terrorist groups, including al Qaeda and the ability to produce Weapons of Mass Destruction.

In the aftermath of 9/11 the U.S. government (USG) initiated and continues military offensive operations as the primary course of action in attempting to win the Iraq war and through its’ success, victory in the global war on terrorism. However, staying the course is not effecting the war’s end quickly enough; there are those who do not believe victory in the Iraq War by and of itself will lead to victory in the global war on terror. According to the Iraq Study Group, terrorism in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein could grow; a chaotic Iraq could provide a still stronger base of operations for terrorists who seek to act regionally or even globally.⁴ Current U.S. policy is not

² National Security Council. Strategy for Winning the War on Terror, 2006

³ NATO.Inc., www.nato.int/issues/active_endeavour/index.html

⁴ James A. Baker and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs, The Iraq Study Group Report, The Way Forward—A New Approach, Vintage Books, New York, 2006, p. 34.

working; the level of violence in Iraq is rising and the government is not advancing national reconciliation.⁵ Instead the West, particularly the United States has seen an increase in terrorist plots and attacks. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, began in order to halt terrorism and destroy al Qaeda, and bring to justice its leaders including Osama bin Laden have instead fueled a surge in Muslim “fundamentalism” aimed at removing Westerners (infidels) and their influence from the Middle East.

U.S. national security thinking continues to be guided by the belief that a global U.S. military presence is fundamental to making the United States more secure.

According to the National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002:

“For more than six decades, America has sought to protect its own sovereignty and independence through a strategy of global presence and engagement. In doing so, America has helped many other countries and peoples advance along the path of democracy, open markets, individual liberty, and peace with their neighbors. Yet there are those who oppose America’s role in the world, and who are willing to use violence against us and our friends. Our great power leaves these enemies with few conventional options for doing us harm. One such option is to take advantage of our freedom and openness by secretly inserting terrorists into our country to attack our homeland. Homeland security seeks to deny this avenue of attack to our enemies and thus to provide a secure foundation for America’s ongoing global engagement.”⁶

Thus, even the administration admits its aggressive forward presence abroad spurs terrorism; yet maintaining a global presence appears to have become an end in itself for U.S. national security strategy.⁷ Rather than withdraw forces from Iraq, or Saudi Arabia for that matter, the U.S. government appears determined to maintain a regional force to quell doubts about its intent to remain influential in the region, and thereby globally.

Iraq is seemingly dissolving into civil war while Western military gains made in Afghanistan are eroding as the Taliban slowly re-gains authority. The trial, sentencing,

⁵ Ibid., p.38.

⁶ Charles Pena, *Winning the Un-War, A New Strategy for the War on Terrorism*, Potomac Books, Inc, Washington, D.C. 2006, p. 57.

⁷ Ibid.

and finally, execution of Saddam Hussein in 2007 by the U.S. supported Iraqi government was condemned by senior leadership in both Eastern and Western countries as unfair, and did nothing to stem the violence against U.S. and coalition troops in Iraq. Terrorist activities worldwide continue, with New York and London as primary targets. According to Georgetown University Professor Bruce Hoffman, “the enemy has been dispersed but is now more lethal, better trained, and is more unpredictable than ever. Al Qaeda has achieved an autocatalytic capability to generate cells sympathetic to the movement. The CIA officially confirms this analysis and warns that Iraq has abetted a global rise in radicalism.”⁸

The U.S. must adapt its national strategies to incorporate understanding of itself as it continually transform to identify and meet new challenges. This is the WHAT in what America is trying to achieve globally. The U.S. must understand the growth of the “threat” posed by Islamics’ who see Western presence and influence in the Middle East as trespass bent on the destruction of Islam. The United States must present itself as a friend to Muslims worldwide, not just the state of Israel, looking to foster an acceptable solution to Arab-Israeli conflict and peace in the region.

The thesis of this paper is: To win the “War on Terrorism” aka the “Long War”, the U.S. and West must design a response which incorporates study and understanding of the historical roadmap and developments leading to the resurgence and re-embracing of Islam, evolution of anti-Western sentiment, and the overall regional dynamics and culture that shape Muslim ideology. This paper will show why military efforts alone cannot win the war against terrorism as it is a tactic, not an enemy; why the West must also incorporate other elements of national power; diplomatic and information for success;

⁸ Foreign Policy Research Institute, Assessing the Long War, Frank Hoffman, January 5, 2007

and argue the need for a holistic approach to understanding Islam and the re-embracing of Islam by Muslims worldwide.

The methodology used in arguing this thesis consists of analysis, synthesis, and recommendation; and conduct literature review and analysis to highlight the need for cultural awareness and understanding. The author analyzes three case-studies of nation-states with a Muslim majority. The three case-studies analyzed are:

- The creation and decline of Yugoslavia
- The Arab-Israeli conflict
- The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan

This paper will highlight a historical review of Islam, the global use of nationalism, or colonialism, the accepted term pre-World War II, and a look at United States strategic political policies within the region. It recommends first, understanding of Islamic culture and religious significance to Muslims, as within Islam, religion is the core of one's identity, and second, diplomacy and political dialogue with key Muslims worldwide as the solution to the growing threat of Islamic "fundamentalism" against the United States and the West.

“The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”

--Carl Von Clausewitz, On War

Ambiguity Defines Terrorism

According to Dictionary.com, terrorism is defined as:

1. The use of violence and threats to intimidate or coerce, esp. for political purposes.
2. The state of fear and submission produced by terrorism or terrorization.
3. A terroristic method of governing or of resisting a government.⁹

Merriam-Webster's Dictionary On-line defines it as:

- The systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion.¹⁰

Cambridge Dictionaries On-Line defines terrorism as:

- (Threats of) violent action for political purposes.¹¹

The commonality of these three definitions is the defining of terrorism as a verb, rather than a noun. Terrorism is not defined as a person; a terrorist is. Analyses of terrorism—and ascriptions to its causes and remedies—are hampered by an absence of any agreed-upon definitions...As a consequence, casual and arbitrary invocations of the term terrorism tend to serve the interests of the speaker.¹² Terrorism, after all is a tactic,

⁹ Dictionary.com., dictionary.reference.com/.

¹⁰ Merriam-Webster's On-Line Dictionary., www.m-w.com/.

¹¹ Cambridge Dictionaries On-Line, accessed December 2006, available at dictionary.cambridge.org/, December 2007.

¹² Adam Garfinkle, Editor, A Practical Guide to Winning the War on Terrorism; Hoover Institution Press Publication, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 2004, p. 16.

not an enemy; taken literally, a “war on terrorism” is closer to a “war on strategic bombing” or a war on “amphibious assault” than it is to orthodox war aims or wartime grand strategies as one normally makes war on an enemy, not a method.¹³

Terrorism is a method of political struggle or warfare available to any player, including individuals, groups, and states.¹⁴ One cannot simply assume anyone who uses terrorist tactics is to be the target of American war making; terrorism is a diverse tactic, used by many groups with varying political agendas, many of whom pose no immediate threat to Americans.¹⁵ The declaration and use of jihad in its’ conventional translation of “holy war” by Islamic fundamentalists gives rise to the joint use of the nouns Islam and terrorist by western standard. The west labels Muslims, who commit suicide bombings as criminals and thugs, defined in the same vein as the criminal who robs the corner 7-11 or steals a car.

The Muslim fundamentalist does not kill for personal gain; that is one of the tenants of jihad: one does not take illegal booty.¹⁶ Muslims committing jihad do so to protect Islam; for those Muslims who follow Osama bin Laden that means expelling the U. S. from the holy lands of Mecca and Medina. Islamic terrorists’ uses suicide attacks, historically a recent phenomenon, as an “operation against those far outstripping them in numbers and equipment, with prior knowledge this will lead to their death.”¹⁷ This western lack of understanding of the nature and intent of Muslim terrorists helps fuel the

¹³ Stephen D. Biddle, *American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA 2005, p. 6.

¹⁴ Adam Garfinkle, editor, *A Practical Guide to Winning the War on Terrorism*, Hoover Institution Press Publication, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 2004, p. 15.

¹⁵ Stephen D. Biddle, *American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA 2005, p. 6.

¹⁶ David Cook, *Understanding Jihad*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 2005, p. 22.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

distrust, hostilities, However, According to Caleb Carr, author of “The Alienist,” Islamic terrorists are religious soldiers, not criminals, the term current President Bush and his administration usually refer to, and continue to employ tactics against of more use against smugglers, drug dealers, or racketeers.¹⁸

In “The Battle for Peace” U.S. Marine General (Ret.) Tony Zinni, then Commander-in-Chief of the United States Central Command, in charge of all American troops in the Middle East from 1997 to 2000 states,

“We have already made the mistake of declaring war on one of its (instability) more dangerous symptoms—terrorism...and called it officially the “Global War on Terrorism”. Think about it: we’ve declared war on a tactic—terrorism—not on an ideology, not on a nation-state. We measure success in this war tactically; in terrorists killed, finances disrupted, cells taken down. This is no way to fight terrorism...or to fight instability. Fighting an enemy only at the tactical level tells us we don’t grasp the scope and complexity of what we’re up against. Meanwhile, al Qaeda is growing from an organization into a movement. Osama bin Laden’s strategic and operational levels—the continuous flow of angry young men willing to blow themselves up, for example, or his ability to preach as justification an unchallenged, aberrant form of Islam—go interrupted.”¹⁹

Terry Eagleton, author of “Holy Terror” defines terrorism as a modern invention, emerging with the French Revolution, beginning life as state terrorism. He goes on to say that terrorists, whether of the Jacobin or modern-day variety, whether Islamic fundamentalists, Pentagon promoters of shock and awe, or conspiracy theorists huddled in the hills of Dakota, are not in general bereft of ideas, however maligned or preposterous their ideas may be.²⁰ On April 9, 2003 Muslims throughout the world watched with a mixture of shock and awe as a statue of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was pulled down in the center of Baghdad. While true the Muslim world felt shock and awe,

¹⁸ Caleb Carr, *The Art of Knowing the Enemy*, The New York Times article, December 21, 2001, p. 39.

¹⁹ General Tony Zinni, Tony Koltz, *The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America’s Power and Purpose*, PALGRAVE MACMILLIAN, New York, 2006, p. 114.

²⁰ Terry Eagleton, *Holy Terror*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005, p. 2.

it was not in the way the U.S. military intended. It was as if the clock of history had been turned back to the early days of colonialism in the nineteenth century. For the first time in more than eight decades, Western armies were marching into the capital of a major Muslim state with the express purpose of overthrowing the regime. Another reason for the shock and awe: the U.S.-led conquest was broadcast live and watched by hundreds of millions of viewers.²¹ Their terror is intended to help execute their political visions, not substitute for them; there is a complex philosophy of political terror in nineteenth-and twentieth-century Europe, which can by no means be reduced to simple thuggery. The word terrorist is an underestimation.²²

He goes on to say that terrorism in a broader sense is as old as humanity itself; in a more specialized sense terrorism runs all the way back to the pre-modern world. It is there that the sacred first sees the light of day and the idea of terror, implausibly enough is closely bound up with this ambiguous notion. It is ambiguous because the word sacer can mean blessed or cursed, holy or reviled; and there are kinds of terror in ancient civilization which are creative and destructive, life-giving and death-dealing. The sacred is dangerous, to be kept in a cage rather than a glass case. The affinity between terror and the sacred may sound peculiarly, even offensively irrelevant to the terrorism of our time, yet it is not wholly possible to understand the notion of terror without grasping this curious double-edgedness. Eagleton asserts that terror begins as a religious idea, as indeed much terror is still today; and religion is all about deeply ambivalent powers which both enrapture and annihilate.²³ There are those who could consider both God and

²¹ Adam Garfinkle, Editor, *A Practical Guide to Winning the War on Terrorism*; Hoover Institution Press Publication, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 2004, p. 4-5.

²² Terry Eagleton, *Holy Terror*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005, p. 2.

²³ Ibid.

Jesus Themselves as terrorists; he demanded the life of his Son as He had been offended and Jesus willingly gave it.²⁴

Terrorisms' history is as old as human conflict; it is a great equalizer of power; colloquially put, the poor man's weapon.²⁵ The nation-state has a perceived monopoly over the legal use of violence; this resonates well in the West as most Western states represent the will of the public as expressed in free elections. Electorates can remove unwanted or dangerous leaders and are expected to act fairly and impartially and should be the sole instrument entrusted with the use of violence against its own citizens. In most of the rest of the world however, regimes are not elected, lack basic democratic legitimacy, and routinely use forms of intimidation and terrorist brutality to maintain a monopoly of political power. Beleaguered populations often turn to violence or terrorism as a response.²⁶

Thus, a key psychological notion lies behind much of the perception and use of terror: terrorism is often seen in the developing world to be more "justified", or at least less morally reprehensible, when the weak use it against the strong as their main or only weapon of resistance. Ironically, contemporary values of human rights and democracy, and concepts of national self-determination and social justice, may have stimulated the use of terror among oppressed or frustrated groups in a misguided search for "justice" on the international and national level. Many oppressed peoples used to take their condition for granted; they no longer do.²⁷

Defining the War on Terrorism

²⁴ Ibid., p. 40.

²⁵ Adam Garfinkle, Editor, A Practical Guide to Winning the War on Terrorism; Hoover Institution Press Publication, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 2004, p. 15.

²⁶ Ibid., p.17.

²⁷ Ibid., p.17-18.

In a thirty-two minute speech President George W. Bush gave at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, July 2004, he declared no less than six times that “the American people are safer” as a result of invading Iraq.²⁸ However, when the 9/11 Commission issued its report later that month, it concluded that Iraq could not be linked to al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks: “To date we have seen no evidence that these or earlier contacts [between al Qaeda and Iraq] ever developed into a collaborative operation relationship. Nor have we seen evidence that Iraq cooperated with al Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the United States”—this calls into question whether attacking Iraq had anything to do with the terrorist threat to America.”²⁹ Adding further confusion was then-Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge’s warning of “credible reporting” that al Qaeda was planning “a large-scale attack in the United States in an effort to disrupt our democratic process”—hardly a message that America was safe from another terrorist attack.³⁰ The U.S. may be safer but Americans require, after close to five years of war the confidence that they are now safe. That they are free to do more than wonder when the next attack against them will occur.

The U.S. and West may well be safer as a result of the Iraq War; it is possible Operation Iraqi Freedom could have led to a direct disruption of Al Qaeda operations worldwide. However, as Iraq’s involvement in the events of September 11th 2001 remains doubtful, the question stands was and is Iraq a player in the war on terror. The

²⁸ Charles Pena, *Winning the Un-War, A New Strategy for the War on Terrorism*, Potomac Books, Washington, D.C., 2006, p. xxiii.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. xxiii.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

United States still lacks a clear focus for waging the war on terrorism. There is no overarching view of the terrorist threat and no top-to-bottom plan to combat it.³¹

In a prime-time address to the nation in April 2004, President Bush stated “the violence used in Iraq is familiar. The terrorist near Baghdad is using the same ideology of murder that killed people in Madrid, Bali, in the killing of 241 Marines in Beirut, the first World Trade Center bombing and the bombing of African embassies, the USS Cole attack, and...the horror inflicted upon thousands of innocent men, women, and children on September 11th, 2001”.³² The only thing these events have in common is the killing of innocent people, but the people responsible and their motivations were not the same in every case—although that is clearly what the president meant to imply.³³ The change after September 11, 2001, is that most Americans now know from their own experience that religious nationalism, and the terrorism that it can produce, is a major problem in the world today.³⁴

President Bush claims that before 9/11 the al Qaeda threat was “obvious”, as evidenced by the intelligence community recognizing al Qaeda as responsible for the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania as well as the attack against the USS Cole in 2000. However, the preponderance of evidence shows that the president was not at all focused on al Qaeda. In fact, the president did not mention al Qaeda once in any public statements before the 9/11 attacks; his national security focus was on

³¹ Ibid., p. xxiv.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Christopher Catherwood, *Why the Nation's Rage, Killing in the Name of God*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham, Maryland, 2002, p.165.

missile defense, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and rogue states. This preoccupation is evident in his many public statements.³⁵

In December 2006, the British Foreign Office advised the government to stop using the phrase "War on Terror". A spokesperson for the department said the government wanted to "avoid reinforcing and giving succour to the terrorists' narrative by using language that, taken out of context, could be counter-productive". Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is a man of few regrets, but he has acknowledged that he had second thoughts about the Bush administration's often-used phrase "the war on terror" to describe the U.S. military endeavors in Iraq and Afghanistan. Asked by conservative commentator Cal Thomas what he would have done differently during his often-stormy, almost six-year tenure as President Bush's defense chief, Rumsfeld replied: "I guess I don't think I would have called it "the war on terror." Rumsfeld continued: "The word "war" conjures up World War II more than it does the Cold War, and it creates a level of expectation of victory and an ending within the 30 or 60 minutes of a soap opera. And it isn't going to happen that way." he said. Terror is a weapon of choice for extremists who are trying to destabilize regimes and impose their will in the hands of a small group of clerics, their dark vision on all the people that they can control."³⁶

International terrorist movements, as proclaimed by the Bush administration, should be the primary target of the international global cooperation evidenced directly after 9/11. However, the Bush administration's global war on terrorism defines terrorism too expansively, permitting nearly all dictators and regimes to embrace it and to declare

³⁵ Charles Pena, *Winning the Un-War, A New Strategy for the War on Terrorism*, Potomac Books, Washington, D.C., 2006, p. 1.

³⁶ Cal Thomas, *It is Not a War on Terror*, 28 December 2006, thinkprogress.org/2006/12/12/rumsfeld-iraq-terror/, available December 2006.

their own local opponents all to be terrorists—and hence legitimate targets of the larger antiterrorism struggle. In effect, the global war on terrorism has given license to many nasty regimes to depoliticize and then criminalize any local resistance and ethnic movements that have recourse to political violence—and this in countries where nearly all resistance to the state is treated violently. States such as Russia, China, Israel, and India to name a few have exploited the GWOT for their own ends. In most cases, the criminalization of legitimate political grievances has worsened the problem, heightened tensions, and intensified anti-American feelings.³⁷ In the Middle East, the problems associated with this dynamic are particularly complex and problematic. Few regimes are legitimate in terms of popular support and electoral legitimacy. Until legal channels exist for the expression of grievances—often not justified by minorities but also by the majority against unpopular regimes—there will be latent sympathy for acts of violence against the repressive state.³⁸

Iraq: The Wrong War

The United States government went to war against Iraq as it deemed Saddam Hussein a potential threat to U.S. borders and national interests. Numerous intelligence reports stressed Saddam Hussein as attempting to acquire WMD capabilities, and willing to use them. Analysts surmised the reason for Saddam refusing to allow UN weapons inspectors into the country, between 1998 and November 2002 (despite Security Council Resolution 687), was he had reconstituted Iraq's prohibited WMD programs.³⁹ In the January 29th 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush stated his objectives were to

³⁷ Adam Garfinkle, Editor, *A Practical Guide to Winning the War on Terrorism*; Hoover Institution Press Publication, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 2004, p. 22.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.23.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.27.

eliminate the threats posed by terrorists and by regimes that seek weapons of mass destruction. He devoted one sentence to North Korea, one to Iran, and five to Iraq.⁴⁰

“Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax and nerve gas and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens, leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.”⁴¹

On Good Morning America on September 8, 2003, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice responded to a question about Iraq being the central front on the war on terrorism by saying, “The president told the American people shortly after September 11th that we are going to fight this war on the offense. We are going to fight it on the territory of the terrorists.”⁴² Clearly the implication was that Iraq was the territory of the terrorists responsible for 9/11.⁴³ The conclusion the American people drew from these events and rhetoric: the enemy in the war on terror is the leader of the country of Iraq, Saddam Hussein. Defeating Saddam Hussein equaled a secure America. However, there is no concrete evidence of links between Iraq, al Qaeda, and the attacks of 9/11; the evidence in fact suggests the opposite.⁴⁴

On January 28, 2004, David Kay, recent head of the Iraq Survey Group told the Senate Armed Services Committee, “we were almost all wrong, and I certainly include myself.” He said 85 percent of the work was done and he did not expect ever to find WMD stockpiles in Iraq; and that it would take an outside inquiry to investigate the intelligence failure on WMD. Dr. Kay argued it was important to acknowledge failure,

⁴⁰ Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, New York, New York, 2004, p. 92.

⁴¹ United States State of the Union Address, CNN.Com, January 2002, accessed January–April 2007.

⁴² Charles Pena, *Winning the Un-War, A New Strategy for the War on Terrorism*, Potomac Books, Washington, D.C., 2006, p. 37.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 39.

and that Congress and the public would only have the necessary confidence in any intelligence that reached the president and top officials if there were such an inquiry.⁴⁵

Rohan Gunaratna, director of terrorism research at Singapore's Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies and author of "Inside al Qaeda", and considered one of the world's foremost experts on al Qaeda researched thousands of documents and videos after Operation Enduring Freedom and could not find any evidence of al Qaeda links to Saddam Hussein or the Baghdad administration; a senior U.S. official acknowledged, "We could find no provable connection between Saddam and al Qaeda".⁴⁶ Despite President Bush's assertion that "there is no question that Saddam Hussein had al Qaeda ties," at most both shared a common hatred of the United States.⁴⁷ Hussein did have links to terrorists, supporting two types of terrorist groups: Iranian dissidents devoted to toppling the Iranian government and a variety of Palestinian groups opposed to peace with the Middle East.⁴⁸ But the potential for Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden to potentially ally against the United States was slim; Saddam was a Muslim secular ruler while bin Laden is a radical Muslim fundamentalist—hardly compatible ideological views.⁴⁹

Iraq was the wrong war because the enemy at the gates was—and continues to be—the al Qaeda terrorist network operating in sixty or more countries around the world. Although it seems obvious, it is important to remember that the 9/11 attacks were not carried out with any assistance from Saddam Hussein. None of the nineteen hijackers

⁴⁵ Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, New York, New York, 2004, p. 434.

⁴⁶ Charles Pena, *Winning the Un-War, A New Strategy for the War on Terrorism*, Potomac Books, Washington, D.C., 2006, p. 39.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

were Iraqis. Iraq had not been linked to the planning, financing, or execution of those attacks. The former regime was not known to support or provide safe harbor to al Qaeda, as the Taliban regime did in Afghanistan.⁵⁰ Therefore, President Bush's three postwar declarations do not accurately reflect U.S. national security posture:

1. "Our nation is more secure"

This statement presumes that Iraq (like the Taliban regime in Afghanistan) was a correct target in the war on terrorism to dismantle the al Qaeda network. Moreover, the paradigm used to define terrorism is nations using "terrorism as a means of political expression." It was later determined the government of Iraq did not sponsor al Qaeda; therefore it did not fit this particular paradigm. While the Taliban government did support al Qaeda, it is privatized terrorism, sponsored by bin Laden and independent of any one nation-state.⁵¹

2. "Iraq is now the central front in the war on terrorism."

If Iraq has become the central front in the war on terrorism, it is so only because the U.S. decided to invade that country. Iraq was not a hot-bed for al Qaeda under Saddam Hussein's brutal rule, but al Qaeda has skillfully used the Iraq war to rally more to its cause.⁵²

3. "We are aggressively striking the terrorists in Iraq, defeating them there so we will not have to face them in our own country"

To be sure, al Qaeda is taking advantage of the U.S. situation in Iraq and is linked to some of the terrorists there. In October 2004 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi pledged his loyalty to Osama bin Laden, renaming his terrorist group Al Qaeda in the Land of Two

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid. p. 41.

⁵² Ibid.

Rivers (Iraq is commonly known as the land of two rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates). Al Qaeda may have also had a hand in the bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003 and the bombing of the Red Cross in Baghdad in October 2003. Sunni Baathists who formerly held the reins of power are resisting the change brought about by U.S. military action—but these are not terrorists who would otherwise attack the United States. Also, the insurgency is not exclusively Sunni-based; the uprising in Fallujah and violent resistance in Najaf in 2004 were both orchestrated by Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. The majority of Iraqis view the U.S. military as an occupying force and wants them to leave their country. Those al Qaeda operatives in Iraq are more than likely there because the U.S. military presence is a convenient target in their neighborhood. Since the beginning of hostilities, less than 1% of insurgents in the country have been identified as foreigners, meaning the majority of insurgents are indeed Iraqi.⁵³

The bipartisan Iraq Study Group recommends new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly. The study group believes these two recommendations are equally important, reinforcing one another. The group also states if the Iraqi government moves forward with national reconciliation, Iraq will have an opportunity for a better future, terrorist will be dealt a blow, stability will be enhanced in an important part of the world, and most importantly, America's credibility, interests, and values will be protected.⁵⁴

A continued U.S. military presence in Iraq allows al Qaeda to convert Iraqis, previously sympathetic to the United States to being sympathetic to al Qaeda and

⁵³ Ibid. p. 44-45.

⁵⁴ James A. Baker and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs, The Iraq Study Group Report, The Way Forward—A New Approach, Vintage Books, New York, 2006, p. xiii.

terrorism. Continuing to keep the U.S. and the U.S. military as the face of change in Iraq rather than the face of Iraqis themselves is worse than not directing our attention against the al Qaeda threats. It allows the inevitable unintended consequences of those actions, such as the events at Abu Ghraib prison, military forces accused of the torture and killing of Iraqi civilians and other alleged negative events to create anti-American sentiment; the first step toward growing a terrorist. Not all will convert; but as the U.S. remains in the country the potential for converts readily exists. Aggressive U.S. military tactics may, in fact be necessary to deal with Iraqi insurgents and terrorists but may do more to create terrorists.⁵⁵

David Kilcullen, currently the Deputy in the U.S. State Department Counterterrorism Office wrote in 2005 an article for the *Journal of Strategic Studies*, redefining the war on terror as a “global counterinsurgency”.⁵⁶ The change in terminology has large implications. A terrorist is a kook in a room...an insurgent has a mass base whose support can be won or lost through politics.⁵⁷ According to Kilcullen the notion of a war on terror has led the U.S. government to focus overwhelmingly on military responses.⁵⁸ In a counterinsurgency, armed force is only a quarter of the effort; political, economic, and informational operations are also required.⁵⁹ By speaking of Saddam Hussein, the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, the Taliban, the Iranian government, Hezbollah, and al Qaeda in terms of one big war, administration officials and ideologues have made Osama bin Laden’s job much easier. “You don’t play to the enemy’s global

⁵⁵ Charles Pena, *Winning the Un-War, A New Strategy for the War on Terrorism*, Potomac Books, Washington, D.C., 2006, p. 47.

⁵⁶ George Packer, *Knowing the Enemy*, *The New Yorker*, December 18, 2006, page 62.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

information strategy of making it all one fight. Let's not talk about bin Laden's objectives—let's talk about your objectives. How do we solve that problem?"⁶⁰

In the final analysis Iraq was the wrong war; not because the United States used preemptive military force—preemptive self-defense would have been justified in the face of a truly imminent threat; not because the United States acted without the consent of the UN—no country should surrender its defense to a vote of other nations; and not because, so far, WMD have not been discovered—even if those weapons existed, they were not a threat.⁶¹

Iraq was the wrong war because Saddam Hussein proved no real threat to the national security or strategic interests of the United States. Ironically, President Bush provided his own indictment of the Iraq war when he addressed the UN General Assembly in September 2003: "No government should ignore the threat of terror, because to look the other way gives terrorists the chance to regroup and recruit and prepare".⁶² But that is exactly what the Iraq war has been—a dangerous distraction in the war on terrorism against the real threat: al Qaeda.⁶³

Pre-9/11 Strategic Terrorism Strategies

Past administrations have employed a range of measures to combat international terrorism, from diplomacy, international cooperation, and constructive engagement to economic sanctions, covert action, protective security measures, and military force. The application of sanctions is one of the most frequently used anti-terrorist tools of U.S.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 40.

⁶² The White House, President Bush Addresses United Nations General Assembly, September 23, 2003 www.thewhitehouse.gov, accessed December 2007.

⁶³ Charles Pena, *Winning the Un-War, A New Strategy for the War on Terrorism*; Potomac Books, Washington, D.C., 2006, p. 48.

policymakers, generally aimed at deterring and punishing state sponsors as opposed to terrorist groups themselves from the late 1970's to the mid-1990s.⁶⁴

Because the U.S. international counter-terrorism policy framework has been sanctions-oriented, and has traditionally sought to pin responsibility on state sponsors, changes in policy and approaches are regularly being considered and implemented. A desire to punish a state for supporting international terrorism may also conflict with other foreign policy objectives involving that nation, such as human rights concerns.⁶⁵ But in the future, new types of terrorists may emerge: individuals not affiliated with any established terrorist organizations and who are apparently not agents of any state sponsor.⁶⁶ In “The New Terrorism: The Nature of the War on Terrorism”, author Michael K. Kometer writes of a global Islamic terrorist structure, amorphous; but a reality with semiautonomous pieces bound tighter than in the past. However, the Islamic movement has internal struggles allowing outlying spokes of the hub to act autonomously.⁶⁷ While bin Laden set-up financial networks and propaganda organizations in London, removal of the leaders would probably not debilitate the operations of its pieces. Despite his extensive influence, there is more to the movement than bin Laden.⁶⁸

The U.S. created the Joint Counter-Terrorism Center in 1986. In the context of the cold war however, terrorism seemed far less important than more conventional kinds of military threats. As a result, the Counter-Terrorism may have become a dumping

⁶⁴ Raphael F. Perl, Terrorism and National Security: Issues and Trends, CRS Issues Brief for Congress, Updated March 9, 2006, Congressional Research Service; The Library of Congress, p. CRS-6.

⁶⁵ Ibid, page CRS-7.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Michael W. Kometer, Major, USAF, The New Terrorism: The Nature of the War on Terrorism, School of Advanced Military Studies, Air University, 2004, p. 59.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p.57.

ground for intelligence professional deemed unsuitable for more important jobs. Through the 1990s, the U.S. government position was that in many countries fundamentalists were a legitimate and repressed opposition. In each case of attacks against the U.S. in the 1980's and 1990's U.S. retaliation was limited to police and legal action against those directly responsible. The government made no serious attempt to strike those abroad who had instigated the 1993 attack or its failed successor.⁶⁹

The passage of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132) signaled an important shift in policy, from punishing state sponsors of terrorism to the terror organizations themselves. The act, largely initiated by the executive branch, created a legal category of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) and banned funding, granting of visas and other material support to such organizations. The USA Patriot Act extended and strengthened the provisions of that legislation.⁷⁰

When the Clinton administration took office in 1993, terrorism issues were handled in a small directorate of the National Security Council (NSC) staff for “International Programs” commonly referred to as “drugs and thugs”. Terrorist attacks early in the new administration, particularly the 1993 attempt to blow up the World Trade Center, quickly changed this perspective. The first World Trade Center attack also spotlighted the problem of how or whether the NSC could bridge the divide between foreign policy and traditionally domestic issues such as criminal justice. That attack,

⁶⁹ Norman Friedman, *Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New way of War*, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, p. 14.

⁷⁰ Raphael F. Perl, *Terrorism and National Security: Issues and Trends*, CRS Issues Brief for Congress, Updated March 9, 2006, Congressional Research Service; The Library of Congress, p. CRS-6.

handled by the FBI as a matter for domestic law enforcement, had been carried out by a mixture of American citizens, resident aliens, and foreign nationals with ties overseas.⁷¹

President Clinton concluded that the National Security Act of 1947 allowed the NSC to consider issues of domestic security arising from a foreign threat. The President later issued a formal directive on counterterrorism policy, Presidential Decision Directive 39, June 1995. It characterized terrorism as a national security concern as well as a matter for law enforcement and also articulated a “lead agency” approach to counterterrorism policy. It had four main programs areas:

1. reducing vulnerabilities
2. deterring terrorism
3. responding to terrorism
4. preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

In each area responsibilities were assigned to the departments and agencies of the government.⁷²

In early 1998 the Clinton Administration prepared a new presidential directive, PDD 62, on counterterrorism; its goals to strengthen the “lead agency” approach in ten program areas, reemphasize the importance the President attached to unconventional threats at home and abroad, and strengthen interagency coordination.⁷³

Under the Clinton and Bush administrations budget funding for counterterrorism grew, largely due to the bombings of the World Trade Center and USS Cole. During the Clinton administration, counterterrorism reached a new level of importance previously

⁷¹ Understanding the War on Terror, A Foreign Affairs Book; W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 2005, p. 166.

⁷² Ibid. p. 166.

⁷³ Ibid. p. 168.

unseen. The Bush administration proposed a 27 percent increase in CIA counterterrorism spending for Fiscal Year 2002.⁷⁴ A draft presidential directive on al Qaeda consisted of an expanded covert action program against al Qaeda, including significantly increased funding and more support for the Northern Alliance, anti-Taliban Pashtuns, and other groups. National Security Council staff member Richard Clarke, prior to a Principles Committee meeting scheduled for 4 September 2001, criticized the military for its unwillingness to retaliate for the USS Cole and urged policymakers to imagine a day after a terrorist attack, with hundreds of Americans dead at home and abroad, and ask themselves what they could have done earlier. He feared Washington would be left with a modest effort to swat flies while waiting for the big attack. Then came September 11, 2001.⁷⁵

American Strategic Policies & Interests in the Post-9/11 World

The Bush Doctrine

The Bush Doctrine evolved in the aftermath of the events of 9/11. Although neither President George W. Bush nor the leading figures of his administration have publicly referred to it as such, it was unsurprising in the aftermath of 9/11 that a new foreign policy doctrine should be formulated. Bush immediately and viscerally understood the events of 9/11 as unacceptable and vile, necessitating a clear declaration to both the American people and the world as to how best to respond to the perpetrators of such a heinous attack and how, thereby, to make the U.S. secure for the future.⁷⁶ Following a

⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 178.

⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 181.

⁷⁶ Mary Buckley and Robert Singh, Editors, *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences*; Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2006, New York, New York, p. 3.

series of landmark speeches that crystallized and advanced the re-evaluation of U.S. policies, the National Security Strategy (NSS) of September 2002 was the result.⁷⁷

Therein, the four pillars of the Bush doctrine were set out:

- The maintenance of American military primacy;
- The embrace of preventative war as a supplement to traditional deterrence;
- The war on terrorism;
- Democracy⁷⁸

The Strategic Studies Institute, part of the U.S. Army War College and the strategic level study agent for national security issues tells us that public discussion of American interests changed dramatically after 9/11 but the interests themselves have changed little if at all.⁷⁹ In particular, security of the homeland and the safety of the American population were always vital national interests as shown in the 1995 Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense: Since the founding of the Republic, the U.S. Government has always sought to secure for its people a set of basic objectives:

- The protection of their lives and personal safety, both at home and abroad
- The maintenance of the nation's sovereignty, political freedoms, and independence with its values, institutions, and territory intact.
- Their material well-being and prosperity

Similar phrasings can be found in most pre-9/11 American strategic documents; security of the homeland and the population hardly emerged as interests in 2001.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 4.

⁷⁸ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002.

⁷⁹ Stephen D. Biddle, American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005, p.3.

⁸⁰ Ibid. p. 4.

In September 2001, the President announced that the nation was at war—and public statements since then have repeatedly echoed that formulation. Yet the nation’s key strategic documents have continued to treat threats in the same generic, unspecific, peacetime-like sense that they had done prior to 2001. This lack of threat specificity makes true strategic thought difficult. Wartime strategy is normally concerned with identifying enemy weaknesses or centers of gravity and crafting a design to strike at them. Weaknesses and strengths are specific to the parties, however—no two actors are identical. Sun Tzu’s oft-cited injunction to know one’s enemy is all about the need to fit one’s strategy to the particulars of one’s enemy and his specific vulnerabilities. This is impossible when official strategic documents do not identify the enemy but instead frame policy in terms of broad categories of challenge-types without naming actual challengers.⁸¹

America Needs A New Strategy

To Beat Jihadists, Know Thy Enemy.⁸²

By making the fight mainly military, the U.S. misses al Qaeda’s ideological aim—boosting its following for a “battle to the death”.⁸³ The question is: who exactly is the enemy in this war, what are their goals, and what are our goals? In the presidential address of 10 January 2007, President Bush admitted what America and the rest of the world already assumed and needed to hear the “leader of the free world”, and the President who initiated the war on terror say;

⁸¹ Ibid. p. 6.

⁸² Stan Crock, To Beat Jihadists, Know Thy Enemy, Business Week Online, September 2004, p. 1.

⁸³ Ibid.

“The new strategy I outline tonight will change America's course in Iraq, and help us succeed in the fight against terror. That the Iraqi elections of 2005 were a stunning achievement. We thought that these elections would bring the Iraqis together — and that as we trained Iraqi security forces, we could accomplish our mission with fewer American troops. But in 2006, the opposite happened. The violence in Iraq — particularly in Baghdad — overwhelmed the political gains the Iraqis had made. Al-Qaeda terrorists and Sunni insurgents recognized the mortal danger that Iraq's elections posed for their cause. And they responded with outrageous acts of murder aimed at innocent Iraqis. The situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American people — and it is unacceptable to me. Our troops in Iraq have fought bravely. They have done everything we have asked them to do. Where mistakes have been made, the responsibility rests with me. A successful strategy for Iraq goes beyond military operations...It is clear that we need to change our strategy in Iraq.”⁸⁴

The next question then is change current strategy to what new strategy, capable of bringing democracy to Iraq, ending that war and ending the war on terror? According to then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “This conflict cannot be won by military means alone.”⁸⁵

New strategies for Iraq and the Middle East region itself are not new. The region has been prominent due to the Arab-Israeli conflict since the birth of the State of Israel. The United States has maintained visibility on the country of Iraq and Saddam Hussein in particular. Stabilizing the region with a democratic Iraq without Hussein as its’ leader was not a new course of action as a result of September 11, 2001. In June of 1999, the United States Central Command sponsored the Desert Crossing Seminar to identify interagency issues and insights on how to manage change in a post-Saddam Iraq. Participants were focused on proposed phases and concepts, as well as the risks, threats, opportunities, and challenges likely to be present. Participants included the Department of State, Department of Defense, National Security Council, and the CIA.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ The White House, The President’s Address to The Nation, January 10, 2007.

⁸⁵ Charles Pena, *Winning the Un-War, A New Strategy for the War on Terrorism*, Potomac Books Inc, Washington, D.C., p. 73.

⁸⁶ USCENTCOM, *Desert Crossing Seminar After Action Report*, June 28-30, 1999, p. 3.

One important issue discussed was that regime change in Iraq may not enhance regional stability. It was felt that Iraq would likely be unstable and this instability may spread if not properly managed. The country could fragment along religious and/or ethnic lines. In a sense, a western-style democracy may not engender long term stability without considerable stabilization, preparation, and long-term sustainment.⁸⁷

Additionally, many participants continuously expressed the view that the United States lacks sufficient information on individuals, groups, and /or elements within Iraq to plan for, or respond to, Saddam's departure.⁸⁸ One note of caution the United States failed to heed was that Iraqi military forces could be essential to transitioning from hostilities to a democratic government; the principal accepted an analysis concluding that restructuring and re-equipping Iraq's military might not even be necessary for the protection of legitimate national security concerns.⁸⁹ While the U.S. had and continues to have good intentions, its actions may have created more of the enemy rather than co-opting them to the West.

What is Victory?

Despite all the lives lost and ground gained (and lost) America is no closer to winning or ending the war than it was in the months following 9/11. In order to win this war, to secure the homeland and assure U.S. allies and coalition partners that it can and will remain a superpower, the U.S. must understand what victory should be; that to "stay the course" will only continue what has become a war of attrition. The coalition achieved the initial strategic objective in Iraq: regime change. The question still remains what should victory in Iraq look like; many now believe that victory means a friendly,

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 10.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 11.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 20.

prosperous, self-defending democracy, while defeat means civil war—and the metrics that matter most are thus measures such of elections held, Iraqi security forces trained, or electricity generated. Such a victory creates a demonstration effect in which Iraqi democracy catalyzes political change elsewhere in the region, removing the underlying cause of Islamist terrorism; a defeat, by this logic, would produce region-wide chaos that would undermine, not facilitate, the larger war on terror.⁹⁰

Stephen Biddle goes on to say that this analysis is deeply flawed as Iraq may or may not become a stable democracy but the demonstration is already lost; Iraq is already in a civil war requiring a U.S. strategy shift from classical counter-insurgency to one designed for terminating a civil war.⁹¹ Significant numbers of U.S. men and women will continue to be killed or wounded along with huge numbers of Muslims and Arab men, women, and children also continuing to be casualties. Singular use of military force and overwhelming numbers cannot secure American objectives in Iraq or the global war on terrorism. Rather than stay the current course, the United States Government must seek a new strategy integrating not just military actions, but diplomatic, information, and economic means to win the war.

The United States must build a new international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region. In order to foster such consensus, the United States should embark on a robust diplomatic effort to establish an international support structure intended to stabilize Iraq and ease tensions in other countries in the region. This support structure should include every country that has an interest in averting a chaotic Iraq, including all

⁹⁰ Tommy Franks, Stephen Biddle, Peter Charles Choharis, John M. Owen IV, Daniel Pipes, Gary Rosen and Dov S. Zakheim, National Interest Online, "Is This Victory?", November 10, 2006, accessed January 2007.

⁹¹ Ibid.

of Iraq's neighbors—Iran and Syria among them as they all share an interest in avoiding the horrific consequences that would flow from a chaotic Iraq, particularly humanitarian catastrophic and regional destabilization.⁹²

At the same time, the U.S. must push the Iraqis themselves to shoulder their burden of leading and transitioning their country. There is no action the American military can take that, by itself, can bring about success in Iraq. But there are actions the U.S. and Iraqi governments, working together can and should take to increase the possibility of avoiding disaster there, increasing the chance of success. The Iraqi government should accelerate the national recognition program and accelerate assuming responsibility for Iraqi security using increased number and quality of Iraqi brigades. The U.S. would increase strength numbers of military personnel assigned in support roles, while conducting on-the-job training. This will allow for the re-deployment of combat forces out of Iraq.⁹³

The Iraq Survey Group recommended sixty-seven points. One creating an office for a Senior Advisor for Economic reconstruction in Iraq, authorized to quick-disburse funds to promote national reconciliation should be quickly implemented. This will increase the effectiveness of assistance programs, allowing the Iraqis to move quickly towards working infrastructure, regular payrolls, and more importantly, increased confidence in the government.⁹⁴ As the U.S. seeks the guidance and support of key Muslim leaders worldwide, who in turn can benefit from a true understanding of U.S.

⁹² James A. Baker, Lee H. Hamilton, C0Chairs, The Iraq Study Group Report, The Way Forward – A New Approach, First Vintage Books, 2006, p. 44.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 70.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 89.

social and political policies, open dialogue will evolve, not only about Iraq but the discussion of and resolution of issues between east and west.

U.S. in Iraq: An Unpopular War

The Bush Administrations' reactions to September 11 were fast and furious, much in the vein of "shock and awe" tactics defined by military doctrine. According to Louis Fisher, Congressional Research Service, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 forced a major redistribution of political power within the United States, shifting unprecedented authority to the presidency, the military, and the law enforcement community, and attracted broad support for U.S. military action in the destruction of Al Qaeda and its networks. In the war against Iraq however, the United States government could gather only the support of a handful of allies.⁹⁵

In taking military action first against the Taliban in Afghanistan and later against Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the United States signaled its intention to act with or without allies, the UN Security Council, and with or without public support. In both wars, President Bush received statutory authority from Congress. In some cases, as with his military order of 13 November 2001, authorizing the creation of military tribunals, he acted alone, with few checks from Congress or the judiciary. The scope of presidential power was curbed by executive self-restraint in the face of public and press criticism.⁹⁶

U.S. military action against Afghanistan attracted broad support throughout the world, with nations recognizing the US right to destroy al Qaeda training bases and its capacity to plan execute future attacks. President Bush received the assistance of many countries in stripping al Qaeda of its financial and organizational assets. However, when

⁹⁵ Patrick Hayden, Tom Lansford, Robert P. Watson, Editors, Ashgate Publishing Company, Burlington, America's War on Terror, VT 2003, p. xvi.

⁹⁶ Ibid, p. xvi

the Bush administration requested action against Iraq, international support was limited to a Security Council resolution to send inspectors back to Iraq. The Security Council refused to back a second resolution to authorize military action. A strategic shift in global politics occurred, signaled by the U.N. Security Council's refusal to support military action, with China, France, Germany, Turkey, and other countries withholding support.⁹⁷ The United States government, while still a superpower, was engaging in a war which it would "go alone", without a supporting global consensus.

The administration lacked support in the war in Iraq due in part to the mistakes made in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the administration was on notice not to duplicate its earlier mistakes of intervening only to help check Soviet designs and then vacating, leaving a vacuum that invited control by the Taliban and the al Qaeda terrorist network. Yet following the military triumph of November 2001, the promise of reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan has seen little follow through, resulting in resentment among Afghans, who concluded that once again a commitment by an outside power remains unfulfilled.⁹⁸

Although the U.S.-led coalition that invaded Iraq in 2003 and toppled President Hussein was made up of allies, the current Iraq war and its alleged links to the larger campaign against terrorism have been highly controversial. The Bush Administration has been accused of acting in violation of international law, committing human rights violations; and violating the U.S. Constitution particularly with regard to the internment of prisoners of war in its military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The United States could not muster Arab and Muslim support for the war against Iraq, with Saudi Arabia

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. xvi.

and NATO ally Turkey refusing to participate, leaving only Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar for bases of operation. Numerous demonstrations in the Muslim world in opposition to the United States and its plans to invade Iraq continued, and leaders from those countries warned that any attack would destabilize the region and fuel more anti-American terrorism and retaliation. With little help from regional allies, nor much of the world, the United States had a choice to continue a diplomatic approach or go to war without the desired support. It chose the latter.⁹⁹ In doing so, the United States further distanced itself from its' gradually shrinking network of regional allies.

However, Iraq cannot be addressed effectively in isolation from other major regional issues, interests, and unresolved conflicts. To put it simply, all key issues in the Middle East—the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq, Iran, the need for political and economic reforms, and extremism and terrorism—are inextricably linked.¹⁰⁰

The United States made the same mistakes in Iraq it has made when waging wars against foreign nations and cultures, one critical to achieving strategic goals anywhere: it did not know the “real” enemy and its resilient nature. Additionally it:

- Assumed fighting and winning a traditional war was the main objective.
- Allowed its political arrogance to lead to political short-sightedness.
- Misjudged the will of the American people to fight the long war.

America misjudged global public opinion. The right of a state to protect itself against aggression was not borne out in Iraq as Iraqi aggression against the U.S. was not proven;

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 94.

¹⁰⁰ James A. Baker and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs, The Iraq Study Group Report, The Way Forward—A New Approach, Vintage Books, New York, 2006, p. 44.

America lost that IO campaign, ultimately viewed as the transgressor by Muslims worldwide.

The second war in Iraq began after the fall of Saddam. It was not the traditional war shown on CNN in '91 and again in 2003. It is the war of ideals, the clash of civilizations long simmering within the region. As long as Hussein remained in power, Iraq posed a small threat to American citizens and American national security. He kept his atrocities against the Iraqi people within Iraqi borders. Because events in Iraq have been set in motion by American decisions and actions, the United States has both a national and moral interest in doing what it can to give Iraqis an opportunity to avert anarchy.¹⁰¹ The U.S.-led invasion removing him from power and his subsequent trial, and later, execution increased the proliferation of Muslim terrorism the United States government now views as its' number one threat. In Iraq, the fallout from the war proved to be all-encompassing, reaching the furthest corners of the Arab and Muslim worlds.

On Friday 29 December 2006 Saddam Hussein was executed for crimes against the Iraqi people. His U.S. human rights lawyer said Saddam received an unfair trial while in American custody and was executed against U.S. and international law. This execution was denounced world wide as barbaric, and in no way leading to a peaceful Iraq; instead, it would lead to more civil unrest and violence. Denounced by the countries of Russia and Libya, who themselves have questionable civil rights records, the Vatican, India, and many other countries and human rights organizations, President Bush still declared the trial fair and that he (Saddam) received the justice he denied to the Iraqi people; that it was an important milestone in Iraq becoming "a democracy" and an ally in

¹⁰¹ James A. Baker, Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs, The Iraq Study Group Report, The Way Forward – A New Approach, First Vintage Books, 2006, p. 2.

the war on terror. Pakistan, an Islamic ally in the U.S.-led war on terror, a leader of a coalition of six religious parties said Saddam had not received justice.¹⁰²

In the Arab world, hostility to any military attack on Iraq was expressed in Damascus and Riyadh (which stood to make some gains in security terms from the Iraqi dictator's fall) as much as in Cairo and elsewhere. Indeed, the only Arab country that did not oppose military operations was the tiny Gulf Arab state of Kuwait, which had hugely suffered from Iraqi aggression in 1990. The attack on Iraq, therefore, for many opened what Richard Perle, a leading Republican figure and former assistant secretary of defense had referred to in early November 2001 as "phase two" of the war on terror. Apart from Iraq, he named Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, and North Korea as being on the target list. Of this list of eight states, all but one fell in the Arab or Muslim worlds. The impression being reinforced in the Middle East, therefore, was that the war on terror was, at its core, an anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic exercise fought to strengthen the west's position in the strategically important Persian Gulf region, and also to ensure Israel's long-term security by eradicating any remaining sources of opposition to its presence and policies in the region.¹⁰³ While the majority of the world understood the President's as directed against only those who had directed hostilities as the U.S. and west, that small minority of radical Islamists took those words out of context, leading to the perceived clash between Islam and the secular west.

And the Enemy is...

¹⁰² CNN.com World, Hussein Execution: World Reaction, www.cnn.com, 30 December 2006.

¹⁰³ Mary Buckley and Robert Singh, editors, *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences*; Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, New York, New York, 2006, p. 110.

The enemy has shown itself capable of adapting; it does not engage in a traditional war; rather, it uses stealth, insurgency, and strategic communications to outmaneuver the physically stronger Western military. It is slowly gaining ground. It gains converts daily. It is winning the IO war. Who then is this enemy? That is the answer required to gain victory.

America is fighting a war on terrorism; a war against a tactic, with Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda thrown in. However, they are but the tip of the iceberg in this war. Killing or incapacitating bin Laden and destroying the Al Qaeda network does not guarantee the end of hostilities. Overcoming the Iraq insurgency or withdrawing U.S. and coalition forces from Iraq does not guarantee a Western victory. The (1) Arab-Israeli conflict and (2) resulting Islamic Jihad dictate continuation of the war. To win The Global War on Terror, secure the homeland, and defend in depth, the U.S. government must understand the “who” in who is the enemy and the “why” in why this surge in terrorist attacks. The enemy is al Qaeda surely. The enemy is also the cultural divide between the east and west, due to the lack of productive communication. The west needs more linguists trained in Middle Eastern languages. It also needs more Foreign Area Officers with the cultural education and training on regional history and affairs. It is wise to know and understand one’s enemy. Once the U.S. and west puts these practices into place, better understanding of what causes terrorist attacks will develop. From this, the U.S. and east will be better postured to embrace each others policies and standards, decreasing the need for terrorism.

It must adopt a national security strategy aimed at acceptance of the idea that Islam is not the enemy; that Muslim culture is not adverse to democratic ideals; and

demonstrate itself as a true friend to the Muslim majority who welcome U.S. efforts to stabilize the Middle East. The U. S. government must be seen as not only a friend to Israel, but also willing to work towards a solution acceptable to Muslims, Arabs, and Israelis' in the region. To do less leaves America and its' allies vulnerable to the proliferation of terrorists-in-waiting who perceive jihad against United States ideology and "democracy" in particular as not only acceptable but the final solution.

Understanding the Evolution of Threats to American Interests

According to the Strategic Studies Institute, few truly new threats have emerged while few have disappeared. A comparison of six strategic documents, the 1996, 2002, and 2006 National Security Strategies of the United States; the 1997 and 2001 Quadrennial Defense Reviews, and the 2005 National Defense Strategy present the same threats and challenges pre and post-9/11, namely: 1) rogue states, 2) terrorism, 3) transnational crime, 4) proliferation.¹⁰⁴ So U.S. perceived threats remain virtually the same. But these threats also remain ambiguous at best.

America grew from humble beginnings, expanding coast to coast while adopting an isolationist posture as a strategy to prevent succumbing to threats plaguing the rest of the world. The events of December 7th, 1941 ended forever America's isolation, thrusting American into its' global role as the superpower and leader of democracy, a role from which it can and will not shrink but must embrace to ensure the protection of the American people and their materiel prosperity.¹⁰⁵ Beginning with the Japanese defeat at the end of World War II, America assumed the role of world protector and champion of

¹⁰⁴ Stephen D. Biddle, American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005, p. 4.

¹⁰⁵ General Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz The Battle For Peace, A Frontline Vision of America's Power and Purpose, PALGRAVE MACMILLIAN, New York, New York, pages 11-12.

democracy. Once the United States accepted this role, it also became the global target for all who see America as not the Saviour but an infidel bent on destroying cultures regarded as “unacceptable” by the U. S. government, leading to an increase in violence against Americans. Despite this growth of hostility, the United States relished its role, continuing to grow in economic and political authority, intent on exporting democracy throughout the world.¹⁰⁶

But to continue in this role, America must understand how the world continues to evolve. What America may perceive as new global challenges may well be in fact a re-emergence of cultural and religious pride and integrity and resistance to the perceived “slings and arrows” leveled at the Middle East and Islam in particular. The world outside the United States is a diverse and multidimensional environment, rich in peoples, cultures, languages, religions, sensibilities, and sensitivities which few Americans directly experience. Yet a major part of the understanding necessary to create a national strategic vision requires not just the experience of the richness beyond U.S. borders, but a deep understanding based on long immersion out there.¹⁰⁷

In order to put a “face” on the enemy we struggle to overcome, to understand why this enemy America calls terrorism exists, Americans must understand the emerging global environment and at the same time, understand America itself. Its’ ability to shape global politics, strategies, and interventions since the end of World War II has evolved into a global perception, not necessarily true of all nations and peoples, of an American arrogance that all roads lead to Washington. Other cultures and religions, Asia, both east and west, and Islam were historically significant, rich, and varied thousands of years

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 15

before there was a United States. These cultures and religions perceive themselves as the “elder statesmen” of the world, and the United States as the immature newcomer. Both have much to discuss; each is significantly historically. While the west is technologically rich, the east is oil rich. Both have a significant impact on global markets, trade, and the lives of the masses.

Samuel Huntington, author of the “Clash of Civilizations” writes, “the most obvious, salient, and powerful cause of the global religious resurgence is precisely what was supposed to cause the death of religion: the process of social, economic and cultural modernization that swept the world in the second half of the twentieth century”.¹⁰⁸ The USG in particular and Americans in general take for granted these same cultures will willingly reach out and grasp American ideals, particularly democracy as they are aggressively “invited” to move away from their rich heritages, towards a willing re-birth in America’s ideal image.

Evolution of Anti-Western Sentiment

In an interview conducted with ABC new correspondent John Miller in May 1996, Osama bin Laden answers the question, **“What is the meaning of your call for Muslims to take arms against America in particular, and, what is the message that you wish to send to the West in general?”**

Bin Laden: “The call to wage war against America was made because America has spear-headed the crusade against the Islamic nation, sending tens of thousands of its troops to the land of the two Holy Mosques over and above its meddling in its affairs and its politics, and its support of the oppressive, corrupt and tyrannical regime that is in control. These are the reasons behind the singling out of America as a target. And not exempt of responsibility are those Western regimes whose presence in the region offers support to the American troops there. We know at least one reason behind the symbolic participation of the Western forces and that is to support the Jewish and

¹⁰⁸ Christopher Catherwood, *Why the Nation’s Rage, Killing in the Name of God*, Rowman, Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham, MD 2002, p. 72.

Zionist plans for expansion of what is called the Great Israel. Surely, their presence is not out of concern over their interests in the region. ... Their presence has no meaning save one and that is to offer support to the Jews in Palestine who are in need of their Christian brothers to achieve full control over the Arab Peninsula which they intend to make an important part of the so called Greater Israel.”¹⁰⁹

Why the Nation's Rage

Today's Islamic world seems riddled by schizophrenia that confounds most Western observers. Celebrations in the Arab street after the attacks of 9/11 are juxtaposed against solemn official statements by Arab governments in support of the so-called war on terror. In order to delve into the mind of the faithful, one must come to terms with an identity phenomenon that strongly resides within the broad and transnational Islamic milieu; that the Muslim world writ has, in modern times, been profoundly traumatized. The trauma comes primarily from four main influences:

- impact of European colonialism
- pressures of modern secularism
- blunt reality of military and scientific impotency vis-à-vis the West
- distorting influences of modern Arab successes¹¹⁰

To understand Islam one must understand that Islam is not a religion separate from Muslim culture. Islam is the foundation of the Middle East, as inseparable from Muslim culture as the heart from the body. Perceived attacks by the West upon the Islamic religion are viewed as attacks upon the body. We cannot forget the swell of Muslim anger due to the Pope's (innocent) word's about Islam. Muslims who were previously Muslim mainly in name only renewed their religious oaths to Allah and Islam and, angry at the perceived disrespect to Allah and Islam united against the West.

¹⁰⁹ Frontline Interview; Hunting bin Laden: Who is bin Laden, www.PBS.org, May 1998.

¹¹⁰ Major Stephen P. Lambert, U.S. Air Force, The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct, Joint Military Intelligence College, p. 107.

According to Major Stephen Lambert, USAF, “The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct”, the first external challenge to Muslim identity came in the form of European colonialism. It challenged Islam’s long-term historical imperative, threatened the ultimate unity of Allah and law to the rest of the world. Traditionally Islamic society viewed European culture as barbaric and inferior. Perhaps the greatest impact of European imperialism was that the withdrawal of French and British colonial influence left a disorganized power vacuum that was haphazardly filled by secular Arab regimes and the newly emerging state of Israel (in which the British were key players along with the creation of the modern state of Saudi Arabia.) The second notable pressure leveraged against Muslim identity has been secularism. In the wake of European colonialism and World Wars I and II, secular governments came to power throughout the Muslim world, rejecting Islam’s historical, political, and religious imperatives.¹¹¹

The third major assault on Islamic identity has been the painful self-perception of impotency vis-à-vis the West. The recent history of successive defeats is a searing reality to the psyche of the Islamic identity, whose history exalts the exploits of a proud desert warrior class and Islam’s initial and dramatic 100 year-military expansion. Since 1948, Islamic armies have been soundly defeated at least seven times by Western militaries.¹¹²

Despite its’ rich history of culture and regional domination, the Middle East region has produced no evolved technology, no scientific breakthroughs in keeping with Western standards. The Middle East produces few exports save oil and imports approximately 95% of its goods. It lags painfully behind the West (and the Far East) in generating new technology for global markets. It produces no missiles or tanks. The

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 107-111

¹¹² Ibid., p. 113

perception of impotency is not limited to the military sphere alone; it also applies to science and technology. In short, there are no Muslim computers, cars, aircraft, electronics, or hospitals in the Western world.¹¹³ Turkey is a producer and supplier of weapons systems in the region; Turkey has long aligned itself with Western ideology and culture and therefore does not fit this model.

It is only within the context of the previous three factors, colonialism, secularism, and impotence that this fourth (successes) and last one begins to take shape. The Middle East tried to, somewhat fashion itself in a secular manner, adopting elements of Western culture. Women took off the veils; countries became more mainstream, secular Muslim rather than fundamental practitioners of Islam. The 1967 Six-Day war symbolized the final failure of Egypt's Nasser's Pan Arabist nationalism. But it also signaled an end to the legitimacy of the secularist experiment. The Arab states were decisively defeated by Israeli air and ground forces, sustaining over 20,000 killed and 50,000 wounded, while the Israelis suffered 779 dead. The 'big lie' of the time and widely debated today was the Israeli victory was covertly supported by both British and American military forces. The major outcome of the "Arab-Israeli" war was the loss of Arab lands to the Israelis and the displacement of Arabs from their homelands. To the extent that the Muslim identity ever received legitimacy from the secularist model, the defeat in 1967 signaled its' demise. The faithful began to rescue their identity with a deliberate and steady revival of Islam.¹¹⁴

This renewal in Muslim self-identity allowed for the rise to prominence of "fundamentalist" Muslims, who decreed the West the enemy of Islam. Osama Bin Laden first rose to prominence beginning in 1979 after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 1114

¹¹⁴ Ibid. p. 115.

taking upon himself the responsibility for removing infidels from the Holy lands. He aligned himself with the United States to win against the Soviets, despite himself hating Americans. In one early interview he recalled; “I always hated the Americans because they are against Muslims. We didn’t want the US support in Afghanistan, but we just happened to be fighting the same enemy.”¹¹⁵ In 1990 bin Laden declared “war” on Americans and the government of Saudi Arabia after U.S. and coalition forces deployed to Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War. Again infidels had occupied the homeland. According to bin Laden, “When it comes to Muslims, there is testimony from westerners and Christians who testified to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of our children in Iraq and Bosnia. America every time makes a decision to support them (Christians) and prevent weapons from reaching Muslims, and allow Serbian butchers to slaughter Muslims. Every action solicits a reaction. It is a punishment that fits the crime.”¹¹⁶

While not the “appointed” leader of Muslims globally, Osama is the “self-appointed” leader of fundamentalist Islam. His goal: to remove US-led foreign influence and forces completely from the Middle East, remove the state of Israel, and remove the corrupt US-influenced government of Saudi Arabia, and possibly, Turkey, returning the Holy Land to the righteous followers of Allah and Islam.

Finally, the surge in Muslim population growth has generated a large population where fifty percent are youth under the age of 18, unemployed and disaffected who become recruits to Islamist causes.¹¹⁷ The making of a terrorist is fairly easy--a lack of hope for better living standards leaves Muslim youth open to the influences of terrorist recruiters promising money now to the potential terrorist and payments for life to their

¹¹⁵ Ibid. p. 95.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. p. 211.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

families. The educated middle-class is also ripe for induction into the terrorist ranks; not due to a lack of financial means but a desire to see Islam return to its prior preeminence.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict

The Arab-Israeli conflict is critical to U.S. strategic interests because of America's close relationship with the state of Israel and precarious relationships with key Arab states from which oil is exported. The global impact of middle eastern oil production is experienced daily. Fluctuating oil prices strike at the heart of capitalist countries-the consumer wallet. The U.S. has a stake in peace between the two parties. However, in order to secure peace, both sides must feel regional freedom without which there can be no peace. The United States has demonstrated its commitment to Israel, always stating the right of the Israeli state to exist. The U.S. National Security Strategies of 2002 and 2006 both illustrate America's commitment to an independent and democratic Palestine, living beside Israel in peace and security.¹¹⁸ Israel also has a large stake in the success of a democratic Palestine. Permanent occupation threatens Israel's identity and democracy. So the United States continues to challenge Israeli leaders to take concrete steps to support the emergence of a viable, credible Palestinian state.¹¹⁹

Does hatred of Israel (the "Little Satan") fuel hatred of America (the "Great Satan"), such that appeasing the one hatred could dispel the other? The president of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, was another who argued that most terrorist incidents in the world could be traced to the festering Israeli-Palestinian dispute, yet it was not the situation of the Palestinians that drove Islamists associated with Osama bin Laden to attempt to assassinate Mubarak in 1995. And if the Arab-Israeli conflict is what fuels terrorism,

¹¹⁸ The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p. 10.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. p. 11.

how did the conclusion of a peace deal between Israel and Egypt in 1978 lead directly to the murder of then-president Anwar Sadat? In short, whatever the connection between the hatred of Israel and the hatred of America (in no way denying the connection) it is not the simple one-way street posited by those on Left and Right alike who have looked for a convenient solution to the challenge before us. One could argue the other way; that if Israel had never come into existence or were to magically disappear, the U.S. would still stand as an embodiment of everything that most Arabs consider evil.¹²⁰

But, even if Israel was wiped off the face of the Earth tomorrow, the Palestinians would be no better; the new state of Palestine would be a repressive dictatorship bent on crushing its God-given enemy. Where does the U.S. come in? While the U.S. recognized the Jewish state on its establishment, U.S. policy has been shaped from the start by its role as the successor to the British and French in maintaining order in that part of the world, by U.S. interests in containing Soviet power in the long period of the cold war; and by its economic dependence on Arab oil. Not until the 1967 war, really not until the 1973 Yom Kippur war, would it have been truthful to describe the U.S. as friendly to Israel—and even in the last decades it has consistently pressured Jerusalem at every turn to “solve its conflict with the Palestinian Arabs by any means possible. While America continues to support Israel as it believes it shares the same human values, pressuring Israel to surrender territory or divide its capital city of Jerusalem would reward terrorism and incite further attacks as it could be perceived as a step backward for Israel and a step forward for those who seek to eradicate the state.”¹²¹

¹²⁰ William J. Bennett, *Why we Fight, Morale Clarity and the War on Terrorism*, Doubleday, 2002, p. 107.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

However, after 9/11 and the U.S. hunt for bin Laden, United States policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict recognized the need to curry favor with the Arab and Muslim world, for image management and to foster a new coalition. The Jordanian Foreign Minister said plainly: “it will be difficult to line up Arab support without a commitment to solving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute once and for all”. This view was shared not just among the Arab states but the European allies as well.¹²² The courtship of the Arab world for U.S. plans included the need to “accelerate U.S. pressure” on Israel for acquiescing to an independent Palestine.¹²³ Arab hatred of the Jews existed long before the creation of the State of Israel.¹²⁴ Murderous anti-Semitism is constant; permeating throughout the Western countries. In England, the idea took hold that the Jews have succeeded in embroiling the West in an unnecessary and unwanted conflict with the Islamic world.¹²⁵ However, America must confront the hatred which demands an unblinking and uncompromising approach. America cannot deny its kinship with Israel; rather it must continue to support her efforts at survival as she confronts evil.¹²⁶ The U.S. must continue to promote establishment of a Palestinian state as a way to allow Palestinians to finally feel not just secure but a part of the Middle East and not intruders in their own land and hopefully, begin resolution of the conflict.

Understanding Identities-Cultural vs. Nationalism

At one time—especially in Europe—a nation-state was defined as the geographical domain of a specific ethnic group or tribe—Italians, Germans, French,

¹²² Patrick Hayden, Tom Lansford, and Robert P. Watson, Editors, *America’s War on Terror*, Ashgate Publishing Company, Burlington, VT 2003, p. 86.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

¹²⁴ William J. Bennett, *Why we Fight, Morale Clarity and the War on Terrorism*, Doubleday, New York, New York, 2002, p. 119.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.* p. 124.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.* p. 130.

Poles, Hungarians. In the old order, wars between European nations were wars between tribes—Germans versus French, Greeks versus Turks. In many parts of the world, and even in Europe, ethnic identities may now no longer relate to geographical boundaries, and peoples may no longer take their identities from the nation-states where they reside. The social diasporas have exploded, and assimilation has become more difficult.¹²⁷

National identities have declined in favor of other forms of identity, especially true in cases of states created artificially as a result of colonialism. For example, before the British created Iraq, there was no “Iraqi” nation or “Iraqi” people. There was no previously existing “Iraqi” identity. The British established the nation of Iraq at the 1920 treaty of Versailles from what was the nation of Mesopotamia, the world’s first known civilization. Baghdad was the capital of the Abbasid Caliphate and the leading Arab and Muslim city for centuries. The Ottoman Turks conquered and ruled the lands from 1632 through World War I. Independence was granted in 1932, and in 1968 the Baath Party overthrew the military government, bringing Saddam Hussein to power. Iraq was an artificial creation of the West. The same situation exists in many African nations. How many Nigerians consider themselves to be Nigerians first and Ibo or Yoruba second? These artificially created states have been frail and unstable from their birth.¹²⁸

States such as Nigeria and Indonesia did not exist in any form at all before the advent of Western imperialism. Even the great Mogul emperors in India were unable to conquer the entire subcontinent, though they were able to rule over most of it. In such instances, the notion of a state being an imagined community, a political construct of a modern age, is therefore readily understandable. It was not possible to be a Nigerian

¹²⁷ General Tony Zinni, Tony Koltz, *The Battle For Peace, A Frontline Vision of America’s Power and Purpose*, PALGRAVE MACMILLIAN, New York, New York, 2006, p. 60.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

nationalist of any description prior to 1900 because no such state existed. Likewise, the United States is a European construction, since no one Native American group ever achieved remotely the predominance over its neighbors that was achieved by the colonists from across the Atlantic.¹²⁹

Under Saddam, everyone in Iraq was Iraqi; they had no choice...though they were also Sunni, Shiite, Chaldean, Kurd, Turcoman, Assyrian, or Christian. Now that the U.S. has knocked out Saddam's regime, can it assume everyone in Iraq will still hold on to an Iraqi identity? The U.S. invaded Iraq believing that Iraqis would all keep thinking of themselves as Iraqis. America went in to free all Iraqis as Iraqis. But it turns out they did not think of themselves as Iraqis. They wanted to be free as Shiites or Kurds. And it turns out that the minority Sunnis were reluctant to give up the privileges, powers, and ascendancy they had long held over all the other Iraqis.¹³⁰

Nationalism: Shame and Humiliation

Nationalism, for use in this thesis is defined as the basic form of self-identity which a group of homogenous or non-homogenous peoples will seek solidarity with. Nationalism is loyalty to the state; culture, religion, and one-time history take second place to the state. The weak link in these new and artificial nation-states is nationalism itself. Nationalism is usually forced; it requires putting one's traditional cultural heritage and identity second to paying homage, and taxes to the new state, usually a state newly created as a result of a victory in war. Those too weak to win are now forced to serve a nation to which they, the day before owed no allegiance or maybe even had a

¹²⁹ Why the Nations Rage, Killing in the Name of God, Christopher Catherwood, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Lanham, Maryland, 2002, p. 47.

¹³⁰ General Tony Zinni, Tony Koltz, The Battle For Peace, A Frontline Vision of America's Power and Purpose, PALGRAVE MACMILLIAN, New York, New York, 2006, p. 61.

commonality. The end of World War I with the defeat and national humiliation of Germany and the harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles, and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the abolishment of the Caliphate, led to a great division of lands, nations, and peoples in Europe and the Middle East.¹³¹ The Treaty of Versailles created new states, dismantled old ones, and led to German and Muslim shame and humiliation.

Nationalism itself has not necessarily always been a negative. Historically it has existed in Western Europe and Russia for hundreds of years. Germany, France, and Great Britain are examples of where nationalism worked, after years of colonialism and the great powers letting go of their colonies. The United States also exists in a nationalistic form; it has “sovereignty” over the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, and for many, the District of Columbia, for example.

Nationalism could, from some vantage points, be described as a positive force. It is hard to argue against independence for colonial peoples. Prior to 1914, this was in effect the case of many European nations as well as those peoples subject to European empires beyond that continent’s boundaries. As we shall see, when considering the origins of nationalism itself, many of the states that received independence in 1918 had existed previously in some form.¹³²

Some have compared Osama bin Laden to Hitler. In some senses this is a false comparison as Hitler was the dictator of one of the most powerful nation in the world; bin Laden is on the run with a few thousand followers. There is, however a striking parallel of the lasting impact of World War I on the German and Muslim people. World War II

¹³¹ Christopher Catherwood, *Why the Nations Rage, Killing in the Name of God*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham, Maryland, 2002, p. 25.

¹³² *Ibid.* p. 27-28.

arose from the Germans' sense of profound national humiliation for World War I and the harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles.¹³³

The great Ottoman Empire also met its end in 1918. But here the story was very different. The Muslim and Turkish cores of the empire were humiliated—the Turks lost their empire. But in 1922, under their charismatic military leader Kemal Ataturk, they struck back.¹³⁴

Recapturing parts of Turkey, such as Izmir, which had been given to the Greeks, and in 1923 they negotiated a new treaty, that of Lausanne, that returned much that had been taken away by the Allies. Ataturk abolished the last Ottoman remnant, the Caliphate in 1924, launching a modernization policy abolishing old customs, such as the wearing of the fez, abolishing permanently the link between religion and state, and introducing the Latin alphabet.¹³⁵

A Divided Turkey

Turkey is obsessed with Europe. A century ago, the Ottoman Sultans who sought to reform the decaying empire looked to Europe as the source of enlightenment and progress. Later Attaturk, the first President of the country emulated all things European, from law and politics to music and dress, as he laid down the foundations of the new Turkish Republic. Modern Turkey joined every European and Western organization possible, starting off as a founding member of the Council of Europe in 1949, becoming the only Muslim country in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization

¹³³ Ibid. p. 25.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

of Security and Cooperation in Europe, and entering the European Economic Community as an associate member.¹³⁶

The aim of full integration into the new Europe has been the cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy ever since. In 1996, the European Union approved a Customs Union with Turkey. Nobody thought Turkey would easily ascend to the ranks of union easily; Greece has successfully blocked more than \$450 million of EU financial aid intended to ease Turkey's debut in the Customs Union (Spain and Portugal did receive this kind of assistance). The Turks believed their cause would prevail.¹³⁷

For Turkey's secular establishment, haunted by the specter of Islamic fundamentalism and Arabization, Europe appeared as a political safety net. Even Islamists who initially looked at Europe as a hostile Christian camp, came to see European democracy as a shelter from Turkey's harsh secular rule.¹³⁸ However, acceptance into the union and thereby, acceptance into the West was not forthcoming. In the spring of 1997 European Christian Democrats declared Turkey was not a candidate for membership in the European Union, not short or long term. The main reason given was the difference in civilizations. This official statement coming from a meeting that included such prominent Europeans as German chancellor Helmut Kohl, Spanish prime minister Jose' Maria Aznar, and Belgian prime minister Wilfred Martens sent shock waves around Turkey and the region. Here were responsible Christian Democrats taking up Huntington's controversial "clash of civilizations" theory.¹³⁹

¹³⁶ Marvine Howe, *Turkey Today, A Nation Divided Over Islam's Revival*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 2000, p. 148.

¹³⁷ Ibid. p.149.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid. p. 149.

About the same time Turkey was excluded from the short list of candidates for the 2004 Summer games by the International Olympic Committee. These acts by the EU were viewed by Turks as a repudiation of the Republic of Turkey itself as membership talks with Poland, the Czech Republic and other countries would begin. Adding insult to injury, Cyprus, that Greek-dominated island that had never come to terms with the Turkish minority in the North was accepted as a candidate.¹⁴⁰ Turkey also must deal with repudiation from its Muslim brethren as it seeks to gain union membership. Turkey is an active partner with Israel, the first Muslim country to recognize Israel.

In 2005 the European Union accepted Turkey as a candidate for union membership. However Turkey is still under the microscope in determining acceptance. Turkey has placed itself in a prickly situation, waiting on acceptance from Europeans who to date still are not yet willing to accept the country as an equal as it attempts to loosen its ties to its Muslim heritage for European acceptance. This is a stellar achievement for Turkey and Muslims worldwide, anxiously awaiting the outcome. Denial into the E.U. could further distance Turkey, pushing it further towards a more fundamental Islamic posture and away from the west. The United States must continue to influence Europe that Turkish membership in the union is mutually favorable. This will continue favorable political ties with turkey, allowing the U.S. to retain Turkey as a strong regional ally.

Nationalism is the current favored form of cultural identity in North and South America and some emerging African nations. But it does not always work nor work well.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 151.

Case Studies in Point:

Yugoslavia—When Marshal Tito ran Yugoslavia, he maintained stability throughout the country; people might actually have considered themselves Yugoslavs, though they also thought of themselves as Serbs, Albanians, Bosnians, or Muslims, Orthodox Christians, or Catholics. But after he died, the old order collapsed, the lid popped, and nobody thought of himself as Yugoslav. All of a sudden, this person is a Serb. That person is an Albanian. That one is a Bosnian. That one is a Muslim. A Croat. Eastern Orthodox. Catholic. Suddenly, identity issues became central to the political dynamic...religious identities, ethnic and tribal identities.¹⁴¹

Under Tito, many people were essentially secular in their outlook. Religion might have been a notional part of their self-identity but not its prime form. This began to change when the federal state of Yugoslavia began to unravel. “Religion mattered not so much in and of itself...but rather as the main vehicle of ethnic and national allegiance in new states bent on defining citizenship almost exclusively in terms of national identity.”¹⁴²

In “Why the Nations Rage”, Yugoslavia, whatever its faults as a one-party Communist dictatorship is heralded for at least trying to be inclusivist; one could describe one-self as a Yugoslav without any qualification. After the fall of Tito this essentially became impossible. Chaos reigned because the state had rarely been ethnically homogeneous from the beginning, save for Slovenia. The would-be successor republics

¹⁴¹ General Tony Zinni, Tony Koltz, *The Battle For Peace, A Frontline Vision of America’s Power and Purpose*, PALGRAVE MACMILLIAN, New York, New York, 2006, p. 61.

¹⁴² Christopher Catherwood, *Why the Nations Rage, Killing in the Name of God*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Lanham, Maryland 2002, p. 133.

were all ethnically and/or religiously heterogeneous, especially Bosnia, where Bosnian Muslims, Catholic Croats, and Orthodox Serbs all lived side-by-side.¹⁴³

Since one of the most cultural differences is religion, a diverging factor not important under the secular Tito regime now assumed a new importance:

“What made someone a Croat was the fact that he or she was a Roman Catholic; just as what made someone a Serb was membership, however attenuated, in the Orthodox Church. Not that actual religious devotion mattered all that much either in Croatia or Serbia. What counted, once the nationalist myth making had been successful, was the way in which religion was put to use.”¹⁴⁴

It is this sense of religion to create, in a sense, a new imagined community based on an original core ethnies that makes religion such an important component of self-identity and thus of religious/ethnic conflict.¹⁴⁵

Marine Corps (Ret) General Tony Zinni highlights the failure of the state of Yugoslavia. He notes how in the Balkans, Yugoslavs became Serbs, Croats, Muslims. Nobody (there) today calls themselves a Yugoslav. He answers the question: when institutions and control fail, when no single power can dominate a society, what is left? Stripping away a very fragile national identity will drive people into the strongest remaining communal identity.¹⁴⁶

Iraq—In the Middle East, nationalism is a more recent concept. The bringing together of somewhat like peoples under one flag in the region was generally accomplished using either shared religion or culture as the standard. In Iraq, being Sunni, Shiite, Kurd, or Christian, took second place to being Iraqi, not willingly but forcibly under the rule of Saddam Hussein.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 134.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ General Tony Zinni, Tony Koltz, *The Battle For Peace, A Frontline Vision of America's Power and Purpose*, PALGRAVE MACMILLIAN, New York, New York, p. 102-103.

Saddam Hussein controlled his nation through the use of terror, maintaining stability in the country for twenty-seven years. As a result, America and her allies had little to fear of threats from Iraq. Though far from a stable society, the United States effectively contained Saddam's misdeeds inside of Iraq's borders. The cost of containment was more acceptable than intervention. However, removal of Hussein from power allowed the Sunnis and Shias free reign to engage in what is now spoken of as civil war. U.S. military forces are mired in an ever-worsening insurgency. Civil war is growing while disorder and chaos grow even more entrenched.¹⁴⁷ The fear of WMD in the country proved unfounded; the Baath Party folded and was almost immediately disbanded by coalition authority. Hussein and his henchmen abandoned the war and were later hunted down and either killed or captured. The enemy was defeated. Or was it? Since the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, the country has begun to dissolve into the same type of civil war that tore apart Yugoslavia. Iraqis have turned inward, again becoming Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd.

The Kingdom of Heaven

The Middle East has a long and varied history. It has been home to Islam, Judaism, and Christianity for thousands of years. It is considered the holiest of lands as it is the birthplace of Jesus and the Prophet Mohammad, and home to the holy cities of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem. In AD 610, the Prophet Mohammad founded the religion of Islam. In the first century AD, Jesus founded the Christian religion. In approximately 1800 BCE, Abraham began the oldest monotheistic religion, Judaism, in the land of Canaan, now known as the State of Israel. Therein lays the problem.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 112.

The Middle East has been claimed by each religion as the “Kingdom of Heaven”, or “Kingdom of God”, since the advent of the Twelve Tribes of Israel. It is here that human life began in the Garden of Eden, as believed in all three major religions. It is here that Jews, Christians, and Muslims studied and prayed and lived peacefully amongst each other for hundreds of years. However, the peace would not last as each religion came to believe it should be the sole landlord in the region, based on their interpretations of their Holy Scripture, The Holy Bible, Qur’an, or Torah.

Between AD 355 and AD 1699 wars raged for control of the Holy Land. These wars consisted of Muslim and Arab domination of lands as far East as Bosnia, Herzegovina, the Bavarian town of Regensburg and parts of North Africa. Parts of Afghanistan, Egypt and Spain fell to the Muslims. Thousands of Christians and Jews fell to the onslaught of Muslim invaders. It was in AD 732 that Charles Martel of France at the battle of Tours is credited with halting the spread of Islam and saving Europe from Muslim control. However, this was the prologue to the beginning of the current state of affairs.

The Crusades & Jihad: Understanding the Differences

While most Westerners will consider the concept of “jihad” or “Holy War” as recent, this is not the case. Holy wars existed as far back as the fifth century B.C. with the Persians invading Europe in an attempt to conquer the Greeks. Alexander the Great attempted to conquer all of Asia, as far as India, in the fourth century B.C. The Romans established by bloody military conquest colonies in Mesopotamia, northwestern Arabia and Assyria in the second century A.D.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁸ Guy Maclean Rogers, Alexander: the Ambiguity of Greatness, Random House, Inc. New York, New York, 2005, p. 10-11.

Islam enjoyed a large degree of success during the conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries, and it continued to prevail during the periodic local invasions that followed during the ninth and tenth centuries (the conquest of Sicily and southern Italy, for example, and the conquest of Crete). In the tenth century however, Normans in southern Italy, with the encouragement of the papacy attacked their Muslim neighbors, conquering that region and the island of Sicily. The papacy saw the spread of Islam in Western Europe as a threat to its' own survival, the very survival of Christianity itself. While Islam and Christianity had co-existed peacefully more or less in Spain, the potentially Muslim threat to Christians continued to weigh heavily and beginning in the tenth century small Christian kingdoms in Spain initiated extensive raids upon the disintegrating Umayyad caliphate of Cordova (finally abolished in 1031) and a re-claiming of previously held Muslim territories. This also led to a union between the weaker Spanish Muslims and the stronger, more unified and organized North African Muslims and a general abet uneasy peace between Spanish Muslims and Christians.¹⁴⁹

Of special note: David Cook, Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at Rice University writes, Islam came under attack not only from the Christian West but the East, the sole instance other than European colonialist ventures of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, during which the core lands of Islam have come under the control of non-Muslims. While not as long in duration or intensity (from approximately 1200-1300), Mongol hordes, beginning with Genghis Khan invaded the Holy Land and also engaged in warfare with Muslims for control of the region, leading to the end of the Abbasid caliphate and the foundation of an initially non-Muslim state east of the

¹⁴⁹ David Cook, *Understanding Jihad*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 2005, p. 49-50.

Euphrates River. Converts to Islam though lax in its practice and more tolerant of non-Muslims, Mongols were “infidels” who sought to attack and subjugate the entire Muslim world. Their attacks were not directed against infidels but against Muslims. In 1258 Hulagu, the younger brother of Kublai Khan besieged Baghdad, captured, and murdered the Abbasid caliph. While the Mongol threat was defeated in the thirteenth century, it consumed in particular Sunni Muslims during the period when the laws of jihad were being formulated and codified, in a way that no previous threat had done. It brought about a shift in the way Muslims thought about conducting warfare. For Sunni Muslims, the terrible destruction wrought by the Mongols in Central Asia, Persia, and Iraq, and the challenge to Islam posed by military success achieved by infidels heightened the perception that there needed to be a shift in thinking about warfare.¹⁵⁰

Ibn Taymiyya, an influential Syrian Hanbali scholar who lived during the period of the Mongol invasions and the ongoing threat of the Crusades espoused the division of the world into two absolute and mutually exclusive spheres—the land of Islam and the land of the unbelievers, and a necessary hostile relationship between the two. He drew on his inspiration from the militant interpretation of Islam developed by the seventh-century extremist Kharjite movement, which espoused a strict and literal interpretation of the Quran. According to this vision, jihad was an absolute religious requirement for all Muslims; any engagement in an action considered bad and forbidden resulted in the person being labeled a kafar or unbeliever, guilty of treason to Islam and subject to punishment –jihad as holy war.¹⁵¹

¹⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 52-54.

¹⁵¹ Natana J. Delong-Bas, *Wahabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*, Oxford University Press, New York, New York, p. 247-249.

Muslims also responded to the Mongols and Crusades with the full flower of the mamluk system, a permanent standing army unique to Islam, which imported slaves from Central Asia and Africa. During this period, Ibn al-Nahhas al-Dumyati, a jihad theorist wrote the *Mashari al-ashwaq ila masari al-ushshaq*, detailing the moral legitimacy of civilian casualties in the war against infidels and that jihad is obligatory at all times. Abu Bakr al-Kasani, one of the great codifiers of Muslim law during this same period defined jihad as devoting exertion. In the legal realm it is used as part of a process leading to a call directed to infidels by Muslims who will eventually fight and win and establish Islam in a dominant position. Ibn Qudama al-Maqdisi, a Hanbali jurist listed seven essential characteristics of who can participate in jihad. The first three are absolute: the person must be Muslim, post-puberty or mature, and third, intelligent, not insane. Ibn Qudama, of critical importance states that it is no longer required to openly declare war upon Christians and invite them to Islam prior to the commencement of hostilities; this has been sufficiently done and there is no further need to make it. For Ibn Qudama, it is self-evident that Muslims are in a permanent state of war with Christians.¹⁵² This permanent state of war required the use of non-traditional ideas and methods.

The Seljuk Turks

In 1095 Alexius I Comnenus, the new emperor of Byzantium, fearful the Seljuk Turks might seize his capital at Constantinople, appealed to Pope Urban II for military assistance. The Turks, (inhabitants of what is known today as Turkey), had invaded the Byzantine or Eastern Roman Empire, decisively winning battles and “restoring” the Holy

¹⁵² David Cook, *Understanding Jihad*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 2005, p. 54-61.

lands to the descendants of the Prophet Mohammad. In the early 11th century the Fatimid caliph Hakim began to persecute Christians; pilgrimages were cut off and pilgrims traveling to the Holy City were robbed and beaten. He also despoiled the Holy Sepulcher. Persecution abated after his death in 1021, but relations remained strained and became more so when Jerusalem passed in 1071 from the comparatively tolerant Egyptians to the Seljuk Turks, who in the same year defeated the Byzantine emperor Romanus IV at Manzikert. The sacred places of the Roman Catholic Church were profaned or destroyed¹⁵³.

Pope Urban II's Call to "Holy War"

The message was received by Pope Urban, who on November 27, 1095 at the Council of Clermont declared not a "bellum iustum" or "Just War", but a "bellum sacrum" or "Holy War" against the Muslims occupying the Holy Land. The battle cry of the Christians, he urged, should be 'Deus volt' [God wills it].

"Although, O sons of God, you have promised more firmly than ever to keep the peace among yourselves and to preserve the rights of the church, there remains still an important work for you to do. Freshly quickened by the divine correction, you must apply the strength of your righteousness to another matter which concerns you as well as God. For your brethren who live in the East are in urgent need of your help, and you must hasten to give them the aid which has often been promised them. For, as the most of you have heard, the Turks and Arabs have attacked them and have conquered the territory of Romania [the Greek empire] as far west as the shore of the Mediterranean and the Hellespont, which is called the Arm of St. George. They have occupied more and more of the lands of those Christians, and have overcome them in seven battles. They have killed and captured many, and have destroyed the churches and devastated the empire. If you permit them to continue thus for awhile with impurity, the faithful of God will be much more widely attacked by them. On this account I, or rather the Lord, beseech you...to carry aid promptly to those Christians and to destroy that vile race from the lands of our friends. I say this to those who are present, it meant also for those who are absent. Moreover, Christ commands it. All who die by the way, whether by land or by sea, or in battle against the pagans, shall have immediate remission of sins. This I grant them through the power of God with which I am invested. O what a disgrace if such a despised and base race, which

¹⁵³ Lebanon and the Crusades, www.cedarland.org/crusleb.html.

worships demons, should conquer a people which has the faith of omnipotent God and is made glorious with the name of Christ! With what reproaches will the Lord overwhelm us if you do not aid those who, with us, profess the Christian religion! Let those who have been accustomed unjustly to wage private warfare against the faithful now go against the infidels and end with victory this war which should have been begun long ago. Let those who for a long time have been robbers, now become knights. Let those who have been fighting against their brothers and relatives now fight in a proper way against the barbarians. Let those who have been serving as mercenaries for small pay now obtain the eternal reward. Let those who have been wearing themselves out in both body and soul now work for a double honor. Behold! On this side will be the sorrowful and poor, on that, the rich; on this side, the enemies of the Lord, on that, his friends. Let those who go not put off the journey, but rent their lands and collect money for their expenses; and as soon as winter is over and spring comes, let hem eagerly set out on the way with God as their guide."¹⁵⁴

This was officially the beginning of the Crusades, the Christian “Holy War” against Islam. Centuries later, the Muslim East has determined to give the Christian West its final response. Bin Laden gives prominence to Ibn Taymiyya as the original inspiration of jihad against a corrupt regime, and sees himself as carrying on an important Muslim historical tradition. Bin Laden vehemently denounces the “Christian Crusaders” and “Zionist Jews” conspiracy to destroy Islam, his concern the globalization of culture and his intense opposition to the existence of Israel due to its displacement of Palestinian Muslims.¹⁵⁵

The Islamic Call to Jihad

Muslims have fought internal wars for centuries, not always jihad. Among Muslims, who acknowledge the associations of jihad with warfare, most would define the term jihad as warfare authorized by a legitimate representative of the Muslim community for the sake of an issue that is universally, or near universally acknowledged to be of

¹⁵⁴ Paul Halsall, Internet Medieval Source Book, (c) Jan 1996, www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/urban2a.html.

¹⁵⁵ Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, Oxford University Press, New York, New York, 2004, p. 273-274.

critical importance for the entire community against an admitted enemy of Islam.¹⁵⁶ A legitimate representative is, according to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, knowledgeable of Islam, most correct in his faith, and easiest to reconcile with the teachings of the Quran.¹⁵⁷ The key issues critical to the faithful Muslim community bin Laden seeks to resolve are the overthrow of nearly all Muslim governments, which he views as corrupt; to drive western influence from those countries; and eventually abolish state boundaries.¹⁵⁸ To the faithful, on these issues may hinge the survival of Islam.

Osama bin Laden's call on 23 February 1998, for a jihad against America and the West fits these parameters:

"The Arabian Peninsula has never -- since Allah made it flat, created its desert, and encircled it with seas -- been stormed by any forces like the crusader armies spreading in it like locusts, eating its riches and wiping out its plantations. All this is happening at a time in which nations are attacking Muslims like people fighting over a plate of food. In the light of the grave situation and the lack of support, we and you are obliged to discuss current events, and we should all agree on how to settle the matter. No one argues today about three facts that are known to everyone; we will list them, in order to remind everyone:

- First, for over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples. If some people have in the past argued about the fact of the occupation, all the people of the Peninsula have now acknowledged it. The best proof of this is the Americans' continuing aggression against the Iraqi people using the Peninsula as a staging post, even though all its rulers are against their territories being used to that end, but they are helpless.
- Second, despite the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist alliance, and despite the huge number of those killed, which has exceeded 1 million... despite all this, the Americans are once again trying to repeat the

¹⁵⁶ Understanding Jihad, David Cook, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 2005, p. 3.

¹⁵⁷ Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, Oxford University Press, New York, New York, 2004, p. 196.

¹⁵⁸ Adam Robinson, Bin Laden; Behind the Mask of the Terrorist, Arcade Publishing, New York, New York, 2001, p.143.

horrific massacres, as though they are not content with the protracted blockade imposed after the ferocious war or the fragmentation and devastation. So here they come to annihilate what is left of this people and to humiliate their Muslim neighbors.

- Third, if the Americans' aims behind these wars are religious and economic, the aim is also to serve the Jews' petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there. The best proof of this is their eagerness to destroy Iraq, the strongest neighboring Arab state, and their endeavor to fragment all the states of the region such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan into paper statelets and through their disunion and weakness to guarantee Israel's survival and the continuation of the brutal crusade occupation of the Peninsula. All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on Allah, his messenger, and Muslims. And ulema have throughout Islamic history unanimously agreed that the jihad is an individual duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim countries. This was revealed by Imam Bin-Qadamah in "Al-Mughni," Imam al-Kisa'i in "Al-Bada'i," al-Qurtubi in his interpretation, and the shaykh of al-Islam in his books, where he said: "As for the fighting to repulse [an enemy], it is aimed at defending sanctity and religion, and it is a duty as agreed [by the ulema]. Nothing is more sacred than belief except repulsing an enemy who is attacking religion and life."¹⁵⁹

Based on the calls of both Pope Urban II and Osama bin Laden, there is fundamentally no difference between the Christian Crusades and an Islamic Jihad. Per the writings of Ergun Caner, President of Liberty Theological Seminary, Liberty University, and the author of "Christian Jihad", while the Crusades are a distant memory in the minds of most, to Islamics' the Crusades have never ended:

"As a matter of fact, at the end of the book...my brother and I do a chart where we compare the speech of Pope Urban II at the Council of Claremont, November 27th, 1095, to bin Ladin's Fatwa. Catholics were mad and other Christians were mad, but it's true. There have always been Christians in the army. I'm not a pacifist. But there's a fundamental quantum shift that took place at the calling of the Crusades. Up until the Crusades, we had operated under a 'just war criteria.' I'm a 'just war' person...My brother and I took a stand before the Iraq conflict on C-Span, and said that this was a necessary and also a moral war -- that this was just. So I don't want to come off sounding like a pacifist. But the shift happened this way. In 1095, at the Council of

¹⁵⁹ World Islamic Front, Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, 23 February 1998, viewed January –April 2007.

Claremont, Pope Urban crossed the line from a 'just war', in Latin 'bellum iustum' to 'holy war', or 'bellum sacrum.’”¹⁶⁰

“As inconsequential as it may sound, it is a profound difference. For instance, instead of having a secular authority -- our president is our Commander in Chief in a just war -- in a holy war we have a sacred authority -- the pope is our commander. In Islam a Fatwa has to be signed by a Caliph or a Sheik. The promise of eternal salvation, absolute assurance if you day, that was from Pope Urban. As a matter of fact, Pope Urban said 'Deus vult!' or 'God wills it!' and people basically shrugged their shoulders. There wasn't a lot of response initially. But then he said, 'If you go and kill the infidel, you will be forgiven immediately -- Paradise.' There is fundamentally, no difference between bin Laden, in that case, and the Crusades.”¹⁶¹

“The third distinction that I would point out is that in a holy war there is no difference between combatant and soldier. That's why we make battlefields in our culture and our history because of 'just war'. But not in my culture. We hide in the mosque. We hide in the daycare center. Because everybody is Mujah Hadin. What about the Muslims who were in the World Trade Center Towers? As Mullah Omar put it, they were unknown and unwilling Mujah Hadin. They received the same promise. There's an al Qaeda Web site that glorifies the nineteen bombers, but it also says in Arabic, 'and to those who purchased heaven with their blood on the planes,' because again, there were Muslims on the planes, and there were Muslims in the Towers.”¹⁶²

“The final distinction between 'just war' and 'holy war' is that you are fighting to kill the infidel instead of convert the infidel. In a 'just war', every warrior wants peace. In a 'holy war', every warrior wants victory. All Islamic eschatology is based on what we are going through right now.”¹⁶³

The standard, scholarly definition of jihad is “military action with the object of the expansion of Islam and, if need be, its defense”. The Prophet Mohammad never formally declared a jihad, not at least using that term, yet he undertook many campaigns that were the prototypical jihad wars.¹⁶⁴ Because of the sacred nature of the combat, the jihad should benefit from divine support; some authors describe it as a sacrament for the

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ David Cook, *Understanding Jihad*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 2005, p. 2.

community of Muslims. Such boundaries place jihad squarely within the ideal of a “just war” familiar to Christian theologians, as distinct from the concept of “holy war”.¹⁶⁵

Just war doctrine justifies the use of military force under certain conditions, including proportionality—the expectation that more lives would be saved by the use of force than would be lost—and legitimacy, the notion that the undertaking must be approved by an established authority.¹⁶⁶ In just war theory, soldiers cannot target non-combatants. However, in spiritual or holy war, there are no innocent bystanders; all are potential soldiers and could justifiably become the object of a violent assault.¹⁶⁷ Pope Urban II, by declaring “Deus vult” or “God wills it” permitted the contemporary emergence of the ideology of jihad.

A New Way Ahead

In December 2006, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group released its one hundred and forty-two page report, “The Way Forward – A New Approach”. Made up of notables, such as James Baker, Vernon Jordan Jr., Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day O’Conner and others, its’ charter was to review the ground situation in Iraq and recommend strategies for a new way ahead. Its’ report highlights the need for a new United States vision to secure stability in Iraq, and potentially the Middle East. Its recommendations are external and internal approaches.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. p. 3.

¹⁶⁶ Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God; The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles California, 2000, p. 25.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid. p. 57.

¹⁶⁸ James A. Baker and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs, *The Iraq Study Group Report, The Way Forward—A New Approach*, Vintage Books, New York, 2006, p. 41.

The External Approach

A new diplomatic offensive is required, proposing regional and international initiatives and steps to assist the Iraqi government in achieving certain security, political, and economic milestones. Achieving these milestones will require at least the acquiescence of Iraq's neighbors and their active and timely cooperation would be highly desirable.¹⁶⁹ This approach provides eighteen recommendations designed to stabilize relations between Iraq and its regional neighbors. Notably, these recommendations primarily address engaging Syria and Iran in to help with constructive policies towards Iraq; continuing to deal with Iran's nuclear program through the United Nations; a renewed commitment by the U.S. to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts; and Israel returning the Golan Heights. Finally, the United States must give priority to the situation in Afghanistan, due to the renewed threat posed by the Taliban.¹⁷⁰ So the United States must, in order to ensure peace in the Middle East, negotiate with Muslims and Arabs in the region; continue its commitment towards the Afghan people, and, find a solution acceptable to both Arabs and Israelis, as recommended by its' own independent commission.

The Internal Approach

As the new diplomatic offensive provides the proper external environment, Iraqis must take the difficult steps necessary to promote national reconciliation, establish security, and make progress on governance. Because of the security and assistance it provides, the U.S. has a significant role to play; however, only the government and people of Iraq can make and sustain certain decisions critical to Iraq's future. The Iraq

¹⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 44.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid. p 45-58.

Study Group provides sixty-one recommendations on Iraq achieving milestones—or objectives on national reconciliation, security, and governance. While miracles cannot be expected, the people of Iraq have the right to expect action and progress. The Iraqi government needs to show its own citizens, U.S. citizens, and the rest of the world it deserves continued support.¹⁷¹

First and foremost, the United States should lay out an agenda for continued support to help Iraq achieve milestones and underscore the consequences if Iraq does not. The transfer of command and control of Iraqi security forces from the U.S. to Iraq should be influenced by Iraq's performance on milestones.¹⁷² Favorable public opinion plays a large part in these recommendations. Recommendations 22 and 23 state, “the President should state the U.S. does not seek permanent military bases in Iraq”, and “the United States does not seek to control Iraq's oil.” The United States therefore must present itself as only seeking to support the Iraqi people in their efforts to become a self-sufficient democracy; not as attempting to subjugate them and in effect steal their oil.

Conclusion and Summary

“It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world...The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people. America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy, required by the grave challenge we face – the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully revealed to the American people on September 11, 2001. This strategy reflects our most solemn obligation: to protect the security of the American people...And we are fighting alongside Iraqis...a new ally in the war on terror in the heart of the Middle East. We

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p. 59.

¹⁷² Ibid., p. 60.

seek to shape the world, not merely be shaped by it; to influence events for the better instead of being at their mercy.”¹⁷³

The National Security Strategy of March 2006 reads like a blueprint for action in changing the face of the Middle East, intended or otherwise. Taken out of context, the strategy states the best way to secure enduring security for the American people is to shape the world by creating a democratic world, thereby limiting or destroying the influence of Islam worldwide, as perceived by Muslims worldwide.

This is the premier national security issue of the current administration and the aim of the Global War on Terror: to maintain the U.S. (potentially) precarious footing in the Middle East, specifically Saudi Arabia and possibly Turkey, while maintaining firm support to the state of Israel as it creates, shapes, and influences the global world in its’ way of thinking. The United States must adapt national strategies to incorporate understanding of itself as it continues to transform to meet new global challenges, and the threat posed by Islamics’ who see western presence and influence in the Middle East as trespass bent on the destruction of Islam.

To accomplish its’ desired end state, the U.S. geo-political process must understand:

“This is not a clash of civilizations. If anything, this is a clash between Western civilization and the revolutionary religion of Islam. It is not a war between Christianity and Islam—mainly because the United States and other Western countries do not represent pax Christiana. To the contrary, the predominant “religion” of the West today is secularism. It is not Clausewitzian war, in which war is said to be the extension of politics. It is religious war, initiated by the historical, religious imperatives of Islam. The conflict is a war between the ideas of Western democracy and those of revolutionary Islam. The enemy is the revolutionary Islamic vanguard, and it obtains its support from the resentment felt among followers of transnational Islam. The enemy is driven and sustained by an ideology rooted in the historical doctrines of Islam, is certain of Allah’s divinely pre-ordained victory, and is

¹⁷³ The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, prologue.

imbued with an ideology that begins and ends with the Qua'ran and the Prophet Mohammad. In other words, this is a religious war.”¹⁷⁴

The current situation in Iraq highlights the U.S. lack of understanding of the “enemy” it fights and the conflict in which it is engaged. Its’ inability to anticipate the long, protracted conflict in Iraq is directly linked to errors in judgment about the lack of will, ability to organize, adapt, cohesion, and fear of western military dominance now obvious in the region. To win the “Global War on Terrorism”, the U.S. and West must study and understand the historical roadmap and developments leading to the resurgence and re-embracing of Islam, evolution of anti-western sentiment, and the overall regional dynamics and culture that shape Muslim ideology. The British were better at this; they knew when to cut their losses, leaving their colonial kin to clean up the mess.

To underestimate the perceptions of many Muslims, who are encouraged by Islamic fundamentalists, bin Laden and others, to view the United States as hostile towards Islam continues the U.S. and the west down the path of chaos, complexity, and misunderstanding on both sides. The west must establish new partnerships with Muslims in Iraq, Iran and Syria, and continue its traditional partnerships with Saudi Arabia, Egypt et al, ensuring productive dialogue as all seek solutions to regional instability. Clearly defined strategies that can end the violence stabilize the region, and jumpstart the diplomatic peace process can only exist if the West truly knows and understands the enemy.

¹⁷⁴ Major Stephen P. Lambert, U.S. Air Force, *The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct*, Joint Military Intelligence College, Washington, DC, 2005 p. 159.

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