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**The US Intelligence Community's Five Year**

# **STRATEGIC HUMAN CAPITAL PLAN**

**An Annex to the  
US NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY**



**OFFICE OF THE  
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE**

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Department of the Navy

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An Annex to the  
US NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY

*June 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2006*



OFFICE OF THE  
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE



*There is no doubt that the success of the US Intelligence Community in helping preserve the nation's security depends above all on the dedicated military and civilian members of our workforce.*

# Foreword from the Director of National Intelligence


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There is no doubt that the success of the US Intelligence Community in helping preserve the nation's security depends above all on the dedicated military and civilian members of our workforce.

IC professionals must not only identify, collect against, and analyze myriad threats to the safety of our citizens and to America's interests and values; they must also anticipate threats that have not yet materialized, and many of our colleagues willingly put themselves in harms' way to do this. They are truly on the front lines in the War of Terror, with danger as their constant companion and patriotism their inspiration and motivation.

In recent years, the Intelligence Community has embraced the powerful critiques of the 9/11 and WMD Commissions, now framed by statute in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Those landmark documents have helped make us better prepared and more vigilant than we were on September 11, 2001. But we cannot rest. We must continue to transform our intelligence capabilities and cultures...and much of that transformation will depend on how wisely and well we develop and deploy our human capital.


This Five Year Strategic Human Capital Plan will underpin the IC's ongoing transformation. It is designed to bring more Community-wide coherence and cohesion than ever before to the way IC agencies lead and manage their people. It is designed to promote professional growth. And in keeping with the *National Intelligence Strategy's* call for integration and innovation, it is intended to be bold in helping us realize our full potential as a Community. I look forward to working with you to achieve that ambitious goal.



**John D. Negroponte**

*Director of National Intelligence*


*June 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2006*



*No organization has a mission  
more critical than ours.*

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*The National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) recognizes  
the importance of our people.*



## Overview:

# The National Intelligence Strategy

**Introduction.** We live in a complicated and dangerous world. The 21<sup>st</sup> century demands that those who serve in the agencies of the US Intelligence Community (IC), both military and civilian, be capable of rapidly collecting and analyzing intelligence in a threat environment that is becoming exponentially more complex, volatile, and interconnected. The National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) recognizes the importance of our people in its Enterprise Objective 4, which calls upon the IC to “attract, engage, and unify an innovative and results-focused Intelligence Community workforce.” It also requires a five year human capital (HC) strategy that will:

- Build an agile, “all source” workforce by projecting and planning for mission critical human resource requirements (both quantitative and qualitative); determining the optimum mix of military, civilian, contractor, and other human resources necessary to meet those requirements; and creating an overarching IC-wide human resource policy and information architecture that enables the IC and its components to rapidly acquire, develop, integrate, and deploy our human resources within and across organizational lines to accomplish the mission;
- Win the war for talent, by attracting and retaining the best and brightest candidates, recognizing and rewarding technical expertise, performance excellence, integrity, and commitment to service; providing enterprise-wide opportunities for professional growth and leadership development that will help realize (and use) the full potential of our employees; and encouraging initiative, innovation, resourcefulness, and resilience among the members of the IC and those who lead them; and

- Strengthen the Intelligence Community by creating a culture of personal, professional, technical and managerial leadership at all organizational levels; fostering an IC-wide *ethos* that values selfless service, integrity, and mission accountability; and embodying those values in a transformational, 21<sup>st</sup> century leadership corps that engenders excellence at all levels of the Community.

**Service as an Integrating Force.** These three broad goals touch virtually every Enterprise Objective, and the National Intelligence Strategy’s success turns in part on managing these complex inter-dependencies. However, as critical as these goals, objectives, and relationships are there is much more to the Strategy’s human capital vision; indeed, the NIS literally defines the IC’s transformation in human capital terms, stating that “a high-performing intelligence workforce that is results-focused, collaborative, bold, future oriented, self-evaluating, (and) innovative” is central to the Community’s ultimate integration...and its ultimate success (NIS, page 4). This demands a degree of IC-wide cohesion that is unprecedented, a binding force as powerful as the one that aligns our colleagues in the uniformed services of our country; this too must be part of our Plan.

**Outline of the Plan.** To ensure that the Intelligence Community is able to acquire and sustain a workforce (and an institutional culture) that can meet these far-reaching requirements, the NIS tasked the IC’s Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO), in partnership with the Chancellor of the National Intelligence University, to develop a comprehensive, five year IC Strategic Human Capital Plan. This Plan, covering the

military and civilian members of the Intelligence Community in 16 separate elements of six different cabinet departments, is set forth on the pages that follow.

- **Setting the Stage**

The Plan begins by providing the *Strategic Context* for our efforts, outlining the many and

- **Realizing the Vision**

Thereafter, the Plan sets forth an integrating *Vision* for the IC's workforce, along with details regarding the three human capital *Goals* outlined above, which are intended to achieve that vision. Each goal includes a number of aggressive, actionable program and policy *Objectives*, designed to ensure



varied threats to our Nation's security. This sets the stage for the goals and objectives that follow, and it is intended to remind us that everything it proposes must enable and support the IC's mission. The Plan also outlines a number of *Human Capital Challenges*, many of which face every Federal agency and others that are unique to our Community, that we must confront and address.

that our vision becomes reality (most already underway), along with critical *Interdependencies* with other NIS initiatives. These sections also set forth implementation *Milestones* and notional outcome *Metrics* to gauge our progress. The Plan concludes with final observations and immediate *Next Steps* for execution, as well as an Appendix that describes the intensive, inclusive planning process that gave rise to this document.

# The Strategic Context:

## Global Threats, Extant and Emerging

If our mission depends on our people, the IC's Strategic HC Plan must take the Community's external threat environment into account — these are the challenges our workforce must face (sometimes directly!), and the Community's HC policies and systems must enable and sustain it in that vital effort.

Our “business” is the Nation's security, and today that security is threatened by a chaotic multiplicity of adversaries and enemies, real and potential — from rogue states and emerging regional powers to non-state actors and extremist movements. These threats know no national or regional boundaries or borders...there is no clearly defined battlefield. They are fueled by a world beset by competition — over resources, land, information, and ideologies. They are also asymmetric, not just between major economic and military powers, but between established and developing nations, cultures, and religions.

Our threat environment is further complicated by the fact that our principal adversaries operate in a diffuse and networked form; they have learned to hide their intentions and capabilities in plain sight — among the everyday and commonplace, from technology to transport — to threaten the security of US interests and citizens. And the danger they present is further compounded by “two-edged” technologies that can be transformed from the benign and the beneficial to weapons of mass destruction. Thus, while there is less danger of global thermonuclear war, in many respects the early 21<sup>st</sup> century is an even more dangerous time than the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

- **The War on Terror**

Terrorism remains the preeminent danger to our citizens, our homeland, our interests, and our allies.

The Intelligence Community is on the front lines in the War on Terror, and this will continue to be our first priority. However, even as we prosecute that war with all the tools at our disposal, we must be relentlessly vigilant to other possible threats to our safety and security.



White House photo by Paul Morse

- **Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Proliferation**

The development of dangerous weapons (biological and chemical as well as nuclear) and delivery systems constitutes the second major threat to the safety of our Nation. Most nation-states are constrained in the use of WMD by the logic of deterrence and international control regimes, but these constraints may be of little utility in preventing the use of mass effect weapons by terrorist groups or rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran.


- **Two-Edged Technologies**

Emerging and esoteric technologies, such as biotechnology and nanotechnology, offer the potential for great benefit; however, they also may be modified for destructive purposes. These “two-edged” technologies move freely in our globalized economy, as do the scientists and engineers who

can weaponize them, making it extremely difficult to track and deter efforts to acquire and employ their necessary production techniques.

- **Globalization and Interdependence**

To one degree or another, all nations are affected by the phenomenon known as globalization. While it has benefited many, its underside – fierce competition for global energy reserves and emerging



markets, tremendous disparities between rich and poor nations, criminal networks that create and feed black markets in drugs and even human beings, and the rapid transmission of disease – all breed potential threats to our security.

- **Emerging Regional Powers**

Globalization has resulted in a shift of world economic momentum and energy to greater Asia – especially China and India. These two Asian giants comprise fully a third of the world’s population – a huge labor force eager for modern work, supported by significant scientific and technological capabilities, and competing with the rest of the global economy for natural resources and capital.

- **Energy Competition and Security**

Competition for energy has increased the geopolitical role of key energy producer states such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Venezuela.

At the same time, the pursuit of secure energy supplies has become a much more significant driver of foreign policy in countries where energy demand growth is surging – particularly China and India.

- **Fragile Infrastructure**

Our infrastructure is vulnerable to both natural as well as manmade disruption, a condition compounded by the inextricable linkages and dependencies among components of our infrastructure and our very way of life. Witness the breadth and depth and disruption caused by Hurricane Katrina, and the ripple effects felt throughout the United States.

- **Pandemics and Epidemics**

The realities of the 21st century have forced us to expand the definition of bio-threats to include naturally occurring pandemics, such as the potential emergence of a new and more deadly avian influenza strains. There are many unknowns about avian flu, but even the specter of an outbreak could have significant effects on the international economy, whole societies, military operations, critical infrastructure, and diplomatic relations.

While each of these threats represents a major intelligence challenge by itself, their potential interplay has made our mission that much more difficult. Simply put, we must have a workforce that knows as much as humanly and technically possible about *every one* of the threats described above, sometimes from the “inside” of those countries, organizations, and networks who would do us harm. Thus, our Nation cannot afford to have less than the very best at the tip of its intelligence spear. The powerful critiques of the 9/11 Commission and the WMD Commission, framed by statute in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, have helped make us better prepared and more vigilant than we were on that terrible day in September 2001. But we cannot rest. We must transform our intelligence capabilities and cultures...and much of that transformation turns on our human capital.

# The IC's Human Capital Challenges

Our strategic context shapes the IC's mission, and in turn, the requirements and capabilities that shape our workforce. It also impacts our ability to meet those requirements...that is, how effectively we are able to acquire, develop, deploy, and retain the human capital we need. We face formidable challenges in that regard. We find ourselves in a war for talent, often for the most arcane and esoteric of skills, sometimes between ourselves and/or with our own contractors. And even when we win it, we must then confront and close daunting gaps in the demographics, experience levels, and "world-views" of the "generations" resident in our own workforce.

- **Hyper-Competition**

Our war for talent is being fought in a labor market that is shrinking, the result of lower US birth rates, fewer college graduates (especially with technical degrees and foreign language proficiency), and fewer still who are US citizens. Add to that our requirement for some of the most esoteric skills, including proficiency in the most difficult languages, scientific disciplines, and emerging technologies, as well as the most stringent suitability and security clearance requirements anywhere, and it is clear that the IC will face hyper-competition for the best and brightest.

- **Insufficient Diversity**

The US civilian labor force is becoming even more diverse, and while the IC has made steady progress over the last several years, we are not keeping pace...at least according to conventional measures. Part of the problem lies with the benchmarks we use — US Civilian Labor Force data includes many non-US citizens who cannot meet our clearance requirements.

*We find ourselves in a war for talent,  
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But even if we find better metrics, the fact is that greater diversity is a mission imperative for the IC. We need a workforce that looks like America, but our challenge (and our definition of diversity) is much broader: we also need a workforce that can effectively deal with all of the diverse peoples, cultures, and subcultures of the world. The good news is that the United States remains a land of immigrants, and heritage communities offer a potentially rich source of candidates for the IC.

- **An Imbalanced Workforce**

After years of tight budgets and externally constrained hiring in the 1990's, we are now confronted with disproportionate concentrations of relatively new recruits (that is, those hired post-9/11) on one hand, and retirement-eligible

employees on the other. In between, we face critical shortfalls of experienced mid-career professionals — those who would have been in the succession pipeline, but for under-funding and hiring ceilings. Instead of a more-or-less even distribution of professionals across all



year groups and experience levels, the shape of our workforce is bimodal, two “humps” with a deep and disturbing valley in between. The IC literally skipped a generation of new hires, with serious ramifications for our overall capacity and leadership succession.

- **Generation Gaps**

While we have been blessed with the funding to rapidly expand our workforce, especially in such mission-critical areas as analysis and human intelligence (HUMINT), the wave of post-9/11 new hires brings a different “world-view” about work and careers. No less patriotic than their colleagues, they nevertheless see a different balance between work and family, job and career. For example, many of the IC’s newest generation are not seeking a 25 to 30 year career with a single employer; instead, they see a future with multiple jobs and a variety of employers. We need to recalibrate our HC policies and practices to accommodate this. We also need to prepare their supervisors for a potential “culture clash” with their newest employees... who have far different styles of work, interaction, dress, leisure, even language.

- **Competition with Contractors**

Increasingly, the IC finds itself in competition with its contractors for our own employees. Confronted by arbitrary staffing ceilings and uncertain funding, components are left with no choice but to use contractors for work that may be borderline “inherently governmental” – only to find that to do that work, those same contractors recruit our own employees, already cleared and trained at government expense, and then “lease” them back to us at considerably greater expense.

# Our Vision:

## An Integrating National Intelligence “Service”

**The Challenge.** The US Intelligence Community’s Strategic Human Capital Plan is a means to an end — accomplishing our national security mission, in the face of the threats to our Nation’s security and the human capital challenges that exacerbate them. In this regard, the Plan includes a number of innovative and far-reaching HC initiatives, all designed to ensure that the IC has a workforce that is second to none. However, its true purpose goes far beyond hiring, training, pay, and benefits...it is intended to do nothing less than help bring about the IC’s transformation.

- **Transformation Through Integration**

The National Intelligence Strategy declares that its success is dependent upon integrating our Nation’s intelligence agencies and those who serve them, transforming them from a constellation of separate but cooperating elements into a more unified, cohesive “whole.” The IC’s professionals, both military and civilian, must begin to see themselves not just as employees of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the National Security Agency (NSA), but also as part of something larger — an overarching national intelligence “service,” unified by high standards and performance, common mission, and shared core values. A truly integrated IC is the only answer to the myriad threats that we face, and a focus on our common service (deliberately enabled and reinforced by HC

policies and practices) can become a powerful force in that regard.

- **Unity Without Uniformity**

That said, a national intelligence “service” does not depend on or require a monolithic, homogeneous institutional culture, or a one-size-fits-all set of personnel rules and procedures (although some uniformity will undoubtedly be necessary). Nor must it come at the expense of the separate traditions and interests of the various agencies that comprise the IC or their respective departments — at least those that are consistent with the aims of the Intelligence Reform Act and the NIS. We believe there is a way forward that respects those traditions and interests, and that strikes the proper balance between individual independence, agency autonomy, and Community-wide cohesion and integration.

That way ahead is set forth below, through a unifying IC Strategic Human Capital Plan that is intended to chart a navigable course from today’s present to tomorrow’s future: an IC transformed under the umbrella of a national intelligence “service,” integrated by shared values and a common ethos, and aligned by supporting HC policies and systems that balance Community-wide coherence with the need for agency (and departmental) flexibility and focus.

# Realizing the Vision:

## Our Strategic Human Capital Goals

By its own terms, the success of the National Intelligence Strategy turns on our people...it requires nothing less than a unified corps of dedicated intelligence professionals that is bold and innovative, focused on results and on the future, collaborative and self-evaluating, and led by senior officers who understand and leverage the capabilities of the entire US intelligence enterprise. While the vast majority of the IC's civilian and military members already meet one or more of these characteristics, we need to ensure all of our people are provided the opportunity and the means to reach their full performance potential in this regard. The Intelligence Community's Strategic HC Plan, along with the IC-wide policy and program "architecture" that will enable its execution, establishes three broad goals designed to achieve this end-state.

- **Goal 1: Build an Agile, "All Source" Workforce**

If the IC is to be able to anticipate and rapidly respond to the array of threats and targets described in the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), we must plan for an "all source" workforce that is optimized by its mix of military and civilian employees, contractors, and international and academic partners seamlessly integrated to achieve maximum agility and enabled by an enterprise human resource policy and information architecture that allows easy movement across organizational lines. To achieve this goal, we must be able to project our requirements (both qualitative and quantitative) with far more precision and rigor, match them against current capacity, and close any gaps revealed in the process.

- **Goal 2: Win the War for Talent**

Our mission requires more than just the right workforce size and structure. It also requires the right people. The IC must be an "employer of choice," able to attract and retain the very best and brightest to our ranks, even in the face of fierce competition for talent and scarce skills. Our workforce must be dedicated to our mission and strengthened by its diversity, able and willing to meet and exceed the highest standards of conduct and performance. And in so doing, they deserve the best we can offer them in terms of training, career and professional development, competitive compensation and benefits, and support for them and their families.

- **Goal 3: Create a Culture of Leadership... at All Levels**

As an institution, the IC is a paradox. Comprising 16 separate agencies in six separate cabinet departments, it must somehow integrate those diverse organizations, unifying them around shared mission and values ...a common *ethos* like the one that binds together those who wear the uniforms of our separate military services. Our Nation's intelligence agencies must be united by a common IC culture, its own *ethos* of service, integrity, and accountability. This is a daunting challenge, and if we are to succeed, we will require a new kind of leadership, developed, deployed, and demonstrated at all levels of the IC.

# Goal 1: Build An Agile, All-Source Force


The threats that face our Nation are many and varied...indeed, even at our best we cannot be expected to predict every challenge to our national security. When such threats emerge, we must have a workforce with the capacity in place to deal with them, agile and adept enough to respond rapidly and effectively...a “Total IC Force” ready and able to bring all of its human resources (civilian, military, contractor, even retiree “reserves”) quickly to bear.

**Critical Dependencies:** This HC Goal enables the following key Mission and Enterprise Objectives:

- **Mission Objective 1** – Defeat terrorists at home and abroad
- **Mission Objective 2** – Prevent and counter the spread of WMD
- **Mission Objective 5** – Anticipate issues of strategic concern for decision-makers
- **Enterprise Objective 1** – Build an integrated intelligence capability
- **Enterprise Objective 2** – Strengthen analytical capacity

## IC Annual Employee Climate Survey Talent Index

■ Positive ■ Neutral ■ Negative ■ Do Not Know



This index measures employee perceptions about an organization’s ability to recruit and retain top talent. It gauges if employees understand how their work relates to their agency’s goals and mission priorities, and if they get a sense of accomplishment from their work. It also assesses employee satisfaction with coworkers, supervisors, working conditions, involve-

ment in workplace decisions, training and development opportunities, promotions, pay, and rewards. The IC results are strong in this critical area: most employees indicate that IC organizations are doing what it takes to hire and sustain a workforce with the talent and skills needed to meet our critical national security mission.

- **Enterprise Objective 3** – Optimize collection capabilities
- **Enterprise Objective 8** – Exploit path-breaking scientific research

**Goal 1: Milestones and Metrics.** Program and policy milestones are described below. Metrics will focus on



key indicators of workforce dynamics and structure (such as accessions, experience levels and distribution, inter-agency details, attrition and replacement rates, etc.) for all segments of the IC workforce – military, civilian, and contractors. In addition, our workforce planning system will evaluate current workforce capabilities, by major functional/occupational group and key competency area (for example, foreign language capability) against future requirements, as well as actual execution against IC/component accession and training targets.

## Objective 1.1 Plan for Threats and Requirements

**Plan for Threats.** Capacity begins with planning. Today, workforce planning is largely a budget exercise, focused on maintaining and/or adjusting overall civilian staffing levels. And given the long lead time it takes to hire, train, develop, and deploy our most critical human assets, we must be better able to project our human resource requirements literally years in advance, compare those requirements against current capabilities, and then take sustained action to close the gaps that may be revealed, to include sustained funding for projected accessions, training, career development, etc. across our Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

- **Project Strategically, Plan Systematically**

On the demand side, we need to be better able to link requested civilian staffing levels to changes in missions and threats.

Similarly, on the supply side, we need far more precise, multi-year projections of attrition (quits, retirements, etc.) and migration (that is, employee movement from one IC element to another, within the IC as a whole, and/or between occupations), taking into account differences in these patterns among major occupational groups.

- **Model Supply and Demand**

We have already begun to design and develop a more rigorous, requirements-based workforce planning system. We have acquired an IC-wide license for a computer-based workforce planning tool that offers the degree of sophistication we require, and we are in the process of reconfiguring that tool to reflect our major program budget categories and populating its database with ele-

ment-level human resource information. The system is expected to achieve initial operating capability in time for the FY 2008 budget cycle.

- **Plan for Foreign Language Requirements**

One of the first applications of this new, requirements-based workforce planning system will be to develop an IC strategic human capital plan for foreign languages. Based on an analysis of the return on investments in foreign language hiring

career paths that encourage and reward continuous development of these critical skills if we are to realize full return on our investment in them.

- **Manage Military Manpower**

We also need to become more involved in defining and addressing our military manpower requirements. For example, active duty military members provide a major share of the IC's foreign language capability. Better planning and




and training to date, the ODNI concluded that such return was difficult to gauge, given relatively vague requirements and performance metrics. A preliminary iteration of that plan will be developed in time for the FY 2009-2014 program planning cycle, using NSA's work with its Language Readiness Index as one of the IC's benchmarks. In addition to hiring and training requirements, this strategic plan must also address the long-term career development of personnel with foreign language capability (both military and civilian); they must have viable

utilization of military members with such critical skills, including comprehensive career management, will improve the return on our investment in their hiring and training. This will require close collaboration with the military services. In this regard, the ODNI and the Department of Defense (DoD) are developing a "joint" set of military manpower metrics, to include such things as accession and fill rates for military intelligence and language specialties, that we will use to ensure the capability of this vital component of the "Total IC Force."

## Objective 1.2

### Identify Common, Core Competencies

**Define Critical Qualities.** There also is a qualitative dimension to workforce planning...not just the gross numbers that may be required by a particular component or function, but also the competencies and qualities of the individual employees behind those numbers. We need to identify and validate those competencies for each major functional community, as a basis for common qualification, training, and performance standards; these competency models also will ensure we can identify critical gaps between current and projected workforce capability, and guide cross-Community and component-level strategies to close them.



- **Validate Analytic Competencies**

We have already begun this effort. In partnership with the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, we have completed the validation of an IC analytic competency model that identifies the set of critical knowledges, skills, and attributes required to conduct effective intelligence analysis, now and in the future. The model, to be completed and implemented in FY 2006, includes general analytic competencies (such as critical thinking); categories of “target” expertise, based on the topics and countries set forth in the NIPF; and analytic tradecraft — the tools and methods used by the intelligence disciplines, linked directly to IC quality standards for analytic products.

- **Catalog Analytic Resources**

This competency model will be integrated into the Analytic Resources Catalog (ARC); already online, the ARC is a comprehensive database that provides IC leaders with a detailed inventory of the thousands of intelligence analysts in the IC, according to their expertise and experience. The

ARC will serve as a powerful workforce planning tool, providing a baseline of current analytic capability and capacity, compared against the requirements projected by the NIPF. And by listing individual analysts by name and expertise in its “Yellow Pages” feature, the ARC will also enable and encourage informal information and knowledge-sharing networks, another top DNI priority.

- **Manage HC by Function and Profession**

The analytic community’s efforts offer a template for the rest of the IC. Each major functional community, in partnership with HC professionals, should take a similar approach. Comprehensive, functionally-specific competency models should be developed in FY 2006 and 2007 and employed to help us determine required staffing levels, IC-wide and in each component, with far more precision (see Objective 1.1), as well as the annual accession, training, and retention targets necessary to meet and sustain those levels. In addition, these models will serve as the basis for function-specific qualification, training, and performance standards. Note these models and standards would serve as a common, IC-wide baseline and would not preclude additional, component-specific competencies, so long as they meet required methodological rigor.

- **Foreign Language Competencies**

As we develop a comprehensive functional “inventory” of our critical human resources, we must also ensure that we capture their foreign language competencies; an inventory of foreign language-capable employees must catalog their proficiency levels (which are the focus of the best current databases), as well as their experience and skills sets. This is essential to workforce planning and utilization. Proficiency levels can be identified by standardized testing to include Oral Proficiency Interviews. In addition, we need to record such things as years of professional experience in specific languages and dialects; written and oral translation; transcription, interpretation, and/or interrogation skills; language analysis (that is, writing reports based on foreign language material); foreign geographic names; and open source exploitation.

## Objective 1.3

### Build an Enterprise HR Information Architecture

#### **Integrate Systems to Foster HR Information**

**Sharing.** Information is essential to workforce planning. The IC must design, develop, and deploy an integrated, enterprise-wide human resource information architecture if we are to achieve the degree of precision and information-sharing necessary to support the sophisticated, “corporate” workforce planning and management system our mission demands.

- **Ensure Interoperability**

This does not necessarily mean that the IC needs a single human resource information system, although the potential cost savings associated with a single platform makes this an option that must be considered. At the very least, however, it means some degree of interoperability amongst the various IC human resource

information systems in use today. Such interoperability will enable the rapid, cross-component movement of personnel as well as personnel information, and also could pave the way for improved operational efficiencies through shared human resource services and/or employee self-service.

- **Make the Business Case for Integration**

At present, there is little or no IC interoperability, with as many as four different commercial human resource information systems platforms (and various separate versions of those systems) currently in use. The business case for greater integration of such systems is obvious, and in its FY 2007 pass-back, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) recommended that the DNI conduct a business case analysis, modeled after a similar initiative now underway in the regular Federal Civil Service known as the HR Line of Business. The DNI’s Chief Information Officer (CIO) and the IC CHCO have already initiated such a study, with a target of completion by the end of FY 2006.

- **Meet Critical Short-Term Information Technology Requirements**

In the interim, in FY 2006, we need to move forward aggressively to address a number of information technology (IT) requirements that are integral to our overall IC human capital plan. These include implementation of the IC’s recently acquired workforce planning software (see Objective 1.1); web-based support for the Community’s new “joint duty” policy, to include an online listing of joint duty opportunities and detailees (see Objective 3.4); a database of applicant resumes, so they can be shared and accessed by all IC components (see Objective 2.1). In FY 2007, we also will expand the ARC database to accommodate additional, competency-based inventories of acquisition professionals, scientists and engineers, and possibly collection personnel (Objective 1.2).

## Objective 1.4 Integrate Our “Total Force”

**Engage all Elements of the Force.** The integration called for by the National Intelligence Strategy is more than organizational. We must also begin to look at all who contribute to the IC’s mission as a “Total Force” -- civilian employees, military members, contractors, and international and academic partners. And if we are to realize the full potential of that force, those various elements and components must be fully integrated as well, according to a deliberate doctrine that identifies and leverages their relative strengths.

- **Eliminate Restrictive Staff Ceilings**

Today, there is no such doctrine, at least with respect to the use of contractor resources to augment critical line and staff functions. Indeed, the decision to use such resources is often predicated on arbitrary end-strength ceilings...restrictions that may literally preclude the use of US Government (USG) civilians or military personnel, even where that makes the most sense from a mission and cost standpoint. Thus, the use of contractors is often tactical and exigent, driven by factors unrelated to mission.

- **Identify Inherently Governmental Functions**

In its FY 2007 pass-back, OMB requested that the DNI conduct a study to determine if contractors may be engaged in IC work that is “inherently governmental” and hence improper. We are initiating that study, with completion targeted for the end of FY 2006. The study’s results will help us determine the optimum mix of civilian,

military, and contractor personnel, develop a plan for rebalancing our workforce accordingly, and identify resource and policy issues that may enable or constrain us from achieving that optimum end state.

- **Manage Staff Levels to Budget**

We also must have the inherent flexibility to employ the right levels and mix of civilian, military, and contractor personnel to meet mission requirements. This is impeded by the imposition of rigid end-strength ceilings to manage our workforce. This year, as part of our legislative agenda, we will seek relief from such end-strength limitations, at the very least to permanently authorize ODNI to approve staffing at 102 percent of ceiling – a flexibility Congress has provided on a year-by-year basis in the past. In FY 2007 and 2008, however, we will ultimately seek to manage our civilian staffing levels based on overall NIP funding exclusively, with no end strength limitations.



## Objective 1.5 Stand Up New Force Elements

**Integrate and Expand Mission Capacity.** The National Intelligence Strategy also provides for the establishment of several new IC organizational elements, all designed to integrate various functions and operations, and as a result, provide the Community with additional mission capacity. The “stand up” of these new organizational elements presents considerable HC challenges, especially at a time when other parts of the IC (for example, the Departments of

# IC Annual Employee Climate Survey

## Overall Employee Satisfaction

■ Positive
 ■ Neutral
 ■ Negative
  Do Not Know

*Considering everything, how satisfied are you with your job?*



This single item provides an overall indication of how satisfied employees are with their jobs. While most Federal employees are satisfied with their jobs,

IC employees are even more so. This is a very strong result for the IC.

Homeland Security and Treasury, the CIA, and DIA) are also expanding staff capacity.

- Establish the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)'s National Security Branch (NSB)**

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Reform Act of 2004 directed the FBI, in coordination with the DNI, to establish a National Security Branch, and within it an Intelligence Career Service, to improve the Bureau's intelligence collection and analysis capabilities. The DNI and the Director of the FBI have established a joint task force to oversee the establishment of the NSB, starting in FY 2006 and continuing through FY 2008. Part of that effort will include the application of the IC's analytic competency model (see Objective 1.2 above), as well as the qualification, training, performance, and promotion standards derived from that model, to the Bureau's agents and analysts. This will ensure the Bureau's analytic corps is as capable as its mission demands.

- Form the National Clandestine Service (NCS)**

In response to WMD Commission, the DNI established the National Clandestine Service (NCS) to strengthen the Nation's HUMINT capabilities, integrating DoD, FBI, and CIA operations and personnel under the overall leadership of the CIA. The DNI and the Director of the CIA have established a joint task force to

oversee the establishment of the NCS, starting in FY 2006 and continuing through FY 2008. Part of that effort will include the development of consolidated workforce staffing requirements and hiring plans for the IC's clandestine collectors; common qualification, training, and tradecraft standards; and compensation and benefit policies that ensure internal equity among the various components with NCS assets.

- Stand Up Office of the Director of National Intelligence Centers and Mission Managers**

The United States' intelligence capacity also will be strengthened by the establishment of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX), as well as "Mission Managers" for Iran and North Korea. Each of these elements is designed to serve as an IC-wide integrator, bringing together all-source collection and analytic expertise in support of their mission areas. They too present considerable HC challenges, and not just with respect to achieving their FY 2006 initial operating capability. Beginning in FY 2007, they also will have a role in the strategic management of human capital, with responsibilities for competency modeling, standard setting, and career pathing that bridge the collection and analytic communities that support them. NCIX is an early exemplar in this regard.

## Goal 2:

# Win the War for Talent

Our mission mandates talent of the highest caliber, individuals with some of the most valuable (and valued) skills in the labor market; individuals who can meet and



exceed the very highest standards of performance and integrity, competence and conduct...all at government salaries. This is challenge enough, but it is compounded by the demands we place on our people, psychological as well as physical. Our human capital strategy and supporting systems must be up to the task.

**Critical Dependencies:** This HC Goal enables and/or depends upon the following key Enterprise Objectives:

- **Enterprise Objective 1 –**  
Build an integrated intelligence capability
- **Enterprise Objective 2 –**  
Strengthen analytical capacity
- **Enterprise Objective 3 –**  
Optimize collection capabilities

- **Enterprise Objective 7 –**  
Establish clear, uniform security practices
- **Enterprise Objective 8 –**  
Exploit path-breaking scientific research
- **Enterprise Objective 10 –**  
Eliminate redundant support systems

**Goal 2: Milestones and Metrics.** Program and policy milestones are described below. Metrics will focus on key indicators of the IC's attractiveness as an employer, (such as applicants per vacancy, offer and acceptance rates for new hires, new hire quality, short/long-term attrition and retention rates, etc.), as well as our workforce's overall quality and "health." We also will continually monitor workforce diversity, broadly defined to include non-traditional races and religious/ ethnic groups, against various population and workforce benchmarks and baselines – including more relevant and specialized employers and labor markets. In addition, the annual IC Employee Climate Survey will provide a comprehensive set of indicators that will help us gauge the morale of our employees, and by inference, their motivation and retention proclivity (see Objective 3.1).

## Objective 2.1

### Maintain Our Competitive Edge

America's intelligence services continue to attract our Nation's best and brightest, idealistic individuals, both young and experienced, who want to serve their country. We receive resumes from thousands of high-quality applicants each year and generally have the luxury of being able to choose the very best of

them. Despite long waits for security clearances, most of those we select stay the course. However, we cannot take any of this for granted...it still takes dozens of fine applicants to find just a few who can make the cut, and we still face keen competition, often from our own contractors, for those with scarce skills and attributes. Thus, we must use every tool at our disposal if we are to maintain – and sharpen – our competitive edge.

- **Recruit Corporately**

We already have begun to integrate the separate recruiting efforts of the various IC agencies, coordinating campus and other recruiting visits to avoid competing against one another. Under a common IC brand and informational materials, our “joint” recruiting teams, coordinated by the ODNI and a subcommittee of the IC CHCO Council, are now able to extend their reach to more campuses and other recruiting events (such as the national conferences of various minority professional associations, etc.), and to offer candidates who may have had an interest in a single agency information on a much wider variety of intelligence career options.

- **Exploit Technology**

We also have begun to leverage technology to maintain our edge, with an IC recruiting Web site ([www.intelligence.gov](http://www.intelligence.gov)) that provides an effective overview of Community careers and “hot links” to the Web sites of our member agencies. We have plans to improve our site in FY 2006, adding the capability to accept electronic resumes that can be shared with all members of the IC, as well as continuing to evolve and improve our “branding” to establish the Community’s own overarching institutional identity in the labor market.

- **Hire Before Graduation**

The IC has a number of tools at its disposal that give us an edge – at least with respect to other

Federal agencies. Unique scholarship programs like Stokes and Pat Roberts programs, (as well as the DNI’s own scholarship authority), and tested approaches like cooperative education programs and summer internships, allow us to identify and acquire college talent even before graduation. These scholarship and other pre-employment programs have been realigned within ODNI and centrally funded to ensure greater coordination with IC accession targets and corporate recruiting efforts. We also are following an NSA pilot, modeled after the military’s Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program, that “pre-commissions” and prepares outstanding college juniors and seniors for IC careers...a variation on the ODNI’s own Centers for Academic Excellence (see Objective 2.2).

- **Solve the Clearance Problem**

Part of our ability to compete for the best and brightest turns on the success of Enterprise Objective 7, regarding security clearances. Under ODNI leadership, the personnel security community in the IC must expedite the reengineering of the security clearance investigation and adjudication process in FY 2006, so that our recruits are not forced to wait months before they can begin to do the work they were hired to do. The IC also needs uniform security clearance standards to allow ease of movement between and among IC components (this is especially critical to the success of joint IC duty; see Objective 3.4). There are other creative solutions worth pursuing. The DNI’s Open Source Center, in partnership with a number of other stakeholders, is exploring the feasibility of establishing a “research park” for new hires in FY 2007, where they can do unclassified analytic work while awaiting their security clearances; the scientific and engineering community also is exploring similar “half way house” alternatives.

- **Enable Mid-Career Entry**

We also need to become more adept at and receptive to, recruiting mid-career professionals from the so-called college “after market.” For too long, we have assumed that the only way to meet our civilian HC requirements was to hire at the entry level and “grow our own” talent over the course of 30-year careers. However, we know the career patterns of today’s new hires will not resemble this traditional model, and we must devise effective alternatives to this closed-system paradigm. Some of our IC components, for example, CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), already have begun to exploit the mid-career professional talent source. To accelerate these efforts, in FY 2007 we intend to take full advantage of OPM’s Senior Presidential Management Fellows program (designed for lateral entry at mid-level pay grades), and, if necessary, design our own similar program. A compensation system utilizing broad pay bands also will allow us to offer more competitive salaries to mid-career candidates (see Objective 2.4).

- **Expand Our Contingent Force**

Finally, we need to expand our “ready reserves” beyond costly contractors, so we have additional sources of talent to meet short- and medium-term surge requirements. The Intelligence Reform Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 gives the DNI authority to establish a National Intelligence Reserve Corps of IC retirees who can be employed without any annuity penalty, and we have plans to exercise this authority in FY 2006 to provide support for the stand-up of FBI’s National Security Branch. We also need to expand NSA’s innovative industry exchange pilot program and use it, along with existing Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) authorities, to acquire less-than-permanent talent from the private sector and academic institutions.

## Objective 2.2 Increase the Supply of Critical Skills

**Employ Supply-Side Strategies.** The IC’s mission requires some of the most difficult-to-find skills...for example, fluency in some of the most esoteric and complex foreign languages, deep expertise in foreign cultures, mastery of one-of-a-kind technologies. By definition, these skills are in extremely short supply, and competition for them is keen. The IC generally fares well in that competition (in part because of the tools we have), but in many cases, there simply is not enough “clearable” talent to meet our needs.

*Because of our mission, we also need a workforce that is truly global in nature, one that can understand the subtle cultural nuances and complexities of ethnic and linguistic groups and subgroups to deal effectively (and sometimes clandestinely) with people from around the world.*


One way of getting an edge in this competition is to develop human capital pipelines that extend far beyond the IC.

- **Leverage Our Centers for Academic Excellence (CAE)**

The IC already has a number of innovative initiatives underway. For example, our Centers for Academic Excellence pilot establishes recruiting and teaching relationships with colleges and universities that have degree programs consistent with IC workforce requirements, as well as large minority populations. The pilot provides targeted grants to these institutions, funding the development and delivery of specialized courses and curricula (and thereby producing graduates) intended to meet our hiring needs. The first of our four pilot schools will graduate its inaugural class of CAE students in FY 2006, and if they prove to be attractive candidates, we have plans to institutionalize and expand the program to an additional two to four universities in FY 2007.

- **Implement the National Security Language Initiative (NSLI)**

As noted, we aggressively recruit individuals with foreign language proficiency, with every means at our disposal; however, in many cases, there are just not enough candidates to meet our demand, especially given high “wash out” rates during the rigorous security clearance process. One way to



attack such shortages is to increase the supply of viable candidates. That is the goal of this Presidential initiative. The DNI is one of its four sponsors (along with the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Education), and we have committed funds to support such activities as summer language immersion programs at the elementary and secondary school levels. These programs are intended to encourage students with an interest and aptitude in languages of strategic importance to the United States to acquire and/or maintain a foreign language proficiency. NSA has been designated as lead IC agency for this initiative, and with the ODNI, it will develop a concept of operations for this initiative in FY 2006 for implementation in FY 2007.


## Objective 2.3 Strengthen Our Diversity

**Make Diversity a Mission Imperative.** We must ensure we have a workforce that looks like the Nation we serve; this almost goes without saying, but in the case of the IC, we must go even further.

Because of our mission, we also need a workforce that is truly global in perspective, one that can understand the subtle cultural nuances and complexities of ethnic and linguistic groups and subgroups to deal effectively (and sometimes clandestinely) with people from all of the various countries and cultures of the world. To underscore his commitment to this imperative, the DNI has issued an IC Policy Statement on Diversity, one of his first, and has retained the Diversity Senior Advisory Panel for the Intelligence Community (composed of senior officials from industry, academia, the military, and the IC) to advise him on diversity policies and practices.

# IC Annual Employee Climate Survey Performance Culture Index

■ Positive 
 ■ Neutral 
 ■ Negative 
  Do Not Know



This index measures whether leaders provide their employees with vision and direction, and whether employees can see the linkage between their work and the mission, goals, and performance of their agency. It also gauges whether employees believe that high performers are recognized, rewarded, and

promoted, as well as whether their agency effectively deals with poor performance. These results indicate that while the IC, on average, does a better job of creating a positive performance culture than the rest of the Federal Government, there is still much room for improvement.

- ### Sustain Progress

The DNI's FY 2005 Annual Report on IC Diversity shows we continue to make slow but steady progress in this important area; female and minority representation is improving, particularly in the "pipeline" of new hires and those moving up the ranks to senior officer positions. To ensure that we are able to sustain and accelerate progress, we will develop an IC EEO and Diversity Action Plan in FY 2006 linked to this Plan, which will incorporate recommendations made by the Diversity Senior Advisory Panel for the IC in its 2004 report, *Diversity: A National Security Imperative for the Intelligence Community*.

- ### Reach Diverse Candidates and Communities

We also will continue our targeted IC-wide minority recruiting outreach effort; for example, in FY 2006 the IC recruiting team made visits to

national conferences sponsored by the Hispanic Professional Engineers Association, American Indians Science and Engineering Society, Asian Diversity, National Careers for the Disabled, and the Thurgood Marshall Scholarship Fund, in addition to Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) and Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities (HACU) member institutions. We will pay particular attention to the first "Class of 2006" graduates from those minority-serving colleges and universities that are partnering with our benchmark Centers for Academic Excellence (see Objective 2.2). In FY 2006, we also have plans to convene a meeting of various heritage community leaders, such as the Arab-American League, to discuss how the IC can reach out to members of these strategically important ethnic groups as a rich potential source of new recruits.

## Objective 2.4

### Invest in Our People

#### **Integrate Training, Education, and Career**

**Development.** We must take a far more integrated, “corporate” approach to the education, training, and career development of our professionals. To date, that has been left to individual IC components, with little if any integration or coordination among them. And while component training and development programs generally have been of high quality, standards, courses, and curricula have been inconsistent and uneven, varying across the IC, and sub-optimizing the return on our substantial training investment. We must do better. Our professionals are critical to our mission, and we must ensure they receive the very best education, training and career-long development, defined and integrated by strong, IC-wide professional communities of practice, and delivered by a “corporate” system of higher learning and education— a true National Intelligence University system that serves those professional communities.

- **Build Professional Communities of Practice**

One of the most effective ways to achieve this objective over the long term is to establish formal communities of professional practice across the IC, each responsible for “governing” their respective professions. These communities of practice also will serve as a powerful integrating force within the IC, mapping out career paths for their members that include “joint” developmental assignments between components (see Objective 3.4) and fostering informal information and knowledge sharing networks across organizational boundaries. Note these various initiatives would serve as a common, IC-wide baseline within and among these professional communities and would not preclude complementary, component-specific efforts.

- **Provide Functional Stewardship**

As a first step in FY 2006, those senior leaders in the ODNI who oversee the Community’s major professional disciplines — the Deputy and Associate Directors of National Intelligence for Analysis, Collection, Management (including budget and finance, human resource management, acquisition, etc.), Science and Technology, and Information Systems — should assume some stewardship responsibility for the strategic management of their human capital: the analysts, collectors, scientists, and support personnel who accomplish the Community’s mission.

- **Nurture Our Professional Corps**

Beginning in FY 2006, and working in partnership with the IC’s Chief Human Capital Officer and the Chancellor of the National Intelligence University, these functional chiefs should begin to define the common core knowledge, skills, and abilities critical to their respective disciplines; compare the current capacity of their human resources against these requirements; champion recruiting and component-level training efforts to close any gaps (see Objectives 1.2 and 1.3); and institute high professional standards governing the qualification, training, certification, performance, and promotion of their members. As noted, these various initiatives provide a common, IC-wide baseline within and among these professional communities and would not preclude additional complementary, component-specific efforts.

- **Build Inter-Disciplinary Bridges**

Like their counterparts in the more traditional professional communities, the Directors of NCTC, NCPC, the National Counterintelligence Executive, and Mission Managers for Iran and North Korea, also must assume stewardship responsibility for their human capital requirements. While their role is much more difficult — their HC capability

comes from a variety of intelligence disciplines and does not actually “belong” to them — they must still ensure that the IC has individuals with the requisite cross-domain competencies to meet its needs in these critical, inter-disciplinary areas.



- **Define Counterintelligence (CI) and Other Cross-Domain Competencies**

For example, NCIX has already developed a CI competency model that will bridge those developed by the analytic and collection communities that supply their human capital. The Iran and North Korea Mission Managers have similar plans underway for FY 2006 and 2007, complementing similar efforts in the analytic community.

- **Identify National Counterterrorism HC Requirements**

As part of the NCTC’s development of the National Implementation Plan, the National Security Council (NSC) has proposed a

far-reaching, Federal government-wide effort, beginning in FY 2007, to identify current and projected counterterrorism hiring and training requirements — everything from analytic competencies to foreign language capabilities. ODNI and OPM will collaborate in this effort, under the guidance of the NSC.

- **Establish a National Intelligence University System**

In their efforts to ensure our professionals meet the highest standards, the IC communities of practice must be supported by a strong training and education establishment with

a cross-cutting, IC-wide focus. Recommended by the WMD Commission, the National Intelligence University (NIU) is designed to serve that purpose, integrating and aligning the Community’s various training schools and educational institutions under one common, virtual “roof.” The NIU will function as a network managed and administered by the ODNI, and made up of the schools and training components of the IC. In addition, through academic outreach activities and partnerships, the NIU will extend its reach to other US-government training centers, degree-granting institutions and the broader academic community, to include universities, think tanks, and other information centers.

— **Coordinate Courses and Curricula**

NIU will leverage the separate strengths of its member institutions, ensure each meets the highest standards of pedagogy, coordinate disciplinary and inter-disciplinary training and education at all levels, and promote career-long learning and development for the IC's professional workforce — from entry and full performance employees, to senior experts and executives. Specific NIU initiatives will be set forth in greater detail in its forthcoming Learning and Education Action Plan, linked to this Plan to be completed in FY 2006.

— **Deliver Professional Education**

**Systemically**

In this regard, the NIU will oversee a higher education system that consists of (1) *component-specific* programs designed to meet local requirements unique to a particular IC element; (2) coordinated programs delivered by various IC components but intended to meet *common* requirements (for example, as set by a particular professional or functional community) according to common standards; and (3) *joint* programs that are expressly designed to promote an integrated, enterprise-wide perspective among professionals and leaders across the Community, as a complement to the IC's "joint duty" initiative (see Objective 3.4).

• **Establish Common Professional Education and Training Standards**

The NIU will encourage member institutions to seek formal academic accreditation. Beginning in FY 2006, and in partnership with the NIU,

each of the IC's major professional communities will establish common training course and curriculum standards for their professionals. These standards will be used to "accredit" the NIU's various member institutions and ensure that every course they offer is of the highest caliber. Derived from the competency models being developed for each of the IC's major functional and occupational groups (see Objective 1.2), training standards will be linked to common qualification, training, performance, and promotion standards in each of our major professional disciplines. Draft IC-wide training standards already have been developed for intelligence analysts, and once they have been validated against core analytic competencies, they will be used to assess current courses.

• **Focus on Foreign Language Training**

At present there are several separate language training institutions that support the IC and the military, including the Defense Language Institute, NSA's National Cryptologic School, the State Department's Foreign Service Institute, and the CIA's Intelligence Language Institute. While each program has some specialized functions that serve the requirements of their parent agencies, there are also large areas of commonality, and much can be done to share resources in such areas as course content, curriculum development, and methodology. The fledgling Consortium for Intermediate and Advanced Language Training, launched in 2005 with an initial focus on Chinese and Arabic language study, provides a basic construct for resource sharing, and the NIU will evaluate and expand this construct in FY 2006 and 2007.

## Objective 2.5

### Ensure Competitive Compensation

**Focus on Market and Performance.** We must ensure that the Community has the ability to fairly and competitively compensate its employees according to their “market value” and their relative contribution to the IC’s mission. This will require major changes to existing civilian compensation systems in the IC, most of which are firmly rooted in the Federal government’s General



Schedule (GS). Like the GS system, current IC compensation rules are not responsive to labor market competition, particularly for scarce technical and language skills, and they place far too much emphasis on longevity for annual pay adjustments.

- **Modernize our Compensation Systems**

The PDDNI recently announced that exercising the various statutory personnel flexibilities shared by the DNI, the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security and the Directors of the CIA and the FBI, the Community will attempt to design, develop, and deploy a common IC compensation “architecture” that links compensation to market and mission, as well as to the competencies and contributions of individual employees. And while it need not require a “one size fits all” approach,

that architecture must ensure market and performance equity for like occupations and responsibilities across the Community.

- **Recommend a Common IC Compensation Architecture**

This common architecture will be developed in FY 2006 and will attempt to integrate similar (but heretofore separate) efforts underway in the Departments of Homeland Security and Defense that will impact IC employees. The approach is intended to balance the unique requirements of the IC as a *Community*...without compromising the interests of the various agencies and cabinet departments involved, and to ensure a “level playing field” across the IC, avoid dysfunctional inter-agency competition, and preclude untenable pay disparities between and among IC components. For long-range planning purposes, component-by-component implementation will begin sometime in the FY 2007-2009 timeframe; however, our implementation timetable will be event-driven, not calendar-driven, and include a “readiness assessment” of each IC component against criteria to be developed by the CHCO Council.

- **Establish a Program Executive**

A joint IC Program Executive Office (PEO) headed by senior executives from NSA, CIA, and NGA has been established, and all IC components and their respective cabinet departments are represented. The Program Executive Office will (1) analyze any and all lessons learned from previous IC and other Federal pay system modernization initiatives, including those undertaken by the NGA, CIA, and NSA; (2) identify and consider common elements of the ongoing DoD, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and FBI pay-for-performance efforts, including those associated with the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS), as well as government-wide legislative proposals, as a starting point for an

IC framework; and (3) ensure employees and managers are kept fully apprised of the IC's deliberations and decisions at every step.

- **Develop Options and Recommendations**

The first phase of the initiative, to be completed by the summer of 2006, is designed to integrate employee input and technical research to produce a set of options and recommendations for consideration by the Joint Intelligence Community Council Deputies (D/JICC) and the IC Leadership Committee. In addition to the substantive content of a modern IC compensation system or systems, those recommendations will address the degree of commonality necessary to ensure internal (that is, inter-agency) performance and pay equity. The second and subsequent phases will depend on the strategic decisions made by these two bodies.

- **Assess IC-wide Performance Management Systems**

Our Pay Systems Modernization initiative will place far more emphasis on individual performance in pay-setting, and the effort's ultimate success will depend on how effective and credible our employee evaluation systems are. In this regard, OPM has developed a set of criteria that can be used to assess whether an agency's performance evaluation system is sufficient for performance-based pay – in effect, the criteria indicate an agency's "readiness" for pay-for-performance. Beginning in FY 2006, the IC, under the overall coordination of the Pay Modernization PEO, will begin evaluating component performance appraisal systems against those criteria, making improvements as necessary.



## Objective 2.6 Provide Competitive, Customized Benefits

**Expand Benefit Choices.** We must ensure our employees have the widest possible range of choices when it comes to their fringe benefits — such things as health and life insurance, long-term care, dental and vision coverage, etc. Competitive employee benefits are an important part of the recruiting and retention equation, but they may even be more critical in the IC, given the sometimes extreme demands our mission places on our employees and their families. In many instances, we ask our people to put themselves in harm's way, under conditions that stretch (and in some cases exceed) the limits of many traditional Federal employee health, life, and other insurance programs, and we must do everything we can to provide our employees with insurance options that address our unique circumstances.

- **Offer Health Benefits Alternatives**

Wherever possible, we will seek to enhance and expand the health benefits options available to the IC. For example, working in partnership with the CIA, we were able to make its health benefits plan (the Association Benefit

Plan) available to civilian employees of DIA, NSA, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), NGA, and the ODNI in November of 2005. First developed in 1947 (and heretofore available only to CIA employees), that plan was designed to specifically address the needs of employees posted or deployed overseas. We plan to extend eligibility to the remainder of the IC during the next Federal Employee Health Benefits open season in November of 2006.

- **Provide Customized Supplemental Coverage**

In addition, we will seek to provide customized supplemental coverage to all IC employees, no matter which health plan they choose. For example, over the years, the CIA has expanded its insurance programs to offer an increasingly comprehensive package of optional, supplemental coverage for such things as accident, income replacement, and life insurance (covering acts



of war and terrorism, as well as deployments to hostile areas) and long-term care insurance, and again in partnership with CIA, we will provide all IC employees with an opportunity to enroll in those supplemental plans in mid-2006 during a planned “mini” open season – component payroll systems permitting. We will also seek out similar and/or additional supplemental insurance coverage options for IC employees with other qualified underwriters.

## Objective 2.7 Support Our Families

**Expand Our Social Contract.** Our mission puts great stress on the families of our employees. That stress is especially severe for the families of those who must be posted or deployed overseas, in many cases on short notice and/or in covert status, almost always at some risk. However, that stress is not limited to the families of those “at the tip of the spear.” Our mission demands much from all our people, and we owe it to them to establish policies and practices that help them achieve the right balance between work and family, and that provide a safety net of support for their loved ones.

- **Identify Best Practices**

We are fortunate that forward-looking leaders (and their spouses) in many IC components long ago identified this as a priority, and they currently offer a wide variety of services to the families of our “troops,” both military and civilian. Working with the Family Advisory Boards established by the Directors of CIA, NSA, and NGA, we have begun to catalog those services as part of a study currently being conducted by a team from the Council for Excellence in Government; that study, to be completed in the summer of 2006, will identify those services that may serve as “best practices” for the entire Community to emulate.

- **Implement New IC Initiatives**

We already have identified several best practices that should be exported to the rest of the Community. For example, CIA and NSA have developed a training course for the spouses of deploying officers that we have now mandated for FY 2006 implementation throughout the rest of the IC. Additionally, to institutionalize our commitment to this objective, the IC CHCO Council has established a formal subcommittee on Employee and Family Support to develop an aggressive policy agenda in this area, with the DNI designating a dedicated program manager on his Human Capital staff to support it.

# Goal 3:

## Create a Culture of Leadership...at All Levels

Goals 1 and 2 are intended to ensure that the IC has a workforce with the talent and commitment to do the job. However, while they provide a platform for greater integration, these goals themselves will not transform the IC. It takes more to forge a confederation of sometimes-autonomous agencies into one integrated, unified team. Such a transformation turns on building a

common Community culture. We must identify, articulate, and above all, demonstrate the core values that bind us all together...and make us different. This will demand visionary, courageous leadership – not just at the top, but at all levels of the Community, from the front line to the front office, all contributing to an emerging ethos that connects us to a common and compelling mission.


*We must identify, articulate, and above all, demonstrate the core values that bind us all together...and make us different. This will demand visionary, courageous leadership – not just at the top, but at all levels of the Community....*

**Critical Dependencies:** This HC Goal enables or depends upon the following key Mission and Enterprise Objectives:

- **Mission Objective 1** – Defeat terrorists at home and abroad
- **Mission Objective 5** – Anticipate issues of strategic concern for decision-makers
- **Enterprise Objective 1** – Build an integrated intelligence capability
- **Enterprise Objective 2** – Strengthen analytical capacity
- **Enterprise Objective 3** – Optimize collection capabilities
- **Enterprise Objective 8** – Exploit path-breaking scientific research
- **Enterprise Objective 10** – Eliminate redundant support systems

# IC Annual Employee Climate Survey The Leadership Index

■ Positive ■ Neutral ■ Negative ■ Do Not Know



**Goal 3: Milestones and Metrics.** Program and policy milestones are described below. Metrics will focus on key indicators regarding the strength of the IC’s culture and its leaders, derived from the annual IC Employee Climate Survey, with its various leadership effectiveness indicators, as well as targeted analysis of trends and issues raised in various complaint and appeal processes. We also will focus on leadership and professional development, monitoring the dynamics of our joint duty rotation base (nominees/candidates per vacancy, candidate quality, joint tour length, planned and actual joint training delivery, post-assignment placement and promotion rates, etc.), as well as the dynamics of the leadership development “pipeline,” including the quantity, quality, and diversity of succession pools, for all levels of management.

## Objective 3.1 Foster an *Ethos* of Service, Integrity, and Accountability

**Define a Community *Ethos*.** The most powerful way to strengthen and unify our Community is to foster a common *ethos* amongst all who serve in it. That *ethos* embodies the “code” of shared values that guides the way an individual (and an organization) behaves, and it defines an institution’s culture. In our case, those shared values can inextricably bind us together in our common service to our Nation, integrating the IC like no other force. This is not an abstract idea; our core values have a direct bearing on what we do and how we do it. However, shared values are as intangible as they are powerful. Consequently, an attempt to create and sustain a common institutional culture across the IC, especially where none really exists today, may be our most difficult HC objective.

- **Articulate Our Core Values**

An IC *ethos* must be embodied in certain fundamental principles, enduring values that define the character of the IC and its workforce, so deeply held that they are independent of time and place and circumstance. Without a common set of shared values to guide our actions, we will never be a true Community. And as a Community, we must explicitly articulate those values if we expect our people to embody them. We offer three such values; we do not presume they represent the only values, or the most important — they are only offered as a starting point:

- **Selfless Service**

Our shared commitment to our national security mission must have priority, taking precedence over parochial interests, organizational as well as personal. We have an uncommon mission, and it requires an uncommon dedication to our Nation and its citizens.

- **Integrity**

We must have the courage to seek and speak the truth...to our leaders and policymakers, our superiors and subordinates, our colleagues and co-workers, accepting the consequences of doing so, even in the face of personal or professional adversity.

- **Accountability**

We must hold ourselves personally accountable for achieving results, as well as for adherence to all the laws and rules that govern how our most sensitive missions are to be accomplished. In this regard, we are ultimately accountable to the American people, for protecting them from harm, but also for protecting their privacy and civil liberties.

- **Instill and Reinforce Our Values**

We also must “walk the talk” of our values. Starting now, we must instill these core values in every member of the IC; if these are to be the binding glue of an IC culture, we cannot leave this to chance or to on-the-job osmosis. We must discuss our values in recruitment and training, and reinforce them on the job. We also must ensure all of our HC policies and practices, formal and otherwise, are aligned with and reinforce these values. Nothing could be worse than to send our workforce mixed “do as I say, not as I do” signals in this regard. This is particularly critical when it comes to performance management and reward systems.

- **Model Professional Integrity**


Wherever possible, these values should be validated as critical job competencies. For example, the analytic community has already identified integrity as a core requirement of all intelligence analysts, with dimensions ranging from the due diligence expected of an analyst in researching a particular intelligence issue (manifested in part by the community’s professional tradecraft standards), to the conviction that an analyst must have when “speaking truth to power.”

- **Ensure Personal Accountability**

We must make accountability for results an integral part of our performance management and reward systems. As a start, the DNI recently announced that he will require the heads of every IC agency to submit an individual performance “agreement” for his review and approval at the beginning of each fiscal year; the agreements, to be co-signed by the agency head and the DNI, identify the specific program results the agency head personally promises to achieve by the end of the year. In FY 2006, every senior executive in the agency head’s chain of command also is required to develop a personal performance agreement with his or her superior.

- **Measure Our Progress**

We must also measure whether the IC provides the sort of work environment that is consistent with these core values...and where it does not, we must take aggressive steps to improve. In this regard, we have just completed the first-ever annual IC Employee Survey to determine our



workforce's satisfaction with their leaders, their organizations, their ability to collaborate with peers across the IC, and the personnel policies and practices that affect them on the job. While only preliminary results were available as of this writing, they are generally encouraging; however, there are several areas that will need to be addressed — by the IC as a whole, and/or by individual components. With the inaugural 2005 survey as a baseline, we will repeat this process each year, so we can gauge how far we have come, and how far we need to go.

- **Establish a Culture of Learning**

Finally, our culture must support self-evaluation; in other words, we must learn from what we have done – from mistakes as well as accomplishments.

In FY 2006, the NIU officially established an IC Lessons Learned Center (following a recommendation by the WMD Commission), and it is now up and running. The Center has established a Senior Steering Group of ODNI leaders to guide its efforts, and with their input, it has begun developing IC-wide standards for studying, collecting, and sharing lessons learned; these standards will be used to sanction component studies, as well as to incorporate their results into education and training. In this regard, the Center has already sanctioned several important studies currently being conducted by various IC components (the results of these studies will be disseminated on NIU's Web site), as well as a presentation series that will feature personal "lesson learned" case studies by senior IC leaders.

## Objective 3.2 Develop a New Leadership Blueprint

**Require Leadership at All Levels.** Leadership is the key to an integrated Community culture that values service, integrity, and accountability. Indeed, as noted, leadership is the key to the IC's entire human capital strategic agenda. And this leadership cannot just come from the top...in a "net-centric" world where rigid hierarchies and formal chains of command may not have the necessary agility to deal with the threats we face, every member of the IC must be prepared to step up to the leadership challenge when it comes. For our part, we must prepare our people to do so; this cannot be left to chance. If our leaders, both present and future, are to survive and thrive in such a world, we must devise a new blueprint for them, one that focuses as much on *how* they lead, as on *what* they deliver, integrating our core values, new and enduring leadership competencies, and an unswerving focus on results.

- **Ensure Senior Leadership Ownership**  
This blueprint must be driven from the top, and to that end, the DNI has announced that this year he will establish a Leadership Development Executive Council under the auspices of the PDDNI and the IC Leadership Committee. The Council comprises senior executives from across the Community...those who are directly accountable for our mission, and who clearly have the biggest stake in ensuring leadership excellence at all levels. The Council will “own” this Objective, as well as Objectives 3.3 and 3.4, guiding the modernization and integration of the Community’s leadership development system.

- **Identify Critical Leadership Qualities**  
Our core values and our mission must guide our leadership blueprint. The IC’s 21st century leader must be able to achieve mission results as effectively through amorphous networks as through formal, hierarchical structures...adeptly navigating through complex webs of people and information that have no clearly defined boundaries, discovering, synthesizing, and integrating information to produce credible, actionable intelligence for policy makers. In FY 2006, the Leadership Development Executive Council should determine these strategic and operational requirements, and ensure that they are operationalized in our HC systems and policies.

— **Validate New Competencies**  
We must validate those new (and enduring) leadership competencies essential to our evolving mission. We have already begun this process. Under the sponsorship of the IC Leadership Committee, we are validating a new leadership competency model for the Community, identifying those critical qualities that characterize how our most effective leaders lead. To be completed in FY 2006, the end result will be a set of target leadership competencies (our leadership “tracraft”) that are essential to

success in a post- 9/11 world, and the NIU must ensure that its member institutions retool their leadership development curricula accordingly.

- **Identify and Develop Emerging Leaders**  
Given the long lead time necessary for developing our senior leadership cadre, our components must become far more sophisticated in succession planning — especially in identifying and developing front line professionals with the potential (and the desire) to lead. In this regard, in FY 2006 the NIU should ensure that its member institutions offer “readiness” programs that provide training and developmental assignments that prepare employees for the challenge of their first and subsequent leadership assignments.

- **Set High Standards for All Who Lead**  
Once our new leadership competency model is validated, we must make it real, by using it to establish (and enforce) the highest standards for those who lead in the IC. These standards must drive the way we select, develop, evaluate, and compensate leaders. To that end, in FY 2007, NIU will review the courses and curricula of its various IC member leadership institutes to ensure that they all meet such standards, and the IC CHCO will develop and implement common, IC-wide performance and promotion standards for leaders.

- **Ensure Accountability**  
We already have established the requirement that all IC component heads and their subordinate senior executives and professionals develop an annual personal performance “agreement” with demonstrable individual objectives that further the NIS; each agency head’s agreement is co-signed by the DNI. Subject to periodic progress reviews and annual updates, these agreements will serve as a common means of evaluating and comparing leaders across the IC, along with those critical competencies common to all IC leaders.

## Objective 3.3

### Treat Leadership as an Enterprise Resource

**Connect the Dots.** The 9/11 Commission concluded that the IC failed to “connect the dots” of existing intelligence in a way that may have warned us about the impending terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, and it attributed at least part of that failure to the insularity of the separate, largely independent agencies that

comprise the IC.

The bureaucratic borders between our components are real and they sometimes operate as barriers to effective information and intelligence sharing.

- **Ensure an Enterprise Orientation**

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 sought to remedy this by empowering the DNI to make service on his staff, or in more than one IC component, a prerequisite for promotion. Patterned after similar reforms implemented by our armed forces in the mid-1980’s, we believe “joint IC duty” will ensure that our leaders, as well as our front line professionals, acquire the broader, enterprise-wide perspective essential to success in a net-centric world.

- **Establish Joint Duty Requirements**

We are well on our way. The DNI has issued IC Directive 601, which establishes joint duty

experience as a prerequisite for promotion to most senior executive positions in the IC, identifies those positions in the ODNI and its various Centers that provide joint experience, and sets the terms and conditions for joint rotational assignments. The directive also ensures that individuals on joint assignment to another IC component are fairly considered for permanent promotions in their “home” agency through rigorous oversight and enforcement.

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*...“joint duty” will ensure our leaders, as well as our front line professionals, acquire the broader, enterprise-wide perspective essential to success in a net-centric world.*

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- **Identify Joint Duty Positions and Opportunities**

In addition, we have begun the process of identifying additional civilian positions

outside of the ODNI that may provide and/or require joint duty experience, based on criteria endorsed by the IC Leadership Committee. In consultation with the heads of IC components and their respective departments, the DNI will publish these positions; we will also establish a Web site for posting joint duty opportunities, both rotational and permanent, so employees will be able to apply and be considered for them. In addition, we will identify and accredit “joint” training and development course requirements to complement rotational assignments; together, joint duty and joint training will serve as integral and reinforcing parts of our overall professional and leadership development pipeline. These steps will be completed in FY 2006.

## Objective 3.4 Integrate Leadership Development

**Develop Leaders Jointly.** We need leaders who see the IC as a single enterprise, who are accountable for results, but who are also as concerned about means as ends... however, leaders like this do not happen by accident. One of our highest priorities must be an integrated IC leadership development system that produces a senior leadership corps embodying these qualities. Today, each IC element develops its own leaders, and these separate efforts yield suboptimum results... especially now, when “joint duty” will become a prerequisite for promotion to virtually all senior leadership positions in the IC (see Objective 3.3).

- **Provide an IC Leadership Development Roadmap**

We cannot leave leadership excellence to chance...it must be developed systematically across the IC. By FY 2007, working with the IC’s components and functional communities, we must establish a clear, “corporate” roadmap of assignments, courses, and other developmental experiences for those who will lead us. That template may allow for variations from one component to another (because of differences in mission, size, structure, etc.); moreover, most leadership training will still be provided by individual IC components. However, the DNI, through the Leadership Development Executive Council, must ensure that those separate efforts are integrated and aligned with our competency model; the courses and curricula they offer are grounded in an

IC-specific “enterprise” leadership philosophy derived from that model; and the courses the components deliver meet the highest standards of content and pedagogy.

- **Ensure Open Enrollment**

As a first step in FY 2006, all of the Community’s core leadership training courses must be available to any member of the IC. This will leverage our existing leadership development



capacity for maximum effect *and* complement the IC’s new “joint duty” requirement, breaking down inter-agency barriers as leaders from all across the Community learn together. And to ensure that this happens, we have already established a requirement that at least 25 percent of all spaces in a component’s core leadership development curriculum be reserved for attendees from other IC elements. NIU will identify those core courses, and by FY 2007, include them in a comprehensive, Web based IC course catalog, with the on-line registration and recordkeeping necessary to support this requirement.

## Objective 3.5 Foster a Senior National Intelligence “Service”

**Integrate Our Senior Services.** To realize the full potential of these interrelated efforts over the long term, the IC’s leaders must be treated as a single senior executive corps that integrates the separate senior services extant in the Community today: the Senior Executive Service, the Senior Intelligence Service, the Senior National Intelligence Service (SNIS), the Senior Foreign Service, the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service, the FBI/Drug Enforcement

- **Enable Greater Inter-Agency Executive Mobility**

In the interim (FY 2006), we must work with the IC components, their respective departments, and OPM to develop a master interchange agreement that allows individuals in one IC senior service to be non-competitively appointed to another such service; we also must look for every opportunity to bring the separate senior services together (the recent DNI policy on a common date for applying new Executive Schedule salary rates is one such example), under the leadership of the ODNI’s new Office of Senior Officer Management.



Administration Senior Executive Service, and their senior technical counterparts, such as Defense Intelligence Senior Level employees.

- **Grant Dual Commissions**

This fragmentation creates artificial barriers that unnecessarily impede inter-agency mobility (and the enterprise perspective that comes with it), and as long as these fissures exist, the integrating power of “jointness” will never be a reality. However, integrating our senior services under an SNIS need not come at the expense of the identity of its separate elements, some of which reach far beyond the Community. Rather, we believe it is not only possible, but also desirable for IC leaders to hold a “dual commission” in more than one senior service and in so doing, be able to move between such services with relative ease.

- **Establish a Common Leadership *Ethos***

The US military offers us a model for our future. Regardless of service, flag and general officers are bound by similar personnel policies, and their orientation has become more and more “purple” as a result of their joint duty — that shared experience engenders a common leadership ethos that diminishes service differences when it really matters. Between now and FY 2009, we have the opportunity to follow a similar path. All of the elements are being put in place: joint duty as a requirement for senior rank; a corporate set of leadership characteristics, embedded in common evaluation and promotion standards; performance agreements that will align the efforts of all the IC’s senior leaders with the NIS; an integrating IC leadership development system; and a Council of the Community’s most senior executives to oversee the implementation and integration of these initiatives.

# Conclusions, Caveats, and Next Steps

**Service as an Integrating Force.** As noted at the outset, this Five Year Strategic Human Capital Plan is intended to be bold and innovative, but entirely in keeping with the mandate given us by the President, Congress, and the American people. And while the notion of an overarching National Intelligence “Service” may have seemed a bridge too far at the beginning of this document, we believe the strategic agenda set forth herein leads inevitably and inexorably to such an

- **A “Net-Centric” Structure**

First, the DNI is not a department in the Executive Branch, but rather is an independent agency created to oversee intelligence activities that span the various cabinet-level departments and agencies. The DNI’s authorities provide for strategic and fiscal control over the other IC elements (as well as some control over leadership appointments), but these must co-exist with the

## STRATEGIC HUMAN CAPITAL PLAN

end-state...*without* compromising the interests and authorities of the separate agencies and their respective agencies and cabinet departments. Nothing could better serve the goal of integration, acting as a powerful force for bringing cohesion to the Community and its various components and employees. Thus, we stand by our vision and believe it represents the sum total of the goals and objectives set forth herein.

**Caveats and Challenges.** As noted, however, the Intelligence Community comprises 16 separate elements, 15 of which reside in six separate cabinet departments. Moreover, each department and IC element has historically operated more or less independently, especially with respect to their human resources. Thus, the execution of this Plan faces at least two unique challenges:

individual departmental and agency authorities that were not supplanted by the creation of the DNI. Thus, this plan is uniquely net-centric, cutting horizontally across organizational boundaries, relying more on the power of shared mission and values than formal authority to integrate the IC, and as such, this HC strategic plan cannot be compared to other, more traditional departmental HC plans.

- **Starting From Scratch**

Second, when it comes to the strategic management of the IC’s human capital, the DNI is starting from scratch. Its notional predecessor, the IC Community Management Staff, had virtually no staff devoted to this area, and while the Director of Central Intelligence

(DCI) issued a directive on human capital (DCI Directive 1/12) in December of 2004, its focus and impact were prospective. With the appointment of an IC Chief Human Capital Officer, a Chancellor for the newly-created National Intelligence University, and a Chief of Equal Employment Opportunity, along with their supporting staffs, the DNI has recognized the importance of human capital to the IC's mission...and its transformation.

**Next Steps: Alignment of Component Strategic HC Plans.** If that transformation is to be realized, the community requires more than this Plan. To achieve its ends, the DNI needs the commitment of every one of the IC's components and departments, their senior leaders and managers, and our employees and military members. This Plan is intended to be action-oriented, to demonstrate that we mean what we say, but given the unique relationship between the DNI and the elements of the IC, the heads of the IC components must follow suit. Accordingly, as a final objective for FY 2006, each component should develop (or as applicable, revise) its own strategic human capital plan to align with and enable this far-reaching agenda.

*. . . to achieve our goals,  
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our employees and  
military members.*

# Appendix:

## Developing the IC Strategic Human Capital Plan

In response to the mandate of the National Intelligence Strategy, the IC's Chief Human Capital Officers Council, comprising the CHCOs and equivalents from all of the IC's components and their respective departments, devised a multi-phased process to develop and deliver the first-ever IC Strategic Human Capital Plan to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). As outlined below, that strategic planning process was intensive and inclusive, engaging numerous stakeholders to ensure that the final result had the "buy in" necessary for successful execution.

- **Conceptual Approach**

Beginning in the summer of 2005, the IC CHCO established a small, multi-agency strategic planning cell made up of some of the most forward-thinking members of the IC's human capital community. Meeting weekly through the early fall of 2005 even as the NIS was being formulated, this cell sketched out a conceptual design for an inaugural IC-wide strategic human capital plan, as well as a phased (and broadly inclusive) process to take that concept to reality.

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*The IC CHCO established a small, multi-agency strategic planning cell made up of some of the most forward-thinking members of the IC's human capital community.*

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- **Strategic Planning Off-Site**

Central to that process was a strategic planning off-site for the IC CHCO Council. More than 25 Council members and staff met for two days in November 2005 to develop the consensus HC vision and goals set forth below, as well as a number of specific program and policy initiatives. The

Principal Deputy DNI (PDDNI) attended and provided an overarching strategic context for the session.

- **Special IC CHCO Council Session**

The results of the off-site were consolidated and summarized in a detailed briefing that was presented to a special session of the entire IC CHCO Council (including departmental representatives) in December 2005. The Hon. David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the US and a champion of HC strategic planning, participated in the session, providing valuable feedback to the IC members on our approach.

- **CHCO Council Drafting Teams**

Based on feedback from this plenary session, the Council divided itself into four small drafting teams (one for each of the four original strategic HC goals outlined in the briefing), each comprising a senior Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) staff member and one or more component and/or departmental



CHCOs and staff. In January 2006, these drafting teams met and prepared draft text for the Plan, as well as proposed metrics. Their input was consolidated by the IC CHCO staff and presented to the Council in its February 2006 meeting for final revisions.

- **External Review**

The Plan was reviewed by an external panel of independent experts convened by the ODNI's Office of Strategic Planning. It was also reviewed and assessed by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) against the human capital standards and requirements of the President's Management Agenda (PMA).

OPM is responsible for overseeing the Human Capital part of the PMA scorecard in relation to the standards identified in its Human Capital Assessment and Accountability Framework. OPM also evaluates Federal agencies on the efficacy of their strategic human capital plans. Feedback from both of these reviews has been incorporated in this final version.


- **Final Coordination**

The Plan was shared in draft with the CHCO Council for comment in March 2006. In addition, a two-page summary of the Plan, along with a list of all of its objectives, was also provided to the IC components for official comment. The Plan has also been briefed to other ODNI NIS plan "owners" to ensure appropriate connectivity as well as to senior component representatives. Once published, the Plan will be briefed to the IC Leadership Committee, the Joint IC Council Deputies, and other key IC stakeholders, including Members of Congress and staff, and IC employees and managers.

**Annual Evaluations, Status Reports, and Updates.**

This inaugural IC Five Year Strategic Human Capital Plan is intended to be a "living" document, regularly updated and revised to reflect changing IC and DNI priorities and requirements. At the end of each Fiscal Year (FY), beginning in FY 2006, the Council will provide an annual report on progress against the Plan's goals and objectives, as well as the various program milestones and metrics previously described, with any interim revisions to the Plan provided at that time. Every three years, coincident with the planning cycle for the National Intelligence Strategy, the Council will undertake a more comprehensive review of the Plan.

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