

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS: A NEW PARADIGM,
ANALYSIS TOOL, AND US AIR FORCE ROLE**

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ABSTRACT

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Today, the Department of Defense and Department of State have difficulty evaluating the degree of nation/state failure in its consideration for stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Could our nation be making a most basic error of trying to apply western-styled, “tried- and- tested-in-the-US” templates to every failed nation and state situation? Can a new paradigm be used to evaluate a nation/state’s social evolution? Can our nation apply new tools and resources to the task of failed nation/state reconstruction?

This paper proposes that discernable levels of societal progress or failure can be defined using a new model for evaluating levels of nation/state evolution. Combining this model with a newly presented concept called “centers of lift” may help determine the best approach in shaping stabilization and reconstruction missions. Carefully tailoring a stabilization and reconstruction mission to match the precise needs of the targeted failed nation/state will help ensure sustained success.

Finally, this paper asserts that the US Air Force is a national resource capable of organizing, training, and equipping its forces for the conduct of stabilization and reconstruction operations in the post-conflict environment. The US Air Force has all the fundamental trade and profession skills sets imbedded in current mission support roles.

STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS: A NEW PARADIGM, ANALYSIS TOOL, AND US AIR FORCE ROLE

The US Air Force, as with all branches of military service, is transforming. It is transforming, not merely as a result of congressionally mandated cuts to personnel or program budgets, but out of a necessity to retain relevancy in today's conflict environment. It has taken over a decade to reach this point, but legislative and defense policymakers have seen its approach since the end of the Cold War. In the intervening years, all of the services have force-fit much of their Cold War planning criteria onto the myriad of contingency operations. These have involved huge investments of taxpayers' money above and beyond the services approved budgets. The US Air Force in particular has struggled to defend its new state-of-the-art air superiority fighter in light of today's (and those of the foreseeable future) predominately asymmetric conflicts. Although the US Air Force is currently engaged throughout the world within the domains of air, space, and cyberspace, it struggles to find a contributory role in post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations.

The nation will always need to maintain a capability for gaining and keeping air superiority and the F-22 is unchallenged in that role. In the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, once air supremacy was attained, the US Air Force focus largely shifted to supporting allied army units in close air support, surveillance, reconnaissance, and airlift missions.¹ To support these missions, large numbers of US Air Force personnel duplicate the same roles performed at home station but as expeditionary wings in the heart of the conflict theater. When not planning, preparing, and launching aircraft for these supporting US Air Force missions, the vast majority of the expeditionary wing is involved in sustaining its own personnel and equipment. Today, the over-extended US Army conducts most stabilization and reconstruction missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is despite the fact that few if any of the specialties needed for these missions currently exist in the US Army's active ranks and those that do reside in reserve and guard units. Unlike the US Army, the US Air Force still maintains a large contingent of military support personnel whose missions are to run "cities" that they call air bases. Some functions are performed by civilian contractors, but the functional capability still remains in "blue suits" in numbers great enough to sustain demanding deployment rotations called Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) rotations. This paper proposes that these AEF missions be expanded to include stabilization and reconstruction type missions without detrimental impact to ongoing garrison operations. It is time to get serious about the how the future US Air Force will transform to remain relevant in the global war on terrorism.

First, a new paradigm is needed to understand post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction requirements of failed states and nations. Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of State (DoS) seemingly do not attempt to define the severity of a failed state or nation in its consideration for stabilization and reconstruction efforts. If the US military is still involved at all after the conflict phase of an operation, the tasked units deal with whatever faces them by adapting existing and additional forces as necessary. This approach is haphazard in both effectiveness and efficiency and in most cases results in great loss of resources through mismanagement and misapplication. In the worst of situations, it can even be detrimental to the recovering nation/state. The most basic error is what LTC Mike Moon, of the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, refers to as “the big mistake.” LTC Moon asserts that current US stabilization and reconstruction efforts try to apply western-styled, “tried-and-tested-in-the-US” templates to every failed nation/state situation. One of LTC Moon’s case studies is that of Iraq where the US Army Corp of Engineers has mounted a grand project building Iraq a new electrical power grid and distribution system. This project makes sense if it were to be applied to post recovery efforts of a major hurricane on the US coast. He contends, however, that it doesn’t make sense in a country which has never known, let alone built, maintained, and sustained a system of this magnitude. Yes, the Iraqi population had electrical power systems and a semblance of a distribution grid, but it was not universal throughout even heavily urbanized Iraq and it was only available (and free of charge) to Iraq’s elite. The rest of the country operated quite well on generator power that was privately owned, operated, and distributed, much like the early prairie cooperatives of the Midwestern America in the 1920s. This was neither a bad nor undesirable convention. It provided jobs for those who maintained the power generation equipment, distribution system and generated capital for its long-term sustainment. A US acceptance of this different standard of service is not an admission of failure on the part of a reconstructing force. It does recognize that all nations and states may be operating at different but discernable levels of progress in their economies and social structure development. And, it is fully acceptable to rebuild and reconstruct a failed state and nation to that pre-conflict level and not necessarily to an artificial level modeled after one’s own nation/state. This paper proposes that discernable levels of nation/state failure exist and can be modeled. Additionally, the missions of stabilizing and reconstructing forces can and must be carefully tailored to match the needs of the targeted failed nation/state and not to levels higher than their technologists, managers, and administrators can support in our absence.

Next, this paper presents a new approach to planning phase four and five operations, those of restoring stability and return to civilian governance. Current US Army doctrine focuses on Clausewitzian center-of-gravity (COG) analysis for all phases of an operation. But, predominately, the COG approach is used to develop plans for bringing an adversary to its knees by determining the strongest COG and defeating it. This paper offers that although this approach is useful during phases zero through three, phases four and five require a different perspective, that of how to rebuild a defeated adversary. And, this should be done by analyzing where a nation/state needs help to restore it to pre-conflict levels of governance and public services. What is needed is an analysis of its “centers of lift,” or those elements of diplomacy, information, military, economy, finance, intelligence, and law which need to be elevated and restored to strengthen the targeted nation/state.

Finally, this paper asserts that the US Air Force is a national resource capable of organizing, training, and equipping its forces to conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations in the post-conflict environment. The basic elements are already in place. The US Air Force has all the fundamental trade and profession skill sets imbedded in current mission support Air Force Specialty Codes. They perform these skill sets daily at US Air Force installations around the globe and are routinely evaluated in their proficiency to do so. They can operate in pseudo non-permissive environments and be self-protecting of personnel and equipment. They are currently in rotation throughout the world’s contingency operations, but by and large are restricted to missions involving the direct support of deployed US Air Force assets. In some locations they are not allowed off the confines of the protected installation and have no (or limited) interaction with local populations. These support personnel are experts in supporting infrastructure, i.e. roads, electrical generation and distribution, minor and major building construction, telephone systems, computer networks, radio systems, postal services, billeting, messing, personnel accountability, security, law enforcement, contracting, and all forms of logistics management. Coincidentally, these are the same areas of expertise needed by failed nation/states in varying degrees during the post-conflict operations phases of stabilization and reconstruction. The challenge is to analyze these skill sets and develop capability-oriented packages that can be tailored to the stabilization and reconstruction crisis at hand. A joint framework already exists to unit type code capabilities of all shapes and sizes. It is reasonably academic to create new unit type coded (UTC) packages to meet this new requirement. Once in hand, tasked US Air Force units can begin developing mission essential task lists based on performing their respective specialties at varying levels of required expertise. Once trained and equipped for this new mission role, they can act autonomously or be integrated into US Army

commands to conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations with very specific goals and objectives tailored to the crisis at hand. The US Air Force is currently optimized to support major operations overseas while still maintaining home base effectiveness through the AEF rotation process. This proposal merely redefines some of these overseas roles. By combining these new elements, a new paradigm for defining and modeling failed states and creating a new US Air Force mission to support reconstruction teams to recover failed states to predetermined levels of functionality, a new and effective tool is provided to national leadership to assist countries in crisis.

The military's relevance and contribution to post-hostility stabilization and reconstruction is well established. Then Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, asserted in 1947, "[U.S. policy's] purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist."² The US and allied armies of occupation thence contributed mightily to post World War II (WWII) reconstruction. This policy is echoed in the current US National Security Strategy document under the topics of conflict intervention and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction citing, "...[strong local institutions and governance are] critical to establishing the rule of law and a free market economy, which provide long-term stability and prosperity."³ Unfortunately, the military in this context is mentioned only as an enabler of stabilization and reconstruction, being needed to "stop bloody conflict."⁴ Likewise, in the current US National Military Strategy (NMS) document, stability operations are mentioned only as a "joint operating concept" under the military of objective preventing conflict and surprise attack. Here the NMS calls for the military to, "...[ensure] order, promote peace, and security or improve existing conditions." And, while stability operations are given this minor mention, reconstruction roles and responsibilities are omitted in toto.⁵ Although National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, clearly delineates responsibility to the Secretary of State, stability operations are, in reality, largely left to the doctrinal vagaries of the DoD and a host of international governmental and non-governmental organizations.⁶

These missions have been as varied as the operations which employed them. In Bosnia an initial North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) effort, in conjunction with the United Nations (UN) and the European Union, gradually brought a stabilized peace which many consider shaky even after ten years of effort.⁷ In Haiti, the US military handed over stabilization and reconstruction to the United Nations (UN) where Brazilian military forces are currently conducting stabilization operations.⁸ In Kosovo, the intervening UN/NATO forces left the

reconstruction of a decimated Kosovo infrastructure to the European Union.⁹ In Afghanistan, an initial US military presence, which overthrew the ruling Taliban government, is in the process of transition to NATO and a sixty-government international coalition support of the Karzai government for its own reconstruction efforts.¹⁰ In Iraq since 2003, the US Army Corp of Engineers has provided engineering and technical support to the US Agency for International Development, the State Department, and other military forces in rebuilding the infrastructure of war-torn Iraq.¹¹

A new paradigm is needed within the DoS and DoD, one that can be used to evaluate nation/states from a perspective of their evolutionary social and infrastructural maturation. As a minimum, this new paradigm model should be able to identify: (1) where a nation/state existed in its social and infrastructure development prior to conflict, (2) where that same nation/state exists in the same sense post conflict, and (3) what resources are needed to return the nation/state to a level of social structure and infrastructure to make it function again autonomously at pre-conflict levels, in effect, to get the nation/state back on track with its natural evolutionary path.

Lawrence E. Harrison in his book, *The Central Liberal Truth*, proposed that countries progress in governance, social justice, and prosperity in evolutionary steps based in part on their own respective historical experiences to include internal cultural experiences and external influences.¹² One could then surmise, if this natural evolution is interrupted, as with outside intervention with an internal civil war, very important defining moments of self-identity may be left unresolved, doomed to resurface in future conflict.

The US may be an example of this phenomenon. In its short history the US didn't instantaneously spring from the first landings at Plymouth Rock into fully fledged, European-styled cities, even with modern Europeans doing the building. The founders of Jamestown did not have a finished copy of the US Constitution in their vest pockets. European rule of law didn't instantly prevail over the newly settled western US territories. European civil wars of unity didn't preclude the US from having to experience its own. Imagine if President Lincoln had not taken the country to war to preserve the union and instead accepted the Confederate States succession? What would have become of the "house divided?" Would it have remained divided with slavery still intact? For how long and to what good purpose might have a divided county existed? Did the US have to experience its own indigenous populations ethnic cleansing and evolutionary human rights struggles? It could be said that the US had to endure and grow through these and many other experiences first hand to ultimately arrive at its current state of evolution, even when other state's lessons learned were readily available to her. It is a mistake

to assume that all nations must or can instantaneously achieve parity with the highest common denominator in social maturation.

Noted bio-geologist, Jared Diamond, in his book, *Guns, Germs and Steel*, acknowledges that although cultural anthropologists attempt to define stages of evolutionary development, they are “doubly doomed to imperfection.”¹³ Nonetheless, he finds it useful to use four categories of evolution when comparing societies, those being: the band, the tribe, the chiefdom, and the state.¹⁴ Diamond’s work focuses on the environmental factors that contribute to societal evolution. The following presentation does not address why nations evolve but only asserts that they do. As such, the categories defined and modeled are purely from observation rather than rigorous scientific explanation.

The New Paradigm

The new paradigm is not really new at all but is derived from noted psychologist Abraham Maslow in his 1943 treatise, *A Theory of Human Motivation*, from which his Hierarchy of Needs Pyramid is derived.¹⁵ An interesting observation can be made of the parallelism between Maslow’s levels of human needs and the concept of nation/state evolution. Beginning with a quick summary of Maslow’s theory, one finds that individuals exist psychologically and physiologically within defined “levels of need.” These levels can be visualized in the form of a pyramid divided into levels. The significance of the pyramid is that the higher you go on a pyramidal level, the more highly you have evolved in terms of physical and mental well-being. From the bottom to the top, these levels are physiological, safety, love and belonging, status and esteem, and actualization (Figure 1).¹⁶ This model is already widely known throughout social scientist and managerial circles and should be familiar to the reader. If not, the reader is referred to any number of references cited in this paper or through other academic search engines.

If one applies a theoretical transform to Maslow’s famed pyramidal levels for individual development, an equivalent hierarchy emerges for describing the developmental levels of groups and communities growing into nations and states. The proposed transform maps Maslow’s hierarchy somewhat intuitively as there has been no formal studies to prove its validity. Still, there is an innate fit between the way individuals interact with their environment that extrapolates nicely into how groups, communities, and nations react to their collective environments. They even fit nicely into equivalent number and ranking of Maslow’s pyramid levels. The transform gives us new names for Maslow’s levels as they apply to groups, communities, and nation/states. Beginning from the base of the pyramid, these new levels are:

competition for resources, ensuring security, perpetuating communal integrity, gaining power and prestige, and advancing ideologies.

The following will describe this theoretical transform in depth and lead the reader to compare Maslow's hierarchical levels of need to distinct levels of hierarchical evolutionary development of a nation/state. It is not meant as the definitive standard applicable to all situations. It is, however, presented as a template that DoD and DoS stabilization and reconstruction planners can use to help define the level to which a nation/state must be restored. Thus, the planner can organize, train, equip, and task the appropriate task force for the mission. The comparison between these two models is obvious at some levels and more intuitive at others. A comparison discussion follows and is illustrated using Figure 1.




Figure 1.

Maslow's first level of needs, that of physiological, deals the human's basic sustenance needs for survival (i.e. food, water, and shelter).¹⁷ Without these, basic viability is at stake. A disparate people can likewise find themselves facing the same viability challenges at their most basic level of organization as a group or community. Sustenance, at this basic level of group and community, can be defined as resources needed to support not the just the individual (as with Maslow's model) but families and relatives and, in a slightly wider sense, neighbors. These resources are needed to satisfy the physiological needs of a people just as they are the person. A process is required even at this basic level of organization to ensure the resources are secured, processed, and distributed for survival only. Little thought is wasted beyond meeting basic needs of food and shelter for family and friend. If placed in competition, an agenda or strategy of securing these resources will naturally ensue at Maslow's individual level, as well as

the family and neighbors level of nation/state development. If not satisfied, this lack of meeting basic survival needs can lead to conflict internal and external to the group or community.

An intervening US stabilization and reconstruction force finding a nation/state at this level of development need not concern itself with building superhighways and grand communications infrastructures. Teams would, however, need to address basic food and water supply and distribution issues to stem any famine and disease and to attend to those already affected. Dietitians would be needed to evaluate nutritional value of available foods and be ready to determine needed supplements. Medical personnel would analyze water quality and recommend purification systems as needed to augment polluted wells and reservoirs. Medical personnel would also evaluate existing medical facilities for adequacy of equipment, medicines, and staffing. Engineers would need to evaluate methods and processes for storing food and medical supplies to prevent spoilage of each. Basic refrigeration requirements and dry storage facilities would be evaluated. Transportation infrastructure would likewise be checked for adequacy in distributing essential resources. This would include a survey of adequate road, water-ways and rail systems (if used). Communications experts would seek to restore, if necessary, basic telephone and network infrastructure, as well as postal services. If none existed, basic emergency radio systems would be constructed where possible. Personnel experts would evaluate the numbers and status of refugees and organize family reunification centers. Contracting and finance experts would execute basic contracts for services needed to facilitate refuse pickup and removal, food, fuel and potable water transportation and distribution. Security teams would provide elementary security and protection from criminal elements preying on the populous.

In situations where this level is encountered, stabilization and reconstruction teams would expect to provide organizational leadership and services in a predominately permissive environment. The recent tsunami relief efforts in Indonesia and other disaster relief efforts depict this level of effort and expectation needed to restore basic levels of sustenance. Massive efforts may be needed in third-world countries after such a catastrophic disaster or other natural event such as famines, drought, and disease epidemic. In more developed countries, where basic restorative services exist, teams may only need to augment existing relief efforts with emergency airlift of supplies and transportation of injured, special medical teams with expertise in disease control and containment, or specialized search and rescue teams equipped with sophisticated imaging equipment and special canine teams to search collapsed buildings after an earthquake or flood.

In Maslow's hierarchy, when an individual is able to satisfy physiological needs, the next need level motivator becomes that of "safety and security." As with Maslow's pyramid, after a group or community satisfies their basic sustenance resource needs the next evolutionary motivator becomes safety and security as well. At this level, Maslow's individual sought protection against entities that might harm him or threaten his possessions.¹⁸ This is almost a direct map into the hierarchical evolution of groups and communities. Once a group or community is no longer primarily concerned with finding and sustaining food and shelter, their new motivation becomes keeping their resources from others who may seek to take them through coercion and protecting them from environmental challenges as well. Again, if this motivation is not fulfilled, the lack of meeting safety and security can lead to conflict internal and external to the group or community. The reader will note that the dominant actors at this level are groups and communities. This is not to say nations or states could not fail or collapse to this level. It is merely to define the level of motivation in the hierarchy. That is to say it could just as easily describe the level attained during de-evolution as it could evolution of present day nation/states.

Let us now consider the areas of concern a US stabilization and reconstruction team should consider during missions at a group or community operating at this level. Hopefully, they would not be devoting resources to developing a constitutional or parliamentary government. Teams would, however, need to address long-term protection of indigenous resources, transportation systems, rural and urban habitats, and formalize health resources and facilities to basically preserve the level of sustenance attained at the first developmental hierarchy level. Security teams would provide elementary security and protection from criminal elements while reconstituting or training local law enforcement to do the same. Engineers would evaluate adequacy of long-term housing, rail, road, and waterway systems with special regard to suitability in handling climatic changes. Transportation infrastructure would be optimized for sustained efficiencies in distributing essential resources. Communications experts would seek robust basic communications infrastructure and grow local maintenance and management capabilities. Personnel experts would begin census activities to determine demographic distributions with social impacts, e.g. identifying clans, families, or tribes of social relevance. Contracting and finance experts would begin promotion of small business activities to employ and involve the local population in providing basic community services. Medical personnel would establish local clinics and assist hospitals with aspects of hospital administration and patient care.

In situations where this level is encountered, stabilization and reconstruction teams would expect to provide organizational leadership and services in a quasi permissive environment. More often than not, groups and communities have resorted to some level of competitive conflict that resulted in their current level of stabilization and reconstruction need. As such, teams can expect the same level of service requirements as found with the first level with the exception that more robust security measures may be required to ensure the safety of operations personnel and the security of materials and supply from looting and hijacking. This may take additional work with local political and religious leadership to ensure hostilities do not interfere with stabilization and reconstruction activities.

While the learned theorist would abandon any further comparison of nation/state evolution to Maslow's Needs Pyramid at the next level of "love and belonging,"¹⁹ the hapless novice soldiers on. True, nation/states seldom require love to be fulfilled or assistance in finding it from others. However, a consideration may be made for the case of groups and communities, for Maslow's needs level of "love and belonging"²⁰ comparatively equates to the evolutionary level of perpetuating communal integrity. To further bring these levels into alignment, one must expand Maslow's term of "love" beyond its limited English use and connotation. To do so, it is better to convey the meaning of this word using the Greek form, *Philia*, the virtuous love of Aristotle.²¹ This is the love in and between groups and communities that binds them in unifying traditions or religion strong enough to evoke the motivation for preserving and perpetuating the integrity of a communal group. It is the first solid evolutionary steps of disparate groups and communities to nationhood. Possibly no stronger example of this exists beyond that of the Hebrew Nation. Their communal bonds have run unbroken for literally thousands of years. Along with the ubiquitous safety and security motivations that have spawned numerous wars throughout their existence, in the last century alone this *Philia* love and need for communal belonging led to their ultimate formation as a state.²² In contrast to this unifying example, the Balkan wars, since the fall of the Soviet influence on the area, has been exemplary of how communal forces can split a state apart and regress it back to this nation level. As such, this level brings a plethora of new influences and cultural nuances that stabilization and reconstruction teams will encounter and must consider in any plans to provide assistance.

In formulating action plans at this level of nation/state development, it is imperative that stabilization and restoration team leadership fully engage with communal leadership before jumping into any assistance activities. The cultural landscape must be fully understood to include grasping the current relationships between communal groups, being knowledgeable of historic biases between groups and for or against the West, and understanding religious and

other tribal or community traditions. As such, it may not be prudent for civil engineering teams to place control of power generating equipment in the hands of one group that has communal biases against another group being serviced. Medical and lodging teams must be cautious of the arrangements for bedding patients and housing members of opposing groups so as not to incite actions of retribution. Security teams must consider keeping burgeoning police forces from becoming militia arms of any single or majority group. Communications, contracting, and other general infrastructure teams must ensure services and contracts are distributed equally between conflicting groups and not to the elite only. This layer of additional considerations at the preserving communal integrity level of nation/state evolution is paramount if restoration and stabilization activities are to be successful and not result in further aggravation of communal disputes and violence. Within all restoration and stabilization teams, strong language and cultural understanding skills are a must.

Recent examples of external intervention at this level of nation/state evolution must include the previously mentioned Balkan conflict. The communal Philia and belonging that separated the indigenous groups and communities of Bosnian and Kosovo Muslims and Eastern Orthodox Christians certainly led to a long and bloody conflict. Tito had played an important role in leveraging or controlling this needs level and sustained a modicum of stability within the former Yugoslavia. After the eventual demise of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, it was this motivation and corresponding need level that regenerated an environment ultimately leading to war between the communal factions.²³ UN security forces attempting to protect food convoys often found themselves steeped in accusations of favoritism between the factions. The centuries of conflict and other historical influences in the region were little understood and not incorporated into relief activities, which largely negated their effectiveness due to perceptions of inequitable distribution of resources and protection of communal groups. Likewise, the US in Iraq faces identical issues of communal violence in the form of sectarian conflict between Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish populations. Perceptions and realities of unequal power and resource sharing, historical hatreds spawned in atrocities committed across all factions, and distrust from cultural mistakes made by US teams have largely negated stabilization and restoration activities. The same situation will be experienced in Sudan should US forces engage in their communal civil war. Again, stabilization and restoration teams must be solidly grounded in knowledge of cultural histories and language to be effective in restoration and stabilization activities at this volatile level of nation/state evolution.

Maslow's "love and belonging" needs and corresponding communal perpetuation level can quickly, if not seamlessly, evolve into the next levels of "status and esteem" and its

corresponding motivation level of gaining state power and prestige.²⁴ At this nation/state evolution level, self-serving nations seek to expand their influence and recognition. In today's nation/state system, this can only be achieved through achieving state status and joining the club of 192 internationally acknowledged sovereignties. This brings with it still more complications to the intervening stabilization and reconstruction effort should one be necessary within a state. In addition to the complications of all the lower levels so far discussed, now the stabilization and restoration team must also take into consideration substantial influence of governments with potentially effective or disaffected forms of legislative, judicial and executive influences, totalitarian cronies, political parties, defense forces and/or impromptu militias, guerrilla forces, resistance fighters, and existing law enforcement. The intervening stabilization and restoration team cannot simply waltz into this level of state development and try to ignore or overrule these social structures. On the contrary, these entities must be diplomatically cajoled into cooperation if stabilization and reconstruction are to be effective.

Stabilization and reconstruction teams must seek to first win trust and acceptance into the existing social structures. This requires careful analysis of which social structures mentioned are still in existence, are still effective, and how best to imbed restoration and stabilization team expertise into each. In this level of intervention, most basic services and infrastructure are, or have been, in existence as well. The restoration and stabilization team's goal will be to advise and resource the indigenous capabilities to affect their own stabilizing and restorative activities. As such, civil engineering teams will imbed and advise local community or national-level service providers of power, water, and transportation. Communications experts will likewise partner with local or national service providers of telephony, radio, and data networks and postal services. Security experts will join up with law enforcement and military defense entities helping to secure populated and outlying areas, as well as securing borders and sea and airports from potential adversarial advantage. Additional expertise in anti-insurgency techniques (those designed to prevent insurgency vice counter it) may be required to constructively engage resistance movements. All stabilization and restoration teams would endeavor to focus their efforts towards supporting and strengthening the effectiveness of the legitimate central government for continued service-level support to the population.

Examples of this type and level of intervention would be activities involving nations on the verge of sovereign state recognition such as the Kurds of Northern Iraq and Southeastern Turkey²⁵ and potential activities within Bangladesh,²⁶ and in the continued insurgency situation in the Iraqi civil war for tribal dominance.²⁷ When dealing with established states at this level, Lebanon's fractured political landscape comes to mind, as well as possible future regime

collapses in Syria and Pakistan. In the latter, the additional complication of existing nuclear weapons will add the necessity of having nuclear safety engineers to the restoration and stabilization team. Here the teams must be mindful of the motivations for power and prestige in a world. The motivation for political power and national prestige, the overwhelming desire to be respected, acknowledged, and considered an equal among other nations, nuclear or not, will continue to overshadow more conventional attempts to “simply” provide stabilization and reconstruction assistance to a failing state.

When states fully mature, that is to say, when they are fully functioning states that can provide adequately for their populations, control communal strife, and are comfortable in their status within international circles, they emerge at the acme of the nation/state evolution pyramid. Most continue evolving within this level at rates commensurate with their ability to source growth through social and economic stability and ability to reform. A few states may be driven by ideologies and lose their momentum of evolution. Where ideologies rule, these states seem to possess the highest propensity for ineptitude at providing for their populations. They also seem to fall into two categories: the ideologically blinded or mad. A fine line separates the two. The ideological blind seem to blithely ignore even the most basic needs of their states and instead pursue their ideology over pragmatism. In some cases this may take the form of religious moratoriums on modern medical treatments over basic health necessities. They may enforce prohibitions of using certain existing natural resources in deference to preserving ancient traditions. The ideologically mad sees the world through creative but irrational lenses. They deal in extravagance and corruption usually at the expense of the masses. And most dangerously, they may be driven into internal or external conflict driven by an inner skewed ideological calling, again, usually at the expense and detriment of their own population's welfare. At its best, this level can manifest as a deep sense of social or religious duty to interfere with others. At its worse, it can foster a fatalist's sense of destiny and ideological progression using suicidal actors (beyond those described by Robert Pape in his book, *Dying to Win*, where he attributes most suicidal actors' motives as those of resisting occupation or territorial aggrandizement).²⁸ Both act in full self-confidence that they are only responding to their respective superseding ideologies. If the state is one of the two extremes, ideologically blinded or mad, stabilization and reconstruction teams must exercise extreme caution. They must take into account that reciprocal actions of good will and good relations may not be forthcoming, that cooperation may quickly turn to confrontation, that having solid combatant and non-combatant evacuation plans is prudent.

In some ways, stabilization and reconstruction teams operating at this level of the nation/state pyramid face the hardest challenges as they are almost purely diplomacy driven. Teams would be small with senior officers and civilians with vast experience in the culture and language of the subject state. They would normally be operating in states that have formally invited them. Their main objective would be to sell ideas on ways to improve services to the population. Where requested, they would arrange for more expertise and resources to accomplish specific tasks. The team's main output would be information and knowledge on a narrow range of topics of interest to the supported state leadership. Their association with the supported state would be assumed long term. It could be characterized by military-to-military cooperative agreements, mutual defense treaties, trade arrangements, economic and financial incentives, and other elements of diplomacy.

Obviously, the reader can surmise which nation/states can be categorized at this level. Most of Europe, the United Kingdom, Canada, Russia, most Central and South American states except where noted, China, Australia, and the burgeoning Balkans fall into the first category of somewhat healthy and functioning States. Maybe not so obvious are those which fall into the second category of ideologically blinded or mad. Here one would most certainly include North Korea, Syria, and possibly Pakistan and India. Most of the Middle Eastern states, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan, and even Israel are borderline ideology driven as well.

The US must learn to discriminate between these five levels of nation/state maturation or evolution in its application of international assistance and involvement. It is needed to meaningfully define requirements and thus contribute to stabilizing and reconstructing other groups, communities, and nation/states. It must recognize that even long-established nation/states might descend these pyramid levels and thus dictate specific stabilization and reconstruction team composition and activities. An objective approach of this kind would go a long way towards dispelling the perception that the US often imposes a double standard of only helping burgeoning democracies except where it suits US interests to do otherwise. Through strategic communications at the UN and unilateral levels, the US should make known that this model, or others like it, alone drives US interventions of stabilization and reconstruction.


Center-of-Lift Analysis

Now that we have a new approach to modeling nation/states for the determination of the state of state evolution, we next need to develop a new tool to know how best to apply our stabilization and reconstruction skills during phase four and five operations. Current US Army doctrine focuses on Clausewitzian “center-of-gravity” analysis for all phases of an operation.

This works very well when applied to plans designed to bring an adversary to its knees. Careful analysis of an adversary can produce critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities that can be turned into decisive points of operational lines designed to efficiently and effectively defeat an enemy.²⁹ This paper offers that although this approach is useful during phases zero through three, phases four and five require a different perspective, that of how to rebuild a defeated adversary. This should be done by means of analysis of where a nation/state needs assistance in restoring it to its pre-conflict levels of governance and public services. A mirror approach to “center-of-gravity” analysis is required, that of “center-of-lift.” Instead of analyzing an adversary’s elements of diplomacy, information, military, economy, finance, intelligence, and law for strengths to be exploited, center-of-lift analysis will examine a defeated or failed state for these same elements for weaknesses that need to be elevated and restored. A nation/state functioning at pre-conflict levels of evolutionary development is the goal. The simple graphic of the determination of center of lift for an airplane’s wing airfoil describes this approach (Figure 2).

This model follows the characteristics of modern airfoil analysis. The shape or profile of the airfoil helps determine the desired flight characteristics. In our model, the shape or profile of a stabilization and reconstruction program likewise determines the characteristics and the effectiveness and efficiency of post-conflict recovery progress. The airfoil uses camber, chord, and thickness to determine flight characteristics. Our profile uses diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic variables to shape the response curve of our stabilization and reconstruction program. Not all wing airfoils are designed to go fast. Some are designed for maximum lift at low airspeeds. Likewise, stabilization and reconstruction programs should be tailored or shaped to meet the desired progress characteristics of the targeted state. Some will be ready for fast, streamlined programs while others will need maximum assistance but at a much slower pace.

Wing airfoils are acted upon by the external forces of thrust, drag, and sink. Lift and thrust are enablers of flight, while drag and sink (gravity) work against the enablers. In our model, thrust equates to enabling factors of security, internal and external financial aid, international and domestic public support of programs, open and truthful information sharing, and rule of law for the protection of life and property.



“Center-of-Lift” Analysis Model

Figure 2.

Drag in our model characterized by factors that work against progress. In airfoils drag increases as thrust and lift increase. Other drag, called parasitic drag, is a constant associated with skin resistance and geometry of the wing. In our model, the variable drag consists of active elements of insurgency, resistance movements, crime, and civil war. External, negative influences from adversarial states can also impact progress. Just as the airfoil’s “induced drag” increases with forward air speed, so do the active elements mentioned increase their “drag” activities with forward program progress. The airfoil’s “parasitic drag” (the natural resistance to the relative wind due to surface resistance and non-streamlined structures), is translated into terms of cultural influences that are counterproductive to progress, gender biases, and religious counterpoises and technical constraints are some examples. The latter can be considered static elements or constants that still must be overcome to sustain progress.

The pull of gravity is a constant that works passively but invariably counter to our lift vector. Certain population demographics, such as education and technical skill deficits, tend to act as constants that must be overcome to achieve social progress. The environmental and

geographical constraints of inadequate water supplies, arid land, severe climates, and lack of sea ports, are sometimes immutable constants that impede progress.

When thrust and lift overcome drag and sink the resulting lift-thrust vector produces forward flight. Likewise, when effective stabilization and reconstruction programs overcome “drag” activities and population, environmental, and geographical constraints, forward progress is made in a society. The key to center-of-lift analysis at this point is to determine the drag and sink components along with their relative negative impacts and to counter these with specifically targeted programs of thrust and lift that will result in forward progress, commensurate with their level of state evolution.

A New US Air Force Mission

Offered now is a proposed means of accomplishing stabilization and reconstruction operations beyond those employed by Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) currently operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to Russel L. Honre and David V. Boslego in their Joint Force Quarterly article, *Forging Provincial Reconstruction Teams*, current PRTs were created to extend the reach of the supported governments to “monitor, assess, and report on developments” within their assigned regions. They consist of predominately US Army civil affairs personnel supported by technologists and exemplified by police advisers, information operators, civil engineers, and explosive ordinance experts from the US Army and sister services.³⁰ Where these teams have taken an advisory approach to stabilizing governance and public services, the proposed approach puts these teams on steroids and makes them much more robust and involved with the supported population. With little modification to training and organization, the US Air Force is currently postured with most of the resources to step up to this task.

But, why the US Air Force? And, if not the US Army, why not the State Department or other Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) including UN support? The answer is almost academic. These other non-military organizations are not organized, trained, or equipped to operate in non-permissive and overtly hostile environments. Many NGOs and several UN participants have withdrawn their presence from Iraq for just this reason.³¹ They were not prepared to place their operatives in harm's way for long-term efforts in order to accomplish their stabilization and reconstruction efforts. The US Air Force is uniquely postured in manpower, technical skills, and materials in today's military environment to take on these missions.

First, the US Air Force is self-protecting. Unlike NGO and most UN participants, US Air Force personnel are traditionally trained in combat arms, self-aid and buddy care, law of armed conflict, and are even currently augmenting the US Army in convoy protection duties and other “in lieu of” augmentation to the land component forces.³² US Air Force specialties have always dovetailed into US Army operations at the tactical level of operations. This has been found mostly in terminal air control units assigned to US Army corps, division, brigade, and battalion levels. Additionally, the US Air Force has recently expanded its basic training curriculum by two weeks adding basic combat skills training to more closely match traditional US Army infantry tactics, techniques, and procedures. For airmen already in the field, nearly every operational wing has included combat skills training into their pre-deployment preparations for air expeditionary force rotations.³³

Secondly, the US Air Force currently possesses most of the requisite skills sets to conduct stabilizing and reconstructing missions. The typical mission support group (MSG), on any given US Air Force installation, consists of the very specialties needed to conduct these missions even in the most devastated infrastructure settings. These groups are organized into seven specialty squadrons of civil engineering, communications and information, security forces, services, contracting support, logistics support, and personnel services. If assigned the new role of stabilization and reconstruction operations, their missions would most likely include the planning, organizing, directing, and controlling needed to restore or build basic infrastructure.

Thirdly, looking at each of these functional areas individually provides a complete picture of capabilities these squadrons can bring to stabilization and reconstruction operations. The civil engineering squadron has plumbers, structural engineers, electricians, roads repairers, general construction contractors, water treatment technicians, and well diggers. Their focus would be to ensure adequate shelter for the population and the renewal of facilities for commercial enterprises. The communications and information squadron has expertise in all things radio, telephone, and computer systems. They can restore or build basic telecommunications systems vital for emergency services, commercial businesses, and private homes. The security forces squadron has expertise in both security and law enforcement; both would be needed for the resumption of stabilization and reconstruction operations. Lodging, messing, and recreation activities are the specialty of the US Air Force services squadron. These functions would be vital to addressing the needs of the refugee, displaced and homeless populations that always accompany the aftermath of war. The contracting squadron brings personnel versed in gathering requirements and translating these into the drafting, bidding, awarding, and monitoring of local contracts. This has a twofold benefit, that of leveraging local

resources for the stabilization and reconstruction operation effort and providing employment opportunities to the indigenous population. To manage local supplies and transportation requirements, look to the logistics squadron. Their US Air Force processes of managing supply warehouses, bulk fuels, and transportation fleets translate easily to food, medical, heating fuel, gasoline, vehicles and other emergency-type items needed to set up and sustain a community. Lastly, the US Air Force personnel squadron is trained and equipped to be human resource managers. They could track populations reuniting families, account for refugees and displaced populations located in temporary shelters. They could register local professional and trades persons for efficient utilization of their abilities in reconstruction efforts.

But are not these resources available for stabilization and reconstruction operations already? The surprising answer is, "Well, kind of." The US Air Force is organized for deployment operations using a logistical entity called the "unit type code" or UTC. A UTC consists of either personnel or equipment or both, depending on the mission it is designed to support in the deployed environment. UTCs are categorized by capability, but these categories largely emulate the roles and responsibilities of the respective squadron functions as they are performed at home base. As such, UTCs are normally designed to support air bases, either building air bases from scratch or by partitioning the UTCs into packages that augment existing host air base operations. The mechanics of changing UTCs to stabilization and reconstruction operations are relatively simple but require elemental changes to current institutional US Air Force processes.

To create UTCs in support of stabilization and reconstruction operations is first a matter of changing the US Air Force culture away from traditional air base support activities to those of stabilization and reconstruction operations. This is an organizational culture steeped in artifacts as described by Edgar Schein.³⁴ Today, the US Air Force's traditional role for the wing-level MSG is air base support, either in garrison or deployed. Their training is geared towards this mission and their planners are steeped in the same traditional concepts. The artifacts that must be challenged include our tried and true Joint Operations Planning and Execution System. Again this artifact and its associated product the Time Phase Force Deployment Database (TPFDD) are legacies of the Cold War days of deliberate planning enabling the US to transport massive amounts of personnel and material from the US to Europe in the advent of WW III. So inflexible is this system that the TPFDD in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom was dismissed by the Defense Secretary.³⁵ A new adaptive planning system is required that is flexible enough to shape and execute a military response that matches the nations requirements. One of those

flexibility options should be the ability to task trained and equipped US Air Force mission support units to conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Part of this transformation must spring from LTG (Ret) David Barno's inverted pyramid construct of the levels of war and the traditional emphasis placed on each level. LTG Barno observes that the preponderance of military thought since the Viet Nam War has been concentrated at the tactical level with disproportionately small regard/resources devoted to the higher pyramidal levels: operational and strategic/political. To the contrary, he asserts that the insurgents' paradigm of the levels of war pyramid places the highest importance and nearly the whole of their limited resources with the highest levels of the pyramid: strategic and political.³⁶ US Air Force leadership must also transform its paradigm from emphasis that concentrates intellectual and institutional efforts at the tactical and operational level to that of approaching today's military challenges with emphasis at the strategic perspective of applying existing force structure in non-traditional roles. Not only will this keep the US Air Force relevant in an environment weakly challenged in air and space dominance, but will also significantly contribute to the global war on terrorism in an efficient and, more importantly, effective manner.

LTC (Ret) Conrad C. Crane, in his article, *Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won*, identified the need to form specialized peacekeeping units and to create multipurpose units with adjusted mission essential task lists to meet the unique missions of phase IV operations.³⁷ Within this new US Air Force construct, MSGs would be tasked to support stabilization and reconstruction operations through newly tasked UTCs. Furthermore, these UTCs could be tailored to match the requirements of the supported environment. They would be tasked through the AF AEF Center just as they are now for other UTCs. Once in-country, they would "chop" and report to either the Department of State or Defense entity given overall responsibility for stabilization and reconstruction. They would most effectively imbed their resources within the supported community and work closely with the local population government and trades. Their ultimate mission would be to revive, restore, or establish (as required) an environment capable of sustaining a safe, secure, and functioning infrastructure which in turn can sustain economic recovery within the frame work of free market forces. The AF AEF Center would establish rotation policy to sustain required operations until released by their supported military command or state agency.

Long established US government policies have supported stabilization and reconstruction as a way to sustain the peace once won. The US Air Force currently possesses the necessary resources to affect these missions. A transforming mindset that allows AF leaders the ability to

refocus on strategic/political realities will be free to transform its roles and missions in support of stabilization and reconstruction of failed societies.

Conclusion

The Department of Defense and Department of State need not have difficulty categorizing a failed state or nation in its consideration for stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Our nation should avoid trying to apply western-style reconstruction templates to every failed nation/state situation. One effective modeling tool based on Maslow's hierarchy of needs could help categorize how nation/states operate at different but discernable levels of progress in their economies and social structure development. Using this model and other tools such as the presented "center-of-lift" analysis, it is acceptable to reconstruct a failed nation/state to its pre-conflict level of development. And finally, our nation has untapped resources available in the US Air Force that could be applied to the task of failed nation/state reconstruction.

This paper proposed that discernable levels of societal progress or failure can be defined using a new model for categorizing levels of nation/state evolution. By combining this model with our new center-of-lift concept, an objective analysis may help determine the best approach in shaping stabilization and reconstruction missions. Carefully tailoring a stabilization and reconstruction mission to match the precise needs of the targeted failed nation/state (and not to levels higher than their technologists, managers, and administrators can support) will help ensure sustained success.

The US Air Force is a national resource capable of organizing, training, and equipping its forces for the conduct of stabilization and reconstruction operations in the post-conflict environment. The US Air Force has all the fundamental trade and profession skills sets imbedded in current mission support roles. They can operate in non-permissive environments and are currently in rotation already throughout the world's contingency operations. These support personnel are experts in restoring and stabilizing infrastructure.

By combining the elements of a new paradigm for defining and modeling failed states, conducting center-of-lift analysis, and creating new US Air Force mission UTCs to support stabilization and reconstruction teams, failed nation/states can be stabilized and restored to predetermined levels of functionality. Used as prevention or remedy, this new approach provides US national leadership a much-needed tool for assisting countries in crisis.

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